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Cover Image
The automatic riflemen. *(Drawing by Col John W. Thomason, Jr.)*

DEPARTMENTS



IDEAS AND ISSUES

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MARINE CORPS Gazette
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JUNE 2018

Editorial: Origin Story, Our First "Touchstone Battle"

One hundred years ago, Marines of the American Expeditionary Force fought a battle in a game preserve east of Paris that today bears the name *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*—a battle whose legacy would shape the nature of the Corps. The great powers of Europe and their colonies were nearly four years into the bloodletting of the First World War. Hundreds of thousands of young men from across the globe had already died in the filthy trenches of the Western Front, in the dusty ravines of the Gallipoli peninsula, and in Russia, Italy, Mesopotamia, and East Africa. The Corps that joined this fight had grown from a small force of "seagoing light infantry" to its largest end strength to that point in history. In France, more Marines would die than in the previous 143 years of the Corps' existence. Future commandants and general officers like Lejeune, Butler, Cates, Russell, and Breckinridge would learn the hard lessons of the impact of industrial technology on warfare.

In *Twentieth Century Marines: Three Touchstone Battles*, edited by Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC(Ret), and published in 1997 by the Marine Corps Association, the editor explains that a touchstone is a mineralogist's tool: "a hard velvet black piece of basalt used … to assess the value of precious metals." Belleau Wood remains a tool to assess the Corps' warfighting value 100 years after the battle and 14 years since the last Marine veteran of that fight, Gene Bell, joined his comrades. However, even in 1918, this was not our only battle. The Marine Brigade also distinguished themselves at Blanc Mont and Soissons, and fought on until the "11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month," executing a supremely costly attack crossing the Meuse river in the face of German defenses on the last night of the war. More battles would follow throughout the "American Century" and up to the present day, but Belleau Wood made us forever "Devil Dogs" and set our true north to the warrior ethos we call *Semper Fidelis*.

Beginning on page 10, we present a series of articles uncovering the history of the battle of Belleau Wood and its enduring impact. Among these essays are the four winners of the Marine Corps University's Belleau Wood Essay Contest. The overall winner, and first place in the "Company Grade Officers' category," is "Belleau Wood" by Capt James Skeffington. The winner of the "Corporals & Below category" is "The Everlasting Impact of Belleau Wood" by LCpl Henry Luu. The winner of the "Sergeants & Staff Sergeants' category" is "A Battle to Remember" by SSgt Matthew Hannula. Finally, the winner of the "Field Grade Officers' category" is "Army Generals, Expert Riflemen, Rogue Reporters, and Devil Dogs" by Col Maria McMillen.

We also present a series of leadership-oriented essays including the First-Place winner of the 2017 Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entitled "Constraints," by Capt Brian Worley. Of note, this emotional story of the unwavering commitment to doing "what Marines do" is so compelling that a version of the piece will also appear in June's edition of *Leatherneck*.

Finally, I draw your attention to the article "PME" on page 8 by BGen William J. Bowers, the President of Marine Corps University. This response to recent *Gazette* articles regarding PME sends the clear message to the *Gazette*'s authors—today's Marines—that your work is read by the Corps' leaders and your thoughts have a positive effect.

Christopher Woodbridge

LtGen Michael G. Dana

LtGen David H. Berger

MajGen Charles G. Chiarotti

General Officer Announcements

On 10 April, the Secretary of Defense announced that President Donald J. Trump had made the following nominations:

LtGen Michael G. Dana for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as the Director, Marine Corps Staff. Gen Dana is currently the Deputy Commandant, Installations & Logistics.

LtGen David H. Berger for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as the Deputy Commandant, Combat Development & Integration, and CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Gen Berger is currently the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and CG, FMF Pacific.

Col Stephen E. Liszewski for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Liszewski is currently the military assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

Col Lorna M. Mahlock for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Mahlock is currently Deputy Director, Plans, Policies & Operations Directorate.

Col David L. Odom for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Odom is currently the Chief of Staff, III MEF.

Col Arthur J. Pasagian for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Pasagian is currently the Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Systems Command.

Col Sean M. Salene for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Salene is currently the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, II MEF.

Col Kevin J. Stewart for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Stewart is currently the Executive Assistant, Deputy Commandant, Installations & Logistics.

Col William H. Swan for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Swan is currently the Tactical Air Section Head, Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch, Department of Aviation.

Col Calvert L. Worth Jr., for appointment to the rank of brigadier general. Col Worth is serving as Division Chief, U.S. Central Command Division, Regional Operations, J-35, Joint Staff.

On 11 April, the Secretary of Defense announced that President Donald J. Trump had made the following nomination:

MajGen Charles G. Chiarotti for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as the Deputy Commandant, Installations & Logistics. Gen Chiarotti is currently the Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Japan.

Reunions

- **MCMA Reunion**

From 8 to 12 August, the Marine Corps Mustang Association (MCMA) is holding its 32nd reunion and muster at the Menger Hotel in San Antonio, TX. For more detailed information, go to marinecorpsmustang.org. If you are interested in attending, contact LtCol Richard J. Sullivan, USMC(Ret), at 508-954-2262 or sul824@verizon.net.

- **Marine Air Base Squadron-49 Reunion**

On 8 September, a reunion for all former members of the Marine Air Base Squadron-49 will take place in Earlville, MD. For more information, contact Col Chuck McGarigle, USMC(Ret), at 609-291-9617, 609-284-2935, or at mabsreunion@comcast.net.

- **USS *Perkins* Reunion**

From 13 to 15 September, the USS *Perkins* (DD-26, DD-377, and DDR-877) Reunion Association is holding its annual reunion for the U.S. Navy ship in Kansas City, MO. For more information, contact Barry Buchanan at 9827 N. Stark Avenue, Kansas City, MO 64157-8142, at 816-792-3040, or at barryinmo@aol.com.

Golf Company, School of Infantry-West graduates its first integrated Marine Combat Training Battalion Class. *(Photo by LCpl Betzabeth Galvan.)*

Entry-Level Training

Maj Chad Buckel's fine article, "Infantry Entry-Level Training," (*MCG*, Feb18) made some forward-looking proposals for building a world-class Marine infantry. When America imagines its Marines, the color guards in dress blues, flashy aircraft, or an individual operating hi-tech gear may come to mind. However, if America's real image of the Marine is envisioned, it features the Marine grunt with rifle and bayonet going forward against the enemy. Maj Buckel's proposal brings this Marine into the 21st century.

Let's take Maj Buckel's proposal one step further. He proposes that the Infantry Training Battalion (ITB) at the School of Infantry deploy eight companies, each succeeding company going through one 36-week, three-phase program, including basic skills, small unit tactics, and offense/defense. Afterward, the individual Marines should be distributed to the infantry battalions. Why not instead use each ITB company as the base for an entirely new unit and have these newly trained companies go to the Operating Forces intact?

The advantages are obvious: 1) a higher level of unit cohesion, important in a maneuver combat unit and a Corps priority; 2) the opportunity to ear-mark potential junior leaders from among the trainees; and 3) a chance for a company commander to build a chain of command from the ground up, allowing officers and NCOs to train the Marines they'll take into the fight.

How could this system work? When a company of newly graduated recruits forms at ITB, the company commander, executive officer, first sergeant, gunnery sergeant, company clerk, and platoon sergeants would be on hand to receive them. This leadership team performs the command functions, while the ITB SNCOs and NCOs take the new Marines through infantry training. As the company progresses along this enhanced pipeline as proposed by Maj Buckel, platoon commanders, squad leaders, and fire team leaders join the unit. Particularly in the later phases of training, these Marines build the teamwork between leaders and led into an effective combat unit. After this 36-week infantry training program, the company goes to a battalion in the Operating Forces as a unit. Each battalion would receive a new company once or twice a year.

Could the Corps' training base expand to make this concept work? Perhaps ITB could be expanded to "ITR"—the Infantry Training Regiment, as existed in the 1960s. Companies would stand down after two to three years in the Operating Forces, some individuals being promoted or transferred out of the unit, some leaving the Corps, and a remainder forming a leadership cadre for a new company at ITB. These Marines would carry the institutional memory of the original company into the new organization, socializing the new Marines into a world-class 21st century combat infantry.

What does the Corps have to lose by adopting this proposal?

J. Manter

Ranger Training and the Tactically Decisive Junior Marine

Maj Chad A. Buckel's well-reasoned proposal (*MCG*, Feb18) to meaningfully expand and enhance Marine entry-level infantry training by integrating additional capabilities, including elements found in Ranger School, holds considerable promise. As an experimental step in that direction, the Marine Corps, in concert with Training Command (TC) and Infantry Training Battalion (ITB), might consider a variant of the student patrol leader concept, a staple of Ranger School headquartered at Fort Benning, GA. There the student must at some juncture lead all facets of combat patrolling, from planning and rehearsal to assault and withdrawal, all the while being shadowed by lane graders, or "walkers," who rarely miss a trick.

Although Ranger School is geared toward NCOs and junior officers, the student patrol leader concept can profit the entry-level private and PFC as well. The student charged to lead a patrol of his peers will tend to show a broader interest in classroom fundamentals and a sharper focus on terrain and the Red Force soldiers inhabiting it. He will quickly find that the multi-tasking necessary to fight his patrol through a high-side ambush is 180 degrees out from negotiating a video game. As he inspects and quizzes his patrol about radio frequencies, spare batteries, numbers of magazines, audible loose gear, and actions at the objective, he'll realize that "attention to detail" didn't suspend itself the day he stepped off the grinder; a little micromanagement can be a good thing. He will also discover that clear, concise, and timely instructions during the formative and tactical stages of his patrol are foundational to leadership at any level.

Adapting hands-on tactical decisiveness and patrol ownership to our newly minted Marines will not be without modifications or problems. Days would need to be added to the ITB schedule and/or hours to the training day. In the interest of time constraints, as well as subject matter absorption and retention, the near-combat conditions of minimal sleep and food merited during the Ranger course would need to be moderated or curtailed. Patrol routes/lanes would need to be compressed and patrol-specific navigation simplified, truncating time and space between leaving friendly positions, Red Force ambushes, duplicitous partisans, assaults, and sniffing out IEDs. Both TC and ITB would need to determine how much, if any, Red Force free-play is advisable until—and unless—our aspiring infantrymen have nailed the basics.

If time could be allotted in ITB for infantry-bound Marines to experience firsthand tactical leadership, then, in varying degrees, they would certainly gain knowledge and ability, and, because of that, be a little less reliant on education by osmosis once in the Operating Forces. Those who do well as patrol leaders in ITB will be ready to take on more complex assignments wherever they are sent. Those who do not do well will hopefully pay more attention the next time around. When no one knows who will be singled out to lead the next patrol, there will be a little less catnapping in the schoolhouse bleachers. It's worth a shot.

Sgt Reuben Darby, USMC (Ret)

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the *Gazette*. They should not exceed 300 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to gazette@mca-marines.org. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

The entire *Gazette* is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

>Author's note: Having experienced the tender mercies of Ranger School, first as a newly minted lance corporal and again seven years later as a "wannabe" writer after leaving the Corps because of wounds, I gained an appreciation for the course from the position of student and cadre. One interesting event in that seven-year interval was the Florida Ranger camp's reshaping from a World War II enemy setting to one better reflecting the ground action in Vietnam. The officer responsible was then-LTC Charles A. Beckwith, USA, who went on to found Delta Force and later led the Iranian Hostage rescue attempt.

A Three Front War: Part II

John Kiser's article, "A Three Front War" (*MCG*, Oct17), has garnered at least three written responses from concerned readers, one of which was written by myself (*MCG*, Jan18). The March 2018 issue of the *Gazette* contains a reply to my letter, and, while I seek to avoid a continuous point-counterpoint discussion, and will assiduously avoid any ad hominem commentary, I believe it necessary to respond to several assertions advanced by Mr. Kiser in his "reply."

Mr. Kiser seems to make four points in his reply. (1) "[W]hat we are witnessing today via ISIS" began ("its crystallization") "with the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood," and Sayyid Qutb was its inspirational voice; (2) "Definitions" as used in his October article (e.g., "radical Islam," "heretical Islam," "Islamophobia," "disturbed," "misguided," "distorted") are a "problem," and ISIS is to Islam as the Ku Klux Klan is to Christianity; (3) "Islamophobia" is "a defective term;" and (4) "[T]here are many aspects of this worldwide violence in the name of Islam that are difficult to get a handle on."

The reference to the Muslim Brotherhood and Qutb is apparently taken from Chapter 1 of Lawrence Wright's work, *The Looming Tower* (Vintage Books, 2006). Yet selecting the Muslim Brotherhood as the "crystallizing" point (i.e., "to cause to take a definite form," *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (10th ed., 1993)) for Islamic terrorism is an error. Islamic terrorism began before Muhammad's death in 632 A.D. The Tripolitanian piracy of Thomas Jefferson's time has its roots in Muhammad's raids on Arabian caravans. The 2015 Charlie Hebdo murders proceed directly from the murders of Arabs who criticized or mocked or poked fun at Muhammad during his lifetime. The current day mass execution of peoples of various beliefs and ethnicities is supported by Muhammad's revelations and actions, including the 627 A.D. execution of hundreds of Qurayzah Jewish men and boys, an event explicitly attested to by the Qur'an (33: 21-27). (See Maulana Muhammad Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (2002) at 830–32 n. 26a ("Three hundred men suffered death under this sentence")). Other historians use greater numbers: e.g., Karen Armstrong, *Muhammad, A Prophet for Our Time* (Harper Collins, 2006) wrote that it was 700 Jews killed, with a "significant number of the Arab tribe of Kilab," that the executions were "revolting" and "not acceptable to us today." The Muslim Brotherhood is but the leading edge of the current wave of Islamic violence; Muhammad is *the* crystallization of Islam in all its forms, aspects, and particularizations. Professor Akbar S. Ahmed of Cambridge observes that Muhammad is "the ideal type of Muslim behavior and thought." Robert Spencer, in *Islam Unveiled* (Encounter Books, 2002), writes that "he [Muhammad] is to be emulated." We must not lose sight of this.

John Kiser states that "Definitions are a problem." But the problem is not the terms ("radical Islam," "heretical Islam," "Islamophobia," etc.) themselves, it is the use of them. This author has a particular bias against shibboleths—Islamophobia, bigotry, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, nativist, etc., which are bully terms, generalized insults employed to control discourse, deflect focus, suppress reason, and avoid any threat to one's preconceived notions. They are also largely vague, ambiguous, overused, and meaningless. If, as Mr. Kiser admits, Islamophobia is a defective term, then why use it?

Mr. Kiser's reference to the Ku Klux Klan ("as the KKK was 'heretical' Christianity, though it was not referred to as such") is an unnecessary and erroneous distraction. The KKK was and is a despicable, disgusting hate group. Formed as a social club, the Klan quickly became the militant arm of the Democratic Party, engaging in arson, lynching, murder, rape, and other criminal enterprises. The Klan hated blacks, Jews, and Catholics. Whatever the Klan's occasional claim to Christian denomination support—Presbyterianism, Freemasonry—"virtually every Christian denomination has officially denounced the KKK" (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_terrorism#Ku_Klux_Klan). As Edward Condon writes in "The KKK is Not the Christian ISIS," *National Review* (6 June 2017), "The Klan's signature calling card, a burning cross, far from being Christian, is an act of Christian sacrilege." Referencing the formula "ISIS is to Islam as the KKK is to Christianity" is a Hollywood fiction unworthy of reference in the *Marine Corps Gazette.*

Islamic apologists claim that Islam's critics focus on only a few of the Qur'an's Suras and take the Qur'anic statements out of context. By making such statements, the apologists confirm that violent Qur'anic verses exist, and there are more such verses than a few. Moreover, as addressed by Maulana Muhammad Ali, there is no conceivable rational context that can justify that the "only punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive to make mischief in the land is that they should be murdered, or crucified, or their hands and their feet should be cut off on opposite sides, or they should be imprisoned." Yet, for Muslims, the Qur'an is the unalterable word of Allah. What is normal for the Muslim is the Qur'an. What the Westerner sees as radical may just be Muslim mainstream. And if, as Mr. Kiser reports, "the overwhelming majority of Muslims" disapprove of "[m]urdering random civilians in the name of Islam," one wonders why we are daily barraged with reports of attacks on "random civilians" by persons of Islamic faith.

LtCol David A. Higley, USMC(Ret)

Looking to contribute a letter? E-mail your thoughts and opinions to gazette@mca-marines.org.

2017 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest Winners

During late March, the *Marine Corps Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel read and judged the 2017 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest entries.

The winner of First Place this year is Capt Brian Worley for his essay, "Constraints: That which we must do." Over the years, the *Gazette* has published countless articles on leadership, what it means to be an effective leader, and which of the leadership traits and/or principles holds the most meaning, is the most important, and is most effective. Many authors have focused on a life-changing event. This could be a combat situation; however, more often than not, it's in a garrison environment: one of your Marines in is trouble, having a problem, or, in this situation, one of Capt Worley's Marines is seriously injured in an automobile accident. The word spreads within the platoon, the parents and siblings are notified, and all are traveling into town to be with their fellow Marine, their son, their brother. This is a time when defining leadership becomes most difficult. It's the often-asked question, "What now?" Capt Worley will receive a check for $3,000 and an engraved plaque.

Second Place goes to Maj Justin Gray for his essay titled "Connecting with the Connected: Timeless leadership in an ever-changing environment." It's 2050. You are a young Marine officer visiting your grandfather. Looking around his study, you realize it's more like a library, neat, organized. You've been here before, marveling at the books, a rare commodity in an electronic, virtual reality world. Here begins a conversation about "old Corps, new Corps" with granddad. The grandfather has his grandson pull T.R. Fehrenbach's *This Kind of War* from a shelf and tells him to read an underlined passage: "In 1950 a Marine Corps officer was still an officer, and a sergeant behaved the way good sergeants had behaved since the time of Caesar … And Marine leaders had never lost sight of their primary—their only—mission, which was to fight." Regardless of technological advances, ultimately, there is no way to reduce or diminish the human dimension of war and the invaluable strength that comes from forming close relationships with your Marines. Maj Gray will receive a check for $1,500 and an engraved plaque.

Maj C. Scott Duncan's essay, "Rite of Passage: Historical tradition is relevant to future generations of Marines," receives honorable mention. Does the Marine Corps face a slow deterioration from within if it fails to maintain its core values and traditions in face of a society and culture that is more focused on entitlement and self-glorification? The Corps must maintain and present itself as a Service where "self-sacrifice and service to others" is part of our nature. "We have accepted the mantle of self-sacrifice in order to defend the world's most successful way of life." So the question for Marine leaders today—Do we understand our environment? Maj Duncan will receive an engraved plaque.

Gen Robert E. Hogaboom

This contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II, he later served first as Assistant Division Commander, then as Division Commander, 1st MarDiv, in Korea from 1954–55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

Capt Brian Worley

Maj Justin Gray

Maj C. Scott Duncan

PME

The MCU President responds

by BGen William J. Bowers

On behalf of Marine Corps University, I want to compliment the *Marine Corps Gazette*'s editorial staff on the outstanding articles they've published recently. The *Gazette* is being true to the spirit in which Gen John A. Lejeune created it: to serve as a forum for new ideas intended to improve our Corps. Several of these recent articles have focused on improving the Marine Corps' professional military education (PME) system. Our PME system is in a constant state of review and refinement, and we need recommendations from the force to help us develop and deliver the most professional, current, relevant, and challenging curriculum possible in order to prevent stagnancy. The purpose of this letter is twofold: 1) to inform the *Gazette*'s readers on what we're doing about many of the excellent ideas raised, and 2) to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing their ideas because, as you'll see below, they do make a difference.

First, it's important to note a powerful movement that's quietly occurring across our Corps that will significantly impact the future of PME: enlisted Marines are demanding, receiving, and exercising a greater role in how our Corps educates Marines. For example, SNCOs authored three of the four articles devoted to improving PME in the March 2018 *Gazette*. Enlisted Marines submitted more than half of the 41 essays we received for the just-concluded Belleau Wood Centennial Essay Contest and penned two of four winning articles. The days in which SNCOs and NCOs feel "intellectually under-nourished" by our Corps' PME system (as a Staff Sergeant Career Course student told me in fall 2017) are gone. At the start of this academic year, the Commandant challenged us to tap into the intellectual potential of our enlisted Marines—what he called "the unexplored gold mine of our PME system"—and in the spirit of MCU's founder, Gen Alfred M. Gray, we're moving out. The College of Enlisted Military Education (CEME) staff will cover these reforms in a separate article, but they're coming—and fast.

Second, SSgt Matthew P. Petitgout's March 2018 article, "The Reading List and Quarterly PME," suggests revamping both the Commandant's Reading List and Quarterly PME programs to achieve greater educational benefit for Marines. For the Commandant's Reading List, he suggests "some sort of short answer questions to not only inquire about the information gleaned from the book but to stoke the fire of creative thinking much the way guided discussion does." This is an excellent idea. MCU can (and shall) create a "lesson card" for each of the six books the Commandant personally selects annually to be read by Marines, and these cards will be used as a vehicle to generate discussions and/or used by unit leaders for writing assignments. For the Quarterly PME program, while we would not advocate making this "mandated training for all units," we do believe that by creating relevant, valuable, and useful tools, MCU can enhance a unit's PME program by enabling and empowering leaders to run their own PMEs. Our goal for next year is to publish one case study per trimester (see LLI's (Lejeune Leadership Institute's) website at www.usmcu.edu/lli for what we've done so far) to emphasize a theme important for our Corps.* Case study leader discussion guides will further enable a small unit leader to guide the conversation so that it contextualizes the lessons in ways important for his unit.

BGen Bowers in the CG, Education Command and President, Marine Corps University. *(Official USMC photo.)*

Third, GySgt Jay C. Barnard's "Educational Value" asks our Corps' leaders, "[I]s PME really challenging our [enlisted] members as much as it should?," lamenting a "[PME] 'check in the box' mentality" in which "commanders are not willing to send Marines to receive an irrelevant education." GySgt Barnard specifically challenges MCU to "consider revising the program of instruction provided to our enlisted Marines" by including such subjects as sociology, psychology, and ethics and studying the dynamics of human behavior. The Commandant and Sergeant

*Our plan for next year is to produce the three following case studies: 1) BGen Edward Craig and the Fire Brigade in Korea 1950 (suggested by Gen Alfred M. Gray); 2) the re-capture of the Aleutian islands from the Japanese (to familiarize students with the North Pacific and explore amphibious operations); and 3) Hue City (the EWS team plans to explore the impact information environment operations in this battle). We welcome input for other case study ideas.

Major agree with GySgt Barnard. As he suggests, we will add more "relevant, difficult coursework to the [enlisted] curriculum[s]," but as we desire for all Marines to succeed, we will also provide more resources, such as: 1) communications instructors, 2) expanded opportunities for seminar programs, and 3) improved network access. As noted above, these reforms will be covered in detail elsewhere by the CEME staff, but they are coming—*fast*.

Fourth, SSgt Thomas Maddox's "The Future of Education is Now" rebuts an article written by an academic questioning the value of online writing classes. SSgt Maddox concludes that "online or distance education works," and that while professors might not "see" the cross-talk and discussions that occur in a physical classroom, learning takes place virtually via email and chat rooms "in a manner that may be transparent to the professor." He calls on professors to be "flexible enough in their thinking to adapt to new ideas, methods of teaching, and ways of learning." Another winning idea. We have actually been talking about some of our distinguished MCU professors offering courses online to Marines across the Corps—why should this expertise stay bottled up aboard the MCU campus? SSgt Maddox's article tells us it's time to stop talking about it and execute, so that's what we're going to do. Next fiscal year, we will begin to offer online courses to Marines across the Corps, and credits will be coming shortly after we complete phase I of elective development. More details will be forthcoming on this initiative.

Fifth, Maj Breck L. Perry's "Reinvigorating Maneuver Warfare Through PME" provides "a model that attempts to reinvigorate maneuver warfare at the battalion level" with a "formalized PME plan." Maj Perry proposes five lines of effort; an approach, method, and end state to execute the plan; and roles and responsibilities within the battalion to ensure it gets done correctly. He even includes an example six-month PME plan, so he has clearly seen what right looks like. So how can MCU support such a unit PME plan as Maj Perry proposes? By creating and making tools available for Commanders and SNCOs to execute—that's how.

We've covered above how we will create lesson cards for the Commandant's annual book selections, produce case studies available on the LLI website, and expand opportunities for online learning. We can also help with staff rides by either: 1) making an expert available to travel and conduct the staff ride, or (even better) 2) publishing guidance and expertise on how small unit leaders can do this on their own. We have expertise here, and we will take this task on and post the product on the LLI website.

Sixth, the Marine Special Operations Command Commander and Staff published an article in the January 2018 *Gazette* calling for measuring Marines' "ability to *think*, *adapt*, and *collaborate* with allies and partners" by leveraging "time spent in the existing Marine Corps education continuum." The authors correctly point out that "Marines use many of these skills in educational venues as they interact with classmate peers." These, again, are excellent points. We have already submitted a waiver to DC, M&RA to write observed fitness reports on our Corps' doctoral candidates (and have been observing them regularly), and perhaps it's time to expand this mindset to more of our resident PME students—to include those in CEME. Having observed and/or participated in seminar discussions at every school and having read student papers, there are some students who "stand out" in the areas the MARSOC Marines note. While Faculty and School Directors do typically put some comments on their students' fitness reports, we'll get with M&RA and explore ways to more formally document Marines' student performance in their OMPFs.

In conclusion, the Corps' Young Turks are once again on the march, and they're not half-stepping. Moreover, their restless energy and vision is being fueled and nourished by the Commandant, who's simultaneously telling the Corps' senior leaders to "Go faster!" This letter explains how MCU is responding to our Marines' ideas to improve the quality of education we provide to *all Marines*. We have much work to do. We also encourage your feedback on how we're doing and where we can improve. Finally, we want to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing. As LtGen Victor "Brute" Krulak once wrote:

> Progress in military affairs has ever been the product of the curiosity, impatience and iconoclasm of youth. Were this not true we might still be using the phalanx, the ramrod or the hollow square. If young Marines are indeed challenging the status quo I can only declare that they are behaving in the tradition of their forebears, and wish them well.[1]

Stay after it Marines—we're listening and executing!

... MCU is responding to our Marines' ideas to improve the quality of education we provide to all Marines. We have much work to do. We also encourage your feedback on how we're doing and where we can improve. Finally, we want to encourage Marines to keep reading, thinking, writing, and publishing.

Notes

1. LtGen V.H. Krulak, "The Corps' Critics Are Wrong," *Washington Post*, (Washington, DC: 27 October 1985).

2018 Marine Corps University Belleau Wood Essay Contest: Overall Winner

Belleau Wood

The road to the future

by Capt James Skeffington

Walk through the World War I exhibit at the National Museum of the Marine Corps, and it is apparent what the Corps remembers about Belleau Wood: the fields of wheat, the smell of cordite, the whistle of bullets through the leaves.[1] "Teufelshunde," "Retreat, Hell! We just got here!" and "Come on, you sons of b…! Do you want to live forever?"[2]—the Marine Corps rightfully remembers Belleau Wood for the tactical events that occurred in the fields of France 100 years ago this June.

Despite this, the tactical events at Belleau Wood matter less in the grand scheme of Marine Corps history than the strategic consequences that Belleau Wood had on the Marine Corps. At Belleau Wood, the Corps did more than just win a battle; "created … in 1775, the United States Marine Corps was born in that French forest … in 1918."[3] Belleau Wood launched the Marine Corps into its first period of enlightenment, out of which came a Corps prepared to win the next "great war."

Today is an exciting time for the Marine Corps. As it extricates itself from prolonged land battles in the Orient, it is rediscovering its future purpose and reassessing its future adversaries. The Corps now has the opportunity to undergo an enlightenment similar to that which followed Belleau Wood. Done correctly, the Marine Corps can establish itself for another 100 years of success. Done incorrectly, the Marine Corps may find its light snuffed out. Ironically, the tactical lessons from the Battle of Belleau Wood can guide the Corps through this process of strategic revitalization.

MajGen George Barnett, USMC. *(Marine Corps Defense Dept Photo 308436.)*

MajGen John A. Lejeune. *(Marine Corps Defense Dept Photo 308342.)*

Before Belleau Wood

Prior to Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps was little more than a small security force. Presley O'Bannon, the Halls of Montezuma, and Harpers Ferry are all important parts of Marine Corps lore, but these events were trifling in the grand scheme of world events. Just eight Marines participated in Lt O'Bannon's famous Tripoli campaign.[4] At the Battle of Chapultepec, the Marines contributed dozens of the 75,000 American fighters. And after quelling the rebellion at Harpers Ferry, around 3,800 Marines participated in the war that nearly 3.1 million Americans fought.[5] Prior to Belleau Wood, President Harry S. Truman's quip that the Marine Corps is nothing more than "the Navy's police force"[6] was accurate.

>Capt Skeffington's essay is the overall winner of the MCU Belleau Wood Essay Contest and the winner in the Company Grade Officers' category.

At the turn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt briefly removed Marines from their ships, beginning a slow process of disbanding the Marine Corps altogether. Fortunately, a small band of leaders resisted, got the Marines back on the ships, and re-branded the Marine Corps as "first to fight" just in time for World War I. When the opportunity came, the Marine Corps sent the 4th Brigade to France as a part of the American Expeditionary Force.[7]

The Marine Corps' old nemesis—the United States Army—did its best to keep the Marines out of the fighting,

but fortune favored the Marines when the Germans attacked in May 1918 and the Marines were rushed to the front. The 4th Brigade stood fast and held the Germans back, laying the foundation for a general counterattack later that summer and eventually for the end of the war.[8] Fortune again favored the Marines in the form of Floyd Gibbons, a reporter who covered the battle of Belleau Wood with the *Chicago Tribune*. His paper ran a story glorifying the great Marine victory at Belleau Wood, a story that was picked up by other papers and reprinted, further fanning the flames of Marine Corps warfighting prowess.[9] It seems the Marine Corps' "propaganda machine almost equal to Stalin's"[10] was also born in the *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*.

