

Missionizing Operational Culture Studies

Engaging Marines' brains before they engage their weapons

by LtCol Michael Clark

“Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war ... Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war and is therefore inherently flawed.”¹

—MCDP 1, Warfighting

The Marine Corps is in a period of transition. In July 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen David Berger, published his guidance on how to ensure Marines succeed in a future operational environment marked by complexity, “conflict, crisis, and rapid change.”² Although he argues future conflicts will likely be difficult, if not impossible, to predict, Gen Berger recommends preparing for them by referencing contemporary trends. Consequently, he tasks the Service with being able to support fleet operations inside maritime spaces actively contested by “long-range precision weapons, as well as information-related capabilities.”³ He tasks the Marine Corps with being “first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so.”⁴ He also regionally aligns the bulk of Marine combat power and designates the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) as the Service’s main effort region.

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In the Commandant’s Force Design progress report published in March 2020, he recommends a number of Service investments and divestments, such as increasing rocket artillery and eliminating tanks. In the report, he also tasks Marines with being “capable of successfully competing and winning in the gray zone.”⁵ The next month, in April 2020, the Marine Corps Training and Education Command announced an additional Service divestment in the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, indicating a smaller overall investment in operational culture studies. The Service will “invest in areas of higher priority.”⁶

Marine leaders should instead consider investing in operational culture

studies as one of the Service’s highest priorities because operational culture knowledge represents an invaluable contribution to achieving the Commandant’s goals for the Marine Corps. Rather than divesting in these studies, Marine leaders should fix the inefficiencies in how the Marine Corps delivers them by missionizing operational culture studies. The French Army’s use of operational culture knowledge throughout its history operating in Africa, a recent example being Operation SERVAL in Mali in 2012, highlights how investing in operational culture studies can produce amazing dividends for regionally aligned forces operating in complex, unpredictable, and gray operational environments. One way Marines can economically receive these same benefits is by the Service’s leaders integrating operational culture studies into existing formal training and professional military education (PME) and by aligning the studies to Gen Berger’s regional priorities. Taking these steps would likely improve Marines’ operational planning, enable them to prosper in the information environment, increase intelligence capabilities, enable them to survive and succeed in maritime spaces contested by long-range precision weapons, and maximize readiness to respond to crises in the future operational environment the Commandant envisions.

Operational Culture Studies and Operation SERVAL

The French Army’s expeditionary forces have for all intents and purposes been regionally aligned to Africa for over

a century.⁷ One of the many benefits of this alignment has been generations of French soldiers gaining operational culture knowledge through formal study and experience across the continent. They leveraged this knowledge during Operation SERVAL to quickly devise a well-informed strategy, effectively wage a battle for legitimacy in the information environment, maximize local cooperation, and improve intelligence capabilities. These factors were significant contributors to the operation's success.

African stability has historically been critical for French national security. Consequently, the French military has gone to great lengths to maintain uniquely close relationships with counterparts in many of France's former colonies on the continent. The French Army also maintains an extensive and persistent African military presence. It has essentially never left since French decolonization on the continent.

For over a century, an integral aspect of French Army preparation to operate in Africa has been operational culture studies. Culture affects how people within a group understand the world, organize themselves, act, and interpret how others act.⁸ Not all aspects of culture are relevant to military operations, so operational culture focuses on the aspects that affect and are affected by military operations, such as the physical environment, the economy, social structures, political structures, and beliefs and symbols.⁹ As France's colonial empire expanded during the 19th century, French soldiers often hosted anthropologists on military expeditions. This interaction created a symbiotic relationship between the soldiers and anthropologists based on a common desire to understand the new communities they were encountering for the first time. This relationship led to operational culture studies being integrated into French soldiers' training.¹⁰

During the colonial period, French Army leaders also realized a deep understanding of local cultures was key to strategic success. To make the colonies economically viable, the French government never committed substantial forces to defeat adversaries in Africa who often used guerrilla tactics. Con-

sequently, relatively small French Army units, sometimes down to the platoon level, regularly operated independently over large areas of operation. The success of these units often hinged on the ability of small unit leaders to gain and maintain local cooperation, which was particularly useful in convincing human sources to provide the necessary information to target elusive guerrillas. Modern French soldiers study operational culture at the same school that trained and educated French colonial soldiers to navigate culturally complex operational environments.¹¹

Northern Mali was and remains to this day a culturally complex operational environment because of the diverse array of militant groups that operate there. In 2012 these groups included the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a northern Mali Tuareg separatist group that seeks to create an independent state, and Ansar al-Dine, a Tuareg Salafi jihadist militant group. The Tuaregs are an ethnic minority that the Malian government has a history of politically and economically marginalizing. Two other regional Salafi jihadist militant groups present in Northern Mali in 2012 were Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.

