



MARINE CORPS Gazette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

NOVEMBER 2012 Vol. 96 No. 11

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A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

Welcome to the digital edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*

Welcome to the November digital edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. We hope you find this issue informative, and that it brings you a sense of pride and accomplishment as we look at the past, present, and future of the Corps. We have a long history of service to our Nation and have tried to highlight it in this issue. Most importantly, we say, "Happy birthday, Marines."

J. A. Keenan

Editor, Col John A. Keenan, USMC(Ret)





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
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NOVEMBER 2012

Editorial: 237 Years of Service to the Nation

10 November marks the 237th birthday of the United States Marine Corps. Marines around the globe will take time to celebrate the founding of the Corps, toast our success in combat, and, most importantly, remember those who have made the supreme sacrifice for Corps and Country. Like many Marines, I am often asked by those on the outside looking in to describe the Corps. After careful research I have found the best one-word description of the Marine Corps is "cult." Yes, you read that correctly. I believe the Marine Corps is a cult.

Before you decide to organize a march on the *Gazette* offices with torches and pitchforks, let me explain. Now, with the advantage of the Internet, I am the smartest man in the world as I have all information at my fingertips. I found the following definitions of "cult" on Dictionary.com:

1. a particular system of religious worship, especially with reference to its rites and ceremonies.
2. an instance of great veneration of a person, ideal, or thing, especially as manifested by a body of admirers: *the physical fitness cult*.
3. the object of such devotion.
4. a group or sect bound together by veneration of the same thing, person, ideal, etc.
5. *Sociology*. a group having a sacred ideology and a set of rites centering on their sacred symbols.

If the foregoing definition does not accurately describe the Marine Corps and Marines, nothing on the Internet or in the printed word does. It may be hyperbole to say that the Corps is a system of religious worship but very little in life, except for perhaps faith and family, exerts such a powerful influence on Marines, whether active duty or veteran, than the Marine Corps does. In reference to rites and ceremonies, on 10 November Marines will take part in a ceremony in which we read holy writ (the Commandant's and Gen John A. Lejeune's messages) and pass a piece of birthday cake from the oldest to youngest Marine. Look at the second definition. Even the example it uses of "physical fitness" is part of our cult. Who and what do we venerate? We venerate the selfless leader, the Marine who is willing to sacrifice his life for his fellow Marine, and the ideals of honor, courage, and commitment, just to name a few. The third definition fits us. The Corps is the object of our devotion. The fourth definition easily describes us. Once you have earned the title Marine, you are bound forever to that long line of Marines stretching back to Tun Tavern who have done the same. It is an unbreakable and, to those who have never earned the title, unexplainable bond. The fifth definition provides us with insight from the world of social science. We have a sacred ideology. It is a strong belief in our Nation and that the Corps is the guardian of her freedom. We even have a sacred symbol called the eagle, globe, and anchor. No one who has seen the conferring of that symbol on a recruit series after earning the title Marine can be unmoved or doubt that those young men and women have joined something larger than them, being indelibly marked for the rest of their lives.

So on the 237th birthday of our Corps, I for one intend to take part in the rites and rituals that mark this most exclusive and special of all cults and to reflect on the fact that no one can claim a greater honor than to be a United States Marine.

Happy birthday, Marines!

John Keenan

Marine Corps Association & Foundation Honorary President, Gen Joseph Dunford; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); General Counsel, BG Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); LtGen Robert Blackman, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew Davis, USMC(Ret); MajGen James Kessler, USMC; BG Gen Jim Lariviere, USMCR; BG Gen Thomas Draude USMC(Ret); BG Gen George W. Smith, Jr., USMCR; Col William R. Costantini, USMC; Col Catherine Barker, USMCR; Col Helen Pratt, USMCR; Col Stephen Waldron, USMCR; Col Daniel O'Brien, USMC(Ret); LtCol Greg Reeder, USMC; LtCol Matthew A. McCarvey, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Michael Barrett (DoD Liaison); SgtMaj Kim Eugene Davis, USMC; MGySgt Steven Williams, USMC; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Thomas Corzine; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. Jay Holmes; Mr. Jake Leinenkugel; Mr. John Lowry III; Mr. Michael Matz; Mr. James A. Mosel. Marine Corps Association & Foundation Board of Directors, Gen Peter Pace, USMC(Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC(Ret); MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC(Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC(Ret); MajGen Gray Payne, USMC(Ret); MajGen Andrew Davis, USMC(Ret); BG Gen Joseph Composto, USMC(Ret); SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC(Ret); Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Michael Hegarty, Mr. M.L. "Buzz" Hefti; Mr. Larry Prior.

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Women in the Infantry

■ I'm glad an intelligent, non-emotional and non-social engineering conversation is being conducted about women Marines serving in infantry-oriented MOSs. This subject certainly deserves discussion. Capt Petronio should be complimented for her valuable input ("Get Over It," Jul12).

My time in dear old Southeast Asia was spent literally in the field for almost 13 months. My battalion commander was LtCol Van D. Bell, Jr. (a true American hero, in my opinion), and he believed in staying in the field and on operations.

I am 70 plus years old now and I can honestly say I personally have never met a woman that could have physically kept up with us. There were a number of males that struggled. As Col Fox described in his letter in the September issue, things happen in the combat environment that are not explainable, cannot immediately be recovered from, and only place even more physical demands on the individual Marine. This is not a reflection on intelligence or patriotism. It is just a physical fact.

Hopefully reason and common sense will rise to the surface before we start spending more money that we don't have on a social experiment.

1stSgt Larry Pryor, USMC(Ret)

Professional Military Education

■ In response to "The Officer PME Continuum" (MCG, Jun12), I enjoyed the article and I agree that professional military education (PME) needs to extend beyond formal schools. Professional reading is very important and it's one way to tell who is a true professional. While I agree wholeheartedly with the article, I find it discouraging that there is no mention at all of the chief warrant officer ranks. I think that it is just as important for a chief warrant officer to further himself and his knowledge base as it is for any regular officer. I understand that we are a little bit different, but we play a vital role in the function of the Marine Corps.

Include chief warrant officers in all officer matters whether it's PME or plan-

ning—we can and will contribute. We will only improve as a Corps when we are all in this together.

CWO2 James O'Brien

Fighting for Logistics and Logisticians

■ I read with interest the entire September issue dedicated to logistics. The articles covered the waterfront but missed a crucial and, some would offer, preeminent point lacking in the logistics community today—advocacy.

Defined many ways, advocacy is active support in favor of a cause. Logisticians have performed magnificently meeting and shaping combat operations from planning through execution in both Iraq and

Within the logistics community, there is a mixture of various MOSs and the preoccupation on an individual MOS to dominate as the "lead dog" continues; this has gone on for years and continues today.

Afghanistan but (arguably) have failed to synergize their community and stake their claim as an equal member of the MAGTF.

