MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

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A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

Welcome to the digital edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*

Happy Birthday, Marines! Welcome to the November digital edition. We hope we have connected you to the "old Corps" and given you a window into the "new Corps." Let us know how we are doing in our mission of dissemination of military art and science and preserving the history and traditions of the Corps.

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

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Celebrating the Corps' Birthday
(Photo by Carlos Guerra.)

DEPARTMENTS



IDEAS AND ISSUES

DIGITAL EDITION EXCLUSIVE

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GEN ROBERT E. HOGABOOM LEADERSHIP WRITING CONTEST

Gen Robert E. Hogaboom.

The *Marine Corps Gazette* is proud to announce the commencement of its annual Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest. The contest honors the essay that is the most original in its approach to the various aspects of leadership. Authors should not simply reiterate the 11 Principles of Leadership or the 14 Leadership Traits of an NCO addressed in the *Guidebook for Marines.* Authors must be willing to take an honest, realistic look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to them and then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines.

Background

The contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II, he later served first as assistant division commander, then division commander, 1st Marine Division, in Korea in 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for first place; $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place; and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

Instructions

The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a file and send to gazette@mca-marines.org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author's name. Repeat title on the first page, but author's name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are acceptable, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The *Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest during February and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry per author will receive an award.

E-mail entries to: gazette@mca-marines.org

DEADLINE:
31 January

Mail entries to: *Marine Corps Gazette*
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MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

NOVEMBER 2015

Editorial: 240 Years of Service to the Nation

November the 10th is arguably one of the most important days of the year to Marines. It is the day when waves of nostalgia sweep over us as we recall Marine Corps Birthday celebrations of years past. Some were festive and elegant affairs and others were makeshift celebrations on the inner or outer edge of the combat zone. It really did not matter whether we celebrated in dress blues or utilities or, as has entered the vernacular, the FROG suit. What mattered was that we were in the company of our brother Marines, we celebrated the history of our Corps, and we kept alive our hallowed traditions. It made no difference whether the cake was baked by a pastry chef, made in a mess hall, or concocted from K-Rats, C-Rats, or MREs as long as we were able to celebrate the birthday of our Corps and salute those who wore the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor before us.

This month, in tribute to those Devil Dogs of days gone by, we feature two articles that detail the battle that is arguably the birthplace of the modern day Marine Corps. In the machine gun-strewn wheat fields and woods of Belleau Wood, the Corps wrote a legacy of courage that has endured for almost 100 years. On page 12, Maj Ralph Stoney Bates, Sr. gives a different perspective on how that Brigade of Marines stopped a major German offensive and ensured that the Corps' reputation as a fighting force would forever endure. His article, "Belleau Wood," is subtitled "A brigade's human dynamics" and is a fascinating look at the men who transformed the Corps on the battlefields of France. Although some of the members of the Marine Brigade had seen combat in what we would today classify as COIN, they had fought bandits and revolutionaries. To move from that experience to the large formations and warfare of World War I is a testament to their adaptability, flexibility, and courage.

In a second article. we move the clock forward from 1918 to 1955. Every Marine who has visited Belleau Wood has seen the monument that was erected there. In "The Dedication of the Belleau Wood Memorial" on page 24, Col Jay Bruder details how the monument came to be and the ceremony in which it was dedicated in 1955. It is an interesting piece of the aftermath of the battle and the successful effort to create a memorial to those Marines and sailors who fell on those fields and in those woods almost 40 years before. To see a slide show on Belleau Wood, go to https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/gallery/marines-fight-battle-belleau-wood.

As we celebrate 240 years of service to the Nation, we should remember not only Belleau Wood but all the battles and skirmishes where the Marines have acquitted themselves with courage and honor, and—to paraphrase Gen Lejeune—added to the illustrious history of the Corps.

So wherever you celebrate the birthday of the Corps this month, whether at birthday ball with hundreds of your closest Marine friends, or with just a few others who earned the title, Happy Birthday, Marine!

John A. Keenan

Chosin Reservoir Commemoration

To commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Marine Military Academy will hold the Chosin Few Memorial Ceremony on Saturday, 12 December 2015.

Korean War veterans from across the country are encouraged to attend this event. All survivors and family members of the fallen heroes who plan to attend are asked to call (956) 421-9222 or email salazar@MMA-TX.org.

Corrections

- Capt Daniel J. O'Connell's article, "Infantry and Artillery Habitual Relationships" (*MCG*, Oct 15), was incorrectly listed under Leadership in the I&I section of the magazine. It should have been listed under Fires.
- The cover photo for the October issue of the *MCG* was erroneously credited to Cindy McIntyre. Lauren Pearson actually took the photo.

LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

MajGen William D. Beydler

General Officer Announcements

On 16 September, the Secretary of Defense announced that the President had made the following nominations:

- LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff; and senior member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee. LtGen McKenzie is currently serving as the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command.
- MajGen William D. Beydler for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command. MajGen Beydler is currently serving as the CG, II MEF, Camp Lejeune.

raise your hand and take the oath

deploy... and deploy again

watch your children grow from afar

re-enlist

take that gas mask off

work longer and harder than you ever had, or ever will

march in a rainbow flight

eat that veggie omelet MRE

finish The Crucible

TO ALL WHO DARED TO... leave the wire

join a dustoff crew

dig a fighting hole

join the Caterpillar Club

ride the highline chair

serve as an Eleven Bravo

learn what a shellback is

...THANK YOU

USAA®

In the storied history of our Corps, certain unimpeachable images stand forth as unparalleled in capturing the tradition and ethos of what it means to be a United States Marine. Now we celebrate the 240th birthday of our Corps and recall the thoughts, reflections, and esprit that epitomize all Marines. The *Gazette* offers memoirs and heartfelt tributes as a salute to all Marines past and present, those still living, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our great Nation.

***Gazette*—On the Web** **See the Commandant's annual Birthday video at www.mca-marines.org/gazette/240birthday**

10 NOVEMBER 2015

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

When the Continental Congress raised up two battalions of Marines in 1775, it launched the greatest fighting force the world has ever known—a force revered globally for its uncommon valor, unparalleled adaptability, and ferocious tenacity. Over the past 240 years, the battlefields and equipment have changed, but the spirit of the United States Marine Corps has prevailed in every clime and place.

One hundred years ago, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island opened its doors as the first base dedicated solely to making Marines. Since then, hundreds of thousands of men and women have been forged into elite warriors at Parris Island, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, and The Basic School in Quantico. Each recruit had a different reason for stepping onto the yellow footprints, but all are unified by the intangible traits that characterize United States Marines and the remarkable legacy that has carried on across generations.

Whether you served on the hallowed grounds of Belleau Wood, fought on the iconic island battlefields of World War II, navigated the harsh terrain and climate of the Chosin Reservoir or Vietnam, conducted assaults during Desert Storm, marched on Baghdad, fought in close combat in Fallujah, or conducted combat operations in Afghanistan, everyone who wears the Eagle, Globe and Anchor is a member of that storied legacy.

As we celebrate the 240th birthday of our Corps, we pay tribute to all who have served and we remember our fallen heroes. We take great pride in our legacy and in the fine men and women who carry our colors into the future. And we extend heartfelt thanks to our families for their steadfast support.

Our 26th Commandant, General Louis Wilson, once said, "In the last analysis, what the Marine Corps becomes is what we make of it during our respective watches. And that watch of each Marine is not confined to the time he spends on active duty. It lasts as long as he is 'proud to bear the title of United States Marine.' " Thank you all for guarding the legacy of our Corps during your watch.

Happy Birthday, Marines!

Semper Fidelis,

ROBERT B. NELLER
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Protect What You've Earned

A Marine speaks out

by Roxanne Baker

It was early Saturday just before 0100 on 1 February 2014 when a night out turned deadly for two Marines from II MEF. Octavius Thompson, 21, was intoxicated and driving a car with passenger David Moore, Jr., 21, near Jacksonville, NC, when he ran a stop sign, lost control of the vehicle, and crashed into a concrete barrier at 50 miles per hour. Neither was wearing a seat belt. Although Thompson survived the crash, Moore died at the scene.

Although the tragic incident is an extreme example of alcohol abuse, it is by no means an isolated one. According to HQMC's Marine and Family Programs Division, there were 570 DUIs issued throughout the Marine Corps from January 2015 through August 2015. There were 848 DUI cases in 2014 and 953 cases in 2013.

The tragic story that February night hit home for the II MEF leadership at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point. Although there were dozens of resources and programs available for alcohol abuse, the message was clearly not resonating loud enough to the Marines. Another approach was necessary, but the root of the problem first needed to be identified.

Several focus groups were started at Camp Lejeune in February 2015 with the push and support from top leadership, including then-LtGen Robert B. Neller, Commander, Marine Corps Forces Command, who is now the 37th Commandant of the Marine Corps. A random selection of 125 Marines within II MEF between the ages of 18 and 25 participated. The outcome of the research was surprising, said MajGen William D. Beydler, CG, II MEF. Although alcohol abuse within the Marine Corps is considered a widespread problem, they found in their small sample size that 85 percent of Marines drink responsibly. It is only 15 percent of the population that abuses alcohol.

LtCol Jack Matthews, USMC(Ret) is an inspirational and informative speaker who tells it like it is about alcohol abuse. *(Photo by PFC Jered T. Stone.)*

Armed with the new data, they developed the Protect What You've Earned campaign that focused on a new message. Rather than berating Marines and highlighting the punishment and repercussions for substance abuse, the campaign advocates for responsible decision making. It speaks directly to the individual Marine and asks, "What is in your best interest?" Marines work hard to get where they are, Beydler said, and one night of bad decision making can ruin an entire Marine Corps career, jeopardize future employment, and tarnish relationships with friends and

>Roxanne Baker is the writer and media coordinator for the MCA&F. She is an experienced multimedia journalist with hundreds of published works and is married to a Marine.

Matthews recounts his struggle with alcohol. *(Photo by PFC Jered T. Stone.)*

family. These Marines need to refocus their priorities on what they need to protect: their pay rank billets, reenlistments and promotions, opportunities outside the Corps, respect from their peers, and their pride as a Marine.

But the 85 percent of Marines who don't abuse alcohol aren't being ignored either. They do appreciate that the campaign doesn't simply blame all Marines and recognizes that the problem lies within a minority population, said LtCol Shannon Hubacher**,** Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-10, II MEF. Hubacher overseas the Force Preservation and Behavioral Health program that encompasses the Protect What You've Earned campaign. But that majority of Marines are expected to shoulder some of the responsibility for their fellow Marines and help them make the right decisions about their alcohol intake before they hurt themselves or others.

Since the campaign was launched in June, there hasn't been any pushback about the message, Hubacher said. Not only does it seem to be resonating with Marines, but it's also being encouraged within peer groups. The II MEF leadership is working to keep the message visible at all times through billboards, posters, safety briefs, and all interactions with leadership from NCOs to top brass. They're also ensuring the message is kept simple and to the point as "Protect What You've Earned." They've even partnered with the local community of law enforcement, business owners, and elected officials in Jacksonville, NC, to continue the message when Marines are off base.

II MEF also hosted an Alcohol Abuse Prevention Seminar August 20–21 aboard Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. The seminar featured Dr. Jack Matthews, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who shared his tumultuous journey of alcohol abuse to the nearly 6,000 Marines in attendance. Matthews has been speaking to Marines about alcohol abuse since 1994 and has since reached out to upward of 400,000 Marines and sailors with his personal story. The Marine Corps Association & Foundation funded all of Matthews' travel expenses through its Commanders' Forum Program that supports battlefield studies and guest speakers for Marines. MCA&F is proud to work with individual commands to provide not only professional military education but also seminars such as alcohol prevention that improve and strengthen the Marine Corps at large.

Matthews recounted to the Marines at the seminar how he lost everything he earned. He described his personal struggle with alcohol that started with his first beer at 17 years old. Over the years, he progressed as an alcoholic and his family eventually left him in 1977. The final strike was in 1984. He was an active duty lieutenant colonel at an event at Marine Corps Base Quantico when he drank too much, blacked out, and created a scene with other Marines. The following week, he was checked into a rehabilitation center for alcohol abuse at the Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland. The doctors told him

Matthews has been speaking to Marines about alcohol abuse since 1994. *(Photo by PFC Jered T. Stone.)*

that if he continued his path of abuse, he would be dead within the next two years. That night, he visited the Washington National Cathedral, knelt down, and prayed for help to turn his life around.

After seven weeks in rehab, he graduated from the program on Thursday, 24 May 1984 and has since been sober for 31 years. But it wasn't an overnight success, he told the Marines at the seminar. He still attends Alcoholics Anonymous classes every week. And he stressed the long-term consequences of his abuse. He still has estranged relationships with his grown children, wasn't invited to the weddings of two of his sons, and hasn't been allowed to meet two of his grandchildren. He said he hopes his story hits home for the Marines, and that they'll be able to recognize and address the problem before it spirals out of control and they end up hurting themselves and others.

"Honesty started my path toward recovery," Matthews said. "I could feel the albatross off my shoulder. My biggest advice is if you're hurting and you don't like the face in the mirror, call and get help because it's only going to get worse. And you can't do it on your own. Taking care of each other is what being a Marine is all about."

He still attends Alcoholics Anonymous classes every week. And he stressed the long-term consequences of his abuse.

Hopefully Matthews' story and II MEF's campaign efforts can motivate other Marines to take action in protecting everything they've earned as a Marine.

If you or someone you know is at risk, reach out to a Counselor at the Consolidated Substance Abuse Counseling Center, DOD medical personnel, or talk to a counselor anonymously at the DSTRESS phone line. For helpful resources, visit the Navy & Marine Corps Public Health Center online.

Marine Corps Gazette — Professional Journal of U.S. Marines — LINKS

To see a video of Jack Matthews speak about alcohol abuse, go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xp2HXdhmLtY. To hear what the new Commandant had to say about alcohol abuse when he was a Lieutenant General, go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VepAvzDizgs. To learn more about how the Marine Corps Association & Foundation supports Marines, visit www.mca-marines.org.


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Belleau Wood

A brigade's human dynamics

by Maj Ralph Stoney Bates, Sr., USMC(Ret)

Let us explore the human dynamics of how a brigade of Marines stopped the advance of a replenished and powerful German Army driving toward Paris in May and June 1918, forever changing the course of that war. That same brigade then drove two divisions of that reinforced German Army from entrenched positions deep within an old hunting preserve, against all rational logic and all odds, giving the Corps of Marines, possibly destined for extinction or drastic modification of their mission, a new lease on life. This article will not concentrate on tactics. Most of the tactics were flawed. Nor will it concentrate on overall command leadership. Senior command compelling caused those Marines to prevail.

In its aftermath, the stage was set for an Allied victory in World War I. Indeed it was the turning point of that war and would eventually entice the American Expeditionary Forces commander GEN John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, clearly no admirer of the Marines, to remark, "The deadliest weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle."

This battle laid the path toward developing the modern Marine Corps. On the world stage, it firmly entwined the Corps of Marines in general, and the Fourth Marine Brigade in particular, with deep admiration and respect as *the* preeminent fighting force in the world. For the French and the Americans, it resonated as an infinite conclusion. Had it been lost, in all probability, Germany would have won World War I, and the Marine Corps we know today would not exist.

The men who fought it are now gone. We Marines must understand how and why we received their hard-won legacy. The essence of leadership is generating the willingness of others to follow.

>Maj Bates served a total of 26 years active service. He served as a drill instructor from 1959–61 at Parris Island; was a Chief Warrant Officer 2; and a commissioned officer. Although he deployed often during his career, his highlight deployment was to Vietnam, 1967–68. Maj Bates currently teaches the history of military warfare classes at Furman University in Greenville, SC. He is the author of two books,* A Marine Called Gabe *and* Short Rations For Marines.

"The Marines have two salient characteristics: their ability to make something out of nothing and to do it quickly results in their establishing themselves at once and with a minimum of damage to surroundings; and, since they bring ashore with them the sea-tradition of cleanliness and order, they are, when not the first to fight, the First to Clean … The Marines are both 'shore cops' and stevedoree. 'But only for a little while,' they one and all assure you, even the officers: 'The Brass Hats are sure to let us fight soon.'" (From an article published in* The Spectator, *18 May 1918.)

Sometimes men follow despite failure of leadership. Even with the mistakes made by many of their leaders, those Marines persevered through an innate willingness to succeed. Some deep-rooted inner strength caused a few Marines to rise to the occasion and perform miracles against all odds. That battle *is* the Corps' and Nation's essence passed from one generation to another, and then another, and then to still another, yet unborn. Today, Belleau Wood is an outward and visible memorial depicting an inward and spiritual core of courage, determination, and sacrifices that dwelled deep within those men of the 4th Marine Brigade. What was it? What caused it?

Background

With war declared in April 1917, Marine MajGen Commandant George Barnett and his assistant, BGen John A. Lejeune, knew that they had a formidable task before them. Lesser men would have simply said forget it. The Marines

were part of the United States Navy. They had a commitment to the Navy. Indeed, they owed their very existence to the Navy. As an aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the advanced base force—designed for the Marines to secure far flung naval bases—was being discussed, planned, and developed as part of future American naval strategy. The Navy would push the Marines for additional security as a result of The Great War.

Barnett and Lejeune knew that if they moved forward with what they were thinking, it would delay the advanced base force concept. But the "first to fight" motto had been hung out for all to see. They simply had to prove that statement to be fact. Marine attitude took over and they pressed forward with their mission: Get the Marines into the fight in the Great War in France.

The Marine Corps, though always small compared to the Army and Navy, was always in the fight. It always paid its dues. Even so, the Marines had faced extinction several times in its colorful history. Most recently, at the turn of the 20th century, President "Teddy" Roosevelt, by executive order, removed Marines from their primary duty as detachments serving aboard capital ships of the Navy, attempting to replace them with sailors trained as infantry. He was overruled by an angry Congress and an outraged American public. Anger can motivate. But it left the Marines wary of their future. Instinctively, they knew that they had to perform better, indeed *be* better, than anyone else. Their future depended on it. They pressed the Secretary of the Navy, won audience with the Secretary of War, and drove their point home. Marines were created to fight their country's battles, anywhere at any time.

The Marines had asked to be part of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). But the Army didn't want them. The Marines were part of the naval establishment. Even their "first to fight" slogan riled the Army. The Army had no control over Marine-style training. And finally, the Army just didn't like the Marines and certainly didn't want them as a second arm in France. However, somebody did. The Secretary of War forced GEN Pershing to accept a brigade of Marines organized along U.S. Army organizational standards. Pershing was furious over the decision; he felt he had been blindsided and would "pay back" the Corps big time. His actions would become an outward and visible sign of an inward and seething resentment.

Unfortunately, the Marines didn't have the manpower for forming a large brigade while maintaining its naval responsibilities. The Marines stripped their active forces to the bone, fielding only a regiment of battle hardened experienced veterans of the various small wars and expeditions, which was their trademark. Even then, new Marines had to fill in the manpower gaps. The 5th Marine Regiment was quickly formed and dispatched to France.

The 5th Marine Regiment was quickly formed and dispatched to France.

Pershing immediately broke up that regiment and made stevedoree and guards out of them. They unloaded ships, hauled supplies, walked guard duty, patrolled villages and camps, and performed provost duties while maintaining a professional, disciplined appearance. Being Marines, they performed their assigned duties flawlessly, as they bristled and waited. Pershing made "coolies" out of those Marines. He obstinately dispatched a cable to the War Department stating that "he found the 5th Marine Regiment *indigestible* and asked that no more Marines be sent to France."[1] He was rebuffed by the Secretary of War.

From *The Spectator* (now *The American Spectator*), British journalist Reginald Wright Kauffman wrote on 18 May 1918, following his first encounter with the American Marines:

> The Marines have two salient characteristics: their ability to make something out of nothing and to do it quickly results in their establishing themselves at once and with a minimum of damage to surroundings; and, since they bring ashore with them the sea-tradition of cleanliness and order, they are, when not the first to fight, the First to Clean ... The Marines are both 'shore cops' and stevedoree. 'But only for a little while,' they one and all assure you, even the officers: 'The Brass Hats are sure to let us fight soon.'

Getting a second Marine regiment—along with a machine gun battalion—together was more challenging. Potential Marines were clamoring to enlist, but junior officers to lead them were sorely lacking. A few months after declaring war, Congress authorized the Marines 597 officers, a 50 percent increase in their officer strength. The Marines needed to be very innovative, and they were.

They scouted major universities, colleges, and military schools asking deans to provide a certain number of pending college graduates or top men, volunteers for enlistment as officer candidates. And they got them. At one time, within the ranks of the 6th Marine Regiment, 60 percent were "college boys," officer and enlisted. Even those bypassed for officer training joined as enlisted men giving the Marines an unexpected pool of future officer promotions from the ranks. It was an amazing statistic unheard of before or since. It gave the Marine Corps what it needed at that time: a regiment of mostly college boys turned into Marines.

"When the 6th Marines started to arrive piecemeal, they, too, were assigned duties much as those the 5th had before them."[2] Eventually they all had to doff their Marine green uniforms and don the Army olive drab. Adding insult to injury, the popular Marine commander of the 4th Marine Brigade, Charles Doyen, was replaced by the Army's BG James G. Harbord. This only added to the frustration and seething resentment emanating from the Marines. There is no question that treating the Marines as Pershing did caused a deep clandestine umbrage among the Marines that would explode the first time they met the enemy. The vast majority of the Marines of the 4th

Marine Brigade were infantrymen, machine gunners, and navy medical staff. They were not supply clerks, administrative clerks, paymasters, engineers, artillery, or other support types. These were Marines with rifles looking for a fight. They had something to prove.

Even with a full brigade of Marines, they would be infinitesimally small compared to the massive AEF the United States Army would eventually deploy to war in Europe. In June 1918, the Marine Brigade represented less than one percent of the AEF. The eminent U.S. Army historian S.L.A. Marshall was to describe these Marines as "a little raft of sea soldiers in an ocean of Army that was without doubt the most aggressive body of diehards on the Western Front."[3]

After the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion joined together to form the 4th Marine Brigade, they assembled with their Army counterparts, the 3rd Infantry Brigade along with the rest of the 2d Infantry Division, near Bourmont, France, in March 1918. "The 4th Brigade aggregate strength was 280 officers and 9,164 enlisted men, making it by far the largest tactical unit of Marines ever assembled until that time."[4 5] The full brigade eventually moved toward the sound of the guns at the Western Front to meet the enemy, and the Marines would make history.

In some writings and evaluations of the Great War, some sources credit the success of the 4th Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood to the exhaustion of the German divisions facing the Marines. There may be some fact in that assessment. But analysis of the battle must also reveal that some of the opposing German units facing the Marines had been removed from the Eastern Front, re-equipped, and retrained as assault, or shock, troops. These same German forces also faced the United States Army across a wide front. While the Marines advanced, driving the Germans back for miles, American soldiers simply held the lines against the Germans during the Belleau Wood battle. Hardly exhausted, the Germans saw victory on the horizon and even battle weary men can reenergize their strength and spirit when victory is in sight. Those German forces very clearly saw victory—until they met the Marines.

Marines were not alone in halting the drive of the "storm troopers" or even turning the tide of that war against the Germans; however, it is an undisputable fact that this small brigade, the 4th Marine Brigade, on the field of battle established an astonishing record of combat prowess that stands today alongside other famous Marine Corps battles and other historic battles such as Bunker Hill and the Alamo. Only here, at Belleau Wood, the Americans prevailed. Those Marines established a combat record against which all future Marine Corps engagements would be measured.

Making the success of the Marines in that battle even more astonishing is that it came about despite flaws in command judgment, failings of individual leadership qualities, amateurish and antiquated battlefield tactics, broken or nonexistent communications, and flawed or nonexistent intelligence. Marine units and individual Marines and sailors (including some junior Army officers) of that 4th Marine Brigade adapted to conditions, overcame obstacles, and prevailed against all odds. They stopped the Germans attacking from the woods toward Paris, then counterattacked and ultimately drove the Germans from the woods. It took them 20 days and almost 100 percent (some suggest it was closer to 150 percent) casualties, but the Marines prevailed against the German divisions—and the odds—at Belleau Wood. For the German Army, it was their last serious offensive. They had met *the devil dogs*.

It was fate, not plans, chance, not choice, that placed them in front of Belleau Wood. The French had told the Americans that there were no Germans in the woods. Everyone thought that the Marines were in a quiet sector. The French Army was on their left and their division comrades of the Army's 3rd Infantry Brigade on their right, and the hidden Germans were to their immediate front. Both the Marines and the Germans were ready to fight.

Earlier, when these Marines had been cloistered to the side, carrying dustpans and brooms, hauling trash, and stacking boxes, the ranks knew they simply were not wanted by the Army. Though disappointed and disillusioned, they would not quit. They performed their duties as Marines, believing that sooner or later they would be able to prove their mettle. Their time would come. Each man believed it. Each man knew it.

It was the spirit of the individual, the esprit de corps of the unit and dogged determination combined with an unwavering discipline that prevailed in the Battle of Belleau Wood. More than any other single attribute, it was the individual Marine (soldier and sailor of the 4th Brigade) that, within each man, clutched the bulwark of the intense emotion and pride infused by their Marine Corps training, creating the Marine Corps *attitude*.

Sometime earlier, during some of the first Marine-German combat encounters, someone gave the Marines a new name. The Marines were called *teufelhunden* (properly spelled *teufelshunde*) by their German opponents. It is doubtful that the American press created the German term and then proceeded to misspell it. It is doubtful that some Marine simply conjured it up from his random thoughts. From wherever and whenever, thereafter, they would forever be known as Devil Dogs. How and why it happened we will perhaps never know. But it did happen, and they earned the title at Belleau Wood.

Belleau Wood

What really did happen in June 1918 that changed the course of human events?

Few American soldiers (or Marines) were prepared for the massive carnage of combat in World War I. It was true that Marines, especially the veterans of the 5th Marines, had some combat experience. But that experience was against "bandits" or "revolutionaries." With the exception of the American Civil War, where a divided Marine Corps served primarily with their respective navies, one must reach back to the American Revolutionary War to find a time when our soldiers and Marines tangled with a modern, well-equipped, and well-trained and led army. The Germans were all that and more. Our Marines

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and soldiers had not faced modern weaponry from poison gas and machine guns to aerial bombs and long-range artillery. Also, Marines and soldiers were expected to hear shouted voice commands on battlefields, to move in formations aligned left, right, or center so their leaders could observe and direct attacking formations. All these tactics were lost on the modern battlefield. They were outdated, antiquated, and amateurish tactics. But they were employed.

The 4th Marine Brigade would move as part of the 2nd Infantry Division toward the front. MG Omar Bundy, USA, commanded the 2nd Infantry Division. BG James Harbord, USA, who had replaced Marine BGen Charles Doyen, was in command of the 4th Marine Brigade. Col Wendell Neville commanded the 5th Marines. His 1st Battalion was commanded by Maj Julius Turrill, 2d Battalion by Maj Frederic Wise, later by Maj Ralph Keyser, and 3d Battalion by Maj Benjamin Berry, later by Maj Maurice Shearer. Col Albertus Catlin commanded the 6th Marines, later commanded by Col Harry Lee. Their 1st Battalion was commanded by Maj Shearer, later by Maj John Hughes. The 2d Battalion was commanded by Maj Thomas Holcomb, and the 3d Battalion by Maj Bertron Sibley. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was commanded by Maj Eli Cole, followed by Capt Harlon Major, Maj George Osterhout, and Maj Littleton Waller. These were the leaders in Belleau Wood on whom historians tend to concentrate. Mistakes were made by many of these leaders. Individual junior Marines, officers and enlisted, would bail them out.

German troops were occupying the woods in strength, preparing to continue their advance toward Paris. German infantry emerged from the woods moving directly toward the unseen and unknown Marines. Now the Marines would prove their mettle. A spirit and a pride derived from training and esprit was contagious and is what defeated the Germans at Belleau Wood; that, plus a 1903 Springfield rifle in the hands of the Marines. Captured German intelligence reports stated that they were stunned at the accuracy of the rifle fire from the Marines.

Belleau Wood relief map–southern end of wood in foreground. *(Official file photo.)*

In his book *Devil Dogs*, George B. Clark stated the following: "Battles are decided in favor of the troops whose bravery, fortitude, and especially, whose endurance surpasses that of the enemy; the army with the higher breaking point wins the decision." The statement is attributed to COL George C. Marshall, USA. It described the 4th Marine Brigade.

The planned major offensive on the Western Front caught everyone in the Allied camp by surprise. It was a two-pronged attack by massed German divisions. Designed by Gen Erich Ludendorff and approved by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, it attacked the lines between the British and French forces in Northern France along with a simultaneous feint toward Paris through the Chateau-Thierry and the Marne River valley. "To accomplish his overall plan Ludendorff rested his hopes on a series of storm offensives of highly trained troops attacking by infiltration."[6] These Strumtruppen were German Army troops, veterans of the Eastern Front, specifically hand-picked, highly trained offensive forces designed to penetrate Allied lines. Along with these storm troopers were other troops transferred from the Eastern Front and recruits from civil society, trained and deployed to bolster existing German divisions on the Western Front. "Altogether 194 [German] divisions—about 3,600,000 men—would be serving on this front by the time of the attack."[7]

Starting on 31 May 1918, the 2nd Division was given a series of confusing and often countermanding orders. Assignments were made, modified, and rescinded. Confusion seemed to be the order of the day. One regimental commander actually lost his regiment. It took him a day to locate it. Food trucks failed to arrive, and roads were impassable due to swarms of refugees and retreating French soldiers. Mass confusion is appropiate to describe the situation. Eventually, the 2nd Infantry Division arrived in positions that allowed them to begin their advance toward the Chateau-Thierry Sector. Then orders changed again. The Germans held Chateau-Thierry. The division was then ordered to take up positions north and west of the Marne River. With constant shifting of units,

the Marine Brigade ended up on the left and the 3rd Infantry Brigade on the right of the Paris-Metz road. "The US 2d Division with its two brigades were finally taking up positions along the line of Gandelu-Marigny-Bourches-Vaux."[8] The defense line ran roughly from Vaux then north to west to beyond Mares Farm and Hill 142. It would take the division a couple of days to tie in flanks, settle down, and organize for a defense against the advancing German Army.

The initial plan was for the Americans to back up the French. French soldiers had other plans. "During the night of June 3–4 most of the advanced [French] detachment withdrew leaving the Americans holding the front line."[9] The Marines were right in front of Belleau Wood. "Lemuel Shepherd—the future Corps commandant, who was now a lieutenant in Captain John Blanchfield's company of Wise's battalion—had earlier in the morning stationed a dozen men in an observation post on a hill several hundred yards ahead of the line."[10] Shepherd's men saw them first: Eight to ten Germans emerged from the woods, moving slowly.

> A minute later the Boches tore out of the woods, a machine gun to every ten of them. A rain of good American lead from good American riflemen met them. We saw them stop. Surprised? Why, they never dreamed of anything like it ... We lay in the open, digging with bayonets and firing while the Boches was [sic] frantically passing back word that a cog in the wheel had slipped. They never dreamed of Americans, we later learned from prisoners.[11]

Shepherd's small band of Marines, with rifle and machine gun fire, combined with timely supporting artillery fire, stopped the German advance cold.

The French marveled at the most accurate rifle fire in the heat of combat that they had ever seen. Marine training—with an emphasis on rifle firing—paid off in a big way. French, British, and even American soldiers were taught that volume of fire in combat, designed to keep the enemy heads down, was the correct methodology. Marines operating from defensive positions were taught otherwise. "Take aim, boys. Line them sights up. Take a breath. Let half of it out. Hold. Keep your sight picture. Slack. Squeeze. Let the rifle do its thing. One shot. One kill," the range instructor would say over and over again. "It's not the noise of the burst. It's the hits that count," they would add.