After an influx of weapons and Tuareg fighters into the area as a consequence of the 2011 Libyan regime collapse, in January 2012 the MNLA initiated a secessionist rebellion. It allied with the three Salafi jihadist groups because at that point in time all four groups shared the same enemy: the Malian government. Within a number of months, the Salafi jihadist groups ended their alliance with the MNLA, and the former allies became enemies. The rebellion continued on, however, and in large part because of the poor performance of the Malian Army against the militants, a military coup overthrew the Malian government. The military government only lasted for a month before a transitional government took over.

A year after the secessionist rebellion began, on 10 January 2013, Mali's interim president requested French military assistance as the Salafi jihadist groups were advancing toward the country's

capital. The next day, on 11 January, French military forces initiated Operation SERVAL with the primary objectives of halting the groups' advances and eliminating their control over the northern half of the country. What quickly grew to become a French-led coalition of French and African soldiers stopped the groups in days, almost completely reversed their gains within a matter of months, and concluded the operation in July 2014 with the coalition achieving its strategic objectives. Substantial French forces have remained in the area as part of a regional counterterrorism campaign that began after SERVAL ended.

Northern Mali's operational environment was not only culturally complex but resided firmly within the gray zone. According to Gen Joseph Votel, Commander U.S. Special Operations Command, in 2015, when fighting in the gray zone, U.S. forces may be "confronted with ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the validity of the legal and political claims at stake."¹² The nature of the conflict in Mali was ambiguous because as the rebellion evolved, multiple conflicts developed, intermingled, and influenced the operational environment. There were intergroup conflicts between the Malian government, Salafi jihadist groups, and Tuareg separatist groups, and there were intragroup conflicts within all these factions.

Some of the parties involved in the conflict were ambiguous because many fighters changed what group or groups they pledged allegiance to. The legal and political validity of the Malian government was ambiguous as well because of the short-lived coup and the questionable legitimacy of the transitional government that ultimately requested French assistance. Furthermore, northern Malian citizens had at least some legitimate grievances with how the government distributed political power and economic resources.

Operation SERVAL's commander, staff, and soldiers waded head-first into this complex, gray operational environment, and the heritage of French operations in Africa gave these soldiers many advantages that helped them succeed.¹³ One of these advantages was regional

operational culture knowledge already gained through previous formal study and experience on the continent. The operation's joint forces commander, BGen Grégoire de Saint-Quentin, had a wealth of experience living and operating in Africa throughout his career. By January 2013, he had already been stationed in neighboring Senegal for two years as the commander of the French repositioned military force there. SERVAL's ground forces commander had served in Africa twice before, and the joint staff that led the operation came from among Saint-Quentin's staff in Senegal, making them familiar with the region as well.

their initial understanding in real time by patrolling alongside and learning from African soldiers, particularly ones from a Malian Army unit composed of Tuaregs. These soldiers "had a perfect understanding of their environment" according to a French Joint Staff summary of the operation.¹⁵

Armed with deep regional operational culture knowledge gained before and improved upon during the operation, SERVAL's leaders rapidly demonstrated a nuanced understanding of northern Mali's complex, gray operational environment. They understood that while just about all the militant groups in northern Mali were violently opposed

the Salafi jihadist groups' information campaign against the coalition. The groups claimed it was filled with "enemies of Islam."¹⁷ Eventually, the coalition had more African than French soldiers in it, so the French countered this claim by putting an African face on the operation as much as possible. One way French soldiers did this was by conducting the combined patrols with African soldiers, many of whom were Muslim. Patrolling with Malian Tuareg soldiers in particular legitimized the coalition in the eyes of coethnic northern Malians. These soldiers also helped translate local dialects—key for rapport-building.¹⁸

