

Discipline

The top performer's true talent

by LtCol Aaron C. Lloyd

If the meaning of discipline is misunderstood, it can conjure up negative images of punishment and criticism. It can trouble those not yet indoctrinated in the culture of the Corps, and yet it forms the foundation for all that Marines hold dear. In the Corps, discipline manifests as the ability to act as one body toward a common purpose, regardless of obstacles, and forms the bedrock of our collective "Marine-ness." This unique quality is not rigorously emphasized in our search for talent, yet it is so integral to our collective identity. A bumper sticker belief is not enough; the lifestyle of the disciplined warfighter—the Marine—must be the standard. All Marines know this. The Corps should emphasize discipline as a non-negotiable quality required of all Marines and evaluate its prominence in the force. Success flows from discipline; failure flourishes in the fertile ground of its absence.

Discipline is recognized outside of the Corps as important as well. Professor Angela Duckworth, a MacArthur Fellow and psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, describes two attributes she believes are more predictive of success than measures of cognitive ability:

Self-control—the voluntary regulation of behavioral, emotional, and attentional impulses, and grit—the tendency to sustain interest in and effort toward long-term goals. A major difference between the two qualities is that grit equips individuals to pursue especially challenging aims over years and even decades, while self-control operates at a more micro timescale in the battle against what could be referred to as 'hourly temptations.'¹

The attributes that Professor Duckworth lists should be familiar to Marines. They sound strikingly like a description of self-discipline, or more

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"There is only one sort of discipline—PERFECT DISCIPLINE. Men cannot have good battle discipline and poor administrative discipline. Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details, and on mutual respect and confidence. Discipline must be a habit so engrained that it is stronger than the excitement of battle or the fear of death."

—LTG G.S. Patton

Discipline means subjection; but not subjection to officers (or seniors). It means subjection of the body to the mind; it means the superiority of the human spirit to the last efforts of wind and weather, and the demons of fear, pain, and fatigue. It is the element of Stoicism without which no man can do his living well.

**—William E. Hocking
Morale and Its Enemies (1918)**

simply put for purposes of this article, discipline. This quality is an enabler that allows individuals to develop the other skills and attributes the Corps requires in its Marines. While this information is interesting, its practical use is more pertinent. If discipline forms the foundational basis for developing skills and talents—and is also predic-

tive of success in a tangible way—the Marine Corps could incorporate that understanding into its accessions, evaluations, and retention programs. To this end, there are several things the Corps can either execute or examine regarding discipline to better exploit the advantages that this attribute brings to the force.

First, the Marine Corps should reaffirm the value of discipline and categorically state that the Corps desires this characteristic in its members. At Marine Corps recruit training battalions and Officer Candidates School, the senior drill instructor and platoon sergeant introduce themselves to the new recruits or candidates with a speech that speaks straight to the soul of the matter. The speech declares, “Discipline is the hallmark of a Marine!” That sentiment must be etched on a new Marine’s soul for all time.

Searing this belief on every Marine’s psyche, however, is harder than simply announcing one’s intent. Discipline is rarely discussed after recruit training and Officer Candidates School, and, if so, it is quickly dismissed. It may be that discipline is taken for granted—and that is a mistake (and perhaps solid ground for another article in itself). Instead, the Corps is currently trying to cultivate the ever-ubiquitous talent; the Corps must first attempt to determine if talent is a legitimate determinant of success.

Second, understanding how discipline enables both a unit and an individual’s success is vital. Everything we do should be oriented toward increasing operational and combat effectiveness. With that in mind, Marines understand that the willing suppression of personal

desire for the benefit of the greater good is a requirement for the pursuit of success. Collective discipline facilitates combat operations through individual sacrifice. Units execute smartly and Marines are expected to endure physical and mental privation to accomplish the mission. The individual Marine must be willing to recognize that doing what is convenient or easy is not always in the best interests of the mission and their comrades.

Third, the Corps must continue its efforts to build discipline in its ranks. The majority of training that occurs in the Operating Forces addresses the requirements designed to increase its effectiveness in combat. There is also a significant focus on safety, liberty incident reduction, family readiness, and personal responsibility. While some would assert that discipline is inherent in everything Marines do, the reality of the situation is less clear. Little regular training directly addresses discipline. This apparent lack of focus on training to be disciplined is concerning. The Corps must directly address what *MCDP 1-3, Tactics*, says about discipline:

Our form of discipline is *absolute*. There is no time off. Someone else may be in charge, but that does not absolve us from the responsibility to do everything we can do to achieve the common goal.²

To develop discipline, Marines must first recognize the value it has for the Corps and make a conscious effort to recognize its presence, absence, or deficiency.

One way discipline is created is through hard and realistic training in an environment closely approximating operational scenarios. This method falls short, however, if it does not directly confront the value of cohesion. *MCRP 6-11D* insists “the subordination of self and an intuitive understanding of the collective actions of the unit and the importance of teamwork, *results in increased combat power* (author’s emphasis).”³ There is a collective guilt and shared responsibility built into Marines that enhances operational proficiency. Marines will not let each other down if avoidable, hence the old adage about fighting for the Marine on his left and right. Additionally, insisting on and noting deficiencies in discipline is imperative. Tried and true leadership techniques can grow and refine these qualities. To identify, recruit, train, and retain individuals with this most important quality, the Corps must first determine that discipline is the driver behind Marine Corps success, not some other innate or nebulous talent.

Additionally, in line with identifying, assessing, and growing disciplined Marines, understanding that developing high-performing Marines does not happen quickly is important. Discipline could be a natural individual characteristic, but more likely, and similar to leadership, it is a combination of the innate and learned when saddled with opportunity or need. There is no substitute for experience and maturity when it comes to making sound and reasoned decisions. An emphasis on discipline will inevitably lead to the betterment of all Marines.

It is undeniable that discipline (the combination of grit, self-control, and self-discipline) is extremely valuable—action must follow. One promising course is assessing these qualities in new accessions, and in our Marines, to assist in determining who to assess and who to retain. Professor Duckworth has developed grit tests—tools to determine the amount of grit and self-control an indi-



There is no substitute for experience and maturity. (Photo by Cpl Shannon Kroening.)

vidual possesses.⁴ While rudimentary and probably not optimal with regard to the Marine Corps' purposes right now, these tests could certainly be used as a starting point for developing a more comprehensive application appropriate for the Corps. Adding the results of a refined grit test could have numerous positive effects on the Corps. First, these tests, properly integrated, could reduce first term attrition by ensuring the accession of the right Marine at the point of entry, thereby eliminating risk at the source. Second, the Corps could refine MOS assignments. A highly refined grit test could assist in assigning Marines to the most appropriate MOS for the individual. Longer train and sustain pipelines and highly technical MOS could benefit from carefully selected, self-disciplined Marines. Third, using the results of these tests could enhance the promotion and retention processes if carefully balanced against the risk that Marines would begin giving the "right" answer instead of an accurate answer. While the test would not be a singular determinant of promotion or retention, it could inform better decisionmaking by selection boards and career planners. By improving the manner in which the Corps recruits, assigns, retains, and promotes Marines, the overall combat effectiveness of the Corps is enhanced.

Finally, another tangible step the Corps could take is to institute an adjustment to the fitness report. Inserting guidance into paragraphs 12 and 14 of Chapter 4 of the Performance Evaluation System (*Marine Corps Order 1610.7*), directing reporting seniors and reviewing officers to specifically comment on the self-discipline of the Marine being reported on within the Section I and K, certainly holds promise. This adjustment would add another level of insight to promotion, selection, and retention boards' efforts to identify the most qualified Marines. The adjustment would be less intrusive than inserting another lettered evaluation block that would impose software development and monetary costs on the Corps. Additionally, it enhances the markings regarding "effectiveness under stress" and "setting the example," in Section E and F of the fitness report.⁵



Success flows from discipline, which is not necessarily punishment and criticism. (Photo by Cpl Shannon Kroening.)

By directing the reporting senior and reviewing officer to evaluate discipline in their personnel, Marines would be incentivized to recognize its presence or absence within themselves and adjust their behavior accordingly.