> The Corps' emphasis on shooting was a source of great pride according to [Col Albertus] Catlin, with Secretary Josephus Daniels announcing, 'Their [Marines] sharpshooting ... has amazed soldiers of European armies, accustomed merely to shooting in the general direction of the enemy. Under the fiercest fire the Marines calmly adjusted their sights, aimed for their man, and killed him.[12]

Over the next two days, the Germans would try several attempts to move out of Belleau Wood, each time meeting deadly rifle and machine gun fire from the Marines. With the German offensive seemingly stalled, Gen Jean Degoutte, the overall French commander of French and American forces in the area, ordered an early morning offensive of his own (which included the 2nd Infantry Division) against the Germans to begin on 6 June. It was ill conceived and poorly coordinated. It simply had "too many moving parts to be executed in the hours of darkness leading to the 3:45 AM assault."[13] All that could go wrong did go wrong. During assaults, flanks were exposed, some units were missing from the field of battle, the maps were very poor—almost totally unreadable—artillery support, such as there was, was not timely, Marines were running low on ammunition with resupply undependable, water replacement was not arriving as needed, food was scarce to none, and evacuation of wounded and dead sorely lacking. Some units were out of place because they didn't get the attack order on time or didn't know where they were. Tactics were antiquated. Poor communications left the brigade commander, Harboard, assuming that everything was going as planned, when in fact, it was not. Marines were being slaughtered, but they continued the mission.

When 2nd Division ordered the 4th Marine Brigade to attack Belleau Wood, Harbord assumed that it was either lightly defended, or not defended at all. He ordered an attack without artillery paving the way. He made a tactical blunder. Berry's battalion had the worst of it, attacking in parade ground formation toward the Wood across a waist high wheat field about 800 meters across. "The Germans later reported that the Americans offered excellent targets."[14] It is here, in this field of wheat, that Floyd Gibbons, correspondent for the *Chicago-Tribune*, who was with Maj Berry, was seriously wounded along with Berry himself. It was initially reported that Gibbons was dead.

Gibbons was a flamboyant, fearless, and colorful writer who often would write a prereport article. Then, he would see the action through and return to his writing to straighten it out, modify it, or just edit it. That was his style. He had written a few bylines based on what he thought would happen that fateful day as the Marines assaulted the "lightly defended" Wood, and sent it to the censor in Paris.

Thinking that he was dead, the censor at AEF headquarters let Gibbons' writings go through as written in honor of his "dead" friend. The next day, the *Chicago-Tribune* electrified the editorial world with astonishing headlines that were only partially true: "Marines Win Hot Battle, Sweep Enemy From Height Near Thierry."[15] Within hours, other newspapers picked up the news and repeated it. *The New York Times* ran headlines on 12 June stating, "Brilliant Victory In Wood,"[16] going on to state the word *Marines* over and over. Yet the battle was far from over.

Pershing was livid. Marines "ate it up." The "coolies" had their revenge. For the Marines, it was indeed payback time. The American public was convinced that it was the Marines that had defeated German forces in France, but it wasn't yet true.

In reality, 6 June was the most costly day in Marine Corps history at that time. "On this day, the Marine Brigade suffered the worst single day's casualties in USMC history with 1,087 men killed or wounded."[17]

Unlike most park-like woods in France, Belleau Wood was a maze of tangled vines and roots, deep ravines, and large clumps of boulders hidden

under massive, ancient trees. It was not a wood that ladies and gentlemen strolled through on Sunday outings. Instead, it was a wood that harbored a dozen species of animals allowed to conceal themselves from view and hide from gentlemen hunters. What lived in that wood had the advantage over the hunter. Germans lived in the wood. But the Germans now faced a different hunter—the Marines.

German commanders, getting feedback from their men who fought against the Marines, made some interesting reports. They reported, among other things, that "Americans did not fight like soldiers but, rather, attacked in gangs of ten or twenty men, primed with alcohol."[18] They also reported that "some of their [Marines] wounded kept on in the attack." The clincher was reported that, "They [Marines] had no idea of tactical principles. They fired while walking with their rifles under their arms."[19]

After several "parade style" assaults, Marines adjusted their assault methodology. They adapted and became fiercely aggressive, shouting or screaming at the enemy, firing rifles from the hip as they advanced, keeping contentious fire on the enemy, keeping the enemy heads down until the bayonet thrust finished off their prey. That style, called marching fire, was used by Patton with his troops in World War II. Staging Battalion at Camp Pendleton during the Vietnam War taught that technique. We Marines attending the training called it "finger pointing–hip shooting:" Point your forefinger resting alongside the rifle toward the target, and squeeze the trigger with your index finger. It worked. Your forefinger and rifle was usually pointed exactly at the target.

By 12 June, Marines had fought far beyond the point of exhaustion, yet continued to wipe out machine gun nests and individual Germans who refused to surrender. On 17 June, most exhausted Marine units were relieved by the U.S. Army 7th Infantry of the 3rd U.S. Army Division. Between 17 and 21 June, numerous U.S. Army attacks in Belleau Wood accomplished naught. The Doughboys gave it all they had, but these troops simply couldn't cut it against the veteran German defenders. After a period of rest, regrouping, and "spreading the word," Marines replaced the 7th Infantry on 22 June and began their final ferocious assault. Marine losses were heavy. Finally, on 26 June 1918, Marine Maj Maurice Shearer signals Harboard, "Belleau Woods now—US Marine Corps—entirely."[20]

The Battle of Belleau Wood was fought by the 4th Marine Brigade under conditions that were unfortunate, inexcusable, unprofessional, and bordering on negligence. But it was the small unit, and the individual Marine that prevailed—because they were angry.

After several "parade style" assaults, Marines adjusted their assault methodology.

These coolies were persistent in proving their prowess in combat. They were angry at how they had been treated by Pershing and the Army. They were angry at failed tactics, confused leadership, and unnecessary casualties, "they fought like a bunch of wildcats."[21]

After the battle, Pershing even tried to get the French to rescind the renaming of Belleau Wood. He was unsuccessful. Continuing even after the war, Pershing and others would downplay the success of the Marines. However, all his life, Harbord always praised his Marines.

"The Marine Corps emerged from Belleau Wood in possession of a legend unlike any the army or navy could claim."[22] The college boys and the veterans had accomplished the impossible. The Marines were mad as they evaluated, adapted, and overcame obstacles, and they took it out on the Germans. As a result of their dogged determination, those Marines caused the French Government to rename that old hunting preserve by the name of Belleau Wood. The devil dogs left us a legacy.

It will now and forever be known as Bois de la Brigade de Marine (Wood of the Marine Brigade).

Notes

1. BGen Edwin H. Simmons & Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC(Ret), *Through The Wheat*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 55.

2. George Clark, *Devil Dogs*, (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 2000), 36.

3. This information was accessed at www.militaryfocus.com.

4. Simmons & Alexander, 127.

5. Ibid., 64.

6. Robert Asprey, *At Belleau Wood*, (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1996), 32.

7. Ibid., 33.

8. Alan Axelrod, *Miracle at Belleau Wood*, (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press 2007), 59.

9. Clyde H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps*, (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam's and Son, 1939), 481.

10. Axelrod, 88.

11. Ibid., 90.

12. Dick Camp, *Devil Dogs At Belleau Wood*, (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), 19.

13. Simmons & Alexander, 101.

14. Ibid., 106.

15. Camp, 96.

16. Axelrod, 206.

17. Camp, 96.

18. Axelrod, 202.

19. Ibid., 202.

20. Ibid., 226.

21. Ibid., 225.

22. Ibid., 228.

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PACIFIC BATTLEFIELDS

Iwo Jima MOH Recipient Woody Williams on top of Mt. Suribachi

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70th Anniversary of Iwo Jima
Reunion of Honor Historical Symposium - Guam - Charter Jet to Iwo
Pre Tour: 11 - 15 Mar Saipan/Tinian
Post Tours: 21 - 24 Mar Hawaii/21 - 26 Mar Peleliu/ 21 - 26 Mar Imperial Japan Adventure

18 - 28 Jul Marianas Campaign 1944
Liberation of Guam, Tinian & Saipan
Post Tour: 28 Jul - 1 Aug Honolulu, HI

At Runway Able on Tinian where Enola Gay took off!

2 - 12 Aug Guadalcanal "Turning the Tide"
Edson's Ridge - Henderson Field - Iron Bottom Sound - Tulagi
Post Tour: 11 - 17 Aug Solomon Islands "Up the Slot"

10 - 23 Oct 70th Anniversary of the China Marines
Beijing - Tientsin - Xian - Post Tour: Shanghai

In Planning for November: WWII CBI Theater Burma & Thailand
Post Tour: China

Wreath Laying with Wake Island Vets!

4 - 9 Dec 75th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor - 1941
Waikiki Beach Hotel - Punch Bowl - Dec 7th Ceremonies

8 - 14 Dec 75th Anniversary of the 1941 Invasion of Guam and Battle of Wake Island
Guam - Charter Flight to Wake - Post Tour: 14 - 17 Dec Saipan & Tinian

PCFYers having fun in China.

65th Anniversary of the Korean War
Korea Revisits & Peace Camp For Youth (Grandchildren) Subsidized Tours to Seoul, South Korea - PCFY college-age students in July

VIETNAM BATTLEFIELDS

Gen Peter Pace back where it happened with MHT!

27 Feb - 11 Mar Battle of Hue City & Tet Offensive
Phu Bai - Da Nang - Chu Lai - Khe Sanh

9 - 21 Apr 50th Anniversary Search & Destroy Operations in I-Corps 1966
Da Nang - Chu Lai - Leatherneck Square – DMZ

9 - 21 Apr Operation Dewey Canyon - I-Corps
A Shau Valley - Khe Sanh – Dong Ha

7 - 20 May 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War "Delta to the DMZ" Op Birmingham 1966
I - II - III Corps - War Zone C - An Loc - Tay Ninh
Bien Hoa - An Khe - Pleiku - Qui Nhon

Multi Generations back at Chu Lai!

15 - 27 Jul 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War I Corps Op Hastings 1966
The Ques Sons - Chu Lai - Hoi An - Da Nang - Hue City
Leatherneck Square - Khe Sanh - Con Thien - Quang Tri

20 Aug - 2 Sep 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War Op Prairie - 1966 I Corps
Chu Lai - Red Beach - Hoi An - Da Nang - Hue City - Leatherneck Square
Khe Sanh - Con Thien - Quang Tri - Dong Ha



The Most Interesting Gunny in the World says I don't go back to Vietnam often but when I do I go with MHT!

20 Aug - 3 Sep 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War Cav & Air Mobile "Delta to the DMZ"
I - II - III Corps - War Zone C - An Loc - Tay Ninh - Bien Hoa - An Khe - Pleiku - Qui Nhon

Good food, good friends...

3 - 13 Dec Holiday Return
I - II - III Corps - War Zone C - An Loc - Tay Ninh - Hue City - Da Nang

EUROPE BATTLEFIELDS

Wreath Laying at USMC Irish Marines Memorial!

25 Mar - 4 Apr 100th Anniversary of the Easter Rising 1916
Dublin - Belfast - Derry - Easter Rising Ceremonies

19 - 27 Apr Turkey WWI Dardanelles Campaign
Istanbul, Gallipoli Battlefields & Troy
ANZAC Day Ceremonies - the best way to see Turkey

Bucket List Drink....from Bulldog Fountain Belleau Wood!

21 May - 1 Jun 100th Anniversary of World War I Verdun - 1916 & USMC Battlefields
Paris - Belleau Wood - Chateau Thierry - Mont Blanc - Reims
Meuse-Argonne - The Somme - Ypres - Passchendaele

1 - 9 Jun 72nd Anniversary of D-Day 1944: "Normandy to Paris"
American Cemetery Ceremony - Omaha Beach - Utah Beach
St. Mere Eglise - Pegasus Bridge - Bayeux

D-Day Navy Vet Bob Jagers interviewed in Normandy with MHT!

2 - 12 Jul WWII Russia 75th Anniversary of Operation Barbarossa "Eastern Front"
Battles of Kursk, Moscow, Stalingrad
Post Tour: St Petersburg

10 - 21 Sep WWI 100th Anniversary of the Great War - 1916 Battle of the Somme
Paris - Belleau Wood - Chateau Thierry - Mont Blanc - Reims
Meuse-Argonne - Ypres - Passchendaele
Post Tour: Battle of the Bulge – Bastogne - Gen Patton's Gravesite - "Siegfried Line" - Malmedy - Easy Company 516th P.I.R. "foxholes"

29 Sep - 11 Oct Ireland "All of the Emerald Isle" plus WWII U.S. Marines, Soldiers & Sailors
Dublin - Belfast - Southern Counties - WWII Sites
Post Tour: Scotland & England - 950th Battle of Hastings

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2016 29 YEARS OF SERVICE

Smedley Butler

Gimlet Eye and the unjust Medal of Honor

by Capt Kevin M. Boyce & Vance Osterhout

Generations of Marines have been imbued with a ritual history that can be recited upon command. Who was the only Marine to receive five Navy Crosses? Chesty Puller. Two Marines to receive two Medals of Honor? Dan Daly and Smedley Butler. Such a purely legendary existence strips these figures of their true dimensions and reduces them to a version of bar room trivia for Marines only, though perhaps it at least keeps them alive in public memory.

Recently, we were presented with a rare opportunity to see another side of Smedley Butler. We were able to read a collection of his family's letters in the Green Library at Stanford University's Special Collections and Archives. Opening the boxes of ancient correspondence under the high ceilings of the special archives, we were overawed with the sense of having our very fingers on history. Butler's handwriting was often difficult to interpret, but we became accustomed to it with time, be it pencil on lined paper or pen on Gendarmerie d'Haiti letterhead.

Butler's service is unmatched. He fought in the Spanish-American War in Cuba, the Philippine-American War at Manila, the Boxer Rebellion in China, the Banana Wars in the Caribbean and Central America, and finally, World War I. From 1898 to 1931, Butler led Marines fearlessly across some of the most treacherous and distant foreign lands. Smedley Butler's decorated service speaks for itself and in April 1914, then-Maj Butler would receive his first Medal of Honor. The citation reads, "For distinguished conduct in battle, engagement of Vera Cruz, 22 April 1914. Major Butler was eminent and conspicuous in command of his battalion. He exhibited courage and skill in leading his men through the action of the 22d and in the final occupation of the city."[1]

Before the smoke cleared from battles in Mexico, Butler and his Marines were sent to intervene in Haiti after the assassination of Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.[2] Butler took command of the Haitian military police force known as the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, fighting against "armed insurgents" known as the Cacos rebels.[3] It was here on 17 November 1915 where Maj Butler earned his second Medal of Honor for conspicuous bravery during the attack on Fort Riviere, Haiti.[4]

During all of these wars and battles, one thing remained constant—Smedley Butler wrote home, and he wrote frequently. Butler was a beloved family man. He wrote often to his wife, children, and parents while deployed on foreign soils. The contents of the letters were no different from the correspondence a Marine would pass along to his or her family today. He noted the weather, his aches and pains, heartache from being separated from family, finances, and even the food.

After hours of reading through boxes of seemingly mundane letters to

Butler frequently wrote to his parents. *(Photo by Vance Osterhout. See footnote 5.)*

>Capt Boyce is an air support control officer and currently serves as a graduate student as part of the Commandant's Career-Level Education Board at California State University, San Marcos. He deployed as a Helicopter Director, Marine Air Support Squadron 3 in support of Regimental Combat Team 5 at Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom 12.1 and again as a Senior Air Director, Camp Leatherneck for Operation Enduring Freedom 14.1.

>>Mr. Osterhout is currently a graduate student at California State University, San Marcos. He was honorably discharged as a sergeant in the Marine Corps after serving from 2000–05. Then-Sgt Osterhout served as a fixed-wing and helicopter mechanic with multiple Marine fighter/attack squadrons in Iwakuni, Japan, and Miramar, CA, as well as Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron 775 at Camp Pendleton, CA.



LIBERTÉ ÉGALITÉ FRATERNITÉ

GENDARMERIE D'HAITI

PORT-AU-PRINCE, LE February 21st 1916

Dearest Mother:

About this time each year it has been my habit to acknowledge the approach of thine and Father's wedding anniversary so here goes for this years effort.

Each year I am away I swear faithfully to myself that I will make it a point to be at home the next time one of these days rolls around, but duty of some sort always seems to crop up and keep me away.

Thirty seven years is a mighty long time to live with any one person but thee and Father seemed to have found

A letter to his mother. *(Photo by Vance Osterhout. See footnote 5.)*

his family, we were presented with a revelation. Writing to his mother on 21 February 1916, Butler first pays tribute to his parents with a fantastic display of filial piety. Clearly his parents' wedding anniversary was a date he valued, and he addressed his mother with the loving "thee" and "thine." He expresses regret, "that all this foreign service, away from every one you love, is hardly worthwhile, yet what am I to do?"[5] He has, of course, some quite material concerns in this regard, that his work, "is a man's size detail and will be the foundation in which I hope to build my future career," and that, "If all goes well I shall be able to save enough from my salary of nearly $9,000 a year to educate my Babies and … to have a little nest egg for Bunny and myself when we get old."[6] We found not merely a legendary figure, but a man who wished he could be with his loved ones, understanding, however, the sacrifice of building a better place for himself in society. Butler loved his wife, affectionately called Bunny in several letters, and ended each letter to her with a lengthy and elaborate admission of love, which involved a bit of secret codification.

Beyond this, he immediately launches into the revelatory business of the Medal of Honor he was awarded for action at Vera Cruz. Perhaps in vague and hurried reference, you may have heard that he didn't particularly want the medals he was awarded, these famous medals for which he is ritualized in Marine Corps boot camp history.[7] For example, in a 1983 *Marine Corps Gazette* article, retired LtCol M.L. Bartlett wrote "His sense of honor was without peer; for example, his second award of the Medal of Honor (at Vera Cruz) was so specious that he pleaded with his father to have the award withdrawn."[8] Additionally, in 1992, former Marine and author of numerous books, George B. Clark wrote "Here [Mexico] he earned his first Medal of Honor, which had recently been approved for awarding to officers. He made a half-hearted attempt to return it, expressing his belief that no one really had earned one during the campaign."[9] Although this piece of information has been shared many years ago in *Gazette* articles and glanced over in the scholarship of a dated history book, we found that Butler had vehemently denied this particular medal. We must quote at length to convey the wording he used to describe what he called a "perversion of our country's greatest gift."[10] With original emphasis:

> A Medal of Honor, awarded me for Vera Cruz, has arrived here. Now this is one of those Medals, authorized by Congress for heroism and in my opinion should not be given to every man who takes part in a campaign just because he happens to be in the vicinity. This is my case and I, in even my most puffed up moments, can not remember a single action, or in fact any collection of actions of mine that in the slightest degree warranted such a decoration. I did my duty as best I could in Vera

MajGen Smedley D. Butler. *(File photo.)*

Cruz but there was absolutely nothing heroic in it.[11]

He demands that his father, Congressman Thomas S. Butler, somehow force the Department of the Navy to take the medal back, stating that the award for action in Mexico has "an element of fraud." He says that he wants the Marine Corps' Medal of Honor to remain one only given for true heroism, where he feels that the Army and Navy have awarded them "unjustly."[12] We got the feeling that Butler wanted to make sure that he was his own man, and not the son of a Congressman, when he received his promotions and awards.

The point of this act of tearing scales from eyes is not to imply that Smedley Butler should be stripped of this Medal of Honor, though this does appear to be his fervent wish in February 1916. It is rather to illustrate his humbleness and desire to perform his duty, to be awarded when he had truly been heroic and not merely because of who his father was or as the culmination of a successful campaign. No doubt, indeed, that anyone reading this has met or at least heard of a person who, upon being presented with an award, felt reluctant or undeserving at having been recognized. Those around them can clearly see the quality of their character, but the individual wishes for nothing more than to be able to continue his work. Seeing that Smedley Butler was such a glory denier, and to the degree that he expressed such feelings, made us feel that he was more worthy of recognition than we had ever realized in our ritual recitals.

Notes

1. United States Marine Corps, "Major General Smedley D. Butler, USMC Medal of Honor Citation: Haiti," United States Marine Corps History Division, (Quantico, VA), accessed 16 February 2015, at http://www.mcu.usmc.mil.

2. Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 64.

3. Mary Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 10.

4. F.A. Smith, "Major General Smedley Darlington Butler, USMC," *Leatherneck Magazine*, (Quantico, VA: August 1940), accessed at https://www.mca-marines.org.

5. Smedley Darlington Butler letter to Maud Darlington Butler, 21 February 1916, box 3, Smedley Darlington Butler Family Correspondence, 1894–1973 M1975, Green Library, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University), 1.

6. Ibid., 1 (back).

7. *Above and Beyond: A History of the Medal of Honor from the Civil War to Vietnam,* (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Company, 1985), 113.

8. M. L. Bartlett, "Smedley Butler's Story," *Marine Corps Gazette,* (Quantico, VA: June 1983), 75, accessed at https://www.mca-marines.org.

9. George B. Clark, "Letters of Old Gimlet Eye," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: November 1992), 96, accessed at https://www.mca-marines.org.

10. Butler letter 2 (back).

11. Ibid., 2 (front).

12. Ibid., 3 (back).

>Author's Note: Mr. Vance Osterhout took photos of the letter and envelope from an archives box at Stanford University's Cecil H. Green Library.

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The Dedication of the Belleau Wood Memorial

November 18, 1955

by Col Jay Bruder, USMC(Ret)

After the First World War, many memorials and markers were placed across the Chateau-Thierry battlefield of the Aisne-Marne Defensive of June and July 1918. When the Commandant, Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. visited the battlefield in the early 1950s, he noted there was no commemorative marker to the fallen Marines inside Belleau Wood. In 1953, donations were taken up from current members of the 5th Marines for a memorial plaque in French and English. Felix de Weldon, the designer of the Marine Corps War Memorial, was commissioned. He did

>Col Bruder is an intelligence officer who served in Beirut and in Desert Shield/Desert Storm before commanding I MEF Headquarters Group in Fallujah. He also served as Chief of Staff, I MEF. He retired in January 2010. His grandfather was Gen Gerald C. Thomas who received a battlefield commission at Belleau Wood. He went on to become a key player in the Service unification battles following the Second World War. After retirement in 1956, he was recalled to serve for two years as Staff Director for the Net Evaluations Subcommittee of the National Security Council. This article was inspired by a conversation between a former Gazette editor, the late Col John Greenwood, and the author's late uncles, William H.J. Thomas and Col Gerald C. Thomas, Jr.

Mr. Felix de Weldon, the designer of the Iwo Jima Monument, also designed the Belleau Wood Monument. *(Official DOD photo.)*

not limit himself to the modest request. Instead, he sculpted the now celebrated image of a gaunt, shirtless Marine with a fixed bayonet and rendered it as a bas relief cast in bronze and mounted on the same black marble he had used for the pedestal of the Marine Corps War Memorial in Arlington. De Weldon's Belleau Wood memorial, situated at the center of the wood, was dedicated on November 18, 1955.

In 1955, the battle was still a vivid memory for the surviving participants, but it was not necessarily a clear memory. It would not be until 1965, when Robert Asprey published his landmark book, *At Belleau Wood*, that the participants had a coherent timeline and detailed description of events from across the battlefield. Asprey pieced together a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle of time, space, and uncertainty. A good number of the pieces to the puzzle were missing and would never be properly filled in. Yet, Asprey was able to cogently describe much of what did happen and put to rest some long-standing misimpressions from the chaos of the battle. He documented a battle that was an organizational nightmare marked by severed communications, battered command structures, inadequate equipment, minimal logistic support, and serious tactical errors. Over the course of a month-long engagement, these liabilities were turned into a victory through the incredible heroism and endurance of Marines, sailors, soldiers, and Frenchmen.

In May 1918, the German Army made its final great push to break the French lines. The U.S. 3rd Division was among the first U.S. units into the fight as it moved up to the Marne River on May 31st and reinforced the 10th French Colonial Division on the eastern edge of the German salient at Château-Thierry. By June 2nd, they had refused the German advance in their sector. Without these two units standing their ground, there would have been no time for the 2nd Division to maneuver into place from the south and west. There would have been no meeting engagement at Belleau Wood. And there would have been no *Chicago Daily Tribune* lead line on 6 June 1918 from their nearly-dead reporter, Floyd Gibbons, reading, "I am up front and entering Belleau Wood with the U.S. Marines."[1] Something dramatic surely would have happened, but it would have been a very different encounter.

The U.S. and French honor guard prior to the unveiling. *(Official DOD photo.)*

The Marines were more than ready to fight after months of rear echelon and trench-line duties.

As it did happen, once the Germans met the stiff resistance of the U.S. 3rd Division, they shifted their point of main effort to the west and on 2 June ran smack into the 6th and 5th Marine Regiments and 6th Machine Gun Battalion of the 4th Brigade. The brigade was assigned to the U.S. Army's 2nd Division, which was only just arriving in place. The Marines were more than ready to fight after months of rear echelon and trench-line duties.[2] The Marines, under orders of the 2nd Division, assumed the defense by means of steady and disciplined attacks across acres of open fields in the face of murderous machine gun and artillery fire and continued into the well-fortified German positions in the woods. By the time the last unit of the 2nd Division was pulled off the front line on July 8th, the Germans had thrown elements

of five divisions at Belleau Wood where they were mauled by the Marines who themselves suffered horrendously with 126 officers and 5,057 men listed as casualties.[3]

There is no question that the Marines took the brunt of the fighting and the vast majority of the casualties at Belleau Wood. However, the actions of adjacent and supporting units should not be understated. Asprey noted the U.S. 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division on the Marine's right flank spent most of the battle "fighting position warfare which held most of the disadvantages of offensive warfare without such compensation as ground gained, prisoners and guns captured, and glory given."[4] It was not until Belleau Wood was secured that the 3rd Brigade was set loose to capture the town of Vaux. This, while not a trivial action, had little of the desperate edge of the fight already won. In the end, the 3rd Brigade paid a dear price indeed with 68 officers and 3,184 men listed as casualties.[5] Additionally, the untested 7th Brigade, 3rd Division was called up from their positions along the Marne on 15 June to relieve the Marines of the 4th Brigade on the line for a critical period of rest and reorganization. The Marines quickly resumed their positions and the offensive on 21 June.[6] Likewise, the 167th French Division held the left flank. The presence of the French troops pressed into service as they fell back through Marine lines is attested largely through personal accounts and photographs. It was a crowded and confused battlefield. Today, we should be careful to remember, in fair measure, all who contributed.

The Commandant's official party for the 1955 dedication arrived at the Évreux Air Base on the afternoon of 17 November. Three general officers who had also fought at Belleau Wood accompanied the Commandant. LtGen Gerald C. Thomas, then Assistant Commandant, had been a sergeant, Intelligence Chief in the 75th Co (later re-designated B Co 1/6). In the ensuing years, he had served in Haiti and China, planned the Guadalcanal landing as the Operations Officer for the 1st Marine Division, and commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea. LtGen Alfred H. Noble, then serving as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, was a first lieutenant commanding the 83rd Co (K Co 3/6) and was awarded the Navy Cross for his heroism at Belleau Wood. As Assistant Commander of the 3d Marine Division, he planned and executed the recapture of Guam. MajGen William Arthur Worton, USMC(Ret), a first lieutenant and second-in-command of 79th Co (F Co 2/6) was seriously wounded by gas and projectiles on 6 June 1918 during the attack on Bouresches. He was admitted to the hospital four days later and eventually evacuated for wounds. In the 1920s, he became a China expert who went on to arrange the surrender of Japanese forces in China at the end of WWII and became a special advisor to President Eisenhower after he left active duty. The Commandant himself had been a lieutenant, acting company commander, with the 55th Co (H Co 2/5). He was twice wounded and evacuated after 7 June. He was awarded the Army Distinguished Service Cross and the Navy Cross for his heroism. He returned to Belleau Wood in October 1919 for three months as a member of a mapping survey team.

From left to right: MajGen William A. Worton, LtGen Gerald C. Thomas, Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, and LtGen Alfred H. Noble. All fought as young Marines at Belleau Wood. *(Photo from USMC Archives.)*

> ***There is no question that the Marines took the brunt of the fighting and the vast majority of the casualties at Belleau Wood.***

At about nine in the morning on the day of the ceremony, Gen Shepherd and LtGen Thomas departed from their hotel to pick up generals Worton and Noble who were lodging at an old and elegant hotel on the right bank near the Place de l'Etoile. MajGen Worton, who was known to be quite a gregarious character, coaxed the Commandant and Assistant Commandant out of their waiting cars and into his hotel. Speaking French—as did most of the officers who served both in France and Haiti—he summoned the

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Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd renders a salute to the unveiled monument. Others are left to right: LtGen Gerald C. Thomas, Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, VA; French Vice Admiral G.L.J. Rebuffel, Assistant Chief of Staff of the French Navy; and (background) LtCol Gordon H. West, Aide to Gen Shepherd. *(Official DOD photo.)*

manager and said words to the effect: "*Monsieur le propriétaire, les jeune soldats de la grande guerre avait besion du'n verre.*" The hotel proprietor took the hint immediately, opened the bar, and charged a round of glasses for a toast to fallen comrades before the official party set out for a long and emotional day. They then drove for an hour and a half to the north and east of Paris though countryside still devastated by the destruction of two world wars in the span of three decades. When they reached Belleau, it was bitterly cold with a brisk wind sweeping across the battlefield.

A memorial in memory of 50 and more American Heroes whose resting places in these woods are still unknown. *(Photo by Terry Schwartz.)*

Early in the day, the official party walked the battlefield. As Gen Shepherd and LtGen Thomas approached a farmhouse, a woman emerged. Despite the passage of more than 30 years, she called out without a moment's hesitation, "*Lieutenant Shepherd, vous êtes de retour.*" It was but one of many poignant reunions that day for this group of warriors who had led the Corps though three of the most challenging wars of the 20th century.

The staff of the American Battle Monuments Commission at Aisne-Marne had excelled in preparing the grounds. A platoon-sized detachment had been formed up from Marines assigned to duty across the U.S. European Command. They were matched by a contingent of French Marines, another of French Army, and reinforced with a U.S. Army Band. There were some 200 spectators. The woods themselves had recovered from the splintering shell damage of the battle in the intervening decades and had begun to reclaim the dark and foreboding look of June 1918. The unveiling was a brief ceremony starting at three in the afternoon and lasting not more than twenty-five minutes. Gen Shepherd, Admiral Rebuffell of the French Navy, and the sculptor, Felix de Weldon, all spoke. All then returned to the ceremonial entrance to the cemetery at the top end of the woods where Gen Shepherd and Admiral Rebuffell laid wreaths followed by taps and the firing of salutes. The shivering crowd repaired by cars to the Hotel de Ville in Château-Thierry, about six miles distant, for refreshments known as the "*Vin d'honneur.*"

The Battle of Belleau Wood not only changed the course of the war, but it also changed the history of the Marine Corps. The general officers assembled at Belleau in 1955 were among the group of commissioned and enlisted Marines who emerged from the battle resolute in their determination never to repeat the nightmare they had just survived. They were convinced that the Marine Corps must organize along the infantry division model and incorporate organic supporting arms and logistics into Marine formations. Their struggle to transform the Marine Corps was held in check

during the small wars years. Yet, they were rigorous in their study and planning. When the opportunity for growth and restructuring came in 1939, they knew exactly what they wanted. They set about creating the air, ground, and logistics team that carried the Marine Corps and the Nation through World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Thanks to the Government of France, which owns the land, and the continuing efforts of the staff of the American Battle Monuments Commission, which maintains it, you can come back to that same place and walk the very ground where a generation of Marines and Sailors conquered their fears and left behind not only their fallen comrades, but also the Old Corps of naval detachments built around Marine Barracks and went on to form a New Corps of infantry divisions, air wings, and combined arms expeditionary forces that have served the Nation so ably ever since.

Thanks to the staff of the American Battle Monument Commission, Aisne-Marne, France, and the staff of the Marine Corps History Division. Personal recollections of the day's proceedings based on the accounts of W. H. Johnson Thomas, then a Marine security guard stationed at the U.S. Embassy in London, and Col and Mrs. Joseph Bruder, USMC, then assigned to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The National Archives has posted a brief film of the ceremony, which you can find by searching online for "Belleau Wood Memorial Dedication."

They set about creating the air, ground, and logistics team ...

Notes

1. LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine Corps 1775–1962*, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1962), 203.