French soldiers' operational cultural knowledge helped them understand which African soldiers not to partner with, further aiding the battle for legitimacy. French leaders understood partnering with non-Tuareg Malian soldiers would likely have reignited the animosity northern Mali's population felt toward the Malian government. Reigniting this animosity could have made achieving French strategic objectives much harder, if not impossible. Ultimately, partly because of French soldiers' cultural savvy and partly because of many northern Malians disagreeing with how the Salafi jihadist groups governed, the local population largely saw the French-led coalition members as liberators instead of representatives of the government many northern Malians revolted against a year prior.¹⁹

The French-led coalition's successful battle for legitimacy enabled it to take maximum advantage of local cooperation. Perhaps the most significant byproduct of such cooperation was minimizing the number of adversaries coalition soldiers needed to fight, like avoiding conflict with MNLA militants and the citizens that supported them. Local cooperation was also instrumental in coalition soldiers receiving information from willing local sources. Once the Salafi jihadist militants decided not to face the coalition directly and to hide among the local population, coalition forces used invaluable local information to identify how the militants were operating, identify if they had left an urban center or were hiding among the



Unlike French-led coalition forces in OPERATION SERVAL, Marines only conduct episodic training missions with partner nations in Africa. (Photo by Cpl Alexander Mitchell.)

The operation's ground forces were eventually organized into four battalion task forces, the first of which was largely composed of French soldiers already in Africa. The other three were primarily composed of soldiers from France. Many of these soldiers had already studied African operational culture knowledge and had previous experience in different parts of the continent like SERVAL's leaders. A substantial number of the French soldiers, however, did not have much knowledge or experience in northern Mali's specific area of operations.¹⁴ To mitigate this ignorance and inexperience, they were able to improve

to the Malian government, on whose behalf the French-led coalition was fighting, not all the groups were violently opposed to the coalition's strategic objectives. With this knowledge, French forces entered into a tacit partnership with the MNLA against the Salafi jihadist groups. Doing so also helped avoid having to fight the MNLA and the Salafi jihadist groups simultaneously, which might have incentivized the factions to enter back into an alliance of convenience against a new mutual enemy.¹⁶

Operational culture knowledge also helped French soldiers counter

population, and locate militant weapons and supply caches. Local cooperation also helped with expeditionary logistics. French soldiers often relied on local vendors for fuel and water during the operation.²⁰

Missionizing Marine Operational Culture Studies

Given the potential benefits of a focused and integrated operational culture studies program, Marine leaders should aspire to more economically deliver these studies instead of divesting in them. They can more economically do so by missionizing operational culture studies to better reflect operational culture's place as a critical warfighting competency and better align these studies with Gen Berger's regional priorities. A missionized Marine operational culture studies program should be different than the French Army's program because Marines have more global capabilities and responsibilities than French expeditionary forces do. The benefits of Marine leaders missionizing these studies include enabling Marines to develop better operational plans; increasing competitiveness in actively contested information environments; increasing HUMINT capabilities; surviving and succeeding in maritime spaces actively contested by long-range precision weapons; and increasing readiness to respond to crises in complex, unpredictable, and gray operational environments.

Until recently, Marines studied operational culture through the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) program. Based on guidance from the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James Conway, the program began in 2012 to develop Marines that are "more effective at operating in culturally complex environments."²¹ The program taught Marines—from sergeant through lieutenant colonel—general cultural concepts and skills as well as cultural considerations and basic language skills unique to one of seventeen world regions. Marines studied the same regions throughout their careers, resulting in Marines familiar with a variety of cultures spread across all geographic combatant command AORs. RCLF training was also a requirement

to complete PME for a Marine's given rank.

The RCLF program was an inefficient use of operational culture studies resources, and the Regional and Culture Studies Program (RCSP) that replaced it is similarly inefficient. In both programs, Marines study general operational cultural concepts useful for Marines no matter where they deploy. Studying one of seventeen world regions, however, is not. Studying the Sahel in Africa, for instance, will not prepare Marines very well for operations in Southeast Asia because of the vast differences in each region's culture and history.²² Additionally, the regions Marines study have no bearing on where they are assigned or deployed. It was and remains possible for Marines to spend their entire careers studying regions they never set foot in and Marine units deploy to a region none of its leaders have previously studied.