The Marine Corps has an opportunity to capitalize on something that appears self-evident. Discipline is a force multiplier. To access and retain the best Marines possible, the Corps should use every tool in its arsenal. Retaining a Marine who is highly skilled

Discipline is force multiplier.

in a specific area but does not have the discipline to face disappointment and make the requisite sacrifices necessary for the Corps' success is just as bad as not retaining a Marine in the first place. As the Marine Corps moves forward facing threats from both nation states and rogue actors, the individual Marine remains the most potent instrument of victory. To maintain its edge over all enemies, the Marine Corps should reaffirm the belief that it is not talent in its most ubiquitous form but rather discipline, grit, and self-control that allows the Corps to fight and win on the battlefield today and tomorrow. Em-

phasizing these qualities as vital to the Corps' success will assist the Nation's shock troops in continuing to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready.

Notes

1. The MacArthur Foundation, "MacArthur Fellows Program," (Chicago, IL: 10 December 2015), accessed at <http://www.macfound.org>.
2. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-3, Tactics*, (Washington, DC: 30 July 1997), 97.
3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCRP 6-11D, Sustaining the Transformation*, (Washington, DC: 28 June 1999), 31.
4. Dr. Angela Duckworth, "The Duckworth Lab," (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania), accessed 22 February 2016 at <https://sites.sas.upenn.edu>.
5. Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 1610.7, Performance Evaluation System*, (Washington, DC: 13 February 2015), 4-28-4-31.



The Reality of Perception

What's the problem, and who cares?

by Capt Benjamin A. Skarzynski

Mismanaged perception can derail unit effectiveness. Controlling for all other factors, if two platoons are given the same task, but one perceives it negatively and one positively embraces it, the product will be significantly different—it could mean varying levels of success, even life or death. As leaders, we are obliged to study and better ourselves. Perception of the task or attitude of the command has a disproportionate impact on effectiveness. Leaders are the windows of perception as command flows down and control up. The ability of leadership to decipher perception, how perceptions are formed, why they exist, and how to mitigate negative effects, will increase effectiveness. What is the difference between a good leader

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and a bad leader in terms of how you are perceived? With a good leader, you want to do the things he tells you. With a bad leader, you resent him for the things he makes you do.

Although the issue of perception spans all levels of command, I will focus on company-level leadership and below. Drawing from psychology and business, as well as Marine Corps doctrine, I seek to identify and define the issue to leaders, discuss existing leadership strategies, apply strategies of interaction

and persuasion, and provide practical suggestions. Mitigating negative perceptions across, between, and among your unit will increase individual and unit satisfaction and pride, which will ultimately reflect in performance.

Perception

Every level of command has an opinion and perspective of those above and below it. As you experience friction and things invariably go wrong, you find ways to rationalize whose fault it is or who should have done something different. If higher headquarters had only planned better, they would have foreseen this problem, and we wouldn't be waiting here. If those Marines had only done their job, they never would have allowed this to happen.

The human mind can rationalize anything. When faced with issues, the primary outlet is to focus on an external source. To leadership at every level, perception *is* reality. What your commanding officer and Marines think of you *is* who you are to them. It is how you are evaluated and how you receive tasking and treatment. You cannot stop perception; you can only shape it.

What is perception? We receive stimuli from the world around us through our senses. This raw information forms our perception of the world. It is influenced by several factors: social norms, customs, past experiences, and personal biases. Applied to leadership, perception is how you view your role and tasks. Your immediate thought when you receive a task, or think of the logistics shop, is telling of your perception. Ok, so who cares, and what does this have to do with leadership? Human beings



If things go wrong or you experience friction, the first reaction will be to rationalize whose fault is it, what went wrong, and why. (Photo by Sgt Rebecca Floto.)

are fundamentally biased—nothing is perceived without the filter of your perception. Marines especially tend to be strong-willed individuals. This makes us prone to some traditional biases in perception.

Without being unnecessarily scientific, fundamental attribution error¹ is the tendency to focus on internal as opposed to external factors to explain behavior: “the Marines in the admin shop are stupid, and that is why they messed my package up. That’s their only job!” as opposed to, “They process hundreds of items each day, and the information that I gave them was incomplete.” In self-serving bias,² individuals associate success with internal factors and failure with external factors. Think about your immediate reaction to feedback and evaluations. Do you immediately attempt to explain your faults or do you think of ways to correct them?

This is not to say that all Marines are blindly arrogant and egotistical but consider our inclination to biases in perception. Even as an introspective person, it takes conscious self-thought to consider my biases in perception. I know that I have personally experienced both of these biases in my perception. This feeds an adversarial climate and reduces efficiency. If I think that the logistics shop is inadequate and equate success to myself, I am less likely to enlist their help. Not only do I lose capability, but I open myself to increased friction. Take that a step further to consider the potential effect on perception and command climate. If I think like that, it probably exists across the battalion staff. An infantry battalion is functionally organized to provide capabilities. To intentionally shut out functional areas limits our combined capabilities, either as a MAGTF or battalion, all because of biases in perception.

Ownership

According to leadership principles, we should all seek responsibility and take responsibility for our actions. To foster a cohesive unit and positive command climate, ownership must be broadly applied. When a command decision is issued, it is owned by all Marines in that command. It is the

subordinate leader’s imperative to ensure his Marines understand the decision, and to vest interest and responsibility. This increases ownership by subordinate leaders.

Under high stress and operational tempo, perception becomes disproportionately important to effectiveness. Undermanned, overtasked, and faced with the loss of several key leaders in the triangle of death in Iraq in 2005–06, members of one of the most elite Army units, the 101st Airborne Division, committed unspeakable atrocities by raping a young girl and murdering her and her family. Pervasive throughout the personal accounts in the book is the issue of

your perspective and set the tone for those you lead.

Negotiation

Perception is largely transferred through the chain of command in the form of orders, direction, and guidance. How you perceive your task and your company commander depends, in large part, on how he interacts with you. The same applies to the Marines under your charge; the manner in which we interact with Marines matters. You can convey the same content several different ways and elicit a wide variety of responses, perceptions, and, most importantly, results.

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perception. Had the chain of command in *Black Hearts*³ conveyed a greater sense of ownership to that platoon, it may have changed the platoon’s attitude toward the Iraqis and other units in the battalion. Though in retrospect we seek to justify, the sense of isolation and ostracism is tangible and the ramifications are chilling. Would they still have committed those atrocities? It is impossible to say. Establishing causality is beyond the scope of this article, but certainly a correlation exists. Take a good look at your own unit and deep inside your own leadership style. The scary thing is that those same issues of perception are universal.

We are asked to accomplish a wide variety of tasks. Maybe some are seemingly meaningless, or the output is not apparent. That is when it is most important for a leader to be aware of and manage perception. Negative perception, regardless of task or situation, is infectious, especially from leadership. There is a time and place for venting frustrations, but it is among peers. When faced with an issue, you can be a part of the problem or part of the solution. When you own everything and are solution-oriented, you correct

In *Getting More*, Stuart Diamond asserts that there is no difference between negotiation, persuasion, communications, and selling.⁴ The nature of our work as Marines often results in undesirable tasks. Someone has to tell the Marines to do it, which will invariably be accompanied by their perception of the task through the lens of your tasking, whether it is digging a hole and living out of it or producing signed rosters validating our ability to safely operate motor vehicles and water craft. Orders, guidance, and direction all function as a negotiation, though often one sided. Clausewitz describes war as an interactive social process.⁵ Leadership, too, is an interactive social process; the way that we convey orders and guidance is received and perceived by the human being on the other end of it. Diamond describes the spectrum of negotiation:

- Forcing people to do what you will them to do.
- Getting people to think what you want them to think.
- Getting people to perceive what you want them to perceive.
- Getting people to feel what you want them to feel.⁶

If I want to stay in the field an extra day to remediate training, but my platoon sergeant wants to head back to rest the Marines, our interaction is a negotiation. We both have things that we want and employ strategies in their pursuit. As a leadership team, the way that we reach that decision is going to affect the perception of my platoon sergeant and the Marines who undoubtedly have physical hardship in their future. Consider the above processes. First is coercion. “Staff Sergeant, we’re going to stay in the field another day, good to go?” I am leveraging rank and authority in order to force my point. Though commonly associated with the military in general, this is the weakest form of persuasion. Perhaps, “we came out to accomplish this task. According to the definition of the task in the T&R manual [training and readiness], we have not accomplished the task.

with little sleep, perception is critical to the success of training. If the perception becomes negative, then effort will cease and training value will dramatically decrease. Authority and the T&R manual may not sufficiently motivate a cold, wet, and tired Marine.