Within the logistics community, there is a mixture of various MOSs and the preoccupation on an individual MOS to dominate as the "lead dog" continues; this has gone on for years and continues today. This would be totally acceptable if Marines considered themselves logisticians first, but, unfortunately, some Marines are engineers, supply, etc., first, and this loyalty to initial MOS undermines the logistics community writ large.

Advocacy is needed to link and fight for logistics throughout all elements of

the MAGTF and the Marine Corps. Some will disagree with this, but comments such as "indoor MOS," an attitude that Combat Action Ribbons aren't rated by support personnel (in spite of MCO clarification), and a Ground Logistics Awards Dinner (vice Logistics Awards Dinner) are just some examples. Most disappointingly, some logisticians don't see the importance of advocacy and allow themselves to be treated as second-class MAGTF citizens.

Logisticians need to take a lesson from the other elements of the MAGTF, as the grunts and aviators do this superbly in championing their causes.

Hopefully time and leadership will change this. Admittedly, I was part of failing to bring this about.

BGen Dave Reist, USMC(Ret)

Language and Culture

■ In "Language and Culture in the Marine Corps" (MCG, Aug12), Capt Janine Mills does an excellent job identifying and suggesting a solution to the problems of language skills and operational culture within the Marine Corps. During the Center for Irregular Warfare Integration Division's (CIWID's) recent Service-level Irregular Warfare Capability Based Assessment, the leading capability gap identified by the Operating Forces was "provide regional language/culture capability." The gap statement further clarifies the issue: "The MAGTF has limited language and cultural capabilities impacting the ability to understand operational culture, negotiation, and mediation, to include the ability to identify training and education requirements and skills." The shortfall identified by Capt Mills does exist and deserves attention. Capt Mill's solution, the establishment of an international affairs officer as a primary MOS to serve as a feeder MOS for future foreign area officers, is logical and well thought out. The creation of what at CIWID we would refer to as career "advisors" is highly favored. The immersion of an individual in the language and operational culture of a region in a less episodic manner than is currently allowed in the foreign affairs officer

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the *Gazette*. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED.

Letters may be e-mailed to gazette@mca-marines.org. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

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program would certainly provide operational commanders a more seasoned and capable advisor to assist their units in preparation for, and execution of, assigned security cooperation and building partner capacity missions. The language and operational culture gained by a more professional advising force in the Marine Corps would also assist the commander in the planning and execution of major conventional operations. The Irregular Warfare Capability Based Assessment suggests other potential solutions to our language and operational culture shortfalls to include changes and/or additions to doctrine, training, leadership and PME, and personnel. Although CIWID does not endorse the particular path chosen by Capt Mills, it does recognize the fact that the captain has clearly identified a pressing need within our Service that when addressed will improve the perfor-

mance of our Operational Forces across the range of military operations.

LtCol B. "Zach" Woodworth

Marines As Athletes

■ The article "Marines Are Professional Athletes" (MCG, Aug12) should be required reading in all agencies that support Marine fitness. In order for the program to work policy, facilities and attitudes must all be in alignment. The authors bring up excellent points regarding the need for dedicated space and the fact that Marine Corps Community Services has a very diverse constituency. I recently returned from a tour on an Army installation that had a gym catering to functional fitness. In contrast, on my new Marine Corps base, trying to do functional fitness is a hassle. The gear is under lock and key, potential users have

to go through a certification process to get it, and the gear cannot be used after dark (eliminating use during early morning or evening physical training) even though it sits in a very well-lit parking lot. Don't even think about bringing the gear inside this gym that is jam packed with machines, treadmills, and bikes. However, on a positive note, my last command had two outstanding, innovative athletic trainers who were valuable members of our team. They worked miracles and got Marines, who the traditional medical establishment had given up as lost, back into training. This program must be expanded so more units can reap the many benefits. The return on the investment is certainly worth the cost.

Nancy Springer

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
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MCA&F

Advancing leadership and recognizing excellence
by Roxanne Baker

America remembered her veterans this month and paid tribute to their service and sacrifices. The Marine Corps Association & Foundation (MCA&F) recognizes the importance of inspiring today's young leaders with the Corps' past heroes every month of the year. You help keep those legacies alive with your support of the MCA&F Marine Excellence Awards Program. Each year you fund nearly 11,000 awards given to enlisted Marines and officers at formal schools throughout the Corps. This represents about 97 percent of all awards distributed outside the USMC awards system. Your resources provided the newly renamed 1stLt Baldomero Lopez Honor Graduate Award and the LCpl James E. Swain Marine Corps Intelligence Enlisted Marine of the Year.

Another key mission is to provide active duty Marines with professional development opportunities. Those Marines attended the MCA&F Professional Dinner, utilized unit libraries donated by MCA&F, and studied combat lessons at Gettysburg sponsored by MCA&F. But we also never forget our veterans who have paved the way through our continued support of wounded warriors.

A hearty "thank you" to America's veterans, today's active duty Marines, and all MCA&F supporters.

Happy 237th Birthday, Marines!

To learn more about MCA&F's mission to advance and recognize Marines, visit www.mca-marines.org.



GEN Martin Dempsey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the guest speaker at the first ever MCA&F Professional Dinner at the Crystal Gateway Marriott hotel in Arlington, VA, on 6 September. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)

>Roxanne Baker is the writer and media coordinator for MCA&F. She is an experienced multimedia journalist with hundreds of published works. She is married to a Marine.



The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, was the guest speaker during the second annual MCA&F Intelligence Awards Dinner. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)



MCA&F's 1stLt Baldomero Lopez Honor Graduate Award recognizes TBS' graduating second lieutenant demonstrating the highest potential for leadership in the Corps. The award is named after Medal of Honor recipient 1stLt Baldomero Lopez, who cradled a grenade in order to protect his fellow Marines during the amphibious assault at Inchon during the Korean War. Charlie Company's honor graduate, 2dLt Stephen Spicher, was the first to receive the newly renamed award during the graduation at Little Hall on 12 September. 2dLt Spicher stands with TBS Commanding Officer, Col Todd S. Desgrosseilliers, far left; 1stLt Lopez's niece, Karen Bunk-Lopez; 1stLt Lopez's Commanding Officer at Inchon, LtCol John Stevens, USMC(Ret); and 1stLt Lopez's nephew, Mike Lopez. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)



MCA&F contributed \$1,000 toward the Society of American Military Engineers' 6th Annual Boat Cruise fundraiser benefiting veteran and military family support organizations on 2 August. The donation sponsored 8 spots for wounded warriors plus 2 guests to enjoy a 2-hour cruise on the Chicago River and Lake Michigan. (Photo by Kurt Richter.)