Two differences between the RCLF and the RCSP programs are completing the RCSP program is no longer a requirement for Marines to be considered PME complete, and under the RCSP program, Marines may choose what regions they study. Eliminating the organizational incentive of making the RCSP program a PME requirement is a further signal current Marine leaders value operational cultural studies less than before. Marines being able to choose what region they study means they may still devote considerable time and effort, should they choose to study operational culture at all, to studying regions they may never set foot in and that are misaligned with Gen Berger's recent regional prioritization.

In his planning guidance, the Commandant regionally aligns all units within the three MEFs, constituting the bulk of Marine combat power. Gen Berger designates III MEF as the Service's "main focus-of-effort," and he aligns it with USINDOPACOM and the Navy's 7th Fleet.²³ The CMC aligns I MEF to support USINDOPACOM as well and 3rd Fleet. He aligns the 7th Marine Regiment, one of three regiments organically assigned to I MEF, to support U.S. Central Command as needed. Finally, Gen Berger directs II MEF to support 2d and 6th Fleets. Sec-

ond Fleet is responsible for the Northern Atlantic, and 6th Fleet is responsible for supporting U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command.

A missionized operational culture studies program could teach all Marines the operational culture knowledge relevant to the strategically significant regions the Commandant has tasked their units with supporting. One way to missionize these studies is to have all Marines study USINDOPACOM operational culture—relevant to the newly designated main effort AOR. To do this, Marine leaders could eliminate the RCSP program and integrate general operational culture concepts and USINDOPACOM operational culture studies into all existing formal training and PME. These studies should begin at the School of Infantry, Marine Combat Training, and The Basic School. Rather than formally studying operational culture on Marines' own time, as the RCLF program requires, integrating these studies into training and PME would more effectively establish operational culture considerations as a critical element of warfighting.²⁴

Marine formal training and PME venues devoting larger portions of their curricula to operational culture studies would also address what Gen Berger identifies as the "greatest deficiency in the training and education of leaders: practice in decision-making against a thinking enemy."²⁵ To make this practice worthwhile, Marines should accurately understand how real potential enemies think. Understanding how people think is precisely what operational culture studies teach. As Marines advance in rank and receive USINDOPACOM operational culture courses throughout their careers, this cumulative education could ensure 100 percent of senior officers and enlisted Marines have a deep understanding of how key players within the main effort AOR understand the world, organize themselves, act, and interpret how others act.

Marines assigned to II MEF and 7th Marines should learn operational culture knowledge relevant to these units' command-designated AORs. These Marines could learn this knowledge

as part of their unit check-in processes to ensure they actually receive it and do so in a timely manner. Training and Education Command should fund these operational culture studies to prevent any financial burden being levied on II MEF and 7th Marines. Should Marines return to these units for multiple tours, they too could develop a deep understanding of the command-designated regions' operational culture through cumulative studies. All Marines should continue to receive predeployment operational culture courses specific to the country or countries they are slated to deploy to, and these courses should continue to be the primary way Marines get introduced to cultures they are unfamiliar with should they deploy to regions they have not studied before.

Missionizing operational culture studies can help Marines succeed in any operational environment in a number of ways. The first way is helping Marines develop better operational plans by giving them the tools for more informed critical thinking, increasing their ability to solve the complex problems Gen Berger's vision of the future operational environment may present. According to *MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process*, the most important step of the process is its first step: problem framing. The publication argues, "no amount of subsequent planning can solve a problem insufficiently understood."²⁶ Two critical problem framing steps are understanding the environment and understanding the problem. The majority of the factors that define the environment and problem can be understood by studying operational culture.²⁷

Missionized operational culture studies can aid Marines by enabling them to build off more insightful problem framing to develop plans that exploit an operational environment's human complexities against competitors and adversaries. This is what French leaders did during Operation SERVAL by tacitly allying with the MNLA against the Salafi jihadist groups. Even if Marines never directly interact with anyone else and operate from uninhabited islands with rocket artillery, understanding how all significant actors within an area of operations think and interpret

Marine actions with these weapons can help Marine leaders better employ them to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.