Measures of Success and the First Step Forward

Part of being a leader is evaluating your own effectiveness. It is imperative to continually strive to improve yourself and ensure efficiency in leadership and operations—you owe that to your Marines. Once you identify perception as an issue, the next step is to figure out where you stand. There needs to be feedback or measures of success as a leader. How do you know how you are being perceived as a leader, and how can you avoid self-deceit and self-serving bias?

Part of being a leader is evaluating your own effectiveness. It is imperative to continually strive to improve yourself and ensure efficiency in leadership and operations—you owe that to your Marines.

Therefore, we must stay another day in order to be successful.” Getting people to think what you want them to think is logic-based. Or, even stronger, “SSgt, we’re both invested in the success of the platoon. Neither of us want to perform poorly at our assigned tasks, so in order to accomplish this, we need to stay.” Aligning goals can be a powerful tool, especially when you both perceive the problem in the same way. The only more powerful form is to employ emotions, to get him to want what you want, and feel how you feel—evoke *esprit de corps* and pride in proficiency.

The argument is not that we need to start making emotionally-based cases for everything. The manner in which you convey your guidance, however, is going to affect how it is perceived by your Marines. If it is raining, and we have been working hard for several days

Command climate surveys are a good existing measure to help determine perception in the command, although they are only required at the battalion level. It provides bottom-up refinement and serves a tool to gauge perception within the command. When given the opportunity to anonymously offer opinions, leaders will divulge their perceptions. Frustrations will exist, but to prevent the survey from being every Marine’s opportunity to complain, word the prompts in such a way that they discuss legitimate issues and elicit constructive feedback. How would you rate the proficiency and effectiveness of the operations shop? In what ways could they better support companies? We use after-action reviews to learn from training, why not incorporate more frequent reviews of leadership at lower levels? The same model can apply at the platoon level. Evaluate the effectiveness of the

training schedule. In what ways can we better accomplish our goals?

If you demand constructive criticism then ensure that you invite it upon yourself. “360 degree performance reviews” allow subordinates to anonymously evaluate their leaders. If you care about the perception of your subordinates, ask for it. It is functionally similar to a command climate survey, offering anonymous input. Using the formal medium of performance evaluation simultaneously humbles the leader and empowers the subordinate, providing invaluable feedback to the leader.

The problem of perception is that, without realizing its impact on unit effectiveness, it will fester and ultimately diminish unit capabilities. Leaders at every level are obligated to own and address these issues to maximize the unit capabilities and effectiveness. Applying existing strategies of ownership, considering how you are relaying orders and guidance, and institutionalizing feedback and perception analysis within your unit marginalizes its negative impact on you and your unit’s performance.

Notes

1. Dr. Christopher L. Heffner, “Our View of Self and Others,” AllPsych (blog), Chapter 8, Section 2, accessed at <http://allpsych.com>.
2. Ibid.
3. Jim Frederick, *Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in the Triangle of Death*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2011).
4. Stuart Diamond, *Getting More: How to Negotiate to Succeed in Work and Life*, (New York: Three Rivers, 2010), 12.
5. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997), 3.
6. Diamond, 6–9.



Outfitting for the Fight Ahead

Purchasing expeditionary systems for an expeditionary fighting force

by 2ndLt William S.L. Murphy

2330 off the coast of North Africa, conflict has erupted in a littoral city, and American lives are at risk. Marines of the 22d MEU are put on standby to conduct a non-combatant evacuation. The mission commander will have to decide how the Marines will gain access to the city and by what means they will evacuate the civilians. What aircraft are available for close air support? Where can rotary-wing assets land? Can the landing team use ground vehicles? At that moment, the mission commander should not have to question whether the systems at his disposal are the most effective to accomplish the mission. Conflict is inevitable. As America's expeditionary force-in-readiness, the Marine Corps must be prepared to respond to crisis at a moment's notice, and the weapons systems it purchases must be ready too.

In *Out of the Mountains*, David Kil-

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cullen describes the conflict climate in terms of four drivers: "population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness."¹ He goes further by stating that, as of 2012, 80 percent of the world's population lives within 60 miles of the sea (the littoral). Instead of just quoting this fact on countless PowerPoint presentations, the Marine Corps must fully accept its consequences and must prepare for the full spectrum of conflict in the urban littorals. This means that the vehicles, weapons systems, training, and strategy we use must be effective in that environment. The question is, are they?

The Marine Corps is in the process of procuring two major systems: the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV) and the F-35B. Both are formidable vehicles with a litany of features that would make previous generations drool. These vehicles are replacing aging predecessors, the HMMWV and the AV-8B Harrier and F-18, respectively. All three of these systems have been in active service for over 20 years, 30 in the case of the HMMWV. The decision to develop and replace these aging systems came out of time and experience over the last 15 years of conflict.

Iraq and Afghanistan had an enormous impact on the American military.² More than ten years of conflict has changed the strategy used in urban warfare and altered the vehicles in which Americans go to war. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while very different, showed us that a determined insurgency can inflict tremendous casualties on our forces using the improvised explosive device (IED). The IED is not a new weapon. It can be built using a variety of materials, making it an ideal weapon for insurgencies. IEDs have been around in numerous forms for decades and have been used around the world from Northern Ireland to Lebanon, Chechnya to Vietnam, and, more recently, in Paris. The destruction wrought on the coalition's unarmored vehicles in the early years of the Iraq war was horrendous. Thin-skinned HMMWVs were easy targets for insurgents looking to attack American forces.

In response to this threat, the United States and other coalition countries began purchasing mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs). This new



The F-35B is not a premier close air support aircraft. (Photo by Sgt Lillian Stephens.)

generation of armored personnel carriers boasted V-shaped hulls, heavy armor, and thick ballistic glass, making them some of the safest vehicles for coalition troops. However, the early MRAPs were large, heavy, and not capable of off road maneuverability. Since then, designs have been refined. By 2009, the Army and Marine Corps were outfitting troops with the Oshkosh MRAP all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV). Smaller than most other MRAPs, the M-ATV gave soldiers and Marines protection, mobility, and good off-road performance. Hoping to build off of that success, the Army and Marine Corps have recently awarded Oshkosh the contract to replace to aging HMMWV with the JLTV, an even lighter MRAP.

The JLTV is a well-protected and powerful vehicle. According to Oshkosh, the JLTV will offer the same under belly blast protection of an MRAP while having the off-road mobility of a HMMWV.³ At over 14,000 pounds, the JLTV will be twice the weight of a HMMWV, as well as being wider and taller. The larger size of this new vehicle has implications for an expeditionary force, such as the Marine Corps. It can provide an unparalleled level of mobility and protection if the vehicle can get to the battlefield or wherever a crisis arises.



The JLTV is a replacement for the MRAP. (Photo by Cpl Austin Schlosser.)

paring for a non-combatant evacuation mission in a dense urban area 60 miles inland from the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. Due to the time sensitive nature of the mission, a ground convoy to the evacuation site is infeasible. The civilians are in a non-governmental organization headquarters deep inside the ancient section of the city. There are no hasty landing zones for the Marines to land helicopters. Power lines hang

kilometers from the non-governmental organization's headquarters. Analyzing the urban terrain, it is decided that the JLTVs are too large to effectively maneuver down the city streets, even if they could be effectively transported by the helicopters. The Marines must navigate on foot through a potentially hostile environment, organize the evacuees and use unarmed, civilian vehicles to move hastily back to the landing zone. That mission would have to be completed without medium or heavy machine guns, while possibly being harassed by mounted enemy infantry.

This type of scenario is not hard to imagine—many littoral cities are not built to accommodate modern vehicles. Large, armored vehicles would be unable to maneuver through a densely packed and poorly constructed urban area. Do not take this to mean that armor and even tanks do not have a place in urban warfare; they do. Finding a solution is not easy. The JLTV is the product of a great deal of work to shrink the M-ATV and create an effective solution to the IED threat. However, as an expeditionary force, we will not get to choose when we fight, evacuate, keep the peace, or provide humanitarian assistance. We need the ability to deploy vehicles from helicopters, planes, and ships, giving Marines maneuverability and fire power in urban areas.

