

The Marine Attaché

Enabling the DIRINT's vision and the MOC as a strategic enabler

by Maj Derek A. Filipe

In August 2017, Mark Pomerleau published an article in *C&ISRNET* outlining the newly appointed Director of Marine Corps Intelligence (DIRINT), BGen Dimitri Henry's three core capabilities required for the "battlefield of the future,"¹ announced at the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System Worldwide Conference. Although the DIRINT's speech focused on industry, academia, and technology to achieve the three core capabilities, a more holistic and inclusive approach to the problem set lies within the current resources and structure of our beloved Corps, as evident in the DIRINT's letter "MCISRE: Driving Change," published in the September 2017 edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*.²

In the July 2016 edition of the *Gazette*, LtCol Frank Chawk and Capt Daniel Vassar authored a well-written and accurate description of the Marine Attaché (MARA) Program, published prior to the *Marine Corps Operating Concept (MOC)* of September 2016. This article will demonstrate how MARAs already enable the DIRINT's vision and the MOC by reviewing each core capability in detail, providing a theoretical scenario delineating the ideal placement of a MARA following the DIRINT's Embassy tour, and offering/identifying potential courses of action (COAs) to increase the quality and utility of the MARA and the MARA Program writ large. If utilized properly, MARAs not only enhance the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE) but are also paramount to answering critical tasks and issue areas within the MOC. The positive impact of MARAs throughout the MCISRE and on strategic decision makers will allow for more informed decisions on the

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employment and deployment of forces, as well as which type of forces to deploy (not only kinetic versus non-kinetic but also task organization), and maximize the effectiveness of organic observation and collection assets focused on a specific problem set.

The DIRINT identified an "agile network," "resiliency and data integrity," and "redundancy" as the necessary tools required for the success of the MCISRE. Similarly, the MOC described information as a weapon and identified

globally networked and information-enabled populations [that] now react to viral versions of events and ideas moving at the speed of the internet, complicating our ability to gain and maintain an accurate, up-to-date, intelligence-driven understanding of conflicts.³

In "MCISRE: Driving Change," the DIRINT wrote, "Our primary mission remains support to operational decision-makers through the integration of data, information, and intelligence."⁴ Both the MOC and the DIRINT's vision require Marines to "take actions that *inform, promote, coerce, dissuade, convince, compel, deceive, mask, and intimidate*."⁵ The thought-provoked determination of a MARA's follow-on assignment can tremendously increase support to strategic-level decision makers if the assignment places a MARA on an operational staff close to senior leaders and decision makers—and this would prove invaluable to the mission. Detailed below are direct traces of the DIRINT's three core capabilities to the

MOC's critical tasks (delineated into issue areas), coupled with how MARAs fulfill these obligations.

The "Agile Network" traces to the MOC's "Evolve the MAGTF" critical task. MARAs are nodes in the MCISRE, extending the reach of the enterprise/network and able to make the network more agile via the enterprise operations center (EOC), Defense Attaché Service (DAS), and relevant geographic combatant command (COCOM). The EOC is the service-level intelligence center with a global integration mission and, via the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), is the hub and "fixed site" of the MCISRE. As the hub of the enterprise, MCIA provides intelligence to the Marine Corps' Operating Forces, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and allied partners. As the "fixed site" of the MCISRE, MCIA is the conduit for national-to-tactical integration, as detailed in Figure 1 from MCIA.

Currently, 33 MARAs are dispersed throughout the COCOMs to maximize the distribution of the Marine Corps' cultural, geographic, and global network. However, 33 out of approximately 194 countries (including Taiwan, the Holy See, and the State of Palestine) yields only 17 percent of the world's countries. MARAs allow the EOC immediate connectivity to a specified country, furthering the agility of the networked MCISRE. Since the DAS and COCOMs have representation in nearly every country (i.e., a country's embassy has a Defense Attaché Office [DAO] without a MARA), their network is clearly more extensive. Not only can the EOC reach out to a MARA with a specific request for information (RFI), a proactive MARA will feed information and observations to the EOC if deemed immediately valuable to the

Marine Corps and/or the intelligence community.