2. Robert Asprey, *At Belleau Wood*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), 73, 97.

3. Ibid., 326–327.

4. Ibid., 310.

5. Ibid., 327.

6. Ibid., 290–298.

Reflections of a Former Drill Instructor

Fully understanding the important things

by SSgt Jerry S. Correa

MCRD San Diego.

As I walk out of the duty hatch to the porthole by front hatch, the early morning light is just beginning to fill the eastern sky, and the rest of the depot remains quiet except for the few drill instructors arriving for work. This time is known as "The Calm before the Storm!" It's 0455, and my head is pounding from yelling so much. Every time I swallow, it feels like razor blades; my feet are swollen in pain; and I am both mentally and physically tired because I had only two hours of sleep. However, in five minutes, I will have to forget all of these personal distractions because the recruits will awaken to another hectic day of recruit training. Most mornings for new drill instructors are just like this, having to constantly remind yourself what it means to be a drill instructor and why you volunteered for such a difficult and demanding duty. Mornings like these are the reason why the three years I served as a drill instructor were the most challenging, but, at the same time, the most rewarding experience I have had in my career so far. I volunteered to be a drill instructor because I wanted to mold and put my thumbprint on the future of the Marine Corps. I wanted desperately to be a part of the three-month long process of transforming civilians into basically trained Marines who are imbued with our core values of honor, courage, and commitment, and for three years, I performed to the best of my ability.

No one joins the Marine Corps just to be "basic." *(Photo by Cpl Caitlin Brink.)*

However, I always had an issue with the term "basically trained Marine." The word "basic" should not be used to describe a Marine, for most Marines are alpha males and females. These alpha males/females join the Marine Corps because they want to be part of the best military organization in the world. They want to climb that mountain and slay the dragon as advertised in the recruiting commercial. No one joins the Marine Corps to be basic. Although the concept "creating basically trained Marines" is drilled into your mindset throughout Drill Instructor School, I have never met a drill instructor whose goal was to turn his recruits into basic Marines. Marine Corps drill instructors strive to make their recruits the best at everything.

During recruit training, the recruits are tested on a number of graded events. Graded events such as close order drill (COD), rifle marksmanship, and physi-

>SSgt Correa is assigned to Headquarters and Support Battalion, MCB Camp Pendleton. He served as a drill instructor, senior drill instructor, and chief drill instructor at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego from July 2009 to October 2012 and trained over 600 recruits. SSgt Correa deployed to Iraq in 2004 and 2008.

cal training (PT) just to name a few. Like all Marines, drill instructors are extremely competitive, striving to train their recruits to be the best and to win every graded event, but the life of a drill instructor becomes so competitive that being the best at everything becomes a constant thought in the minds of both the drill instructors and the recruits. Sometimes you can find yourself skipping or speeding through training events because you want to spend more time preparing your platoon for the next graded event. It was always a race to finish your guided discussion or other type of training in order to be the first platoon on the parade deck to get your platoon extra drill time practice in front of the reviewing stand.

The 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Charles C. Krulak, once stated, "For over 221 years our Corps has done two things for this great Nation. We make Marines, and we win battles." As leaders, we must pass down our knowledge and experience to those we train so that they don't make the same mistakes we made or witnessed others make. Drill instructors are the first line of defense. Drill instructors need to be constantly thinking of ways to better educate and prepare their recruits not just for the Marine Corps but the common things that they will experience after graduating recruit training. The more educated and prepared our Marines are, the easier and better we can prepare them for battle.

Now that I am off the drill field and returned to the Fleet, I look back in time and realize there were a lot of things I wish I would have done differently. Almost three years later, more mature, experienced, and wise, I quickly noticed once I returned to the Fleet the amount of basic knowledge junior Marines in the Fleet were severely lacking. A lot of Marines lack knowledge in basic topics such as Marine Corps customs and courtesies and personal finances. I now wish during my drill instructor tour that I would have put less of an emphasis on some of the graded events and more of an emphasis on some of the topics our younger Marines are having issues with during their first term of service.

One aspect of leadership that I regret not doing during my drill instructor tour was calling cadence during PT sessions to my recruits. During my tour, I noticed that most training companies only sang cadence to their recruits during the motivation run on family day. Family day is the day before graduation. Most drill instructors choose not to sing cadence to their recruits because they would be called "sugar" or a "recruit lover" by the other drill instructors for attempting to motivate their recruits. Until recently, I never realized the long-term effect it would have until I went on my first company PT run because most of the junior Marines did not know any cadence when called upon to lead the formation. I personally failed to provide "leadership by example" as a drill instructor because I did not want to be labeled as a "sugar hat." Calling cadence during physical training is a military tradition that can be traced back to the Revolutionary War. During the Revolutionary War, unit leaders used a cadence count for the complex sequence of loading and firing muskets. Today, it is used to boost morale, build camaraderie, and to keep Marines in step. Calling cadence is a basic skill every Marine should learn from listening

Now that I am off the drill field and returned to the Fleet, I look back in time and realize there were a lot of things I wish I would have done differently.

and observing their drill instructors. Today's drill instructors need to stop worrying about what other drill instructors may label them and immediately start setting the example by singing running cadence to their recruits whenever possible.

Another topic I should have put more emphasis on during my tour was personal finances. In 2013, the Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS) provided assistance to 22,090 Marines across the whole Marine Corps. Forty-eight percent of those Marines were within the ranks of private and lance corporal. Over 40 percent of those Marines needed assistance for basic living expenses. Marines do not plan to fail at anything; most of the time, they fail to plan. I believe that the reason for such high numbers requiring assistance is a lack of education when it comes to finances. Most young Marines do not know how to plan financially, and by the time they get to their first permanent duty station, it is usually too late. Most recruits join the Marine Corps immediately after graduating high school where they receive very little to no personal financial education. Unless taught by their parents, most recruits do not have the basic knowledge on how to manage their finances. For most recruits, the Marine Corps is their first job, so they have limited experience dealing with money. During the last week of recruit training, as per the training schedule, recruits are given a one-hour class on personal finances. I have never heard or witnessed any drill instructor using "DI time" as provided on the recruit training schedule to teach such classes on personal finances because it has no bearing on earning company honor platoon. Personal finance is a topic that drill instructors should sit down and have multiple guided discussions with their recruits. Having guided discussions after in-class training will benefit the recruits as it allows the recruits the opportunity to interact and ask their drill instructors questions. Also, when drill instructors reiterate topics that are taught in the classroom, it gives the topic more emphasis thus making it more important to the recruits. These guided discussions and training should occur during third phase. Throughout this period, recruits begin the transition from the strict regimen of recruit training to an environment of professional membership in the Marine Corps. Upon leaving recruit training, Marines should be able to read their Leave and Earnings Statement, should know how to put together a personal budget, and should know the basics about the Thrift Savings Plan.

Teaching recruits about personal finances can alleviate a lot of the monetary and personal issues that younger first-term Marines are facing. Many Department of Defense studies have shown that financial issues are the number one reason for security clearance issues, it is the number two reason for stress among Marines, and it is one of the top five triggers of suicide. Financial issues can also lead to loss of focus on training and marital problems that in turn can lead to domestic violence; they can also prevent a Marine from being assigned to certain duties. Hindsight is great, but at the very least, I wish I would have taught my recruits the importance of budgeting, spending wisely, and saving. These are tools that can change a Marine's life for the better.

The Marine Corps places one of its most important responsibilities on Marines selected to become drill instructors. Per the *Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego SOP Manual* (CO, Recruit Training Regiment, 2014),

> The Drill Instructor is the key to successfully accomplishing the mission of recruit training. The Drill Instructor's wholehearted effort ensures that the pride and traditions of our Corps are maintained and passed on to the next generation of Marines.

Knowledge and skills acquired by recruits during recruit training can be retained for their whole Marine Corps career. I strived daily to ensure I gave 110 percent into training my recruits because I knew the type of impact that the drill instructor can make on an individual Marine's future. The harder you work the better trained your recruits will be! One event that I will always remember from Drill Instructor School is the moment when we were issued our drill instructor campaign covers. One of the instructors told us that we were only being loaned our campaign covers and that we do not yet own them. In order to have full ownership of our campaign covers, we had to earn the right to wear them every day for three years with sacrifice, blood, sweat, and tears. At the time, I thought I knew what he meant, but it wasn't until I completed my tour and had an opportunity to look back in time to fully understand what he meant. When I look back now, I know I put 110 percent into training my recruits, but maybe I wasn't mature enough to know the difference between the important things and the things that were made important because of the culture on the depot at the time.

USMC

Marine Corps Innovation

The need for a reawakening

by Capt Christopher J. Wood

Let's be honest. Innovation is hyped and is the latest in a long list of headline catching buzzwords that pervade corporate and military lexicons. Herculean efforts are made to strategically insert the word into speeches, mission statements, and marketing documents. However, this often-overused word still has an important lesson to teach the Marine Corps. Its popularity stems from the uniquely American innovation revolution happening right now among start ups, corporations, millennials, and even some government agencies. These groups have incorporated simple, efficient, and transformational techniques to think creatively and develop novel solutions to complex problems.

Despite their Silicon Valley roots, these contemporary techniques harken back to our own principles of maneuver warfare and John Boyd's OODA (observation, orientation, decision, action) cycle. The Marine Corps is past due to capitalize on the opportunities available by implementing these techniques. The Commandant has provided a clear vision for our Marine Corps to innovate, adapt, and win. Current efforts leave gaps in our ability to incorporate modern approaches that create better Marine innovators, capture and collaborate on ideas generated from within the Corps, and to test these ideas rapidly and inexpensively. If these gaps can be mitigated successfully, the future Marine Corps will be driven by a culture of innovation that empowers Marines and civilians to aggressively pursue that which is "better" and "different." Sustainable and streamlined processes will provide simple solutions to complex problems. New capabilities, whether developed inside the Corps or from an outside source such as a start up, will be validated and assimilated within weeks and months—not years. Most importantly, formalizing a Marine Corps innovation capability will provide strategic and tactical advantages to overwhelmingly outpace our adversaries.



1stLt Victor H. Krulak's photo of Japanese landing boats in Shanghai harbor. During the interwar period, Krulak's vision for amphibious warfare combined with a Corps-wide culture of innovation that would come to redefine the Marine Corps and save countless lives in WWII. ***(Photo courtesy of LtGen V. H. Krulak.)***

Innovation Defined

Despite its hype, innovation is still necessary but too often seems ambiguous, nonsubstantial, and ill defined. Let us first answer "what isn't innovation?" It is not a platform, a piece of equipment, a status quo mentality, or something created by a single person or organization. Subsequently, let us next answer "what is innovation?" It is change that improves the world in incremental or radical ways. Those ways can be entirely new, or they simply put existing things together in new and more useful forms. Innovation flourishes when an environment is deliberately grown to entrust a person to change his world through just an idea. The components of this environment are two fold: first, a culture with risk tolerant leadership that rewards innovation; and second, a program built with the right process and tools. Organizations, government and commercial alike, have spent three decades learning and proving out the core principles of innovation to make it into an organization-wide capability. These principles empower employees to

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generate and collaborate around their ideas, isolate employees to minimally develop their ideas into prototypes, quickly test and fail these prototypes, and facilitate early and continuous stakeholder involvement.

Marines Are Built To Adapt, Not Innovate

Theorists have differed between being cognitively tuned to adapt versus innovate, with roughly 2.5 percent of the population having the capacity to innovate.[1] Adaptors focus on incremental improvements within existing processes, technologies, or systems.[2] Innovators, on the other hand, redefine entire paradigms in unpredictable ways, often known as being "disruptive." Disruptions challenge and break down entire systems, technologies, or markets. Email disrupted post mail, the iPhone disrupted the cell phone, and maneuver warfare disrupted attrition warfare. This lens provides valuable insight for the Marine Corps and the Marines within it. The Marine Corps has fiercely embedded adaptation within the core ethos of a Marine and how the Corps functions. Fortunately, only a small percentage of Marines are disruptive in the sense described above. A Corps full of disruptors would be catastrophic, resulting in constant change and turmoil. The USMC must continue to recruit and produce Marines who can instantly adapt and violently execute. However, Marine innovators are also needed to create the change that moves us forward, keeps us relevant, and maintains our advantage over our adversaries.

Most large organizations are naturally inclined to reject, or at least resist, change. That resistance is particularly common among those who occupy a prominent place within their respective field. Further, the Marine Corps is faced with congressional, inter-Service, and cultural impediments that hinder the velocity and extent to which we can change. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps does not possess the luxury to resist change. In order to maintain our role as the Nation's ready force, our Corps has a fundamental responsibility to evolve; our citizens depend on Marines to not only adapt but to implement new ways to be ready in an unknowable future. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is rightly focused on deep exploration of potentially high impact ideas and testing those ideas within wargame-style experimentation. Although MCWL has been effective in this domain, three gaps remain. First and most importantly, the Corps must identify, enable, and create better innovators. Second, we must generate, collaborate, and experiment with a high number of ideas that are both grown from within the Corps and brought in from academia, start ups, or other nontraditional sources. Third, we must advance the processes and technology that are used to develop, test, and acquire these ideas in a way that is fast, cheap, scalable, simple, transparent, and benefits from advances in modernized technology.

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Introducing the Innovative Engine

In order to meet these gaps, we must reinvigorate a culture of innovation that explores new ideas and invests resources, which allow Marines to champion their ideas. This culture must be purposefully enabled and nourished by leadership, but ultimately, it must also be implemented by individuals. The first step in developing this change is to find ways to make better innovators. Subsequently, their ideas will expose previously unforeseen solutions, and it will demonstrate the innovative esprit that the Corps so rightly espouses. The methods to enact this change have been borne out by countless companies and corporations as they fought to maintain or expand their market share. These same methods have also been brought into several forward thinking government agencies, such as the National Security Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Department of Defense is just beginning to adopt these methods within the Air Force's Futurist Program, the Chief of Naval Operations Rapid Innovation Cell, and the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force Innovation. Our Corps has a proven and proud history of innovation that ranges from amphibious doctrine to vertical envelopment to maneuver warfare.[3] However, these examples are from a bygone era. Recent decades have brought about a new wave of globalization, Internet-based communications, mobile devices, big data, and cloud computing. These shifts have all changed innovation, and the time has come for the Marine Corps to similarly pivot.

The first step to undertaking a new innovation program is a critical assessment of the organization's culture, people, and business processes. Each organization has a unique situation that will require specific tools to be precisely employed to be effective within that particular organization. Such a set of tools can be put together to form an innovation engine for the Marine Corps. I have previously written about some of the Marine Corps' own challenges to innovation.[4] An innovative engine addresses these challenges through an ecosystem of people, process, and technology. Focused first on enabling our Marines and civilians, the engine crowdsources ideas and collaboratively evolves those ideas into proposals to be approved by appropriate communities. Ideas range from doctrine to equipment to software. Once approved, the idea champion will spend one to four weeks working with the innovation engine team to produce a "pitch" worthy prototype. Before making further investments, the prototypes must be sponsored by an organization, then tested and validated. The innovation

engine is designed to produce several benefits.

> ***"One's mind, once stretched by a new idea, never regains its original dimensions."***
> ***–Oliver Wendell Holmes, Physician, Poet, Professor***

Allow individuals to champion their idea. A basic truth of people and organizations is that no one cares more about an idea than its creator. The Marine Corps often succumbs to "not invented here"-itis. Current bottom up approaches exploit Marines to submit their inventive solutions; ultimately, they function as black hole suggestion boxes. Instead, we must allow a Marine to drive his idea throughout the process. Not only will this make for the development of bolder and better concepts that remain aligned with the original need, but it strengthens Marines with vital career enhancing skills such as creative and critical thinking, concise communications, and a firsthand understanding of the USMC capabilities production processes.

> ***"Our best ideas come from clerks and stockboys."***
> ***–Sam Walton, Wal-Mart***

Form an innovation community. Traditional perspectives of innovation are defined by "right person, right idea, right place, right time." This perspective has been debunked by present-day practices. Innovation rises from a community of fellow innovators with diverse backgrounds, experiences, skill sets, and biases, all of whom are intimately familiar with the problems of their organization. The Marine Corps' hardest problems are often solved by our lance corporals and lieutenants; we must give them the ability to organize and collaborate.

> ***"I can't understand why people are frightened of new ideas. I'm frightened of the old ones."***
> ***–John Cage, Composer, Artist, Author***

Discover new ideas. Once formed, the innovator and the larger community must work against stagnant mindsets in order to discover new ideas. Discovery can often lead to great ideas, but effective programs must also pursue bad ideas. These seemingly bad ideas have massive potential but are nearly always marginalized before ever being initially cultivated. The most disruptive and powerful ideas nearly always appear bad in their present context.

> ***"There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home."***
> ***–Ken Olson, 1977, Founder of Digital Equipment Corp.***

> ***"A new idea is delicate. It can be killed by a sneer or a yawn; it can be stabbed to death by a quip and worried to death by a frown on the right man's brow."***
> ***–Ovid, Poet***

Develop an idea. Ideas have little value as simply thoughts in our heads, words on paper, or images on a screen. As in any large organization, new ideas in the Marine Corps require careful protection, development, and guidance to be successful. These ideas must be openly explored before they are offhandedly dismissed. Rapid and minimally invested prototyping allows this exploration. A prototype isn't designed to support a final capability, but instead, it is built only as far as necessary to pitch the idea to an existing Marine Corps organization.

> ***"The best way to have a good idea is to have a lot of ideas."***
> ***–Linus Pauling, Nobel Prize Winner***

Test and fail many ideas. In innovation, as in *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting* (HQMC, Washington, DC: 1996), constant experimentation and controlled failure is customary and even encouraged. The Marine Corps embraces this philosophy in our training and exercises, yet we leave it by the wayside when we check into our commands and headquarters environments. To counter this, the Marine Corps must aggressively pursue as many ideas as possible, even when some ideas display clear risks of failure.

> ***"If you want to kill any idea in the world, get a committee working on it."***
> ***–Charles Kettering, GM***

Inject good ideas into the Corps. The seminal challenge of any new idea is how to integrate it into existing efforts. Our bureaucratic ca-

pabilities development processes are riddled with oversights, approvals, and single points of failure. They create contemptibly low probabilities of success for bottom up ideas. Ideas that do manage to succeed are often advocated by a senior leader and highly noncontroversial. We must implement transparent, accountable, and funded processes that shore up the expeditious (weeks, not months or years) injection of these ideas into existing solution development offices. Of all the barriers to innovation, the Marine Corps is most challenged by our own institutional resistance. Overcoming these challenges demands bold leaders who are willing to apply appropriate pressure.

The Marine Corps must indeed innovate, adapt, and win. We have the right people and the right ideas to do so, and as Gen Alfred M. Gray often points out, "it doesn't cost anything to think." All that is left is to create the right systems to propel our people to create an ever improving, ever changing Marine Corps.

Of all the barriers to innovation, the Marine Corps is most challenged by our own institutional resistance.

Notes

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Military Leadership and Narrative

The value of stories

by Capt Nathan A. Fleischaker

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Although not traditionally associated with leadership, recently the value of narrative and storytelling has gained increasing attention in leadership studies originating from a wide variety of disciplines, ranging from business to cognitive science.[1] *Narrative* and *story* are terms used interchangeably; they both refer to a broad range of written or spoken communications that convey experiences and explain (more or less overtly) the connections between events, time, actors, and motivations. Particular examples range widely in style, from myth to fable to historical accounts, and they may be true or fictitious, visionary or historical, lengthy or barely a few words. Whatever their format, stories and narratives tie certain ingredients together to help humans organize their thinking and better understand the world.[2]

Not of interest to only academics, narrative has also become a buzzword in parts of the military. Over the last five years, military journals, doctrine, and operational headquarters have invested significant attention to the idea. Strategic communication and information operations focus on winning the "battle of the narratives" by better telling our story through all available means.[3] Because stories provide a potent means of combining disparate elements into a cohesive whole, they have also been of interest within the recent shift to emphasizing design. Design uses story as a tool: irreducibly complicated environments cannot be fully understood when put together as a list of parts; they are better grasped when tied together within a narrative. Additionally, recent contributions to military thinking include the development of "narrative led operations"[4] and "strategic narrative."[5] Both of these concepts seek to codify narrative's use, not only in understanding environments and problems but also in communicating intent, making decisions, and planning operations.

Human factors—how we relate to our fellow Marines and host-nation citizens—is important when we know that what we do may have lasting effects. *(Photo by Cpl Austin Long.)*

Leaders and Stories

All of this is to say that stories are a powerful tool. They help us influence people, determine our course, make sense of our environments, and direct and synchronize actions. However, despite the recognition that narratives have great potential, the military's focus on narrative has been focused almost entirely externally, on operations. Narrative is used in information operations to influence a civilian population or used as a foundation for operational planning. There has been little discussion about narrative being used internally, or stated otherwise, about how and why leaders should influence subordinates through stories. Narrative is essential for

understanding complex situations, synchronizing operations, and influencing the external environment—these same qualities make it a formidable asset for leaders. Harvard psychologist Professor Howard Gardner argued persuasively nearly a decade ago that "leaders achieve their effectiveness chiefly through the stories they relate" and "exert their influence through the stories they tell and the ways they embody those stories."[6] While this theory has not been adopted by the military, its importance has received significant attention within the business leadership world.[7]

Narratives are powerful. Just as their utility in operational planning is being examined and encouraged, their ability to uniquely communicate vision and to more comprehensively influence subordinates deserves thoughtful attention among leaders.

The Power of Stories

At the end of and immediately following my battalion's recent deployment to Afghanistan, we were met by a litany of leaders from higher echelons of command, each eager to tell our unit how impressed he was by our success and how important he deemed our operations. Yet, of the multitude of commanders and sergeants major who spoke to us—from battalion to MEF level—the only talk that had any lasting impact (and of which more than a vague recollection remains) was from a commander who linked the Marines' actions during deployment into a grander story of what the United States is working to accomplish in Afghanistan. The points he underscored were nearly identical to those underscored by the other commanders: hold your heads high, you helped us accomplish the mission, you can be proud of your efforts and sacrifice, and now you need to focus on the future while maintaining high standards of conduct and discipline in garrison. However, his delivery of this message had a singular potency because it was communicated through a story. More than simply *stating* that we had done well and should be proud, in using narrative this commander *showed* how both our actions and the sacrifices made by our casualties had lasting impact.

Stories are foundational to how the human brain processes and understands the world. We comprehend not by simply taking in isolated facts and figures but by recognizing patterns and searching for connections among things observed. Thus, stories provide the means by which ideas can have context because patterns linking cause and effect can be found. "Stories constitute a uniquely powerful currency in human relationships," argues Professor Gardner. "The story," he adds, "is a basic human cognitive form."[8] Other research by the Nobel Prize winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman suggests that our brains are hard-wired to understand events through stories, which explain connections between observations and events. These explanatory stories are frequently given to us by parents, teachers, culture, and other external factors. However, in the absence of a given narrative, the mind will subconsciously attempt to create its own explanatory stories based on whatever limited observations are available. These self-created stories are typically overly simplistic and frequently flawed, being based on incomplete data. Still, despite the weak rationale and little evidence that built them, our belief in these created stories can be frighteningly strong.[9] Since our minds are so susceptible to accepting and acting on stories, one who can tell a story and convince others of its truth and relevance is in a powerful position to shape how people think and respond.

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Throughout human history, stories—not didactic lists of facts and reductive analytic reasoning— were used to bind groups together, giving them an identity, answering fundamental philosophical and spiritual questions, communicating values and vision, and showing meaning by connecting seemingly chaotic experiences.[10] This, whether on a grand or small scale, is the stuff of leadership: forging a team, understanding one's environment, communicating priorities and end state, and synchronizing the individual actions of subordinates to accomplish a shared mission. Admittedly, the military leader is not always trying to answer fundamental questions about the meaning of life; however, the squad leader who receives new Marines fresh from the School of Infantry is confronted with how to forge his squad and communicate how daily actions such as field day or inventorying gear, which may seem random and far from related to combat, are necessary for readiness that will facilitate mission accomplishment during an upcoming deployment.

Narrative can speak powerfully to both reason and emotion, possessing a unique power for motivating individuals. This is particularly important to our warfighting philosophy: as Marines, we emphasize the importance of human factors and appreciate Napoleon's observation that in war "the moral is to the physical as three to one." We work harder and are more willing to take calculated risks when we know our actions have lasting meaning and value as part of a greater whole. Narrative can sweep individuals into a larger plot with grander ambitions, giving sufficient context and value to actions, and this ability makes it an essential element of military leadership.

Stories for the Military Leader

While there are strengths to be gleaned from recent studies in the social

sciences examining the use of stories in leadership, several factors distinguish military leadership. Those who lead in the military do so within a hierarchy that ultimately serves elected officials, so military leaders are not at liberty to create their own narratives. Instead, one of the primary responsibilities of a military leader is ensuring consistency with and propagating his superiors' narrative. This can lead to a set of conflicting duties when leaders, in observing possible inconsistencies or contradictions, begin to doubt or critique the official narrative.

How a leader should deal with questioning the official narrative is a critical issue, but due to space it must be addressed elsewhere; here I focus on how stories affect leadership in the area that is most unique to the military: combat. Because of combat, military leaders are confronted with violence, suffering, and death and thus face far more profoundly difficult questions about the purposes of operations and risks taken. Not only are the questions harder, but the failure to provide adequate answers also can have starker consequences.

Risk, casualties, and purpose in combat. Because the risks and stakes in combat are so high (death and life changing injury being an everyday risk if not a regular occurrence), the search for meaning and reason in these actions can be profound. Military leaders face an acute demand to communicate a mission's meaning and value. If a leader fails to do so, he'll see a plummet in morale and a disappearance in his unit's understanding or respect for the mission. Within a disciplined or cohesive unit, Marines might still—out of self-preservation—perform their duties adequately. However, the kind of external initiative needed for mission accomplishment among subordinates will vanish, replaced by internally focused efforts to pass time and survive the deployment. In contrast, a narrative can communicate compellingly how goals and actions fit into long-term ends. This is the most effective way for a military leader to convey the importance and value of a unit's actions, providing meaning for that unit's risks borne and sacrifices made.

The story is about how our role relates to what the country is trying to accomplish. ***(Photo by Cpl Austin Long.)***

The value of sacrifice. One well-known narrative that attempts to explain sacrifice and the acceptance of risk in combat is the aphorism "In combat, soldiers don't fight for grand causes, but for the guy on our right and left." This statement is certainly true at one level: when rounds are impacting, one's concerns narrow tremendously, and focus in that moment should be on those immediate actions that will ensure the unit's survival. But notice that this maxim is also a succinct story that powerfully communicates the importance of small unit cohesion: the trust, confidence, and deep camaraderie that is critical among those who fight together. Beginning with an individual Marine's actions—including potential risks—in battle, it connects these with the principle of unit preservation over self-preservation. The virtue of sacrifice is a value that military culture honors and indoctrinates into its members through countless stories, Medal of Honor citations, and monuments that glorify the self-sacrifice exemplified by past heroes. The sacrifice story effectively communicates an explanation for risk, injury, and death in combat, and military culture reinforces this story so effectively that a military leader can and will communicate it with little effort.

The story of the value in sacrifice is incomplete, however. While it can honor an individual's sacrifice in battle, it fails to answer why the battle happened in the first place. When the firefight is over, and perspectives expand beyond the immediate, broader questions of purpose and meaning matter. Then it is apparent that the military leader must, on this broader scale, connect purpose and meaning to risk and sacrifice. If no narrative is communicated in these instances, or if the conveyed narrative now appears inadequate to compel a vision for achievable and desirable victory, there can be devastating consequences.

Narrative and combat stress. In his seminal work on combat trauma in Vietnam, *Achilles in Vietnam*, Dr. Jonathan Shay establishes that the worst cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were caused not by the traumatic stress experienced but by the inability of his patients to find any kind of meaning and purpose in their terrible experiences. Particularly harmful was what Shay refers to as "violation of what's right:" when the previously believed reasons for fighting are seen as flawed, false, or insufficient. For Vietnam veterans, this disillusionment and sense of betrayal—and correspondingly more severe PTSD—was tied to the fact that victory was so poorly defined and they were bewildered by having "lost the war" while also believing they had won every battle. In many of Dr.

Shay's patients, victory had "meant to them being in possession of the ground at the end of the battle … many men experienced a deep malaise that their concept of victory, of strength embodied in fire superiority ... didn't fit, were futile."[11] When their original conceptions of victory crumbled, "the pain and rage at being blamed for defeat in Vietnam was beyond bearing."[12]

A significant part of these veterans' problems can be attributed to a failure of narrative. Leaders failed to give these veterans a resilient story showing how their actions, endured risks, and sacrifices were part of any greater scheme. In short, there was failure in effectively narrating what these veterans were doing and why. They were given a limited sphere of understanding; purpose was limited to minute tactical accomplishments or a vague concept of fighting communists. Like our aphorism—the story of fighting for the Marine on our right and left—there was nothing necessarily wrong about telling Vietnam veterans to maintain local fire superiority and to own terrain at the end of the day. But those are lists, not stories, and as such they proved unable to structure these veterans' understanding of the world when confronted with traumatic combat stress. The result was aggravated PTSD.

Particularly concerning is Dr. Kahneman's separate research showing that in the absence of another known narrative, the human mind creates its own story for why things are happening, based on limited information available. Unless a leader has provided an account of what is happening from his broader perspective, individuals will create or imagine their own simplistic understanding of purpose based on their limited perspective.[13] While this may be dismissed as naïve or as rumors that need to be crushed, it is simply how our minds work. Lack of accurate information or of a connecting account results in flawed mental models. This seems to have been the case in many of Dr. Shay's patients: without leaders who communicated a meaningful story—explaining the fight over a particular piece of terrain or giving a more comprehensive understanding of an achievable victory, for instance—these subordinates created their own simplistic stories which proved inadequate during and after combat. Terrible and lasting psychological damage was to follow.

The burden and responsibility of a combat leader is to provide an undergirding story so his subordinates can know and understand what they are doing. This story must be communicated in preparation for combat situations and regularly reinforced throughout a deployment.

Military leaders have the advantage of a culture that indoctrinates the value of personal sacrifice for the unit; still, leaders need to reemphasize this value with care, and remember to communicate a more comprehensive narrative.

Dealing with unit casualties. There is both an immediate tactical value and a long-term value for Marines when leaders define the enduring meaning in their actions, including the risks and casualties of combat. Dr. Shay's work demonstrated the importance of providing an accurate and strong narrative, helping our Marines to process on a long-term basis their combat stresses and trauma. But narrative is also critical in ensuring Marines are able to "stay in the fight." Sadly, during my company's most recent deployment to Afghanistan, several Marines were killed, and more were seriously injured. These Marines' vehicle teams, squads, and platoons were deeply affected by their losses, understandably, yet in such situations, there is danger of a unit or Marines "going internal" when combat effectiveness and mission focus must be maintained. Along with finding meaningful ways to honor our casualties and ensuring a short duration of rest (about 48 hours) when an operation resulting in casualties was over, we found it was critical for leaders to communicate the reasons and purpose for our actions, and then to keep Marines active and personally involved in the mission. Narrative and stories, especially from leaders at every level, were paramount in this process, particularly in honoring the Marines' sacrifice and explaining "the why." It was important to show value simultaneously at multiple levels: the personal sacrifice that saved members of a Marine's unit, that sacrifice's aid to accomplishing the immediate task at hand, and how our operations tied into a grander, strategic mission. While it is important to emphasize an understanding of the mission prior to deploying, reiterating that understanding throughout a deployment and particularly during times of crisis is equally necessary. Further, this restatement of purpose also helps Marines stay in the fight, as it gives subsequent missions added value: carrying on a legacy that our casualties had sacrificed to achieve.

Stories: A Responsibility of Leaders

The costliness and risks endured in combat require leaders to communicate ultimate meaning and value. Because this task is great, military leaders need to avail themselves of every tool and story, ensuring that the full value of our actions is understood and told. Military leaders have the advantage of a culture that indoctrinates the value of personal sacrifice for the unit; still, leaders need to reemphasize this value with care, and remember to communicate a more comprehensive narrative. They must explain how the mission is of great value by presenting a compelling vision of what an achievable victory means. Ignoring or procrastinating on this task is detrimental since the minds of subordinates will create a story where one does not exist. A leader's failure to communicate the story to his subordinates is essentially an endorsement of an unknown story, whatever simplistic

and likely flawed story is created from subordinates' limited information. The potential consequences of such a failure are stark.