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The size of the JLTV, however, limits its mobility in numerous environments, particularly third world, littoral cities where the Marine Corps will most likely deploy.

Narrow streets, low electrical wires, and ineffective port facilities all present large logistical and operational issues for the JLTV. Going back to the introduction scenario, Marines from the 22d MEU receive an urgent call and are pre-

ten feet above the street, dangling low, presenting dangerous obstacles for a turret gunner nearly nine feet above the ground. The streets are narrow and cluttered with obstacles. Although fictional, this could describe dozens of cities in the region and many more worldwide. The Marines depart the USS *Wasp* aboard MV-22s and CH-53s and land on the closest available landing zone several

One vehicle capable of easily maneuvering within an urban environment is the Jeep ground mobility vehicle. It comes in a variety of armed and personnel carrying configurations and is still capable of fitting aboard a CH-47. In comparison, the CH-53 has a 2.5-foot wider cabin, the same cabin height, and could accommodate the Jeep ground mobility vehicle or a similar system. Despite providing much less protection from IEDs, they are capable of bringing fire power and maneuverability to the tightest urban environment. Having this type of capability on a MEU would give mission commanders the flexibility to respond to a greater variety of missions, confident that their Marines would have the tools necessary to accomplish the mission and return home.

On the other end of the spectrum is the F-35B. A state of the art aircraft, the F-35B offers advantages in speed, stealth, firepower, and command and control capabilities over the current Marine aircraft. However, given that the role of Marine Corps aviation is to “support Marines on the ground,” the fact that the F-35B will not reach full close air support ability until 2022 presents a serious problem.⁴

According to a 2015 military.com article, the F-35B will not have the necessary software to deploy the latest generations of close air support munitions, the Small Diameter Bomb II (SDBII). Furthermore, the aircraft touts numerous features that are more at home in an air-to-air conflict rather than supporting troops on the ground. If the aircraft was designed to counter air-to-air threats more than support the GCE, then it does not fulfill Marine Corps aviation’s mission as it should.

In an effort to dispel the image that the F-35B is not a premier close air support aircraft, the Air Force will hold a head-to-head competition in 2018 against the best close air support jet in the Air Force’s arsenal, the A-10. While the results of this competition will undoubtedly be interesting, one wonders if there were other platforms available that could have been a better replacement for the Harrier than the F-35B. Shouldn’t this plane should be capable of slow flying speeds, low altitude mis-



A-29s were delivered to Afghanistan in 2016. (Photo from Wikimedia.org.)

sions, carrying the necessary munitions, and tailor-made to support the GCE? Perhaps not, but there are those who will always wonder if this aircraft was purchased because it best suits the Marine Corps’ mission or because it was the most technologically advanced.

There are many proponents of an aircraft that is dedicated to close air support. Two outstanding examples of this kind of aircraft are the Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano, now designated the A-29, and the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine. Both aircraft are proven turbo-props, capable of carrying a wide variety of armament, and are already being used to combat insurgencies around the globe. In the case of the A-29, the United States is already purchasing and providing these aircraft to the Afghan Air Force to fight the Taliban.⁵

This has not been meant as an attack article against the new systems developed and purchased by the Marine Corps. Rather, it is meant to begin a thoughtful discussion about aligning strategy and mission capabilities with system development and procurement. There is no doubt that the new capabilities that are coming into production will greatly help with some missions, but it is questionable whether they will help the Corps face the full spectrum

of conflict. Will the JLTV work as well delivering humanitarian aid and keeping the peace in Haiti as it does fighting terrorists in Fallujah? Will the F-35B support Marines on the ground as well as it will combat other aircraft?

This article begs to ask the question, “Are we buying vehicles to fight the last war instead of the next war?” Whatever the answer may be, no purchase should be made without thinking this answer through.

Notes

1. David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*, (New York: Oxford Press, 2013), 28.
2. *Ibid.*, 26.
3. Oshkosh Defense, “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),” (2014), accessed at <http://oshkoshdefense.com>.
4. Kris Osborn, “F35 Will Not Reach Close Air Support Potential Until 2022,” *Military.com*, (9 March 2015), accessed at <http://www.military.com>.
5. Richard Sisk, “After Delays, A-29 Attack Aircraft to Arrive in Afghanistan in 2016,” *Military.com*, (28 December 2015), accessed at <http://www.military.com>.



Strengthening Garrison Decision-Making Ability

Using small unit integrity decision games

by LtCol Aaron A. Angell

What would you do? Given the opportunity to prevent a drunk driving, sexual harassment, sexual assault, or domestic violence incident, *what would you do?* The easy answer is that you would take the steps to prevent these incidents, but the truth is that actual life is not so simple. You will often not be asked simply if you want to step in to prevent an incident. Real incidents may involve you directly as the offender, victim, or potentially as a witness. In each role, what would you do?

Real experiences give us the opportunity to test our mettle; however, we do not all have the opportunities to gain these experiences before being tested. Furthermore, some of us may not get a second chance to save ourselves or to save our fellow Marines and families. Thinking tactically, the question of “what would you do” is something that each one of us must think about and ask relative to combat—hence why we seek to develop realistic combat training to prepare ourselves. One method for creating experience without actually being in the incident is through tactical decision games (TDGs). The intent of this article is to draw out the use of decision games for integrity issues and to enlighten our Marines to do the right thing implicitly. Ultimately, this article offers a technique to build integrity resilience and create adaptability through the use of small/unit integrity decision games, potentially even in lieu of the traditional safety brief.

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Integrity Decision Games

A decision game, or decision-making game, is a low-fidelity simulation of incidents that might occur where an individual, or a group, is presented with a dilemma with varying levels of uncertainty. The methodology of a decision game is to put the participant into a realistic scenario, using an extremely low-cost experiential exercise. The end state is a strengthened decision maker who has more practical experience in thinking through challenging problems and potentially greater understanding of the considerations of a given scenario. Adding a time limitation adds to the pressure and makes it more realistic.¹ Like most skills, you can improve decision making ability through practice.²

Playing a tactical decision game (TDG) is very simple. Putting yourself [the teacher] in the role of the commander, you read the situation [to the student]; within an established time limit you decide what plan to adopt and communicate that plan in a form of the orders you [the student] would issue to your unit if the situation were for real. You provide an overlay of your plan. Then, and this is an important part of the process, you explain your plan as a means of analyzing why you did what you did.³

Being military professionals, we have often been involved with TDGs as participants or as teachers, using this method to build our understanding of tactical scenarios. Furthermore, TDGs strengthen our ability to make decisions for the inevitable situation when we are faced with a similar situation on the battlefield.

The leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formulae that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.⁴

TDGs are not a fresh idea. Now, take this concept of decision games for the purpose of tackling non-tactical, or garrison, leadership issues. These are day-to-day challenges that each Marine faces while deployed, at work, at home

station, and even on liberty. This also may not seem novel, but think about the impact of this approach. Leaders can introduce tough topics that have resulted in poor decisions and bad judgment by Marines in the unit or expand them to include trends across the Marine Corps. Leaders can put their Marines, and themselves, into realistic scenarios designed to help them realize the considerations related to making the right decision. Leaders are creating an experience that will build habits of action and resilience for their Marines to fall back on when similar situations happen in real life.

Varied scenarios can be based on annual training requirements but also on the needs of the unit based on current trends. Resources are available, but be innovative—leaders can make realistic scenarios themselves. Use current unit issues, although avoid embarrassing certain individuals. You can create a realistic scenario without making it a replica of what just happened the week before. On the other hand, you could also recreate the scenario as a case study to teach individuals in your unit what did actually happen in a recent event. This can potentially reduce rumors, with some risk of embarrassment for the individual. A bold variation is to have the involved Marine provide his experiences for realism.