Within the *MOC*'s critical task of "Evolve the MAGTF," the MARA as the agile node assists in the "unified action" and "challenges of compositing" issue areas (*MOC* paragraphs 6.2.3 and 6.2.5, respectively). Under these areas, the Marine Corps must:

- Examine the combat-multiplier effect of integrating more Marines into key nodes of the Joint force and global SOF enterprise.
- Continue to emphasize task-organized, general-purpose forces for security cooperation activities to facilitate access, improve regional understanding, liaison with the regional Marine Forces Components (MARFORs), and enhance integration with theater special operations commands.
- Determine the requirement for standing Liaison Officers at key agencies and organization in the JIIM [(Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational)] force.
- Ensure MAGTF CE's [(Command Elements)] understand regional differences affecting organizational integration.⁶

Integrating more MARAs and/or Marine senior defense official/defense attachés (SDO/DATTs) into our Corps introduces more Marines into "key nodes of the Joint force." MARAs understand and can continuously improve the regional and cultural understanding of the MARFORs, COCOMs, and MEFs alike. MARAs are the ultimate "liaison officers" across the JIIM force because of close and constant contact—MARAs live in the State Department world, work closely with other governmental agencies located within their specific embassies, and engage with host-nation militaries and other foreign military attachés accredited to their country of interest. MARAs provide an unmatched level of agility on a global scale.

"Resiliency and Data Integrity" traces to the *MOC*'s "Evolve the MAGTF," "Operate with Resilience in a Contested-Network Environment," and "Exploit the Competence of the Individual Marine" critical tasks. These refer to the MCISRE's need to incorporate a feedback loop to ensure the accuracy of the in-




Figure 1.

formation/intelligence provided to operational decision makers. MARAs are validation and/or verification nodes of information and observations acquired via other reporting channels. If a report is published commenting on a particular country's current force structure, the EOC can communicate directly with the MARA in that country, if there is a MARA present. Since the MARA is integrated into the EOC, this happens in near realtime. Of note, the DAS, service COCOM, and potentially Office of the Secretary of Defense representatives would contact the SDO/DATT directly in the instance where near-realtime reporting is necessary.

Within these three *MOC* critical tasks, the MARA as a resilient node is critical to the "Integrating Command, Control, and Information Tools," "Role of Signature in Offense and Defense," "Enhanced Concept of Intelligence," and "Cultural Learning" issue areas (*MOC* paragraphs 6.2.2, 6.3.1, 6.3.4, and 6.5.5 respectively). Delineated in the *MOC*, the Marine Corps must:

- Evolve our approach to information sharing and information availability to ensure units large and small, operating dispersed or concentrated, have the awareness to employ the full range of combined arms at a tempo enabled by the distribution of timely and actionable information.
- Better integrate all forward-deployed and garrison MAGTF elements into the globally netted ISR architecture to increase awareness, preparedness, responsiveness, and effectiveness.
- Be prepared to make effective decisions in a degraded or denied C2 environment.

• Approach security cooperation activities in a manner that gives us insights into the local signature norm such that we can better detect and accurately interpret threat activity and raise an adversary's signature.

• Empower the [MCISRE] to evolve at the pace of information technology development, for example, folding open-source intelligence (OSINT) into every aspect of situational understanding to expand the scope of our knowledge base and greatly ease the challenges of sharing information with allies and coalition partners.

• Ensure Marines gain and maintain their language, regional expertise and culture (LREC) capabilities, with a particular emphasis on learning to consider cultural factors in planning and decision-making processes at all levels of operations, especially in complex terrain where understanding the cultural landscape is as important as understanding enemy capabilities.⁷

For Marine Corps situational awareness, the ideal scenario occurs when the MARA is the SDO/DATT. In the likely instance there is not a MARA in a particular country, the EOC would reach out to a MARA in a neighboring country—as all MARAs are not only familiar with their country's military and current events but are also cognizant of important regional issues. The MARA in a neighboring country should be able to answer the RFI or contact the DAO in the country of interest to address a particular RFI. Resiliency coupled with data integrity yields a high level of fidelity within the MCISRE if the MARA is leveraged properly.