This article focused on combat leadership because the stakes and requirements in combat are immeasurably high and great. Still, the tasks for any other Marine leader differ in quantity, not quality. The tool of narrative and story is similarly effective for all intents and visions. Because of how the human mind is designed to function, narrative is simply the most powerful way to communicate connection, purpose, meaning, and value. As Marine leaders, we must consistently supply our Marines with a broader and better-informed perspective, connecting a unit's day-to-day actions, small and great, to its role in a greater narrative. We must communicate in stories; it is a fundamental duty of a leader of Marines.

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Establishing Credibility

Be competent and have character

by MGySgt Charles A. Walker

Be competent and have character; these are the two components to credibility. Marines desire credibility not because they want recognition but because they want the evidence of their success in the past to influence their success in the future. As a Marine, there are many things that you cannot control: your duty station, billets and tasks assigned, and the people you have to work with (or work for). There is one thing you can control though, and that is your own credibility. First, let me acknowledge that the further we progress in rank, our success has less and less to do with ourselves and more to do with the Marines whom we serve alongside. The point here is that individual credibility is established by displaying competence and character.

Whether in recruit training or Officer Candidates School, we each learned the leadership principle "be technically and tactically proficient." The core of that principle is to be competent. Regardless of rank or MOS, we are expected to be the subject matter experts at the appropriate level. We are expected to master the technical skills of our trade and to tactically apply them in a given condition or environment. As Marines, we are taught that to be competent we must know our job "two levels up." Developing that level of competency is hard work. Rarely does the Marine Corps as an institution deliberately set conditions for the individual Marine to achieve that level of competency. A Marine must show initiative and aggressively pursue the attainment of that level. There are few forcing functions that require a Marine to attend advanced training or courses for his MOS. Either the Marine's command makes his development a priority or the individual Marine is persistent in pursuing attendance at an advanced or supplementary course.

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Operational tempo and competing priorities don't always permit an individual to break away from the unit and go to school. In these instances, the Marine must "make up in hustle what he lacks in experience." By asking questions, seeking mentorship, eagerly assuming increased responsibilities, and displaying faithfulness in the sustainment of proficiency, a Marine can build competence. This takes time, it takes persistence, and it takes consistency. The old adage "Rome wasn't built in a day" can likewise be said of competency. Marines can develop competency through training and involved leadership who guide them toward meeting (and exceeding) the standard. As we guide them, we must make sure that it is measured and deliberate. There are times when a Marine is performing exceptionally well and leaders be-

Leaders must prove by actions that our core values—honor, courage, and commitment—are not just empty words. *(Photo by Cpl Kathryn Bynum.)*

gin to groom him for "the fast track" consisting of meritorious promotions, awards, and competitive assignments. It is quite possible to accelerate a Marine too quickly. When that happens, we discredit the rank, and we make it much more difficult for the Marine to be competent. I read a commentary once where the author made the statement "Marines rise to their level of incompetence;" this is very thought provoking. As leaders, we must foster an environment for our Marines to become competent without compromising their growth.

The other component to credibility, character—determines how competency is applied. As leaders, we can train our Marines to be competent. We cannot train them to have character; however, it can be cultivated.

At its root, character is how an individual applies the morals, values, and ethics that he believes. One of the methods by which we as an institution cultivate character is in the establishment of our core values: honor, courage, and commitment. These are among the first things an individual learns about our organization as they strive to earn the title of U.S. Marine, but as leaders, we must prove by example that these are not empty words. As a young Marine sees these values lived out by his leaders and mentors, he will embrace these values and adopt them. It must be noted that character is a choice—it can be influenced—but the individual must elect it himself. Because character relates to morals, and morals quite simply are the belief in the difference between right and wrong, it is important to emphasize the need for spiritual fitness. The conduct issues our Corps is currently experiencing all relate to a lapse in or lack of character. Examine each case closely, and you will find an individual who lacks spiritual fitness. It has been my experience that we as Marine leaders fail to emphasize its importance or even to recognize it as relevant. Yet one's faith addresses fundamental core issues, the answers to which will give an individual purpose, conviction, and direction. It will provide a lens through which to view and will affect how they conduct themselves.

Character is built one decision at a time, like a brick wall, but if there isn't a solid foundation, it is only a matter of time until the wall will fall. This is why so often when Marines do fall they have to re-examine how they arrived at their current state and who they are. From personal experience, I once found that the man that I was and the man that I wanted to be were very far apart. When I chose genuine integrity and made spiritual fitness a priority, I soon found that my character became more than a set of ideals held; instead, it became a life lived. My foundation was set on solid rock, and I became a much better Marine. Character affects every aspect of being a Marine from our standards to our work ethic, from our discipline to our decisions.

... character is how an individual applies the morals, values, and ethics that he believes.

Through time, experience, and maturation, we can combine competency with character and thereby establish credibility. Credibility cannot be underrated. It goes before you on a new assignment, it is how you are known, and it is inextricably tied to your name. As the old saying goes, "you make a name for yourself," and it's better to have a good name than it is to be rich.

You can gauge your success when another Marine simply says of you to another "he's solid, you can count on him," or "he's good to go." It's Marine language, few words but deeply understood. A friend of mine, SgtMaj Paul McKenna (then-Sergeant Major 3dMarDiv) told a group of NCOs one day "credibility grants you access." One young infantry squad leader set his jaw and nodded approvingly while a senior Marine officer scrawled the quote on his hand, so he wouldn't forget it. The statement is succinct and it applies to all hands, especially leaders. Credibility grants you access to the commander who seeks out your opinion (because you are competent and have character). This is to be prized whether you're a staff officer, a senior enlisted advisor, or simply "a Marine doing his job." Credibility also grants you access to the junior Marines because they will trust you. This is something that can only be earned through a consistent display of character and competence. If the individual Marine will choose to be competent and have character, we can eradicate the issues of conduct plaguing us now and keep our honor clean. Do this and we can fulfill our promise to be the most ready when the Nation is least ready.

To our God, our country, and our Corps, let us remain Semper Fidelis.

USMC

Stewardship of Resources

Not so accountable, not so responsible

by Capt Chad Phillips

The Marine Corps has done so much with so little for so long that we now do everything with nothing. For the last decade, the Marine Corps has operated a fiscal land flowing with milk and honey, and an entire generation now serves that doesn't remember the years spent wandering in the desert. With a drawdown in full swing, we are past the point of reading future fiscal tea leaves and are currently merging left on a financial interstate that will shortly become a country highway. Some leaders will do less with less, but I believe that the proper stewardship of our resources, we can do nearly as much with less and actually be better off for it. I would like to postulate a practice currently utilized by the U.S. Army that would force a focus on stewardship from the bottom up and allow us to nickel-and-dime our way to a much-improved state of financial readiness.

I recently returned from an individual augment (IA) deployment where I served as the logistics officer for an Army sustainment brigade conducting the CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) Materiel Recovery Element (CMRE) mission. For the first month and a half, I was force fed a new flavor of alphabet soup and learned to function in an environment that was sort-of-but-not-really what I was familiar with. One area I was required to become proficient in was the financial liability investigation of property loss or FLIPL. This is an investigation completed any time government property is lost, damaged, destroyed, or stolen (LDDS). I believe this process is one with which the Marine Corps could improve the personal accountability of its resources.

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To what extent do we hold Marines responsible for items or equipment that are LDDS? *(Photo by Cpl Mark Stroud.)*

I will outline below how the Marine Corps currently handles the LDDS of resources and then propose what I believe is a better way to do so.

The *Marine Corps Consumer-Level Supply Policy, Marine Corps Order 4400.150* (*MCO 4400.150*) (Washington, DC: HQMC, January 2014) provides clear guidance on the extent to which Marine Corps leadership can hold Marines responsible for LDDS property. When personal gear issued to a Marine is LDDS, the Marine fills out a missing gear statement and articulates a desire to, or not to, reimburse the government for the LDDS item(s). Should the Marine take responsibility for the loss, he will pay for the items and the matter will be closed. If he chooses not to take responsibility for the missing items and reimburse the government and negligence is apparent, then *MCO 4400.150* outlines the only option for the commanding officer: "The only recourse remaining to the unit Commanding Officer is disciplinary proceedings, if appropriate." These disciplinary proceedings consist

entirely of courts martial. Should a Marine damage equipment that is not a part of his personal gear issue, such as a vehicle, then generally even less responsibility is assumed by the Marine. This is where I believe the process is significantly flawed.

As it currently stands, the Marine Corps system allows for a fair solution, but it is a fair solution with unnecessarily heavy consequences. A leader's only option is likely a career ending administrative action or nothing. There is no escalation of response. I believe many commanding officers will, and should, be reticent to adjudicate in this manner due to the significant long-term effects of these consequences on individual Marines.

I believe a better way to address the problem would be to determine liability via a simple investigation, charge the Marine should there be negligence, and then drop the matter. I wholeheartedly believe that few things command the full attention of a Marine faster than influencing their money or their liberty. I am fully confident that the care and accountability of equipment, from the crescent wrench to the tank, would fundamentally change overnight if Marines knew and believed their pocketbooks would be affected due to careless stewardship of the resources entrusted to them. This is how the Army manages the care and accountability of property, and I believe we should follow suit.

In the Army, upon the conclusion of the FLIPL, there are two primary outcomes. The servicemember is released from any liability and the matter is closed or they are found liable and some level of financial restitution is made. The basic tenants of assessing financial liability are as follows: it must be proved that the servicemember's actions, or lack thereof, were the proximate cause for the LDDS property, *and* these actions are due to simple or gross negligence. Should both of these criteria be validated, the servicemember can be held financially responsible. The cost can vary depending on multiple factors, but simply stated, a servicemember will not be charged more than one month's base pay due to damages resulting from simple negligence. For damaged items, there is a formula to determine the depreciated value. If it is determined the loss to the government is due to gross negligence, the total cost could be assessed against the servicemember(s).

Examples of negligence assessed from my deployment include a corporal/specialist who accelerated too quickly out of a motor pool, turned too sharply, and sideswiped a vehicle sitting at a stop sign. An antenna mount was damaged on his vehicle, and he was charged for the depreciated value of that mount. A second example is a company commander who signed for gas masks prior to deployment, left a portion of them stateside without subsigning them to another soldier, signed for the full quantity again while in Afghanistan, and was unable to account for over $5,000 worth of gas masks. He was charged for the full amount of the loss as it was just under his monthly base pay. After many discussions with my peers in the Army, I learned it is common practice for a company commander to set aside one month's base pay upon taking command to ensure he has the ability to pay for property that goes missing should he fail to properly account for it.

At this point, I am sure there are more questions raised about specific details of possible situations than I have answered concerning the conduct, legality, financial burden on individual Marines, and "what if…?" of FLIPLs, and I am intentionally not going delve down that deep. *Army Regulation 735-5* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, May 2013) is the Army's property accountability regulation and Chapter 13 is dedicated entirely to the conduct of the FLIPL. For those interested, it is a fairly boring read but quite informative. What I will discuss are some simple procedures a prudent company commander in the Army takes to ensure his property is accounted for so he isn't left paying a large bill after his time in command.

We're responsible for government property. *(Photo by LCpl Anne K. Henry.)*

I will use a truck company as an example. Prior to changing command, a full inventory is conducted by the incoming and outgoing commander to ensure all items are present. Once the company's equipment is accounted for, the outgoing commander is free to leave. If the incoming commander is smart, he will then subsign all equipment down to the user level. This means each platoon's worth of gear is signed to the platoon commander. Each platoon commander signs it down to the squad leaders, and each vehicle is signed over to the servicemember responsible for operating it. He is responsible for everything associated with that vehicle.

If something goes missing, it is the responsibility of that servicemember to find what is missing or pay for a replacement.

There are positive second- and third-order effects of this practice should the Marine Corps adopt it. First would be the care and ownership individuals would have for their equipment while using it. Second, easily pilfered items will be managed and accounted for much more closely. Third, reckless driving would decrease. Fourth, inventories of equipment prior to and after field exercises would happen much more regularly. Fifth, the percent of a unit's budget spent on replacing "lost" items would ensure decreasing budgets can purchase the fuel, ammo, and chow required for training. The list could go on and on.

... the Marine Corps can improve its accountability procedures and make it easier for both Marines and their leadership to be better stewards of the resources entrusted to them.

As with any change, there will always be unforeseen challenges that impact implementation, but with focused and dedicated effort, I believe any of these challenges can be overcome. This process has been common practice in the Army for a long time and communications across service lines will ease the transition. One potential shortfall that could exist in the Marine Corps is sufficient legal resources. If an Army servicemember is to have a liability assessed against him, the completed investigation must first undergo a legal review in order to ensure said servicemember is indeed the proximate cause for the LDDS property. It is likely that the Marine Corps doesn't possess a lawyer population robust enough to provide sufficient services for this function. A potential fix for this is to find some level of middle ground where a commander is the determining individual vice the lawyer.

A second challenge is simply education. This is not a minor policy and procedural change but rather one with significant impact on how property accountability operations are executed. It would take time and education for leaders at all levels to understand and implement the changes I am proposing.

To conclude, I believe the Marine Corps can improve its accountability procedures and make it easier for both Marines and their leadership to be better stewards of the resources entrusted to them. Are there procedures in place to ensure Marines are held accountable? Yes, there are. Are they the best thought out and applied procedures? I don't think so. In fact, the sheer weight of the only consequences available to Marine leaders is such that their application is likely to be often minimized to the point of ineffectiveness. Service in the Marine Corps has recently become increasingly competitive with the drawdown, to the point that the smallest administrative black mark in a Marine's record can mean the end of his career. I believe the ability to adjudicate errant or negligent behavior with regard to property accountability in a meaningful manner and without a permanent mark in the record book will be far more effective than the judicial proceedings that are currently available to Marine leaders. This in turn will inculcate a much higher level of stewardship that will lead to increased fiscal readiness.

A Mature Approach to Alcohol

More father and son, less gaoler and prisoner

by Maj John D. Jordan

>Maj Jordan is a 7562 (CH-46E Pilot) currently serving as the Future Operations Officer, 1st MLG. He has previously served as a Forward Air Controller in Afghanistan and as a pilot with squadrons in both California and Okinawa.

American society does a poor job preparing its youth to deal with alcohol. The approach to alcohol emphasized in schools and other programs targeted at adolescents are largely cautionary and punitive, which does little to develop mature habits of thought. The Marine Corps has attempted to address this trend in its portion of America's youth through similar punitive and control programs with similar effect. The result is an underground culture of binge drinking that is not only hazardous in its own right but also serves as a gateway to poor decision making leading to myriad health and legal issues. Marine Corps alcohol policy that teaches and models the responsible use of alcohol in social settings would better prepare young Marines for making mature decisions about alcohol, would reduce alcohol-related problems, and prepare those young Marines to make better, more mature decisions.

America has long had a Janus-faced relationship with alcohol, varying from the bacchanal to the prohibitionist. Benjamin Franklin is famous for his purported quip that alcohol was "proof that God loves us, and loves to see us happy,"[1] and George Washington was well on his way to being the largest distiller in America on his death. Conversely, the states ratified the 18th Amendment in 1919, prohibiting the production, transport, and sale of alcohol, ostensibly to improve public morals and support the war effort. After the 18th Amendment's repeal, the federal government, states, and localities enacted a wide variety of laws to restrict the availability of alcohol. Today, alcohol is legally available, but laws and regulations tightly regulate access and use, most specifically for those under the age of 21.

An alcohol-free birthday celebration is seen by some as a tactic to avoid problems at a Ball. ***(Photo by Cpl Daniel Wentz.)***

Society, largely through schools, bombards America's youth with messages emphasizing the dangers of alcohol. Schools typically require alcohol abstinence pledges to participate in athletic and other school activities and often exercise a surprising amount of control over students' personal actions after school hours and away from school grounds. Besides criminal sanctions for underage consumption, schools often inflict academic sanctions as well. However, this puritanical approach has had a perverse effect. Underage drinkers tend to consume alcohol unsupervised and develop unhealthy drinking habits that they bring forward with them.

The best studies of underage and young adult drinking are of college students, and these are very applicable to the Marine Corps' junior enlisted and officers. Both populations are drawn from the same demographics, are away from sustained parental supervision for the first time in their lives, and are largely below the legal age of consumption. Both populations move in with strangers into group accommodations, whether these are dormitories or barracks, and both are indoctrinated with the values of their respective institutions, which ban the use of alcohol for

those below the legal age, reinforcing alcohol's position as "forbidden fruit." Yet despite these controlled environments and the threat of sanctions, binge drinking remains a prevalent activity in both college and the Marine Corps.

Binge drinking is the most prevalent form of alcohol consumption by underage and just over the age Americans. Institutional and legal restrictions make the acquisition of alcohol difficult, so when it is acquired, it is consumed swiftly and surreptitiously in drinking binges. These events often take place off base or campus, usually when the younger people know older friends with their own residence. The rapid consumption of such large amounts of alcohol is in and of itself dangerous as it can lead to alcohol poisoning, blackouts, and memory loss. Further, binge drinking strongly correlates with sexual assault by lowering inhibitions on the part of a perpetrator and by making the victim unable to resist or give meaningful consent.

Current Marine Corps policy focuses on controlling access to alcohol and imposing sanctions on violators but gives only lip service to teaching Marines how to maturely handle alcohol. The incentives in place are to have as few alcohol-related incidents as possible, and the easiest way to do that—or at least demonstrate a commitment to that goal—is by the promulgation of restrictions and punitive programs for offenders. These measures range from bringing a whole unit in for collective "training" on Saturday if there is an alcohol incident to dry Marine Corps Balls held in a unit's workspace to maximize the command's control of the attendees. These extreme approaches manifest "a haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy,"[2] but do little to prepare young Marines to make good decisions about alcohol. Instead of perpetuating such a gaoler-prisoner relationship with our Marines, we should consider another, one that is more in keeping with the idealized father-son relationship for which we strive.

Young people are by their nature malleable, and their relationship with and perception of alcohol is no exception to this. Prohibitionist culture in their high school years and in the military and college encourages dangerous consumption habits by turning it into forbidden fruit. Conversely, younger people who have had positive, supervised experiences with alcohol, such as at dinner with family, tend to develop a better relationship with alcohol.[3] Not only is some of the allure stripped away by familiarity, but they also tend to have an idea of their own tolerance. It is this essential social modeling, at a familial level, that the Department of the Navy perversely inhibits through policy.

Are the scare tactics effective? *(Photo by SPC David McCarthy.)*

The Department of the Navy issued OPNAVINST 5350.7 in the wake of the Tailhook Scandal. It directs that commanding officers "Shall establish an aggressive program aimed at achieving positive goals which include … significant reductions in alcohol abuse incidents." Further, it directs the deglamorization of alcohol, largely by substituting alternative activities. The explicit and implicit intent of 5350 has resulted in a culture where underage and binge drinking is known to take place, but as long as everyone is discreet about it, it continues.[4] While "leadership" is the putative solution to alcohol abuse offered up by 5350.7, what is needed is a type of leadership that mentors instead of hectors, and does not attempt to boil down complex issues to trite phrases such as "just say no."

The best approach to alcohol use by young Marines, both officer and enlisted, is for their seniors to model the proper behaviors. While it is not legal for Marines under the age of 21 to consume alcohol, it is neither illegal nor immoral for their superiors to model responsible drinking behavior in front of them. If the role of the officer and NCO is to be a surrogate parent to a young Marine, this requires meaningful interaction with all aspects of life, not a sanitized environment where difficult issues are fobbed off with posters and a liberty brief. Maturely addressing alcohol in a social setting, and educating and modeling proper behaviors is part of a real parenting process.

Research on drinking habits suggests that youthful exposure to alcohol can actually have a protective benefit. The Prevention Research Center at Pennsylvania State University has conducted research that demonstrates that anti-alcohol messaging has little effect on youth drinking habits.[5] However, learning at home that drinking *is normal behavior* reduces the consequences of excessive drinking. Further, young people who engaged in limited drinking at home, such as an occasional glass of wine at dinner, are two-thirds less likely to have engaged in binge drinking than their peers. The Marine Corps should embrace a similar approach to dealing with young Marines and avoid the failed

campaigns so prevalent in society as whole.

Marine leaders should demonstrate the normality of alcohol and how an adult is expected to approach it. Neither drinking nor abstaining from alcohol should be stigmatized. Rather, leaders should demonstrate that a drink is merely an accessory in a social environment and not an end unto itself as it is in binge drinking. Alcohol should be present and acknowledged as an optional part of a social event but neither center stage nor hidden away. Simply drinking in moderation and facilitating an enjoyable social event and ensuring that leaders discuss alcohol in a mature manner accomplishes this. Nothing strips away the allure of forbidden fruit like banality.

The challenge for leaders in regard to alcohol is to change how they talk about it. A leader sharing sea stories involving how he or she "got wasted" or "messed up" create the impression that such behavior is acceptable can lead to emulation by young Marines. Leaders need to be mindful of how they attempt to relate to the young Marines in their charge. It needs to be emphasized by word and deed that while a drink is a social accessory, a drunk is a social embarrassment. Legal sanctions may not even be necessary if the social stigma against boorish drunkenness is strong enough and higher headquarters supports this approach.

Is the early morning Saturday hike a deterrent? *(Photo by Cpl Jerasco Jenkins.)*

To support this more mature approach to alcohol, headquarters will have to exercise a degree of self-restraint. While there is great value in a headquarters gathering data on training standards met and incidents that occur, these can be misleading at best and deceptive at worse. The approach to alcohol described above does not lend itself to formal instructional settings as the current, spreadsheet-friendly arrangement does, but rather requires persistently engaged leadership that does not lend itself to filling in check boxes. Additionally, if the program is successful in creating a social stigma to poor alcohol handling, then minor instances of foolishness would probably not need to be addressed at a higher level but merely recorded for statistical purposes. With Marines' immediate leadership persistently engaged in demonstrating proper behavior, and higher headquarters enabling them to do so, there is a real chance that such a mature approach to alcohol would be successful.

Teaching and modeling mature behaviors around alcohol would have a positive effect on young Marines, enabling them to make better decisions about whether to imbibe or not. The result would be a more mature force that enabled commanders to spend more time on training tactical skills and less time controlling Marine's personal lives. With a force that handles alcohol better, related issues such as drunk driving and sexual assaults would also likely decrease, as some of the bad decisions that lead to these are avoided. Finally, a less punitive approach that works is in everyone's interest, and contributes to better establishing the father and son relation of which General Lejeune spoke.[6]

A leader sharing sea stories involving how he or she "got wasted" or "messed up" create the impression that such behavior is acceptable can lead to emulation by young Marines.

Notes

1. Benjamin Franklin may have never said it, but he did think along these lines: Bryce Eddings, "Did Ben Franklin say 'Beer is Proof that God Loves Us and Wants Us to be Happy?" accessed at http://beer.about.com.

2. "H. L. Mencken Quotes," *Brainy Quote*, accessed at http://www.brainyquote.com.

3. Susan Brink. "Drink Wisley—Taught by Whom?" *Los Angeles Times*, (September 1, 2008), accessed at http://articles.latimes.com.

4. Thomas James Brennan, "In the Military, the Drinking Can Start on Day 1" *The New York Times*, (October 1, 2012), accessed at http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com.

5. Brink.

6. John A. Lejeune. "Relations Between Officers and Men," accessed at http://www.mcu.usmc.mil.

Enhancing Defensive Live Fire

It's more than static, loud, and bright

by CWO2 Matthew St. Pierre

As a young sergeant and a member of the Enlisted Instructor Company—The Basic School, I participated in the night defensive fire, better known as The Mad Minute. The student lieutenants, VIPs, and some family members gathered in the bleachers to enjoy the show. They "oohed" and "ahhed" at the volume and violence of a Marine Corps rifle company's fire power. In retrospect, I fear those impressionable lieutenants unintentionally learned that a defensive live fire shoot is only static, loud, and bright.

Although The Mad Minute cannot be totally to blame, the Marine Corps has long ago stopped rehearsing live fire, movement, and maneuver in the defense. Marine Corps live fire defenses are painfully similar. They are characterized by static, linear positions, which ensure the safe deconfliction of surface danger zones (SDZs). If a Marine unit trains at an Army range, the defensive live fire range has predug, cemented fighting positions. Sadly, the only real training gains are range card construction, weapons systems integration, and perhaps, with a suitable feedback mechanism, marksmanship. Instead, I propose a "crawl, walk, run" approach to developing our skills in live fire defensive movement and maneuver. By taking a stepped approach, we may conduct realistic, live fire defenses, which enhance both our readiness and lethality.

The "crawl" phase would begin with fire and movement from primary defensive positions to alternate defensive positions. An alternate position is, by definition, fires along the same sector of fire as the primary defensive position, just from a different location. Alternate positions are often used by crew-served weapons when their primary positions become untenable. As an example, a unit may begin training with both a machine gun section and an interspersed rifle squad (for security) entrenched in an online formation. The unit would then identify, build, and stake alternate positions to the rear of the firing line. As the line fires in the defense, machine guns could displace to their alternate positions as the rifle squad on both flanks increased their suppressive fires. Once the machine guns were in place, they would resume firing with the other Marines from the infantry squad remaining *forward*. To finish bounding the whole defensive line back, the flanks would then move to their alternate positions and resume firing alongside the machine guns. To ensure this movement is done safely, the defense would have to have enough space to allow for the traditional 300 mils/15 degrees offset. Some may find

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When they move to an alternate position, there will be fewer safety control measures as their proficiency increases. *(Photo by LCpl Michael Dye.)*

this idea disconcerting; however, it is just like the traditional bounding forward we practice on squad ranges across the Marine Corps. By both utilizing sector bags or aiming stakes to ensure the machine guns do not move outside the 300 mils/15 degrees and by locking down traverse and elevation mechanism, moving to an alternate position is actually safer than bounding forward. (See Maps 1 and 2.)

Chapter 17 of the *DA PAM 385-63 Range Safety*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Pamphlet, April 2014) states, "For the SDZ, there must be an angle of 15 degrees or 100m (whichever is greater) between the limit of fire and the near flank of the closest individual or unit and all impacts are beyond the individual or unit. For the batwing SDZ, all non-participating personnel must be outside the SDZ."

The "walk" phase would continue to build upon the "crawl" phase by adding disengagement criteria for the entire force. Once the training unit meets their disengagement criteria, the entire force would begin to bound backward, utilizing the same techniques as moving to an alternate position from the "crawl" phase. The difference in this phase would be using fewer safety control measures such as aiming stakes but adding more safety individuals (acting as position safety officers) to the event. The entire force could rehearse the bounding movement back to a limit of withdrawal (LOW)[1] and the reestablishment of the defense. Only after a unit is comfortable with moving to alternate positions (as described in the "crawl" phase) do I recommend a live fire movement to an low.[2] With demonstrated proficiency in this "walk" phase, a battalion commander or infantry weapons officer may begin to build the logical final bridge from defensive fire and movement to defensive fire and maneuver by incorporating covering fire.

By incorporating the commitment of the reserve, we infuse defensive maneuver into our live fire exercise in the final "run" phase. Similar to a live fire assault, the reserve force will sweep into the engagement area from either flank. By utilizing the same control measures as an offensive attack, we could mitigate risk to an acceptable level. Safety mitigation techniques would include the 300-mils/15 degrees rule and target reference points (TRPs). For example, once the maneuver force reaches the 300-mils/15 degrees offset, supporting fires would shift to the next TRP. As the maneuver force reaches the last TRP shift, the defensive line ceases fire in order to allow the final sweep through the engagement area. In addition to TRPs, pyrotechnics, position safety officers, barrel stops, and radio commands all mitigate risk by increasing the control of fires. A final enhancement of this range would be the progressive opening of fires in order to recover a forward element retrograding back to friendly lines. By using the same risk mitigation techniques, the supporting unit could progressively open the azimuth of fire, thereby closing the door behind the retrograding force.



Map 1. *(Image by author.)*



Map 2. *(Image by author.)*

Similar to a live fire assault, the reserve force will sweep into the engagement area from either flank.

The Marine Corps needs to develop live fire defensive fire and maneuver skills. *(Photo by LCpl Michael Dye.)*

Some would argue that the risk is too high to conduct live-fire fire and maneuver and that being "online" is the safest way to conduct a live fire defense. However, there are several counterpoints in favor of instituting movement in live fire defenses. First, institutionally, we are already comfortable using the 300-mils/15 degrees rule, TRPs, pyrotechnic techniques, and smoke grenades to shift fires during live fire attacks. Secondly, a fire team conducting live fire buddy rushes on an attack range with automatic weapons has a greater risk of errant shots than an automatic weapon firing in the defense with sector bags or aiming stakes. Thirdly, with our professional success in Tables 3 and 4, we are already adept at pivoting 180 degrees and safely engaging a target. According to the *DA PAM 385-63 (Department of the Army Pamphlet) Range Safety*, Chapter 17 lays out the process for live fire. It states "during live fire exercises planning, the risk management process must address possible hazards from friendly fire and control measures to reduce or eliminate them, while executing the METL task to published standards." In Chapter 17 of the DA PAM, it also talks about how close we can maneuver:

> To determine how close unprotected troops may maneuver to the target area, an impact area and a danger zone must be established for each target area used. Danger zones must be computed and issued to leaders and safety personnel before starting the exercise. When several types of weapons are being fired into one target area, the combined total danger zone (composite danger zone) will govern. These restrictions normally should not preclude unit commanders from selecting tactically sound supporting weapon positions for their scheme of maneuver, provided the positions and directions of fire do not exceed the total range area available for the exercise. When feasible, leaders and safety personnel will be shown the physical limits of the danger zone by ground survey.

Leaders must also emplace control measures in order to ensure every Marine knows where and when to fire; however, with proper supervision and inspection of positions, sector bags, and azimuths of fire, both defensive fire and movement and fire and maneuver can be just as safe as live fire attacks.

Maneuver is the essence of victory, not just in the offense but also in the defense. By taking the stepped approach outlined above, we could conduct realistic live fire defenses which enhance our abilities in combat. We must, however, force ourselves to think larger than just live fire ranges. By neglecting to push ourselves to perform fire and movement and maneuver from the defense, one half of the offense/defense tactical dichotomy will remain out of step with our doctrinal ethos of maneuver warfare.[3] Although the live fire tactics proposed may unsettle some, with proper control measures the risk will be reduced to no more than that of a live fire supported attack. Real risk is being unprepared to maneuver from the defense with live ammunition, which in turn will lead to defeat in combat. In the future, I hope that what makes The Basic School defensive night fire "mad" is not the intensity and volume but the fact that it is static.

Real risk is being unprepared to maneuver from the defense with live ammunition which in turn will lead to defeat in combat.

Notes

1. I have yet to find the doctrinal term "limit of withdrawal" (LOW). Similar to a limit of advance (LOA), an LOW would enhance the organization of a withdrawal and provide a visible terrain feature where leaders could reestablish the defense if disengagement criteria were met. This term could be incorporated into any changes to operational terms and graphics publications.

2. This is another constructed acronym for movement to the line of withdrawal. It is similar to a break contact drill but to a preordained location which tactically supports the defense.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, (Washington DC: United States Government Publishing, 1997).

Army Design Methodology

What can it do for the Marine Corps?

by Maj William R. Soucie

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The U.S. Army Design Methodology (ADM) can serve as a complementary planning tool to the Marine Corps' design that is central to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). To best support this thesis, a summary of ADM and Marine Corps design are offered below as well as a summation of how the two ideas diverge. A discussion of "sense making" as a theoretical underpinning that supports this thesis highlights the mutual support it offers the two approaches. The historical example of Gen James N. Mattis and the 1st MarDiv in Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II) showcases design in action, specifically where the aspects of ADM were involved. The conclusion addresses a possible counterargument while bolstering the argument that ADM is a complementary tool that reinforces the Marine Corps design process.