Resources are available if you are looking for a starting point. Over time, the *Marine Corps Gazette* has included numerous combat or operational related TDGs. To tackle some of the non-tactical scenarios, the Lejeune Leadership Institute, a branch within the Marine Corps University, has released the *Issues for Garrison Ethics and Leadership* (2009). Other options available for integrity or ethical decision games include *Leadership, Ethics, and Law of War Discussion Guide for Marines* (2008), *Discussion Material for Small Unit Leaders Issues of Battlefield Ethics and Leadership and Issues* (2008)⁵, *MCRP 6-11B* (with change 1), and *Marine Corps Values: A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, October 1998).

Scenario-based training creates adaptability. Decision games will ex-



Hip pocket classes are also a way in which small unit leaders can discuss current unit trends or concerns. (Photo by LCpl Osvaldo Ortega.)

ponentially increase the ability of an individual to make an informed decision even in a scenario that the individual may not have previously experienced first-hand.

Small Unit Discussions

Discussions engage individuals. An effective technique is to engage individuals to draw on their experiences and get their involvement in the process of education and training. Using discussions to follow a decision game has an enormous positive impact on the participants. Assuming that the decision game scenario will come true, the learning that occurred across the group will enable individuals to operate more implicitly to approach and potentially solve a problem. They will have already developed a foundation of knowledge regarding the scenario, to include understanding what considerations are important. Further, the group will have identified during the discussion which participants have applicable strengths in understanding and solving certain problems. These are just a few subtle impacts of using small unit discussion groups for scenario-based training that may not be realized until you are in a real situation.

Leaders should empower NCOs to lead these discussions. These decision

games and discussions provide the opportunity for NCOs to develop communication skills in small unit settings and an opportunity to better understand their Marines, relative to the topic. NCOs can utilize participants who have experience with a specific scenario to provide more context and realism. These participants have the experience that we want to share with others who have not yet gained that particular experience themselves. The objective is to draw out that experience for others to learn these lessons, without requiring each individual to have to learn the hard way through personal experience.

We know that building rapport as a small unit leader is important for unit trust, and small unit discussions are the avenue to do so. As participants share their experiences and further reflect their individual perspectives on life, the leader can share personal experiences, orchestrate involvement of those who have related experiences, and provide guidance and direction to assist each participant in making a right choice. The more that the individuals in a unit are familiar with those around them, the closer the unit will be as a team. This creates trust up and down the chain of command, which further benefits the health of the unit in mission accom-

plishment as well as responsiveness to personal welfare concerns.

Timing Considerations

There are a few timing considerations to effectively use these small unit integrity decision games as a technique. This is an educational technique that you can use on a regular schedule or as a hip pocket class. You could use this in place of a weekly liberty brief. You may also want to drive the topic based on current unit trends. Each of these considerations provides enormous flexibility to the commander.

First, you may establish a unit battle rhythm to employ this technique with regularity. This enables your leaders to effectively prepare for these discussions. Further, it shows a dedication on your part to the use of this technique to develop adaptability and resilience within your junior leaders. On the other hand, this training technique can be impromptu with the benefit of not having to coordinate training areas and equipment. This is described as "Situational Training" in *Common Sense Training, A Working Philosophy for Leaders* (New York: Penguin Random House, November 1998) by LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr. Using this technique more spontaneously may also show your junior leaders that this can be done at

any time. This works well when a unit spontaneously, yet frequently, pauses operations to conduct situational training with tactical and non-tactical topics. However, without using this technique regularly or frequently, it is possible that a unit will not use the technique at all.

Next, you may use these small unit integrity decision games in place of a weekly liberty safety brief. The idea is to move away from a formation where an individual lists the things not to do and instead use a small discussion venue to discuss integrity issues. The intent is to send your Marines on liberty after discussing realistic integrity dilemmas. Sending Marines into a weekend after putting them in tough scenarios that they may live out during the weekend is a powerful way to influence their personal judgment.

Lastly, senior leaders can be personally involved in driving the topics for these discussions while using small unit leaders to conduct the training. Commanders and senior enlisted leaders can choose specific topics based on current command climate issues, potential upcoming challenges based on operational commitments or scheduled holiday periods, or availability of individuals with certain experiences. There is no perfect calculation for determining the most appropriate topic. However, the success

of a unit in dealing with non-tactical life issues is one way to show if this program is effective.

Conclusion

You should consider using decision games to exponentially improve the abilities of your Marines to make the right decision in tactical and non-tactical scenarios. Consider employing the technique of decision games, followed by small unit discussions that are driven by NCOs. Strengthen your junior leaders by empowering them to discuss real-life dilemmas using a technique that presents considerations related to realistic life dilemmas, and then puts individuals in the hot seat to make decisions. Use scenarios that hit close to home in your unit, or that you see on the horizon, to prepare your Marines for the inevitable. Develop these scenarios using your own experience, use the experiences of your Marines, or open some of the listed resources to create a spark to ignite this flame in your unit. It is not guaranteed to prevent every bad decision, but it is guaranteed to better prepare your young decision makers.

Notes

1. Donald E. Vandegriff, *Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War*, (Washington, DC: Center For Defense Information, 2006), 102.
2. John F. Schmitt, *Marine Corps Gazette's Mastering Tactics*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1994), 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *FMFRP 12-2, Infantry in Battle*, (Washington, DC: 1998), 1.
5. *Issues for Garrison Ethics and Leadership* (2009); *Leadership, Ethics, and Law of War Discussion Guide for Marines* (2008); and *Discussion Material for Small Unit Leaders: Issues of Battlefield Ethics and Leadership and Issues* (2008) are available through the Marine Corps University, Lejeune Leadership Institute, and can be accessed at <https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/sites/leadership/>.



When small unit leaders build trust within the unit, unit members become more willing to share their experiences. (Photo by LCpl Herman Vidana.)



BIG “T”/Little “t”

The emerging training paradigm for deployed Marine Corps forces

by Maj Christian C. Pappas & Charles M. Olmsted

“Using specific words to describe the training we provide matters,” Col J. Q. Bohm, CO, Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, Crisis Response, Central Command 15.1 (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) told his staff. The CO’s words detailed an important distinction when we were addressing the training we were conducting with our Iraqi, Jordanian, Bahraini, Kuwaiti, and other coalition partners. Correctly characterizing and explaining this training or cooperation is critical when U.S. units describe daily interaction with foreign forces. That distinction touched on the fact that words matter and drive authorities almost as much as the actions that those words characterize. “Training” is one of those critical words. We distinguished our training parameters, authorities, and fiscal constraints by using the colloquial terms “Big T” and “little t” when addressing this subject in situation reports or other similar communications. The activities conducted throughout the entirety of SPMAGTF-CR-CC’s deployment would lend even greater weight to these passing words spoken in a staff meeting.

During the course of SPMAGTF-CR-CC’s deployments, working in conjunction with U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT), U.S. Marine Corps Force Central Command (Forward) (MARCENT ([Fwd])), Combined Joint Task Force-Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR), and Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command-Iraq (CJFLCC-I), SPMAGTF-CR-CC developed and conducted a wide range of training with and of coalition and partner nation military forces. Each training event involving partnered military forces required a clearly defined authority, which, at

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Big T training is authorized and funded by Congress and is designed to build the capability of our partner nation. (Photo by Cpl Paul S. Martinez)

times, was not as clearly defined as one would have hoped due to the constantly changing grid of authorities and policy interpretations. As the Marine Corps departs the paradigm of over a decade of land warfare in well-defined joint operating areas and re-enters its traditional role of fighting the Nation’s small wars through Phase 0 engagement to partnered kinetic strikes in the same day, it is imperative that commanders and their staffs familiarize themselves with the authorities that will enable them to fight and win the Nation’s conflicts

while remaining true to the oaths each have sworn to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of America.

In accordance with the *National Security Strategy*,¹ the United States is likely no longer going to “go it alone” and will rely heavily on formal coalitions and partners to maintain its national security. Fighting with and through partners will be the method by which the United States will maintain its place in the world. The coalition and partnered warfare executed over the

past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan will only increase as the United States continues to engage both near-peer competitors such as Russia and asymmetric threats like the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL). This article, though touching briefly on the experiences of other recently deployed Marine forces, will focus on the experiences of SPMAGTF-CR-CC 15.1 and 15.2, and the authorities on which they relied in conducting various training events with foreign forces that ranged from multinational exercises to training of foreign security forces while in combat. Our objective is to assist commanders and staffs in understanding some of the underlying authorities that they will rely upon when executing missions in the “new normal” environment.