“Redundancy” traces to the MOC’s “Enhance Our Ability to Maneuver” critical task. Redundancy as it pertains to the MCISRE describes alternative methods of communications to distribute information without compromising timeliness or fidelity. Closely tied to the feedback loop described above, the MARA can act as a fail-safe or network node of last resort. Within this critical task, the MARA as a redundant node is vital to the “Urban Operations/Complex Terrain” issue area (MOC paragraph 6.4.3) and must:

- Train to address the full degree and extent of the compartmentalization (block; street; building; sewer; tunnel; cave; jungle; mountains).
- Exploit man-machine interface and manned-unmanned teaming to overcome challenges in urban terrain.
- Refine our ability to use open sources of information and human sources of intelligence to create accurate, mission-informed course of action analysis that reflects a nuanced sense of the conflict from the perspective of all parties and how that changes as the adversary adapts.⁸

If there is a situation brewing in a particular country, and that country’s government shuts off the Internet (think “Arab Spring”), that country’s MARA

can still provide accurate and timely information and observations to senior decision makers, the EOC, and the intelligence community. The Marine Corps is poised to fight and win in the Information Age; however, a large portion of this dominant posture depends on “boots-on-the-ground” networked nodes to provide redundancy if necessary. Also, as the MARA has access to the U.S. Embassy communications network, he can use novel and innovative methods to relay information and observations to the proper recipients.

As portrayed above, MARAs play an integral role in the MCISRE, the MOC, the embassy community, and the intelligence community, providing a high return of investment to the DIRINT, MCIA, and Marine Corps writ large because not all MARAs are bred from the 02XX primary MOS. MARAs are chosen on merit, not MOS, which permits non-02XX Marines to act as critical nodes within the EOC and MCISRE construct. The selection process will be discussed later in this article, as there are ways to improve the quality of selected MARAs, thereby increasing the quality of the EOC and MCISRE network and yielding better support to the operational decision makers.

An overlooked benefit of the MARA Program is the post-Embassy assign-

ment. To maximize contribution to not only the MCISRE but also the greater Marine Corps, there are specific locations/billets to which MARAs should be assigned immediately following their MARA tour (unless selected for command or top-level school). Since MARAs arise from many MOSs, specific assignments may be generalized to ensure the MARAs maintain, or in some cases regain, MOS credibility. Consider the following theoretical scenario in which a recent former MARA from Emersonville, the capital of fictional Braelandia, fills a billet within the V MEF G-2 (or G-6 for 0602s, or G-3 for operators, etc.). In the scenario, Maj Belt-Buckle (Maj BB) was recently assigned to the CG, V MEF’s staff as the G-6 operations officer. (Disclaimer: Aspects of this scenario are realistic and applicable to current global situations designed to demonstrate utility to the Marine Corps. However, details and COAs are arbitrary and only used to demonstrate feasibility.)

A phone call woke the CG, V MEF, at 0330 on a Thursday—an 8.7 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter six kilometers north of Emersonville, Braelandia, had just leveled the capitol city twenty minutes earlier. His Deputy CG (DCG) had gathered all the required usual suspects for crisis response planning when he remembered Maj BB. Maj BB had returned from the U.S. Embassy DAO Emersonville as the MARA about two months before and was now the G-6 operations officer. The CG called him at 0345 and invited him to attend the DCG’s crisis planning meeting because he had recently read somewhere that a MARA was a “strategic enabler who plays a crucial role in overseas operations.”⁹

The planning team gathered. The G-2 struggled to find recent and relevant information (forget about intelligence) on Braelandia. Maj BB provided an ad hoc political-military situation update, geographic considerations, and a current events brief. The information Maj BB briefed supplied the planning team a solid foundation with which to intelligently begin the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) or Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2). Since both the Army Attaché (ARMA) and SDO/DATT



Marines serving with an attaché’s office can provide firsthand knowledge and observations of the host-nation’s capabilities. (Photo by Cpl Kimberly Aguirre.)

extended their tours to three years, Maj BB had worked with them for the past two years and then turned over to the current MARA in country. Maj BB, worried for the safety of the ARMA (he was the best man in the ARMA's wedding in Selville, Braelandia) and the SDO/DATT's families, first ensured that everyone was "okay" and accounted for.

Maj BB called the DAO in Emersonville with no answer, so he sent the ARMA a Facebook message and the SDO/DATT a WhatsApp text. The ARMA responded immediately, stating he and his new wife were safe, as was the SDO/DATT, operations coordinating officer, operations NCO, and their families. However, because of the extensive damage and limited routes to the Embassy, they would require some time to arrive at the Embassy and assess the damage. At this point, the CG, VMEF, already had contact on the ground and "ground-truth" access to information, while the MCPP/R2P2 was organized to develop potential COAs.