Planning and preparation are central to both the Army and the Marine Corps. The military decision-making process (MDMP) and the MCPP proved suitable for the problems presented by conventional warfare including, for instance, Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Beyond the conventional fight, these processes were found lacking during the stability operations during the Global War on Terror. Routinely, the detailed planning did not adequately address social, political, cultural, religious, or economic components. The two planning processes were ineffective in cultivating a sufficient understanding of the problem or solutions when the eventual outcome did not achieve the desired conditions of civilian and military leadership.[1] Neither Service's vision of design replaces the detailed planning process but rather serves as deliberate conceptual tools to foster greater understanding before and during detailed planning in response to unfamiliar problems.[2]

Planning processes have to effectively cultivate understanding of the problem and possible solutions. *(Photo by SSgt Philip Grondin.)*

For the Army, successful planning requires the integration of both conceptual and detailed thinking.[3] Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: ADM, MDMP, and troop leading procedures. The ADM is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them.[4] The key concepts for ADM, described in *ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process*, are critical and creative thinking, collaboration and dialogue, framing, narrative construction, and visual modeling.[5] The activities that build off the key ADM concepts are those of framing the operational environment, framing of the problem, and development of the

operational approach.[6] These activities are overlapping features of both Army and Marine Corps design processes.

For the Marine Corps, design is the conception and articulation of a framework for solving a problem. A design-inspired framework represents a broad operational approach conceived as a result of understanding gained largely through critical thinking and dialogue—the basic mechanism of design—and articulated through the commander's intent and guidance.[7] The Marine Corps design process is different from the ADM because design is at the heart of the MCPP and not bifurcated as a separate methodology or process. Despite this difference, the previously mentioned concepts of ADM, when applied during the problem-framing step of the MCPP, are likely to produce greater understanding—the stated goal of both Services' design processes.

The key concepts that underpin ADM and the way in which they are deliberately presented in *ADRP 5-0* are the greatest benefit to the Marine Corps' design process. The discussions of critical and creative thinking as well as collaboration and dialogue are contained in multiple locations throughout Army and Marine Corps doctrine and are mutually supporting. ADM begins its significant contribution to MCPP in the process of framing. Despite the adoption of problem framing as the nomenclature of MCPP's first step, the doctrine remains ambiguous about what occurs during this phase other than gaining a greater understanding. When discussing framing, though only two paragraphs long, *ADRP 5-0* is replete with suggestions of questions, topics, and cognitive approaches that could be useful during this particular exercise. That said, a near comprehensive understanding resulting from the framing of the problem communicated ineffectively to the commander or subordinates is of little value.

ADM's narrative construction and visual modeling offer the most to the Marine Corps design process. The narrative construction—the conscious bounding of events and artifacts in time and space—is central to framing.[8] Questions that seek to explain events or provide meaning bolster the construction of the narrative. Put another way, what Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe call "sense making" is the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize human action.[9] Explicit efforts at sense making tend to occur when the current state of the world is perceived to be different from the expected state of the world.[10] Narrative construction explains the activities of ADM and this can be applied to MCPP, specifically the framing of the operational environment and the framing of the problem in order to make sense of the world. The complexity of some problems requires creating a model of the problem. A visual model, based on the logical inference from evidence, helps create thought to develop into understanding.[11] These broadly defined concepts are additive to the Marine Corps process as they are not presently part of the Marine Corps. Despite this fact, the historical example of the 1st MarDiv, commanded by then-MajGen Mattis during OIF II supports their existence of narrative construction and visual modeling and how they were successfully brought to bear.

Then-LtGen James T. Conway, Commander I MEF (left), and then-MajGen James N. Mattis (right), CG, 1st MarDiv, confer during Operation Iraqi Freedom. MajGen Mattis, prior to deployment into theater, had his staff do an assessment of the people his forces would encounter during operations in Iraq. ***(Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly.)***

In 2004, MajGen Mattis began with an assessment of the people that his forces would encounter during the deployment. The general and his staff discovered that the people of Al Anbar possessed a considerably different demographic dynamic than the imam-led Shia areas that dominated OIF I.[12] During the process of framing, the discovery of three basic groups emerged and required distinct narratives to communicate with them but also to communicate to the personnel of the 1st MarDiv. Guided by the maxims of, "First do no harm," and "no better friend, no worse enemy," the objective was to establish a secure local environment for the indigenous populations so that they could pursue economic, social, cultural, religious, and political well-being and achieve some degree of normalcy.[13] Accurately capturing the magnitude of the endeavor required the creation of a visual model to make sense of the complexity. Figure 1 (on the next page) is a representation of the model used by the 1st MarDiv staff, serving as I MEF(Forward), to make sense of the tasks at hand.[14]

With the benefit of hindsight and the design work of Gen Mattis, it is easier to see the actions taken to overcome the ambiguity of the unfamiliar problem faced by the Marines in Al Anbar. The general and his staff framed the problem given the new set of circumstances presented to them. With greater



Figure 1. I MEF (Forward) design for OIF II.

understanding achieved, the appropriate messaging via information operations, or narrative construction, took place to explain with enhanced clarity what the desired conditions were. Complementary to that narrative, the generation of the design graphic, the visual model, helped make sense of what at first glance appeared to be an overwhelming task. One could argue that this was done without the use of ADM or even Marine Corps design. While partially correct, the formal processes presently articulated in doctrine were not specifically involved, but this counterargument misses the point. The previous example is offered to demonstrate that the processes of design were used in the past, and that in going forward, the Marine Corps will benefit in a complementary form from the deliberate articulation of the actions taken by Gen Mattis which are now codified in *ADRP 5-0*.

The foregoing argument is not intended to suggest that one form of design is preferable to another. However, there are aspects of ADM that, when applied to Marine Corps design, can serve as a complementary role to the MCPP. Design was introduced in the military because of obvious shortcoming in the independent detailed planning processes when facing complex problems. Both ADM and Marine Corps design seek greater understanding and, in that respect, are mutually supporting. Where the two differ is where ADM is one of three planning methodologies, the Marine Corps has incorporated design into the detailed MCPP. Despite this difference, ADM can serve the Marine Corps as a complementary tool. More specifically, the key concepts of framing, narrative construction, and visual modeling that underline ADM bolster Marine Corps design.

These ideas provide deliberate articulation of the concepts only mentioned in passing or anecdotally discussed in Marine Corps doctrine. The theoretical underpinning of Weick's and Sutcliffe's sense making promoted the linkage of both design approaches in achieving greater understanding. The example of Gen Mattis and the 1st MarDiv demonstrated the historical application of the design process and allowed for the identification of framing, narrative construction, and the visual model created to support an operational approach to a complex unfamiliar environment. Short of direct interaction with object systems, such as the adversary or populations, group interactions involving frank and candid input are the best way to replicate the nonlinear nature of conflicts and the parties involved.[15] By incorporating aspects of ADM where time and circumstances allow, the Marine Corps design process is made stronger.

Notes

1. United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, *Design and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), Lesson Card 1, 7210-OP-15*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 2014), 2.

2. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1 (MCWP 5-1), Marine Corps Planning Process*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2010), 1–4.

3. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP 5-0), The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 2–4.

4. HQDA, *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP 3-0), Unified Land Operations (ULO),* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 1–9.

5. *ADRP 5-0*, 2–5.

6. Ibid., 2–6.

7. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2011), 3-3.

8. *ADRP 5-0*, 2–5.

9. Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, "Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking," *Organization Science,* (Cantonsville, MD: July–August 2005), 409.

10. Ibid.

11. *ADRP 5-0*, 2–5.

12. *MCWP 5-1*, J-1.

13. Ibid.

14. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2010), J-2.

15. Ibid., 2–9.

Reliance on Contractors for Communications

Are they a permanent part of our future?

by Maj Brandon Newell, 1stLt Ashly Hart, CWO3 Aaron Ellis, CWO2 Jay Tansy & MSgt Jeremy Croghan

As the final unit to deploy to Regional Command (Southwest) (RC[SW]) at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, we saw firsthand just how dependent the Marine Corps has become on contractors. After years of growing robust and reliable communications architectures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is hard for any communicator to envision an effective deployed network without having contractors to support it. As the Marine Corps deploys Special Purpose MAGTFs to the Middle East, it is imperative that the institution is prepared to support them with contractors the longer the network is in place.

Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the network users' expectations skyrocketed the longer the network was in place. Each iteration of deployed communicators strove to improve the network, leaving behind thoughts of "mobile and modular" for greater "redundancy and reliability." As they explored the options available to them, they inevitably transitioned the network to a more commercialized one. Each new advancement on the network resulted in a coinciding new requirement for expertise that is not found in the 065X (data, information, message specialists) community. Therefore, communicators proactively pursued approval for contracted support.

As we deployed in January 2014, the result of this four-year development was obvious. We inherited a network that had just as many contractors as Marines supporting the network. The 9th Communications Battalion detachment was comprised of 150 Marines. Meanwhile, the contracted workforce the C-6 inherited was 165 strong. Honestly, we would not have had it any other way. The network was built upon virtualization (VMware), site recovery (SRM), and storage (NetApp), holding over 90 terabytes of data and was tied together by miles of commercial fiber and hundreds of CISCO switches. The results were glorious. The network was stable to the tune of only two network outages over a 10-month period, both tied to power failures. Our users were spoiled and that was the way we liked it. This was anything but an expeditionary network run by individuals who are Marines first and communicators second.

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> ***Each new advancement on the network resulted in a coinciding new requirement for expertise ...***

This article is intended to share what we learned about utilizing contractors for deployed USMC communications. We utilized contractors in the fields of data, information assurance, wire/telephony, and transmission. We discovered the benefits of contractors in each of these fields as well as the challenges. Finally, we developed recommendations for acquiring, integrating, and downsizing the contractor force.

The Benefits

There is a common theme to the benefits of contractors in the different

communications fields. It centers on *expertise* and *experience*. Data is where this is most evident. A data Marine (0651) is trained to be a jack of all data trades. Commercialized networks require experts on things like exchange, VMware, SRM, NetApps, and switching protocols. These capabilities are not mastered by a jack of all trades. You can't effectively install, troubleshoot, or transition these capabilities with a jack of all trades.

Contractors are necessary to fill in the knowledge gaps that the 0651 Marines do not have. The network grew to be structured around commercialized virtual environments, multilevel WAN (wide area network) acceleration, 10Gbps LAN (local area network) links, multichassis core switching, and multiple 155 Mbps optical network WAN links. All of this requires expertise. Additionally, it required experience.

Experience can be divided into two areas: "credentialed" experience and resident knowledge of a particular architecture. Credentialed experience is based on a technical expertise put in practice over an extended period of time. Contractors have simply spent more time developing technical skills than communications Marines. This time leads to knowledge and wisdom that cannot be replicated. The other area of experience is firsthand experience, or resident knowledge, on a specific network. The fact that these contractors often stay in place for multiple years is invaluable to a community such as the Marine Corps that constantly rotates deploying units.

For information assurance (IA), contractors were employed for multiple reasons. On NIPRnet (Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router network) and SIPRnet (Secure Internet Protocol Router network), contractors were employed for their expertise in skills such as Blue Coat Management. However, Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), i.e., the coalition network, was a different matter. Because the network was very flat, the Army only provided IA rights to contractors for whom they controlled the contract. Even if a Marine had the same credentials as contractors, the Army did not trust their level of experience and the wisdom that comes from that. They deemed it too great a vulnerability to the network, because of the servicemembers' lack of expertise and experience. Therefore, we had no choice but to employ contractors for this capability.

For wire, RC(SW) had transitioned to a full-blown commercialized network with a Building Industry Consulting Services International (BICSI) standard physical infrastructure. Aboard Camp Leatherneck and the adjacent Camp Bastion, fiber distribution supported over 6,000 computers via two main distribution facilities (MDFs) and 16 area distribution nodes (ADNs), each with redundant routes tying them to the MDFs. Approximately 2,000 switches were distributed throughout the ADNs and the hundreds of buildings housing computers. The commercial-grade fiber was much more brittle than the tactical fiber typically used by Marines. This meant experience with splicing and troubleshooting was the most critical aspect of having contractors. These are not skills that require a lot of expertise, but experience makes all the difference. The additional benefit was the resident knowledge acquired over years of a contractor supporting the same fiber distribution.

Within the telephony field, the critical skill was voice engineering. Marines are familiar with Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) but RC(SW) utilized a local session controller which is not a program of record. Very few Marines have experience as on-call managers. The gulf of expertise between a corporal 0612 (field wireman) and the voice engineer contractors was astronomical. One of our contractors was a 45-year-old individual who had spent 17 years working for Comcast doing voice engineering. Is there any wonder we enjoyed a call success rate above 97 percent with the 3 percent failure rate mostly made up of busy signals?

The final benefit to these contractors is the most well-known. It is the relief to the force management level (FML), which is focused on the number of troops deployed. Every war faces constraints. Some are financially constrained and others are manpower constrained. The Iraq and Afghan wars both became constrained by the latter. Force management level became a very politicized aspect of the wars. Therefore, the Department of Defense had to find a way to provide more capability with fewer troops. That means they had to outsource the "non-warfighting" functions. For example, the manning of chow halls and fuel farms is contracted out. Communications architects and administrators served the same purpose. If a billet was restricted to a large well-protected base, why have that individual equipped with warfighting skillsets? The Marine Corps expends millions of dollars and the majority of a Marine's career in making him a warfighter, yet on large bases such as Camp Leatherneck, that skill often goes unutilized. Paying contractors to serve a communications function in which they have greater expertise and more experience, and have their billet not count against force management level is a successful strategy. However, the effective employment of contractors is critical.

Challenges and Recommendations

The challenges of employing contractors in a deployed environment can be broken into three categories: acquiring them, integrating them, and downsizing them. The challenges in the acquisition stage are: a) identifying requirements, b) writing requirements, and c) securing funding. The integration challenges are comprised of: a) integrating the contractors and Marines into the organizational structure, and b) ensuring synchronized effort. Finally, the challenges of downsizing the contractor workforce proved to be as equally important as our mission to maintain communications reliability and redundancy while redeploying all personnel and equipment out of RC(SW). Through our experiences in 2014, we learned the following lessons that we offer to the reader as recommendations.

Acquisition. We recommend assigning a resource management officer (RMO) to be the belly button for all contracts even before you receive your first contractor. This officer must be someone who can master the requirements process. It is tempting to simply

Contractors may be required to help Marines put equipment in service and keep it operating. ***(Official USMC photo.)***

have each subject matter expert (SME) handle the requirements writing in their area, but this strategy is vulnerable to constantly having someone else navigating the requirements field. The RMO must utilize the SME's expertise, but he would be wise to have the SME not worry about the requirements process.

In order to initiate the contract, all requests for services or support must go through the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) process. We assume that some version of the JARB process will always be required when seeking overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding. The JARB documentation should be submitted three months in advance as this process can be tedious and must go through many different channels before final approval. The list of required documents is fairly exhaustive. For new contracts, once the JARB package is approved, the request for support or services is forwarded from the C-4 (logistics) to the regional contracting office to generate the requirement and begin solicitation to all eligible bidders. At this point, a contracting officer representative will be assigned.

With a three-month lead time, requirements must be identified early on. Think back to when MEB-A first deployed in 2009. That first staff certainly had to think about the type of contracted support they required. Unfortunately, they were most likely ill-prepared for that challenge. Did they have someone trained with an understanding of the requirements and contracting processes? Did they know that they would be the first of five MEB/MEFs to deploy to Camp Leatherneck? We recommend that the Marine Corps institutionally studies the communications contracted support required in Afghanistan and determine what services will most likely be needed the next time the Marine Corps is called on to serve in a similarly lengthy scenario. We do not believe these capabilities and skill sets should be looked at as program of record requirements. However, the institution should design a capability and workforce requirement that is prepared ahead of time. This will spare the next communications unit from figuring out capabilities and requirements from scratch.

Integration. It is absolutely critical to integrate the contractors and the Marines in the organizational structure. When the initial contractors arrive, integration is easy. There is a Marine hierarchy and contractors are plugged into the appropriate sections. This becomes more difficult as the contractor force grows and new units arrive for relief in place. This cohesive unit arrives in theater and finds a large contractor work force—in our case, 150-plus strong—that understands the situation much better than the Marines.

When we arrived in theater, there was a definite separation between the contractors and the Marine structure. The disunion led to a lack of cohesion in troubleshooting, a lack of understanding by the contractors as to the mission, and a missed opportunity to develop enhanced technical skills in the Marines. The lack of cohesion was the most egregious fault of all. As the communications-integrator for RC(SW), the C-6 needed a single, cohesive organizational structure as the communications provider.

We recommend a typical Marine Corps hierarchical structure where the contractors are integrated into the appropriate sections. SNCOs should be the section heads with tasking authority over Marines and contractors alike. The SNCO is ultimately responsible for all actions within his section, which ensures there is ownership and aggression on all taskings. Unity of effort is created by the SNCO section head.

We recommend there are no sections that are contractor only. The expertise of contractors must be merged with the mission accomplishment of Marines. Our data section serves as a useful illustration of the right way and the wrong way to employ contractors.

The network contractors were broken into LAN and WAN sections. The LAN personnel were responsible for high-speed switching and intermediate routing and were embedded with the Marine network personnel. Many of the LAN engineers would provide informal training to the Marines, which greatly enhanced the Marines' skill.

The WAN engineer contractors, however, were in a different building and were segregated from the LAN personnel. The WAN section consisted of no Marines because the type of capabilities employed exceeded the Marines' capabilities. The knowledge level of the WAN engineers was significantly greater than other personnel. Because they were segregated, troubleshooting and complex tasks across multiple sections lacked cohesion and synchronization.

The bottom line is that units should not deviate from the organizational structure principles Marine Corps units are accustomed to just because there is a large contractor force. The Marines bring an enhanced understanding of this structure and aggressive mission accomplishment, while contractors bring the technical expertise. The key to an effective organization is that the Marines and contractors merge their strengths. Don't sacrifice organizational structure for enhanced technical expertise and vice versa.

Downsizing. Maintaining capability while downsizing the force becomes very challenging when half of the work force is contractors. Unlike with Marines, leadership does not control exactly how long a contractor will remain in place. Contractors face their own temptations to find their next employment, so there is a constant concern that your most critical contractors will leave early. They are not required to give notice. They can decide they are quitting one day and be on a plane the next.

Integration as discussed above is the only mitigation leadership has to minimize this risk. By effectively integrating contractors into a cohesive section and unit, they acquire a sense of responsibility and dedication to the section and the success of the mission. It is important that contractors understand how critical their skill sets are to the overall mission. A close connection to the Marines in their section ensures they see who specifically will be most impacted by their early departure. They will understand the turmoil faced by these Marines if they leave. Even if they choose to leave, they will be more inclined to give notice and personally ensure the training of those around them.

This relationship must be strong both ways. It is critical that the RMO is communicating to the contracting leads as much information about billet downsizing as soon as possible. Our guideline was to provide 30-day notice of billet off ramps, even though there was no requirement to do so. This built trust in contractors that they were not just pawns. It would have been safer to tell them nothing and let them all assume they were staying until the very end of the mission. However, once the trust had proven to be broken, no one would have blamed the contractors for doing what was in their best interest by leaving early.

Maintaining capability while downsizing the force becomes very challenging when half of the work force is contractors.

Finally, attrition is a fact of life when downsizing a workforce. Some leaders will be tempted to off ramp the exact billet quantities the unit is capable of doing without. However, if the leader attempts to be precise, they leave themselves no risk mitigation when additional contractors leave early.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Marine Corps will continue to see communications contractors on the battlefield. The institution must be prepared for this eventuality by ensuring that lessons learned from our experiences with contractors in the past leads to the future benefits for warfighters. The expertise is absolutely needed. The key is combining that expertise with the mission accomplishment of Marines in an effectively integrated structure. The Marine Corps institution can do more to set these units up for success by studying the capabilities and workforce employed in Afghanistan. The institution should be prepared for the eventuality that the Marine Corps will be drawn into lengthy wars and have a plan for supporting capabilities and contractors when the requirements exceed the program of record capabilities.

The contractors were just as important to our success as the Marines were. These individuals are not money-first and selfish. They do care about what they do and they want to feel like they are a vital part of the team. Unfortunately, we lost a contractor during our deployment to a heart attack. There were no clear guidelines for the servicemember role when sending home a deceased contractor. It turns out this individual was a retired Army soldier. Despite no requirement to do so, we stood with 50 other Marines and contractors on the tarmac at midnight one night and honored this individual as he was loaded onto the bird, just as we would have done for an active duty Marine. We recognized that he was sacrificing and taking risks to be in Afghanistan. He was away from family and many comforts. Certainly, he was being paid handsomely for it, but we were benefiting from his choice to do so. The mission benefited and our success hinged on his performance. This is worthy of appreciation and respect.

USMC

Palantir Integration in III MEF

Fully exploiting a capability

by Capt William Sapp

>Capt Sapp is an 0203 (ground intelligence officer). He wrote this article while serving as the Knowledge Management Officer, III MAGTF Intelligence Center, 3d Intelligence Battalion. While at 3d Intelligence Bn, then-1stLt Sapp was appointed a Palantir Product Owner and member of the Palantir Configuration Control Board. He is currently a student at the MAGTF Intelligence Officer's Course, Virginia Beach, VA.

In early 2014, the Palantir Advanced Analytical Platform was fielded to III MEF with dedicated server and field service representative support. Though not a field user evaluation (FUE)—Palantir is already a contracted commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology used in both I and II MEF—the goal of the fielding is to find the platform's utility within the Pacific Command area of responsibility and within the dynamic security environment that III MEF faces. The use of Palantir in III MEF, specifically in a garrison environment, has proven challenging. With such a large area of responsibility and many disparate problem sets, it is difficult to delve deep into any individual problem set without a significant dedication of the already limited analytical manpower. There are also issues with the bureaucratic process requisite to any major program of record with respect to system changes and support requests. Despite these challenges and the limited use of Palantir, mainly during MEF-level command post exercises (CPX), it is clear that there is great utility in its capability within III MEF and the Pacific Command area of responsibility. Based on the use of the application, we have collected a list of recommended changes that, if implemented swiftly, will increase Palantir's utility across the entire range of military operations (ROMO).

Palantir can support Marines in COIN and stability operations but has yet to demonstrate a capability to support HA/DR or conventional warfare. *(Photo by LCpl Mandalin Hatch.)*

Palantir is a system in the sense that it has dedicated hardware in the form of servers; however, at the user level, Palantir is a web-based application that can be downloaded and used in either a connected or disconnected mode. Marine analysts can use existing hardware, such as Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) Tier 3s, the USMC all-source intelligence workstation, to download and use the Palantir application. As an advanced analytic application, Palantir has already proven its utility for Marine units in the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan.[1] The ability to input high volumes of data from multiple sensors and data sources, then visualize and manipulate the data and recognize relationships and anomalies in the data is where Palantir's strength lies and is what the application is famous for.

Palantir Can Do More

III MEF must be prepared to operate across the entire ROMO facing potential contingencies ranging from humanitarian assistance, growing religious extremism and sectarian violence, and the ever-present threat of conventional warfare from North Korea. Palantir has proven it can support Marines in the middle of the ROMO (e.g., counter-

insurgency, stability operations, etc.), but has yet to prove its utility on either end of the spectrum (i.e., humanitarian assistance/disaster relief [HA/DR] and conventional warfare). Palantir has the existing algorithms and framework to support all-source intelligence across the ROMO and it needs to be utilized.

Conventional Warfare and Battle Tracking

For the G-3 (Operations), maintaining a common operational picture (COP) is a straightforward process. At the MEF level, most friendly units are tracked via Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and are thus automated. Any units without BFT make regular position reports (POSREP) to identify their location and disposition. However, for the G-2 (Intelligence), maintaining a common intelligence picture (CIP) or RedCOP (Threat common operational picture) is a bit more difficult. Unfortunately, the enemy doesn't use BFT and typically won't send us POSREPs. So analysts must conduct *battle tracking* and track enemy movement and actions—as well as changes to their strength—using dynamic all-source analysis. This is where Palantir comes into play. Palantir can support battle tracking not only in the analysis of changes to enemy composition, disposition, and strength but also serve as a dissemination tool both with deliberate intelligence products and track updates to the COP. Though Palantir's current build is not designed to conduct battle tracking, some of the current capabilities of the application, such as its high volume data ingest, associations, and collaboration tools are an added utility to the standard battle tracking process. Palantir's engineer support and responsiveness are one of the company's greatest values. That being said, below is a recommended list of modifications that would enable Palantir to better serve the USMC all-source intelligence community as a tool for conventional battle tracking.

Palantir's current ontology does not support conventional enemy units or equipment. An ontology is "… the means by which data from multiple sources are transformed and integrated from their raw storage formats into data objects and associated properties that represent real objects in the world—people, places, things, events, and the connections between them."[2] The relationship between the generic and specific entity types are described in a parent-child type model. For example:

> An object is created in Palantir to represent a generic event (parent-type). The object can be further broken down to a specific type of event, such as a bombing or election (child-type). A conventional example is a generic unit (parent-type), further broken down to describe an order of battle type such as an infantry battalion (child-type).

Analysts need to be able to construct units as entities with relationships to higher, subordinate, and adjacent unit entities. They must also be able to associate enemy equipment, such as vehicles and major weapons systems with their units. Part of this change needs to be the inclusion of MILSTD 2525 standard operational graphics.* Adding the Modernized-Integrated-Database** (MIDB) as a data source is a must; it will let analysts create entities for structures such as bridges and bunkers vice the current practice of using static layers.

COP integration is also highly recommended. This allows analysts to view friendly force disposition and operations, which will add context for enemy actions and reactions. Analysts also need the ability within Palantir to write/modify/delete tracks to the COP. Example: analysts modify an enemy unit's location within Palantir, right click the entity on the map, and click "send to COP." The change in enemy unit location is then reflected on the COP. To truly support advanced analytics, analysts should be able to build/teach Palantir various enemy doctrinal templates. Palantir would then be able to identify/recognize/suggest when a series of enemy units are conducting a doctrinal tactic or maneuver. This would also identify gaps in collection via missing units from the template.

*MIL-STD-2525 (military standard) is the primary directive that DOD uses to standardize warfighting symbology.

**MIDB provides order of battle data containing all valid textual and graphical information about enemy sites, facilities, and units.

HA/DR

Though Palantir is most familiar to Marines on the Secure Internet Protocol Routing network (SIPRNet) as a classified instance, there are many other deployments of the application. Palantir has an unclassified instance built specifically to support HA/DR operations. In order to simplify data input from a wide range of nongovernmental organizations and relief agencies, as well as the United States Agency for International Development, Palantir created Artemis. Artemis is a simple web form that allows on-the-ground users and first responders to submit data online, even from a smartphone. Simply put, Artemis enables unstructured data input and translates it to a structured entity that can be queried and manipulated in Palantir. Access to an unclassified instance of Palantir would connect analysts directly to the relief effort; it would allow interagency collaboration, thus enabling streamlined analysis of remaining relief needs and tracking of the effectiveness of the ongoing relief effort.[3]

Integration Within III MEF

Since the fielding in early 2014, integration of Palantir within III MEF has been a challenging process. Its utility as a battle tracking tool during conventional warfare is a chief concern. It was determined that one of the several CPXs in which III MEF participates (e.g., Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, Combined Marine Component Command CPX) would provide the requisite scenario to test Palantir's applicability. The first attempt to integrate Palantir into the battle tracking process occurred during Exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2014 (UFG 14). However, due to the complexity of the exercise simulation architecture, a logical means by which to ingest the extensive exercise data into Palantir could not be identified. It was not until the weeks leading up to Exercise Key Resolve 2015 that a

At the MEF level, most units are tracked using the Blue Force Tracker. *(Photo by Nacho Anazawa.)*

method of ingesting exercise simulation data into Palantir was identified: a data integration of the Pacific Command M3*** server. With the integration of exercise simulation data, analysts were able to ingest over 100,000 intelligence reports over a two-week period. This solved the long problem of "where is my data?" but posed an even greater one: "what do I do with all this data?" The latter question can likely be solved with some of the changes recommended above.

Immediately following Key Resolve 2015, Marines transitioned to Exercise Combined Marine Component Command CPX 2015. This exercise had a significantly less complex architecture; because there was no automated data feed as in Key Resolve or Ulchi Freedom Guardian, analysts used Artemis web forms to input reports. The majority of the data ingested comprised of SALUTE**** reports and POSREPS describing either enemy activity or displaced civilians. Due to the limited number of reports and 239 SALUTE reports over a five-day period, it was difficult to find any necessary manipulation of data. Since Palantir automatically parses reports based on time and location, analysts could easily visualize reports both geographically and chronologically. However, the low volume of message traffic and lack of historical data (because it was a "canned" scenario) within the database did not necessitate extensive link analysis.

Fortunately, III MEF has not executed a HA/DR operation since the fielding of Palantir in early 2014. However, in the event that it does, Marines need to be prepared to use tools like Artemis and unclassified Palantir to assist in relief operations. Though there was limited success in the use of Artemis web forms during Combined Marine Component Command CPX 2015, III MEF is not currently resourced with the needed infrastructure—namely servers to host an unclassified instance of Palantir and information assurance approval to connect to it—to use the application in an HA/DR contingency.

***M3: Multimedia Message Manager, a secure messaging capability used by the U.S. Government.

****SALUTE report: an enemy observation report describing size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment.

What's the holdup?

What is holding up implementation of the recommended changes, both in hardware and software? It isn't Palantir. Support from Palantir has been outstanding. The Palantir field service representatives have bent over backward to support analysts and leaders in both training and idea generation. Palantir engineers are among the brightest in the industry and want to help the Marines. The short answer is that we are holding ourselves up. Not just those of us in III MEF, though we share responsibility, but the USMC intelligence community as a whole. Palantir's popularity in Afghanistan is partially due to its rapid integrations and short turnaround time for change requests. However, due to the fact that Palantir is not a program of record, the HQMC Intelligence Department has assumed a much more bureaucratic process for requesting and implementing changes to Palantir: the Palantir Configuration Control Board (PCCB).

The PCCB is a virtual committee, appointed by the HQMC Intelligence Department with representation from each MEF, Marine Forces Command, Marine Forces Central Command, Marine Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Combat Development and Integration Division, and is hosted by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR). Its charter directs it to collect, prioritize, and vote on Palantir change requests.[4] This board meets monthly to discuss the progress and evaluation of current change requests and to vote on the acceptance of new change requests. Palantir change requests must first be formally submitted by a product owner. Requests are then triaged by the SPAWAR action officers. After triage, the PCCB then votes on the change request. If accepted, the request is given to Palantir engineers to actually make the change. Once Palantir has completed program modification, but before fielding to the user, the modification is verified by SPAWAR. At first glance, this is a logical process that gives the fleet, as well as supporting agencies, equal access to request and drive Palantir change requests. Unfortunately, this isn't always the case in execution. Change requests are prioritized on a first-come, first-served basis. Product owners were recently asked to vote on the priority of the over-logged requests; however, there was little shift in the priority. Ad-

ditionally, validation and final release of change requests—even after Palantir engineers have completed them—can take months for approval before they finally reach the Marine analyst.

How can this be fixed? Bureaucratic processes are not new to the military, especially when it comes to information assurance. Great care must be taken when introducing changes to existing applications. However, one of Palantir's main selling points is its rapid integration process, where users can speak directly with field service representatives for either on-the-spot or quick turnaround product changes. By applying layers of military bureaucracy to the existing process, the PCCB has negated any dynamic advantage Palantir may have over other applications and inhibited III MEF's ability to fully realize the potential for Palantir across the ROMO. Only by streamlining the change request process and putting the control back in the hands of the users can the USMC intelligence community really allow Palantir to mold itself to support the Marine analyst.

Conclusion

Palantir has proven itself during counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. III MEF aims to prove its utility on either side of the ROMO, namely HA/DR and battle tracking during conventional warfare. Though steady progress is being made toward integrating Palantir, there are self-imposed roadblocks. On some occasions, these roadblocks can be mitigated, such as with Artemis web forms or the Pacific Command M3 data integration. However, until larger changes are made (e.g., conventional ontology, MIDB, and COP integration), analysts will not be able to take advantage of its true capability and utility across the entire ROMO. Palantir is a powerful tool that comes with outstanding support. It is worth further investment of time and resources to continue to modify Palantir so that Marines can fully exploit its potential.