After France: The Rebirth of the Marine Corps

The story of the Marine Corps' innovation and enlightenment during the 1920s and 1930s is well-documented. LtGen John A. Lejeune, who commanded the 4th Brigade in France, became the 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps and made great strides toward professionalizing the officer corps, building traditions and *esprit de corps*, and testing new concepts via large-scale training exercises. LtCol Pete "Earl" Ellis, who also served in France, though briefly, famously forecast the future island-hopping campaign against Japan in his publication, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*. In 1933, Marine Corps schools suspended classes for a year and drafted new doctrine: the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. As prescribed by the manual, the Marine Corps experimented with landing craft capable of operating in contested waters and difficult terrain; the experimentation that began in the 1920s and 1930s produced a landing craft for the Guadalcanal campaign.[11]

The Marine Corps did not evolve perfectly following Belleau Wood and the First World War, but it made enough improvements to facilitate its success during the Second World War. The "climate of openness, once conducive to introspection and imagination"[12] during the interwar period was indispensable to the growth of the Marine Corps. Without this introspection and innovation, things may have played out very differently in the Pacific; perhaps the Marine Corps would have reverted to its role as the Navy's police force.

Few pictures symbolize the rebirth of the Marine Corps following Belleau Wood better than the official portraits of the 12th and 13th Commandants. On the left is the 12th Commandant: MajGen George Barnett.[13] He became Commandant just before World War I broke out in 1914 and saw the Marine Corps through its mobilization, deployment to France, and return home again. On the right is then MajGen John A. Lejeune,[14] who fought in France and returned home with fresh ideas for the Marine Corps.

The uniforms of the two men speak volumes about the shift that took place around the time of Belleau Wood. Gen Barnett's uniform—the sash, the fringed epaulets, and the bicorne hat—reflect a bygone era. Gen Lejeune's uniform, on the other hand, is similar to the Service uniforms worn today. As symbolized by the change in uniform, the First World War and the Battle of Belleau Wood changed the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps emerged from the interwar period with a new lease on life, fresh ideas, and a new sense of purpose. Belleau Wood was a springboard for the Marine Corps to rebrand itself from a security force to a capable fighting force. The leaders in the interwar period embraced this new role and carried its momentum into World War II, where the Marine Corps truly solidified itself as an elite fighting force.

The Marine Corps Today and in the Future

The Marine Corps finds itself in a situation not unlike just after Belleau Wood. Having just exited from large-scale land operations in foreign lands, the Marine Corps finds itself reorganizing and re-equipping, gazing into the future, and trying to determine how it can contribute in the next conflict. On the fringes of the Far East, a rising power slowly gains momentum, beginning to challenge the order and balance of previous generations. Concepts centered around the seizure of advanced naval bases in order to facilitate naval operations in the Pacific again grace the pages of the *Gazette*. On the fringes of the Near East, a wounded but still dangerous adversary agitates, challenging its neighbors and the geopolitical order that has existed for decades. Technologies teased during the recent wars promise to play an exponentially greater role in the next major war, once they undergo the refinement and mass production required for integration into modern militaries.

Of course, there are important differences between 1918 and 2018; the 21st century is not destined to be version 2.0 of the 20th century. However, many lessons from 100 years ago at Belleau Wood—including the tactical lessons—can be particularly useful as the Marine Corps walks into its next period of enlightenment.

Lessons from Belleau Wood

The first lesson comes from the competence, bravery, and *esprit de corps* that each Marine carried across the wheat fields and into the Bois de Belleau.

> It was the spirit of the individual, the *esprit de corps* of the unit and dogged determination combined with a unwavering discipline that prevailed in the Battle of Belleau Wood. More than any other single attribute, it was the individual Marine … that, within each man, clutched the bulwark of the intense emotion and pride infused by their Marine Corps training, creating the Marine Corps *attitude*.[15]

Since at least Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps' center of gravity—that thing which it cannot do without—is its individual Marines. Yes, of course, the MAGTF, the Joint Strike Fighter, and Tun Tavern are also important, but the individual riflemen make the Marine Corps the Marine Corps. Marines already know this, but it can't be emphasized enough: it is the attitude and spirit of individual Marines that makes the Marine Corps great. Snuff out this spirit, and the Marine Corps will become just another army; foster it, and the Marine Corps will flourish. We would be wise to evaluate changes against the following criteria: does this

change improve (or least not harm) the competence, attitude, and spirit of individual Marines?

The second lesson comes from the 1,087 casualties at Belleau Wood on 6 June—the most in Marine Corps history up to this point.[16] Although the 4th Brigade won the day, they bled more than was necessary. At the beginning of the engagement, the Marines went over the top and through the wide open wheat fields "bunched together, one behind the other." These amateurish tactics made the Marines easy targets for the German machine gunners, who baptized them with fire.[17]

The casualties at Belleau Wood are a sobering reminder of the importance of "getting it right" before the next fight begins. By the summer of 1918, the First World War was into its fourth bloody year. Machine guns and barbed wire were well-known, but the Marines failed to adapt; they failed to learn, so they paid for their mistakes with blood. Whatever we fail to improve now, during a time of relative peace, we will pay for later. The importance of constantly improving, of getting it right even when the situation isn't as urgent, cannot be understated.

The third and final lesson doesn't come from the woods of Belleau Wood but from the jungles of the Caribbean. The world finished the war to end all wars intent on securing long-lasting peace, but the Marine Corps finished the war and quickly resumed its duties fighting the Banana Wars. For decades, Marines deployed to Cuba, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, all in an effort to control the small wars going on there. The war with Japan, which the Marine Corps foresaw and prepared for as early as the 1920s, did not come immediately or even quickly. Rather, the Marine Corps slogged its way through a series of small wars nearer to home.

As much as the Marine Corps would like to focus on the next big war, it is important to remember that it is significantly more likely to get involved in numerous small wars before the next big one strikes again. The Marine Corps has an obligation to be prepared for a variety of contingencies: "such other duties as the President may direct."[18] In its constant battle to remain relevant, the Marine Corps must prepare to say "yes" to any of the contingencies, both large and small, which the American people might ask it to undertake.

Conclusion

As we celebrate the sacrifices and accomplishments of the 4th Brigade in France, exactly 100 years ago, the Marine Corps can be proud of those accomplishments and of the accomplishments which followed. Some of the most famous, thoughtful, forward-looking leaders of the 20th century cut their teeth with the 4th Brigade: Lejeune, Daly, Ellis, Neville, Holcomb, and Shepherd, just to name a few.

As the Marine Corps looks forward into the 21st century, it should be excited.

As the Marine Corps looks forward into the 21st century, it should be excited. There are many new challenges but also many new opportunities. Leaders at the very top of both the Department of Defense and HQMC have correctly challenged their organizations to continue improving, continue innovating, and continue evolving. These leaders have opened new venues for Marines to express themselves and their ideas. And at the same time, they have charged Marines to "protect what they've earned"—that spirit which sustained Marines at Belleau Wood and which will sustain on future battlefields. Though individual Marines may not live forever—as Dan Daly famously put while going over the top at Belleau Wood—the Marine Corps certainly can.

Notes

1. World War I Exhibit, the National Museum of the Marine Corps, (Quantico, VA). See https://www.usmcmuseum.com.

2. Alexander Merrow, Gregory Starace, and Agostino von Hassell, "Belleau Wood," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: November 2008).

3. Alan Axelrod, *Miracle at Belleau Wood: The Birth of the Modern U.S. Marine Corps*, (Lyons Press, October 2010).

4. John Hickman, *Early American Wars*, (Kurose Ross, 1982).

5. The Civil War Trust, "Civil War Facts," available at https://www.civilwar.org.

6. Alan Rems, "Semper Fidelis: Defending the Marine Corps," *Naval History Magazine*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, June 2017).

7. Maj Ralph Stoney Bates, "Belleau Wood: A Brigade's Human Dynamics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: November 2015).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. "Semper Fidelis."

11. LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume I*, (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1989).

12. LtCol F.G. Hoffman, "Military Innovation in the Interwar Period," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: February 2016).

13. History Division, Marine Corps University, "Who's Who in Marine Corps History: Major General George Barnett," (Quantico, VA).

14. History Division, Marine Corps University, "Who's Who in Marine Corps History: Lieutenant General John A Lejeune," (Quantico, VA).

15. "Belleau Wood: A Brigade's Human Dynamics."

16. "Belleau Wood."

17. Ibid.

18. Title 10 U.S. Code § 5063 (1956).

2018 Marine Corps University Belleau Wood Essay Contest: Second-Place Winner

A Battle to Remember

From the battlefield to the home front

by SSgt Matthew Hannula

>SSgt Hannula's essay was second overall in the MCU essay contest and was the winner of the Sergeants and Staff Sergeants' category.

As an engagement which holds a place of distinction in Marine Corps history, the Battle of Belleau Wood is taught to every Marine recruit and officer candidate during initial training. Ask any Marine about Belleau Wood, and one is likely to be regaled with tales of long-range marksmanship, the origin of the term "Devil Dogs," and the phrase, "Retreat, Hell!" To this day, the Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments still wear the French Fourragère, representing military honors bestowed upon the Marines by France. As historians and Marines reflect upon the lasting impact of Belleau Wood in the century since the battle, it is proper to recognize the actions of those who fought heroically in defense of France. The commander of the Marine Brigade, BG Harbord, USA, wrote, "No one who has not visited that wood can comprehend the heroism of the troops which finally cleared it of Germans."[1] But any analysis of the lessons of Belleau Wood that resonate today would be incomplete if it focused solely on tactical aspects of the battle itself, without acknowledging the greater strategic value of those fateful weeks in June 1918. This essay makes the case that the lesson that resonates to the greatest degree to this day is the importance of effective public relations, especially as the Marine Corps fight moves into the Information Age.

Any discussion of the legacy of Belleau Wood must take into account the condition of the Marine Corps in the pre-World War I era, which would be unrecognizable to those serving today. In the year preceding the entry of the United States into the First World War, the Marine Corps had just been authorized by the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 an increase in manning to 15,000 men.[2] The mission of the Corps was centered around providing security aboard naval vessels and serving as an advanced base force.[3] Sea and land power were considered the purview of the Navy and Army, respectively. As such, the Marine Corps did its best to seize every opportunity for gainful employment, with engagements ranging from the famous fighting at Chapultepec to the Boxer Rebellion.[4] The Marine Corps remained a relative afterthought, except when it was targeted for dissolution by proponents of the Nation's larger armed Services. President Theodore Roosevelt himself suggested in 1908 that the Marines "should be absorbed into the army and no vestige of their organization should be allowed to remain."[5] In plain terms,



Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, and MajGen John A. Lejeune take a ride on a tractor, World War I. *(Photo by Dept of Defense, 519401.)*

the Marine Corps' main focus was a battle for continued existence while simultaneously fighting the Nation's battles at home and abroad.

Concurrently, in 1907, the Marine recruiting office in Chicago established a publicity bureau, with the purpose of drumming up media coverage in pursuit of local recruiting goals.[6] The Marine Corps at large followed suit in 1911 with the creation of the Marine Corps Recruiting Publicity Bureau in New York.[7] One function of this bureau was to collect stories and ideas from the recruiters across the country and generate articles and photographs which could be provided free of charge to newspapers via *The Recruiters' Bulletin*.[8] Publishers enjoyed free copy to fill their papers, and the Marine Corps benefitted from publicity in areas that otherwise had no Marine presence. By the time the Marine Corps was poised to enter World War I, the Recruiting Publicity Bureau was operating at top speed, providing twice-weekly updates to 2,000 newspapers across the country.[9] Such efforts were intended to bolster the massive recruiting effort that the Great War demanded but also functioned as a nationwide public relations organ, giving the Marine Corps a share of publicity disproportionate to its size.

As the United States reluctantly entered World War I in 1917, the Marine Corps was lobbying to send a contingent to join the war effort in Europe. Army GEN John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, was hesitant, doubting that the Marines could operate side by side with his soldiers.[10] Commandant George Barnett was able to convince the Secretary of the Navy that Marine participation was critical to the survival of the Corps and secured a place for a relatively small contingent. Under this agreement, the Marine Corps had to wear Army uniforms and use Army weapons and equipment, a price the Marines were willing to pay to ensure participation; and the 4th Brigade (Marines) was dispatched to France. When the Marine Brigade finally joined the fighting in the area known as Bois de Belleau in June 1918, they were dressed and equipped as U.S. Army soldiers, firing Army rifles, and under the direct command of Army BG James Harbord. Over the course of the following weeks, the Marine Brigade carved out a place for itself in history through its tenacity and courage under fire while enduring historic losses during the Battle of Belleau Wood. The story of the battle itself is often where a Marine's instruction begins and ends, without the necessary context to ask the all-important question: "How did a battle fought in another Service's uniform, under the command of an Army general, become the defining battle of the Marine Corps?" The answer is, "By accident, to some degree." It goes without saying that the men who fought at Belleau Wood thoroughly deserve the glory bestowed upon them. The sacrifices made in the wheat fields and forests of France clearly stand on their own merits in the annals of military history. But the legend of Belleau Wood, and by extension, the Marine Corps, has enjoyed the advantage of circumstance with respect to the long-term strategic impact of this single battle.

The Marines were not alone in the woods outside Château-Thierry. There were French and American soldiers to their flanks, who were also engaged in fighting. Critically, there were also multiple news correspondents working throughout the region. These writers were bound by censorship rules and forbidden to identify with almost any specificity anything that could reveal the size and type of forces in a given area. However, it had occurred to some writers that the Marine Corps was a Service unto itself, no different than the Army or Navy, and its identification as a monolithic Service would "convey no useful information to the enemy."[11] The request to use the generic term "Marines" was approved, and, as a result, the Marine Corps dominated the headlines of United States newspapers during the weeks-long battle, despite the fact that adjacent Army units were similarly engaged.[12] The Marine Corps' publicity infrastructure, designed to leverage media coverage in support of recruiting goals, was already primed for maximum public engagement and benefitted greatly from the front-page news coverage, as Marine volunteers enlisted at record rates.[13] The publicity machine the Marine Corps built was effectively magnifying the exploits of the Corps, making it appear as though the Marines were winning the war on their own. This was, of course, inaccurate. But in the world of 1918 news media, being "first to print" was more effective in drumming up support than actually being "First to Fight."

After the war, the Marine Corps would survive another round of military drawdowns, in part because of the publicity garnered from the coverage of Belleau Wood. Budget cuts and peacetime brought the elimination of *The Recruiters' Bulletin*. The Marine Corps emerged on the other side of the interwar years with a new concept for public relations: the combat correspondent. Born from a lack of suitable coverage at Wake Island during World War II, BGen Robert Denig sought to create a role within the Marine Corps for "writer-fighters." In stark contrast to the heavy coverage of the Marines at Belleau Wood, the heroic fighting taking place at Wake Island was described as "silence from Wake." A message released by the Navy in December 1941 simply stated, "The Marines on Wake island continue to resist." To combat this dearth of information, the Marine Corps trained combat correspondents to "fight first," and write accounts of the action after the fact.[14] Similar to *The Recruiters' Bulletin*, these correspondents also focused on the impact of the war effort at the local level, providing small-town newspapers with war stories of local interest. Key to these efforts was the speed with which stories were processed. Realizing the importance of being "first in print," stories were sent via air to Washington to be processed and disseminated.[15] Additionally, the Marines embraced new technologies such as film with sound to distribute the exploits of the Marine Corps to theaters in every city in America. By the time the famous flag raising atop Mount Suribachi took place, the Marine Corps was prepared to leverage the famous scene to dramatic effect, all with a staff less of less than 200 combat correspondents within an overall force approaching 500,000 Marines.[16] To bol-

Marine in gas mask about to give the gas alarm. *(Photo by Defense Dept, 528835.)*

ster the impact of this tiny force, and to foster good relations between the Service and the press, the Marine Corps embedded civilians such as Joe Rosenthal of the Associated Press, who took the famous photograph. It is difficult to imagine today a more iconic image from World War II, but without a concerted effort to engage in deliberate public relations, the heroics of Iwo Jima could have suffered the fate of the "silence from Wake." Observing from the beach, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal famously remarked that the raising of the flag meant "a Marine Corps for the next 500 years." After the war, his prediction of a stable future for the Marine Corps was codified into law in the National Security Act of 1947, a momentous achievement for a Service that had otherwise existed to some degree on the periphery of the Defense establishment.

The public relations lessons learned at Belleau Wood and reinforced in the island-hopping campaign of World War II continue to resonate with the modern warfighter. The concept of the "strategic corporal," a tactical small unit leader whose actions can have magnified follow-on effects, is an apt lesson in applied public relations and crisis management.

While the fundamentals of warfare have remained constant for thousands of years, the speed and breadth of the dissemination of information has increased exponentially in the modern "viral video" world. The Marine Corps has adroitly demonstrated the ability to leverage positive media coverage during its existence but also has suppressed negative publicity at times. Ubiquitous cameras and Internet connectivity have hampered the ability of the Marine Corps to fully control the flow of information from the battlefield to the home front, with strategic implications. This was made especially clear in 2012, when a video began circulating on the Internet of Marines in Afghanistan urinating on the dead bodies of Taliban fighters. The incident had taken place months earlier during counterinsurgency operations. At the time the video began to circulate online, the United States was seeking to wind down operations in Afghanistan after a recent troop surge and negotiate for peace. The video was described by an Afghan peace council official as having a "very, very bad impact on peace efforts."[17] The propaganda value of this video was also clear for recruiting new insurgents to fight NATO forces. Additionally, the speed with which videos such as this are able to spread makes seizing the media initiative difficult for the Marine Corps. In the same manner in which the Marines were given disproportionate credit for their efforts at Belleau Wood, the entire Marine Corps was blemished by the Taliban urination video for the actions of a few.

As the Marine Corps returns its focus to its expeditionary roots, the challenges of the 1918 era have shifted to some degree. Although the Marine Corps does not face the same existential threat it did prior to 1947, as the smallest branch of the military, the Marine Corps must compete with the larger Services for money and manning. Recruiting remains a primary effort, as the Marine Corps trains tens of thousands of new enlisted members and officers every year. A primary message of recruiting has focused on the "elite" status of the Marine Corps that styles itself as the best of the best. For years, the Marines have made efforts to distinguish themselves both in battle and visually. One aspect of this manifested itself in the "MARPAT" utility uniform, unique to Marines. While the Marine Corps has traditionally embraced the idea of being an elite Service unto itself, within the Service it has taken measures to reduce individualism within the ranks. The modern Marine uniform carries no unit identifying patches, unlike the Army. But this desire for uniformity has unintended consequences. As an extension of this elitism, the Marine Corps resisted joining the ranks of United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), believing that the Service was best served keeping its finest Marines in house. The Global War on Terror came with increased missions and funding for special operations forces, and the Marines found themselves on the outside looking in. Without a significant seat at the table, the Marine Corps risked once again slipping into perceived obsolescence. The Marine Corps eventually rolled its force reconnaissance companies into the modern iteration of the Marine Raiders, joining

Belleau Wood relief map. *(File photo.)*

SOCOM in earnest decades after its founding.

As it has been throughout its history, the Marine Corps is currently engaged around the world on behalf of the Nation. Increasingly, these actions are being undertaken by the special operations community, which is especially popular in books and films, and which is often the center of recruiting campaigns, despite the small numbers relative to the armed forces at large. Each Service has its own distinguishing mark of its elite members: the Army Ranger tab and 75th Ranger Regiment scroll, the Green Berets of the Army Special Forces, and the golden trident of the Navy SEALs. In the modern era, these are not only marks of accomplishment, but they are Service-wide branding that allows a layman to see a photograph or film clip of a service member and recognize, "That's a Green Beret." The Marine Corps recently adopted its own insignia for the Marine Raider community, once again applying lessons learned throughout its history, realizing that public trust and confidence in the Marine Corps requires the public to first recognize Marines in action. Although this was not the primary purpose of any of these signature marks of elite warriors, the effect this change will have on the Marine Corps resonates just the same. Navigating the Marine Corps' website, one can observe how the small raider and reconnaissance communities are dramatically overrepresented in published photos and features, relative to their size. Once again, the Marine Corps recognized the stories that sell and kept the public engaged and the recruiting mission met.

When applying lessons learned from the century-old case study of the Battle of Belleau Wood, it may appear, on the surface, to be difficult to compare the era of trench warfare to the modern battlefield. But the underlying fundamentals of warfare have not changed, only the methods by which practitioners of the martial arts conduct war. History is not only written by the victors but by those who bother to record it at all. Although this essay demonstrates the force-multiplying effect of publicity, it merely amplifies the actions of the Marine in combat and is no substitute for the underlying accomplishments. If a single word had never been recorded of the exploits of the Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood, its actions would be no less courageous, but there also may not be a Marine Corps today. Through true courage and a bit of luck, the Marines of Belleau Wood made it possible for the Americans of today to recognize the names "Guadalcanal," "Khe Sanh," "Fallujah," and "Sangin."

The legacy of the Marine Brigade in France resonates with every Marine battle fought since and continues to ring especially true when Americans read with pride about the Corps they do not *need* but continue to *want*.

Notes

1. George B. Clark, *Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

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3. Ibid.

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2018 Marine Corps University Belleau Wood Essay Contest: Third-Place Winner

Army Generals, Expert Riflemen, Rogue Reporters, and Devil Dogs

How a far-off battle charted the course of the modern Marine Corps

by Col Maria McMillen

>Col McMillen's essay was the first-place winner in the Field Grade Officers' category and third place overall in the MCU essay contest.

"Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely," the dispatch of 26 June 1918 read.[1] The woods were eventually christened the *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*, or the Marine Woods, but they are more commonly known to all who have worn the eagle, globe, and anchor as Belleau Wood. After twenty days of tenacious fighting, the Marines had emerged with an uncompromising victory. The victory was the result of discipline, determination, and sacrifice: the hallmarks of the Marine Corps, before and since. The battle has cemented itself as a defining moment for the Corps for reasons both historical and legendary.

Much of how the Marine Corps operates today can be traced to the Battle of Belleau Wood, particularly with regard to the pride in belonging, passion for marksmanship training, and public relations, more commonly referred to today as strategic communications. The reality is that the battle has taken on mythical proportions. Yet the battle itself remains the centerpiece. The Marines who fought this specific engagement largely remain anonymous. Although remarkable Marines fought side by side, legends such as Sgt John Quick, Sgt Dan Daly, and future Commandants, Generals Clifton B. Cates, Thomas Holcomb, Wendell Neville, and Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., gained their iconic status before (for Quick and Daly) or after (for Cates, Neville, and Shepherd) the battle. At this hallowed ground, the battle itself and the fighting spirit of "The Marines" reigned supreme, vice that of a specific Marine or specific action. At Belleau Wood, there was no Marine or moment; there was no John Basilone at Guadalcanal or Flag Raising at Iwo Jima. Because of the anonymity of the Marines on the

Lejeune and staff members. *(File photo.)*

battlefield, the battle lives on, etching in every Marine a sense of camaraderie with those valiant Marines, those nameless Marines, who fought.

Today, the Marines no longer have in their ranks a living survivor of the battle; the ground has been trod by but a few. Yet the battle looms large in the hearts of our country's Marines, imprinting the ethos of determination against all odds and "every Marine a rifleman" into the young recruit at Parris Island, the rugged colonel facing retirement, and the spry veteran at the local American Legion. That battle is the Battle of Belleau Wood. The fighting spirit of the Marines who fought the battle remains, just as their names are lost to time. The lasting imperatives of the battle that are mirrored in today's Corps are eloquent in their simplicity: be proud of your title, be brilliant in the basics, accomplish the mission, and get the story out; and remember, sometimes the Marines' biggest ally might not be wearing Marine Corps green.

We Are Marines

During the battle, the Marine 4th Brigade was referred to as "the Marines." Not knowing their unit or specialization didn't seem to bother the Marines of the 4th Brigade, or any others for that matter; they were just pleased to be mentioned. Then as well as today, the pride of belonging to the Corps and being a Marine supplants any subcategorization. Other Services focus on the distinction of their differences, while the Marine Corps emphasizes its sameness. This pride in earning the title "Marine" is forged into all those who walk the parade decks of Parris Island, San Diego, and Quantico. Because it is earned, the title Marine is held in high regard by both those who earn the title and those who fight against them. This pride in belonging has carried over from the woods of France to the jungles of Vietnam, and, more recently, to the poppy fields of Afghanistan.

"I love the Corps for those intangible possessions that cannot be issued: pride, honor, integrity, and being able to carry on the traditions for generations of warriors past."
—Cpl Jeff Sornig

Every Marine A Rifleman

Upon encountering the Germans, the Marines relied on the habits they had formed in their training and in the jungles during the Banana Wars. Rather than go for a complex coordinated attack, they deployed along a low ridge and opened fire—slow, well-aimed, deliberate fire. Although the system of fire typically used during that time produced effective fire up to 200 yards, the Marines were inflicting causalities on the Germans at a range of approximately 800 yards. So accurate was the fire that the Germans believed they were being fired upon with machine guns.[2] The time spent on the rifle range and the obsessive preoccupation with marksmanship training was seeing results on a battlefield that had seen little progress in the four years prior. Today, Marines remain fanatical in their training. Ever-increasing proficiency in the rifle and more complex weapons systems are the driving forces behind Marine Corps training. This training is the bedrock that ensures the Marines will always be prepared, whenever and wherever they are called. This focus on the basics creates a foundation that puts well-trained Marines on the battlefield, ready to rush to the sound of gunfire and employ the solid tactics that training instills. Although the battleground has changed, focusing on the basics rather than on the exquisite or unique has delivered victories in battles as diverse as Iwo Jima, Pusan, Khe Sanh, and Fallujah.

"Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman. All other conditions are secondary."
—Gen Alfred M. Gray

Accomplish the Mission

The Marines on 6 June 1918 were told by the French Corps Commander via their Brigade Commander, BG James Harbord, USA, to "rectify the line and secure stronger ground."[3] It took almost three weeks, but the Marines accomplished the mission. The ground covered was a mere 2,250 meters at its greatest distance, and in some places, the distance covered was less than 1,000 meters,[4] but that ground was hard won and involved "some of the most desperate fighting ever performed by troops."[5] This victory against a determined enemy was even greater than the ground covered from 1914 to spring 1918. The Germans had rarely been pushed back by the allies, so 2,250 meters was significant. Something as simple as accomplishing the mission and finishing what you set out to do has been a hallmark of the Marine Corps. If you want something done right, give it to the Marines. Even under daunting odds, the Marines find a way to "get the job done." This ability is a testament to a Marine's belief in himself and his belief in the Marines on his right and left. Prior to receiving the mission, the French were retreating from the ground the Marines would occupy. This tasking of improbable missions was not unique to World War I: the 1st Marine Brigade in Korea, once again under command of an Army Corps Commander, was given an almost identical mission in the Pusan perimeter—ultimately pushing back the

"Being ready is not what matters. What matters is winning after you get there."
—LtGen Victor H. "Brute" Krulak

North Korean unit 26 miles over four days.[6] Accomplishing the mission sets the Marine Corps apart. Since Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps has been the reliable entity to get the job done, no matter how difficult.

Tell It to the Press

Strategic communications was born on the wheat field! The ability to get the story of the Marines from the battlefield, runway, tent, field, and office has served the Marine Corps well. The Marines capitalized on self-promotion and the love affair the Nation had with her Marines; to tell their story, the Marines didn't have to wait for the selfie, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat to spread the word. They let the embedded journalists do it for them. Much of the legend that was born on Belleau Wood was brought to the news-hungry American public because of wartime restrictions, not in spite of them.

> ***"The Marine Corps has just been called by the New York Times, 'The elite of this country.' I think it is the elite of the world."***
>
> ***—ADM William Halsey, U.S. Navy***

In an effort to keep the specific units unknown to the enemy, the chief censor of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) inadvertently made a slip in the instructions relative to mentioning specific troops.[7] Gen John J. Pershing, USA, censored journalists from writing specific units in their dispatches. The journalist assigned to the Marines, Floyd Gibbons, was a writer with a colorful style. During the World War, to save time and get the "exclusive," journalists would pre-write articles and wait until after the fighting concluded to fill in the blanks. Injured but not treated at the "dressing station," Floyd Gibbons was assumed dead. As a last favor to the "dead" Gibbons, the censor published his pre-written dispatch in all of its sensational glory. The account of the Marine Brigade at Belleau Wood parlayed the exploits and heroic accounts of the Marines. Since no other units had been mentioned in articles, there was considerable glory in the headlines and jealousy by non-Marine units in the retelling.[8]

Floyd Gibbons is also most likely the one who conceived the term Teufelhunden, or Devil Dogs. As the phrase was written by him at a time, the term didn't literarily exist in German, as it was technically misspelled and tensed incorrectly. Nonetheless, it has gained legendary status, and the correct spelling and factual origin are of little consequence when the lore prevails.[9] Still today, the Marine Corps' strategic communications, or propaganda, as some call it, is deliberately fostered by a trained team of public affairs specialists, but often the most sensational and lasting headlines are not generated from within the Corps but by those reporting through pictures and words on the Marine Corps Story. Who can forget Operation IRAQI FREEDOM's post-Fallujah photo of the Marlboro Marine or Tom Ricks' book *Making the Corps*? These are but a few memorable examples, however; the Marine Corps is consistently reported on favorably by journalists, authors, and photographers. Often, the Marine Corps will use the pictures and quotes in their own recruitment or motivation products. No Service uses strategic communications to a greater advantage than the United States Marine Corps, a lesson lastingly learned in the woods and wheat fields of France.

The Ally in Another Service

4th Marines initially had a Marine commander. However, in May 1918, Marine BGen Charles Doyen was found physically unfit during a required physical exam; the periodic exams were an element of AEF policy that general officers were required to perform. GEN Harbord, GEN Pershing's Chief of Staff, was chosen to take command, as Pershing told him he could give him no better command in France than that of the Marine Brigade.[10] He was excited to command Marines but wasn't sure the feeling was mutual. It was. GEN Harbord led the Marines during one of the most memorable battles of the Corps, and the Marines looked upon him favorably as demonstrated by their affectionate display when he was promoted to major general on 30 June 1918[11] as well as when the Marines commissioned a portrait of GEN Harbord to hang in the Washington, DC, Army-Navy Club. Many Marines contributed to the portrait, to include the then-Commandant, MajGen John A. Lejeune.[12] In 1923, GEN Harbord was made an honorary Marine at the dedication of Belleau Wood as an American Battle Monument. The words he spoke that day, some five years after the battle, ring true today, almost 100 years later:

LTG James G. Harbord. *(Photo from Library of Congress, No. 32263.)*

> Now and then, a veteran, for the brief span that we still survive, will come here to live again the brave days of that distant June. Here will be raised the altars of patriotism; here will be renewed the vows of sacrifice and consecration to country. Hither will come our countrymen in hours of depression, and even of failure, and take new courage from this shrine of great deeds.[13]

His designation as an honorary Marine speaks to the positive impact he had on the Marine Corps and its legacy.