Each year MCA&F recognizes the marketing and public affairs (MPA) Marine of the year and sponsors Ka-Bar plaques to the top six Marines from the country's six regional districts and a sword to the MPA of the Year. MCA&F President and CEO, MajGen Edward Usher, USMC(Ret), presented the awards during a ceremony at the Gray Research Center on 21 September. Pictured from left are: MPA of the Year, SSgt Clinton Firstbrook; SSgt Jeffery Cosola; MajGen Usher; Sgt Scott McAdam; Sgt Aaron Rooks; and Sgt Justin Kronenberg. Sgt Ronald Hendricks, also an award recipient, was not in attendance. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)



Cpl Lauren A. Kohls is presented with the LCpl James E. Swain Enlisted Marine of the Year award at the second annual MCA&F Intelligence Awards Dinner in Arlington, VA, on 21 September. Cpl Kohls serves as a Pashto linguist with 2d Radio Battalion's virtual signals intelligence extension watch-floor, supporting operations in Afghanistan. Pictured from left are: Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett; Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos; Cpl Kohls; BGen Vincent Stewart; Skip Gaskill of Textron, financial supporters of the award; and MGySgt Daniel T. Schaller. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)



MCA&F donated a top-of-the-line graphics monitor to wounded warrior SSgt Jason "Crash" Jensen. A medically retired combat photographer, Jensen spends about 50 hours a week creating graphic designs free of charge for nonprofit organizations. MCA&F's East Coast Area Representative, SgtMaj Adam Terry, USMC(Ret), right, presented the monitor to Jensen, left, in July in front of The MARINE Shop at Camp Lejeune. (Photo by Aisha Gurganus.)



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In the storied history of our Corps, certain unimpeachable images stand forth as unparalleled in capturing the tradition and ethos of what it means to be a United States Marine.

Now, we celebrate the 237th birthday of our Corps and recall the thoughts, reflections, and esprit that epitomize all Marines.

The *Gazette* offers memoirs and heartfelt tributes as a salute to all Marines, past and present, those still living, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice in service to our great Nation.



(Photo by Cpl Shannon E. McMillan.)



10 NOVEMBER 2012

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

As we pause to celebrate the 237th Birthday of our Corps, we reflect on the rich legacy of service handed down to us, we recommit ourselves to the tasks at hand, and we look forward toward a bright future in service to our country.

Marines exist to fight and win our nation's battles. We are most proud of our well-earned reputation for answering the clarion call first. This was never more evident than at the epic Battle of Guadalcanal 70 years ago. Picked to lead the first Allied counteroffensive of the Pacific War because they "were the most ready," Marines landed on 7 August 1942 in the Solomon Islands. They persevered through months of unremitting deprivation and bitter combat. By the time the veterans of the Blue Diamond, the Cactus Air Force, our legendary Marine Raiders, and initial elements of the Follow-Me Division gathered together to raise a canteen and toast the Birthday of their beloved Corps some three months later, the battle was no longer an issue. The situation was well in hand . . . victory was assured.

We carry that same legacy of resolute commitment and valor today. Over the past year, Marines have stood firm in the toughest of circumstances and on numerous occasions. We've taken the fight to the enemy in Helmand and to the Horn of Africa. We've manned the ramparts of beleaguered embassies in the Middle East and North Africa, fought alongside our Allies throughout the world, while behind the scenes, afloat and ashore, other Marines did the painstakingly hard work required to maintain our high levels of readiness and efficiency.

As we look toward the future, we know that our sentimental place in the hearts of our fellow Americans and critical role in the defense of our way of life, are assured. America has always wanted a Marine Corps . . . it's always been that way. Now, more than ever, America needs its Marines as we confront a dangerous and unpredictable world. Faced with difficult days ahead, we will continue to draw strength from our rich heritage and the shared values of the Marines to our left and to our right. We know who we are . . . we know what we stand for. As ever we will strive to be found worthy of the legendary trust of our fellow Americans.

I salute the enduring faithfulness of those who have gone before, of those who wear our cloth today, and of the families who stand so resolutely at our sides.

Happy Birthday, Marines, and Semper Fidelis!



James F. Amos
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Marine Tanks at Thon Tham Khe

Armor lesson learned

by BG Raymond E. Bell, Jr., AUS(Ret)

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the retaking of the Falkland Islands by British Armed Forces. Led by then-Marine Brigadier Julian Thompson, 3 Royal Marine Commando Brigade, accompanied by 3 and 4 Troops, "B" Squadron (a mechanized armor formation) of Queen Elizabeth II's The Blues and Royals cavalry regiment, landed on East Falkland Island on 21 May 1982. Eight light tracked armored fighting vehicles with a recovery vehicle made up that latter small combat contingent. The inclusion of the two troops had almost been an afterthought because British military authorities had judged the terrain of the Falkland Islands unsuitable for effective armor employment. The units would encounter barren craggy hilltops, rock strewn riverbeds, few hard surface tracks, and numerous peat bogs. Obviously it was no place for armor. At the end of the campaign the lesson was that there was an appropriate place for armored units in the campaign. Experience from Vietnam was once again vindicated.

A History Reviewed

The participation of armored fighting vehicle formations in the Vietnam War initially took a backseat to the advent of muscular airmobile operations. No less an American commander in Vietnam than GEN William Westmoreland, USA, at first stood in the forefront of those who felt armor, especially tanks, could not be effectively employed on South Vietnamese terrain. But he came to realize that armored cavalry, mechanized infantry, and tank formations could have appropriate and important roles in fighting the Viet

>BG Bell is a retired Army armor officer who served in Vietnam in the III MAF area of operations in 1968–69. He was the XO, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division, an armored cavalry unit that operated on the "Street Without Joy."



Tank engaging the enemy in Vietnam, 1967. (Defense Dept Photo USMC A370093)

Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

The U.S. Marine Corps also saw the helicopter as the battlewagon in the sky as a future dominant force in land combat in Vietnam. But the Corps did not exclude the tank from its inventory of lethal weaponry. Yet little is heard of how tanks played a role in Marine operations in Vietnam. The presence of tanks, however, could often have telling results, a lesson well worth learning.

It takes a vicious battle, such as that was fought starting 27 December 1967, to understand the vagaries of Marine tanks engaged in combat in Vietnam. On that day, in 24 hours, Battalion

Landing Team 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 3/1) in Operation BADGER TOOTH lost 48 Marines killed in action (KIA) and 86 wounded. Immediate enemy body count amounted to only 31 confirmed dead. The book, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 1968, The Defining Year*, stated that Operation BADGER TOOTH was not only a bloody experience for BLT 3/1, but that it also raised questions as to the effectiveness of such operations as those conducted by special landing forces.¹

BLT 3/1 was the ground element from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment of a specially formed task group (Special Landing Force Bravo), which

also included artillery, tanks, and amphibious tracked vehicles, plus helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262). The BLT was embarked on amphibious ships of the Seventh Fleet and was afloat aboard ship from November 1967 to May 1968. The BLT had been “borrowed” from the 1st MarDiv, one of the two Marine divisions (1st and 3d) of the III Marine Amphibious Force engaged in combat in the Republic of South Vietnam. It was, and is, Marine Corps policy to keep one or more specifically configured air-ground battalion-sized organizations onboard ships to perform landing force missions. Unfortunately, the severe casualties experienced by BLT 3/1 in Operation BADGER TOOTH called into serious question the special landing force concept of sending an amphibious force ashore to conduct operations on the ground as opposed to making an amphibious assault landing to gain a beachhead.