Notes

1. Rowan Scarborough, "Military Leaders Urgently Push for New Counterterrorism Software," *Washington Times*, (Washington, DC: 27 August 2012), accessed 10 April 2015 at http://www.washingtontimes.com.

2. "Dynamic Ontology." Palantir Gotham Technologies, (New York, NY), accessed 14 April 2015 at https://www.palantir.com.

3. "Disaster Preparedness and Crisis Response." Palantir, (New York, NY), accessed 10 April 2015 at https://www.palantir.com.

4. "Palantir Configuration Control Board (PCCB) Charter," PCCB Intelshare, (New York, NY: 8 October 2013), accessed 13 April 2015 at https://intelshare.intelink.gov.

Expeditionary Advising

Downshifting from Phase I to Phase II

by BGen Paul K. Lebidine, USMCR, & LtCol Patrick J. Carroll, USMC(Ret)

"You have all the clocks, but we have all the time," or so claimed a Taliban propagandist in 2011.

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>>LtCol Carroll is a retired lieutenant colonel and Middle East Foreign Area Officer (FAO) currently serving as a Senior Advisor with the Advise and Assist Directorate, Resolute Support Headquarters. He has over four years of advisory experience in Helmand, Nangarhar, and Kabul, Afghanistan.

"*Tsenga yeh? Joor yeh?* How are you, my friend?!" the NATO Team Leader cried to the Afghan Corps Commander in Camp Shorab, Helmand, Afghanistan in January 2015.

"*Shah raghalast, p'keer raghlay* … welcome, welcome back, my friend," Brigadier General Dadan Lawang, Commander of the 215th ANA Maiwand Corps cried.

This was the first time that U.S. Marines and their British colleagues had returned to Helmand Province after genuinely "closing up shop" on the 31st of October the previous year. They were coming back for a couple of weeks … not to reoccupy Camp Leatherneck or Camp Bastion, but to begin a new phase of advise and assist under a Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance model … and they would continue to do so periodically in 2015, with plans to do the same in 2016. How had this come about, and what were they aiming to achieve?

Advise and Assist Directorate

Following the U.S. Armed Forces' experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 14 years, and given the difficulties of transitioning from large-scale counterinsurgency operations to a more sustainable and supportable security cooperation posture, the question naturally becomes, "How do we continue to provide robust Security Force Assistance (SFA) over the long term to help mature and operationalize friendly Armies and Police Forces in the future—particularly in extremely unsettled environments?" The simple answer is that we typically do so through the Security Assistance Office[1] (and its supporting Geographic Combatant Command) and a variety of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance-type programs. This is definitely the case with dozens of our allies—in many

MGySgt Robert Oak, USMC, providing "advise and assist" to the ANA as a part of an Expeditionary Advising Package (EAP). *(Photo by author.)*

cases developing countries—around the globe.

The follow-up question, though, is whether this construct is sufficient for operating in a combat environment, particularly after a protracted counterinsurgency. Do we just simply extract all of our conventional forces and trainers, consolidate a limited military presence in the U.S. Embassy's Security Cooperation Office, and just go from there? Not likely. This is particularly not the case when we have just drawn down from a major war, and yet we are still in the process of training, advising, and assisting (TAA) large-scale National Defense and Security Forces, such as we have done with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.[2] In fact, one might argue that the Iraq scenario provides the perfect paradigm of what we should *not* do under these circumstances; the transition in Afghanistan serves as a much better and more prudent template to follow for transitioning from major counterinsurgency efforts. That is: to train, advise, and assist indigenous military and police forces on a relatively industrial scale and then responsibly shift lead security responsibilities to those same forces while continuing to provide varying levels of advise and assist (A&A) support over a relatively extensive period of time. This subsequent chapter in A&A would follow the tactical progress and raise the bar, so to speak. It would concentrate on the higher level of defense and security institution building (i.e., helping to connect ministerial processes with the operational and tactical levels). This is exactly what Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) as promulgated by *SFA Guide 3.12* is all about,[3] and it aims to cement security gains for long-term stability. To answer the Taliban propagandist, "You [the insurgent] only *think* you have all the time; we stand by our allies and we will work *shona ba shona*[4] to wear you down."

This paper examines the shift from Phase I to Phase II of Resolute Support in Afghanistan, and offers a possible paradigm for providing Levels 1–3 SFA even as the U.S. and allied NATO and Coalition partners downsize their

Afghan National Army soldiers cleaning their weapons at the Regional Military Training Center in Gardez, Paktiya province. *(Photo by author.)*

footprint in Afghanistan.[5] This model may equally have applicability in today's zones of conflict like Iraq, or for future SFA efforts during overseas contingency operations in other "hot spots" around the globe like Nigeria, Syria, etc. Furthermore, it may be employed by the U.S. unilaterally or as a multination coalition like NATO. In fact, one could certainly argue that economically speaking, it is a far less expensive construct to sustain than establishing a long-term presence in a particular country. Its goals are three-fold:

1. Maintain a positive rapport with the host nation and its security forces for the long term with a minimal force on the ground.
2. Mitigate any feeling of abandonment by the host nation and host nation's security forces once U.S. Armed Forces—and/or Coalition Forces—largely draw down and redeploy.
3. Continue to assist the indigenous forces to mature their Essential Functions,[6] those functional areas considered *sine qua non* for an effective, modern security and defense establishment.

... it is a far less expensive construct to sustain than establishing a long-term presence in a particular country.

In 2011, NATO forces hit their peak strength at about 101,000; even in 2014, the NATO forces levels were still at over 28,000 troops with robust Train, Advise, and Assist Commands (TAACs) in the north, east, south, and west. This was not only unsustainable from the perspective of the NATO coalition but likewise not desired by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). While then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai's Loya Jirga in 2013 had voted to ask NATO to remain in the country, hammering out a bilateral agreement was much harder, and ultimately the decision was made to significantly draw down the force in 2015 and to leave a more compact NATO command (known as *Enhanced Enduring Partnership* or EEP) post-2016.

But again, the question became how to do this responsibly and to maintain all of the progress that had been achieved with the ANDSF, especially since 2009. Even as the TAACs continued their

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) discussing plans for an Afghan-led deliberate operation. *(Photo by author.)*

TAA mission, plans were well underway to downsize and eliminate them by the 1 October 2015. The answer came from a white paper developed by Regional Command–Southwest (RC–SW), headquartered at Camp Leatherneck in the Spring/Summer of 2014. Even as most of the other Regional Commands were transitioning to more compact TAACs, plans were underway to completely eliminate RC–SW. This was based mainly on the fact that Helmand and Nimroz Provinces were so distant from the capital and therefore the most difficult to reach and the most problematic in which to maintain a Coalition presence. Due to the tumultuous nature of the area, the veritable heartland of a largely Pashtun-based insurgency, RC–SW recommended establishing a small cell in Kabul under the ISAF command that would continue to monitor and advocate for 215th Corps, particularly along the lines of Essential Functions 1 (Plans, Programs, Budget and Execute), 4 (Force Generation), and 5 (Force Sustainment). Commander of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), GEN John Campbell, embraced the idea; and as RC–SW retrograded and redeployed on 31 October 2014, handing the Leatherneck and Bastion complexes off to the 215th ANA Corps, a seven-man Advise and Assist Cell (AAC or "ack") composed of U.S. Marines, British Army, and U.S. Navy advisors was established at the ISAF HQs compound in Kabul. Based on an initial positive assessment of the efficacy of the AAC construct, GEN Campbell expanded the original cell and directed the creation of an Advise and Assist Directorate (AAD) under a one-star General Officer with initially two subordinate regional AACs.[7]

Expeditionary Advising Packages (EAP)

Initially, the AAD and AACs were conducting their mission largely through phone calls and periodic face-to-face visits in Kabul by 215th Corps personnel as well as the associated regional policing elements from the Type-A Provincial Chief of Police's headquarters in Lashkar Gah.[8] This could not truly sustain a long-term relationship, though. As a result, the Resolute Support Headquarters' Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, MG Kurt Fuller, endorsed the idea of Expeditionary Advisory Packages (EAP); and the construct was first operationally tested in January 2015. The EAP consisted of the eight-man Advise and Assist Cell[9] along with two platoons from the Theatre Reserve Force (TRF)[10] to provide "Guardian Angel" (GA) and force protection support, as well as some key enablers mainly related to medical, communications, and aviation support. After the initial trial-test of the EAP concept, the AAD then developed various scalable force packages based on the overall aim of the mission. Some EAPs were focused on advise and assist with long-term FBSFA in mind. These became Sustainment EAPs (EAP-S) and were aimed at A&A along the eight essential functions, but primarily on the critical EFs 1, 4, 5, and 6. In addition, some EAPs were created to advise and assist along Warfighting Functions during actual ANA-directed combat operations. The first Operational EAP (EAP-O) was conducted in February, March, and April 2015 to support the 215th Corps during their largely successful Operation Zulfiqar in the Upper Sangin River Valley meant to disrupt insurgent operations prior to the start of Fighting Season 2015 (FS15). The second EAP-O was actually conducted by the recently established AAC-SE to advise and assist the 203rd Corps during Operation Badr in southern Ghazni aimed at disrupting insurgent networks there at the beginning of the so-called FS15.

The AAD, regional AACs, and EAPs have been in operation since November 2014. While they in no way provide the robust Level 1 TAA that was possible under the former Regional Commands and the TAACs, they are indeed the logical progression toward downsizing the theater and still maintaining sufficient touch-points with Corps and associated regional police elements through a Level III SFA construct. In terms of the ANDSF, we also believe that they are valued assets and provide the following:

- AACs mitigate any feeling of complete abandonment once a large force like the Regional Commands or TAACs depart.
- They maintain positive rapport over the long term with a minimal force on the ground. While SOF maintains a presence largely for the CT mission, the Resolute Support conventional EAPs are aimed at FBSFA.
- AACs connect the "deep fight" (i.e., the ministerial or national level) with the "close fight" (i.e., institutional/

operational and tactical units such as the Corps and Provincial Police Headquarters [PPHQs]).

- They can provide access to key Coalition enablers during framework and deliberate operations that still allow the ANDSF to naturally mature (i.e., casevac in the event of a mass casualty, some limited in extremis CAS, access to ISR, etc). As the partnered military or police develops, this also allows advisors to encourage these same forces to rely more and more on their own organic enablers such as indirect fire and close air support.
- During framework operations, the AACs "shadow track" Afghan processes along the Essential Functions and can help to identify key friction points and assist the Afghans in resolving the same.
- EAPs also allow the U.S., specifically, to keep track of our equipment and materiel investment; similarly sustaining continuous support for our partnered nations.
- AACs can be augmented (substantially) by contract personnel with multiple years of Afghan experience both in training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF, and doing so through the FBSFA construct.

The AAD, regional AACs, and EAPs may provide a model for future Security Cooperation operations and the delivery of advice and assistance, particularly in unsettled environments, and where a large U.S. presence is not possible nor desired by host countries or by the U.S. government. In some environments, they could even be established aboard MEUs and other shipborne MAGTFs and launched regularly from an over-the-horizon (OTH) posture—similar to the platforms which currently constitute the special purpose MAGTFs–Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) deployed to Africa, Central, and Southern Command. The major difference between FBSFA EAPs and the majority of traditional security cooperation training missions is that these would be focused more on the strategic and operational, rather than the tactical needs of indigenous forces. Instead of teaching the Somali National Army how to conduct light infantry tactics, for instance, these would be geared at larger issues, such as how foreign Ministries of Defense and Interior and General Staffs deal with force generation and mitigate attrition, how they sustain a force logistically, how they work through pay and accountability problems, and most importantly, how they connect those very same essential functions down to the operational and tactical levels. In short, the goal is to make sure an Army or paramilitary force remains in the fight over the long haul. As a result, those constituting the advisor cadre for these EAPs would likewise be your graduate-level advisors—military and civilian personnel with multiple tours and years of advisory experience, in-depth cultural and linguistic knowledge, and experts at building lasting relationships with America's partners around the globe.

Notes

1. SAO or Security Cooperation Office (SCO) is a broad umbrella term for military offices within the U.S. embassy that provide training and materiel assistance to friendly governments' Armed Forces, and in some cases, Police Forces. Depending on the country, they may be referred to as Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group (JUSMAG), Office of the Defense Representation–Pakistan (ODR–P), etc.

2. Formerly referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); the term was changed in early 2015 to mark the change from the ISAF mission to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

3. *Resolute Support Security Force Assistance Guide 3.12* was produced in July 2014 under the direction of the former Commander of the International Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. It provides NATO partners and troop contribution nations (TCNs) a common understanding of how ISAF/RS will execute the shift from a unit-based, combat-oriented advisory mission to a Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance mission.

4. *"Shoulder to Shoulder"* – one of the popular Dari (Afghan Persian) sayings under ISAF's *Komak wa Hamkaray* ("*Help and Cooperation*") construct.

5. According to *SFA Guide 3.12*. Level 1 = Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANDSF counterparts on a continuous, persistent (usually daily) basis from either an embedded footprint or in close proximity. Level 2 = Advisors train, advise, and assist their ANDSF counterparts on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the ANDSF counterpart threat level to advisors, and CF resources. Level 3 = ISAF provides additional training and advice from a centralized location (e.g., at a Regional Training Center or Regional Corps Battle School) or during a Battlefield Circulation or Staff Assistance Visit while accompanying ANDSF commanders and staff sections.

6. The Essential Functions according to *SFA Guide 3.12* are EF1 (Plans, Program, Budget and Execute), EF2 (Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight), EF3 (Rule of Law), EF4 (Force Generation), EF5 (Force Sustainment), EF6 (Command and Control Operations), EF7 (Intelligence), and EF8 (Strategic Communications).

7. The second AAC—AAC–Southeast—became fully operationally capable (FOC) on 22 April to assume the advise and assist responsibilities from TAAC-E which had until that time been responsible for TAA'ing both the 201st and 203rd Corps. AAC–SE assumed the AA mission for 203rd ANA *Tandar* Corps in Gardez, Paktiya. Plans for additional AACs are in the works based on the drawdown of remaining TAACs.

8. Type-A Police Chiefs replaced the former construct of Regional Chiefs of Police (RCoPs). They ostensibly became the senior PCoP within a multi-provincial area and controlled the Regional Training Center (RTC) and Regional Logistics Center (RLC) as well as security within their own province. All other PCoPs in the same area were referred to as Type-B PCoPs.

9. Team Lead, EF 1 Advisor, EF 4 Advisor, EF 5/Infrastructure Advisor, Engineering Advisor, MoI Advisor, and two interpreters.

10. The Theatre Reserve Force (TRF) is a force at the strategic or operational level held to counter unforeseen situations or to prevent strategic failure. This force is not tasked to carry out campaign essential tasks but is prepared for contingent tasks (example: force protection for NATO forces).

Counterinsurgency Considerations for the Information Age

Do we have to have one?

by 2ndLt Ben Kallas

Few people would be surprised to hear the nature and strategy of insurgencies have developed markedly over the past two decades. At the same time, relatively little has been written about the implications of those developments for small unit leaders in the U.S. military. To answer that question, the following article discusses a theory about the evolution of warfare known as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), how that theory has materialized on the battlefield, and finally, what these developments mean for small unit leaders involved in counterinsurgency operations.

The Fourth Generation

The concept of 4GW was first introduced in a *Marine Corps Gazette* article in October 1989.[1] The authors identified three "generations" of warfare which overlap slightly but are generally distinct from one another. The first generation encompasses the tactics associated with the smoothbore musket, as practiced during the American Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation was a response to the increased lethality of automatic weapons and artillery during World War I, which forced soldiers to disperse along broader fronts. Rail transportation and the telegraph facilitated the movement and coordination of troops, but tactics still relied upon attrition. The ensuing stalemates and massive casualties proved that defensive tactics had become superior to offensive tactics, and that a new doctrine was necessary.

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The Germans introduced that doctrine with blitzkrieg in World War II, ushering in the third generation of warfare.

> Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. As frontal attacks had proven suicidal in WWI, the new tactics relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them.[2]

The third generation employed new inventions like airpower and tanks, along with decentralized command and control. It was devastatingly effective and provided the starting point for modern maneuver warfare. As *MCDP 1-3, Tactics,* points out, "increased weapons lethality, communications range, and tactical mobility"[3] are still key factors driving the greater dispersion and decentralization of forces on today's battlefields.

The authors then sought to predict the fourth generation of warfare. They identified several patterns which became more prominent throughout the previous generations: mission-type orders, less dependence on centralized logistics, greater maneuverability, and negating the enemy's physical strength by destroying its will or ability to fight. Enhancing these characteristics to form a new generation of warfare should create a highly dispersed, adaptable opponent that evades enemy forces but specifically targets its enemy's will to fight. The authors proposed that 4GW actors would harness the unprecedented interconnectedness and complexity of modern societies to completely bypass the opposing military and convince their opponent's political decision makers that victory would not be worth the social, economic, and political costs of fighting. While this description does not fit the world's leading militaries, it does describe groups like al-Qaeda and networked insurgencies in countries like Iraq and Pakistan.

Numerous authors have refined the theory since 1989. For instance, Col (then-LtCol) Thomas X. Hammes argued five years later that insurgencies like the first Palestinian intifada had already used 4GW tactics[4]—an argument he later expanded in his book, *The Sling and the Stone.*[5] He suggests the degree of violence in a conflict now matters far less than how that violence is perceived around the world. Similarly, David Kilcullen argues that "given pervasive media presence and near-instantaneous exploitation of all combat action, counterinsurgency may now be 100% political."[6] Col Pat Phelan, Irish Defence Forces, points out that while there are precedents for almost every aspect of 4GW—like guerrilla tactics and waging psychological warfare—the degree to which insurgents can communicate with the opposing popula-

Gathering information is only part of the effort. The information has to be shared to be usable and effective. *(Photo by Sgt Michael Juneau.)*

tion and with one another is a game-changing development in warfare.[7]

4GW in Practice

Most conflicts that involve Western democracies are not "necessary" in the sense that the nation is fighting for its survival or territorial integrity. As a result, public support for the conflict is not guaranteed, and our enemies have identified public opinion as liberal democracies' critical vulnerability. If insurgents effectively manipulate information to demoralize the opposing population, they can negate liberal democracies' military strength by undermining politicians' will to fight.

Until a few decades ago, people were only vaguely aware of violence abroad unless they witnessed it firsthand; that is no longer the case since images of dying soldiers and civilians are readily available via the Internet, news media, and cell phones. Thus, casualties now carry far more weight from a psychological standpoint. Even if civilians on the homefront support the cause behind a conflict, they feel uncomfortable when they see the human cost of warfare—including the cost to the opposing side's civilians. Their level of discomfort largely depends upon how skillfully the opposing side frames those casualties as indiscriminate and unnecessary.

Indeed, information technology makes it quite difficult for the leaders of liberal democracies to control information and shape public opinion. The insurgent "relishes the fact that we rightly cherish and protect both our freedom of speech and an adversarial media as central tenets of one of our most important freedoms, because it aids him immensely in pursuing his strategic goals."[8] Western elites cannot restrict information since direct media censorship is anathema to free societies, so our enemies tailor their tactics and media messages accordingly.

Consider the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. The United States was working with the United Nations to stabilize the war-torn country and thus had no critical national interest at stake when Somali militiamen shot down two Black Hawk helicopters and killed 18 U.S. special operations soldiers. Had the American public remained oblivious, it is unlikely the U.S. government would have changed its policy. The Somali militia realized this and provided armed escorts for Western reporters, who filmed four dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.[9] The ensuing public outcry forced the Clinton administration to abandon Somalia.

Similarly, insurgents in post-invasion Iraq used the Internet to expand their audience once hostage taking became commonplace. They posted videos and photos of their hostages online and sent the information to major news outlets to ensure international media coverage, thereby leveraging the sympathy of a massive global audience. They forced military contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and even Philippine sol-

diers to withdraw from Iraq in order to save hostages.[10] The targeted organizations had to comply given the global public pressure to meet the insurgents' demands. These tactics would never have succeeded without modern media; imagine trying to do this during World War II or the Boer War. Today insurgents can, in true 4GW fashion, leverage the power of information to achieve victory without firing a shot.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of 4GW insurgencies is their ability to decentralize their operational structure. Throughout history, a hierarchy has been necessary to communicate, coordinate, and maintain order.[11] Using a network rather than a hierarchy makes collective action more difficult since it is harder for insurgent cells to coordinate with their peers in the absence of a central leadership. On the other hand, it is difficult for counterinsurgents to unravel an organization with a highly ambiguous organizational structure.

Information technology now allows those insurgents to learn about developments and innovations around the world extremely quickly—a process called "open-source warfare,"[12] analogous to the model used to build Wikipedia. For instance, the highly decentralized groups within the Iraqi insurgency were still able to learn, adapt, and coordinate so quickly that David Kilcullen described the insurgents as a "self-synchronizing swarm."[13] The "leaders" of such networks only merit the title insofar as they provide inspiration to the cells that follow them; often no direct connections exist between the leader and the led. Since the leaders only contribute ideas or inspiration to their followers, their removal—as in the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or Osama bin Laden—has little impact on the network's operational capacity.

Al-Qaeda is arguably the model 4GW insurgency. It targets its opponents in the West through psychological warfare by attacking symbolic or political targets to attain maximum media coverage. Rather than occupying territory, it works through other groups to acquire safe havens from which to plan and execute operations. The group has also demonstrated that decentralized insurgency can thrive on a global scale.[14] If a group in the Sahara can communicate with Iraqi or Syrian insurgents via chat rooms or cell phones, they can fight for the same cause. Direct communications may not even be necessary; mere inspiration can be enough. As a result, removing individuals or even an entire insurgency from the network has little or no impact on the others' ability to operate. By leveraging information technology to unite a network of cells and sympathetic insurgencies in numerous countries through a common ideology, it has created a resilient network across a global battlefield.

Images of casualties carry an adverse psychological impact on civilians who may even support military operations. *(Official Marine Corps photo, MC Mountain Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, CA: 2010.)*

Lessons for Small Unit Leaders

The Marine Corps spends the vast majority of its time conducting operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, where "small unit leaders may conduct tactical actions that have operational and even strategic consequences."[15] In low-intensity conflict, seemingly small incidents can have a disproportionately large impact. Here the perception of violence is far more important than the actual destruction of enemy forces and equipment; it is also the type of conflict in which 4GW actors thrive. This means the aforementioned strategic-level developments in warfare will also apply to the tactical level—the realm of small unit leaders.

The U.S. military is largely configured to win conventional wars, so it allocates the vast majority of its resources toward winning tactical engagements through "a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, opportunistic maneuver."[16] 4GW insurgents, on the other hand, do not care about winning engagements so long as collateral damage and the occasional American casualty cause our public to turn against the war and withdraw the troops. Our military won every major engagement in Vietnam but still lost the war because public support collapsed. Today our opponents may not even engage our forces. Instead they will create enough carnage—even against their own civilians, in the case of Iraq—to convince the American public the conflict is simply not worthwhile.

Many of the Marine Corps doctrinal publications were written before the Internet and cell phones became pervasive, yet they still recognize the potential strategic ramifications of tactical actions during small wars.[17] That effect becomes stronger each year as the world becomes more interconnected. Think of the strategic impact the Abu Ghraib scandal or individuals urinating on corpses had on our recent wars. How many new insurgents and disillusioned Americans did those events create? Per-

ception and public opinion are far more important today than in the past.

The U.S. military recognizes that counterinsurgency success cannot be measured solely by physical destruction of the enemy, especially since eliminating individuals has a limited impact on decentralized insurgencies. Small unit leaders will still conduct such missions, but they must consider the broader context of their actions. Preventing the creation—or even the perception—of collateral damage and unnecessary violence is of strategic importance in today's counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, we can and should establish positive relationships with local and international reporters in order to influence public perception of events on the ground. Otherwise our enemy will dominate the international media narrative.

All Marines must understand that our enemies will seize every opportunity to manipulate information and influence international politics, so small unit leaders should educate their Marines about the nature of a given insurgency and the international context of the counterinsurgency effort. This education, along with the prudent use of force and an active media presence, will position us to outwit and eventually beat fourth-generation adversaries at their own game.

Notes

1. William Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, and Gary Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: October 1989), 22–26.

2. Ibid., 23.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (MCDP 3-1), Tactics*, (Washington, DC: 1997), 8.

4. T. X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: September 1994).

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10. "Deadline Set for U.S., British Hostages," Fox News Report, (New York: 19 September 2004); James Glanz, "Hostage is Freed After Philippine Troops are Withdrawn from Iraq," *The New York Times*, (New York: 21 July 2004); John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization,* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007).

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13. David J. Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, (Taylor & Francis Online publication, 2006), 111–130.

14. Singer; Phelan; Metz.

15. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1-0, Operations*, (Washington, DC: 2001), 1-9.

16. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: 1997), 72.

17. *MCDP 1-0*, 1-9. See also: *MCDP 1*, 32.

Improving Marine Corps Combat Capabilities by Shooting Some Sacred Cows

Fully exploiting a capability

by Col Gary Anderson, USMC(Ret)

Marines love tradition and things like November 10th, dress blues, and boot camp keep the Marine Corps unique. But when a tradition gets in the way of combat readiness, it needs to be seriously examined, and some things that are traditional have become a drag on the Corps. Here are my top four.

>Col Anderson lectures on Red Teaming at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.



Ditch the Division

Before the IT age, the infantry division structure was a necessary mechanism for ensuring an effective span of control. Today, it is an unnecessary and redundant level of command that only serves to lengthen our observation-orientation-decision-action cycle. The division headquarters also takes up boat spaces that would be more efficiently filled by trigger pullers.

There is no reason that a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element, augmented with some billets from the division, cannot maneuver three to four regimental combat teams, an air wing, and a logistics element without a cumbersome division structure getting in the way. It would be easy enough to test this structure in experimental wargames by running an exercise with a division as a baseline and then seeing if the MEF would be more efficient without it. My bet would be that the MEF would be better served without the intervening redundant headquarters.

If Marines want to keep the division names active, they could combine the few remaining billets in the division

after cutting redundant boat spaces with the base staffs into one housekeeping organization. Camp Butler would become 3d Marine Division, Camp Pendleton 1st, and so on.

Most Pilots Should Be Warrant Officers

The aviation officer community is the most bloated and inefficient element of the Marine Corps. Staffs are inflated to find jobs for aviators without cockpits to occupy, and the aviation community's undue influence has been a plague to Marine Corps efficiency for years. You don't need a college degree to be a fighter pilot or fly a helicopter; the Israelis and U.S. Army respectively have proved that for decades. Aviation is a young man's game. There can be a commissioned cadre to provide squadron commanders and squadron/group/wing staff officers. The office of the Deputy Commandant for Aviation (better known as the Aviation Mafia) has become infamous for the suppression of dissention in the ranks of the aviation community; it should be abolished with aviation managed in the same manner as other occupational specialties.

Fewer aviator field grade and general officers would help control senior officer bloat. Keeping warrant officers in the cockpit as aviation specialists—not officer generalists—would improve the combat efficiency and aviation safety by eliminating the need to rotate the members of each squadron 100 percent every three years.

Revamp the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP)

MSTP was a good idea that was poorly implemented. It was created to replicate the Army Battle Staff Training Program, which was supposed to be the key to victory in Operation Desert Storm. As Gen Bernard F. Trainor and his co-author Michael Gordon revealed in their book, *The Generals' War*, this process-oriented system actually prevented army flexibility; uninhibited by this tripe, the Marine Corps was the real driver in the war, moving far quicker than the ponderous army structure which slavishly adhered to every step of its decision-making process even when steps should have been skipped. Nonetheless, we Marines bought in to this process-oriented myth.

What the Marine Corps needs is a MAGTF Staff Evaluation Program (MSEP) monitoring the warfighting competence of each MEB and MEF twice a year. The current Red Team and general structure of the MSTP should be retained, but the Red Team should be unconstrained. The Marine Corps Staff Planning Process should be a point of departure, not a sacrosanct end in itself. A commander and his staff should feel free to deviate from it if the situation warrants. The ability to fight and win against a thinking adversary should be the metric, not the staff's ability to blindly follow a process.

... the aviation community's undue influence has been a plague to Marine Corps efficiency for years.

If the MAGTF loses the fight in the first exercise of the year, the evaluators should point out where the weaknesses reside so the commander can make personnel and process changes. If the commander cannot make the changes needed to correct the deficiencies in the first exercise and underperforms in the second, the Commandant should have enough ammunition to replace him or her with someone who can. The personnel who man the MSEP should be proven MAGTF staff officers who have actually held the billets that they are evaluating and excelled in them. The MSEP should be a career-enhancing assignment.

Bring Back the Iron Colonels

In today's environment, the cigar chomping, highly experienced Chiefs of Staff and G/J3s of old with years of field experience have ceased to exist. In the brief time an officer has at the O-6 level before going into the selection one for brigadier general, he must have gone to a war college, had a joint tour, and had a command tour. There is literally no time to gain the experience to plan and manage large formations. If an officer doesn't become a brigadier general, he or she is put out to pasture at 30 years; worse still, many talented officers head out the door after their first pass over, seeing a dead end ahead. The Marine Corps would do well to give talented colonels who want to continue to serve and Chiefs of Staff and G/J-3s the option of staying in. The operational genius of the German General Staff system was not, as is commonly thought, in its educational system, but in the fact that the real planners and operational artists at echelons above regiment were free to tell the commander that he was wrong in his thinking and put that advice on record in the event that it should be ignored.

Some colonels have no desire to be general officers; however, some want to continue to serve. The law would have to be changed to allow them to serve for perhaps five years after today's mandatory 30-year ceiling. At some point, a commander at any level needs to hear, "Sir, that is a dumb s—t idea" from someone whose career will not immediately be terminated by the dumb s—t with the idea.

Allowing selected talented staff officers with a proven level of competence to stay beyond 30 years is a good idea for all of the services, not just the Marine Corps. That group should be kept small and elite, perhaps no more than 50 for the Marine Corps. I would go so far as to say that as one officer retires, he should be allowed to nominate his successor. I believe that thinking members of Congress would see the logic in such a course and alter the appropriate legislation accordingly.

The proposals in this article are deliberately designed to be provocative and will be fiercely resisted by the communities most impacted, but some sacred cows sometimes cease to produce milk; when that happens, they become a burden. The Marine Corps cannot afford to carry such dead weight.

USMC

I'm Not a Veteran, but I Know a Few

Does the American public?

by Capt Trevor D. Mills

"I worry that we could wake up one day and that the American people will no longer know us, and we won't know them."

–ADM Mike Mullen, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

>Capt Mills is a signals intelligence/ground electronic warfare officer currently serving as the Executive Officer, Foreign Policy Advisor, United States Southern Command. He deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in 2012.

It's Veteran's Day. A data mining company that sold my browsing history has struck. On cue, I've received an email for 10 percent off an eligible purchase from a chain restaurant. Discounts are great; nothing beats saving a $1.10 on an $11 breakfast, but I'd rather have a 10-minute talk with the person who would have handed me a three-egg omelet with up to four toppings and an obligatory "Thank you for your service" thrown in for good measure. Perhaps in the course of that conversation he would understand that I really shouldn't be getting that "veteran's discount" after all. Come to think of it, could you spare me 10 minutes? Because there's a bit of confusion about this nowadays.

According to U.S. Code, a veteran is a "person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released there from under conditions other than dishonorable."[1] Since I'm still on active duty, the company tracking how many times I hit "refresh" on the DuffelBlog page should have sent me something on Armed Forces Day (the third Saturday in May which honors Americans serving in the five branches of the military). If they really want my business, er, "appreciate my service," at a future date they can send a 50 percent off coupon for a case of scotch to my grave on Memorial Day (the last Monday of May which commemorates the men and women who *died while in military service*, which means I'd have to die before I become a veteran [e.g., still on active duty] to be so honored).

Whatever the definitions and technicalities may be, history gives insight into the spirit and intent of days such as this. We get the word veteran from the Latin "vetus" meaning "old."[2] The Romans called them veterani—those who served in military campaigns whose units, and in many instances themselves, were "blooded"—engaged in combat firsthand, or were at least close enough to have seen it, and taken a measure of experience, knowledge, and stories from it. Even the retired ones were sometimes called back to service if a new army needed to be hastily assembled, for there are few better ways to form the backbone of an otherwise "green" army than by putting in some old hands.