"I can't say enough about the two Marine divisions. If I use words like 'brilliant,' it would be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job they did."
—GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA

There are many instances in battle when members of another Service have been the staunchest advocates for the Marines, usually commending their fighting spirit and tenacity in battle. Men such as MG Frank E. Lowe, USA, who stated in 1952 during Korea that "the safest place in Korea was right behind a platoon of Marines. Lord, how they could fight,"[14] and GEN Wesley Clark, USA, during the Gulf War, who stated, "The more Marines I have around me, the better I like it."[15] Clearly, the Marines are held in high regard by other Services. That was true at Belleau Wood, and it is true today.

Belleau Wood: The Defining Moment

At Belleau Wood, the Marines met a well-postured German force that mustered all its strength in the spring of 1918 for an all-out effort to break through the stalemate that had defined trench warfare for the previous four years. The Germans reached Belleau Wood because they had achieved a breakthrough, and they were ready to capitalize on the momentum gained against the French. They didn't count on meeting the United States Marines, a combat force that proved most effective in stopping the German advance. The incredible, almost implausible, victory came at a huge cost. During the battle, 4th Brigade, a unit of some 9,000 Marines, the largest tactical unit of Marines ever assembled, suffered extensive casualties, with more than 4,000 killed or wounded.[16] On 6 June, the Marine Corps' "longest day," Marines suffered more than 1,000 killed in action, more than the Marine Corps had sustained in its 143-year existence.

Belleau Wood was *the* defining point, when the United States Marine Corps transformed from a very competent fighting unit usually fighting in far-off, little known places to the modern Marine Corps machine fighting the Nation's and the world's battles alongside the Army on the world stage. It transformed the Corps from a niche naval and small wars force to the fighting organization that is seen as the first effort to put against world conflicts today. The Corps is still a supremely competent force, a reflection of those Marines who fought the enemy in the wheat and the woods of France, a force consisting of individuals who are proud to own the title Marine, a force that epitomizes every Marine a rifleman and is good, really good, at the basics, a force that gets the job done and knows how to let the American public know they did it, through embedded reporters and other service members. The Battle of Belleau Wood looms large, greater than the greats who fought it; 100 years later, it still captivates and encapsulates the Marines of today and continues to define the modern Marine Corps fighting spirit.

Belleau Wood was* the *defining point ... It transformed the Corps from a niche naval and small wars force to the fighting organization that is seen as the first effort to put against world conflicts today.

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2018 Marine Corps University Belleau Wood Essay Contest: Fourth-Place Winner

The Everlasting Impact of Belleau Wood

Leaving a legacy from the first fight

by LCpl Henry Luu

The Battle of Belleau Wood, one of the most meaningful battles in Marine Corps history, is still influencing much of the Marine Corps' way of fighting to this day. This battle only lasted for 26 days, but its impact on the Corps will remain forever. The Marine Corps is proud of its motto "First to fight." This mentality, of being the first ones on the battlefield, is derived from the Battle of Belleau Wood. The Marine Corps also learned resourcefulness through this battle, utilizing what scarce gear and supplies it had on the battlefield. Additionally, with this resourcefulness, the Marine Corps learned the power of striking where it counts. Before deploying any Marines to any conflict, including the Battle of Belleau Wood, there is strategic planning from leaders and commanders who know their Marines through shared training. The Battle of Belleau Wood is a terrific example of understanding the potential of a brigade, understanding when to strike, and understanding what is needed to win a battle. It was also an extraordinary display of conviction and willpower by those in charge and unswaying morale by those being led. This was the first battle of World War I that the Marines encountered, and they demonstrated their superior fighting ability, and as a result, the Battle of Belleau Wood ended with a victory for the Allied Powers.

>LCpl Luu's essay was awarded first place in the Corporals and Below category and fourth place overall in the MCU essay contest.

What It Means to be Prepared

In the Battle of Belleau Wood, the Marine Corps adopted one of its earliest, most powerful, and inexorable mottos, "First to Fight." In his book *Miracle at Belleau Wood*, Alan Axelrod describes the Marines as "having volunteered to be the First to Fight and toughened by training at Parris Island and Quantico."

Being toughened by crucial training enables Marines to effectively win battles. However, in reality, the Marine Corps cannot fully prepare the individual Marine for the carnage that Belleau Wood represents. According to author David Bonk,

> In the course of late May and June, the Americans learned very hard lessons about the reality of warfare. The inadequacies of their training and shortcomings of their officers were measured in the length of the casualty lists. The real impact of the American battles of June 1918 was not in the ground taken or villages captured. Although the immediate result of the battle of Belleau Wood was to stop the German advance towards Paris and allow the French Army to reorganize, there was much more at stake. When the 2nd Division confronted the Germans at Belleau Wood, the Americans and Germans entered into a final struggle for moral ascendancy over the battlefield and the final outcome of the war ... boosting the morale of the troops. Conversely, possession of moral ascendancy demoralized your enemies and eroded their will to resist. The rapid string of Allied victories following the collapse of the German offensive in July 1918 bears testimony to the impact of the battle of Belleau Wood.[1]

Bonk explains that because of the fog of war and human error, the training that the Marines shared could not completely alleviate the factor of death in war. The Battle of Belleau Wood is a testament to the truth that Marines can only prepare to an extent. According to an article by Stephen L. Foster, "Overall, on the first day of battle the Marines lost nearly 1,100 men." But with this, the magnitude of spilled blood only fuels the inextinguishable fire that every Marine houses. The Marines in the battlefield developed their "moral ascendancy." Even though the Marines were at a disadvantage, this boost in morale is one of the ultimate factors that led to the victory of Belleau Wood. The shortcomings of training were bandaged by the Marines' morale. One of the lessons that the Marine Corps learned from Belleau Wood is that training must be met with

the morale and spirit of Marines when the battle begins. There is no ending until the enemy surrenders.

Resourcefulness within Allies

The Marine Corps also strived to be one of the most resourceful branches of the U.S. military. The United States Marine Corps Historical Society explains, "The Leathernecks and Doughboys were left to use their mess kits and bayonets to dig their positions, scraping out shallow fighting holes, they nicknamed 'foxholes,' for cover." At the time, Marines were given inferior tools to perform a job. But they adapted and prevailed. "Within a day … the Germans launched their first assault … For the next two days General Ludendorff's troops would attempt to break the American line, but to no avail."[2] The Marines learned how to hold their own against a better equipped force with their steadfast abilities and leadership. But this resourcefulness cannot be made without the help of allies. According to Foster,

> On June 30, 1918 the French Sixth Army officially proclaimed that the Bois de Belleau would henceforth be referred to as Bois de la Brigade de Marine, an homage to the new-found respect the Marines earned from their French counterparts.

Every step the Marines took brought new allies to the fight. This is one of the most resourceful factors because the Marines were able to rely on the skills from other nations to help aid them in battle. This also had an impact within the Department of Defense.

> Likewise, a bridge of respect was built between the Marines and their Army Commander, Brigadier General Harbord. Presented [with] a set of Eagle, Globe, and Anchor insignia from the men he led into battle, Harbord wore them on his uniform for years. Of his Marines, Harbord said, "I cannot write of their splendid gallantry without tears coming to my eyes! There has never been anything better in the world."[3]

The word resourcefulness comes from the word resource; with allies, the Marine Corps was able to bolster its defense, offense, and morale through the efforts and resources provided unexpectedly but willingly from allies on the cruel battlefield.

Conviction, Willpower, and Fear

> At about 3 o'clock Monday morning [June 10] the Marines started, as soon as the artillery fire was stopped, to go through those woods. At the nearer edge of the woods, devastated by our shellfire, they encountered little opposition. A little further on the Germans made a small stand, but were completely routed; that is, those who were not killed. By this time the Marines were fairly started on their way. They swept forward, clearing out machine gun nests with rifle fire, bayonets, and hand grenades.[4]

Early in the morning, the Marines marched through the gap of German fire with the conviction and willpower to capture Belleau Wood. This does not mean Marines are fearless. They fear a greater fear. "Marines know fear," said LtGen Peter Pace while he was the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe, in 1998,

> People think Marines don't fear combat. Their greatest fear is not living up to the heritage of the Marines at Belleau Wood, the Marines at Iwo Jima. This heritage is what leads troops forward. It's this heritage that keeps them going as they fight for each other.[5]

The Marines' willpower to cut through fear on the battlefield resonates through every preceding battle and war that they have encountered and continue to encounter. The conviction to follow through with tradition is found within the leadership and subordinates in every unit. A lesson that the Marines learned through conviction and willpower on the battlefield was that there is a greater loss if the mission is not completed; with this loss comes the loss of their brothers and sisters in battle.

Lessons Learned

Throughout the Marine Corps' history, there is one commonality: everything is born from blood. The Marine Corps trains its Marines with the mentality, "Train how you fight." This practice is built from the blood of past Marines, the blood of the brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice and built the standard and lessons learned for those who came after them. This practice works because it is the scaffold that supports future Marines through the knowledge of past failures and successes from prior battles and wars, creating a more knowledgeable and warfare-smart fighting force. Whether it is the Battle of Belleau Wood, Chosin Reservoir, or Desert Storm, Marines will always learn from their mistakes and actions. Through this bloodshed, the Marine Corps' leadership develops lessons learned from all battles in order to continue to win and mitigate the amount of future blood that will be spilled on the battlefield. The men and women who enter the battlefield know that there is no greater honor than dying for a better future for the people of the United States and all free peoples of the world. The battlefield is unforgiving, and the only respite Marines have is within their unit and squad.

Every Marine lives this important, condemned lesson from their first battle: the pain of losing a fellow Marine in battle and the yearning to protect what is left. And with this, the Marine Corps will continue to strive for the best. Future battles and wars will bring future traditions, tactics, and safeguards.

Notes

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Battle of Belleau Wood

"Retreat, Hell! We just got here."

by LtCol Michael "Kiwi" Kelly, USMC(Ret)

For any attempt to learn, the lesson needs to be placed in its true context to make the learning experience of value. The following is offered as a primer to help put Belleau Wood in its proper context. To better understand the battle, we need to understand the following:

1. The Battle.
2. The Wood.
3. The Allies.
4. The Joint Environment.
5. The Enemy.
6. Ourselves.

The Battle

Strategic level. The year was 1918. The Germans sought a decision on the Western Front before the weight of the U.S. forces, the AEF (American Expeditionary Forces), would have an impact. They transferred approximately a half million troops from the Eastern (Russian) Front over the winter of 1917–1918 with the objective of forcing the British to withdraw from the continent. They sought to achieve this through a series of offensives that would draw the French strategic reserves to protect Paris. An exhausted France, abandoned by its British ally, was expected to seek a negotiated settlement.

Operational level. The 1918 German campaign plan consisted of five offenses, Operation BLUCHER, the Aisne-Marne offensive, being the third. The German advance toward Château-Thierry brought the Germans closer to Paris than they had been since the opening campaign of the war in 1914. The French requested, and received, the 2nd and 3rd U.S. Infantry Divisions to help stem the German tide in the Aisne-Marne region, in the vicinity of Château-Thierry.

Gen Clifton B. Cates, Commandant 1948–51. ***(Official Marine Corps photo.)***

The 3rd Infantry Division blocked the German advance in the vicinity of Château-Thierry. The 2nd Infantry Division was positioned to the west with the Marine Brigade assigned the sector around Belleau Wood and the 3rd Infantry Brigade centered on Vaux. There was no deliberate decision to assign the woods to the Marines; units were initially placed as they arrived. The Paris-Metz highway was designated a unit boundary, with units later consolidated and repositioned.

The Wood

Belleau Wood is little more than three kilometers in length, only one kilometer at its widest point. At the start of the battle, the woods were full and lush; three weeks later, they resembled a plantation of toothpicks. While the trees could absorb blast and shrapnel, a direct hit by artillery transformed them into thousands of deadly wooden fléchettes. While the surrounding farmers' fields are gently rolling pastures, much of the wood's interior is compartmentalized terrain, often resembling a mini-Bridgeport. Even with today's technology, C2 (command and control) of anything larger than a platoon would prove challenging. The wood was neither tactically nor strategically significant in itself; it was the battle of opposing wills for psychological dominance that underscored its importance.

Your Allies

On 3 June, by Les Mares farm, four kilometers west of Belleau Wood, Capt Lloyd Williams, 51st Company Commander, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, uttered the now-famous refrain, "Retreat, Hell! We just got here!" to a retreating French officer. As Marines, the concept of retreat is foreign, but putting

>LtCol Kelly was medically retired from the Marine Corps in 2005. He lives north of Belleau Wood and for the last 10 years has escorted and participated in Marine Corps PMEs that visit the Wood.



Then-MajGen Thomas Holcomb, Commandant 1936–43. (Official Marine Corps photo.)

this French retreat into context is important to both the battle itself and our interaction with allies today. The Allies had endured four years of high-intensity combat, sustaining casualties barely fathomable today. The British attack along the Somme on 1 July 1916, partially designed to relieve the pressure on the French in the vicinity of Verdun, suffered approximately 80,000 casualties; of those, 19,600 were killed in action. Had the British continued at this rate for another two and a half days, they would have equaled the total U.S. killed in a decade in Vietnam (approximately 58,000). During these 1918 offenses, the French Army had witnessed the German Army take in a matter of days what had taken them months and huge casualties to capture in the previous two years. In Operation BLUCHER, the German 6th Army (seventeen-plus divisions) had achieved complete surprise and shattered the French 7th Army (ten divisions), which had foolishly massed its forces in the forward trenches. Once penetrated, the demoralized French fell back toward Château-Thierry.

The fact that the French had held the shoulders of the salient at Reims and the vicinity of Soissons created a favorable condition for the Allied counterattack in July that began the front-wide retrograde of German forces on the Western Front.

LtCol Logan Feland, Executive Officer, 5th Marines, noted that some Marines were hanging out at the regimental command post longer than required, delaying their return to their units engaged in the wood, this after only a few days of intense fighting; compare four days to the four years the French had endured. At this stage of the war, the British were suffering 70,000 casualties per month; the French, 112,000.

We can question why the French pushed the attack on Belleau Wood ...

We can question why the French pushed the attack on Belleau Wood, severely limiting the Marines' preparations; in many cases, battalions were conducting assaults with almost no warning or preparation. The answer is threefold. First, there was the pre-war French doctrine that emphasized the offensive, or élan. Second, the French were desperate to reclaim French territory, and with fresh American forces, they had the assets to press the occupying Germans. Third, the French knew from costly experience that the longer they delayed the attack, the more time the Germans had to strengthen their defenses, making future assaults all the more costly.

In an era of increasing coalition warfare, it is essential that we understand the culture, experiences, and doctrine of our partners as well as the enemy.

The Joint Environment

The 4th (Marine) Brigade, commanded by an Army brigadier at Belleau Wood, fought the entire war as part of the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division, which was later commanded, from August until the armistice in November 1918, by Marine Gen John A. Lejeune. The Marine Brigade included the Army's 2nd Engineer Battalion, which fought alongside Marines through to the last night of the war, building pontoon bridges to support the 5th Marines' crossing of the Meuse. Marine air did not fly in support of the Brigade, serving in the Azores and Belgium. Fires were provided by a combination of the French Air Force, U.S. Army, and French Army artillery units.

The 2nd Infantry Division was rated as one of the top three U.S. Army divisions in WWI, along with the 1st and 26th Divisions. The 2nd Infantry Division suffered the most casualties, saw the third most days in combat, and captured the highest toll of enemy prisoners. The official heraldry of the 2nd Infantry Division is the "Indian Head," which has been incorporated into several 5th and 6th Marines' unit logos.

Your Enemy

The German Army in 1918 was an exhausted but still-determined adversary. It was well led and could draw upon four years of experience. By 1918, the strength of a German division was less than half a U.S. division. A Marine battalion could put more Marines into the fight than a German regiment, but what the Germans lacked in manpower, they made up for in firepower, possessing a higher percentage of machine guns per unit. The Marines would face elements of five German divisions at Belleau Wood. The units the Marines engaged in the woods were, for the most

part, commanded by Maj Josef Bischoff, recipient of the Iron Cross 1st Class in 1915 and awarded the Germans' highest medal, the Pour Le Mérite, for his leadership at Belleau Wood. Maj Bischoff was ideally suited to lead the Germans here, having experienced jungle warfare in German East Africa (today's Tanzania), perfect preparation for the close-quarter fighting in the woods.

Many of our doctrinal concepts in *MCDP 1, Warfighting* (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997), can be directly traced back to the tactical innovations of the German Army between 1916 and 1918 (enemy focus, surface and gaps, mission tactics).

Yourself

In 1917, the Corps totaled 17,400 Marines. By the end of the war, we were 79,500; of those, 32,000 served in France, along with 330 Navy personnel. Gen Smedley Butler led a second brigade of Marines during the occupation of Germany after the armistice. Other Marines continued to serve around the globe. Initially, the Marines utilized the "triangle" formation of three platoons, three companies, but in compliance with the U.S. Army, they adopted the British "box" formation with four platoons and four companies per battalion. Companies were numbered, not alphabetized. As an example, 2d Bn, 6th Marine's four rifle companies were numbered 78th, 79th, 80th, and the 96th, the 96th being added when the Marines transitioned to the box, or four-company battalion. Familiar names such as Parris Island and Quantico became Marine installations during the war.

MajGen Wendell C. Neville, Commandant 1929–1930. *(DOD photo (USMC) 302062.)*

Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant 1952–55. *(DOD photo (USMC) A402516.)*

At Belleau Wood, four future Commandants (1stLt Clifton B. Cates, 1stLt Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Maj Thomas Holcomb, Col Wendell C. Neville) would see action, as would many of the regimental and divisional commanders who would lead us across the Pacific. Four Medals of Honor would be awarded, two to Marine Gunnery Sergeants, two to U.S. Navy officers, one a dentist serving on the front lines. On the opening day of the battle of Belleau Wood, 6 June, the Marines would suffer 1,087 casualties, more than had been lost in the 143 years since our founding on 10 November 1775, and such a bloody day would not be suffered again until the assault on Tarawa—20 November 1943. During the 22 days of Belleau Wood, Marines would suffer 1,062 killed in action, with a total casualty count of 9,036, more than the initial number of Marines in the Brigade on 6 June.

Conclusion

In the overall course of the war, the importance of the battle for Belleau Wood is questionable. What would have happened had the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions not blocked the German advance crossing the Marne is open for debate. The origin of the term "Devil Dogs" is debatable; no matter, we are not about to change that. What is not questionable is the psychological importance of this fight; it buoyed our exhausted Allies and extinguished any hope of the Germans that the American Expeditionary Force could not fight. Surviving German records attest to the bravery, marksmanship, and even recklessness of the individual Marine; there is no debate there. Our initial tactics, C2, and decisions may have been questionable, but the Marines learned and adapted. For the Corps, Belleau Wood and subsequent battles shaped the next generation of senior leadership that would take us across the island-hopping Pacific campaign of World War II. Without the lessons of World War I, we would not have been prepared for World War II; they did not forget. Nor can we. *Semper Fidelis.*

USMC

The Battle of Belleau Wood

Why the Marines won

by Bradley J. Meyer

Belleau Wood. *(Painting by Frank Earle Schoonover.)*

Why did the Marines win the Battle of Belleau Wood? The actions on 11 June 1918 were key. On that day, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines charged across "the wheatfield," decisively entered the wood, broke the German line, and drove across the breadth of the wood. They cleared most of the area, along with an attack the following day, but the wood was not finally cleared until 26 June because of a number of factors: exhaustion of the Marine Brigade, partial reinforcement and recovery of their position by the Germans and the ensuing period of gas warfare trying to maximize American casualties, and a final defensive line to the north. But the actions on 11 June broke the back of the German defense.

German sources make clear why the Marine attack of 11 June succeeded. A small party of Marines, who remain unidentified to this day, after suffering heavy casualties assaulting across the wheatfield, hit an undefended gully just after entering the wood. The Germans had stationed forces to cover this gully, but they were taken out by the preparatory artillery fire. Furthermore, the gully was a weak point; not only was it a junction point between two different regiments (the 461st of the German 237th Infantry Division and the 40th of the German 28th Infantry Division) but it was also a junction point between the two divisions—the 237th and the 28th.

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

Map 1: Action on 6 June. *(Map by author.)*



Map 2: Action on 11 June. *(Map by author.)*

Working down the gully, this party of Marines, and others who no doubt followed them, came in behind the right flank of the German 2/40th Regiment and rolled up its two rightmost companies from the flank and rear. Marines attacking from the southern part of the wood (2/6) hit the battalion from the front, while elements of 2/5 continued rolling up the battalion from its right rear. The 2/40th Battalion broke. Large numbers of Germans surrendered or were shot as they tried to escape the collapsing German position.

Meanwhile, the German battalion to the left of the penetration point (from the Marines' perspective), the 1st Battalion, 461st Regiment, was rolled up from its left by Marines who exploited the newly opened gap, surrounding the two leftmost German companies. When the Germans brought up their reserves, these companies had to fight their way out in "savage hand to hand combat."[1]

In what was no doubt a highly confused action, the Marines of 2/5 drove all the way across the wood; they arrived on the east side of Belleau Wood, but they thought they were on the north side. They looked out of the wood and saw the village of Bouresches, which they thought was Belleau village, and they looked at Belleau and thought it was Torcy, which was north of Belleau Wood. This all seemed good, since the original plan had been to enter the wood, turn north, and clear it to the north end. But in fact, the north end of the wood was still occupied by substantial German forces, which in fact were behind and to the rear of the left flank of the Marine line. It took some time for 2/5's commander, LtCol Frederic M. Wise, and all of his company commanders to accept the idea that they had completely lost orientation and faced a serious threat to their flank and rear.[2]

In January 2018, myself and Maj Ryan Gordinier of the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) class of 2018 had the opportunity to reconnoiter the battlefield, preparatory to an expanded SAW staff ride to the battlefield. Already aware of this history, I hoped perhaps to be able to find the critical gully that enabled the rolling up of the German position. This proved to be possible. If you follow the attack path of 2/5 across the wheatfield, toward the end of the assault path of 2/5, there is a kind of depression that would offer cover to a standing man from the German machine guns known to have been off to 2/5's left flank at Hill 169. (See Map 1.)It is also the case that a kind of a ridgeline conceals the tree line off to the south of 2/5's line of attack (meaning that there would be no fire from that section of the woods).[3] It would be a natural thing for troops to move into that draw to find shelter from fire.

If you continue in the lowest part of this draw, you hit a little stream running through it, and if you continue down this stream, you hit the woods, where the stream becomes a gully perhaps twenty yards wide. If you continue down the stream, the valley widens until it turns into the central ravine which enters Belleau Wood from the northeast.

This little gully was in fact *the gully* that enabled 2/5 to get on the right flank

In what was no doubt a highly confused action, Marines of 2/5 drove all the way across the wood; the Marines arrived on the east side of Belleau Wood, but they thought they were on the north side.

This simple map was drawn by a Marine lieutenant before the battle of Belleau Wood. The map was used to designate machine-gun pits with proper interlocking fire. *(Photo by Agostino von Hassell.)*

of the German 40th Regiment and roll it up. The German 461st Regiment accused the 40th Regiment of breaking from a Marine frontal attack, enabling the Marines to roll up the left flank of the 461st. Responding to this accusation, the commander of the German 28th Division, General Gusav Boehm, stated that the flank of the 40th Regiment had been rolled up by a Marine attack coming up the gully of the central ravine.[4] That central ravine was in the German 237th Division's sector, not the 28th's. Therefore, a contemporary German source specifically fixed the gully the Marines used to enter the German position. This gully is not obscure or easily confused with other gullies in the area; it is the western end of the main gully in Belleau Wood.

It is apparent what happened. After crossing the wheatfield, some Marines of 2/5 had gotten into the gully, which according to German accounts was not covered, the positions intended to cover it having been taken out by artillery fire. German accounts say there were trench mortars intended to help cover 2/40th's left flank. But as soon as they opened fire, Marines assaulted out of the gully and overran them. Then, the whole German line was rolled up as previously described.

This reconstruction of events helps clarify an iconic image of Belleau Wood, Marines charging machine guns with bayonets. Generally speaking, in World War I, charging machine guns with bayonets didn't work too well. But a heavy machine gun's arc of fire is limited by its tripod to about 90 degrees to its front. The tripod can be shifted, but that takes some time.[5] So, if you came upon a machine gun from the rear, it might make sense to charge it before the trail could be shifted.

American accounts of the battle are much less clear than the Germans'. But if you think about it, it was not necessarily memorable to particular Marines that no one was shooting at them as they moved through a gully. Some mortars opened up off to the right, so they were rushed, and then there was a lot of confused fighting in which the little group rushed one or more German machine guns, possibly from the rear. When the confusion died down, everyone thought the battalion had turned left and driven to the north, but as it turned out, it had driven straight east.

It is telling that for years after the battle, LtCol Wise argued that the fight would have gone a lot better if they had followed his plan to attack farther to the north. Considering the astonishing good fortune of the attack as it actually took place, this is evidence that he never understood what had actually happened. Ironically, that may be true of all the Marines who fought on 11 June.

The Germans, however, knew what had happened to them.

What can be said by way of analysis and summary? First of all, this was very much a maneuver warfare battle. The Marines hit a gap and poured through it.

The Marines at Belleau Wood showed a high level of initiative and willingness to engage in combat at low levels, another maneuver warfare tenet. A lot of troops might have sat down and awaited orders once they reached the safety of the gully. As military historian Edward G. Lengel put it:

> Other men might have waited for direction or slavishly followed orders

that made no allowance for such an opportunity, but the Marines simply drove along the ravine and slammed with unstoppable momentum into the enemy flank and rear.[6]

The Marines attacked whatever enemy was nearest. In the confused fighting in Belleau Wood, perhaps no one on the Marine side had a complete picture of what was going on, but the overall effect was to break the German position.

In the charge across the wheatfield on 11 June (see Map 2), the first two companies suffered heavy losses from the flanking German machine-gun fire. The two rear companies suffered less. A small group of Marines hit a gap,—which German sources say was opened up by artillery fire—poured through the gap, crossed a small plateau, and rolled up the main German line. Other Marines, in a confused wooded environment where everyone quickly lost basic orientation (such as which way was north), exploited this gap and rolled up the German line to the north (461st Regiment) as well.

That, together with a lot of fighting spirit in all phases of the battle, is what won the battle of Belleau Wood.

Notes

1. All historical events, unless otherwise noted, are drawn from Edward G. Lengel, *Thunder and Flames: Americans in the Crucible of Combat*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015).

2. Robert B. Asprey, *At Belleau Wood*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965).

3. I had a conversation about two years earlier with a student of the battle, Col Sean Callahan, USMC(Ret), who had noticed from battlefield reconnaissance that one company of 3/5 in the 6 June attack that made it into Belleau Wood more or less intact, the 47th, had been sheltered by "a ridge near Lucy-le-Bocage." Maps made it clear this ridge was associated with Hill 181. While not directly related to 2/5's attack on 11 June, this conversation alerted me of potentially protective terrain in the wheatfield area. On 11 June, no Americans attacked south of the ridge, but its presence prevented fire coming from the base of the trees south of 2/5's attack route.

4. *Thunder and Flames*. See page 399, note 8 for General Gustav Boehm's statements about the breakthrough gully.

5. Waldemar Pfeifer, *Entwurf eines Exerzier-reglements fuer die Infanterie*, (Berlin: Verlan von R. Eisenschmidt, 1921).

6. *Thunder and Flames*.

2017 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest: Winner

Constraints

That which we must do

by Capt Brian M. Worley

Phone calls at 0430 are rarely good. I hop out of bed, hoping my wife is still asleep; I dislike when my burden become hers. The person on the other end tells me that one of my Marines is in the intensive care unit (ICU). I call my Gunny, and he's already aware. I am showered and in my truck heading to the hospital within fifteen minutes. I wear civvies because I'm not sure what this day will bring. The 45-minute drive to the hospital doesn't do much to calm my nerves, and I get conflicting word about what the battalion wants me to do. I turn off my phone. I know what I need to do: take care of my Marine. I get to the hospital and park; I ask a person in scrubs where I can find the ICU, and my Gunny and I link up to take the elevator. He is calmly focused.

I don't like hospitals. We get buzzed in to the ICU; I find the nurse and ask for the room. It's to my left, and I see him. My Marine. He's in a coma, on a ventilator, cut open from emergency surgery and plastered with gauze, sensors, and bandages. A traffic accident did this. A drunk driver. I don't know what to say. "S…, sir," is all my Gunny can get out. It captures the moment. I corner the charge nurse, and she tells me it isn't good. I see a small crowd outside the room, and I introduce myself and ask who the doctor is. It isn't good. They aren't sure he is going to survive. I call my boss and decide to stay put. This is where I need to be.

I send my Gunny back and tell him to send my sergeant down with a duty vehicle. The parents are flying in this afternoon; they've been made aware of the situation. His sister is returning from overseas, and his brother is studying in Asia; both are booking flights. I put a plan together in my mind. We will take care of them. It is not a question. Later on, my regimental sergeant major will describe it eloquently, "We only care for Marine families one way." Truth, sergeant major.

>Capt Worley is the S-4, 9th Comm Bn.

Picking up his parents from the airport is the worst thing I've ever had to do. I arrange with security for them to be taken off the flight first. The police officer is a Marine, and she helps immediately. *Semper Fidelis*. I speak to the California Highway Patrol, and they agree to escort us to the hospital. Minutes may be the difference in seeing their son alive. I wait at the gate with my sergeant and the chaplain. We're in civvies; Chaps is in his service uniform. I wish he wasn't. I see security escorting the parents. They see us; the mom is crying. I shake their hands. She asks me if her son is still alive. "Yes ma'am, but we need to go." She breaks down. All eyes in the airport are on us. This is a military town; people know what a chaplain in uniform and a crying mother means. I have to get them out of here. No one deserves an audience for their grief.