Training with and training of foreign forces is nothing new to the Marine Corps. Marine Corps training and advisory groups hail as far back as to the Banana Wars of 1915. There, Marines not only served in an operational

capacity, they also organized, advised, and trained units in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.² Today, SPMAGTFs and MEUs continue to train with foreign forces under various mandates and authorities around the globe.³

The nuance of training *with* a foreign force vice providing training *to* a foreign force is a significant dichotomy that must be understood by commanders and their staffs as they deploy in the new normal environment. Put simply, there are two primary types of training we can conduct with partnered nations: formalized training and interoperability training. Colloquially, formalized training is referred to as “Big T” training, while interoperability training is referred to as “little t” training. Big T training is training and equipping specifically authorized and funded by Congress in order to build the capacity of a coalition or partner nation and is also commonly referred to as security assistance. Little t training is

training conducted with coalition and partner nations that primarily benefits the DOD. As was highlighted by Col Bohm, words matter in distinguishing what it is a MAGTF is doing, because failure to adhere to the law can have serious implications not only for the unit but also for U.S. foreign policy.

Through the Constitution, Congress has the power of the purse, and it is for the Executive to execute the fiscal mandates.⁴ Training of foreign forces always involves the expenditure of public funds and resources, and consequently, Commanders must execute their missions in accordance with the law. Congress maintains control of activities such as training of foreign forces through public laws and statutes, such as the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the DOD Appropriations Act (DODAA), and title 10 and 12 provisions. As with any expenditure of funds from the public, spending money for training follows the fiscal law principles of purpose, time, and amount. In order

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for training of foreign forces to occur, Congress must specifically authorize it and appropriate for it.⁵

“Big T”

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead Federal Agency for training and equipping foreign military forces, and its authority in this regard is primarily set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. The execution of training and equipping foreign forces, also known as security assistance, is Big T training and is commonly executed in the form of foreign military sales like the cases with the U.S. Military Training Mission–Saudi Arabia and the Marine Corps Training Mission–United Arab Emirates, both of which are conducted under the purview of DOS even though the actual training is conducted by the U.S. military. However, Congress, in carrying out its mandate to control who can spend money on what and when, has authorized the DOD to execute security assistance in support of coalition and partner nations in certain limited circumstances either through codified U.S. statute or, more typically in the case of the DOD, through the annual NDAA and DODAA. The fiscal year (FY) 2015 NDAA not only authorized funding for training of foreign forces but also set forth vetting requirements to ensure that the U.S. trains only those forces that have not engaged in conduct



Little t training primarily benefits DOD. (Photo by Cpl Paul S. Martinez.)

ally there is little room for deviation from the guidance established by the DOD to implement congressionally authorized training packages; therefore, the executing units must understand the limits of their authority as they are critical in ensuring compliance with law and policy and, arguably more importantly, ensuring the Marine Corps will have a continued role in these partnerships and programs.

One of SPMAGTF-CR-CC’s primary training initiatives involved establishing and supporting advise and assist (A&A) and build partnership

support, supplies and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment in order to defend Iraq from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ITEF provides authority to train Iraqi security forces with a national security mission, including Kurdish Security Forces, tribal forces, and certain other local security forces. Consistent with long running U.S. policy, ITEF may not be used to train groups with terrorist affiliations or with connections to Iran.

In addition to ensuring that U.S. forces do not train terrorist groups or Iranian-backed militias, all units receiving training or equipment must be vetted to ensure that they demonstrate compliance with international human rights law. In order to accomplish this goal, Section 1236 contains Leahy vetting requirements. Prior to beginning training or equipping any units, the names and other identifying information on the Iraqi brigade and battalion commanders of the units must be gathered and submitted to DOS for vetting through the International Vetting and Security Tracking System (INVEST). For units smaller than a brigade or battalion, the information for the senior leader in the unit is also submitted for vetting. An additional requirement to the vetting process is to provide Iraqi forces with training on the law of armed

One of SPMAGTF-CR-CC’s primary training initiatives involved establishing and supporting advise and assist (A&A) and build partnership capacity (BPC) sites for training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

contrary to national policy.⁶ This vetting is typically done through a process known as Leahy vetting.⁷ Thus, through statute Congress specifically authorizes the DOD to conduct training in order to enhance the capabilities of a partner nation. The DOD then publishes additional guidance to dictate how training will be conducted. Typi-

capacity (BPC) sites for training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Congress authorized this formalized training under the FY 2015 NDAA section 1236, Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and reauthorized with modifications in the FY 2016 NDAA. ITEF gives DOD, in coordination with DOS, authority to provide training, equipment, logistics



Marines from the Black Sea Rotational Force participated in an exercise involving eight NATO nation and partner nations. (Photo by Cpl Kelly Street.)

conflict, human rights, and respect for civil authority. The SPMAGTF-CR-CC staff judge advocate (SJA) or a representative from CJFLCC-OIR normally provides this training, utilizing a CJFLCC-OIR produced period of instruction.

The other significant Big T training initiative for SPMAGTF-CR-CC is the BPC authority granted in the FY 2006 NDAA as amended and now codified as 10 U.S.C. Section 2282. This authority gives the DOD, with the concurrence of DOS, the authority to train a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support on-going allied or coalition military stability operations that benefit the United States. The statute covers types of capacity building, limitations, congressional notification prior to implementation of a program, and coordination with DOS.⁸ 2282 authority includes providing foreign forces with equipment, supplies, training, defense services, and small-scale construction (less than \$750,000 per project). Most of the funds are supposed to be spent on training and equipping with very little on construction (<5 percent of total). 2282 authority is treated much like a foreign military sales case, to include pseudo letters of acceptance

and Security Cooperation Office (SCO) vetting and monitoring responsibilities. Practically speaking, which was the case of SPMAGTF-CR-CC 15.1, what this means is that there is a long tail required for notification, production, and delivery as well as a limitation on the

... U.S. forces are authorized to train with coalition or host-nation forces ...

activities that can be conducted, namely that operational support in current and future operations is limited like that of an foreign military sales case. Because of this, initial activities under the approved case were limited to training of Jordanian forces but using only organic Jordanian training equipment and ammunition. Only in follow-on iterations has the full scope of the case been realized with the delivery of significant ammunition stocks and equipment to support the Royal Jordanian Marine Battalion and the rapid reaction force; however, the advisors supporting the case cannot advise on current counter-

ISIL activities while in their 2282 role. The lesson learned from this experience was to work heavily with the MARFOR and the SCO in the U.S. embassy in order to leverage other authorities and to synchronize efforts to support the combatant commander's theater campaign plan and the host-nation's desires. An additional consideration for Section 2282 authorized training is that, like most security assistance statutes, it must include elements that promote observance of and respect for human rights and the rule of law. Unlike the 1236 training requirements in Iraq, for human rights training conducted under 2282, the DOD has mandated a specific two-day training course created by and under the purview of the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS).⁹ The training must employ DIILS approved instructors and DIILS materials. Thus, there is an extra coordination element required for 2282, which is not required for 1236, but is easily met using DIILS instructors and the SPMAGTF-CC-CR, 5th MEB and other forward deployed judge advocates. Again, coordinating through the MARFOR and the SCO, the training could be delivered in a timely manner.¹⁰

“Little t”

As part of its constitutional role in raising and supporting armies and to provide and maintain a navy, Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of the military, which allows units to train to missions assigned through the Executive. The key mission being fighting and winning America's wars, which under current national strategy and practice means the U.S. military must learn to fight alongside partner and coalition forces. As such, as a necessary expense to meet its mission, U.S. forces are authorized to train with coalition or host-nation forces, unless otherwise specifically provided for. This training is usually referred to as interoperability training, or colloquially, as little t training. This little t training is authorized so long as it is genuinely intended to benefit the DOD unit conducting the training and is limited to interoperability, familiarization of U.S. forces with

a foreign security force, and safety for the U.S. unit conducting operations or exercises with a foreign security force.¹¹ Much can be done within the scope of little t training; however, this is not a separate authority like security assistance authorities that allow for the provision of equipment or formal training. The key to any analysis in making this determination is whether the U.S. forces would be adding capability or capacity to the foreign security force or would any benefit to the foreign security force be merely incidental to the United States conducting training of its own forces. This determination turns on purpose and intent of the training and should focus on whether the interoperability training is being conducted in support of an exercise, current operations, or a registered operation plan.