Missionized operational culture studies can also help Marines succeed in any operational environment by using a deeper understanding of operational cultural knowledge to counter an information campaign from competitors and adversaries that often have a native-level understanding of local culture. According to *MCWP 3-32, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*, the information environment consists of three dimensions: cognitive, physical, and informational. The cognitive dimension is defined by human perception and is the most difficult of the three to measure and understand. *Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations*, declares the cognitive dimension to be "the most important component of the information environment."²⁸ Operational culture knowledge is the key to understanding the cognitive dimension. French soldiers during Operation SERVAL used their operational cultural knowledge to effectively counter the Salafi jihadist information campaign and avoid unforced errors that would have made the campaign harder.²⁹

Winning in the information environment can also contribute to maximizing local cooperation, which can contribute to operational success in a number of ways. One way is minimizing the number of potential competitors and adversaries, like the French did during Operation SERVAL. Another way is increased human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. HUMINT includes all intelligence produced from human sources. It is normally used to cover intelligence gaps technical means cannot collect against. According to *MCWP 2-10, Intelligence Operations*, the two main limitations of HUMINT collection are placing human sources at risk and taking the time to plan, execute, and analyze information from a HUMINT operation.³⁰

Maximum local cooperation can potentially minimize HUMINT limitations. Local cooperation can decrease the danger to sources collecting on an unpopular enemy on behalf of relatively popular Marines, and cooperation can

inspire local sources to volunteer information to Marines. Volunteers could negate the need to plan and execute a HUMINT collection operation. Local cooperation from willing sources was one way French soldiers during Operation SERVAL were able to collect information that was timely and accurate enough to use to target elusive Salafi jihadist fighters.

Missionized operational culture studies can also benefit Marines operating in a specific operational environment. Gen Berger seems most concerned with, a maritime space actively contested by long-range precision weapons. To successfully operate in such a space, the Commandant calls upon Marine leaders to invest in two operating concepts, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Distributed Operations (DO). EABO involves deploying the "smallest, lowest signature" forces to establish, operate, and disestablish expeditionary advanced bases more rapidly than enemies can detect and target them. DO involves giving units down to the squad level the capability to employ combined arms, increasing their lethality and viability as independent maneuver units when dispersed across the battlespace.³¹

One of the fundamental assumptions behind conducting EABO and DO in a contested maritime space is Marines would likely not enjoy the same level of external support they have been used to receiving over the past decades of combat operations. A deeper understanding of the relevant operational culture can help Marines survive and thrive in such a space. Unless Marine leaders believe all strategically significant islands are uninhabited, small unit leaders leveraging operational culture knowledge to win in the information environment and maximize local support can minimize their signature and aid their survival by receiving timely assistance from local sources for basic human needs, such as food, water, and medical aid. During the French colonial period, French soldiers often had to rely solely on local sources for basic survival needs because they were often cut off from French support for long periods of time. Even if Marines can receive

external support, local assistance can minimize their signature—such as the French use of local vendors for logistical support during Operation SERVAL.

With local support, small, independent Marine units can also increase HUMINT capabilities as previously discussed. This is particularly critical for DO, which counts on supporting arms to act as a force multiplier for small Marine units. When operating in the complex, gray environment Gen Berger envisions, all sources of intelligence are crucial to ensure Marines properly target supporting arms. An indigenous human understanding of such an environment gleaned from local sources may be necessary to discern friend from foe or at least discern foe from not foe, particularly against an adversary that actively tries to deny technical collection. Only if supporting arms are used against the correct targets will they have force multiplying effects. If supporting arms are used against the wrong targets, then they could deliver tactically, operationally, and strategically force crippling effects instead—regardless of how precise they are.

Missionized operational culture studies can also help small unit leaders operating within contested maritime spaces make better tactical decisions when dealing with uncertain and changing situations. Another side effect of being cut off from external support is small unit leaders could be unable to receive guidance from higher echelons before making decisions with potentially operational or strategic implications. Even if they can ask for guidance, small unit leaders may not want to because doing so could increase their signature. These leaders may not need such guidance if they have a more complete understanding of the operational environment shaped by relevant operational culture knowledge.