Alas, that empire fell, for many reasons I posit, but perhaps a Norman Rockwell painting holds a clue.

Homecoming Marine[3] depicts a young man of that Service returned from the Pacific theater after World War II. He clutches a captured Japanese flag, and the Silver Star Medal (the third highest military decoration for valor) adorns his chest. He is speaking to those he knew before he left; guys who worked in his auto repair shop and a couple of local boys. He probably told them about the most frightening, thrilling, and life-defining journey of his existence. It was, after all, the deadliest war in human history. But for me, whatever wonder I had in imagining the tales that Marine shared was overshadowed by the most striking part of the painting—how the people surrounding the Marine were so typical of the period and so different than today's Americans: *they knew a veteran*.

About 22 million Americans are veterans,[4] accounting for around 6 percent of the U.S. population.[5] A significant number served in World War II and Vietnam and will sadly be lost at an increasing rate. Although the U.S. has been in active conflict for the past 13 years, only about .5 percent of the population serves actively at a given time, compared to almost 9 percent during World War II.[6] The percentage of veterans, then, will drop significantly—and

Spend time with them, listen to their stories; it's more than a free meal at a local restaurant. *(Photo by LCpl Cory D. Polom.)*

soon. Like Rome, our population will increase over time, with veterans spread thin along the dangerous outskirts of the world, deployed far from home, only to return to a populace that is less connected with them than when they left, has borne none of the monetary burdens, and with the exception of relatives who have lost sons and daughters, paid nothing of the human cost of war.

What will happen when the majority of Americans, who do not even *hear* of the costs of war (except as a short, impersonal news segment between commercials), vote, and put into office our representatives? Will our military members' lives be considered in the ballot box? Will the tolls in blood and treasure expended be worth the patches of earth wrested from the hands of our enemies?

There's a sure way to find out. Ask a vet. They, like many Americans, have stories to tell. Boot camp and battles fought, for certain. But also insights on a life of moving to a new home every few years, traveling the oceans of the world, divorce, true love, addiction, new cars, old scars, and more time spent with people for whom they would die than you can fathom.

It's important that we stay connected to our veterans. *(Photo by Cpl Lucas Vega.)*

Please, don't buy vets lunches out of pity and put yellow magnets on cars because you are too uncomfortable or unsure of what talking to someone who has served with honor to safeguard not their way of life but yours might entail. Don't arbitrarily thank vets for their service when you don't know a single detail about what that service was. If you ask a question that they don't want to answer, don't be afraid, they'll just tell you about something else you didn't know. Take the buy-one-get-one vouchers and shred them. Instead, take ten minutes—*1/6th of an hour*—and talk to a person that has a story to tell you that is more real than anything Buzzfeed conned you into clicking on today.

The worst fate that can befall a man—or any group of people for that matter—is not to be feared or hated, but to be forgotten. Remember the American Veterans—seek them out, find them, talk to them, and most importantly, listen to them. When they raised their hands and took an oath, they wrote a check to you, the American people, "for an amount up to and including their lives."[7] I didn't major in economics, but I think that's a better deal than any coupon is offering this week.

Notes

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2. Definition accessed at http://www.merriam-webster.com.

3. Norman Rockwell, *Homecoming Marine,* 1945, oil on canvas.

4. Department of Veteran's Affairs, Washington, DC, information accessed at http://www.va.gov.

5. U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, information accessed at http://www.census.gov.

6. Pew Research Organization, Washington, DC, information accessed at http://www.pewresearch.org.

7. Unknown.

A Tour at HQMC

Lessons learned

by Col Kevin J. Stewart

>Col Stewart is currently serving as the Commanding Officer, Combat Logistics Regiment 25. He has served as the CO, 1st Maintenance Battalion and deployed to Afghanistan as the CO, Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (Forward).

I served two years within Installations and Logistics (I&L) at HQMC as the Branch Head, Logistics Vision and Strategy and the Logistics Policy and Capabilities sections. It was an eye-opening experience and an incredible opportunity to learn how the Marine Corps works at the highest level. It was also the most difficult billet that I have ever held, but in many respects, the most "impactful" on the key logistics challenges facing the Marine Corps.

I am now the Commanding Officer, Combat Logistics Regiment 25, and I do not miss HQMC at all; however, I am a much better Marine today for having completed that difficult assignment. I purposefully waited almost a year before taking the time to think and write out my lessons learned to frame them in the context of serving in the Operating Forces and looking back.

My first assignment to HQMC was as a colonel select coming out of top-level school, and it was not my first choice of assignment. I had successfully avoided HQMC for my entire career and was hoping to continue that trend. I always found it odd when I ran into the occasional Marine who wanted to be assigned to Headquarters. For me, it was the last place I wanted to serve. Nevertheless, the orders came and I was going. At first, it was a little overwhelming, and the transition was difficult. Just learning how to park and get to the Pentagon was a challenge, but like anything, you quickly settle into a routine. Another learning experience was figuring out how to navigate the halls of the Pentagon and that took time to become comfortable with, if that is even possible. However, these challenges paled in comparison to understanding the way things worked and how to get things done, which was especially difficult as a Branch Head. In retrospect, I wish I had come to HQMC much earlier in my career as a field grade officer to learn the nuances and build the relationships with the professional civilian force that is in place to provide continuity. *My first lesson learned is to not avoid an assignment to Headquarters, but embrace it; you will learn more than you can imagine and I guarantee you will be a better Marine for it.*

Marine Corps Emblem. *(File copy.)*

By our nature, Marines like to get things done and are action oriented; we are focused on results and mission accomplishment. Unfortunately, the very nature of HQMC is the antithesis of this, and progress moves at a snail's pace. It is important to "calibrate" your expectations and recognize the small victories that will eventually lead to success. You will row very hard, likely harder than you ever have before. At times, the work will seem insignificant—the constant writing of information papers, developing briefs, answering congressional requests for information, or responding to senior leader inquiries—but it is all very important and contributes to the mission. *My next lesson learned is that if you do enough small things right, big things will happen.*

The workload never ends and the constant "churn" can be frustrating, but it is about keeping up and staying ahead (or at least not falling behind). Typically, when tasked to write an information paper for a three-star, your personal desire and professional pride is to make it perfect. However, the deadline involved usually does not allow perfection and your best effort will have to suffice within the time allotted. At times, it can be infuriating, but you will quickly adjust and it is important to remember this next lesson as you try your best under the time conditions allotted: *whether you spend ten hours on a task or two hours, the end result will likely be the same.* This can be a difficult proposition to accept, but an important one to acknowledge.

The most difficult thing to deal with is the "organizational bureaucracy" that exists in the fielding/development of new capabilities. We have created a system between HQMC (advocates and proponents), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (requirements), Marine Corps Systems Command (acquisition), and science and technology

(future ideas) that is neither responsive, innovative, nor ready for this new era of fiscal austerity. Within this environment, the most important lesson is the role of the advocate at the three-star level. *To advance an important initiative through this organizational bureaucracy, the role of the advocate is pre-eminent.* Additionally, if you can get two advocates to collaborate, your chances of success are even higher. *Successful advocacy is paramount; it is the engine that will drive progress.*

Almost as complicated as the organizational bureaucracy is the budget process, and this is something in which you must become an expert. In today's fiscally constrained environment, it is even more relevant. Almost everything at HQMC centers on resourcing and the competition for scarce resources among all of the various programs is intense. It is all about money. *If you understand the budget process and how to positively influence, your initiatives are more likely to be successful.*

During my two years at HQMC, I had the privilege to serve with some of the finest civilian professionals and those relationships endure today. Although they do not wear the uniform, the love of the Marine Corps is clearly evident in most and it is more than a job for the good ones. We are blessed to have some good ones who are serving the Corps with pride. As Marines "come and go," these civilian professionals provide the required level of continuity to keep things moving forward when progress is slow. *It is about people and the relationships built will help throughout your career and beyond.*

It is hard to explain, but one of the most important lessons is "perspective" after you leave and return to the Operating Forces. There are a host of challenges faced by Marines today; table of organization and table of equipment structures that are not correct, policy issues that make little sense, or equipment fielding issues. These things all require action at HQMC to solve. *After a tour at HQMC, you will have a better understanding of how to "plug-in" and positively influence.* This will pay dividends for the Marine Corps and help Headquarters focus on solving issues that truly matter.

I avoided a tour at Headquarters for many years, and I do not look forward to returning any time soon, but I now enthusiastically encourage others to go. It will be one of your most challenging assignments but potentially the most impactful on the important issues facing our Corps today. It is an opportunity to generate ideas and be a part of the solution. *Serving at Headquarters Marine Corps will be a rewarding experience and one that will make you a better Marine.*

USMC

10 Lessons of Vietnam

Every Marine should know

by Maj Herbert J. Bowsher, USMCR

As we reflect on the 50th anniversary of the start of the conventional phase of the Vietnam War, it is worth considering the many impacts this conflict has even today on not only civilian policymakers but the military as well. The history of this conflict must be studied by both groups if we as a Nation are to avoid the pitfalls of that war in future conflicts.[1] The fact is, civilian policymakers decided—rightly or wrongly—to intervene militarily. As Marines, we carry out the Nation's policy decisions, and we must be prepared to achieve decisive outcomes in support of national policy across all types of conflict. With this in mind, what could have been done differently from the military perspective to achieve a better outcome in Vietnam? An understanding of the U.S. military's actions and decisions from this era yields key lessons that directly apply to the recent past, present, and future operating environment.

U.S. military leaders, at the outset of the Vietnam War, failed to understand the adversary they were facing and the kind of war in which they were fighting; consequently, they chose to pursue a military strategy that required unacceptably high human costs and did not enable our forces to achieve allied objectives in the region. What follows is a discussion of 10 critical lessons of this conflict which should inform us of not only how a better outcome could have been achieved, but, more importantly, how to improve our operations going forward. The more all ranks understand and apply the lessons of Vietnam, the better prepared the Marine Corps will be to achieve decisive outcomes that advance national policy objectives.

The host nation has to have legitimacy. *(Official USMC photo.)*

Lesson 1: Know Your Enemy

At the beginning of our intervention in force in Southeast Asia, American military leaders did not grasp the rich history of the people of Vietnam nor did they place a priority on learning about the enemy they were facing.[2] The civilian leadership of the Department of Defense saw the conflict as a targeting problem and essentially scoffed at the notion that the North Vietnamese were a formidable adversary. One of the most important lessons of the history of American involvement in Vietnam was the drastic consequence of our failing to understand the will and tenacity of our Communist adversary. We allowed ourselves to be blinded by our advantages in technology and firepower into thinking that the enemy would easily bend to our will. This turned out not to be the case as the North Vietnamese demonstrated their steadfast—if not

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fanatical—commitment to a long-term struggle regardless of the human or material costs of the war.

Lesson 2: Know What Type of Conflict You are Engaging In

The Communists were engaged in total war using any and all means at their disposal. The U.S. intervened without demonstrating an understanding of this reality. American forces were sent to Vietnam to fight a limited war for limited objectives without the benefit of total mobilization of national power. Moreover, the Communists used guerrilla tactics as well as conventional tactics using some unconventional methods.[3] American military leaders decided to pursue a strategy heavily weighted toward conventional warfare within their constraint of fighting a limited war. This decision demonstrated a lack of understanding of the true character of the war.

Lesson 3: Intelligent Operational Design is Essential

In 1965, U.S. military leaders decided to implement a strategy heavily weighted toward attrition and conventional firepower. The decision led to many bad outcomes that could have been anticipated by an intelligent group of focused planners.[4] Instead, the strategy that was implemented placed American units in the lead and marginalized the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in both perception and reality. The decision to pursue an attrition strategy did not rule out any counterinsurgency efforts. The problem was that the conventional operations were not integrated with the counterinsurgency and pacification efforts, with the effect that the large search-and-destroy operations often undercut the gains being made by counterinsurgent forces in the hamlets.[5]

Lesson 4: Never Choose to Fight from a Position of Weakness

U.S. military leaders acquiesced to the constraints imposed upon them by policy makers in Washington. They designed a strategy centered on a passive defense within the borders of South Vietnam that yielded the initiative to the enemy.[6] Senior military planners effectively placed American conventional forces in a weak position that forced them to react constantly to the enemy, who was fighting without the constraints placed on American units.

Lesson 5: Align Military Strategy with the National Strategic End State

The U.S. military leadership in the early- to mid-1960s had the benefit of a clearly stated national objective in Southeast Asia. The American end state in that theater was an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam. Military strategy within that theater, however, suffered from a distinct lack of unity of purpose. There always seemed to be conflict between the "other war" of pacification and conventional search-and-destroy operations. Within the civic action programs that made an attempt at counterinsurgency and pacification, there was a lack of unity of effort. The overall civic action effort was characterized by disorganization, poor management, and lack of performance metrics.[7] All of these deficiencies pointed to problems in implementing a coherent, feasible, acceptable, and sufficient strategy to guide the efforts of military forces in theater.

Lesson 6: Understand the Strategic Center of Gravity[8]

American military leadership in Vietnam did not seem to comprehend the importance of public opinion in that particular conflict. As the casualty numbers rose, it became steadily apparent that every soldier or Marine killed in action came at a cost in American support for the war. The Tet Offensive illustrated that the support of the American public was the strategic center of gravity. The overall impression that this offensive created was that U.S. forces were fighting from a position of weakness. The perception of allied forces as being on the defensive and the large number of casualties despite the military defeat of the enemy led to the American people's loss of confidence in the military strategy in Vietnam. Had military leaders understood the strategic center of gravity of this conflict prior to committing large numbers of U.S. forces in 1965, they would have turned against a strategy of attrition with conventional American units in the lead. Any intelligent planner should have anticipated that such a strategy would be accompanied by unacceptably large human losses, particularly if that planner had the advantage of an understanding of the enemy's will. The strategic center of gravity turned out to be the support of the American public, a fact that the enemy understood and used to their advantage.[9] Once the American public turned against the war as a result of the appalling number of American casualties, the U.S. military had run out of time to pursue a better strategy.[10] At that point, the Communists had essentially sealed their victory.[11]

Lesson 7: Host-Nation Government Legitimacy Is Paramount in Foreign Internal Defense

The U.S. military implemented a strategy in 1965 that effectively marginalized the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The RVNAF represented the legitimacy of the host-nation government, yet U.S. military leadership appeared not to comprehend the vital necessity of training and legitimizing this organization until it was too late. The most important military job for the U.S. should have been "to develop South Vietnamese armed forces that could successfully pacify and defend their own country."[12] Until the U.S. changed course in 1969 and implemented Vietnamization, the RVNAF was allowed to languish as the U.S. military stiff-armed their hosts. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara acknowledged—albeit far too late—that "external military force cannot substitute for the political order and stability that must be forged by a people for themselves."[13]

Lesson 8: Execute Unity of Effort across the Interagency Process

An enduring impression from a study of America's involvement in Vietnam, particularly from 1965–1967, is that there seemed to be no one in charge of the allied effort in Southeast Asia. Given the nature of the conflict, the logical choice for this role would have been the U.S. Ambassador. The reality was a tragic lack of unity of effort across the many government agencies

that were supposed to be working toward one goal—that of an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. Many agencies had an interest in the well-being of the South Vietnamese villager, from government agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and ARVN to private organizations such as CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc.).[14] However, the entire effort lacked coordination and appropriate measures of effectiveness. With the early decision having been made to focus on firepower and conventional search-and-destroy operations, Allied military leaders in Vietnam did not give this effort the priority that it required in terms of resources and oversight. In his memoirs, former Secretary of Defense McNamara stated, again many years too late, that this lack of unity of effort was a major cause of the debacle in Vietnam.[15]

Lesson 9: Understand the Difference between Partisan Guerrillas and Insurgent Guerillas

The insurgency in South Vietnam was being fed by two distinct sources: externally, the government of North Vietnam was actively supporting the Viet Cong; internally, lack of adequate governance bred resentment.[16] Conditions in the south had deteriorated so badly—in part due to the U.S. search-and-destroy strategy and its secondary effects—that internal insurgents were being created as a result of the chaos. The U.S. Army focused on the externally supported insurgents (partisan guerrillas) but did not adequately deal with the conditions that fostered the growth of internal insurgents (insurgent guerrillas). As former CAP (Combined Action Program) Marine and author Michael Peterson noted, the response to the insurgent guerrilla threat is more complicated, involving socioeconomic and political dimensions. Peterson points out that any plan to counter the insurgent guerrillas must deal with the root causes of the insurgency.[17] One significant result of overlooking the distinction between the two types of guerrillas was the proliferation of refugees (between 4 and 5 million people became refugees during the war) which obviously worsened the resentment among villagers in South Vietnam.[18] The refugees, uprooted from their homes, became a ready source of recruitment for the Viet Cong.

Aerial view of a typical Vietnamese hamlet, arguably the center of gravity. *(Official USMC photo.)*

Lesson 10: Air Power Alone Cannot Achieve a Decision on the Battlefield

Several air campaigns conducted throughout the conflict demonstrated the futility of relying solely on air power to achieve military objectives. The problem with these air campaigns was that they were relatively easy to defend and they led to large numbers of lost aircraft. Thus, they did not achieve their objective to bomb the enemy into submission while minimizing U.S. casualties. In addition, the air campaigns created hundreds of U.S. prisoners of war, which were not only a humanitarian disaster and embarrassment for the military but also a valuable bargaining chip for the enemy. When air power was successful, it was more often in the context of close air support to ground forces such as the battle of An Loc in 1972. At An Loc, air power was a supporting arm that made a huge difference in the success of the ARVN; however, it was the ground forces that stood and fought that proved decisive.[19]

An enduring theme throughout all the lessons to be drawn from this conflict—particularly for a field grade officer or SNCO—is the importance of operational design in campaign planning. The military failures in Vietnam demonstrate the importance of key military planning activities such as a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield and center of gravity analysis. The decision by senior military leaders in 1965 to pursue a military strategy heavily weighted toward attrition at the expense of training the host-nation armed forces—such as a search-and-destroy approach instead of a clear-and-hold approach—betrayed a tragic lack of contextual understanding and critical thinking. Finally, the conflict is a stark reminder that in war the responsibilities of commanders and staffs are grave because "the resources they will expend are human lives."[20]

>Author's Note: The author would like to thank Dr. James H. Willbanks and Col Jay E. Johnson at the U.S. Army CGSC for their contributions to the development of this article. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

Notes

1. While this discussion will focus on lessons for the military professional, the reasons for

the American defeat in Vietnam must be understood in the context of decisions made not only by civilian leaders in Washington but also the indigenous leadership in Hanoi and Saigon. An outstanding book on this topic is *Hanoi's War* by Lien-Hang Nguyen.

2. GEN Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, *The 25-Year War*, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 175.

3. Ibid., 176.

4. Ibid., 180.

5. Michael E. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons*, (New York: Praeger, 1989), 37. Battalion commanders "were not in Vietnam to win the hearts and minds of the people … they didn't understand the nature of the war they were involved in."

6. Palmer, 178.

7. Peterson, 100.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 596: "the center of gravity … in popular uprisings is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion."

9. Palmer, 180.

10. Public Broadcasting System, "Vietnam: A Television History: The Homefront," (Boston: WGBH, 1983). "By late 1967, polls showed a majority of Americans opposed the war."

11. Michael Lind, *Vietnam, The Necessary War*, (New York: Touchstone, 2002), 261.

12. Palmer, 179.

13. Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect*, (New York: Times Books, 1995), 333.

14. Peterson, 102.

15. McNamara, "A major cause of the debacle there lay in our failure to establish an organization of top civilian and military officials capable of directing the task," 332.

16. North Vietnam was also supporting the Communist insurgency in the South by providing conventional military forces, hence the requirement for U.S. and RVNAF forces to counter both a conventional and unconventional threat.

17. Peterson, 18.

18. George Donelson Moss, *Vietnam: An American Ordeal*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), 180.

19. James H. Willbanks, *The Battle of An Loc*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).

20. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1997).

Preparing for Future Conflict

Drawing the sword: the sine wave dilemma

by Capt Travis L. Hord

From the earliest times of armed conflict, the scabbard was created to protect and keep the sword's edge honed for battle. Over the ages, technology advanced and materials evolved from leather wraps to copper and finally steel. In time, the interior was lined with felt and coated with oil to preserve the blade from rust and changes in clime and place. The sword of the Corps is never fully sheathed. As a forward deployed force-in-readiness, poised as the Nation's elite crisis team, we require—and the Nation demands, that the next time the Marine Corps sword is fully drawn, it will deliver the decisive, shocking blow.

In order to truly meet the demands on our Service, we must reconcile the idea that every battalion, even within the same regiment, should be allowed to be distinguishable. The planning guidance of the 36th Commandant, Gen Joseph F. Dunford, stated, "we must rebalance in some areas to address personnel, equipment, and training shortfalls … to respond rapidly to contingencies," in order to meet the increasing demands the MAGTF offers to combatant commanders during an interwar period. This guidance requires an adherence to the concept that a MAGTF's expeditionary nature is not merely a capability but remains a mindset to fully achieve the versatility, flexibility, scalability, and combined arms capability inherent in the composition of a fighting institution. It is during the interwar period that the institution must correctly shape the Marine Corps scabbard of composition and organization, so that the fighting instrument is most ready across the full range of military operations in the next major call-to-arms.

LtCol E.H. "Pete" Ellis, hailed as a visionary and the creator of the template used to achieve amphibious victory in the Pacific during World War II, predicted conflict within a postwar period. This was not an attempt to posture the Corps to receive procurement funding, validate the existence of the Service, or meet a trend line of current societal pressures. Rather, he was providing a singular focus on the most prevalent enemy to counter and defeat them.

>Capt Hord is an infantry officer currently serving as the Operations Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. He has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 15th MEU, and the 31st MEU. Capt Hord has served as an Assistant Operations Officer, Weapons Company Commander, and Headquarters and Support Company Commander within 3d Bn, 5th Marines.

How effective will we be operating in a dispersed and distributed environment? *(Photo by Sgt John Robbart, III.)*

"Who knows only his generation remains always a child."

–Cicero, 46 BCE

Today, the Marine Corps has a robust capability to prosecute action in the world's troubled regions and adequately shape the force for the next major conflict. Ongoing are multiple study initiatives designed to meet the needs of the Nation in its next conflict. Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), HQMC, is sponsoring "Ground Warrior 15," which is a Service-level, large-scale wargame focused on the GCE in a major combat operation under the *Expeditionary Force 21* (*EF 21* [HQMC, Washington, DC: March 2014]) construct. The primary objective of the war game is to determine capability requirements of a composited division-sized GCE in Phases II and III of major combat operations in an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) environment. The subordinate objectives include examining capabilities across the warfighting functions including a dispersed and distributed environment; a lack of GCE-level headquarters in composited GCE operations; the operational capabilities of a regimental landing team in a complex, hostile urban littoral environment; and the role of the GCE in setting the conditions for Joint operational access in an A2/AD environment. This study will give commanders the parameters needed to shape their forces while operating as a part of a large-scale amphibious operation.

Another major study being conducted by the Operations Analysis Division (OAD) within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is the "Organization and Composition of the GCE Study." This study is expanding the methodology of the "Composition and Structure of the Marine Infantry Battalion," conducted in 2014, in which the evaluation was limited to one infantry battalion that would be mirrored across the force. The expanded analysis is seeking to produce a capability to examine a mix of infantry battalion structures in the GCE. This initiative will capture implications of rebalancing the force with smaller GCE task organizations for an *EF 21* environment and identify risks that surface when there is a need to composite for larger scale operations.

Studies of the basic fighting unit signals the force is in a position to validate or to reorganize the manner in which it fights. There is a necessary task toward restructuring the basic infantry structure. Leaders at all levels must rapidly assess our Nation's strongest opponents and consider our force structure in battalions to meet the requirements of the most pressing operational war plans. We must do this while remaining a relevant option for lower intensity conflicts against non-state actors. Our greatest failing in this endeavor would be restructuring our force with little to no focus on the most prevalent enemies, and to disregard the lessons of a decade at war.

The capabilities of a regimental landing team conducting a landing in a hostile, antiaccess/area denial environment will be examined. *(Photo by Cpl Michael S. Lockett.)*

Consider a mathematical parallel in which the amplitude of a sine wave represents the total force expenditures of assets used to achieve combat readiness.[1] At this moment, the Marine Corps is descending into the trough between major conflicts. We inevitably ascend when major conflict arises again. History has demonstrated that the frequency of the wave is 15 years on average, with numerous small wars and limited actions conducted between the crests of major conflict and the troughs of the interwar periods. The Marine Corps must be prepared to fight at any point along this paradigm including high- and low-intensity conflicts. The institution can achieve the adage of "training the way we fight" and decrease the amplitude of force expenditure if current study efforts determine the correct composition of the GCE and the infantry battalions. If the studies assessments and subsequent reorganizations are wrong, we will have set the conditions for failure, like when Specialist Thomas Wilson, USA, in 2004 asked the Secretary of Defense about "having resources [armored HMMWVs] available" to counter theater-improvised explosive devices while already deployed to an active area of combat.[2] We must set the conditions to draw the sword with determined precision in the future.

At the company level, it has been difficult to maintain superior levels of pure offensive and defensive capability while ensuring adequate proficiency on tasks associated with low-intensity operations. The core mission of "locate, close with, and destroy" has not changed. However, locating, closing, and destroying have taken on new meaning and are far more complex tasks in 2015 than they were in previous large-scale engagements. From necessity and having the ability to adapt, small unit leaders have expanded their understanding of each of these three tasks beyond a pure kinetic solution and have adapted to train within that framework. This necessity came from operating in combat environments in which winning was defined not by killing adversaries en masse or destroying enemy materiel. Victory was achieved through understanding complex human networks, methodically eliminating insurgent threats, and ultimately enabling civil authority to establish legitimate governance. This fact is not to demonstrate that the Corps is any less lethal or unable to conduct high intensity operations. It instead validates that our doctrine is sound enough to

allow the flexibility to accomplish the mission whatever the circumstance may be.

If the composition of the infantry battalion was not altered mid-campaign to one of a highly mobile force with abilities to conduct distributed operations in the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan, we would have failed. Examples of adaptation to warfighting techniques included the use of sensitive optics, designed to deliver antitank missiles, used as perfect platforms to discern enemy combatants from non-hostile civilians at a distance. The missile system, designed originally to kill the T-72, acquired exact grid locations used to deliver precision low-yield indirect and air delivered fires. The use of embedded law enforcement professionals also greatly enhanced the ability of infantry battalions to achieve success while operating in a complex rule of law system to convict known insurgents. These variations of gear and external subject matter experts are a small sampling of what allowed our forces to achieve such high levels of success on the battlefield. It can be argued that the leaders of our Corps from previous generations did not have to cope simultaneously with the complex high and low intensities of the world we are witness to today.

Preparing to fight an enemy with a known doctrinal template and a national flag provides a quantified goal for strategists and budget analysts to target resources and training. In turn, this allows commanders to provide a definable mission statement. Current evidence shows well-trained and well-funded asymmetric threats are more prevalent[3] now than any near-peer state actor we may face. We cannot ignore, however, the need for the Nation's pivot to the Pacific. The strategic importance of this focus may outweigh any other embroiled region despite the urge to fight for the ground upon which we have already shed blood. This should impact the planning horizon of the Marine Corps over the next 10 years; we must manage the dilemma of training expenditure versus where to focus in order to flatten the wave before the next conflict.

One answer is to organize, train, and equip an infantry battalion to high-intensity conflicts. This will fulfill our obligation to our major operational commitments. Then we must maintain and educate the force to achieve victory during low-intensity conflicts. The causal effect of conducting a decade-long counterinsurgency mission is a necessary key to achieving both ends of this aim. The Marines, both officer and enlisted, who mastered the techniques of complex targeting and understanding human terrain at the company level, will be the battalion- and regimental-level leaders in the next conflict. These men and women, tested in battle against asymmetric enemies, will be the connecting file of experience and education from high- to low-intensity conflict to the new generations of Marines who did not experience operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The firsthand knowledge and experience is, of course, perishable. In two generations of Marines, the low-intensity expertise will become a distant memory if we do not embrace the lessons we learned and continue to educate the force on the successes we have achieved. We must also ensure new leaders understand all aspects of high-intensity conflict. A well-trained and adaptable force masters all ends of the spectrum.

The human aspect of overcoming challenges and adapting to win has always been the hallmark of the Marine Corps. Equipping and organizing the force may be argued to be the more complex component. An assumption that each battalion will look identical may suit a baseline for force modeling and generation tools; however, when we consider the table of organization compared to capability, we must understand that each of the varied missions, from high-intensity to small wars, will call for diverse manning and gear sets. Further, the Marine Corps can experience no uncompensated growth. We must know well that any reorganization to increase capability in one functional area will come as a decrease in another. This zero-sum constraint has the potential to create dismay, as commanders will not willingly accept the loss of current assets or manpower in order to gain a capability that is not congruent with their mission requirements. Any proposed reorganization must meet the reality of the operational requirements the unit is currently tasked to accomplish while maintaining the flexibility to composite as a part of a larger fighting force.

During this interwar period, we must also remember that a proposal to change is not new. The Marine Corps has periodically conducted a multitude of force structure studies that have exhausted every possible aspect of remaining a decisive force for the Nation. In 1957, the 1st MarDiv heralded the reorganization of the infantry battalion that included a fourth rifle company and the inclusion of the 106mm recoilless rifle, as an organic means to counter enemy armored threats.[4] It is clear now why this change was made; it came on the heels of Korea, in which our forces had little to no ability to destroy tanks and defend against rear area infiltrators after massive frontal assaults.[5] Further, in the opening of the atomic age, infantry battalions sought the need to operate with relatively greater dispersion and fight from the quadrangle formation rather than the tighter triangle formation leaders were used to.[6] This "improvement" was simply stated as "an old idea in new garb" and "an outfit which in combat will cut the mustard."[7]

Several decades later, in 1983, MajGen H.G. Glasgow, then Director of Operations at Headquarters Marine Corps, ushered in the construct of what most Marines today consider to be "the way it's always been." In that year, infantry battalions decreased in size by ten percent, while gaining 25 percent more firepower.[8] The structure of the battalion became three rifle companies with a weapons and headquarters and support companies. This increase in firepower came by the way of the improved M16 with a three-round burst option and heavier barrel; the procurement of the M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), which, as MajGen Glasgow said, " … was without doubt the finest weapon we have added,"[9] the M224 60mm mortar; and the Mk-19. Increase in mobility was gained by the new HMMWV; the establishment of light armored infantry battalions (now light armored reconnaissance); and the cutting edge concept of the LCAC as a ship-to-shore connector. The rationale for these changes was "to

counter a changing enemy threat," and was viewed as "not revolutionary but evolutionary."[10] At the dawn of the 21st century, a thorough assessment of the historical development of the squad-sized element[11] correctly foretold the "chaotic and rapidly changing small unit combat environments" that we have seen in the recent decade. The metrics of firepower, resiliency, maneuverability, and mobility were discussed in depth throughout conflicts, from the 1940s to present day. Those metrics and the historical approach the study utilized to compare and contrast the 9- to 13-man squad are the same methods that should be applied to changing the composition of an infantry battalion or the GCE. As an adaptable and innovative fighting force, we must answer a discussion advocating change. Especially when directed by a focus from emergent enemy threats. These are necessary evolutions to warfare, not events to dismiss as mere trend.

Current studies focusing on the composition and structure of the Marine infantry battalion and GCE as a whole are a welcome look at a set of topics that are historically conducted during most significant interwar periods. While addressing metrics that could be used to change the composition of an infantry battalion, there still must be a means to flatten the drastic slope of the sine wave of investments the institution has experienced between conflicts of the recent era. Continued study efforts must focus on how the institution can leverage warfighting advances, assets, technology, and methods we have gained over the last decade, but cannot dismiss the reality of large-scale operational and strategic commitments. The next step of any further project needs to explore and expand upon the dynamics of a fighting unit tasked to engage in all levels of conflict within compressed planning horizons, when rendering simulation, war gaming, and combat modeling. The institution must seek to flatten the sine wave of expenditure and reshape our force with focus on the nearest enemy and the ability to adapt to ever-changing missions. The Marine Corps' sword has always been the most ready when the Nation it serves calls for it to be drawn. In this interwar period, the Marine Corps must also ensure both sword and scabbard accept change in order to meet that call.