We get moving. We're in the van, and the highway patrol is leading the way, and my sergeant is worried about exceeding the speed limit in the government vehicle. "I don't care, tell them I ordered you to do it." We get to the hospital in record time.

He was our brother, a son, a sibling, and we all mourn his loss. *(Photo by Sgt Brittney Vella.)*

We have a plan to get their baggage later. I explain everything I know to the parents during the ride. We take the elevator up. Before we're buzzed in, I stop the group. "Ma'am, Sir, this isn't a good sight. Please know that we'll do everything we can to help." It isn't enough. We enter the ICU, and the mother sees her firstborn in a hospital bed. The father holds her as she shakes with grief. I'm in the doorway; the nurse asks me when the siblings are arriving. I ask her to shoot me straight.

"We don't know how long he will last," she says. The sister arrives in five hours. The brother is moving flights to get here sooner, but he will arrive in the early morning. My sergeant and I repeat the process at the airport. It is heart-wrenching each time. We would rather be anywhere else than looking in their eyes as they are escorted off the plane. The sister cries softly during the trip to the hospital. The brother tries to hold it in, masculine pride faltering only when he sees his brother. I hate that part. I ask if the family needs anything; the nurses bring blankets and pillows for them, and I sit in the corner of the room on a chair, unsure of what to do. The uncertainty is unnerving. Leaving feels wrong, like abandoning my post.

This is the second night we'll spend at the hospital. Last night, we slept in the waiting room, taking turns on watch. The nurses told us he could go at any moment, so I gave instructions for the watch to wake the group if anything happened. There were six of us the first night, sprawled on cushions and couches. I got some blankets when my watch ended to cover my Marines because they keep the hospital cold to kill bacteria. This morning, I asked for a razor. My reflection looked tired; I cut myself twice. I decided to invade a conference room closer to the ICU; the Marines had landed. The charge nurse was no nonsense, but I promised we would stay out of their way, and I'm grateful for her kindness. So the second night, five of us sleep under a conference room table, rotating watch. When my watch ends, I pause to look at my Marines, thankful they decided to stay. I didn't tell them to. They did what felt right, what needed to be done. I am humbled by their willingness to endure. Where do we find these people?

The day starts as the doctor consults with the family. Tests have come back with the worst possible news. Life support can keep him alive, but his brain is badly damaged. For a person who lived life aggressively, scuba diving, hiking, shooting, and climbing, there is no quality of life on a ventilator. The doctor stays to answer questions. The family says their final goodbyes and makes the decision to let him go. It's sunny outside; traffic zips by on the interstate, unaffected. We gather in the hospital room, his family, my Marines, myself. No one speaks. It's time. The technicians work, busily removing tubes and sensors and machines. Modern medicine. He looks peaceful, and I'm glad. Privately, I ask the nurse how long it will take. "Not long." I notice my guys crying. I wish they didn't have to see this, but it would be wrong to leave. I look at the father. He and I have talked a lot in the last few days. I see the pain in his eyes. Fathers shouldn't bury their sons.

It is mid-morning when he passes. The nurse announces it; it isn't like the movies; there is no flat tone to announce it. We cry. I grab his hand a final time. I hug his family. I wipe my eyes and step outside to make the call. I look at the nurse and try to articulate that I need to know the time and cause of death, and I call my CO. "Sir, he's gone. He's gone," is what I can get out. I call the adjutant and give him the information he needs for HQMC to start its process. I've already arranged rooms and transportation for the family. I focus on the mission to clear my head: take care of the family. I get us moving. We gather our belongings and return to Camp Pendleton on a quiet car ride. We get the family situated and go home to shower and sleep.

I am in Alphas at the funeral home. I am escorting the remains. My wife drops me off; she can tell I'm nervous. I watched *Taking Chance* because there is no publication for this. I'm early; the funeral director allows me to sit in his office while he prepares the hearse. I hear the Patriot Guard assembling outside. It's time to go. I check the tag on the coffin. It's him. It hurts.

We pull onto the street, and I speak to the Patriot Guard. A retired gunny salutes me and introduces himself. He apologizes for bringing only 25 riders; they used to get many more during the war years, he tells me. Makes sense. There is no nobility in dying in a traffic accident. They clear a path down to the airport. We salute the fallen as the airline crew carefully handles the coffin. I see the eyes of many veterans as they look me up and down, unsure. Credibility is an uphill battle as a lieutenant. I meet the mother and daughter in the terminal; they chose to fly with us. The flight is a redeye; we won't sleep much tonight. I do crosswords with the sister, and it keeps us occupied. I am worried about the family. I hope I have done enough for them.

At the airport in Atlanta, there is an office buried deep below the passenger terminals. I hope you are never there. The man who works in it loves his country; he serves by caring for the remains of fallen service members, taking charge of all those that fly through the airport. He's arranged an honor guard of airport workers, veterans who volunteer their time to honor our fallen. He shows us pictures of folks that he has helped bring home and tells us the stories of those service members. He has a float he enters in his local parade each year covered in their stories, and the pride is evident. It is 0530 on Saturday, and he has come in early with his son to handle our transit. Whoever thinks America stopped being great hasn't met these people. It's time to load my Marine onto our final flight. I take my place next to the honor guard. I see an Army sergeant in his dress uniform, escorting remains on a different flight. We salute and shake hands. I see on his face the same weariness that I feel. We exchange pleasantries; there is nothing to say, but we make eye contact for a long moment. "Take care, brother." We salute. And then we are boarded and in the air.

When we land in Columbus, OH, the aircrew announces that we are transporting a fallen service member. I am conspicuous in my Alphas; now I am conspicuous for my mission. I don't like being the center of attention. They announce for everyone to remain seated.

I move to let the mother and sister out first, but the stewardess explains they mean for me to get off first. "It was her son, ma'am, and her brother. They will go first." Outside, the town is waiting to greet the family. The Reserve unit is present. I link up with the casualty assistance call officer. The unit looks sharp and drills sharp. I get into the hearse.

The local police are escorting us for the brief ride. As we get into town, I see a line of lights; every intersection is blocked by saluting police and firemen. People are out of their cars clapping. It is overwhelming to see the town welcoming home one of their own. I am proud that this is how they receive us; I am proud that the family will ride through the visible support of their neighbors. At the funeral home, I ensure no one sees the remains until I complete my inspection. He looks like a Marine. He looks like my brother. I miss him. I tell the director and casualty assistance call officer that I am satisfied.

I find a local pub. I don't want to sit in my hotel room alone, so I sit at the bar alone and stare at the television. Over dinner, I replay events from my own life. I second-guess my choices. I think about my family. The bartender is curious about me. I'm from a small town; I know it's easy to spot outsiders. She asks me why I look sad. "Because I'm sad, today." She asks what will help. "Time." They let me sit in peace. The beer is good; it helps my mind wander, and after a few hours, I get a taxi. I gather myself and ask for the bill.

"It's been taken care of," she says. I ask what she's talking about, and she says, "We know why you're here. Thank you for what you did." I don't know what to say. I just start tearing up because I'm exhausted and buzzed and overwhelmed by the gesture. "We know why you're here." I've said 'thank you' a million times, but I have never meant it the way I say it now: "Thank you. Thank you for letting me sit here all night. I didn't know what else to do." She knew the whole time. I hold it together until I get back to my room. This is the first time in my career I've felt appreciated because it is the first time I feel I have done something worth appreciating. It is staggeringly cathartic.

While I'm gone, one of my good friends calls my wife to talk. He lost Marines in war and at home. He tells her the best thing she can do is get me to talk about it. I don't like it, but he's right. When I get back he corners me and tells me the same. I still don't like it, but I love him, and he's right. I tell the same to my Marines. On leave, I see my father and talk through it. We are stoic people, but I know he understands. He lost friends when the barracks were bombed in Beirut. He tells me to take care of my people, and he listens. He speaks as a Marine and as a father. At work, I am pestered by helpful listeners. We only care for Marine families one way, and I appreciate it. My guys get memorial bracelets made, and I make sure the family gets them, too. Before I left, I wrote awards for my Marines, and they received them in my absence. They don't want them, but they deserve them. I don't deserve the Marines I have, but I want them.

Leadership is the obligation to advance the mission, whatever comes. Chaotic events do not wait for complete solutions and careful assessment; they demand flexible and timely action. Planning creates maneuver space, anticipating tomorrow's needs with today's information, a critical resource for leaders who think in the future while existing in the present. The leader's center of gravity is an inexhaustible supply of critical thinking built upon a foundation of experience, knowledge, and deliberate invention. It is about leading when required and following when others are more suited to the task but maintaining clarity of the larger context. Leaders recognize that events are nonlinear and require a thought framework that is similarly nuanced. These skills are abstract but essential, acquired only through intent and purposeful exposure. There is no single source of knowledge or experience; there is no one organization that owns effective leadership. There is no shortcut.

Leadership is the obligation to advance the mission, whatever comes. Chaotic events do not wait for complete solutions and careful assessment; they demand flexible and timely action.

If you ask me how to be a good leader, I can't give you a quick answer. It is a nurse caring for a wounded Marine, patiently answering questions. It is a doctor taking time to explain the situation. It is a police officer remaining faithful long after his expiration of active service. It is a highway patrolman going outside the norm. It is an Army sergeant who shares the burden. It is my sergeant staying by my side for days because he knows I need him. It is Marines sleeping in a conference room and keeping the watch. It is a man who works at Atlanta airport and loves his country. It is veterans who still serve in times of need. It is an airline captain saluting the fallen. It is a small town caring for one of their own. It is a bartender picking up a tab. It is a senior Marine caring for a junior Marine, the last generation preparing the next. I am eternally thankful for the leadership of all those I depended upon.

It is a privilege to lead Marines; it was a privilege to escort my brother. My CO thanks me and my Marines later for the leadership we showed. We did what needed to be done. If you ask me to make you a leader, I can't tell you how. But if you find yourself in Grove City, OH, there's a barkeep who can show you.

USMC

13 Leadership Keys to Retaining Our Best

Reconciling idealism and reality

by LtCol Victor Bunch

The looming drawdown and period of fiscal austerity will present hard choices for our Corps and its Marines. Foremost among individual Marines' choices will be whether to invest in a career in the Corps. As we contract, the sharpening competition for career designation and reenlistment may assure the selection of the most *able* Marines, but it cannot ensure the retention of the most able *and willing*. In my opinion, the decade-plus of unrelenting operations and personnel tempo has truncated the opportunities for meaningful career mentorship and exacerbated a naturally occurring phenomenon among first-term Marines, i.e., disillusionment regarding their initial experience in the Corps. As a result, we are at a heightened risk of losing some of our most talented Marines. Mitigating this risk will require a renewed focus on career counseling for our junior Marines so that their first and most important decision—whether they stay or separate—is informed by the collective experiences of the previous generations and not simply by their first impressions. In short, retaining our best will rely on concerned senior leaders helping junior Marines reconcile their idealistic expectations with the reality of service.

>LtCol Bunch is a MAGTF Intelligence Officer currently serving as the CMC Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

My own experience is probably not uncommon and may be instructive to illustrate the phenomenon referenced in the opening paragraph. With an eye on the practical benefits of career military service, I nonetheless joined the Marine Corps for mostly idealistic reasons that are well known to any Marine: I wanted to be a member of a storied brotherhood that exemplified the best in warrior virtues. True to the recruiting poster's promise, the Corps wasn't a "rose garden." I had preconceived notions about what the Marine Corps would be like, and my initial experiences didn't align precisely with those expectations. As I grew older in the Corps, I saw its faults. The bureaucracy was maddening, and the Marines were not ten-foot-tall Spartans. I encountered some questionable leadership as well as policies and practices that didn't quite make sense. Fortunately, my first commanding officers were refreshingly honest and open minded in their career counseling. The mentorship and advice I received as a young officer provided me with knowledge that allowed me to evaluate and reconcile my experiences in the context of the "real" world versus my "ideal." More important than the immediate impact of that counsel was its persistent value. I still continue to recycle and re-broadcast much of that same advice to my junior officers. Furthermore, as I gained more experience, I began to recognize and internalize collective, conventional, institutional wisdom circulating through our best officers—time-tested wisdom informed by talented people and inculcated in the Corps' values. Finding that wisdom allowed me to rediscover the true spirit that animates the Corps and realize anew why it and its Marines remain special in an unvarnished world.

My ultimate decision to remain was buoyed by a series of epiphanies made

We must focus on retaining our best Marines. *(Photo by PFC Damaris Arias.)*

possible by a combination of personal inquiry and the patient counsel of some fantastic senior SNCOs and officers. The following is a distilled list of some basic advice, garnered from my experiences, for use in mentoring junior Marines who are struggling with the contradictions in their Marine Corps experience. Because career mentorship is a two-way conversation, I've aimed the following comments at the two ends of that conversation: junior and senior Marines.

For the Junior Marines

1. First, and most importantly, you should understand that you only "know what you know" about the Marine Corps from limited exposure. Avoid making sweeping judgments without attaining a broader and deeper view. The hard truth is that your entry-level expectations were probably somewhat unrealistic. Your initial skepticism is natural and healthy. We've all experienced it. It is not unlike the evolving estimation of our parents as we grow. As youngsters, we tend to lionize them; as teens, we begin to see (and seek) their faults; and as adults, we begin to understand them and their life choices. In the end, they are still special—even though they're not perfect. Take some time to better understand the Corps before you judge it as unworthy.
2. Get that broader view from other senior Marines. Cast your net widely. Seek mentorship and advice within and outside your chain of command. A diversity of experience and advice will accelerate your assimilation, better inform your first big decision (whether to stay or separate), and help determine the most appropriate vector for your career choices if you stay.
3. Tread carefully if you challenge "old" ideas and practices. Sometimes, there are sound institutional reasons for them that aren't readily apparent. On the other hand, sometimes there aren't, and they should be challenged! Think, read, create, innovate, and speak truth to power, but don't be rash or overemotional. When in doubt, seek advice from a safe mentor outside your chain of command and/or write for publication! You will find that the Corps' leadership values *tactful, considerate,* and *loyal* dissent.
4. Don't be deterred if you observe bad leadership. (See 1 and 2.) If you still hold military service as a virtue, believe in Marine Corps values, and truly care about serving your Nation, then you owe it to yourself and our citizenry to persist. After all, if all the "good people" separate from your Service, who will lead our next generation of Marines? You can only make a difference from within. If you love it, make it better. It is still your Marine Corps.
5. A career in the Corps is not for everyone. It will demand much of you and your family during both peace and war. If your heart isn't in it, then you should probably leave. Regularly evaluate your options. Some of you may have ready-made careers waiting on the outside, but many of you will have equally unrealistic expectations about life in the "Civilian Division," too. The grass isn't always greener. Many of my company-grade officer peers who left the Corps in the roaring '90s were unpleasantly surprised at what they encountered in the civilian workplace. A good number of them attempted to come back. The real value of a Marine Corps career is the opportunity to work with people who share similar values and develop lifelong friendships bonded by shared experience and sacrifice. There's a sense of community within the Corps that's hard to replicate.

For the Senior Marines

1. Understand that your junior Marines' reality is their perception of their immediate surroundings and experiences. Put yourself in their shoes. If



The real value of a Marine Corps career is being able to work with other people. *(Photo by PFC Damaris Arias.)*

all you knew of your Service is what you'd seen in the last few years, what would you consider as the "norm"?
2. Toxic leadership in your organization will have an inordinate impact on junior Marines. Though you may be able to compartmentalize the inimical behavior of other (peer or senior) leaders as an anomaly, the junior Marines may believe it is condoned. (See 1.)
3. You know your Marines and look out for their welfare, but do they know you? Provide your junior Marines the benefit of your personal and professional experience. Explain your motives for joining, and, more importantly, explain why you've stayed. If you care about the health and future of your Service, you should continually make an effort to *recruit* in order to retain the best Marines. Furthermore, encourage your Marines to seek mentorship and advice from other senior Marines who may have different experiences or insight into a different career path or occupational specialty.
4. Don't be afraid to be candid about the drawbacks to service. All of our Services have their quirks and weaknesses. Arm your subordinates with knowledge that allows them to recognize and understand the dysfunctions and how to circumvent or navigate them.
5. Fight the urge to be defensive when junior Marines question the value of their service or decry the lack of career options. As you employ tips 3 and 4, encourage them to frequently evaluate *all* their options. After all, a career in the Armed Forces isn't suitable for everyone. But we shouldn't want our best and brightest to unnecessarily burn bridges, either. Challenge their assumptions about and plans for life outside the Corps and give them unbiased advice concerning life on the inside. The grass isn't always greener, but you assist them in clearly evaluating both sides before letting them jump.
6. Encourage initiative and bind it loosely within the limits of safety and decorum. Let your junior leaders innovate and learn. This is only effective if you've given good guidance and constructive feedback! Our Marines want to take the lead. Prevention of failure through micromanagement is one of the surest methods of killing initiative and morale.
7. Be open to new ideas. When a standard practice or procedure is questioned, don't reply with an automated (negative) response. Listen even if the suggestion or complaint is unsound or unfounded. Conversely, if you cannot defend the efficacy of the aforementioned practice/procedure, perhaps you should listen more closely.
8. Employ Socratic PME—whether it's a battle study, a tactical problem, or a discussion about a leadership issue. Give your junior leaders the opportunity to express new ideas and opinions with your direction and guidance. Teach them, and don't be afraid to learn from them. You might just inspire a future Commandant or Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps!

Look out for your Marines' welfare. *(Photo by Cpl Christian Lopez.)*

Listen even if the suggestion or complaint is unsound or unfounded.

The most important first step in preempting a potential talent drain from our Corps is to recognize and address the legitimate concerns of our future leaders. The future holds real challenges—personnel cuts, dwindling combat deployments, and fiscal austerity measures—that will test the Corps' leadership and may strain morale. Though none of these challenges are new to the institution, they may have potentially negative psychological impacts on junior Marines unless placed into context by credible and *available* senior leadership. The undesirable but transient byproducts of changing Corps circumstances needn't trump the transcendent, intangible benefits of the Corps' culture. Candid cross-generational communication is the key to reconciling the "old Corps" values with "new Corps" expectations and preparing the future Corps. This brief treatise offers thirteen supporting "keys" to kick-start that intercession; however, *concerned leadership* constitutes the tried and true master key to the process.

USMC

Duct-Tape Leadership

Enabling small unit leader initiative

by Capt Devin D. Fultz

The following vignette is a compilation of experiences that every young platoon commander experiences during his first time at the ITX (Integrated Training Exercise) prior to deployment.

The training plan for the day was simple—to allow the platoons to run their own rehearsals while the company commander and fire integration support team leader were taken to the Combined Arms Simulation Trainer in preparation for the Motorized Assault Course. In the days prior, the Tactical Training Evaluation Control Group, Coyote, evaluated the Marines companywide on the basic principles of fire and movement and weapons employment during Range 410A, a platoon-reinforced live fire range, and Range 401, a company-reinforced live fire range. Now, the platoon commanders and platoon sergeants were tasked with finding an "innovative way" to teach the Marines how to correct their deficiencies, some of whom had joined the week the unit left for the exercise. We needed a solution sooner than later. I then observed the squad leaders leading a "buddy rushing" battle drill, reminiscent of what someone would see at MCRD Parris Island or in the hills of Quantico at the Buddy Pair Fire and Movement Course. I did like seeing that our squad leaders built a small maneuver course with MREs and assault packs to simulate micro-terrain, but the junior fire team leaders continued to yell at their Marines to rush, as opposed to getting up and moving themselves. They were like robots, not the flexible fire team leaders that our Corps strives to build at the School of Infantry.

Before he had left, the company commander said, "We still have to teach our team leaders the 'fighter-leader' concept." I remembered an article, "Why Doesn't First Team Rush?" by Capt Michael F. McNamara and Paul J. Kennedy, from TBS, and thought of a solution: We could put duct tape on the fire team leaders' mouths, and then their Marines would follow their tempo, and the rest of the squad would follow the base unit without talking. Realistically, this would cause a problem, running on a live fire range in full gear in the sweltering heat. I realized we did not need a quick fix or remediation to teach the fire team leaders about fire and movement or weapons employment, but there is an institutional problem that spans across all small unit leaders, who need to understand their commander's intent

I am convinced that there is no smarter, handier, or more adaptable body of troops in the world.
—Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Britain[1]

Put intent into action without talking. *(Photo by LCpl Jose VillalobosRocha.)*

"We still have to teach our team leaders the 'fighter-leader' concept."

>Capt Fultz is a Tactics Instructor, Officer Candidates School. He wrote this article when he served as a platoon commander.

and put that intent into action in both a garrison and combat environment.

One of the first tactical drills all Marines, regardless of their future MOS, execute while at recruit training or Officer Candidates School is the buddy pair rush. There is nothing inherently wrong with this process; however, we are not teaching initiative. The mantra "I am up, He sees me, I'm down," gets burned into the mind, and this mistake is not caught until those young privates step into leadership roles or new platoon commanders are looking for a simple way to teach this basic concept. I would metaphorically give a piece of duct tape to the recruit and the officer candidate. Instead of mindless yelling, Marines need to learn to work off the base unit from the beginning. Assign one man to be the senior man of the buddy pair from the start and have his buddy rush solely based off observation of actions and not verbal commands. It is said that when there are two Marines, one is in charge, and this kind of leadership needs to be identified and fostered from day one of training, when moving from place to place or during tactical drills. Implementing this concept at entry-level training will ensure that we subconsciously instill a mindset that will enable success during Marines' careers, when elementary concepts of fire and movement graduate to fire and maneuver and the sounds of combat drowning out the frantic yells of leaders trying to get their Marines to move forward to the objective.

Platoon Level

During the execution of training, a piece of duct tape should go to platoon commanders for the sake of their subordinate squad leaders. Commander's intent and mission-type orders are the foundation of maneuver warfare found in *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, and their principles serve as the base of how orders are given and subsequently executed. One of the worst things a young platoon commander can do is take a heavy hand toward his subordinates to the point that they constantly communicate back and forth to him and not to the adjacent squad leaders and supporting units. The 0365 Infantry Squad Leader should

Once they have passed orders to their units, higher headquarters doesn't need to micromanage unit leaders. *(Photo by LCpl Jose VillalobosRocha.)*

fundamentally know how to adjust fire with mortars and artillery and in most cases can communicate with both close air support and assault support from the ACE. The platoon commander should "let the dogs off the chain" in order to achieve commander's intent and enable the squad leader to fight the Marines as he sees fit and focus on pushing as many available assets as possible to augment the unit's combat power. This level of proficiency down to the squad level will require a change in the prioritization and funding of mission-essential tasks so that a company can focus training at the squad level as opposed to the platoon level during predeployment training. It is commonly said that great squads make great platoons that in turn make great companies and battalions.

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Higher Headquarters

The last strip of duct tape goes to the battalion headquarters after a decision has been made and the balance of command and control is placed on a subordinate unit leader. PME schools from Marine Corps University and the last seventeen years of combat have filled our company- and field-grade ranks with more combat veterans with small unit experience since Vietnam. Through the crucible of combat, these leaders need to let loose their subordinates to fight their Marines and supporting units.

By the end of all the battalion-level rehearsals, like the Combined Arms Simulation Trainer and battalion concept rehearsal, I saw a glazed look in my squad leaders' eyes—the Marines who are actually conducting the critical actions—and even in some of the officer ranks from listening to page after page of orders and coordinating instructions from a white binder. There was no yelling or knife hands, but the effects of higher headquarters dipping too much into the company commander's role were reminiscent of the fire team leader yelling, "Rush!" to

The Corps does its best to build Marines of character. *(Photo by Cpl Kyle McNan.)*

team members. This heavy hand continued through execution as I overheard my company commander and fire integration support team leader get denied fires, as all "command and control" was stuck back on some piece of canalizing terrain or priority was given to the secondary observer sniper team. Command and control could still be maintained by higher headquarters by taking the subordinates' positive feedback and making adjustments and modifications as required. *MCDP 6, Command and Control*, outlines this perfectly. Command and control is a reciprocal influence—command as initiation of action and control as feedback.

Our Ethos

Our ranks are filled with those men and women who have volunteered to serve their country. They have trust in the institution that they will be well trained when the phone call comes to be ready to deploy at a moment's notice. Furthermore, in return, our Nation expects the Marine Corps to return our Marines to society better than they were when they came into service. Knowing this expectation, we cannot pay lip service to warfighting principles like "violent and aggressive execution" and "fighter-leader." We do our best to build Marines of character with all of our sexual-assault training, ethos training, and substance-abuse control training. This annual training does bear fruit, but our Marines are first and foremost warriors, regardless of MOS. "Every Marine a rifleman" is not just a phrase but a reality that needs to be sustained by crushing indecisiveness in leaders and fostering decision making and immediate action at the lowest level.

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Field mess Marines, administrative clerks, supply Marines, and motor transport mechanics augmented the fight during the breakout at the Chosin Reservoir so many years ago. It was the PFC who rallied groups of Marines from various dispersed companies to form squads to take out pill boxes throughout the Pacific Theater in World War II. It was the mythical "Marine" with uncommon valor who chose to close with and destroy the enemy on Iwo Jima, turning the fight through action and imposing his will on the enemy. No duct tape is required for these small unit leaders, whether appointed or rising to the occasion, who are our Corps' center of gravity and define who we are as the protectors of our Nation.

Conclusion

The imminent challenges of our fiscal budget training schedules as we move forward will always put our small unit leaders in a crunch for time as they try to execute commander's intent. White space at all levels is the water in a bottle filled with rocks and sand, annual training, and other mandated quarterly training requirements. Let us not forget that all the "back-in-the-saddle training" and other annual training, though important to mission and material readiness, steals time from tough physical training, the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program, classes on a unit's history, ethics training, and tactical decision games run by small unit leaders. The challenge is to pour out the bottle that mandates training from the top down and fill it up with ideas from the small unit leaders who provide bottom-up refinements. As leaders, we must put on the duct tape and let our subordinates thrive and win in execution. They are our bid for success.

Note

1. Sir Winston Churchill, when describing the U.S. Marine Corps in WWII. From Sgt Gary Haun, USMC(Ret), *Marine Corps Magic*, (Bloomington, IN: 2013).

A Leadership Taxonomy for the Marine Corps

More than the academic realm

by Maj William P. Sumption

>Maj Sumption is currently the 1st MAW G-2 Operations Officer and has served as an S-2/G-2 at a squadron, MAG, infantry battalion and regiment, and MLG. Previously, he was assigned as the MAGTF Intelligence Officer's Course (MIOC) Course Director and has deployed as a MEU ACE S-2, Regional Command (Southwest) Foreign Disclosure Officer, and Black Sea Rotational Force S-2.

Bloom's taxonomy of learning (see Figure 1) is effective in the academic environment for both the instructor and student in setting goals and knowing when they are achieved by a student's ability to remember, understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and create new information. For a simple matter, the progression can occur quickly; the more complex the issue, the longer it will take a student to achieve higher-level learning. This kind of model—progression from a base of knowledge into a more complex and higher level of mastery—applies to more than the academic realm. The same idea translates to a mechanic, a pilot, and, as will be explained here, to a leader. A better mechanic can evaluate nontextbook or ill-defined situations to find the problem. A better pilot will be able to do more than simply remember the fundamentals of flight and (in the instance of a test pilot) will eventually create new procedures in varying situations. But what makes a good leader? How might one leader be more effective than another? I believe the leadership taxonomy presented here evaluates and identifies effective leaders at different levels of command. (See Figure 2.)



Figure 1.

Throughout the United States Marine Corps' different MOSs, there are different paradigms and measurements of success. Every Marine is a rifleman first, but, once specialized, the standard varies greatly. There are different, specific missions associated with each MOS. For example, the requirements (training requirements, daily requirements, short- and long-term professional goals, etc.) for an effective aircraft mechanic vary greatly from an effective intelligence analyst. Achieving these measures of effectiveness and accomplishing the associated missions require leadership at all levels.

Follower

Followership is the foundation upon which leadership is based. In order to be a good leader, one must first understand what it means to follow. It is also important to realize that we never stop being

a follower in some capacity. There is no top of the food chain. We all live somewhere in a structure and need to follow those elements above us—whether those elements are a company commander, a section lead, or even a commanding general. The important thing for a future leader to understand is the motivation behind following. Even within the same unit of the same organization, individual members can have differing motivations. A certain level of self-awareness, as well as lateral awareness in this area, will allow a person to realize what motivations exist and what leadership styles are most effective to different individuals. Followers are continually adding tools and techniques to their leadership toolbox. Therefore, a follower will inherently know what kind of leadership works for him and can save ideas and experiences for later use.

In the Marine Corps, you never stop being a follower in some capacity. Setting the example of how to be led by those senior to you will show those under your charge what it means to follow. Furthermore, even junior Marines are charged with peer-to-peer leadership/followership. One Marine with mastery of a subject can act as a peer leader to assist other Marines. Furthermore, as followers ascend the chain of command, it is important to maintain those good relationships with higher headquarters by being a good follower. The leader of a group can severely undercut his credibility with his subordinates by consistently blaming higher headquarters for negatively perceived situations.

Enforcer

Assuming a supervisory role in any manner necessitates the enforcement of some sort of rule, regulation, or expectation of action. The newly minted leader understands the rules that apply and knows how they should be implemented. Ideally, he has had enough experience following to know the ins and outs of the matter at hand, where the efficiencies lie, and how to do the job correctly. Simply stated, the rules are enforced because they are the rules. The motivation lies with the requirements set forth and ensuring they are completed. It is your job.



Figure 2.

Once the Marine Corps promotes a Marine or places him in any sort of supervisory role, the Marine will automatically move up in the leadership taxonomy. It is important to note that rank and position may warrant a certain level of leadership, but it is up to the individual to pursue progression within the taxonomy. Most have dealt with seniors who, though by position should be higher in the leadership taxonomy, maintain the simple "enforcer" mentality. It is the leadership style they know and are most familiar with; they have failed to develop into a more effective leader.