For SPMAGTF-CR-CC, all training with foreign security forces that fell outside of the Big T specified authorities mentioned above, were informal, interoperability, or little t training events. SPMAGTF-CR-CC conducted little t training with Kuwaiti, Bahraini, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Emirati armed forces through discrete subject matter expert exchanges, shoulder-to-shoulder ranges, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and day-to-day interactions in the conduct of combined operations. For each of the events, the purpose of the training was to benefit the U.S. unit's training objectives. U.S. forces did not train the partnered force or supply it with any supplies or logistics.¹² Specific examples include training with Iraqi Air Force security forces with which SPMAGTF-CR-CC shared an obligation to defend Task Force Al Asad and Task Force Taqqadum, Bahraini Air Force pilots conducting strike coordination and reconnaissance/armed reconnaissance missions with SPMAGTF-CR-CC pilots, various subject matter experts exchanges assigned by MARCENT, participation in exercise EAGER LION in Jordan, and several partnered ranges at SPMAGTF-CR-CC's several basing locations with host-nation forces.¹³ In each of these cases, in order to enhance U.S. forces' security and safety at each location, SPMAGTF-CR-CC conducted interoperability training with

host-nation forces defending the base. While this training undoubtedly benefitted the several host-nation forces, the primary intended beneficiary was the United States.

The most significant lesson learned for the SPMAGTF-CR-CC staffs, and the judge advocates in particular, is the need to train the executing unit and individual planners on the scope of little t training. Units must avoid the temptation to lump all training into the interoperability category; despite the obvious attraction of less oversight, less required coordination, and greater flexibility by the executing unit. Interoperability training is truly for the benefit of U.S. forces in order to allow them to operate together with partner forces as the mission dictates. The danger and harm of masking security assistance behind a thin veil of little t training is much farther reaching than may be realized at the moment of execution by the company or battalion on the ground. Categorizing all ancillary training as interoperability training or little t training erodes credibility with the partner nation, higher headquarters and civilian leadership, subjects the unit to greater scrutiny and less freedom of action, and ultimately may lead to an Antideficiency Act violation or more restrictions enacted by Congress.

The training Marines conduct with our partnered forces will be as successful as the Marines on the ground make it, be it interoperability training or formalized security assistance. As deployed Marine units continue to train and work with partnered forces, be it the Black Sea Rotational Force working in Eastern Europe, the Georgian Liaison Team training and deploying with Georgians into combat, or the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin working with the Australians, the understanding of how we can train with them will remain important. It is imperative that a commander and staff understand the authorities under which it is to operate prior to deployment and that they continue to refine this understanding during execution in order to avoid violating the law and setting false expectations with the partner forces. Critical to the process of security cooperation refinement also includes

feedback from the "using" unit. If more authorities are required in order to allow follow on units to be more successful, then that message must be relayed back to the MARFORs to allow an advocate at both the Service and the combatant commander levels to request and fight for additional authorities through proper channels. With a continued, solid understanding of training left and right lateral limits, the Marine Corps will continue to accomplish the mission in the face of seemingly insurmountable challenges and, consistent with our history, it is under these circumstances when we, as an organization, usually shine the brightest.

"Big T"	"Little t"
Formalized training FOR foreign unit	"Interoperability" training WITH Foreign Unit
Enhances capability of foreign unit	Benefit of training flows to U.S. Unit
Authority comes from Congress/statute (i.e. NDAA)	No associated statutory authority
Funds come from designated "pot" of monty allocated by Congress	Unit O & M funds

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Notes

1. Government of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, DC: February 2015), 3.
2. Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama*, (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 470.
3. Some examples include the Black Sea Rotational Force, which completed PLATINUM LION 15-3, a multi-lateral exercise with European forces; SPMAGTF-CR-Africa (AF), which completed a training package with Senegalese Comandos, maritime security training under fiscal year 2015 (FY15) National Defense Authoriza-

tion Act (NDAA) section 1203, Counter Lord's Resistance Army foreign security force training under FY15 NDAA section 1206, and counter narcotics training under FY91 NDAA section 1004; the Marine Rotational Force–Darwin which regularly engages with the Australians and other Pacific partners; and the SPMAGTF-CR-CC which conducted multilateral and bilateral exercises alongside the MEUs as well as training Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) under FY06 NDAA section 1206 and Iraqi forces under FY15 NDAA 1236.

4. Congress' power of the purse is vested in Article I, section 8, cl. 1 and section 9, cl. 7 of the U.S. Constitution and plays a critical role in its relationship with the executive branch and the U.S. military. Through this power, Congress authorizes expenditure of funds and appropriates specific amounts that may be spent in support of operations, to include training of foreign forces as specifically delineated within statute.

5. "Purpose" requires that appropriations are applied only to the units for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a). Thus, if provided authorization and appropriations

to use on training the Iraqi Security Forces, the DOD may not use that money to train the Japanese Defense Force. A corollary to the principle of Purpose is the Necessary Expense Doctrine under which expenditures must be necessary and incident to the purposes of the appropriation, it must not be prohibited by law, and it must not otherwise have been provided for within another authorization or appropriation. See e.g. Hon. Bill Alexander, 63 Comp. Gen. 422, 427–428 (1984). The principle of Time requires that funds may only be used during their period of availability and that an obligation of funds may only be used to meet a bona fide or legitimate need that exists during the period of availability of that fund. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1502(a), 1552. The principle of Amount refers to the Antideficiency Act (ADA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1342, or 1517(a), which prohibits obligating and expending appropriations "in excess of" the amount available in an appropriation. This last restriction is a particularly important one as violations of the ADA can lead to administrative or punitive discipline and includes a report to the President naming the individual who made the violation. Even good faith or mistake of fact does not relieve an individual from responsibility for an ADA violation.

6. See e.g., Public Law no. 113-291, §§ 1209, 1236 (2014), and P. L. no. 114-92, §§ 1223, 1225 (2015) (continuing authority to provide security assistance to Iraqi Security Forces and Vetted Syrian Opposition).

7. Leahy vetting is a process through which the U.S. government vets U.S. assistance to foreign security forces, as well as DOD training programs, to ensure that recipients have not committed gross human rights abuses. When the vetting process uncovers credible evidence that an individual or unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, U.S. assistance is withheld, consistent with U.S. law and policy. This obligation to vet foreign security forces can be found in section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and in the FY 2014 NDAA.

8. 10 USC Section 2282. Authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces.

9. See www.diils.org for more info on this agency.

10. Like all security assistance programs, Leahy vetting was required which ensured that SPMAGTF-CR-CC partnered with and trained only those units that complied with the international law. A lesson learned from the SPMAGTF-CR-CC experience regarding vetting was that biometric data collected by

Marines could not be used as a substitute for vetting requirements in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. Applying lessons learned in Afghanistan, the FY15 NDAA Section 1236 contains specific requirements for the DOD to brief Congress as to what measures are in place for each training program to mitigate the insider threat. In accordance with that Congressional mandate, DOD has implemented biometric enrollment as a force protection measure. However, biometric enrollment is not and cannot serve as a substitute for "Leahy" or Section 1236 vetting, and the appropriate executive agencies must still coordinate and conduct vetting of those units receiving security assistance.

11. In 1983, the U.S. military was involved in a broad range of training and building capacity to a host of countries, including Honduras, where it was improperly using operations and maintenance funds for training and construction activities. This prompted Congressman Alexander, AK, to request a legal opinion from the Government Accounting Office. The legal opinion provided the limiting basis for future military security assistance expenditure of funds without proper associated authorities among other limitations. See The Honorable Bill Alexander, 63 Comp. Gen. (1984), 445–46.

12. This logistical support does not include acquisition and cross servicing agreements (ACSA) between the United States and partnered forces where any received logistical support is reimbursed from the country receiving it to the providing country, i.e. pay to play. ACSA is a separate authority that must follow regulations implemented through the chain of command to potentially include limited "warranted" ACSA officers as was the case within MARCENT.