Two hours later, Maj BB received an update from the ARMA: All DAO personnel and families were accounted for, and all Marine Security Guard (MSG) personnel were present at the Embassy. Because of its solid structural integrity, the U.S. Embassy incurred minimal damage during the earthquake, and all communications systems functioned as normal. The Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), and key personnel had arrived at the Embassy to conduct their internal crisis response planning session. The DCM was waiting for the Regional Security Officer to arrive to convene the emergency action committee (EAC).

Maj BB asked the SDO/DATT if he and the CG, VMEF, could teleconference into the EAC. The SDO/DATT in turn discussed with the Ambassador, and the Ambassador happily obliged, along with recommending the appropriate planners from U.S. Western Command (WESTCOM) also phone into the EAC. At this point, within hours of notification of a serious crisis in Braelandia, the CG, VMEF, had direct access to the U.S. Chief of Mission because of Maj BB's network during his tenure as the MARA to Braelandia.

As the VMEF planning process continued, the G-2 briefed potential ingress/

egress routes and helicopter landing zones (HLZs). Maj BB shared these suggestions with the ARMA, MARA, and SDO/DATT in country. One of the HLZs was a soccer field near the former U.S. Embassy building which was now occupied by the Commander of the Braelandian Armed Forces and his staff. On his way to the Embassy that morning, the ARMA noted an entire apartment complex collapsed, likely a site of mass casualties, and rendered that soccer field unusable as an HLZ. The new MARA chimed in about the route analysis, saying some of the locally employed staff were stuck in traffic

and the other four required extensive maintenance—and the maintainers did not have the necessary parts on hand. This knowledge allowed the VMEF planners to lean toward more heavy-lift COAs to better assist disaster relief efforts if the Braelandian Government requested assistance.

The G-3 followed the CMO and briefed potential COAs, to include vehicles, equipment, and an updated current situation. Using only a map to conduct route analysis and distance/timing planning, the G-3 briefed AAVs as a potential COA. The G-3 also mentioned a mob of

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because one of the three principal avenues of approach to the city center, where the Embassy resides, could not be traversed because of extensive damage. This knowledge provided the VMEF planning cycle near-realtime information to determine preliminary COAs—saving time, effort, and most likely human lives in the process.

Next, the Civil-Military Affairs Officer (CMO) briefed current news from Braelandian news outlets. Prior to the brief, Maj BB had chatted with the CMO and informed him of the Romanian controlled television station, "Insh-Allah," in Emersonville, which was not controlled by the Braelandian government like the other news outlets. The CMO thanked Maj BB for this information and informed the planning team that the Braelandian Government had not officially asked for international relief and the Braelandian population should not worry because the Government maintained the capacity to provide disaster relief without international aid. Upon hearing this over the teleconference, the ARMA and MARA updated the MEF planning team: They had recently visited the C-130 squadron, which operated all the heavy-lift capacity for the country. Of the six C-130s Braelandia owned, only two were operational

people in Plaza Español massing at the Braelandian President's Executive Office. Maj BB explained to the planning team the tremendous high-altitude planning considerations and challenges unique to Emersonville. This altered the G-3 (and the pilots within the G-3) and G-4 planning, since the G-4 had not yet considered the volume and weight required for oxygen tanks. With respect to the mob the G-3 had mentioned, the SDO/DATT decided to go to Plaza Español on bicycle and determine its current status. Upon the SDO/DATT's return, he updated the planning team that the plaza contained no mob and it was false reporting coming out of Braelandia.

About half an hour later, Maj BB received a WhatsApp text from the Casandian Army Attaché to Braelandia, Col Sousa. Col Sousa and Maj BB became close friends about a year into Maj BB's tour in Emersonville. Maj BB attended Col Sousa's father's memorial service after a quick, harsh battle with cancer. Maj BB was one of the few military attachés to attend the vigil, for he knew Col Sousa adored his father. From that point on, Col Sousa and Maj BB were close friends and professional contacts. Col Sousa's text told Maj BB that the military airfield in Panatarta

(about 150 miles north of Emersonville) was practically destroyed and not usable for cargo aircraft. The only functioning airfield within operational relevance to the disaster site was just outside Emersonville. This information allowed planners to focus efforts and the associated task force size/capability on the sole aerial ingress point close to Emersonville.