Investor

The investor has dared to question why things are the way they are, has the foresight and knowledge to know how systems work, and has made the decision to invest in the organization. Followers can easily distinguish between the enforcer and the investor by how orders and requirements are delivered. Rather than working the system, the investor understands the end state to be met and can articulate methods and processes to his subordinates rather than simply applying strict requirements. The investor is more likely to provide some background or knowledge as to *why* an action is required than simply the evaluation metric involved.

In the Marine Corps, it is common to refer to investors as those who have "drunk the Kool-Aid." Generally, these are the Marines who can lead smaller but familiar groups in different and unrehearsed situations. However, the investor is more in tune with the requirements and processes than the individuals being led. Leadership further up the taxonomy takes more into account regarding individuals and their motivations. However, much can be accomplished in the short term given some good followers and some supervisors invested in the unit.

Simple Leader

The simple leader is one who can effectively lead a group of like-minded individuals. He realizes the existence of motivations within himself and can tap into those same motivations in others. The simple leader does best in a homogeneous group of similarly motivated individuals. He knows what works for him and can instill that same perspective in those he leads.

In the Marine Corps, the simple leaders are those who can lead others of the same MOS and lead them well. More than supervising the completion of tasks or knowing how the system works, the simple leaders can motivate others to work from within themselves. They can relate with their personal experiences. They have "been there and done that," and the junior leaders and followers look up to that experience.

Complex Leader

Larger groups of people from different walks of life and with different jobs will end up having different motivations for their work. The complex leader can both realize that people are motivated by different reasons and bend to try and encourage those outside of his comfort zone. The key is to have good followers who know why they are where they are. The good, complex leader can effectively lead both like-minded individuals and those who are different.

The complex leaders in the Marine Corps can hold the same positions as the simple leaders but will be more effective. No two Marines are alike, and the complex leader realizes this and uses it to be better. He understands that Marines are from different walks of life and receive different training but in the end are still all connected with the Marine Corps bond, and that can make the impossible possible. As the leader, he is invested in the Marine Corps as an organization, in his followers, and in his junior leaders.

Developed Leader

The developed leader resides closer to the top of the organization. More removed from the rank and file, he understands how to lead himself, how to lead like-minded individuals, and how to lead those not like him. He assumes the role of a developed leader by effectively leading other leaders. It is another art for a developed leader to effectively lead those with their own experiences, judgment, and views on leadership, but he commands their attention and respect. He can tap into those leaders beneath him and draw out their best. Expanding his horizons beyond the nearest or most immediate challenge, the developed leader can see the next steps, direct and supervise those leaders beneath him, and trust that a task will be completed without micromanaging the situation. He has faith in those whom he leads.

Ideally, the commanding officer of a battalion or higher unit is a developed leader. He has his own staff of officers and advisors who enable him to give direction to his unit both directly and indirectly. Each of those officers has his own subordinates to lead as well. The commander must be a leader of leaders to be effective. If he becomes target fixated down to the fire team/individual followers, he undercuts his own leaders, and the unit can stray. He should, when appropriate, provide guidance and direction to his subordinate leaders who communicate down to the followers and accomplish the mission. The developed leader will have the intelligence to know his own leaders, their strengths and weaknesses, their motivations, and how to push them to excel within their own situations.

Mentor: noun, a wise and trusted counselor or teacher.

Mentor

Being a mentor implies a level of understanding of leadership not always achieved. A mentor in an organization has the ability, responsibility, and duty to influence an organization multiple generations into the future. The true mentor will develop his subordinate leaders so that they move up in the taxonomy and achieve understanding on how to do their job well and how to lead others to do the same. Like a good chess player, the mentor can think multiple iterations in advance. He exemplifies Plato's ideal from book VII of *The Republic*: a leader who will go back into the cave to bring others out. In the end, a mentor should realize his own finite time and ensure that a successor will be able to take over when it is time to move on. The skills it takes to be a mentor translate across the board. A leader who nurtures junior leaders can instill the same principles into joint Services or even across the boundary into business, academia, or elsewhere.

In the Marine Corps, these mentors are at the top of the leadership taxonomy but are not necessarily the commanding officers. Contrary to the natural assumption, the operations officer, senior enlisted, or other senior Marines may be in a better position to train and educate junior leaders. A good mentor requires face time with his mentee for development, encouragement, and correction. Some of the best Marine Corps mentors are those senior enlisted who have operated at all levels of leadership and command. The best mentors can communicate a portion of their wealth of knowledge and experience to anybody in any situation.

Conclusion

This taxonomy would have utility if communicated across the board throughout Marine Leader Development. It provides mentors the ability to rate themselves as a leader and can be used as a briefing tool to help develop Marines junior to them. This provides more tangible goals for junior leaders to aspire to, beyond the five leadership categories located on the fitness report. A more developed discussion of the leadership taxonomy with MOS-specific case studies could further enhance leadership training across the board and make Marines more aware of how they can be effective leaders.

>Author's Note: The Marine Corps has recently instituted the "Marine Leader Development" framework. From the MLD website:

> *It is neither a philosophy nor a program; rather, it is a framework to be used by Marines at all levels for themselves and subordinates … MLD will be implemented in all Marine Corps commands, and will supersede the Marine Corps Mentoring Program (MCMP).*

Available at https://www.usmcu/edu.

Relationships Matter

It takes one Marine to make another Marine better

by MGySgt Charles A. Walker

The Marine Corps is a corps of Marines. The phrase sounds so comically simple that it is almost absurd; a thoughtful pause, however, will reveal the depth of the statement … a corps of Marines. It speaks of a cadre of remarkable individuals—men and women of every color, creed, and socio-economic background—who have each earned the title of United States Marine. That title binds us to one another across the ages. As a Marine looks back on his time in service, on the experiences that shaped the caliber of Marine he is today, the most prominent influence is that of another U.S. Marine. Whether a mentor, a leader, or a peer, it takes one Marine to make another Marine better. *As iron sharpens iron, so a man sharpens the countenance of his friend.*[1] This happens on a daily basis in our corps and is further evidence that relationships matter.

Relationships are the personal and professional interactions we have with each other and the bonds we form. These can be cemented with face-to-face contact and a firm handshake—presence matters. Being present is paramount to establishing a relationship, especially as a leader. A commander conducts battlefield circulation not only to assess the tactical situation on the ground but also to be with his Marines. Simply being where the Marines are has a tremendous impact, especially in an austere place under conditions of hardship. Ask a Marine who served with the "Blue Diamond," the 1st Marine Division, from 2003–2004 how they feel about Gen James N. Mattis (then the Division Commanding General). Their pride will be evident, as each feels he knows the CG from his visit to their position in Iraq. They have shared experiences with and are devoted to their general. Because of his presence, each Marine knew why they were there, what they had to do, and they felt they were a part of the team. They were then free to "fight with a happy heart." They felt—and still, to this day, feel—a kinship and relationship with their commander. This is one example in our recent collective history; however, this scenario has played out many times, in many places, and at different echelons since 1775.

>MGySgt Walker is an 0399 currently serving as the Operations Chief, 3d MarDiv.

Marines know when you don't care. *(Photo by LCpl Taylor Cooper.)*

Relationships bridge the gap between a professional obligation and a personal commitment. One example of this can be seen between the supporting and supported unit, such as a supported infantry regiment and a supporting combat logistics battalion, or CLB. The CLB receives a request from the regiment, but because of the regiment's operational tempo and competing priorities, the requirement is communicated late to the CLB. The CLB is justifiably unable to provide the support requested as a result of the regiment's failure to plan properly. If working relationships are not established or are poor, this will often be the outcome. However, when the CLB feels it is a part of the team—as a result of ongoing personal contact and interaction—the support will always come through because it is not for "another unit" but for the same team; it's for a brother. These relationships do not end upon transfer to another unit. The Marine Corps is small, and, inevitably, Marines find themselves crossing paths again, whether at a school, on an exercise or operation, or at a new duty assignment. When solid relationships have been established, they can be seamlessly renewed at the next command; momentum is maintained, and

the team is strengthened. When poor relationships are established, there are hurdles to overcome to eliminate the friction.

Beyond a commander and his Marines, or a supporting and supported unit, the greatest area where relationships matter regards personal issues. It has been said that "a Marine doesn't care what you know, but he knows when you don't care." When a Marine is shown that his leadership (or peer) cares about him, that Marine can overcome anything. Our greatest resource is the individual Marine; we are in the people business, first and foremost. The commander that states "mission first, people always" is wise; each of us must invest in one another. SNCOs must spend time with young company-grade officers so that they may influence the caliber of field-grade or general officers they will one day become. Peers must challenge, correct, and encourage each other at all ranks. We must physically and metaphorically put our arms around both our combat veterans and our young, new joins. We share hardship and laughter, we work toward a common goal, and we do it together: one team, one fight. This is how relationships are formed. In crowds around the world, two Marines can find each other, close the gap, and shake hands warmly although meeting for the first time because they each formed relationships with other Marines along the way, and we are all connected one to another. Marines rarely fight for a cause but always for one another. Remember these things the next time a task draws too much of your attention. Slow down and invest in people. Say what you mean, and mean what you say. In this way, the bonds and relationships formed will grow ever stronger as you (and those you influence) add to the illustrious heritage of our corps of Marines.

It has been said that "a Marine doesn't care what you know, but he knows when you don't care." When a Marine is shown that his leadership (or peer) cares about him, that Marine can overcome anything.

Note

1. Proverbs 27:17, *Holy Bible* (New King James Version).

Leaders Need to Talk About Fear

Understanding the emotional state

by 1stLt Christian H. Heller

The legendary warrior Hector, Prince of Troy, stands out of antiquity as the greatest warrior of the age. His deeds include the killing of 31,000 Greeks, defending his city for nine years, and the destruction of Achilles' personal elite guard. Yet even Hector succumbed to fear. While standing against Achilles, he fled three times around the walls of Troy before turning to fight and die. If such a champion could lose all sense to fear, how can we as modern-day mortals overcome such feelings of terror?

As leaders of Marines, we need to talk about being afraid. Fear is the most basic human instinct. All of mankind has experienced both its visible effects (like freezing and tensing) and its invisible effects (such as an increased heart rate or confusion). The fight-or-flight mechanism drives our responses to countless situations; at its basic purpose, fear keeps us alive. It drives our reactions to real or perceived threats and pushes us toward survival. But we don't talk about it.

Those who have witnessed combat are all too familiar with fear, especially that of death. We train for any foreseeable circumstance with detailed schemes of maneuver, casevac plans, and battle drills, yet we spend little time training for and understanding our emotional state during battle. As leaders, we pay verbal homage to "courage" endlessly (i.e., the Five Horizontal Themes at The Basic School, JJDIDTIEBUCKLE,* and our Marine Corps' Core Values). Courage is relative, though. It is only one possible output when experiencing fear; our responses range on a wide scale between courage and cowardice. Courage involves the "mastery of fear," the "inner strength that enables Marines to take that extra step."[2] In order to ensure that we and our Marines reach that inner strength, we must understand and train for fear in the same manner that we understand and train for hikes, patrols, and the rifle range.

*Justice, Judgment, Dependability, Initiative, Decisiveness, Tact, Integrity, Enthusiasm, Bearing, Unselfishness, Courage, Knowledge, Loyalty, Endurance.

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"Soldiers live with continual conflicts between the desire to conquer the enemy and the fear of combat, between the desire to escape the situation and the fear of being considered by his comrades or others a poor soldier, or worse, a coward."[1]

Understanding Fear

Fear is a reaction to a threat, either real or imaginary. All animals demonstrate a similar fight-or-flight response when afraid. While in animals, it is a simple fear based purely on a present stimulus, humans have the ability to fear the future. We take experiences from our past and project them into imagined situations, which provides unique benefits and detriments. We can anticipate likely scenarios and prepare for them, thereby mitigating the chances for negative consequences; however, we may just as likely freeze up or lose focus on the present because of the endless possibilities of death around us. Additionally, the more unpredictable the shock, "the more likely it will be to generate overwhelming fear."[3]

Fortunately, the human brain developed advanced mechanisms for dealing with fear. We have both a high road and a low road for our responses to it. The low road is our instantaneous response to a threat, such as the desire to shoot first and ask questions later. It keeps us alive and consists of our unconscious reactions to immediate threats. The high road is our analytical brain, which considers all possibilities and scenarios. The high road calms us down after an initial shock and helps us to think clearly by minimizing symptoms such as tunnel vision and muscle tension. Consider the OODA (observation, orientation, decision, action) loop. The low road only consists of observing and acting, skip-

ping the bulk of the loop. The high road allows us to go through the full cycle, including the orienting and deciding steps, and arrive at a better decision.

Some academics have researched the types of fear experienced by personnel in combat. Roger Petersen and Evangelos Liaras, in the *Journal of Military Ethics*, examine the effects of fear during times of war. As a threat becomes imminent (e.g., thinking about an enemy during predeployment versus in actual combat overseas), fear can reshape a person's priorities, such as state security (patriotism), honor, and self-preservation. They write that individuals are quickly reduced to deciding between death and dishonor and weigh more heavily their own safety in such times of terror.[4]

MAJ Gregory Daddis points out the four types of fear faced by those on the frontlines: the fear of death or personal harm, the fear of failure, and the fear of being alone, all of which factor into the greatest fear experienced on the battlefield—the fear of a seemingly superior and invincible enemy.[5] How do we lead our Marines through all these fears and keep them focused on the mission, especially if we are also afraid? We must train for it.

Training for Fear

The difficulty in preparing for fear (and finding courage) is that both are elusive qualities. As MAJ Daddis writes,

> Within those individuals, and even units, fear and courage are often unpredictable phenomena. Soldiers who stand fast on one day might break under the strain of battle the next.[6]

The bridge between fear and courage comes not from a single method of mitigation. Numerous measures must be taken for leaders to overcome their own fears and help their Marines persevere in combat. Petersen and Liaras propose five methods by which leaders can counter fear: rational discourse to focus on practical solutions, the emphasis of hope, the threat of shame, the harnessing of anger toward the enemy, and the formation of spite against the enemy.[7]

The *Marine Leaders' Notebook* states three reasons Marines overcome fear: good training and leadership, our honor and convictions, and our sense of brotherhood.[8] Some studies show that soldiers with higher intellectual capabilities demonstrate a better ability to deal with fear, thereby further increasing the need for quality training and education.[9] Training for battle drills of unexpected events, like casualties and ambushes, can help familiarize Marines with the chaotic environment. Realistic training must incorporate all five senses because "the key is not desensitization but sensitization." Individual fundamentals are key factors as well, most especially rifle and weapons skills to negate a threat once it appears.

The fear of death can be very real for Marines in combat. *(Photo by Cpl Andrew Kuppers.)*

Leadership plays a major role in pushing Marines past fear. We must show calm and confidence in the face of danger and chaos by continuing to issue instructions and lead, which helps to lift the burden of doubt and worry from our Marines. We must remember Gen John A. Lejeune's words that the relationship between officer and enlisted should resemble "that between father and son."[10] We all relate to the confidence felt when approaching our own fathers in times of trouble. We must exemplify that same state of tranquility and assurance when our Marines are afraid. Marine Corps doctrine for "stress first aid" includes cover and calm as complementary practices. First, seek cover to remove the danger and manage the threat, then calm to minimize the physical effects, like heart rate, and control the emotional effects which may prevent a Marine from doing his duty.[11] Leaders play the key role in ensuring that both these practices take place.

Finally, the creation of a familial bond amongst Marines is necessary if they are to rise above fear on the battlefield. Individual responsibility, cohesion, shared hardships, and collective training all foster a spirit of oneness and dependence upon the other members of a unit. Sebastian Junger, in his modern classic, *War,* addresses this point perfectly:

> [the] shared commitment to safeguard one another's lives is unnegotiable and only deepens with time. The willingness to die for another person is a form of love that even religions fail to inspire, and the experience of it changes a person profoundly.[12]

Forging this fraternal spirit may be the most important and most difficult job of the Marine leader. The small unit leader is directly responsible for pushing his men past their limits as a unit to build *esprit de corps*. We, as young Marine leaders, must remember that we serve our Marines. They will fight and die, not pushed forward by our commands but pulled forward by their love for the Marine next to them.

Fear and the Junior Officer

My fellow officers at TBS attempted to display and embrace the traits of courage and fearlessness. We spoke in small groups, classroom discussions, and lectures about showing courage in the face of death. Though convincing and motivating, these expressions were only a mask. We did not understand courage because we did not know fear. We imagined being instinctively courageous leaders like Karl Marlantes, who simply "stood up" and led his men up a hill in Vietnam.[13] We practiced maneuvers under fire to manage the battlefield, our Marines, and casualties simultaneously, but blanks in the Quantico Highlands cannot stimulate the same senses as looking to your right and watching as machine-gun fire downs one of your squads. Training scenarios at TBS can insert confusion, panic, and stress into a student, but they cannot project that most primal instinct of survival: fearing for your life and the lives of those around you.

Perhaps, as professionals who operate in and around death, we have something to learn from others like us. Numerous medical authorities have written about their careers surrounded by death and suffering and the burdens they felt. Paul Kalanithi, in his novel *When Breath Becomes Air*, describes his feelings as a young doctor after a risky operation to deliver twin babies that is aptly pertinent to the junior officer:

> What a call to make. In my life, had I ever made a decision harder than choosing between a French dip and a Reuben? How could I ever learn to make, and live with, such judgment calls? … [My] focus would have to be on my imminent role, intimately involved with the when and how of death—the grave digger with the forceps.[14]

I am afraid. I cannot speak for any other young leaders of Marines, but I imagine I am not alone. I fear inadequate preparation leading to excess casualties. I fear not having the words to calm my Marines the night after a battle in the delicate manner of Lt Hillbilly from *With the Old Breed* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2007). I fear mentally freezing in combat, leading my Marines back and forth through buildings and streets with no discernible objective. I fear not being able to "just stand up" and take the hill, instead cowering in terror. Most selfishly, I fear death and bodily harm. These are situations training can prepare us for, but our responses under fire are not guaranteed until we experience them firsthand. Perhaps I was the only lieutenant training in Quantico who was afraid, but I imagine not. I wouldn't know because no one has ever asked, "What are you afraid of?"

Sharing experiences can alleviate or make others aware of how to handle fear. *(Photo by LCpl Tojyea Matally.)*

Notes

1. Christopher Kolenda, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2001).

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5. MAJ Gregory A. Daddis, USA, "Understanding Fear's Effect on Unit Effectiveness," *Military Review*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: July–August 2004).

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7. "Countering Fear in War." The authors elaborate on the difference between anger and spite: "With anger, the desired cognition concerns the action of the enemy; with spite, the image concerns the emotional quality of the enemy."

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9. "Understanding Fear's Effect on Unit Effectiveness."

10. LtGen John A. Lejeune, "Relations between Officers and Men," (Washington, DC: 14 August 1920).

11. *MCRP 6-11C*.

12. Sebastian Junger, *War*, (New York: Twelve, 2010)

13, Karl Marlantes, *What It Is Like To Go To War*, (New York: Grove Press, 2011).

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Awakening Rational Leaders

How we decide

by Maj Brian A. Kerg

Leaders decide. More than any other function, Marine leaders must be adept at decision making. All leadership tools, from the Leadership Traits and Principles to the Marine Corps Planning Process, ultimately facilitate a Marine leader's ability to OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act). Marines leading at every level, regardless of MOS or billet, employ their OODA loop in order to accomplish the mission and ensure the welfare of their Marines.

Unfortunately, most of us remain unaware of how our decision-making process works. How does our OODA loop function? How do we observe our environment? How do we orient on the task at hand? How do we decide on a course of action? And how do we act when executing the selected course of action?

As Marines, we are trained in the technical and tactical aspects of our occupational fields. We are educated in professional military topics that apply to leadership writ large. At more senior levels, resident education programs attempt to cultivate the skills of analysis, synthesis, and critical thinking.

What none of our training or education does is teach us *how* we OODA. How we view the operational environment and the actors within it, how we assess information, how heavily we weigh information, and dozens of other factors affecting the Marine's OODA loop are largely shaped by *heuristics*. It is imperative that leaders of Marines understand what heuristics are, how heuristics affect their OODA loop in both good and bad ways, and how to guard against adverse effects of certain heuristics.

How well can Marines process information and decision making using the OODA loop? *(Photo by Cpl Andrew Kuppers.)*

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Heuristics and Decision Making

Heuristics are rules of thumb, or decision-making shortcuts. Some heuristics are shaped by our own experiences, while others are the products of thousands of years of evolutionary refinement. They provide "rough-and-ready estimates of frequencies, probabilities, and magnitudes."[1] In many cases, heuristics are a decision-making aide; they allow us to make sound decisions with little intellectual effort, increasing the tempo of our OODA loops and allowing us to focus on other tasks. But in many cases, heuristics are decision-making *traps*. Instincts that facilitated tens of thousands of years of survival in a harsh but simple world now frequently work against leaders operating in complex security environments. Research and experiments by psychologists, economists, and information scientists demonstrate that decision makers often think in irrational ways, consider information inappropriately, and make decisions that are contrary to their goals or interests. So how do we build this awareness?

When Heuristics Help and Hurt

You fall into a pool of water. Your intent is to continue breathing. Your instinct is to keep your head above water. In seeking to do this, you instinctively *fight to remain completely*

vertical, which is the most *inefficient* way to afford easy, repeated access to air while submerged. You quickly exhaust yourself and drown. In this example, you were killed by your decision-making shortcut. Your instinctual heuristic of, "In order to breathe, get your airway *up*" created a *bias* of remaining vertical, even when it ran counter to your intent to breathe and survive. Only if you'd been trained in a water survival technique, most of which require you to repeatedly put your airway in the water or go horizontal instead of vertical, could you have defeated your bias and survived.

Heuristics hurt us when they turn into biases. Biases are faulty emanations of heuristics. We use heuristics consciously and unconsciously hundreds of times a day, and biases often cause us to make unsound or irrational decisions, often to the detriment of the mission and our Marines.

An explanation of a few well-known heuristics and their associated biases will help orient the reader to the enormity of this problem:

The *availability* heuristic causes us to assess the probability of an event through occurrences of that event readily available in memory.[2] Such instances are more available to us if they are more vivid. This heuristic is often useful; if a Marine can easily recall getting reprimanded for failing to shave, he can rightly judge that showing up to formation without a shave will have adverse consequences. A consequent bias is *ease of recall*, in which we erroneously apply the availability heuristic.[3] If Sgt Alpha makes a notable mistake a week before his reporting senior writes his fitness report, he will likely receive a lower evaluation than Sgt Bravo, who made the same mistake six months ago.

The *representativeness* heuristic is used when forming judgments about a person. When doing so, the judge will look for characteristics in the person that represent a stereotype.[4] The heuristic is useful; a platoon sergeant looking to pick an M240 gunner from his new Marines is probably going to choose the largest Marine, as he sees that Marine's size as representative of the ability to more effectively carry and employ such a heavy weapons system. A consequent bias of this heuristic is the *conjunction fallacy*, wherein a conjunction of multiple traits is associated with a single trait because the conjunction of traits seems more representative than a single trait. This often causes us to be poor judges of outcomes.[5] The platoon sergeant selecting a new fire team leader from this same batch of new Marines might also assume his M240 gunner will make an outstanding leader as he is large and is erroneously assumed to therefore be extroverted and have command presence.

The *confirmation* heuristic causes us to intuitively select data or the cause of an event because of our assumptions.[6] When trying to make connections, we rapidly make associations in order to help predict outcomes. This heuristic is useful; an ETT (embedded training team) leader trying to negotiate the number of daily work hours he can get out of his Afghan counterparts will provide himself a baseline estimate by referring to the three-hour training day used with the Iraqi forces he trained on his last ETT deployment. A consequent bias of this heuristic is *anchoring*, in which we are able to adjust from initial estimates—the anchor—only incrementally, and often insufficiently, because we grossly overestimate the weight of the anchor's validity.[7] The ETT leader aims high by asking for a four-hour training day, and though the Afghan team leader was willing to make his subordinates conduct six-hour training days, the negotiations are anchored around that first figure, and the Afghan team leader will now rarely train for more than four hours a day.

Comprehensively listing every heuristic and the biases that stem from them would go beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth briefly listing other biases to provide a broader understanding of how problematic our decision-making processes can be.

The clustering illusion causes us to look at random events and see patterns that don't exist; a number of high-visibility incidents of misconduct may cause leaders to believe there is a crisis of discipline within the Marine Corps, when in reality, misconduct is currently at its lowest levels in years but is easier to see because of advances in communications technologies.

The confirmation bias causes us to consider only the information that matches our preconceptions; an infantry battalion commander predisposed to conventional operations may believe his line companies are having a greater effect on securing his area of responsibility because they are conducting a greater

We need to be able to set aside our biases as we process available information. *(Photo by Cpl Manuel Serrano.)*

quantity of combat patrols, but he may be ignoring the disproportionate effect that his unconventional ETTs are having in winning over the local populace.

The conservativism bias causes us to more heavily weight older evidence over new evidence; a platoon sergeant might believe one of his lance corporals is a troublemaker because of a 6105 counseling the lance corporal received early in his career, even if his performance has been exemplary for a year.

The information bias is the tendency to seek more information even if it doesn't affect the situation; a convoy commander planning a combat logistics patrol might waste valuable time reviewing reports on significant action reports that occurred in a province in which his Marines won't be traveling rather than focusing on preparing his Marines for the mission at hand.

The outcome bias makes us base a decision's merit on its outcome rather than on the logic by which the decision was made; an area commander with a stellar performance record and an airtight force protection policy might be relieved because a Marine smuggled a weapon onto base and killed himself.

Escalation of commitment causes us to make new decisions based on the cost associated with the initial decision; when a contractor repeatedly goes over budget and timelines to develop a new fighter jet, the program manager consistently doubles down because of the costs that were already sunk into the project.

Salience makes us focus on the most distinct or recognizable features of a concept. A commander might assume that the MCMAP (Marine Corps Martial Arts Program) is a very dangerous training activity because of the salience of its combative components and discourage it in his command, when in fact, MCMAP is far safer than basketball and running, both of which are much higher sources of injury.[8]

There are more tested and documented biases than can be adequately listed and explained in this forum. Suffice it to say that leaders are constantly and consistently subjected to the same decision-making traps, which can adversely affect their Marines and their success at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Heuristics Awareness and Defeating Cognitive Biases

It's apparent that these biases preexist in the mind. Each of these biases has been observed and tested in myriad ways, most prominently in studies performed by behavioral psychologists, economists, and information scientists.[9] Every Marine leader, whose critical decisions determine mission accomplishment and troop welfare, is affected by these erroneous decision-making processes. But they are not condemned to remain subject to them—*if they cultivate an awareness of them*. Learning to spot biases improves your ability to override them, improving the quality of your decision making.[10] Self-study, institutional education, and the adoption of de-biasing strategies will allow leaders to gain the awareness needed to overcome these biases and make better decisions for their Marines and their commands.

Learning to spot biases improves your ability to override them, improving the quality of your decision making.

Self-study. The cheapest and most readily employable option is for leaders to provide themselves with an understanding of biases at the individual level through self-education. Malcolm Gladwell's *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, which holds a well-deserved place on the Commandant's Professional Reading List, provides an accessible introduction to how humans OODA. Leaders should develop wider and deeper understandings of biases through expanded reading selections on decision-making research. Such selections should robustly analyze and explain decision-making traps and biases through reference to the experiments conducted by behavioral psychologists, economists, and information scientists. Max Bazerman and Don Moore's *Judgment in Managerial Decision Making* and Reid Hastie and Robyn Dawes' *Rational Choice in an Uncertain World*, which principally informed this essay, also serve as lynchpins for the University of Michigan's School of Information curriculum.

Institutional education. Leaders can develop awareness in themselves and their Marines through institutionalizing the study of heuristics, biases, and decision making in a variety of platforms. Directors can add such materials to the curricula of resident PME programs such as Command and Staff College, Expeditionary Warfare School, the Advanced Course, and the SNCO Academy. This would be the most decisive course of action, as it would ensure a robust awareness is developed and maintained in key leaders throughout the Marine Corps, improving the soundness of decision-making processes across the organization. The culture of decision making would be positively impacted Marine Corps-wide in perpetuity. Such integration could be robustly and fluidly achieved by creating partnerships between curriculum developers of resident PME schools and schools of information, economics, and psychology at civilian universities.

At the unit level, leaders who have educated themselves on heuristics and biases can develop PME to locally deliver to their Marines. This capitalizes on the decentralization of training and education, allowing leaders to tailor the program to fit the needs of their unit based on its mission. Decision-making traps specific to an infantry company will differ from those faced by a supply battalion. More general education can also be implemented into preexisting PME platforms, such as that provided in the curricula of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps' naval science courses.

Adoption of De-biasing Strategies. The Marine Corps Planning Process facilitates the development of courses of action for a commander, but it does not

guard against biases. Behavioral decision research literature provides several strategies that can allow leaders at any level to mitigate the degree to which their decisions are affected by biases.

Primarily, leaders can implement *linear models* to guide decisions. Despite the importance of experience for Marine leaders, optimal decisions are demonstrably *not* made intuitively or by gut feeling.[11] Weighing and adding the relevant variables, to include the value placed on each course of action, allows the leader to compare expected values. For example, assigning a value to each preferred course of action, and a value to the likelihood of that course of action, then multiplying both values, will allow the decision maker to immediately quantify the value of each course of action. Though the staff estimate provided during the Marine Corps Planning Process might leverage the expertise of subject-matter experts, linear models produce predictions that are generally superior to those produced intuitively by experts.[12]

Leaders can perform de-biasing to deliberately reduce biases. Actively warning yourself about the biases before a decision, getting immediate feedback from the decision, and programming training that delivers this feedback before the next analogous decision can allow you to train around your natural biases.[13] A reporting senior preparing to write a fitness report might remind himself of biases such as salience, availability, and confirmation prior to writing, get feedback from both the command reviewer and the Marine reported on during and after the writing process, and then file this feedback for review before writing on that Marine again.