13. Additionally, the MEUs and other SPMAGTF-CRs conduct "little t" military-to-military interoperability training within their several operating areas and may even draw from special appropriations in order to conduct this training. Such is the case for SPMAGTF-CR-AF when it draws from the Africa Partnership Station funds derived from NAVEUR and NAVAF. For Marines with MARFOREUR, almost all of the partnered training is "little t" training, carried out by the Black Sea Rotational Force in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Latvia under programs like the European Reassurance Initiative.



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What's Right, and How Do You Decide?

The ethical imperative
by 2ndLt John T. Bayko

The Marine Corps is a unique branch of Service for a multitude of reasons. The Corps has the longest and most rigorous basic training: every Marine—regardless of MOS—is trained as a rifleman, its history is venerated to near-religious proportions by its members, and a great number of other characteristics make it one of the most revered and deadly fighting forces on Earth. The Marine Corps is not legendary simply for its ferocity on the battlefield but also for its keenness of mind and the exceptionally proficient leaders it produces from both the enlisted and officer ranks. Every Marine, from private to general, is taught to be a leader; every Marine has a sphere of influence that they can positively (or negatively) affect with their actions. In a profession of arms, where the currency expended in battle is human lives, the importance of ethics to a leader has never been so prevalent. As exceptionally skilled warriors, we are often called upon to handle extremely difficult tasks at a moment's notice. When crisis strikes, it is far too late to sharpen our minds to make tough ethical decisions: we must prepare now.

Gen James N. Mattis illustrated the crucial importance of sharpening ethical decision making during a lecture at the Naval Academy in 2006. At the lecture, he discussed being investigated for a controversial bombing of a wedding party. When asked by the investigator how long it took him to make the decision to drop the bomb, he replied, "Thirty years. I spent thirty years preparing for that decision that took thirty seconds."¹ He went on to state in the lecture that he accepted full

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responsibility for the bombing and slept peacefully at night during the entire investigation because he knew that he had done the right thing. Gen Mattis's lecture illustrates two points: one, that there is not time to prepare for a crisis when it is already upon you, and two, that as leaders, there is special trust and confidence placed on our abilities to make ethical decisions.

Every Marine, from private to general, is taught to be a leader ...

In his lecture, Gen Mattis was also questioned about the Abu Ghraib scandal, which will forever illustrate what becomes of difficult situations when ethically bankrupt leaders are left in place. The Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq housed some 7,000 detainees. In 2003, it came to light that the prison was the site of egregious human rights violations committed by the U.S. forces guarding the prison, including physical and mental torture, sexual abuse, rape, sodomy, and murder. The incident irreversibly tarnished the image of the United States on the international stage and drastically reduced popular support for co-

alition forces in Iraq.² An entire book could be written on the breakdowns in ethical leadership that took place in Abu Ghraib prison, but Charles A. Graner, an NCO at the prison, is a prime example of what poor ethical leadership can do. Thirteen individuals were interviewed, and all 13 identified Graner as a ringleader in the abuse scandal. Graner's subordinates, who were involved in the scandal, deferred blame to him, stating that they were simply following orders.³ While everyone has a level of personal responsibility for their actions, it cannot be stressed enough that special trust or confidence rests with leaders because they exercise a tremendous amount of influence on those for whom they are responsible. When individuals who have not calibrated their moral compasses are put in positions of power, individuals such as Charles Graner and atrocities like Abu Ghraib are the result. As Marines, we are all leaders, and those we lead deserve better; they deserve leaders that are capable of making sound ethical decisions and making them quickly.

Studying cases such as Abu Ghraib are of critical importance to our development as leaders. Sometimes it is necessary to examine fictional cases as well to further our understanding of ethical decision making. A popular ethical dilemma that is used to sharpen decision-making skills is the "trolley dilemma." The trolley dilemma has

five individuals tied down to a set of tracks with a trolley speeding toward them. There is another set of tracks with a single individual tied to them. The individual making the ethical (or unethical) decision stands in a control room with the ability to divert the trolley. If he does nothing, the trolley will kill the five individuals; if he diverts the tracks, it will kill one individual. What do you do? Most people will respond that they would divert the tracks and have the trolley kill the one individual. This dilemma is normally followed up with a second, similar situation: there is only one set of tracks with five individuals tied to it. The decision maker stands on a bridge over the tracks next to an obese man, who, if pushed off the bridge, would stop the trolley. What do you do? Do nothing and let the five tied to the tracks die, or push the obese man off the bridge?

Most people are far more reluctant to push the obese man off the bridge in order to save the five than they are to divert the tracks. Are these two situations different? Most would argue yes. In the first situation, the one man dies as a *consequence* of saving the five, but in the second, the man dies as a *means* to save the five. Someone who aligns with the utilitarian approach to ethics (the greatest good for the greatest number of people) would both divert the track and push the man off the bridge. Someone who follows a virtue-based ethical code of conduct would divert the tracks (the one individual would die as a consequence of saving the five) but not push the man off the bridge, as to do so would be murder (the individual would die as a means to save the five). Let us introduce a third dilemma: a surgeon is brought five individuals critically injured in a car accident. If he does nothing, the patients will die, but if he sacrificed a coma patient for the body parts necessary to operate on the accident patients, they will live. Is this situation similar to the first or second trolley dilemma?

For a sobering example of how the trolley dilemma plays out in real life, let us examine the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan during World War II, over 190,000 killed, mostly civilians.

Did the United States make the correct decision in dropping the bombs? Did it not treat 190,000 Japanese people as means to end the war? Did the United States push the fat man off the bridge? Did they sacrifice the coma patient? Were they wrong to do so? Do we want to operate based on virtue or utilitarian ethical principles? These are the type of questions we must ask ourselves now in order to prepare for what is to come.

We are not without guidance as we ask ourselves these difficult ethical questions. Marines are given specific ethical guidelines through a number of sources; our core values, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Geneva Convention, the United States Code of Conduct, and the Constitution are just a few of the sources available to Marines to aid in making ethically-sound decisions. Understanding these documents and how they should (and should not) influence our decision-making process is key to making ethical decisions as fighter-leaders. Looking at ethical decision making through the lens of these documents changes how we make those decisions and adds a layer of complexity that is infinitely dense. For example, what if the obese man on the bridge was a convicted felon? What if the man in the coma used to save the car accident patients beat his wife? Does it matter that the Japanese had committed war crimes against the United States? We rarely have the luxury of making decisions in black and white situations as leaders; they are almost always gray. *MCDP1, Warfighting*, defines this gray area as a point of friction, “A force that makes simple difficult and the difficult impossible.”⁴ It is through constant study, experience, and an ethical compass guided by sources such as the Code of Conduct that we ultimately succeed as leaders and bring honor to ourselves, to our country, and to each other despite the friction these situations create.

So the question is, when do we as leaders begin preparing for these ethical decisions? The answer is now. Col Brian McCoy quotes then-MajGen P.K. Van Riper in his book *Passion of Command*, saying, “With 5,000 years of recorded military history there is no excuse for the lack of constant study.”⁵

For evidence that MajGen Van Riper’s statement is true, one should reference the ancient document written by the Chinese commander Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. In his work, Sun Tzu states that, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”⁶ There are few aspects of your character that you must know more thoroughly than your own code of ethics, especially if you are in the profession of arms. *MCDP 1* offers its readers a warning regarding taking preparation for their duties seriously: “Leaders must have a strong sense of the great responsibility of their office; the resources they will expend in war are human lives.”⁷ This is why anytime but now is too late to prepare for ethical decisions. When your finger is on the trigger, or that handset, or that button, it’s already too late; you will not be prepared, and you will make the wrong decision, or the worst decision, which as every leader knows is no decision at all.

Notes

1. Gen James N. Mattis, “Lecture on Ethics,” lecture, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 2006).
2. “U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison,” *The American Journal of International Law*, (Washington, DC: The American Society of International Law, 2004), 591–596.
3. J. Mayer, *The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals*, (New York NY: Penguin Random House, 2008), 286.
4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997), 5.
5. Col B.P. McCoy, *The Passion of Command*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 2006), 59.
6. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (Pax Librorum Printing House, 2009), 13.
7. *MCDP 1*, 57.