The tanks that deployed with BLT 3/1 were from Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, the 1st MarDiv’s medium tank battalion. At the time of this operation a Marine division in South Vietnam, while essentially a major infantry formation, had an organic tank battalion. The companies of the battalion provided valuable fire support to the infantrymen and were assigned, as required, to the various Marine infantry regiments to form joint task forces. It so happened, however, subordinate tank units habitually supported the same unit to facilitate effective employment. A tank platoon consisting of five tanks was a normal reinforcement of a BLT.

The Company C tank platoon was the 3d Platoon commanded by 2dLt R.E. Parrish. Authorized were 19 enlisted Marines along with the commander in the platoon, 4 crewmen to each tank. When deployed the platoon usually operated as a light section of two tanks commanded by the platoon’s senior sergeant and a heavy section of three tanks commanded by a lieutenant.

Parrish’s tanks were the medium M48A3 Pattons, the same as used in Vietnam by the U.S. Army. Because the Marines had only limited means to



Mechanized operations in Vietnam, 1967. (Defense Dept Photo USMC A370034.)

provide tank maintenance support, the commonality between the Marine and Army tanks made it possible to use U.S. Army tank support facilities. There was only a small Army armor presence in the Marine area of operations, however. Required support was limited, which could make for long delays in getting repairs and obtaining spare parts.

The M48A3 had a diesel engine and mounted a 90mm cannon, which fired high-explosive beehive (containing 4,800 steel flechettes), canister (containing 1,281 steel cylindrical metal pellets), white phosphorus (smoke), high-explosive antitank, and armor-piercing (solid shot) ammunition. Since the likelihood of encountering the enemy was remote, the armor-piercing ammunition was often replaced by the beehive or canister round, which was very effective against enemy infantry. The tank also mounted a .50 caliber machinegun in a cupola on top of the turret and a 7.62mm machinegun located coaxially with the 90mm cannon.

The tanks attached to Special Landing Force Bravo joined the task force aboard the U.S. Navy’s Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Bravo 76.5 when it was formed in November 1967. In early

December they sailed with the BLT and its other supporting elements to Subic Bay, Philippines. There the tank platoon spent 2 weeks at the special landing force camp preparing for amphibious operations in South Vietnam.

From 6 to 9 December the platoon did little training but conducted maintenance of equipment. One of the tanks was evacuated to Okinawa for overhaul while at the camp. It would be replaced in Da Nang, South Vietnam, on 18 December before operations began. Then on 11 December the BLT began a live fire exercise that lasted until 0600 the next day. The unit training schedule did not specify whether or not the tanks’ main guns were to be fired during the exercise. Special Landing Force Bravo reembarked on the ARG on 13 December and conducted a BLT exercise from that date until 17 December when it sailed for Da Nang. The command chronology report for that time stated, “Training stressed all aspects of amphibious operations and included live fire of all organic and supporting weapons.” Thus prepared, the special landing force left Da Nang to conduct amphibious operations in Quang Tri Province located just below

the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.

The special landing force's first operation, called FORTRESS RIDGE, conducted in the province saw the tank platoon landed and moved to the BLT's logistics support area. At 1710 on 21 December the landing team's commander, LtCol Max McQuown, dispatched the tanks to Company M with which they participated in a sweep through the assigned objective short of the Cua Viet River. The next day, in a continuation of the attack, a North Vietnamese recoilless rifle round hit one of the tanks causing damage to the tank's turret and searchlight, which resulted in one Marine crewman being KIA and two wounded. The tank was subsequently evacuated to Da Nang where it was repaired but became unavailable for the special landing force's next operation.

The next operation, BADGER TOOTH, turned out to be a far bloodier affair for the Marine infantrymen and a frustrating one for the Marine tankers. Operation BADGER TOOTH took place on the infamous "Street Without Joy," the subject of the book by French author Bernard Fall, who was killed on the Street when accompanying Marines before BADGER TOOTH. During the Vietnam War, before the separation of the country into two halves, the French and Viet Minh had fought a bitter campaign on the same terrain with the French coming out the big losers. Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive the area along the seacoast had been the heart of Communist resistance along the central Annam coast. After a raging battle for the old capital city of Hue during the 1968 NVA and VC offensive where the enemy was soundly defeated, the region became one of the most "pacified" in South Vietnam with a very strong presence of Marine, U.S. Army, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. The 1st ARVN Infantry Division, led by the very capable MG Ngo Quang Truong, was a particularly effective organization in defeating the local Communist insurgency.

Operation BADGER TOOTH's objective was not to preempt a major enemy

offensive in the region but to ascertain the level of, and suppress, enemy activity in an area adjacent to the South China Sea, much the same way the objective of FORTRESS RIDGE was. Intelligence reports, current in December 1967, estimated that there were as many as 1,700 enemy troops in the area, a large force whose mission was not specifically discerned at that time. But where the BLT landed was close to the former capital city of Hue, which proved to be a major target of the Communists during the offensive.

But where the BLT landed was close to the former capital city of Hue. . . .

LtCol McQuown planned to land a company of some 150 Marines on the beach in LVTs (landing vehicle tracked, known also as amtracs). The Marines would establish a landing zone (LZ) on the ocean side of the Song O Lau River. This LZ, code named LZ Finch, was to be seized by the BLT's Company L. Once Company L landed in LVTs and seized LZ Finch, the remainder of the BLT was to be flown into the LZ by helicopters of HMM-262. When assembled on the ground, the four BLT infantry companies were to conduct search and destroy operations through some 14 towns, villages, and hamlets across the Song O Lau River and running southwest of the LZ. The operation was to be supported by mortar fires, available on-call air support, naval gunfire, and, once the first intermediate objective was seized, artillery fire from Marine artillery batteries.

The 3d Tank Platoon, Company C, however, was not to be landed. The terrain beyond the beach and the Song O Lau River was considered an obstacle to movement of vehicles other than the LVTs. As a result, the tanks, which now numbered only four in the platoon because one was still being repaired in Da Nang, would be available only on call.

The initial plan, however, was changed based on information provided by a U.S. Army liaison officer with nearby ARVN forces. Intelligence officers suspected that NVA troops were hiding in two villages close to LZ Finch in an attempt to evade ARVN operations in the vicinity. These two villages, Thon Tham Khe and Thon Trung An, were to be cleared first and then the BLT was to conduct the other preplanned operation.

At 1100 on 26 December, Company L landed on Green Beach (the code name for the debarkation site on the seashore) unopposed and proceeded inland 2 miles to secure LZ Finch. There seemed to be no enemy presence in the area, although former Marine SSgt Deene Fowler, Jr., stated, "My squad leader spotted jungle boot prints in the sand and said that they weren't ours (meaning Marines)."²

By 1415 the CH-46A helicopters flying off the amphibious assault ship USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8) had brought the remainder of the Marine infantrymen safely to the LZ. Companies L and M swept perfunctorily through the seaside villages of Thon Tham Khe and Thon Trung An. Except for the boot prints in the sand no evidence of a major NVA presence was to be found. Additionally, although the Marines killed three VC and detained four individuals in the area, those captured revealed no information about any lurking enemy formations in the vicinity. The only casualty was a Marine wounded by automatic weapons fire that came from some place west of the LZ.