During a teleconference, the SDO/DATT briefed that he had made contact with the Commander of the Braelandian Air Force, and he was sharing all of Braelandia's current plans and operational readiness in support of disaster relief efforts at this time. Until now, it was determined that the Braelandian Government most likely would not request assistance from the United States. However, the damage was so devastating to homogenous disaster relief capabilities that the Braelandian President planned to ask for U.S. assistance at a national press brief in two hours because of his tremendous love of his country and people.

The Regional Security Officer finally arrived after multiple traffic jams, and the Embassy country team would shortly commence the EAC with VMEF and WESTCOM planning cells on videoconference. The Ambassador acknowledged the exceptional efforts of the MEF planning team to kick off the meeting and revealed he had already passed on VMEF's praises to the President of the United States (POTUS), and POTUS was pleased.

Of course, this is a "best case" scenario from a planning perspective. The scenario could continue with examples like these, throughout the entire planning process up to and through execution, but the main theme has already been highlighted: the MARA realizes the DIRINT's vision not only while serving in the MARA capacity but also during the tour immediately following the MARA assignment if the follow-on assignment is a billet of direct impact with access to Marine Corps or COCOM senior decision makers. Also, this does not downplay the importance of the MARA during his Embassy tour; without displaying a high level of professionalism and the ability to network during his Embassy tour, Maj BB never would have had the network in the scenario above.

As LtCol Chawk and Capt Vassar correctly pointed out in their 2016 *Gazette* article, MARAs have four principal responsibilities:

1. Represent the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Armed Forces of the United States generally, and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) specifically.
2. Serve as military advisors to the U.S. Ambassador, other U.S. government officials, and host-nation officials.
3. Report on in-country and regional political-military activities.
4. Support U.S. military theater security cooperation and security assistance programs in the assigned country, as well as coordinate access to host-nation leaders and facilities.¹⁰

However, there are many secondary responsibilities and implicit/explicit orders associated with these primary responsibilities. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) provides and signs guidance memorandums to all Air Force future SDO/DATTs as they prepare for their SDO/DATT tour. The unclassified version of this guidance memo contains fourteen detailed expectations and responsibilities for the future SDO/DATT:

- Building enduring relationships.
- Balancing attaché roles/missions.
- Military-diplomatic representation.
- Ambassadorial advice and assistance.
- Internal relationships.
- Chain of command.
- Military standards.
- Staying connected with SAF/IA.
- Political-military assessments.
- SAF/IA updates.
- SAF/IA country visits.
- Strategic communications.
- Major Command and Numbered Air Force component connections.
- Tour curtailments/extensions.¹¹

Of particular note to the SDO/DATT's importance (outside of the four principal expectations outlined above), I would like to point out paragraphs one, eight, and twelve.

Paragraph one of the SAF/IA guidance summarizes the main theme of the

Maj BB scenario above—everything accomplished and envisioned as an attaché must revolve around this point. Paragraph eight identifies the USAF version of the EOC and its importance to the intelligence community—the USAF considers international relations important enough to enumerate in this memo, as should the Marine Corps. Paragraph twelve is paramount to understanding the strategic and global role SDO/DATTs fulfill. Current Secretary of Defense Gen James N. Mattis, USMC(Ret), in February 2017, said, "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately," in front of members of Congress at a National Security Advisory Council meeting. Secretary Mattis continued,

So I think it's a cost-benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department's diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of an apparent American withdrawal from the international scene.¹²

MARAs and SDO/DATTs (and all military attachés) are extensions of the State Department's diplomacy in all countries and throughout the world. The legendary "Mad Dog" Mattis understands this; it is time the promotion and selection processes do too.

Recommendations

Per the aforementioned details, these are my recommendations to senior leaders of our Corps:

- Include the selection of MARAs and Marine SDO/DATTs on the Commandant's Professional Intermediate-Level Education Board to better ensure that the right Marines are selected for strategic roles. Although there are no Uniform Code of Military Justice responsibilities associated with the MARA or the SDO/DATT, the potential strategic impact alone should place the MARA and Marine SDO/DATT positions on the list of "highly desired" for field-grade officers who want to progress in the Corps. To increase competitiveness and desirability, lieutenant colonel Marine/DATTs should be chosen from the alternates on the lieutenant colonel

and colonel command slates, assuming the Marine Corps received colonel SDO/DATT positions.