A mix of infantry battalion structures is going to be examined. *(Photo by Cpl Kevin Crist.)*

Notes

1. GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, USA(Ret), adapted from "Remembering a Sine Wave," Association of the United States Army, (Washington, DC: August 2013).

2. Eric Schmidt, "Troops' Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive," *The New York Times*, (New York, NY: 9 December 2004).

3. Michael Pino, "Dealing With Today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security," CACI International, Inc., (Washington, DC: 2008).

4. LtCol William Wood, "Capabilities of the New Marine Infantry Battalion," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: May 1958), 22.

5. T.R. Ferenbach, *This Kind of War*, (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 68.

6. Wood.

7. Ibid.

8. Sgt Eric Carlson, "The Infantry Battalion," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: January 1983), 46.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ahmed Hashim and LtGen P.K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret), "Development of the Squad: Historical Analysis," Center for Naval Analyses, (Alexandria, VA: October 2000).

"Fatuous self-complacency or vanity, or short sightedness in refusing to prepare for danger, is both foolish and wicked in such a Nation as ours; and past experience has shown that such fatuity in refusing to recognize or prepare for crisis in advance is usually succeeded by a mad panic.

–President Theodore Roosevelt, 1922

Words Have Meaning

Understanding what we say and write

by Col Alex Vohr, USMC(Ret)

Maneuver: (DOD) 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy.

–Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) held a period of instruction entitled "Terminology" as part of the Warfighting Seminar portion MEF exercises. The purpose was to impress upon the training audience the importance of using the correct terminology in planning and the development of orders. The incorrect use of technology at best increases friction and at its worst can result in battlefield disaster.

Dr. Bradley Meyer, one of the founders and curriculum architects of the School of Advanced Warfighting stood, one overcast windy and cold day in January, on the remnants of Verdun, a World War I battlefield in France. The discussion focused on "defense in depth," a topic for which Dr. Meyer is arguably the foremost expert on in the United States. The students, all majors in a second year of professional education, were working to get their minds around the intractable tactical challenges faced by the World War I combatants in breaking the stalemate of the Western Front.

At one point, one of the students suggested the solution could have been found through the application of the Marine Corps doctrine of "maneuver warfare." Dr. Meyer, an eminently thoughtful man, noted that maneuver alone would not be the solution to the tactical challenge so pervasive that it dominated and paralyzed operations and strategy for the Great War. On the battlefields of World War I, with the front lines stretched from Switzerland to the sea, there was no space for any of the armies to maneuver to gain advantage. The defense in depth Dr. Meyer has suggested, was the centerpiece tactical challenge in 20th century warfare requiring doctrinal paradigm shifts to overcome.

Dr. Meyer's broad and simplistic interpretation of the doctrine of maneuver warfare was literal and focused on the term "maneuver." The word suggests a doctrine advocating the use of maneuver to gain advantage over the adversary. On the battlefields of World War I, the challenge that favored the defender and precluded freedom of maneuver was an interdependency between the symmetry of the armies in the field and the lack of operational mobility. In 1918, the German Army, through concentration of the best troops and the employment of the new "Stormtroop" tactics, overcame the challenge of symmetrical forces. The Germans were not, however, able to overcome the problem of operational mobility. It would take them until 1940 to solve that problem.

The exchange with Dr. Meyer raises questions. The Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare has survived largely intact since it first was codified in the late 1980s into what has become *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting* (HQMC, Washington, DC: 1997). The doctrine was significantly based on the work of Air Force

Just as weapons are re-examined, our doctrine needs to be re-examined constantly. *(Photo by Sgt Joseph Scanlon.)*

>Col Vohr retired in 2013 while serving as the J-4 (Logistics), U.S. Southern Command. Prior to that, he served as the Director, School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico.

Col John Boyd, a modern day war theorist most famous for his observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop. Boyd's OODA loop encapsulated in a single diagram a complex theory for fighting and winning. The distilled doctrine of maneuver warfare leverages a theory for winning at war, perhaps from a position of disadvantage, in a complex, chaotic, and dangerous battlespace. Both Dr. Meyer and the students were correct in their staff ride discussion. Maneuver warfare, a doctrine advocating paradigm changing approaches may have offered a solution to the challenge of the World War I battlespace, but that solution was not to be found in maneuver alone.

The OODA loop alone has a richness and depth far beyond the basic understanding held by most Marines, limited vaguely to the idea of cycling rapidly through the loop to operate at a higher tempo than that which can be achieved by your enemy. To offer a simple analogy for the broader reach of the doctrine, it is about how to look at problems that confound the best minds, such as the problem facing the generals of World War I, and to find a mismatch or an asymmetric seam that can be exploited to win. Maneuver may be part of the solution, but the solution is not limited to maneuver. Like an Ultimate Fighting Championship fighter who gamely maneuvers his way around the octagon only to be viciously submitted when his opponent drags him to the ground and pounds the maneuverer to a pulp, we understand maneuver alone has its limitations.

Asymmetry and attrition are popular words in the defense lexicon. How common is it to hear the sage assertion from a 24-hour news cycle talking head that we don't want to get involved or tied down in a war of attrition? Is this really true? Because of overwhelming advantages in all warfighting functions at the tactical level, attrition is the approach American forces most often employ with great success. Perhaps given the right circumstances, it can be the most effective approach to warfighting, especially when one considers the attrition ratios in current engagements are well over 100 to 1 in favor of U.S. forces.

Although they are versed in it, the Marine Corps should consider renaming maneuver warfare doctrine. *(Photo by Sgt Joseph Scanlon.)*

Attrition in these cases is our asymmetric advantage. The bottom line is that if attrition works to bend the will of the enemy, then by all means use it. What those who decry attrition warfare most likely intend on conveying is that we should avoid wars of symmetry. Battles between symmetrical forces generally incur somewhat balanced casualty rates as armies grind away at each other without decisive result. This was certainly the case in World War I, but is not necessarily so for all scenarios. Specific words have specific meaning.

... using the right words is critical. Marines need to say what they mean and mean what they say.

The term "asymmetry" is most often attributed to our enemies. In the conflicts that have spanned the last decade, the enemy is often described as being a force that is asymmetric to our capabilities. The underlying unspoken assumption in these assertions is that U.S. forces are designed and best suited for conventional fights. The implication is that the asymmetry of insurgency brings challenges U.S. forces find difficulty in confronting. I'd suggest that looking at this challenge through the lens of Marine Corps warfighting doctrine would assess any asymmetric battlefield as one with great opportunity to find and exploit mismatches to our advantage. Some of these advantages may be found through maneuver, but again, maneuver alone is not the extent of the opportunity. Other advantages could be found and exploited through deception, through fires, or even through nonlethal methods such as diplomacy or economics.

The point of this article is that words carry specific meanings and as MSTP would assert, using the right words is critical. Marines need to say what they mean and mean what they say. With this in mind, I'd offer the following recommendations:

- Consider renaming the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine of maneuver warfare. As one option, the title "asymmetric warfare" more completely describes the intent behind the approach while reducing the friction caused through the limitations and imprecise use of the word maneuver. In today's sound bite world, the term maneuver has become somewhat of

a "bumper sticker" for the doctrine. If a bumper sticker impression is all some take away in their depth of understanding, that bumper sticker should be as accurate and complete as possible.

• Reinvigorate efforts to examine, reflect upon, and study Marine Corps doctrine throughout the careers of Marines. Too often doctrine is taught only at the entry level and is not effectively revisited as Marines—especially officers—progress. An understanding of our doctrine should serve as the backdrop and foundation for all training and education. As Marines gain practical experience, new perspectives on our doctrine emerge when it is the doctrine that is periodically re-examined. Most critically our doctrine, descriptive more than prescriptive, provides context for how to think about warfighting.

• Theory is analogous to hypothesis and doctrine is simply theory that has survived limited testing. Gen James N. Mattis has been attributed as saying, "doctrine is the last bastion of the unimaginative." This is true to the extent that we as Marines can't allow our doctrine to mature into unquestioned dogma. The theory behind our doctrine needs to be constantly re-examined through the lens of change in the warfighting environment outside the Marine Corps. In short, we can't drink our own bathwater. If the theory and doctrine no longer meet the requirements of an evolutionary and sometimes revolutionary world, it should be discarded and replaced; better to rigorously pursue this effort during times of peace than to find ourselves with doctrine that does not meet the requirements of the day as did our predecessors during World War I.

... Marines can't allow our doctrine to mature into unquestioned dogma.

• Consider adding Colonel Chet Richards' (USAF [Ret]) book, *Certain to Win*, (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2004), and Frans P.B. Osinga's book, *Science, Strategy and War; The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2006), to the Commandant's reading list at the grade of major or lieutenant colonel or in the "Roots of Maneuver Warfare" section. These books provide color and insight into the work and into the man of Col Boyd. They bring a deeper perspective to the source of much and the Marine Corps' excellent doctrine.

USMC

Professional Note

Corporal Richard S. Singer, Esquire

Base Plate McGurk Expounds . . .

Dusty was distracted from the conversation by a buzz in his pocket as he fished out his cell phone.

"Hey man, I thought we were in a tech-free zone while we were shooting the breeze," drawled Tex, obviously irritated.

Dusty chuckled and looked up, "Yeah, sorry … got a 'tweet' from one of my former Marines."

"A 'tweet?' You?" Tex blinked in disbelief.

"Yeah man, relax. I don't tweet. I just get 'em."

I started to laugh out loud. "So how does a tweet make you chuckle? I 'gots' to know."

"Well, it's from this corporal who was tweeting that he had just won his 10th case."

"Case of what? Grenades or beer?" I asked.

"Court case, knucklehead. He's a no-kidding lawyer in Philly."

Tex weighed in, "So you know a corporal who is also a lawyer?"

"Naw, Corporal Singer *was* in my platoon. Sharp kid. Had come off a couple of deployments and was finishing up with me until he EAS'd. This was the kind of guy you could fire and forget. Give him a complex task, and he would get it done and make it look easy. Marines liked him. He had a way with people, you know the type. Had a funny South Philly accent, a cocky smile, and a great attitude—Gunny material."

Tex and I guffawed.

"Seriously. I tried like blue blazes to get him to reenlist. I pointed out how he was a natural leader and would see a quick path to promotion. I worked with the 'Career Jammer' to find some good deals to sweeten the pot—lateral move options, told him embassy duty stories, and really laid it on him."

> ***Mom and dad were not paying for him to party, so he headed to a recruiter and signed up.***

"Sounds like you really liked this guy," I said.

"I did, Base Plate. I did. I saw a lot of me in him, and I really wanted him to see success."

"So what was his hang up?" asked Tex.

"He told me he had a plan. After he graduated from high school, he went to college and flunked out during the first semester. Mom and dad were not paying for him to party, so he headed to a recruiter and signed up. But it wasn't a desperation move. He looked at his enlistment as an opportunity to get focused and disciplined."

"The GI Bill didn't hurt either," quipped Tex.

"Yeah, but it wasn't the reason he joined. At the end of boot camp, he decided he was going to go to law school and become a trial lawyer. So you can imagine my response to him when he tells me all of this."

We nodded and smiled, thinking about Dusty's colorful vocabulary and straight talk.

"So, I am looking at Singer and I tell the guy, 'You know that you don't get out of the Marine Corps and suddenly you are a lawyer, right?' He says yes and that he has a plan, so I tell him that I want to hear it. Keep in mind I have set up a classic L-shaped ambush, and I am going to get this guy to reenlist by COB [close of business]."

"L-shaped?" I ask, "240 on the tripod locked down along the long access of the kill zone?"

"You know it! I've got him dead to rights.

"And then he lays it on me."

Tex and I inclined to Dusty, expecting to hear a whopper of an excuse; the real reason why Singer wouldn't reenlist.

"His plan was perfect."

"What? Asleep on the 240!!??"

"Seriously. He had a great plan. He told me that his time in the Corps had taught him discipline, planning, determination, and maturity that he lacked coming out of high school. He had already applied to Villanova University and had been accepted. He showed me the acceptance letters. His intention was to study pre-law with a minor in American history. He had applied for and received a Pell grant as well as several scholarships. During his enlistment, he had managed to sock away half—HALF!—of every paycheck in addition to the GI Bill. Once he had completed four years of college, he had his sights set on Villanova's law school and to take the bar exam there."

"I've taken a few 'bar exams,'" said Tex. Dusty stopped talking and just looked at him. "Sorry."

Dusty continued, "I couldn't argue with him. He had a plan, the resources, and had begun to execute the plan. Nothing I said or promised him could convince him to stay in. I wished him luck and told him to stay in touch if he ever needed anything. Four years ago, he sent me a graduation announcement! I called to congratulate him and got him hooked up with our old company commander to write him a letter of recommendation for Villanova law school.

... but I was more impressed with the fact that you have a Twitter account.

"So now, Corporal Richard S. Singer, Esquire, attorney at law, is with a firm in Philly and starting to rack up a few in the win column."

"Wow," I said, with a huge grin.

"Pretty cool story, huh?" answered Dusty.

"Uh yeah … but I was more impressed with the fact that you have a Twitter account."

To be continued …

Service Term Limits and MARSOC

Ten is not the magic number

by SSgt Jasen A. Strong

>SSgt Strong, a Critical Skills Operator (CSO/0372) and native of Suffolk, VA, joined Marine Special Operations Team (MSOT) 8214, Marine Special Operations Company–Fox, 2d Marine Raider Battalion on August 2011. His two previous assignments were as Alpha Element Leader for MSOT 8323 assigned to the Northern Command, area of operations (AO), and as Bravo Element Leader for MSOT 8415 assigned to the Southern Command, AO.

The Marine Corps implemented the Enlisted Career Force Control (ECFC) program "to better manage the career force," with the goal of actively shaping the inventory of Marines by grade and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to the requirements of the Marine Corps as a service component. Additionally, the ECFC was an attempt to stabilize retention in order to standardize promotion tempo across all MOSs without regard to the specific needs or any in particular. The following are the Marine Corps' published time in service (TIS) promotion targets:

- Sergeant (Sgt/E5): 4 years
- Staff Sergeant (SSgt/E6): 8.5 years
- Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt/E7): 13 years

The end state of the ECFC program is to balance the inventory of Marines by grade and MOS to meet proposed career force requirements. MARADMIN 548/12 (MCBUL 5314 Enlisted Career Force Controls Program), signed on 2 October 2012, changed the service limitations for sergeant from 13 years TIS to 10 years TIS "in order to ensure that competitive Marines are afforded a timely opportunity to screen for promotion" by imposing more restrictive limits on sergeants. The annual staff sergeant promotion board is the basis for this ECFC control; upon the release of the results of the staff sergeant promotion board, all in-zone and above-zone sergeants are classified as either "selected for promotion" or "not selected for promotion" (also referred to being "passed over"). Those sergeants selected for promotion continue on their designated career path.

Passed Over

Sergeants not selected for promotion twice (or more) are automatically processed for separation at either their existing End of Active Service (EAS) date, or at a date 7 months after the release of the promotion board results, whichever is later. Sergeants not selected for promotion once will then be screened by their total TIS. Sergeants with one pass for promotion and less than 10 years of service are extended until 7 months following the next annual promotion board to allow an additional promotion opportunity.

Service limits are having a negative effect on MARSOC. *(Official USMC photo.)*

Sergeants with only one pass for promotion who have more than 10 years of service are processed for separation at their EAS (or at a date 7 months after the release of the promotion board results, whichever date is later). Sergeants—even those without a punitive reduction at any point in their career—are only required to have one opportunity for promotion to staff sergeant. For example, a sergeant without a punitive reduction in grade who attains 10 years of service without coming into the in-zone population for his MOS can only be extended until he has had the opportunity for the staff sergeant promotion board to consider him for promotion in an "in-zone" status once.

Service Limits

Service limits require that Marines who have reached a certain year of service in their current grade without being selected for promotion are separated from the active component at their EAS. In the Fleet Marine Force, enforcement of service limits improves promotion opportunity for Marines in junior grades. However, specific to MARSOC, the most junior grade allowable to be a Critical Skills Operator (CSO, the backbone of MARSOC) is sergeant; thereby, there are no grades junior to sergeant in need of improved promotion opportunities. Marine Corps new service limits are as follows:

- Corporal (Cpl/E4): 8 years
- Sergeant (Sgt/E5): 10 years
- Staff Sergeant (SSgt/E6): 20 years

One look at these service limits and the disparity can be found—the promotion target for a sergeant to promote to staff sergeant is 8.5 years TIS (actually service averaged to be 8.8 years TIS)[1]. However, the service limitation for the rank of sergeant is 10 years—1.5 years post target and 1.2 years post average. Combined with the fact that promotion opportunities are annual, based on limited allocations and the competitive nature of a high-demand/low-density MOS such as 0372, and the conditions are set for above-average Marines being passed over for promotion once becomes common.

Marines with no derogatory paperwork—as well as cases of excellent Marines with one derogatory Fitness Report (FITREP) or Article 15 early in their career from which they have since recovered—find themselves denied reenlistment for further service in the Marine Corps. Many of these Marines then take their talents elsewhere, joining AFSOF, ARSOF, or NAVSOF and continuing honorable service.

Waiver

Currently, individual ECFC waivers (allowing a sergeant to serve up to 13 years) are approved by the Director, Manpower Management Division (MM) for requests 1 year or less beyond service limits; or approved by the Deputy Commandant, Manpower & Reserve Affairs (DC, MRA) for requests greater than 1 year beyond service limits. Requests can be submitted via the Marine's Chain of Command, up to the first General Officer, with command endorsements that include justification for retention beyond service limits. Waivers of service limits may be granted in cases where the Marine is deploying for combat, or the MOS is deemed critical. Marines with two passes, or those who have not been selected for promotion to SSgt before 10 years of service, are not currently allowed to apply for a waiver.

Simply put, the ECFC is negatively affecting retention of a critical population within the CSO community—the sergeant who has been with the command for 1–3 years, who still has the potential for another decade of service to MARSOC and the Marine Corps. An example is a Marine with 2d Marine Raider Battalion whose previous MOS stalled promotion to both ranks of corporal and sergeant (common among high-density, low-demand occupations such as motor transport, where it often takes a Marine a full 4 years to promote to corporal), who promoted to sergeant at 6 years TIS. This sergeant then attended the Individual Training Course (ITC) at 7 years TIS, graduated the ITC as a CSO at nearly 8 years TIS with an unobserved FITREP covering the last 8 months of his performance while in a student status.

Just pinned on corporal, he has to be a sergeant to be eligible to be a CSO. *(Photo by SSgt Miguel Carrasco.)*

This Marine now has only 1 or 2 years to gain MOS credibility prior to being in-zone for promotion, and likely only one opportunity for selection to staff sergeant—if this Marine is passed over for any reason (to include simple lack of MOS credibility, lack of an operational deployment, multiple unobserved FITREPs from having been in student status, etc.), he is processed for separation at the end of his EAS or 7 months later. This situation can be remedied—MARSOC needs to pursue a blanket waiver for CSO and Special Operations Capability Specialist (SOCS) occupational specialties to protect the Marines from the shortsighted ECFC program.

Conclusion

MARSOC does not only need to increase the number of new ITC graduates; it needs to retain the experience it already has—to include (but not limited to) the 10-year sergeant. Increasing the service limitation of the Marine Special Operations Team's only NCO rank to 13 years provides these Marines with a chance for promotion in the highly competitive CSO community. The 10-year Marine has the potential for another decade of service, and is likely to return to the same geographical regions in which he is already experienced. Just as the United States has been combating the Global War on Terror since 2001, it is very likely that USSOCOM will continue to be engaged in those similar environments in the long term. Yet as conventional troops have been removed in vast numbers from the combat theaters of Afghanistan and Iraq, chances are that new ITC graduates may not have been involved with either conflict. MARSOC does not only need to make room for junior enlisted but instead retain combat experience and capability.

Note

1. Tom Philpott, "Promotion Rate Disparities Impact Total Career Pay," military.com, 5 December 2013, accessed at http://www.military.com.

On The Cutting Edge

reviewed by Maj Ian T. Brown



WHERE YOUTH AND LAUGHTER GO: With "The Cutting Edge" in Afghanistan. By LtCol Seth W.B. Folsom, USMC. Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2015
ISBN 9781612518718, 352 pp
$34.95 (Member $31.45)

"You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye / Who cheer when soldier lads march by, / Sneak home and pray you'll never know / The hell where youth and laughter go."

These lines, written a century earlier by Siegfried Sassoon to capture the carnage of World War I, provide both the title and moral impetus behind LtCol Folsom's latest book. His two previous works—*The Highway War: A Marine Company Commander in Iraq* (Potomac Books, 2007), and *In The Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War* (Naval Institute Press, 2010)—detail his time in Iraq. Here, Folsom recounts his command of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7, the "Cutting Edge") during 2011–12, as it attempted to bring some semblance of order to that special circle of the underworld called Sangin in Helmand, Afghanistan.

Folsom's is an eminently readable book, humble in tone and unsparing in both its praise of Marines and descriptions of the many miseries they endured in fighting Taliban insurgents across forbidding terrain and an indifferent population. Most of its content will feel familiar to any Marine who has spent time in the Helmand province, yet I would argue that the ideal audience for the book is not the Marine Corps. More on that in a minute.

While differing from Sassoon's trench warfare, 3/7's fight in Sangin deals in its own unique brand of ferocity, hardship, and heroism. Throughout, the Marines of the "Cutting Edge" demonstrate remarkable tenacity and restraint, be it in scrupulously observing the Rules of Engagement immediately after taking casualties on a patrol, handing out chocolate and pens to local children, or weathering the bombast and insults of Afghani commanders who refused to leave the wire to help 3/7 secure their own country. One can only marvel at men like Sgt Kyle Garcia, who, after triggering an IED that blew his left leg off below the knee, applied his own tourniquet while cursing at his squad-mates rushing to assist to "slow the f— down and sweep your way up here!" Folsom paraphrases former Commandant Gen P.X Kelley in the aftermath of the Beirut bombing when he asks, "Where do we get such men?"

It's an excellent question, highlighting the cost 3/7 paid in Sangin. Their deployment exerted a steep psychological toll; Folsom sees a preview in the emaciated form of LtCol Tom Savage, commander of the battalion Folsom's relieves, and then finds the same shrunken figure staring back at him in the mirror when 3/7 returns home. The Cutting Edge endured weekly *shuras* of Afghani elders promising much and delivering little; were disgusted by the pederasty and drug addiction of Afghani policemen and their own inability to change such conditions; and experienced the uniquely 21st century phenomenon of social media backlash from the disgruntled father of an officer Folsom felt compelled to relieve.

Yet this pales in comparison to the physical casualties 3/7 suffered. Sangin's wounds, inflicted by endless IEDs, carry their own special horror. Folsom recounts the steady stream of

>Maj Brown is a CH-53E pilot and currently serves as the TACP requirements officer within CD&I, HQMC. He deployed multiple times with HMH-361 to Iraq and Afghanistan, and served as a FAC with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 31st MEU. He recently received a master's degree in military history from Norwich University; his thesis studied the impact of John Boyd's conflict theories on Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine.

"amps," or amputations, his battalion absorbed: "single amps," "double amps," and in one case a "triple amp," who by some miracle survived his wounds. 3/7's last casualty is the most gruesome: an EOD sergeant literally blown into pieces by an IED he was defusing, identifiable only by the ink of a tattoo on what is left of his shoulder.

Not all the stories are horrifying. There is the mother of a wounded corporal who worried whether other squad members besides her son were hurt and adopted the squad and sent them mail and care packages even after her son was sent home. By deployment's end, 3/7's efforts saw a district election unmarred by violence with Afghani security forces finally taking the lead in protecting their citizens.

But there is the cost. Folsom concludes wondering if America will ever see a return commensurate with the bloody investment his Marines and others made in Afghanistan. There's also the question of whether anyone outside of the small groups who went there will remember their accomplishments and the price paid. This brings me back to the book's proper audience. Marines who have been to Sangin or Helmand don't need to read it; living through it once is enough. But this book should be placed in the hands of every general, every Beltway politician and pundit, and every civilian blessedly untouched by the conflict. They need to read it, so that the actions of 3/7, and every sailor and Marine who waded through a canal or patrolled through moon-dust, are remembered and honored. They need to know what they have asked the best of American youth to do and have some idea of the hell that brought them home aged and mirthless. Several times Folsom observes that people back home will not understand what his Marines experienced. The public never truly will; but, reading this book, at least they will no longer be ignorant.

... the actions of 3/7, and every sailor and Marine who waded through a canal or patrolled through moon-dust, are remembered and honored.

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Deploy the Marine Corps Enterprise Network

An information environment that best supports *EF 21*

by LtCol Leonard J. LeVine

In February 2015, planners from across the Operating Forces, Supporting Establishment, and Headquarters Marine Corps convened an Operational Planning Group (OPG) at Headquarters, Marine Corps Forces Pacific at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. The main focus of the OPG was to define the requirements for an information environment that best supports *Expeditionary Force 21* (*EF 21*) operations and fulfills the tenants of the Joint Information Environment. The overarching goal was to develop a simplified user experience that enables operating forces to utilize and maintain access to the Marine Corps Enterprise Network (MCEN) in a deployed environment and diminish the need to establish separate and distinct tactical networks. This would provide for continuity of critical information during planning and through operations that extend from garrison to remote locations. Most importantly, it would provide a single network environment that is easily echeloned forward and redeployed without loss of critical information and without the need to utilize various email addresses in different domains to accomplish the mission. This would occur without interruption or having to change how the network is accessed or the way information is retrieved. There would also be an improvement to the cybersecurity posture of our tactical networking systems by enabling near real time mitigation of vulnerabilities and assured security compliance. The changing cyberspace landscape presents opportunities for achieving enhanced mission effectiveness, improving cybersecurity, and gaining overall efficiencies.

MCTSSA conducted a limited objective experiment at Camp Pendleton to prove we could merge garrison and tactical networks. *(Official USMC Photo.)*

>LtCol LeVine enlisted in the Marine Corps in September 1994. In December 1997, LtCol LeVine obtained a commission as a second lieutenant under the meritorious commissioning program. After completing TBS, he was trained as a communications officer and subsequently assigned duty with 1st Force Service Support Group (1st FSSG) in Camp Pendleton, CA. He has deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In June 2015, LtCol LeVine transferred to Marine Corps Forces Pacific and served as the G-6 Operations Officer before assuming his current duties as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific.

The OPG generated a Deliberate-Universal Needs Statement, which led to the first in a series of limited objective experiments (LOE) to guide the development of a standardized method for extending the MCEN to the tactical edge. The first LOE was executed from

The MCEN system would obviate the need for separate garrison and deployed databases and email. *(Official USMC Photo.)*

May to July 2015 and was led by the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA) with support from the Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Center (MCNOSC) and Marine Corps Installations Command. The primary goals of this LOE were to develop and demonstrate the capabilities of an MCEN Tactical Processing Node (TPN) and to identify changes required in existing capabilities, policy, and procedures.

Col Ben Stinson, the Commanding Officer, MCTSSA, states, "The Limited Objective Experiments support efforts to merge tactical and garrison networks within the Marine Corps. Our Operating Forces require the ability to rapidly deploy forces while ensuring that Marines have a singular user identity which would provide them seamless access to individual and organizational data from anywhere in the world." The MCEN would be engineered to support operations that employ mission-tailored forces in various sizes that rapidly deploy from a static information environment. A key characteristic would be for the MCEN TPN to provide prompt and reliable access to persistently used information and enable the rapid assumption of operations with no loss in the flow of information to higher, adjacent, and lower echelon units. The end state is an MCEN that enables our forces to operate within a range of mission environments. These operations would be supported by command, control, communications, and computers (C^4) capabilities that assure flexibility, rapid deployment, and scalable solutions to support MAGTF command and control in a Joint, interagency, multi-national, and mission partner environment.

As a crisis unfolds, planning would commence.

The targeted beneficiaries are mission-tailored forces requiring rapid transition from a garrison setting (static information environment) to a deployed environment in order to conduct short duration, crisis response-type missions as described in *EF 21*. The emphasis on scalability and the ability to transition to more robust, locally hosted network services will ensure that should a contingency become prolonged, the supporting C^4 infrastructure can grow along with the mission.

Employing the MCEN as an integrated capability would begin in the garrison environment during steady-state operations where a staged environment of MCEN TPNs are maintained in a "ready-state" status with up-to-date security and software compliance. The MCEN TPNs would be properly configured, compliant with security measures, and rapidly "un-dockable" for portability to any area of operations. The staged environment of MCEN TPNs could reside either physically or logically alongside garrison resources until ready to be deployed.

As a crisis unfolds, planning would commence. Based on factors such as expected user density, operational environment, and personnel and lift constraints, planners would identify which technical resources would be physically deployed forward from the "ready-state" and which would be accessed remotely from the persistent environment. This would be a risk decision that offers flexibility balanced with mission requirements. Technical resources include fundamental network services such as domain name system, dynamic host control protocol, authentication, etc. Other technical resources include real time and near real time services such as chat, telephony, enterprise voice and video teleconferencing, and some command and control applications. The use of standardized and scalable capability sets in the form of MCEN TPNs would simplify planning and employment and also serve to improve training and readiness as the systems would remain online and available for Marines to operate and maintain. Connectivity back to a static environment would be transmission agnostic and primarily through consolidated base stations providing access into an MCEN entry point. Additionally, connections would be possible through satellite or terrestrial means via standardized tactical entry points or through commercial service providers.

Today, there are limited options that provide deployed forces with reach back access into the MCEN. However, in the event of isolation, these options pose an unacceptable risk to the mission. The ability to employ MCEN TPNs would ensure our operating forces retain the ability to employ organic tactical networking capabilities that ensure sur-

vivability in the event of disconnected, intermittent, or low-bandwidth conditions. Local administrators within the operating forces would possess an appropriate level of permissions and capabilities as an imperative to ensure autonomy and responsiveness to dynamically changing network requirements and operational environments. Likewise, deployed operating forces would have the support needed from the larger enterprise such as the MCNOSC, MCTSSA and other supporting organizations.

The first LOE specifically focused on MCEN non-secure Internet protocol router network services that were loaded onto a tactical networking suite, the distributed data system–modular. This LOE was conducted in a simulated tactical environment representing a deployed battalion-level combat operations center connected via satellite communications. Each of the objectives were successfully met for the first LOE which were to: 1) Develop an MCEN TPN using currently available tactical networking equipment and the current garrison MCEN network architecture; 2) Identify and recommend solutions for equipment and policy gaps that prevent the development of MCEN TPNs for the operating forces in order to guide future development of this capability; 3) Demonstrate cyber readiness of the MCEN TPN in a ready-state status; 4) Demonstrate the capability of the MCEN TPN to extend MCEN services to operate in a tactical environment; and 5) Demonstrate the survivability of locally hosted MCEN services in a disconnected or intermittent/low-bandwidth network environment. The first LOE generated a number of technical and procedural changes needed to implement this concept. Many of the technical challenges are associated with data transfer, processing, and storage. Modernization of our existing tactical data systems will better leverage the use of virtualization, optimize performance, and reduce size, weight, and power requirements in a deployed environment. The significant work—some of which has already been initiated—will be in updating policy, developing standardized implementation guides, and repeatable tactics, techniques, and procedures.

According to Col Stinson, future LOEs will target MCEN secure Internet protocol router network, other command and control applications and systems for integration, and MAGTF afloat nodes. Although there will be a multitude of technical, procedural, and policy changes required before this capability is ready to be employed, the series of LOEs that will be executed over the next year are designed to refine the concept necessary to build a unified MCEN that extends toward the tactical edge. The recommendations and findings of the LOEs are nested with other long-term efforts and will inform the Marine Corps Cyber Task Force that is working to improve the Marine Corps' capability and capacity to operate within the cyberspace domain.

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With the MCEN, we can deploy from garrison to an expeditionary environment with enhanced cybersecurity. *(Official USMC Photo.)*

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