LtCol McQuown was not satisfied with the results of the 26 December search. He ordered another sweep through Thon Tham Khe the next day. Starting at 0700 things quickly went from good to very bad. Company L's lead platoon first went in the wrong direction. Redirected, the company approached Thon Tham Khe from the north in LVTs and dismounted to enter the village. Violent resistance promptly broke out from concealed enemy troops that delivered a devastating volume of fire from machineguns, rifles, rocket propelled grenades, and mortars on the advancing Marines.

The company commander, Capt Thomas S. Hubbel, withdrew his troops and called for airstrikes and naval gunfire. The fire support accomplished little as the enemy again delivered withering defensive fires that continued the killing, costing Hubbel and more Marines their lives. Company L was effectively pinned down. Communications between battalion and company soon became lost, forcing McQuown to commit additional combat assets to the battle.

It was time to call for the tanks, but that was easier said than done. They first had to be offloaded from the LPH into landing craft. One of the tanks, having developed electrical problems, would not start. It had to be left aboard ship. The landing craft brought the platoon's three remaining tanks as close to shore as they could without becoming stuck in the sand, and the tanks started to debark. Under marginal weather conditions one tank promptly sank in the rolling surf. It was to remain immobile until the operation was over when it was laboriously recovered. The other two made it ashore, but they had lost their radio communications capability in the water. The tanks had not been properly waterproofed.

In the meantime, McQuown brought the full power of his battalion to bear on the town. Companies I, K, and M surrounded Thon Tham Khe. The two tanks, operating as a light section, accompanied Company K, which struck the village from the south. The company also met fierce resistance, but the tanks now gave the Marines an edge. Unfortunately, because the tanks lacked the ability to communicate with the infantrymen from inside the tank, the crewmen had to talk to the infantrymen by exposing themselves to vicious enemy fire. This limited the tanks' effectiveness as any verbal communication was at best limited, but the tanks' very presence gave additional stiffness to the Marine attack.

By nightfall the situation had stabilized, but there were gaps between the four infantry companies, and the enemy remained in control of the village. When darkness arrived the NVA used the concealment it provided to exfiltrate through the gaps, taking with them many of their wounded and dead.

A search the next morning revealed the now-deserted village had been a literal defensive bastion. As the McQuown report stated, "It was prepared for all-around defense in depth with a network of underground tunnels you could stand up in, running the full length of the village."³ Residents of the village later disclosed that the NVA had spent an entire year preparing its defense.

Because BLT 3/1 had received such a severe battering as a component of Special Landing Force Bravo in Operation BADGER TOOTH, it brought into question the efficacy of future special landing force operations. But it did show emphatically that properly prepared, i.e., waterproofed or maintained, tanks were an asset to be employed whenever possible.

According to McQuown's analysis of Operation BADGER TOOTH with regard to tanks he wrote, "The coastal plain where the initial waterborne landing and heliborne landing took place had good trafficability for all types of combat equipment."⁴ The problem was that the Song O Lau River ran swiftly between the planned objectives and the beach. But he went on to record:

The two operable tanks were extremely valuable even though lacking communications. Had all four tanks been landed in good condition, their impact on the battle would have been significant.⁵

McQuown best summarized the effectiveness of Marine tanks in Vietnam in the lessons learned section of his February 1968 Command Chronology when he discussed the employment of direct fire weapons.

The use of direct fire from tanks . . . is essential if casualties are to be kept at a minimum. The firepower, armor, and better trafficability make tanks superior [to other direct fire means]. BLT 3/1 found that tanks can be used effectively in generally unfavorable terrain provided a careful reconnaissance is made and due care [is] exercised by tank crews. The psychological effect of attacking armor was significant. It was noted that despite high exposure to the enemy's many anti-tank [AT] weapons, no tanks were knocked out

by enemy fire. A high rate of ordnance expenditure by the tanks and the close cooperation with protecting infantry were contributing factors in avoiding enemy AT fire.

What LtCol McQuown wrote became common knowledge about the employment of tanks, be they U.S. Army, ARVN, or Marine Corps, in South Vietnam. His experience mirrored that of not only armored troops but also that of infantrymen regardless of Armed Service. Operation BADGER TOOTH was not the first, or the last, successful employment of tanks in terrain often considered unfavorable for tanks. Indeed, in operations where the helicopter had become a dominant instrument of warfare, the tank also had a significant role to play. Although not much was heard about Marine tanks in Vietnam, Marines as well as Army soldiers found armored fighting vehicles could be major players in combat against the NVA and the VC. Ergo a lesson learned.

Notes

1. Schulminson, LtCol Jack, Leonard Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, Capt David R. Dawson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: 1968, The Defining Year*, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1997.

2. SSgt Fowler's quote was found at <http://www.3onevet.com/guestbook/oldguestbook4.htm>.

3. Schulminson, et al. See also Maj Gary L. Telfer, LtCol Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967*, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1984.

4. 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment Command Chronologies, *Command Analysis*, National Archives, Record Group 127, Washington, DC, February 1968.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.



Read more about Vietnam at www.mca-marines.org/gazette/Vietnam.

Korea

For me it was war and then truce

by Col George W. Carrington, USMC(Ret)

The Korean War was suspended by an armistice on 27 July 1953. That agreement fell in the middle of my tour, and the details of continued skirmishes and negotiations between nations and armies are complicated and outside of my interest in telling of some personal experiences. So let me be jocular and disrespectful as I tell my stories. I certainly saw heroism and gallantry, but the foolish and amusing dominate one's memory.

I was stationed at Headquarters Marine Corps and enjoying a weekend of relaxation in the Virginia countryside when the North Koreans started the war. My participation started with a little January adventure in California before we departed. This was attendance at cold weather training camp near Pickle Meadows, CA. We went and returned by bus at night out of Camp Pendleton. It was the coldest and gloomiest of trips. It was purposeful exposure to a little training in cold and unpleasant weather, which of course was to be expected in Korea. I don't know how the guys who were embarked in summer were handled, but we had to climb hills and hike at night with heavy packs through deep snowdrifts. The best way to handle this was to go unequally in single file. And being a major at this time I was given the unequal privilege of time off in the warm hooch of the camp commander. So the bus ride was my foremost memory.