- Work with the DAS to allocate additional MARAs worldwide to achieve 25 percent coverage of countries worldwide. Based on math above, that would be an increase of fifteen or sixteen MARAs to different countries. These countries should focus on the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), MCIA's *Future Operating Environment (FOE) 2015–2025: Implications for Marines* (26 June 2015) (from which the *MOC* resulted), and host-nation potentials for strong relationship building. MCIA should also seek priorities of effort from geographic and Service COCOMs, including each COCOM's special operations component, when using the NIPF and *FOE* to assess MARA allocation.

- Ensure there is at least one Marine SDO/DATT billet in each geographic command. Currently, there is one SDO/DATT position in EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRICOM. Placing a Marine SDO/DATT in CENTCOM and PACOM would ensure the Marine Corps and the EOC have a strategic leader in each geographic COCOM whose fitness reports have a reviewing officer at the general officer level, the Deputy COCOM Commander. This will carry more weight in promotion boards, therefore making the MARA Program more preferred by Marines who desire career-enhancing positions of strategic impact.

- Following a successful Embassy tour, a MARA or Marine SDO/DATT must be placed on the staff of an operational- or strategic-level decision maker. Depending on the timing of the MARA or Marine SDO/DATT's assignment, he should fill a billet within the COCOM for which he was just the MARA or SDO/DATT or, if fleet time is required for promotion, a critical billet within the MEF responsible for the country where his MARA or SDO/DATT tour occurred. (For example, if the MARA was in Tokyo, Japan, then that MARA should either go to the PACOM or III MEF staff, depending on career tim-

ing.) This permits the Marine Corps to fully leverage a MARA's or Marine SDO/DATT's knowledge set, contacts within the host nation, contacts within the U.S. Embassy in that country, and contacts with other foreign military attachés.

Conclusion

MARAs and Marine SDO/DATTs play fundamental roles not only to realize the DIRINT's vision, strengthen the MCISRE, and enable the *MOC* in many of its critical tasks and issue areas but also ultimately to escalate and proliferate Marine Corps values globally. These critical roles occur during the Marine SDO/DATT's Embassy tour

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and during his follow-on tour if placed in a billet of high impact to strategic-level decision makers. As exhibited by the theoretical scenario above, a MARA could and would have added impact not only to the Marine Corps but also to the entire DOD if placed in the proper follow-on assignment. With this impact recognized, it is vital the Marine Corps consider these DAS billets of utmost utility for the continued success of our beloved Corps. The human dimensions of war are neither lost nor can be overcome by technology. According to the *MOC*, "It is critical to emphasize ... that technology will never override the human dimensions of war."¹³ No one argues the complexity of future warfare, and "complex terrain adds informational and human aspects of the battlespace to the traditional geophysical factors" which our adversaries understand with the intent to "undercut our advantages in technology, mounted maneuver, and firepower."¹⁴ MARAs can swing the pendulum in our favor.

Notes

1. Mark Pomerleau, "3 pressing requirements for Marine Corps intelligence," *C4ISRNET*, (Online: 16 August 2017), available at <https://www.c4isrnet.com>.
2. BGen Dimitri Henry, "MCISRE: Driving Change," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: September 2017).
3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century (MOC)*, (Washington, DC: September 2016).
4. "MCISRE."
5. *MOC*.
6. These bullet points are pulled directly from the *MOC*.
7. These bullet points are pulled directly from the *MOC*.
8. *MOC*.
9. LtCol Frank Chawk and Capt Daniel Vassar, "The Marine Attaché Program: The 'front line' of Partner Nation Engagement," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: July 2016).
10. Ibid. The authors cited this information from Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3821.2, The Defense Attaché System*, (Washington, DC: 2009).
11. Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Relations, "SAF/IA Guidance to SDO/DATTs," *Office of the Under Secretary*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 2017).
12. Alex Lockie, "Mattis once said if State Department funding gets cut 'then I need to buy more ammunition,'" *Business Insider*, (Online: 27 February 2017), available at <http://www.businessinsider.com>.
13. *MOC*.
14. Ibid.