Decision makers can also *reason analogically* to take common lessons from multiple situations. This is the same reason that most PME schools and military academies rely so strongly on the study of military history:

> Historical examples clarify everything and also provide the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences. This is particularly true of the art of war.[14]

When only analyzing a single incident or case study, learners often focus on superficial characteristics of that situation. When comparing lessons from multiple episodes, learners create analogies between each to provide a sound logic and lesson that is applicable to similar situations.[15] When developing a counterinsurgency strategy, leaders shouldn't focus on a single counterinsurgency case but on several counterinsurgency cases to see the larger lessons that will survive application to the current contingency.

Awakening Rational Leaders

Heuristics can help. In so many instances of combat leadership, or when faced with short-fused tasks in a garrison setting, Marine leaders are compelled to rely on experience, to go with their gut, and to violently execute the 80-percent solution. However, using heuristics will inevitably lead to decision-making biases, and many leaders intuitively use bias-laden heuristics even when they are afforded the time to make a more rational decision.

Marine leaders can build within themselves an awareness of these biases in order to make more rational, better decisions. Through deep and broad self-study, the institutionalization of decision-making biases in our PME, and the adoption of de-biasing strategies, Marines will build the awareness needed to become more rational decision makers. This process will initially require a cost in time and commitment, but with constant cultivation of bias awareness and the default implementation of rational decision-making strategies, leaders will make better decisions even when the situation demands a decision *now*.

An adequate leader is *trained* for the known. A good leader is *educated* for the unknown. A great leader is *aware* of how we react to both. We as a Marine Corps can and should build this awareness *now*.

Notes

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The Culturally Competent Marine

Regional culture and language familiarization

by Capt Robert Manuel

On 24 October 2012, Education Command announced the implementation of the RCLF (Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization) Program with the goal to create the foundation for a culturally competent GPF (general purpose force). It aimed to do this by providing approximately 120 hours of training and education on the subject of culture and language spread over twenty years of a Marine's career.[1] Unfortunately, the time and resources devoted to this endeavor are insufficient to change individual predispositions to cultural learning and interaction. Indeed, as currently written, the RCLF Program makes cultural learning more about the military establishment than the continually evolving cultural environments to which Marines deploy or the people in them.[2] This threatens to result in a force incapable of exercising the intelligent initiative required by operators in the "three block wars" of today and tomorrow.[3]

With regard to its general flow, this article first examines the education and training being offered through the RCLF program. It then turns to discussing a key component to cultural competency: individual motivation to learn about novel cultural situations and adapt to them. Finally, it provides three recommendations for increasing the level of training and education provided through the RCLF Program.

The RCLF Program

Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber argue, in *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*, that learning about other cultures should be an integral part of being a Marine.[4] Despite the importance they place on socializing cultural learning in one of the guiding documents for achieving cultural competence in the Marine Corps, the RCLF Program comes up short when measured against existing standards. The table below reflects the cultural exposure provided to unrestricted officers by rank under this program. Similar requirements exist for warrant officers and enlisted Marines.[5] Per Table 1, Marines are provided with a total of four hours of exposure to culture-general topics, 36 hours of exposure to culture-specific topics, and 80 hours of exposure to language training. Given a 40-hour workweek and normal career progression for an unrestricted officer, this equates to three weeks of training and education devoted to cultural learning over a twenty-year career. With this amount of time devoted to the subject, the RCLF Program simply fails to socialize cultural learning into the Marine Corps.

>Capt Manuel wrote this article when he was a Student, EWS, AY12–13.

Problem Ownership

Although training and education related to the study of culture and language would tend to improve Marines' cultural knowledge and behavioral skills, improvement in these areas alone does not ensure cultural competency. Culture is so broad, complex, and dynamic that Marines must also learn to take ownership of the cultural learning process for competency to be achieved. A discussion on the difference between academic and practical problems helps to illustrate this point.

Psychologist Ulric Neisser explains that academic problems are typically characterized by being well defined and formulated by others, coming complete with the information needed to solve them, having only one right answer,

Table 1	RCLF Program Requirements by Rank	
Rank	**Requirement(s)**	**Hours**
Second Lieutenant	**Block 1: Introduction to Operational Culture (Culture General Course)[6]**	**3**
First Lieutenant	**Block 2: (Culture General Course)**	**1**
Captain	**> Block 3 (Region Specific Course)** **> HeadStart 2 Language Coursework**	**> 12** **> 80**
Major	**Block 4 (Region Specific Course)**	**12**
Lieutenant Colonel	**Block 5 (Region Specific Course)**	**12**

Table 1. *(Graphic provided by author.)*

and being simplified so as to be outside the context of normal experiences.[7] By contrast, psychologists Steven Cornelius and Avshalom Caspi write that practical problems are typically characterized by being unformulated or in need of formulation or reframing, having multiple correct answers which are each only satisfying at best, and having multiple ways of being solved.[8] Given the sheer magnitude and ambiguity of cultures, understanding them and interacting across them often falls into the practical domain. This is an important point when considering the relatively wide range of strategies that individuals employ when dealing with practical problems. Individual strategies range from problem-focused action and problem analysis to problem avoidance and denial.[9] By extension, this presents the unmotivated Marine faced with an unfamiliar cultural problem with the opportunity, unconsciously or consciously, to avoid the problem or deny that it exists in the first place.

The importance of ownership to cultural understanding is signaled in *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* by Salmoni and Holmes-Eber's choice to use Bloom's Taxonomy to describe the operational culture learning process. Bloom's Taxonomy's division of learning into cognitive, psycho-motor, and affective domains is one of the things that sets it apart from other learning models.[10] The affective domain's contribution to the model is that it describes how a person interacts with what they learn and how they come to own it.[11] Ownership also relates to cultural intelligence.

Cultural intelligence refers to a person's capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts.[12] In *Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures*, Christopher Earley and Soon Ang introduce a tripartite model of cultural intelligence, which includes cognitive, motivational, and behavioral facets. By examining their model's motivational facet, we can gain a deeper understanding of how ownership drives thought and action across cultures.

The Importance of Socialization

Two components of the motivational facet of cultural intelligence, value questioning and integration and efficacy, are considered here. A person's values shape his preferences to engage in particular actions. As this relates to cultural interaction, a person's values influence the likelihood that he will proactively engage with another culture. For instance, the more "open" a person is to new experiences and ways of doing things, the more likely he will move from stereotypes to accurate representations of a given culture as he is increasingly exposed to it. Studies show that values guide the evaluation of decisions as well.[13]

Like values, self-efficacy influences the likelihood that a person will engage in certain activities. Moreover, a person with a high self-efficacy judgment in a given area is more likely to overcome obstacles, setbacks, or failures in that area than a person with low self-efficacy. This is because a person's self-efficacy judgment, or how good he perceives himself to be at an activity, affects whether he anticipates success or failure as a result of doing the activity.[14] Self-efficacy also affects the goals that a person sets for himself and the strategies that he adopts to meet those goals, since efficacy and goal setting expand and intensify a person's search for the best way to engage the world around him.[15]

That both these components are tied to a person's self-concept should not be lost on the reader.[16] This realization supports the idea that cultural training and education should be aimed at shaping the identity of individual Marines. This in turn ties back to an idea proposed by Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, who argue that, "In any organization the greatest change mechanism is socialization, and in the Marine Corps that socialization mechanism is training and education, both formal and informal."[17] To succeed institutionally in the study of culture, Marines have to own the process.

Marines should feel confident in their ability to exchange information in a foreign language.
(Photo by LCpl Christopher Mendoza.)

Recommendations for Improvement

The Marine Corps can pursue multiple different strategies to increase the institutional emphasis on education and training related to the study of culture—such as implementing an appropriately targeted reading program, improving the availability and quality of language training on Marine bases and stations, and increasing the number of Marines participating in cultural immersion programs annually.

By instituting a reading program tied to the Commandant's Profession-

Marines need individual motivation to learn about adapting to different cultures. *(Photo by LCpl Serine Farahi.)*

al Reading List, the RCLF Program could increase Marines' exposure to anthropological topics and to the "war and society" approach to military history, among other subjects. Marines' increased exposure to these topics would increase their general knowledge of culture while socializing them to the importance of cultural learning more generally. This option would also be relatively inexpensive to implement and would provide Marines with vicarious cultural experience.

Additional language training is another option that could be pursued. The RCLF Program might have to sacrifice the breadth of languages studied for the depth of knowledge gained in just a few languages to make this an economically viable option, but the Marine Corps could invest in part-time language instructors to provide evening classes at its bases and stations to support this initiative. This course of action would allow select populations within the GPF to develop competency in a target language during a given three-year duty assignment.

Yet another option would be to increase the number of Marines sent abroad annually on exchange tours and to resident PME institutions. Many of the United States' NATO allies provide their officers with the opportunity to study at foreign institutions without designating them as cultural area specialists. Since a significant population of Marines enter the Marine Corps speaking foreign languages proficiently, why not capitalize on this capability and send them abroad for cultural immersion?

Conclusion

In closing, the way forward for cultural learning in the Marine Corps has recently been decided by the implementation of the RCLF Program. Revisions need to be made to the existing program, nevertheless, in order to better leverage the advice set forth in one of the Marine Corps' guiding documents on cultural learning. After considering the importance of socialization on cultural learning, 120 hours of training and education on the subject of culture spread over a twenty-year career is too little to achieve the RCLF Program's primary goal. Three options have been proposed to increase the amount of training and education provided to Marines within the GPF to levels that would change individual predispositions to cultural learning and interaction. This dispositional change at the individual level is what is required to create a GPF that can respond competently to complex and dynamic cultural environments that Marines continue to face.

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Counternarcotics Expertise in the Marine Corps

Addressing internal drug problems

by Capt Brandon W. Cox

The Marine Corps has a drug problem, and we need help to eliminate it. Marines are buying, selling, and using illicit drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, ecstasy, and heroin.[1] Concurrently, the increase in PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) and other combat-related trauma has led to an increase in prescription drug abuse and misuse.[2] Currently, the Marine Corps does not have an organic CN (counternarcotics) SME (subject-matter expert) to provide installation and unit commanders with the assets to reduce the detriment to unit readiness caused by drug abuse. Furthermore, combatant commanders play a pivotal role in our Nation's CN efforts across the globe, but they too lack a dedicated organic CN SME. The Marine Corps does provide personnel and assets to these efforts, but they are not trained CN SMEs. A trained CN SME would help to fight our own "War on Drugs," and would be a valuable asset to combatant commanders in the global effort to interrupt, dismantle, and destroy narcotics operations. The Marine Corps must create a CN SME to better combat our internal drug problem and to provide the Corps a more effective capability in the global CN effort.

There should be no debate on whether the Marine Corps has a drug problem. The Marine Corps recognizes drug abuse as such a significant problem that there are information campaigns to help address the issue. A quick walk around any battalion or regimental headquarters is nearly guaranteed to be met with several posters depicting the negative effects drug abuse has had on units or individuals. Furthermore, the fact that each unit has a SACO (substance abuse control officer) and a requirement for mandatory random urinalysis screenings are testaments to the issue's severity.[3]

>Capt Cox wrote this article while attending Expeditionary Warfare School, AY15–16.

The Marine Corps loses a vast amount of man-hours and suffers a detriment to overall unit readiness because of illicit and prescription drug issues. The work that could have been executed by the offender is lost, and the work that could have been conducted by administrative personnel and the chain of command while they are handling an offender's prosecution or administrative separation is lost. There is also a significant amount of time spent by law enforcement and legal personnel during any related investigation and adjudication. The exact amount of man-hours spent on a case is difficult to determine, but any amount of time is too much. A case could be handled in a few weeks to a month for a simple administrative separation, or it could last years for a general court-martial.[4] Unit readiness

Testing for drug use impacts a unit's readiness in terms of manpower and man-hours. *(Photo by Cpl Daniel Wulz.)*

suffers as a result of the lost man-hours and manpower. The Marine who tested positive on a urinalysis not only takes time away from the unit, he also creates a gap in the line. Now, that Marine's job must be passed on to someone else or left vacant.

In FY15, there was a combination of 74 special and general courts-martial that involved the possession, use, distribution, or manufacturing of controlled substances, with several cases involving multiple illicit actions and/or various other charges in relation to the drug offenses.[5] Cases that make it to special or general courts-martial are typically the most severe cases, but they do not account for all, or even most, of the cases that arise. II MEF alone had over 450 Marines with positive urinalysis results during a seven-month period in 2013.[6] Some of the lesser offenses can be adjudicated by means of administrative separation, non-judicial punishment, or a summary court-martial.[7]

The drug problem is such a concern for II MEF that the CG directed the establishment of a CDTF (Counter Drug Task Force) in 2012 to help fight the MEF's drug problem.[8] The CDTF is a collaboration between MPs from 2d Law Enforcement Battalion, the Camp Lejeune PMO (Provost Marshal's Office), and the NCIS (Naval Criminal Investigative Service) onboard the installation.[9] The II MEF CDTF is currently the only organization of its kind in the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps is currently providing assets with limited capability and capacity to CN operations in the Operating Forces. The primary focus of CN operations is in U.S. SOUTHCOM (Southern Command), where countering transnational organized crime is one of the commander's top priorities.[10] Unfortunately, SOUTHCOM receives the lowest priority of all combatant commanders,[11] and budget cuts because of sequestration are causing a reduction of available assets and threatening mission accomplishment in this area.[12] SOUTHCOM assets typically work in conjunction with other U.S. entities, such as the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard.[13] A trained CN SME would be a force multiplier for this particular mission set and could potentially reduce the impact of force reductions in other areas.

The CN SME would be given the title of "narcotics investigator," and he would be assigned the AMOS (additional MOS) of 5819. The narcotics investigator would have a feeder MOS of 5811, MP, and would have to be the rank of corporal through staff sergeant as a prerequisite to attend the initial training.

5819 is currently the AMOS for a Military Police Investigator, but this AMOS and the funding for training this AMOS would be better suited as a narcotics investigator. The current inventory of MP investigators is of little use to PMOs and has no utility in the law enforcement battalions. Both organizations already employ criminal investigators (the 5821 MOS) through their CIDs (criminal investigation divisions), and MP investigators bring no additional skill set to the unit. In fact, they bring a reduced skill set compared to 5821s.

... the narcotics investigator could provide information to local commanders ...

Narcotics investigators would be assigned to all three law enforcement battalions and all PMOs that also have CID sections. Narcotics investigators assigned to the law enforcement battalions would participate in CN operations globally in support of combatant commander requirements. They would also be assigned to MEU LEDs (law enforcement detachments), which are currently sourced from the law enforcement battalions. MEU narcotics investigators, given the appropriate authority and jurisdiction, would provide the MEU commander with an organic asset to combat internal drug problems while also providing an asset to any combatant commander the MEU is assigned to support.

Narcotics investigators assigned to PMOs would provide the installation commander an asset trained in several specialized areas: narcotic, paraphernalia, and precursor identification; trafficking trends and warning signs; narcotic network analysis and exploitation; and current trends in narcotic use. The narcotics investigator would also serve as a conduit between the PMO and local narcotics task forces and/or the local DEA office. Furthermore, the narcotics investigator could provide information to local commanders to help them better identify drug users in their commands.

Some would argue that a narcotics investigator is not needed because the Marine Corps has NCIS and CID agents to investigate narcotics-related issues. Both of these entities are capable of conducting narcotics investigations, and they are both currently active in narcotics investigations within their respective jurisdictions. In fact, NCIS has active narcotics task forces to combat narcotics problems in certain locations.[14] However, they do not have the capacity to serve as Corps-wide SMEs, nor do they have the capacity to dedicate agents solely to narcotics investigations, disruption, and education. They are both undermanned and over obligated with their current caseloads. For instance, CID agents at the Camp Lejeune PMO currently carry a caseload of approximately eight to fifteen cases each.[15] Of those, 27 percent are narcotics related.[16] Though the case-load of NCIS agents was unavailable at the time of publishing, a recent report noted that NCIS agents were unavailable for narcotics investigations during a significant period of 2015 because of competing interests.[17]

Furthermore, neither brand of agent has the amount of in-depth training that the proposed narcotics investigator would have. NCIS and CID agents are trained as basic criminal investigators, but they do not specialize in narcotics investigations.[18] Narcotics investigators would serve as an augment to NCIS and CID agents and as force multipliers to both agencies. Employing a narcotics



The Marine Corps doesn't have organic counternarcotics SME assets. *(Photo by LCpl Patrick Osino.)*

investigator would allow the NCIS or CID agent to focus on the plethora of other crimes that occur within their respective jurisdictions. The relationship would be similar to that of the FBI and DEA—the FBI can investigate narcotics crimes, but the DEA is better suited to handle those cases.

Some might argue that the CDTF example established in II MEF eliminates the need for a trained narcotics investigator. Although the CDTF is working to reduce the drug problem in II MEF, it lacks the training and authority to be a truly effective CN entity. The CDTF's main missions are to provide education and advice to commanders and their staffs and to assist commands in conducting barracks checks.[19] There is currently no formal education required for any MP to become part of the CDTF; the task force depends upon on-the-job training to bring new members up to speed.[20] Additionally, the CDTF has no law enforcement authority to conduct investigations or affect apprehensions on the installation.[21]

There is no doubt the Marine Corps has a drug problem. The Corps recognizes this problem and employs passive techniques to combat it. It is time for the Corps to be more active in its CN efforts. The efforts currently employed are not enough to adequately address the issue, and drug abuse will continue to grow if no new methods are introduced. The creation of a narcotics investigator AMOS would provide commanders with an asset that would be able to help them proactively identify drug issues within their commands. It would also provide an organic asset to the PMOs that could lead CN efforts at the PMO and train all PMO personnel on counternarcotic missions. It would further provide the law enforcement battalions with organic CN SMEs who could pay dividends to their respective MEFs when they execute CN missions abroad in support of combatant commander requirements.

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Blurred Boundaries

Drugs and terrorism

by GySgt Lizette Hernandez

>GySgt Hernandez is a 2862 currently assigned as a Master Instructor and Curriculum Developer, Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School. She is a graduate of Central Texas College and is currently enrolled in a Homeland Security program at American Military University.

There is an insidious threat in the backyard of the United States. While military organizations are focusing more on homeland defense, most U.S. officials remain on the fence about the implications that Mexican TCOs (transnational criminal organizations) have to national security. Instead, our Armed Forces are laser focused on Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran as expected terrorist threats. A critical aspect of Col John Boyd's decision-making cycle, however, is observing and orienting. In much the same way as forgetting to observe and orient in the decision-making process, the U.S. assumes a high risk by underestimating the implications of relevant current events that shape the present-day terrorist situation.

Although the Mexican government accepts U.S. aid and military training to leverage a foothold against the drug cartels, it must be given with limitations so as not to cause more harm than good.

It is also an uncomfortable fact that any U.S. military aid can backfire without the reasonable analysis of behavioral patterns, environmental indicators, cultural implications, and socio-economic factors of the Mexican TCOs. Although the Posse Comitatus Act, Section 1385 of Title 18, USC (United States Code), restricts involvement of the military with law enforcement, it does permit military forces to provide civil support. Currently, U.S. Marine Forces Northern Command, when attached to USNORTHCOM, executes support on homeland security, including counternarcotics operations.[1] It is imperative, however, that USNORTHCOM units and Federal agencies recognize two things. First, that Mexican TCOs' behavioral patterns are analogous to sophisticated terrorism in terms of combat profiling. Second, U.S. military training rendered to Mexican federal agencies is a time-tested failure as Mexican federal agencies are easily corrupted.

"The military-to-military relationship between the United States and Mexico has advanced to unprecedented levels of coordination," said GEN Chuck Jacoby, USA, Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command.[2] DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) reports on the Mexican TCOs state that the drug cartels have established control of drug trafficking lines across the United States.[3] These Mexican drug trafficking organizations are rated as the number one criminal drug threat to the United States; "no other group [crime groups, local dealers, or street gangs] is currently positioned to challenge them."[4] The illegal drug market, however, is only one singlet of the many complex threats TCOs bring to the United States. Additional sources of revenue include smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking (illegal immigrant workers and sex workers), and pirated intellectual property.[5] While none of these crimes qualify as a military problem, the "abilities" of drug cartels to move contraband, weapons, and people are of strategic importance to counterterrorism. This is because the most egregious threat to U.S. national security is the TCOs' massive logistical network to transport cargo across the international border to any location in the United States.[6] That logistical network is expanding worldwide, with Mexican TCO drug trafficking reaching remote areas of Africa[7]and Asia.[8]

Although not usually publicized, the Marine Corps has been increasing its training role of Mexican marines.[9] A lesson in TCO "genealogy"[10] predicts that their actions are an insidious entrapment for bilateral peace relations. Almost every TCO was generated as a result of trained military personnel (deserters, contract guards, or even specially trained teams) that proved to be susceptible to greed and corruption. As a result, the current Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, has been aggressively holding law enforcement officials accountable with massive numbers of job dismissals or trials (resulting from crime investigations on their own rank and files). Corruption among law enforcement is virulent. The following estimations were provided in Calendar Year 2015: of identified killers, 69 percent of victims died at the hands of

the drug cartels.[11] 22 percent of other victims were killed by government or military personnel.[12]

An unfortunate example is the special operations training conducted at Fort Bragg, NC, and Fort Benning, GA, to Guatemalan Kaibiles and Naval and Naval Infantry (Marine) Special Forces in 2001, whose personnel quickly became recruitment sources for Mexican TCOs.[13] In October 2001, the Zetas were formed from government-trained paramilitaries. But a discussion of the correlation between the TCOs' rise to power and disaffected American-trained personnel would prove too voluminous to be included here. Lessons learned from these events, however, should restrict U.S.-Mexico military training. U.S. foreign policy should temper, rather than increase, the U.S. Marine Corps' role associated with paramilitary functions. In some aspects, U.S. military training provided to the Mexican federal government seeded fertile ground for several of the most violent and lethal drug trafficking organizations Mexico has ever seen.

Today, TCOs outperform local law enforcement in Mexico. The most violent drug cartels of Mexico are Cartel Del Pacifico, Arellano Felix, LFM (La Familia Michoacana), Carrillo Fuentes, BLO (Beltran Leyva Organization), Los Zetas, Cartel Del Golfo, LCT (Los Caballeros Templarios, or Knights Templars), and the CJNG (Cartel de Jalisco New Generation).[14] While the number of casualties left by the Mexican TCOs is in dispute, it ranges from 150,000[15] to upward of 160,000[16] dead per year since 2011. Current drug cartels are many times more tactically cunning; have devolved the act of killing into pornographic assassinations of decapitations, torture, and dismemberment of body parts; and are capable of planning and conducting sophisticated attacks with military grade weapons. At the time of this publication, the local law enforcement personnel in several states of Mexico have been replaced (fired, placed on trial for corruption, or disbanded) in lieu of federal law enforcement.

News of targeted violence on federal and police officials, journalists, and rival drug cartels were presumed to be geographically secured to south of the Rio Grande. Another problem is the susceptibility for the recruitment of U.S. service members who may serve as force multipliers to carry out crimes north of the Rio Grande on behalf of TCOs. Exact numbers of recruitment are unknown, but TCOs pay high amounts of cash to service members to carry out assassinations for them.[17] [18] Recruited U.S. service members can also act as "train the trainers" for drug cartels. Former U.S. Army sniper instructor Joseph Hunter recruited other Army snipers to work for a drug cartel and agreed to kill a DEA agent (this never took place).[19] It would be a mistake to underestimate the TCOs' pattern of recruiting service members—they will reach to cover any deficiencies through the right recruitment of military-trained personnel.

It's time for the United States to reconsider its military cooperation programs. *(Photo by LCpl Taylor Cooper.)*

Along the same lines of Andrew Carnegie's U.S. steel monopoly in the 1920s,[20] the TCOs count on engineering and logistics specialists capable of rendering smuggling services to large amounts of contraband.[21] Whereas each member of a local U.S. dealer or cartel in the supply chain produces a different market-specific product, Mexican TCOs are establishing vertical supply-chain ownership that allows them to produce purer and cheaper drugs than the local suppliers. The kingpin of the Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, was recently captured by Mexican authorities. Among some of the reports of his extensive network was the count of 150 sophisticated underground tunnels constructed with air conditioning systems, electrical and lighting services, and train tracks with mining wagons useful for moving several tons of drugs across the United States and Mexican border.[22] Chemical shipments from Asia at cheap prices are transported to labs in Mexico, outperforming the local drug organizations in prices and quality on the American streets. Although there is no certainty in any future, the probability and magnitude of the risks of a TCO alliance with a terrorist group is the Trojan Horse of U.S. national security that represents a threat to foreign relations, law enforcement, government, civilian, and military organizations.

It is important for the Mexican government to continue to put pressure on the drug cartels. Capturing cartel leaders, however, engenders more violence, and killing them often martyrdoms them. These kingpins remain immortalized in the popular *narcocorridos*, popular Mexican ballads that associate glamour, fame, and money to drug trafficking. But the TCOs, like extremist Muslim terrorist groups, operate much

like a Lernaean Hydra—capturing or killing TCO leaders does not stop the drug cartels; in some cases, cutting off a head only ensures another, much stronger head grows in its place.

In September 2010, the arrest of Edgar Vasquez Villareal (also known as "La Barbie"), Arturo Beltrán Leyva, and Ignacio Coronel Villarreal led to a massive amount of confiscated contraband. Indeed, their capture and arrests also led to a protracted turf war to control the real estate while the drug cartels were debilitated.[23] The capture of the drug kingpins, however, did not mean the end of the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel. Instead, violence amplified following the arrests of drug cartel leadership, with periods of atrocious crimes inflicted without mercy to intimidate rival cartels in order to regain control of the area.

Too much U.S. aid without the requisite Mexican civilian security and judicial system to support the alleged criminals will inflict unnecessary damages to innocent civilian lives. Women and children are frequently caught in the cross-fires of open gun fights in public places. One solution may be in the old "Kingpin Strategy."[24] The strategy came about during President Ronald Reagan's "War on Drugs" of the 1980s in Florida, and it attacks several centers of gravity (deficiencies) of drug cartels near simultaneously. Successful attacks on cartels focus on stopping the cash flow and supply distribution chains.[25] Drying up the cash flow will severely hamper the ability of TCOs to spread and recruit. With corruption and greed being the principal motivators of the industry, special attention should be paid to all U.S. aid to ensure direct damage to the cash flow of TCOs.

It's time to change the U.S.-Mexico military cooperation. The transference of U.S. trained military skills is a risk of lethal consequences for many people of either nationality on both sides of the border. Rampant corruption of the Mexican government, susceptibility to bribery of paramilitary Mexican personnel, and the TCOs' accumulation of power and money pose serious challenges to U.S. national security. The most worrisome of the threats is their ability to transport a large number of contraband to nearly any part of the U.S. while avoiding detection. The successful recruitment of U.S. service members to carry out capital crimes on behalf of drug trafficking organizations is also cause for concern. Although the Mexican government accepts U.S. aid and military training to leverage a foothold against the drug cartels, it must be given with limitations so as not to cause more harm than good. Money and power can change people—for some, it can corrupt absolutely.

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Small Wars Redux

Preparing for irregular warfare in the littorals

by 1stLt Ben Kallas

The Marine Corps has entered a critical period. In the wake of two major conflicts, it has the chance to reevaluate its role within the United States military and adjust its structure, equipment, and training to avoid a "last war" mindset and prepare for future operations. In fact, the changes made in the coming years will be necessary to ensure this institution's continued relevance. As Lt-Gen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret), famously observed,

> The United States does not need a Marine Corps. However, for good reasons which completely transcend cold logic, the United States wants a Marine Corps.[1]

Yet by 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned that Marines were increasingly seen as "a so-called second land army" and "too heavy, too removed from their expeditionary, amphibious roots and the unique skill sets those missions require."[2] Their role at the time was necessary, given the significant forces required in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that experience should remain the exception rather than the norm. If the Marine Corps fails to adequately distance itself from the Army before the next major conflict, it will likely be employed again as a second land army—a role for which it is neither optimized nor intended.

While Marines performed admirably in both wars,

> the Marine Corps is optimized to be *expeditionary*—a strategically mobile force that is light enough to get to the crisis quickly, yet able to accomplish the mission or provide time and options prior to the arrival of additional forces.[3]

But expeditionary operations, which prompted the publication of the *Small Wars Manual*, were largely forgotten by the Vietnam era, and the lessons of Vietnam did not prevent similar oversights in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marine Corps' present challenge is to retain the lessons of the last two wars while returning to its *raison d'être*: expeditionary operations, which frequently involve irregular warfare against non-state adversaries in so-called "small wars."

The continued purchase of costly, heavy military hardware at the expense of lightweight, expeditionary capabilities will put the Corps in direct competition with the Army and call the reasons for its existence into question once again. *Expeditionary Force 21* explains that "each adjustment to capability must have an eye toward improving our ability to deploy, employ, and sustain as an expeditionary force."[4] The following paragraphs address the task of returning to our traditional, unique role. The first section sets the stage with an overview of the future operating environment, the second examines the units optimized to work with partner forces and conduct irregular warfare, and the final section focuses on the need for lighter forces and training for expeditionary operations.



The Marine Corps seeks to return to its expeditionary roots. *(Photo by Sgt Hannah Perkins.)*

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The Future Operating Environment

Though the United States has focused on sustained counterinsurgency in two countries with relatively few waterways and limited—if any—access

to the sea, the world's littorals are now more central to geopolitics than at any point in the past. David Kilcullen's *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla* makes this abundantly clear through its focus on four trends shaping the global environment: population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and increasing connectedness.

The vast majority of population growth will take place in the world's poorest countries, which are least able to provide for the newcomers. At the same time, economic factors will continue to drive urbanization on a massive scale, resulting in sprawling and largely unplanned megacities with accompanying massive slums. This will be

> concentrated in low-income areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Cities are expected to absorb *all* the new population growth on the planet by 2050, while simultaneously drawing in millions of migrants from rural areas.[5]

More than half the world's population lives within 50 miles of the sea, and 80 percent of national capitals are near the coast, so the strategic importance of the littorals is difficult to overstate.