In addition to broadly defining the operational environment Gen Berger predicts Marines will operate in, he indicates how quickly he expects Marines to be able to respond to crises within such an environment. They should respond first. To do so effectively, Marines need to be ready to respond to crises before they develop. Integrating USINDOPA-

COM operational culture studies into all formal training and PME would significantly contribute to the readiness of all Marines to rapidly and effectively respond to crises in the main effort AOR. Integrating the relevant operational culture studies into the check-in processes for II MEF and 7th Marine Regiment Marines would similarly contribute to their readiness to respond to crises in the command-designated AORs. These studies would be particularly meaningful should a crisis response's timeline preclude predeployment operational culture studies. Additionally, Marines in II MEF and 7th Marines formally learning USINDOPACOM operational culture knowledge as well as command-designated AOR knowledge would give them a better understanding of how actions in the supporting effort AORs can influence and be influenced by actions in the main effort AOR, better integrating global Marine operations in support of the main effort.

Finally, it would be unrealistic to expect even senior Marines that receive missionized operational culture studies throughout a career to be experts on the operational culture relevant to a specific area of operations given the future's uncertainty. If Marines deploy with minimal notice to a country or countries within a region they have studied before, then these studies can help Marines rapidly comprehend the relevant local operational culture by building off the foundation of knowledge they would already have. Local cooperation can accelerate this comprehension. French soldiers that participated in Operation SERVAL were able to build off the regional operational culture knowledge they had by gaining additional knowledge eminently relevant to the area of operations from the African soldiers they patrolled with and the locals that cooperated with the coalition.

Conclusion

Gen David Berger envisions a future operational environment that is complex, unpredictable, gray, and likely contains areas contested by long-range precision weapons and information-related capabilities. Two steps the Comman-

dant has taken to help Marines operate in such an environment is aligning the bulk of Marine combat power to regions most relevant to U.S. national security and designating the USINDOPACOM AOR as the Service's main effort. The French Army's African operational heritage and recent success during Operation SERVAL highlight the many advantages of missionized operational culture studies for a regionally aligned military force. Consequently, Marine leaders should missionize rather than divest in Marine operational culture studies by eliminating the RCSP and integrating USINDOPACOM AOR operational culture studies into all formal training and PME. Marines assigned to units aligned with other AORs should receive operational culture courses relevant to the units' AORs when they check-in. Taking these steps would help align the Marine operational culture studies program with Gen Berger's regional priorities and ensure Marines are optimally prepared to rapidly respond to crises, come, and fight, if necessary, in the future operational environment.

The other source of French regional expertise that contributed to Operation SERVAL's success was previous operational experience in Africa. Further research is required to determine the most efficient policies to ensure Marines, to the maximum extent possible, deploy to their command-designated AORs and are assigned to units aligned to the same regions throughout their careers. Marine leaders should also consider if a certain level of regional operational culture knowledge and experience should be required to fill key leadership positions in the regionally aligned MEFs and 7th Marine Regiment. A commander's introduction to a region should not be leading a combat operation there, particularly if the operation is conducted on short notice with minimal time to study the operational environment before bullets or rocket artillery fly.

Just like all the force design efforts Marine leaders are currently investing in to achieve the Commandant's goals, missionizing operational culture studies cannot guarantee success on the battlefield. The relative strategic failures of French military operations

in Mali since the conclusion of Operation SERVAL attest to this. There are no combat panaceas, and operational culture knowledge was but one of many factors that led to the 2012 French operation's success. Marine leaders deciding on what to invest and divest in is largely based on the perfectly reasonable assumption they will have limited resources to achieve their goals. Marine leaders, however, should not make the thoroughly unreasonable assumption they will get their money's worth when employing a million-dollar weapon system within a human environment they have a hundred-dollar understanding of. Unless current Marine leaders now believe war is fundamentally a clash between ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment, they should embrace ways to maximize Marines' understanding of the human dimension rather than divest in them. Doing so would ensure force design efforts are not inherently flawed and are instead likely to produce a more effective, competitive, and lethal Marine Corps.

Notes

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