I had an unexpected interruption to my Korean tour. I had a secondary MOS rating, as I remember it was called, as a Chinese language officer. So all of a sudden Korea was postponed by a 3-month diversion to Taiwan to help train Chiang K'ai-shek's marines. One naturally felt a bit impatient by this delay. In addition, I caught a re-

>Col Carrington's service in the Marine Corps began in 1942. He served as an artillery officer in World War II. He volunteered to study Chinese and became a Chinese linguist in Peking and Tsingtao, and later served on the island of Taiwan. Col Carrington had tours of duty in Korea and Vietnam. He served as an aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy and Johnson administration. Col Carrington retired from the Marine Corps in 1969 and served as Schoolmaster, The Marine Military Academy in Harlingen, TX. He has since retired and enjoys life in Beverly Hills, CA.

peat of this assignment 1 year later, so my tour can be called a Taiwan-Korean sandwich. When replacement individuals arrived on the scene in Korea, they would often get jobs displacing the current billet holders. That was a confusing, disruptive way of doing things. I hear that today whenever possible we assign units, usually battalions, to replace their predecessors. Unit integrity is retained. Personnel trained together will fight together. For me, arriving as an artillery major, there was no quick

assignment. My buddies who had not been sidelined to Taiwan got important jobs. I was rotated in and out of our four artillery battalions just to say hello and eventually told I was the G-2, maybe it was the S-2 then, of the regiment.

The G-2 is the intelligence officer, and there was just nothing much one could do about targets on an enemy basically in underground trenches. I was told I was in charge of an antiaircraft battery. No rounds had ever been fired by this unit, and the members had no mission



Artillerymen standing by to fire a 155mm howitzer during the Korean War. (Photo from Bernard C. Nalty, "Outpost War: U.S. Marines from the Nevada Battles to the Armistice," Korean War Commemorative Series, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 13.)

or purpose. There just was no enemy air action then. They probably spent much of their tour playing Chinese checkers. In time I was generally accepted as a part-time fire direction officer or G-3. So I am left now to tell of persons, not combat events. One of us had some peculiar, silly ideas. He had the rocks outside the commanding officer's tent painted white. An armed sentry with distinctive uniform was told he was on duty there. But for what purpose? And this innovative, relatively senior officer, with a background not in field artillery but in naval gunfire support, had some other ideas. He once intruded into the fire direction center tent interfering to question whether men busy with duties of utmost delicacy and importance were carrying the proper number of rifle ammunition rounds in their belts. Also, although there was a generalized order that we wear helmets, he once distracted a Marine in the midst of a fire mission but who had put aside his helmet. He sarcastically asked, "How do you like this steel-covered tent we are in?" He had to be told, "Get the h**l out of my fire direction center, Colonel!" Resort to sarcasm is no way of leadership.

After a few weeks I was made a battalion executive officer. It was a time of standoff, the frontlines being in trenches. There were occasionally patrols sent out into the stretch that was to become known as the demilitarized zone. On one occasion I observed one of our patrolling parties being threatened by a rare Korean or Chinese response. It was in a section not covered by my 105mm howitzer battalion, but I interfered, telling the forward observers to wake up, pay attention, and do their job. I am not sure of this, but I think they might have been from an aviation unit. There was not much responsibility then for the air units, but I recall today one little aggravation. It was cold, cold weather, and generators were few and needed badly by all of the ground units. Somehow an entrenched forward observer team had acquired a generator, which was solely used to activate their nighttime electric blankets.

I regret that many of my memories of my Korean tour are unpleasant and critical. But no matter. These must be



The first contingent of Turks. (Photo from Nalty, p. 32.)

reported. One day a small group ventured out of their trenches and suffered some minor injuries from random enemy fire. One of the group was a senior, relatively older, respected veteran of long-ago service in Haiti or Nicaragua. Our commander decided to evacuate him to the hospital ship then in Inchon, and he concluded that this master sergeant deserved a medal, a Bronze Star. Off he went, but I was soon approached by a Marine who complained that after several forbidden poker games he and some others were owed a large sum of money by the master sergeant. I was sent by helicopter to catch up to him before any return stateside. The hospital ship turned out to be an elaborate, converted Danish yacht that had been contributed under a NATO agreement. I indignantly confronted the offender, telling him no return home and maybe no medal unless he cleaned up his debt. I hope he did.

One day we Marines were ordered by the division to complete perhaps a 2-mile daily circular hike to ensure physical fitness over a relatively mild period of combat. The trouble was that our area had long ago been doused with hidden land mines. So when a couple of wise guys tried to cut across the circular path, they got blown up. I wonder whether this deserved one of those Purple Hearts. And remembering land mines and medals, I tell of a proposed award of a medal to a helicopter op-

erator who landed once in our general battalion area of tents, bunkers, gun pits, mess halls, and trucks and jeeps. His outfit proposed a Bronze Star for his one-time landing in a possible land mine area of long ago. This was in a single small spot, in a brief period of time, where our Marines were living, fighting, training, sleeping over their entire months of combat tours! I played a part in squelching that proposed award.

My regiment of artillery howitzers was in general support, the other division elements then in reserve. We were at the call of a Turkish brigade in the area of the British Commonwealth Division of our 8th Army. I recall a visit of that British artillery commander. He was just touring around in a specialized jeep with a very tall aide, a giant Saint Bernard, and a tremendously long shepherd's staff. He announced he was going to take a swim in the Imjin River. He commented on the combat then as, "We leave the bloody blighters alone and they leave us alone."

There were some incidents involving the Turks that were in great contrast. Frontlines, ours and the enemy's, were stable, unchanging. We lived in our trenches, seldom venturing out. However, there were outposts, and one night the Turks showed great courage and endured many casualties in driving enemy troops off of one of their important hilltop outposts. The word

had gone back all the way to 8th Army and NATO Lake Success Headquarters, taking several hours of reporting and exchange of comment. A reply was eventually sent that the Turk attack should not have taken place and that this feat of conquest was to be surrendered. We cannot imagine the degree of rage and disappointment this caused in the ranks of this gallant Turkish command.

One night three privates from my battalion took a jeep to a hut in which ladies of the night were serving Turkish officers. They were halted by a Turk guard, and one of them shot the guard to death. The delays, the language differences to be translated, the necessity in U.S. military law for pretrial investigation, the jurisdiction, and the interpretations of justice continued to anger the Turks. They were especially upset that the eventual finding was not murder, but because it could not be shown which of the three Marines fired the shot, the finding was a simple misappropriation of a jeep.

Yes, I have lots of inconsequential memories of Korea. I was responsible for a selection of a new area for our 105mm howitzers and picked a wonderful, smooth, good-looking meadow. Trouble was that it was once a rice paddy. Our entry with trucks and heavy howitzers and the return of rain meant we found ourselves in a sea of mud and instability. We had to resort to buying stones and rocks for grinding and road building from an absentee Korean lady whom we made rich. Another time during the truce it was decreed that we should refresh our amphibious capabilities by embarking and landing in available naval shipping. I don't know how or why, but we ended up dropping one howitzer in the ocean never to be recovered. This reminded me of an incident back at Camp Lejeune. A helicopter from an air support unit accidentally dropped a 105 in the forested swamp of Camp Lejeune. The aviators helped in searching, but in the end they bowed

out of the problem, and we artillerymen had to look and look but never could find it. What a swamp it was!