Operating in urban slums makes traditional MOUT (military operations on urbanized terrain) seem simple by comparison. Landing craft cannot reach the beach if seemingly endless dwellings stretch for dozens of miles—and sometimes beyond the shore on flimsy stilts—while thousands of small boats clog every approach to the city. Helicopter landing zones are scarce in littoral megacities due to the population density. For example, Lagos, the largest city in Nigeria, averages 13,000 people/km,[6] and slums are even denser—at 50,000/km,[7] La Rocinha favela in Rio de Janeiro is well within the norm. Once ashore, the combination of winding passageways, dense traffic, and haphazard power lines strewn throughout the narrow streets will prohibit transportation in MRAPs and HMMWVs. Military 1:50,000 scale maps cannot accurately portray shantytowns constructed without any central planning or official oversight. Maintaining control of a squad will become a monumental task, given the irregular construction, close quarters, and crowds.

"Connectedness" refers to the ongoing revolution in IT (information technology)—the Internet, cell phones, and international news media—which is becoming pervasive in even the poorest regions of the world. Many areas never bothered to install landlines since cell phones rendered the former technology obsolete. Satellite dishes and cell towers dot the urban landscape from Mumbai to Rio de Janeiro. While IT has revolutionized economics and social dynamics on a scale not seen since the Second Industrial Revolution, it has also driven a more sinister revolution in warfare. This is best articulated by the 4GW (fourth-generation warfare) theory.

4GW was first outlined in a 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article[8] and has since gained considerable traction. Irregular adversaries understand that they cannot defeat the United States through military strength or attrition alone. They also know that no conflict since World War II has threatened our existence as a nation, so long-term public support for modern conflicts is rarely guaranteed. The original authors identified and extrapolated four trends throughout the past three centuries of conflict—an increased emphasis on maneuver, mission-type orders, decentralized logistics, and destroying the enemy's will or ability to fight—to predict a new generation of warfare in which highly dispersed organizations leverage IT networks to target their enemy's will to continue fighting but generally avoid military confrontation. According to Col Thomas X. Hammes (USMC(Ret)), a 4GW opponent "does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will."[9]

In short, these opponents have identified public support as our critical vulnerability and harness the power of the IT revolution to demoralize American voters. They broadcast images and videos of attacks on the Internet, employ sophisticated information operations, and sit back while our 24-hour news media seizes upon bad news to attract viewers and boost ratings. The characteristics that make open societies so appealing actually become vulnerabilities during confrontations that involve a contest of ideas and willpower vice military strength.

These organizations' ability to radically decentralize their command structure, yet still synchronize their activities through a web of IT connectivity, renders the counterinsurgent's task far more difficult since there is often no clear leadership structure. We saw this in Iraq, especially from 2004–2007. The crowded, networked, and chaotic urban littorals of the developing world provide the perfect scenario to employ this style of warfare against the Marine Corps.

Unless Marines can operate in this environment and contend with these adversaries, we will effectively cede control of every social and economic center of gravity in the developing world. At the same time, rural operations in forests and jungles will remain a central component of irregular warfare. It will become necessary—and perhaps a relief after the chaos of the urban littorals—to work alongside partner forces to track and isolate irregular adversaries in rural areas, protect rural civilians, and guard critical infrastructure. Meeting these operational requirements requires flexible, modular units configured to operate in any clime and place.

Expeditionary Units

We face a range of adaptable adversaries that can maneuver throughout cities, rural areas, the sea, and the cyber realm. A Marine unit—a MEU, a SPMAGTF-CR (special purpose MAGTF-crisis response), or a battalion deployed from CONUS—may face a distributed threat and be required to conduct disaggregated operations across hundreds of miles. Therefore, all of these units need to be task organized and equipped to succeed in virtually any environment. Three units will contribute to that goal: the SPMAGTF-CR, the CLT (company landing team), and riverine units.

The Marine Corps is largely defined as a distinct military branch by two characteristics: it is expeditionary, and it retains the ability to conduct amphibious operations from naval ships. Of the two, the Corps' expeditionary

nature takes precedence since amphibious shipping is a means of conducting expeditionary operations. This point is significant because the Navy lacks the amphibious capacity for the Marine Corps to meet geographic combatant command requirements.

Forward presence was traditionally maintained by three forward deployed MEUs at any given time.

> Our naval requirement of 38 amphibious ships was developed on a capacity for forward presence, crisis response, and forcible entry operations. The naval forces have accepted risk with an inventory of 33 amphibious warships with 30 operationally available.[10]

The shortage of ships has cut the number of forward deployed MEUs in half, and this is unlikely to change anytime soon. The Corps has responded with landbased SPMAGTF-CRs in the Central Command and Africa Command areas of responsibility.

SPMAGTF-CR-Africa Command is based in Spain with spokes in Italy and Romania, while SPMAGTF-CR-Central Command is based in Kuwait with ongoing operations throughout Iraq. Their past operations include multiple embassy reinforcements and dozens of theater security cooperation events. In this manner, they complement the MEUs, which are already spread thin and might otherwise have been tasked with such missions. While SPMAGTF-CRs are forced to rely on air transportation, their persistent presence allows them to participate more frequently in theater security cooperation events and establish closer relationships with SOF (special operations forces). These enhanced partnerships will prove vital when Marines conduct combat operations against an irregular adversary.

Still, neither MEUs nor SPMAGTF-CRs are organized in a manner that allows individual companies to function effectively during disaggregated operations. Though both MEUs and SPMAGTF-CRs regularly deploy company-sized elements, the enablers tasked to support the infantry are drawn from the larger MAGTF—frequently on an ad hoc basis. Those Marines then insert without having trained or planned to operate as a cohesive unit. The appropriate enablers may not even exist within that particular MAGTF. Employing the CLT can mitigate these issues. The concept has already received considerable attention from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Infantry Officer Course, which have experimented with long-range, company-level operations for several years.

CLTs are just one of three type units that will conduct disaggregated operations. *(Photo by Cpl Andrew Neumann.)*

The CLT is meant to be modular and tailored to a situation, though a variety of enablers and equipment will benefit a CLT involved in irregular warfare. The following paragraphs identify several of those. However, we should remain mindful of the limitations inherent to such a small unit; it should be supported by external logistics, close air support, and even other CLTs. Though theoretically possible, it should not be expected to function entirely independently for more than a few days.

The unit is based around an infantry company. In this example, a line platoon is swapped for a reconnaissance platoon, whose training and insert/extract capabilities allow for distant reconnaissance, long-range patrols, and greater interoperability with U.S. or partner-nation SOF. The two remaining line platoons, along with the weapons platoon, focus on shorter-range patrols and deliberate attacks against identified insurgent positions. A six-man scout sniper team under the tactical control of the CLT commander provides close reconnaissance, persistent surveillance, and precision fires as directed.

The CLIC (company-level intelligence cell) exists within most infantry companies, but its resources and effectiveness vary considerably. It typically includes an 0231 Intelligence Specialist and three to five 03XX infantry Marines. This model is barely workable within a battalion structure and is insufficient for a standalone unit since the CLIC will need to perform tasks normally executed by a battalion S-2 shop. After Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2014 experimented with CLTs, the commanders and staff emphasized the importance of well-trained intelligence Marines, to include SNCOs or officers, for the CLIC to succeed in a distributed environment.[11] A junior 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer, at least one SNCO, and a minimum of five infantry Marines will allow the CLIC to coordinate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support; access support from the intelligence community via higher headquarters; generate reports; and provide limited analysis. At least one CLIC member should be familiar with the region's *lingua franca* in order to debrief and liaise with partner forces.

In connected areas with technologically savvy insurgents, information operations may be as important as intelligence. 4GW threats will attempt to dominate the information environment and erode local and international support for the Marines' mission. Thus, military information support operations teams should train and deploy with each CLT. Even a small team may provide the commander with valuable insights into the shifting currents of the local information environment. To be truly effective, these teams require greater authority to conduct operations at the tactical level; irregular adversaries easily out-cycle us in the information realm because of the highly centralized control over information operations.[12] While some centralization is necessary to maintain a consistent message on a regional scale, tactical-level information operations remain virtually nonexistent in an age of smartphones and laptops.

GEN George S. Patton once remarked that "the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless." Logistics and effective long-range communications will be critical in any expeditionary operation. Every CLT should include a small detachment of logistics Marines, to include an SNCO or officer, to coordinate push and pull logistics. Seabasing provides a mobile logistics hub for both surface and rotary-wing resupply, but it is also constrained by deck cycles, load plans, and variable sea states. A landbased logistics hub avoids these issues but does so at the cost of mobility and the additional forces required to secure the area. The following section discusses the need for vehicles that facilitate expeditionary logistics and technology that minimizes the need for resupply.

The CLT's small size necessitates long-range communications with adjacent and supporting elements. In particular, digital interoperability with the ACE will prove decisive in combat. A number of technologies will facilitate this. Radios like the PRC-117G and PRC-152A can support ANW2 (Adaptive Networking Wideband Waveform) networks, which provide redundancy and extended range by relaying signals off other radios—including manned and unmanned aircraft. Commercial off-the-shelf technology like the MANET (Mobile Ad Hoc Network) creates a decentralized digital network among properly equipped communications devices throughout a battlespace without the need for a hub. These networks support devices and software that take advantage of the digital age, launching tactical infantry communications from the Vietnam era into the 21st century. Both networks can stream full-motion video and transmit data, which every infantry squad can leverage through the use of tablets.

Compared to a traditional radio, a tablet's ability to convey information is astronomical. Despite its small size, it can transmit and display text, images, graphical overlays, and maps in high resolution. Applications like KILSWITCH and APASS allow units on the ground to transmit digital close air support nine-line briefs, graphical overlays of friendly and enemy units, gun target lines, and more. Graphics overlaid on a map or satellite imagery dramatically increases a pilot's situational awareness, and the use of a digital close air support nine-line brief shortens the kill chain by up to 50 percent.[13]

While designed to facilitate fires, these applications' core strength lies in their ability to convey information. A squad leader can use KILSWITCH with a pre-loaded grid reference graphic to accurately relay the enemy disposition in specific buildings to CLIC Marines dozens of miles away via ANW2 or MANET. That same tablet can be pre-loaded with translation software to facilitate interaction with locals during patrols. Digital networks and tablet applications will become more sophisticated in the coming years, but the implications for small units are already considerable.

These networks provide the communications architecture to incorporate joint fires in a distributed environment. Still, the CLT will need to reinforce the company fire support team—perhaps with an ANGLICO team—to successfully employ those fires in a distributed environment. The fire support team should include enough joint tactical air controllers, forward air controllers, and joint forward observers to attach one fires expert to patrols and supporting units in deliberate attacks.

Equipping Marines with small unmanned aircraft systems will enhance both intelligence and fires. A squad might use a Raven or a quadcopter like Instant Eye to look over the next hill, maintain persistent surveillance on an objective, obtain enemy grid coordinates for a joint tactical air controller, or laser designate a target for incoming close air support. As such, the Corps should continue to invest in man-packable small unmanned aircraft systems to provide patrol leaders and joint tactical air controllers with immediate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting information. These systems can further enhance these capabilities when configured to serve as relay nodes within ANW2 and MANET networks, which have the potential to extend tactical communications by hundreds of miles.

Incorporating the above elements into a CLT will allow a reinforced company to execute a wide range of missions, but a crucial gap remains: riverine operations. Developing nations often rely on waterways for transportation and logistics since unpaved road networks are unreliable in the dry season and impassible in the wet season. Many rural areas are practically devoid of roads, and the few trafficable routes will make our movements unacceptably predictable.

In part, that is why the *Small Wars Manual* points out that

> where lakes or other inland waterways exist within the theater of operations … every effort should be made to utilize all water-transportation facilities available,[14]

while *Expeditionary Force 21* calls for greater Navy-Marine Corps integration to achieve maneuver "along restrictive waterways."[15] Our present lack of riverine forces relinquishes a large portion of the world's lines of communication—and the associated territory they traverse—to our future opponents. It also limits our ability to work with partner forces, which often use riverine units for these very reasons. To address this, the Marine Corps should reestablish the

0312 Riverine Assault Craft Crewman MOS and integrate Marines into the Navy's riverine units.

Integrated riverine units would capitalize on Sailors' maritime expertise and Marines' tactical acumen on land to dramatically expand maneuver in the littorals. Missions may include trafficking interdiction, critical infrastructure defense, reconnaissance, deliberate attacks, and resupply. Riverine logistics would complement surface and air logistics, providing redundancy when other platforms are hindered by improvised explosive devices, man-portable air defense weapons, inclement weather, or high ACE operational tempo.

As Marines turn their attention back to small wars against irregular adversaries throughout the world's littorals, no single model will be appropriate. Flexible, modular units like SPMAGTFs and CLTs can be tailored to the situation while riverine units bridge the divide between a currently blue water-oriented Navy and a land-oriented Marine Corps. When SPMAGTF-CRs contain multiple spokes, each location might contain a CLT tailored to a specific mission set. A cohesive, reinforced company could then rapidly deploy with only minimal alterations needed. Yet these units are only a partial solution, as our forces must be trained and equipped to conduct irregular warfare.

Training and Equipment

It would be hard to argue that Marines are well-prepared to conduct irregular warfare in the environments described above. Since 2001, they have been expected to deploy either to well-established theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan or to support a conventional war. Moving forward, the Corps' training and equipment procurement should further its role as the Nation's expeditionary force-in-readiness. This includes familiarity with likely operating areas; training for slum combat, jungle warfare, and riverine operations; and interoperability with SOF and partner-nation forces. Procurement will aim to facilitate expeditionary operations via cost-effective, lightweight solutions.

Expeditionary operations are naturally unpredictable, so the Marine Corps as an institution requires a broad understanding of multiple regions. Unlike conventional conflicts, small wars are won and lost based on local support. Marines who cannot or will not work with the local populace will struggle to defeat irregular opponents. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning's RCLF (Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization) program is a step in the right direction and should expand as it gathers momentum. Currently, it is only available to sergeants and above; all ranks should be required to complete some form of RCLF once they reach the Operating Forces, followed by relevant regional training prior to deployment. While the RCLF program includes some language training, the Corps can enhance its ability to interface with the local populace through emphasis on French, Spanish, Arabic, and Swahili. Small unit leaders should ensure that their Marines know about the Defense Language Proficiency Bonus and the associated monetary benefits.

Marines will need to practice operating in slums. Operation Iraqi Freedom prompted the construction of MOUT facilities across the country, but our current understanding of MOUT does not capture the complexity and chaos of sprawling littoral slums. The solution is simple: build slums. They can be constructed at a low cost, as most slums are built with the cheapest materials available. Camp Lejeune and Kaneohe Bay best approximate the tropical environments Marines are likely to encounter abroad, though any base can benefit from a slum training area since the tactics, techniques, and procedures will remain similar regardless of the climate. Marines can then develop SOPs for employing unmanned aircraft systems, navigating vehicles down narrow alleys with low-hanging power lines, operating among structures incapable of stopping bullets, and command and control before they deploy.

Joint exercises will allow Marines to learn from militaries already proficient in the styles of warfare described above. Many countries with large urban slums—Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and India, to name a few—already have working relationships with the U.S. military. Similarly, Colombian Marines have a long-standing relationship with the Marine Corps and considerable experience conducting riverine operations against insurgent groups and narcotics traffickers. Units within each of these militaries are also proficient in jungle warfare. Marines tend to view theater security cooperation as primarily benefitting the partner force; in these cases, the opposite will be true. Foreign militaries may become our best means of relearning skills that have atrophied in the post-9/11 era.

Cooperation with SOF will prove just as beneficial to expeditionary operations. Special Operations Command units already operate alongside partner-nation forces in global hot spots to develop operational best practices, intelligence on local threats, and an understanding of the local culture. Access to this knowledge will assist Marines operating in the region. The development of MARSOC also provides a host of training opportunities to conventional Marine forces, particularly with regard to small unit tactics and mutual support. This is not to say that conventional Marines should attempt to replicate special operations but that understanding SOF roles and skill sets will help "achieve operational synergy during steady-state, crisis response and contingency operations."[16]

A combination of improvised explosive devices and established theaters of operation has led to a massive increase in the weight of everything from individual equipment to vehicles. As we return to our expeditionary roots, the *Small Wars Manual*'s advice that "infantry units in the field in small wars operations should be lightly equipped, carrying only their weapons and essential individual equipment"[17] suggests that changes are in order. Flak jackets and even Kevlar helmets are appropriate for some situations but not all. Discarding them on long patrols saves nearly 40 pounds, which increases mobility and stealth while cutting Marines' water intake in half. A compromise would be to introduce lightweight personal protective equipment. Similarly, swapping the M240B medium machine gun and its current tripod for the M240L and a

lightweight tripod cuts a machine-gun team's weight by nearly twenty pounds.

Water, chow, and batteries are central to infantry operations; proper procurement will dramatically reduce the need for resupply in most environments. If Marines can purify their own water, they can save weight and space with dehydrated rations. They can also avoid carrying enough water to last until the next resupply point. A variety of low-cost water purification technologies like Life Straw and Life Sack already exist and should be incorporated into training whenever possible. The same goes for solar systems, which can recharge batteries and tablets. These systems can even attach to an assault pack, which allows Marines to recharge gear while on the move. Patrols in small wars may last days if not weeks; such mobility and endurance are only realistic if units can self-sustain and reduce the weight they carry.

Vehicles also need to be lighter. In the littorals—especially inland—surface logistics will face such severe challenges that Marines will initially receive most vehicles by air. Most of our current and planned vehicles—the HMMWV, MRAP, and JLTV in particular—are designed to increase survivability against improvised explosive devices, which are rarely a serious concern in the early phases of an operation. Yet these vehicles are expensive, difficult to transport, have poor fuel economy, and likely cannot navigate the muddy back roads or the narrow, crowded streets of the littoral. As with our lack of riverine forces, our vehicles prevent us from using the same lines of communication that partner forces will use.

Marines require vehicles for logistics and mobility, not just protection against improvised explosive devices. SOF and force reconnaissance have used all-terrain vehicles for years to address the issues described above. As just one example, Polaris Industries' MRZR 4 fits inside an Osprey, weighs a sixth as much as an up-armored HMMWV,[18] is a fraction the price of any vehicle in our current inventory, carries up to 1,500 pounds, and is specifically designed for off-road use. An expeditionary force mounted in internally transportable vehicles like all-terrain vehicles or Jeeps would be far better positioned to leverage the ACE for vertical envelopment. They would have immediate access to vehicles for maneuver, resupply, and casualty evacuation in environments that limit heavily armored vehicles to the few suitable roads in the area—if the ACE could transport those vehicles at all.

Final Thoughts

Several trends are converging to make the littorals more strategically important and fiendishly complex than at any point in history. Future conflicts will arise in these densely populated, economically vital, and frequently unstable areas, and the United States will eventually confront irregular adversaries there. There is little question about which Service will lead this effort. Fortunately, no professional military organization has as much potential to successfully conduct irregular warfare—or as much experience with that mission set—as the Marine Corps.

To realize its potential, the Corps will need to create new units and modify existing ones. We will need a flexible, resilient organization capable of conducting disaggregated operations to confront dispersed, highly adaptable opponents. We cannot add value to a situation unless our capabilities match or exceed those of the host-nation's military, so Marines should train for both jungle warfare and combat in urban slums. The Corps must alter its procurement to become lighter, able to deploy to areas without improved roads and operate with minimal logistical support. Frequent training with partner nations, the Navy, and SOF will maximize interoperability and allow us to capitalize on the unique capabilities of each force involved in a joint operation.

Undertakings of this magnitude are never an overnight process, and the requirement to adapt to a fluid geopolitical environment precludes a definite end state for the Marine Corps. Nonetheless, it seems clear that our long-term relevance hinges upon our ability to confront irregular opponents during expeditionary operations.

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The Rest of Your Life!

Your priorities change as you near transition

by Mark Matzke

>Mr. Matzke is Oracle's Hardware and Engineered Systems lead for the U.S. Department of Energy team and NASA. He joined Oracle in 2011 as a member of Oracle's Wounded Warrior Program after serving more than six years in the U.S. Marine Corps. As an infantry officer, he deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan, engaging in direct combat operations.

After becoming a Marine, there is one thing that every Marine and their family must prepare for—eventually leaving the Corps. I joined the Corps as a single man, ready to go wherever I was sent. Almost seven years later, I had a family, and priorities changed. It was time to go. I have seen many Marines refuse to admit that they were getting out and then find themselves out of the Corps, lost, with little to no preparation. Below are my notes on what made my transition as smooth as possible.

Have a mentor. Mentors help you navigate to success in the Corps. The same holds true in the civilian world. Ideally, you should find someone who has successfully transitioned and is well positioned to give advice.

Schedule your departure. It takes twelve months to complete your transition. Do not underestimate this timeline. Before you make your decision, schedule time with your commanding officer or sergeant major, and let them know your thoughts and why you think transitioning out is right. A lot of times, they will have sage advice. You should leave that meeting knowing whether or not you are doing the right thing. Once you have made up your mind to transition, you and your superior need to agree on a pre-transition plan that phases you out of cycles and allows for time to bring in and conduct a turnover with your replacement. Word of caution: If you don't define hard stops, the Marine Corps will work you until the day of your departure. Your focus needs to shift from serving the Corps to preparing yourself for the civilian world.

Education. I knew that I might exit the active duty Corps after my second deployment and wanted to utilize the time during my non-deployable billet to attain the next level of education. As part of my permanent change of station, I also signed up for classes at my new duty station. I attained a master's degree in business administration six months before I was honorably discharged. Plan your education into the transition, and use tuition assistance; I saved at least $10,000.00 using tuition assistance. There is no reason that you can't get a certification or degree before getting out.

Before retiring, find a mentor—someone who's gone through preparing for employment after the Marine Corps. *(Photo by LCpl Adam Dublinske.)*

Employment. Don't rule anything out. Seven years ago, I would never have thought that I would be responsible for helping NASA commercialize space or that my planning would affect power distribution in a four-state region. I was an infantryman, a knuckle-dragger, and after taking the time to really examine my skill set, I realized that managing a mission in a high-pressure environment was what I enjoyed. Analyzing a situation, utilizing the Marine Corps Planning Process, and taking the strategic and breaking it down to the operational and tactical levels was what the Marine Corps had trained me to do.

Know your numbers. A solid financial analysis should be done that tells you how much income you require in order to maintain your current lifestyle. When it comes to benefits, housing, and insurance, we as Marines are very well off. After calculating your required income level, start looking into what work options help you hit that target income. My first year out of the Marine Corps, I came in at $3,000.00 over my target income, not because of luck but

Job fairs are only one source of information about what types of jobs are available in the civilian world. *(Photo by Sgt Rodion Zalolotiny.)*

because I knew exactly what salary I needed to stay in the house I lived in and provide the groceries to subsist as a family of four.

Disability. As a service member who is separating, you are allowed to begin your disability evaluation six months prior to your end-of-active-service date. Do not underrate your need for this analysis. Remember that you trained harder, were exposed to more extreme conditions for extended periods of time, and probably carried a more inordinate amount of weight for "work" than any in your peer group that did not join the military. Years from now, some minor ailment could turn into a serious medical condition, and if it isn't noted in your Veterans Affairs file, it is extremely difficult to link it back to your active duty time. A private insurance company will quickly point out that this is a preexisting condition from before your military service and not cover you. Getting disability is not about money or "playing the system"; it is about peace of mind knowing that knee surgery is covered 100 percent by Veterans Affairs when you are 62 years old. How do you get started? Attend the separations/transition assistance program class, and bring your medical file. The Veterans Affairs representative who gives the brief usually makes himself available to review your file and suggests items that need to be examined further. Don't let pride get in the way; if it hurts, say something, and have it looked at.

Networking. Order 250 business cards that have your contact information and something that a perspective employer will remember you by. A heavyweight, off-white, matte finish with lifted lettering and the Marine Corps emblem is professional. Create a résumé, and have four or five peers help you edit and refine it. Keep copies of your résumé on hand at all times. Create a LinkedIn Account that presents you as a valuable commodity. The first thing someone in the civilian world does after meeting you is look you up on LinkedIn. Join two or three member organizations; for most, active duty military members are given free memberships that are good for one year. Some examples are the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (see www.AFCEA.org) and the Society for Information Management (see www.simnet.org). If there is a field of work that you are interested in, find their professional association and join it. Attend their networking functions, especially the veteran hire initiatives. Companies are under a lot of pressure to hire veterans, and employers get very excited when they find a veteran who fits their profile.

Refine your elevator pitch. "So tell me about yourself." The first time I was asked this question, I rambled on about my family, hobbies, and goals; none of it mattered. You need to develop and refine a twenty-second pitch and a 60-second pitch. Use the twenty-second pitch for social events when you are introduced and the longer version when being formally asked. Summarize your time in the Corps, why you got out, and what you are looking to do next. A well-delivered summary is remembered by those you meet because it tells them that you are articulate, concise, and sociable. Those traits go a long way.

Learn to accept civilians. This sounds hokey, but it is very real. In the Marine Corps, if you see an obese Marine walk by, the first thing you think is, "Disgusting—that is a bad Marine." There are plenty of incredibly talented people in the civilian work world who just don't stay in shape. Reserve your opinion until you get to know them. Do not seek to charge out of the gates without being aware of your surroundings. As Marines, we seek leadership, and when we don't see it, we take charge and begin to organize a defense. Make an effort to keep that valuable trait hidden for a while. Managers love hiring good people—but not if they think you will take their jobs. Give yourself twelve

Do not seek to charge out of the gates without being aware of your surroundings. As Marines, we seek leadership, and when we don't see it, we take charge and begin to organize a defense.

months to learn everything about your new role and master the basics. The time will come where you begin to lead, and then let your Marine training take over.

Find another veteran who you can vent to. Your transition will be tough. Your emotions go up and down. My first twelve months were spent in a cubicle sitting next to recent college graduates that were in some cases eight years my junior. Often, I would just want to leave and see if I could maybe get back into the Corps. Instead, I had a wonderful colleague who had transitioned two years earlier, and we would take breaks or go to lunch and tell war stories, get stuff off our chests, and brainstorm on how to handle a situation.

Smooth your edges. You have spent your entire Marine Corps career saying the following words: sir, ma'am, check, roger, over, time on target, LD, vics, packs … you get the idea. People will thank you for your service and even offer you a position in their company, but if you do not change the way you speak, you will "not fit into the culture" and be asked to find another job. I call it "smoothing your edge without dulling the sharpness of your mind." Speak to your co-workers as peers, and use first names. Guess what? Your bosses are also your co-workers; use their first names and allow them to get to know you.

Have your résumé reviewed and refined. *(Photo by LCpl Sarah Wolff-Diaz.)*

Do not start as a government contractor. You will be asked to take a job that supports the military because you already know it so well and you will be comfortable there. Do not do it! Take three years and get away from any position or company that supports the military from a contractual perspective. You need to leave your comfort zone and push into scary, new frontiers. Upward mobility is not a given in this type of industry. If you spend ten years working for a government contractor, it is rare for you to be able to compete with "the just retired flag officer" that was hired last week, who has the rank and the relationships that you do not have in your customer's community.

My strongest friendships can all be traced back to the Corps. Those shared moments of hardship defined our lives and created deep bonds of trust that have only become more dynamic and are now my most trusted network in the business world. When your time comes, I hope that these points will help you make a smooth transition.

Good luck, Marine!

USMC

Take advantage of educational opportunities. Tuition assistance is offered for some courses. *(Photo by LCpl John Wilkes.)*

MAGTF Warfighting Trends

Planning and assessment

by the Staff, MSTP

After fifteen-plus years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, MAGTF staffs have reoriented their efforts toward the deliberate planning and execution of conventional combat operations. Through various MEF- and MEB-level exercises, warfighting staffs are being reintroduced to the challenges of fighting near-peer enemies with 21st century capabilities, many of which rival or exceed our own. The MSTP (MAGTF Staff Training Program) is charged with leading this effort by designing and implementing these exercises to enhance the skills of the Marine Corps' warfighting MAGTFs. This includes a two-week planning evolution where the MAGTF command element methodically proceeds through each step of the MCPP (Marine Corps Planning Process) with the goal of developing an OPORD (operations order) that will serve as the basis for action for MAGTF operations that follow. This article presents some of the most common planning trends observed by MSTP during MAGTF warfighting training.

Successful planning is commander-centric and requires attention to situational changes. ***(Photo by PFC Erick Galera.)***

Enduring Planning Actions

Problem Framing. The first step of the MCPP, problem framing, contains several actions that need to be revisited, updated, and leveraged throughout the entire planning process. Design, center of gravity analysis (both friendly and enemy), and IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlespace) are three of these actions. They provide planners—and commanders—with a clear understanding of the operating environment. Unfortunately, in practice, these three activities are usually only performed at the introduction of the planning process and then ultimately discarded, depriving them of their enduring value. Often treated as intellectual exercises, staffs rarely revisit these actions during the remainder of planning or during execution. As information about the environment changes, these products must be updated, as they are an essential foundation for understanding effective COA (course of action) development and wargaming, orders development, and execution. Staffs that do not thread these efforts through the planning and execution continuum usually lack sufficient understanding of the set of problems facing them and, consequently, have less integrated and coordinated staff actions and less effective COAs.

COA Wargaming. For most MAGTF staffs, COA wargaming is the most difficult step of the MCPP. The most significant challenge is identifying the required level of detail during COA development in order for wargaming to be as successful as possible. Avoid using the COA wargaming step to actually develop an incomplete COA; instead, focus on using the step to improve the most complete COA possible. A best practice observed by MSTP is to develop as complete a COA as possible during COA development so that wargaming can easily highlight the remaining issues—paving the way for COA improvement. Staffs should, therefore, enter COA wargaming with complete COA graphics and narratives, adversary COAs, a developing synchronization matrix, estimates of supportability, staff estimates, and other important products generated as a result of staff actions.

Regarding detail, for instance, staffs can generally validate logistical support requirements prior to COA wargaming. During wargaming, logisticians should be focused on refining those calculations and preparing for unforeseen changes. Aviation sortie capacities can also be estimated during COA development and then refined during wargaming. Additionally, initial relative combat power assessments at each decisive point in the operation can be calculated during COA development with an understanding that unforeseen enemy reactions during wargaming may result in a requirement for modifications. Other examples apply.