Relief and recovery from the strain of combat, as well as the boredom of Korea, could be found in a program called rest and recuperation (R&R). Members of units, take for example my 105 batteries, might be allotted highly valued awards for 1 week or 10 days for a Marine to relax in Hong Kong, Japan, or even Hawaii. Concurrently, there was pressure for us to contribute to numerous charitable causes, worthy but entirely unconnected with our mission or Korean commitment, such as Belgium flood relief, starvation in Africa, or earthquake relief in Turkey. This all looked very good, generous, and worthy until it was noticed that one battalion was piling up more credits and R&R opportunities by far than others. How could this be? Well, it turned out that that battalion commander, in order to be prominent and worthy of medals and promotion, decided he would sell or award R&Rs. This would reflect his great leadership and his unit's superiority in recognition of others' suffering. So thus were matters revealed and, I trust, rectified.

Yes there are many other memories of my tour. We were visited once by high-ranking officers for the purpose of dedicating a regimental chapel. It is an inconsequential, even silly, feat of memory that I recall that it was dedicated to Saint Barbara. Just to make sure, I find today that Saint Barbara is the patron saint of artillerymen.

There were many boring weeks. We played baseball. There were nightly movies. Most of us managed to get a few days of R&R in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, or Hawaii. R&R was by chartered aircraft. What a great business that was for new startup airlines. My best memory of the start of truce is that it meant days of scoffing up barbed wire and filling in trenches. It was ordered that men would stay in full combat uniforms on these jobs in the excruciating heat of summer. One can imagine how little this could be enforced. Korea is remembered as the coldest and hottest little spot I have ever endured.

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


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The Battle of Belleau Wood


A battle analysis of U.S. Marine Corps actions and follow-on effects within the organization

by SSgt Rudy R. Frame, Jr.

The Battle of Belleau Wood was the most significant battle in establishing American military prowess on par with the powers of the European continent. In so many regards the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was not prepared to fight on a European battlefield, which the Germans counted upon. However, the Marines displayed tenacity and independent, intelligent problem solving by small unit leaders with the initiative and ability to accomplish the mission. In addition, this battle had a dramatic effect on halting the German 1918 offensives and assisting the final turning of the tide for the Great War. The group most significantly affected by this battle was the United States Marine Corps. Belleau Wood is known by all who have worn the uniform of the U.S. Marine Corps as the battle that established the base identity for Marines to this day. The Battle of Belleau Wood has deep significance in stopping the German drive to Paris, increasing allied confidence and German fear of the capabilities of the AEF, and beginning the offensives pushing the Germans back toward their own borders, ostensibly putting the final nail in the German coffin. The Marines of the 4th Brigade performed at Belleau Wood in a manner consistent with that of the greatest military organizations in the history of warfare, facing and defeating a superior enemy in every avenue to include, but not limited to, strategy, experience, and tactical position.

In May 1918 the Germans commenced their third offensive through the sparsely defended area in the vicinity of the Aisne, which offered little other than as a route to push through to

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Battle lines, 9 June 1918. (Map from Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, *The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 137.)

Paris, which would bring the Germans a sorely needed victory and the even more needed logistics supplies. They did, however, run into slowing progress when they reached Chateau-Thierry, which provoked them to adjust their resources to the Bois de Belleau and surrounding area. The Aisne offensive began on 4 June 1918. Subsequently the Marines launched their own offensives on 6 June. This was the beginning of multiple allied offensives to regain the territories lost to the Germans' three offensives of 1918. The Battle of Belleau Wood, as it was officially named

by GEN John J. "Black Jack" Pershing, lasted until 26 June 1918.

The Germans had been at war for nearly 4 years by June 1918. Through the technological and strategic advancements coming from a militaristic society and with experience and further advanced weaponry on their side, the Germans had a decisive advantage over the newly arrived AEF. The rapid success of the stormtroopers released from the Russian front as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk pushed through so far and so fast that they were beyond their logistics support. They therefore

took the most advantageous position to hold in the defense and consolidate before moving to take Chateau-Thierry. Some of the best German stormtroopers from the Eastern Front took up the most advantageous defensive positions on Hill 142 in the town of Bouresches, and in the rest of the Bois de Belleau and its hills. Hill 142 was as ideal a defensive position as could be asked for, with rock formations laid in by glaciers creating natural pill boxes and fields of fire and with typical thick French forest and dense underbrush creating unparalleled natural concealment that was most advantageous for the defense. In addition, from Hill 142 to the woods there was an open wheat field covered by German machineguns and artillery. The Germans also had spotting balloons over the woods, enabling rapid fire upon visual sighting of the Marines. With limited to no air support at times from the French, the Marines had multiple challenges with which to contend.

The German offensives ceased after 4 June. The first Marine offensive began on the morning of 6 June at 0345. (The field order was received just the night before at 2225.). This was one of seven major attacks made by the Marines between 6 and 26 June, the first to take Hill 142 at 0345 on 6 June and the second being a capitalization on Marine success pushing on later that afternoon at 1700 to take Bouresches and establishing a foothold in the Bois de Belleau. The next five major offensives, not to include the daily attacks and counterattacks, were in an effort to fully take the Bois de Belleau and occurred on 10, 11, 12, 23, and 25 June.


The Marines were successful in achieving all assigned objectives and more on the morning of 6 June, though they were not given the agreed upon support by the French as noted by the 4th Brigade Commander, BG James G. Harbord (an Army Officer commanding Marines who earned their respect and who was given a set of the eagle, globe, and anchor, a bestowment meaning more to him than any medal by his own description) in his report to the Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, after Hill 142 was taken. BG Harbord noted that the French did not relieve Marines until 45 minutes before the

attack was to commence. In addition, the French who supported the offensive were slow to move, and both the 1st and 3d Battalions had to halt movement in order to not break the line and allow the French to catch up. By 0710 the Marines had achieved all of their objectives and were consolidating their positions while setting strong security outposts.