A key output from COA wargaming is a summary of casualty and battle damage that will take place during different stages of the COA. These summaries allow the staff to understand the consequences of actions in the battlespace; they feed requirements for additional support or resources, and they help to determine the feasibility of certain planned actions. Staffs often fail to execute this critical action within wargaming, resulting in a vague set of conclusions as to how friendly forces withstood the enemy's actions. Even in cases where the estimates of battle damage and casualties are calculated precisely, staffs often neglect consideration of combat replacement capabilities on both the friendly and enemy sides and incorrectly assume that forces do not reconstitute losses. For example, it may be determined that an enemy unit took 300 casualties during a given engagement within a war game. It would be incorrect to assume that none of these casualties would be replaced from a garrison pool of manpower or returned to duty after medical treatment.

Orders Development. Another trend commonly noted by MSTP is that MAGTF staffs often do not effectively reconcile or crosswalk their OPORD before being published. The reconciliation and crosswalk efforts are tedious and challenging tasks; however, when not done, or not done properly, havoc can ensue. An order's crosswalk ensures that the OPORD is nested within its higher OPORD and purposes are aligned, and it verifies that the MAGTF's subordinate unit OPORDs are nested within the MAGTF command element's OPORD. The nesting of an OPORD mainly ensures that every specified task from higher headquarters is addressed within the OPORD. Additionally, a given OPORD should not denote times, locations, or schemes of maneuver that do not agree with the higher headquarters OPORD.

...the responsibilities for drafting an OPORD are often divided ...

Orders reconciliation further ensures that the OPORD is in agreement with itself; that is, the base order is in agreement with its associated annexes and appendices. In practice, the responsibilities for drafting an OPORD are often divided among an overworked staff in a time-compressed environment. Action officers within staff sections craft annexes related to their functional areas, ultimately submitting them to the G-3 section for consolidation. Time and personnel shortfalls often prevent the officer within the G-3 who is responsible for assembling the OPORD to hold working groups for reconciliation. The typical result is a disjointed OPORD that does not agree on times, locations, or concepts of support. Disjointed orders create an inordinate amount of confusion within the force. The only way to prevent this massive confusion over a simple inconsistency is by allocating the time and resources to reconcile the OPORD prior to its release.

Planning Responsibilities. Each MAGTF's planning capabilities are jointly owned by a Plans section, a FOPS (future operations section), and a COPS (current operations section). With this division of labor, MAGTF staffs tend to orient actions according to planning horizons. For instance, COPS sections usually plan actions that are within 24 hours of execution, FOPS sections usually produce plans that are within 96 hours of execution, and Plans sections develop remaining, long-term planning efforts. In practice, most plans begin in the Plans section and get handed to FOPS and COPS for refinement as execution gets closer.

MAGTF staffs, however, do not consistently delineate planning responsibilities between these three sections. Instead, a loose understanding of expectations is accepted. This often leads to planning tasks being overlooked or addressed during execution, where timelines are compressed and friction becomes overwhelming. Branch plans usually become the first casualty. These plans are real multipliers, enhancing agility and flexibility for commanders when they reach predetermined decision points during execution. Decision points are usually identified during COA wargaming, and subsequent branch plans should be developed in planning—in conjunction with the OPORD by the Plans section or the FOPS section. Instead, it is often incorrectly assumed that the COPS section will develop these branch plans, leading to an incomplete OPORD and, often, less flexibility in execution.

Other plans that are routinely overlooked are the details of complex actions that require coordinated efforts of two or more elements of the MAGTF. Actions like bridge crossings, significant infrastructure development, or large combined arms events require detailed planning at the MAGTF level to coordinate and synchronize actions. The responsibility for crafting these details cannot be abrogated to subordinate units to work out on their own. Instead, this type of planning should be conducted by the MAGTF Plans section or FOPS section prior to execution. In practice, however, it is periodically assumed that the COPS section will specify this coordination with the subordinate units as execution proceeds. As a result, the FOPS or COPS sections are often charged with developing emergency planning teams to address these complex efforts during execution, leading to inevitable shortcomings.

Tenets of Planning

Single Battle. The single battle concept is a tenet of Marine Corps planning asserting that all actions in the battlespace interact and affect each other in some way. In other words, a given action in one portion of the battlespace can have, and should be expected to have, an effect on some other portion of the battlespace. Commanders and planners should use this tenet to frame their efforts in both planning and execution, always ensuring the battlespace is treated as an indivisible entity.

The rear area, mainly dedicated to sustainment and protecting the force, is a section of the battlespace that is habitually not planned for with the same level of attention as the deep and close areas, signaling a less-than-full embrace of the single battle concept. In a linear battlespace where deep, close, and rear areas line up neatly, identifying the rear area is straightforward. However, in complex environments with noncontiguous areas of operations, the rear area can be more difficult to define. It is often forgotten because planners assume it is some type of "green zone" requiring little protection and that it can be managed through a cooperative relationship between its occupants. Or the rear area becomes complicated because important decisions related to its control are not made or prove difficult. Like the deep and close areas, the rear area is susceptible to enemy activity. Commanders' conscious decisions to ensure that rear area activities can function properly are imperative to success and a sustained regard for the MAGTF single battle.

In particular, planning for rear area operations often omits requirements for adequate fires capabilities and sufficient force sizes to combat enemy threats. Additionally, planners often fail to realize that the battlespace changes as an operation proceeds. A rear area is most likely to exhibit differences in shape, size, and character, over time, as a MAGTF proceeds through phases and stages of an operation.

A commander with a refined sense of the MAGTF single battle will focus on the command and control arrangement for the rear area. Several options exist. First, the MAGTF commander can retain control of the rear area and use his staff to manage it. Second, the MAGTF commander can retain control but appoint a rear area coordinator to manage it. The coordinator is responsible for facilitating agreements between occupants but does not have the authority to compel an agreement between them. The third option is to delegate some or all functions of the rear area to a rear area commander. In most cases, this includes a capability to integrate ground and aviation fires. Though this option appears to be the most robust, it requires significant investments in manpower, training, and equipment. Only after detailed analysis and wargaming do MAGTF staffs realize this option is often not available to a MAGTF commander because of competing requirements. One of these options should be chosen during COA development and analyzed during COA wargaming.

Integrated Planning. Like the single battle, integrated planning is one of three key tenets of Marine Corps planning, but it often receives incomplete consideration among MAGTF staffs during planning exercises. Integrated planning includes coordinated planning efforts with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. It also includes functional integration among the MAGTF staff sections as well as between MAGTF staff sections and those of higher and adjacent headquarters. MSTP's observation is that true integration can only be achieved through realtime interaction, either physically or virtually, among all relevant players.

MAGTF staffs usually embrace the importance of planning with subordinates, and it is common to see representatives of subordinate elements at the MAGTF command element during planning evolutions. However, it is uncommon to see adequate integration with higher or adjacent units. In many cases, MAGTF staffs are not fully aware of the support they can provide to the MAGTF. More importantly, higher and adjacent forces may also desire support from the MAGTF. A routine example is the sole use of MAGTF aviation to shape the battlespace without the consideration of joint aviation assets. Another example may include an adjacent unit's dependency on certain actions of the MAGTF to be synchronized for success. This lack of shared situational awareness and coordinated action beyond the MAGTF generally leads to an insufficient understanding of the larger purpose of the operation and incoherent tactical actions.

Top-Down Planning. Top-down planning is the third tenet of Marine Corps planning, and it implies the direct involvement of the commander early in—and throughout—the planning process. It specifies that the commander leads planning (and design) and through this, achieves unity of command and unity of effort. The commander must have personal involvement in the process for it to be successful.

The commander provides top-down influence on planning, both conceptual and detailed, with the assistance of his principal staff. This group of senior officers should be the most knowledgeable experts in the command with respect to their functional areas. The commander relies upon this base of knowledge and advice to drive planning and make decisions. Therefore, the presence and involvement of the principal staff throughout the planning process is essential. Planning can never be subcontracted to an operational planning team without frequent supervision and back briefs by those officers who know the most.

That said, many planning shortfalls are simply because of inadequate supervision by the principal staff. Competing real-world priorities often pull the principal staff away from planning. Action officers who represent functional staff sections within a planning team at higher headquarters are usually captains and majors with limited planning and execution experience. They generally do not have the seasoned, tempered judgment necessary to see errors in planning before they occur. For this reason, it is imperative that principal staff members are involved in the planning process, closely supervising the operational planning team leader, operational planning team members, and other action officers in order to ensure the commander's

planning guidance is followed and intent is realized.

Operation Assessment

Operation assessment is a process that informs a commander whether a series of actions adhere to a given plan and whether the plan is achieving its desired conditions, effects, and objectives. In particular, quality operation assessment with a MAGTF encompasses information from a variety of functional areas and provides the commander with a clear, concise, aggregated analysis. This makes operation assessment a team sport. A good assessment process is developed during the planning stages of an operation, specifically during the problem framing step of the MCPP. Assessment can never be an afterthought.

Operation assessment should be tied to design. Design helps leaders to properly identify a set of problems and articulate ways to address them. Outputs from design include a problem set and an operational approach. These outputs directly fuel an assessment's methodology because they clarify the purpose of the military operation that is being planned.

In practice, operation assessment in earnest is not usually addressed early in planning, and the assessment approach is not often fully developed and understood until execution begins. In these cases, the assessment team was likely not organized during planning, insufficiently guided, and thus not versed in the discussions that took place during design. As a result, the staff creates a fragmented assessment approach that is not connected to the underlying problem set determined at the outset of planning. Worse still, the assessment effort does not meet the specific needs of the commander, the individual charged with making decisions based on the assessment results.

Operation assessment should be conducted by a team of staff members and led by an appointed assessments officer armed with guidance from senior leaders, if not the commander. This team should be knowledgeable and experienced enough to provide meaningful information to the combined assessment. Junior officers and inexperienced NCOs are usually not the correct people for these teams. Instead, field-grade officers and senior enlisted Marines are more appropriate. Additionally, the team should represent interests in all warfighting functions from across the staff. For various reasons, MAGTF staffs often place a low priority on forming assessments teams, resulting in an inability of the commander to accurately understand the outcome of actions during execution as they relate to planning. This inability to understand directly and negatively impacts corresponding decisions intended to produce desired results.

Another trend among the business of operation assessments is that they are too narrowly focused on short-term task accomplishment rather than longer-term objectives and effectiveness. This is not to say that assessing the close fight is irrelevant, as there are certainly circumstances where a commander would need an assessment on the accomplishment of near-term objectives. However, in general, MSTP espouses that MAGTF commanders should rightfully be focused on decision points that are no closer than 96 hours away and even further out if possible. This aligns with a MAGTF commander's rightful focus on future plans, not exclusively future and current operations. While the MAGTF commander is not indifferent to current or future operations, he should be focused on the purpose and end state of the operation and not on individual tasks or daily activities of subordinate units.

Furthermore, assessment teams are notorious for providing the results of quantitative and qualitative data analysis without including recommendations for a commander's subsequent decision. It is common for assessments teams to be so focused on the challenge of gathering data and analyzing it that they often overlook the meaning of it. Consequently, commanders are forced to interpret the data and form their own conclusions without adequate input from the staff. An example of this may be simply informing a commander that an enemy unit has been reduced to 50 percent of its capability without any further context. In this case, the commander is left to guess exactly what enemy capability has been reduced (aviation, tanks, infantry, etc.), where reductions have taken place, and how the unit and its adjacent units will adjust their tactical actions.

Conclusion

MAGTF staffs must continue to refine their proficiency and understanding of the tenets of Marine Corps plan-

The staff will provide the commander a comprehensive analysis during the operation assessment phase. *(Photo by LCpl Matt Myers.)*

They are responsible for plan execution. *(Photo by Cpl Justin Updegraff.)*

ning, design, the planning process, and operation assessment. This is difficult business. A thorough understanding of the battlespace, led by the commander and integrated among all relevant stakeholders, should be the foundation of all military planning. Operation assessment should be a concurrent effort tethered to both planning and execution, regularly feeding the commander with appropriate analysis and recommendations.

MAGTF staffs have steadily improved their planning abilities in conventional operations over the last two years plus, and MSTP is intent on continuing this positive trend. A top-down emphasis from the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the conduct of training against near-peer threats drives our every action. It is only through practice and repetition—the reps and sets—that a MAGTF staff can gain the warfighting proficiency necessary to operate and win when duty calls. We will continue to share our observations and best practices in an effort to improve the warfighting capabilities of senior commanders and their staffs, the very purpose of our mission statement and the sole reason we exist.

USMC

Reinforcing the Gap in Military Justice

A commander's introduction to the new "short-martial"

by The Trial Counsel of the National Capital Region[1]

As trial counsel, we often find that cases detailed to us for prosecution started with a Marine refusing NJP (nonjudicial punishment). That may be about to change.

Effective 1 January 2019, courtesy of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, commanders will have another form of court-martial at their disposal. This new tribunal, an adaptation of the existing special court-martial, will not be authorized to impose a BCD (bad conduct discharge) or more than six months' confinement. It will also not require or permit court-martial members (that is, a jury) and cannot be refused by the accused. These changes reflect an effort to create a court-martial that can efficiently try petty offenses. Because of the limitations on punishment and its potential for reduced logistical and procedural demands, we have termed this option a "short-martial." We expect short-martials to prove invaluable to commanders concerned that NJP refusals unduly delay or prevent the administration of good order and discipline in their units. In fact, the mere availability of the short-martial, which cannot be refused, may persuade Marines to more readily accept NJP—especially if the modified forum is effectively utilized in the months following the 2019 rollout.

This article is a primer in the importance, use, and likely effects of the short-martial on our military justice system.

A Commander's Toolset

For Marines suspected of misconduct, a commander has many tools in his tool kit. (See Figure 1.)

Commanders often encounter friction in the decision space between NJP and special court-martial.

The Problem: NJP Refusal

NJP is typically offered when the misconduct in question requires more (and more public) punishment than is afforded by a 6105 but is not so serious as to merit the time, effort, cost, uncertainty, punitive exposure, and Federal criminal conviction that come with a special court-martial. We say that NJP is "offered" because, like a summary court-martial, it may only be imposed with the consent of the Marine. There are a variety of reasons a Marine might refuse NJP, even if he did commit misconduct.[2] One reason for refusal is that, realistically, a command has only two options when a Marine refuses NJP. They can refer the case to court-martial, which the commander evidently thought more severe than the misconduct warranted when he made the initial decision. Or the commander can pursue administrative routes like counseling, which may be less severe than warranted but would at least be fast, easy, and assured.[3] With the command facing that option set, Marines who have committed misconduct sometimes try to exploit that opportunity in hopes of escaping with only counseling.

Indeed, faced with these choices, and given the logistical burdens and risks of both over- and under-punishment, expedient commanders will often default to counseling when a Marine refuses NJP. First, the manpower drain of courts-martial is significant—depending on the type of court-martial, up to a dozen members of the command must be appointed to potentially serve as jury members, some of them likely for several days. Second, NJP refusals also typically involve minor transgressions for which members historically have been lenient, either by offering little punishment, or, skeptical that the misconduct merits a criminal conviction and not knowing that the Marine refused NJP, by



Figure 1. Commander's options.

declining to convict.[4] Finally, sending the case to special court-martial exposes the Marine to greater punishment than the average NJP-level transgression warrants—including the possibility of a BCD, which is well outside the appropriate level of punishment originally offered via NJP.

Ironically, even in cases where a Marine refuses NJP and the commander, justifiably unwilling to let the infraction pass, elects the more severe forum of special court-martial, investigation, negotiation, and the interests of justice often lead to an agreement in which the accused accepts NJP. That is, we arrive at the same end state, only by a longer route. In this system, there is little downside to the Marine in refusing NJP; instead, the downside is often borne by the command via a negative impact to good order and discipline in the unit and through the manpower and logistics burdens it is forced to bear throughout a lengthy special court-martial process. Until now, there has not been a better system for dealing with misconduct that would otherwise be handled with either NJP or special court-martial.

The Solution: Short-Martial

Commanders will soon have access to a tool designed to remedy the gap between NJP and special court-martial. Starting in 2019, Article 16(c)(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice will permit referral to a short-martial.[5]

This new option squarely addresses three drawbacks for the commander in the NJP/court-martial calculus. First, in a short-martial, a defendant has no right to a members' panel.[6] Consequently, the commander will not need to designate jury members, and the military judge who presides over the case will not need to clear the way for them. This is a more substantial difference than it may seem at first blush. Since a defendant need not ordinarily decide whether to request a jury until the final weeks of a court-martial, current special courts-martial must consider a jury's potential perspective at every step. For instance, dozens of hours can be spent working out whether some piece of evidence might unfairly confuse, mislead, or outrage a jury, which ultimately may never be appointed, or suggesting and perfecting instructions to shape that same jury's understanding of the evidence it will receive. In addition, as trial nears, there will be no need to pull senior SNCOs from their usual duties when a staff sergeant elects trial by a partially enlisted jury, all of whom must be senior to the accused. As trial begins, there will be no need for *voir dire*, in which the Government and the defense debate over which of the members named on the convening order shall serve throughout the trial. Nor will it be possible to bust quorum—that is, to reject so many members that the trial needs to be postponed while more potential jury members are found. And, as trial proceeds, there will be no need for lengthy breaks in which the parties argue over what the jury should be permitted to hear—and less reason to confine trials to working hours or to avoid holidays since the judge, and both parties to the case, can push through for one long day. All told, hundreds of man-hours can be saved in the course of a single case. That's a good thing for defendants, judges, attorneys, and operational tempo at the referring command.

The second drawback that the short-martial addresses is the uncertainty around both conviction and sentencing because of the absence of jury members. While every military judge has a different style, they are always qualified, certified judge advocates with extensive courtroom experience and a nuanced sense for the actual severity of any given set of charges. We predict that, in the long run, "judge alone" sentencing will provide greater consistency and predictability for similar offenses.

Third, because neither BCDs nor more than six months of confinement may be imposed at short-martial, and because of the relative predictability of military judges' decision making, the danger of *over*-punishing the Marine is substantially reduced. (See Figure 2 for a comparison of punishments available at each of the three forums.) Justice for minor offenses will be more appropriately obtainable at short-martial than at a regular special court-martial. Additionally, since a BCD is not authorized at short-martial, there are no restrictions imposed on the characterization of service that can be awarded at a subsequent administrative separation board.

These are only the differences that will emerge in cases actually referred to short-martial. The most significant effects may be felt in cases that never make it to that point. Knowing that the option of short-martial will reduce

	Special Court-Martial	Short-Martial	NJP	
			E-6+	E-5 and below
Bad Conduct Discharge	Yes	No	No	
Confinement	1 year or less	6 months or less	No	
Reduction	To E-1		No	By one grade
Forfeitures	2/3 base pay for 12 months		1/2 base pay for 2 months	
Fines	Yes		No	
Hard labor without confinement	3 months or less		No	
Restriction	Yes		60 days or less	
Extra duties	No		45 days or less	
Restriction w/extra duties	No		45 days or less	
Admonition/Reprimand	Yes		Yes	
Right to a jury	Yes	No	No	
Right to an attorney	Yes	Regulations Pending	No	
Est. time, start to finish	6 months	TBD	1 week (unless refused)	

Figure 2. Comparison of special court-martial, short-martial, and NJP.

the manpower and logistics burden a commander must balance when deciding to refer any given case to court-martial, Marines offered NJP for petty offenses[7] will have much less reason to hesitate before accepting. From October 2015 through September 2016, across the Navy and Marine Corps, NJP was imposed nearly 9,000 times, while the Navy tried 135 special courts-martial, and the Marine Corps tried 208.[8] Those numbers—and the balance they reflect—may change appreciably with the advent of the short-martial, especially if the tool is used wisely in the first months after it becomes available.

... nothing would prevent a commander from starting at a short-martial ...

While the focus of this article has been on the interplay between NJP refusals and the short-martial, it is important to note that nothing would prevent a commander from starting at a short-martial if deemed appropriate based on all relevant factors—it is a new tool in military justice. Many of the details of the short-martial's implementation remain undetermined; however, it is clear that short-martials will fill a gap in the practice of military justice. As 2019 approaches, commanders will be well advised to keep this new option in mind.

Notes

1. Capt Jonathan Margolick, Maj Gregg Curley, Maj Pete Rottkamp, Maj Mark Lubke, Capt Mitch Altman, Capt William Bateman III, Capt Angelissa Savino, Capt Matthew Sinnott. The opinions we express are our own, but the style and accuracy with which we express them owes much to Col Eric Kleis, LtCol Iain Pedden, LtCol Adam King, Maj Harlye Carleton, and Maj Jesse Schweig. For their mentorship and guidance on this issue, as well as on many others, we thank them.

2. See Capt Gregg Curley, "Refusing NJP: The Top 5 Reasons," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: June 2016).

3. For the purposes of this article, we are most interested in punitive or corrective measures. Administrative separation—which carries no criminal conviction, rank reduction (however, if awarded an other than honorable discharge, the respondent is automatically reduced to lance corporal), restriction, or monetary fines, instead simply parting the Marine from the Corps—is a topic for another day.

4. This decision has been referred to for hundreds of years as "jury nullification." While rare, it is a genuine risk at courts-martial in the Marine Corps, just as it is (and must be) in any jurisdiction's trials.

5. Since the National Defense Authorization Act does not supply a short-form name for this court-martial, we have taken it upon ourselves to do so.

6. Some readers will be concerned about a trial without the option of a jury. They need not be. American courts have always recognized a distinction between "petty offenses" and "crimes." Honoring this distinction, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial only for "crimes." The two categories are distinguished by the severity of punishment imposed for violation of the law. Since 1970, the Supreme Court has drawn this line at six months of confinement. More than that and the offense becomes a crime, and the defendant rates a jury. Less than that—as is the case in a short-martial—and no right to a jury trial attaches. See generally *Baldwin v. New York*, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).

7. As of the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice's last recommendation to the President, these offenses were likely to include those requiring two years or less of punishment, as well as certain drug offenses, but not extending to any crime requiring sex offender registration. See Department of Defense Call for Comments, *Manual for Courts-Martial: Proposed Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial*, available at https://www.regulations.gov, page 22 of the proposed amendments.

8. Code Committee, *Annual Report Submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the United States Senate and United States House of Representatives*, (Washington, DC: 2016), available at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov.

Pershing's Crusaders

reviewed by Maj Timothy Heck, USMCR



PERSHING'S CRUSADERS: The American Soldier in World War I. By Richard S. Faulkner. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2017.
ISBN: 978-0700623730, 784 pp.

The centenary of America's entry into the First World War has brought about a flurry of books, articles, and digital projects detailing the conflict, its participants, and its impact. This burst of activity has reopened America's eyes to the war and revealed a deeper understanding of our involvement. Some recent books, like George B. Clark's *Devil Dogs Chronicle*, focus on specific elements (in Clark's case, the Marine Corps), while others focus on individuals, like John Carl Nelson's study of Gen Clifton Cates in *I Will Hold*. Balancing the collective and the individual with impressive scope and clarity, Richard S. Faulkner's *Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I* covers the entirety of the soldier's experience from induction through demobilization.

In his introduction, Faulkner states that his interest in military history started with reading Bell Irvin Wiley's *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* and its companion, *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union,* as a child. Faulkner states that his goal for *Pershing's Crusaders* was to write the equivalent for the American solider of the First World War.

Using a variety of archival sources, including his own collection of letters and diaries, Faulkner explains that the American military was woefully unprepared for the massive expansion needed for war, let alone major combat operations. The dearth of qualified NCOs and officers, shortage of spaces to train, and lack of modern equipment all hampered the American response. Faulkner's previous book, *The School of Hard Knocks: Combat Leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces*, focused on the shortfalls of officer training prior to and during the conflict; in *Pershing's Crusaders*, he does a masterful job of condensing that work and expanding its scope to focus on the shortfalls in the NCO corps as well.

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Pershing's Crusaders also covers the trials and tribulations of minority service members. Prejudices limited the roles of African Americans to support troops and stevedores, though some, like the members of the famed 369th Infantry Regiment, saw active combat. Mexican Americans, recent immigrants, and Native Americans also experienced prejudicial treatment at the hands of the predominately white NCO and officer ranks. Faulkner gives no quarter in this section, quoting policies, reports, and letters sent home, revealing inherent prejudices and identifying the authors.

The American Expeditionary Force's debut in combat is masterfully presented. The arrival of the 1st Infantry Division at the lines near Nancy, France, in late October 1917 heralded a change in the war. Battles such as Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne Campaign all receive fair and balanced treatment as part of a larger section on the combat experience that helps add the human dimension to the combatants.

Women, however, are largely absent from *Pershing's Crusaders.* For Marines raised on the name Opha May Johnson, the near absence of American females in uniform (there were over 10,600 in France) is an unfortunate omission. The role of female Army nurses is covered for only four paragraphs in a section on medical care for wounded and ill troops.

As more works are published in the coming years about America's involvement in World War I, Faulkner's *Pershing's Crusaders* could well be the standard against which other historians find their presentation of the American Expeditionary Force judged. Exhaustively researched, well written, and comprehensive in scope, *Pershing's Crusaders* is a valuable addition to the scholarship of the war.

Belleau Wood Operational Decision Game

"Take that Wood"

by Bradley J. Meyer

Situation

You are the commander of the 4th Marine Brigade, 2nd U.S. Division. It is early on 9 June 1918. Your mission, assigned by the commander of the 2nd Division, is to "clear Belleau Wood on 11 June 1918." This is a matter of particular importance to higher echelons of command, as the majority of the American public thinks that the Marines have already cleared Belleau Wood.

Probably because of the level of attention focused on Belleau Wood worldwide, the French have agreed to support your attack with quite a large amount of artillery fire, namely 50 batteries worth. They are also prepared to fire off a large amount of ammunition, namely 6,000 rounds of 155mm shells and 28,000 rounds of 75mm shells. You may set the targets and priorities for this fire however you think would best support your attack.

On 6 June, two of your battalions attacked the wood, which was believed, at the time, to be unoccupied. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (3/6) ran into a strongly posted German line a couple of hundred yards from the southern edge of the wood. Machine guns with intersecting fields of fire prevented any further progress, even though 3/6 took over 40 percent casualties. There were many large boulders along the German line; the Germans, in many cases, posted their machine guns behind the boulders, thereby securing protection from fire from the front while firing the machine guns at an angle to the front. These arcs of fire intersected. No rifle grenades were available during these attacks, a fact that the Marines have bitterly complained about. It was noted during this fight that there were several relatively covered routes into the southern edge of the woods, working off the gully that runs between Lucy-le-Bocage and Bouresches.

3d Battalion, 5th Marines also attacked on 6 June, across a wheat field.



>Dr. Meyer: see page 26 for bio.

(See map.) They received heavy fire on their left flank from behind a knoll on the western side of the wood, Hill 169, and also from the tree line directly to their front and right flank. Only the company of 3/5 farthest to the right, the 47th, made it into the woods relatively intact. That was because a small ridgeline protected them to some extent from the fire coming from the left. Survivors of the 47th also reported abandoning their original formation, four rows of skirmishers spaced five yards apart with rifles at high port, in favor of "spreading out in the wheat and taking the old formations we had used so many times in the cane fields of Santo Domingo."

You have available for the attack two infantry battalions, 2/5 (75 percent strength), under Maj Frederick Wise, and 1/6, under Maj John Hughes ("Johnny the Hard"). Also available is the 6th Machine-Gun Battalion (four companies, each with sixteen heavy machine guns (Hotchkiss, Model 1914), led by Maj Edward Cole. The attack on Belleau Wood, while of great importance, is part of a larger Allied counteroffensive against the German offensive originating at the Aisne River. The rest of your Brigade is required to hold Hill 142 and the village of Bouresches, localities gained in the 6 June attacks.

Currently all American units have been pulled out of the woods, with the exception of the 80th Company of 3/6, located in the extreme southwest corner of the Wood (northeast of Lucy-le-Bocage). This has been done to give free rein to the action of the artillery. There is no detailed information on German dispositions, but it may be assumed they hold the wood in approximately regimental strength. Because of the small size of the battlefield and the amount of time available, the attack units can approach the wood from any direction south of the Lucy-Bouresches road or west of the Lucy-Torcy road.

Requirement

BG Harbord, what are your orders?

Instructions

Quickly formulate your plans and issue your orders. Provide a brief discussion of the rationale behind your actions. Submit your solution by email to gazette@mca-marines.org or to the *Marine Corps Gazette*, TDG 06-18, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. The *Gazette* will publish solutions in an upcoming issue.

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The Board of Governors of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation has given the authority to approve manuscripts for publication to the editor and the Editorial Advisory Panel. Editorial Advisory Panel members are listed on the *Gazette*'s masthead in each issue. The panel, which normally meets as required, represents a cross section of Marines by professional interest, experience, age, rank, and gender. The panel judges all writing contests. A simple majority rules in its decisions. Material submitted for publication is accepted or rejected based on the assessment of the editor. The *Gazette* welcomes material in the following categories:

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- **Letters**: Limit to 300 words or less and DOUBLE SPACE. Email submissions to gazette@mca-marines.org are preferred. As in most magazines, letters to the editor are an important clue as to how well or poorly ideas are being received. Letters are an excellent way to correct factual mistakes, reinforce ideas, outline opposing points of view, identify problems, and suggest factors or important considerations that have been overlooked in previous *Gazette* articles. The best letters are sharply focused on one or two specific points.
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- **Book Reviews**: Prefer 300 to 750 words and DOUBLE SPACED. Book reviews should answer the question: "This book is worth a Marine's time to read because…" Please be sure to include the book's author, publisher (including city), year of publication, number of pages, and the cost of the book.

Publication Timelines: The average time between an article's acceptance for publication and printing of that article is six months. In some cases the wait can be longer, based on aligning the subject of the article to monthly themes in the magazine and space available. In some cases where accelerated publication serves the interests of the Corps, an article may be moved up in the publication queue. Normally, requirements for PME or Advocacy/Advisory Groups from senior-level Marine Corps leadership (Commanding General, Deputy Commandant) justifies accelerated publication.

Writing Tips: The best advice is to write the way you speak, and then have someone else read your first draft for clarity. Write to a broad audience: *Gazette* readers are active and veteran Marines of all ranks and friends of the Corps. Start with a thesis statement, and put the main idea up front. Then organize your thoughts and introduce facts and validated assumptions that support (prove) your thesis. Cut out excess words. Short is better than long. Avoid abbreviations and acronyms as much as possible.

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