The success of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines in the early morning hours prompted great confidence in the Marines' ability to accomplish the mission. The division command desired to capitalize on the momentum already gained by sending the Marines on their second offensive within a 24-hour period to capture Bouresches and the Bois de Belleau. It was known that taking the Bois de Belleau would be challenging, but the Marines did not have the full picture of how challenging it would be. They were not aware of a French report that outlined the challenges within the area, to include the rock outcroppings, underbrush, and thick forest areas. Aside from the obvious challenges of attacking a well-defended enemy over a distance of more than 1,000 yards on an open field, the Marines were tasked with taking the town of Bouresches while also getting a foothold in the Bois de Belleau. The units in the second offensive were 3d Battalion, 5th Marines; 2d Battalion, 6th Marines; and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines. This fighting was the toughest yet to occur and the first dramatic test of the AEF. Casualties mounted quickly in this push forward. Col Albertus W. Catlin (commanding officer of the attack) and Maj Benjamin S. Berry (Commanding Officer, 3/5) were injured; many lieutenants and men perished, so much so that the drive to push on was severely lacking troops, many of whom had only received their baptism by fire in this battle. Fortunately there were also seasoned veterans of the Banana Wars and many other conflicts in which Marines had served over the years. GySgt Dan Daly made famous the following quote in an effort to drive the Marines on after being frozen in place from shell shock, "Come on ya sons-of-bitches; ya want to live forever?" Leaders like GySgt Daly rallied Marines on the small unit level to con-

tinue pushing the attack and achieving their objectives by using independent problem-solving abilities and initiative. MG Omar Bundy, USA, Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, described the attack as "a gallantry not exceeded in the annals of the war, the Marines kept at their task."¹ Bouresches was originally taken by 1st Lt Clifton Cates with a limited number of Marines. Even though they had taken general control of the town, Cates did not have the fire or manpower to take out a machinegun wreaking havoc on other Marines until further support arrived. So pleased was he with the actions of the 4th Brigade that GEN Pershing sent the following telegram regarding the attacks on 6 June:

Please accept for the Division and convey to Brigadier General Harbord and the officers and men under him my sincere congratulations for the splendid conduct of the attack on the German lines north of Chateau-Thierry. It was





The 55th Company, 5th Marines. (Photo from Bartlett and Sweetman, p. 138.)

a magnificent example of American courage and dash. Pershing.² The Marines managed to take the town of Bouresches on the second offensive, in addition to establishing a foothold in the Bois de Belleau. The ground they captured was never returned.

From 7 to 10 June there was constant back and forth small unit attacks and artillery fire, along with gas artillery, which resulted in Marine casualties who had to be evacuated. A great number suffering from chemical burns refused to leave the frontlines. Because of the casualties, it was not until 10 June that another Marine offensive commenced. It was noted by the Commanding Officer, 6th Marines, that the replacement Marines filling the gaps of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (with less than 3 months from enlistment to the frontline) performed in a manner akin to veteran troops. A large part of this was due to the quality of young men signing up to join the Marine Corps. The recruitment slogan “First to Fight” was instrumental in attracting the most patriotic and devoted of personnel. It is a recruiting slogan still used by the Marine Corps today.

BG Harbord noted in a message to his division commander on 11 June the fact that his brigade had been in nearly continuous combat since 1 June, double the amount of time that the French found to be reasonable to keep any unit on

the frontlines. In addition, the Marines had just conducted their third major offensive and had been successful in each one. The additional four offensives that followed saw the Marines continuing to push through and taking the entirety of the Bois de Belleau, while facing odds and forces that few units had been able to overcome throughout the war and staying on the frontlines longer than other Allied forces. Some commanders would only subject their troops to a period of 5 to 7 days on the frontlines and then either pull back or get a full relief in place.

The Marines also had to contend with gas attacks, which severely burned many of the troops. The field protective masks of the day made breathing nearly impossible, but the Marines fought with them all the while their skin was burning from the gas. The masks themselves gave the Marines the appearance of having a snout or looking like some sort of dog. The Germans facing the Marines often could not believe the Marines would continue to press forward given the challenges in front of them. The Germans gave the Marines a nickname that was endearing in the sense of it being a compliment for a military unit. The Germans truly respected the Marines’ warrior spirit all the while they were in constant battle with them and gave the Marines the nickname “tuefel hunden,” which

means devil dog. Described by German soldiers as crazed men, like dogs from hell running at them with mucus flowing out from their masks. They must be devils, many of them remarked. Devil dogs is a name in which Marines take great pride to this day. It is a part of the Marine Corps tradition to refer to one another as *tuefel hundens*, devil dogs, or a plethora of spin offs all related to the name and always with the remembrance of the history of Marine actions. It is an expectation that Marines know this history and know about Marines like Dan Daly and so many others.

It was not all success for the Marines. The offensives grew stagnant as the Marines became exhausted, and after much harassment by BG Harbord, the Marines were relieved on 16 June by three battalions of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division. The three battalions were on the offensive for 5 days with high casualties and no success, prompting the Marines to reenter the battle on 22 June, with a bloody and unsuccessful offensive on the 23d and 24th. The Marines needed just a bit more effort to mop up the rest of the German resistance within the woods. On 25 June the final major offensive occurred. On 26 June Maj Maurice E. Shearer reported back to the brigade that the Marines owned the entirety of the woods. This was the end to the Battle of Belleau Wood after almost 3 weeks of hard fighting, taking the most challenging of positions with the Marines coming out on top and setting up the AEF and the rest of the allies to break through Chateau-Thierry and continue offensives to drive the Germans out of French and other countries’ territories. In all the Marines suffered a greater number of total casualties in this battle than they did in their entire 140-plus years of existence.

Victory at Belleau Wood came at a sobering price: more than 5,100 Marines killed or wounded, greater than half the entire brigade.³

There were a significant number of awards received by Marines from the battle. These included unit awards from the French (the French Fourragère was awarded to the 5th and 6th Marine

Regiments and is still worn today) and many other personal combat decorations, to include the French Croix de Guerre awarded to Marines for heroism. The first Medal of Honor was awarded to GySgt Charles F. Hoffman during World War I (WWI). In addition, four officers were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, and 144 men and officers were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. For the Marine actions the French renamed the Bois de Belleau to Bois de la Brigade de Marines on 30 June 1918.

The key elements that led to Marine victory in the Battle of Belleau Wood were small unit leadership in the beginning, followed up by much better operational- and command-level organization. BG Harbord was an excellent brigade commander. However, he did not have the greatest resources to work with initially. No battalion-level commanders had any experience on a large battlefield, not a fault of their

own but the result of there being no large-scale symmetrical warfare in the previous years. Officers lost control of their units under the repeated shelling and machinegun fire from the Germans. Within 36 hours of the battle commencing, these young men and officers found their bearing and locked themselves on, stepping up to the challenge of effectively uprooting the Germans. The lessons that the French, British, and Germans learned over a 4-year period had to be adapted by the Marines in an unreasonably short amount of time. Fortunately for the Marines there were men like Daly, Hoffman, and Cates, and this list goes on and on with those who stepped up, took charge, and made the Marine offensives successful. Some of them were veterans of the Banana Wars and some were novices of the business of killing and winning, but all had the spirit, training, and drive that have become synonymous with the title United States Marine.

The lessons the Marines took from their allied counterparts were to utilize short artillery bombardment followed by swift attacks of infantry with grenades taking out machinegun positions, all the while utilizing artillery to pin the enemy down in the rear. It was also essential to take out German spotting balloons to prevent effective artillery and machinegun fire from mounting substantial casualties against Marines. The Marines later realized the benefit of retaliatory gas artillery attacks. They only returned gas after a bombardment by the Germans with gas; unfortunately, it took until the last week of the battle, but it did still reduce the burns suffered. Even still the gas had a positive effect for the Marines against the Germans on a psychological level with Marines charging and taking German positions while being gassed. The Germans developed an immense fear and respect for the newly named devil dogs. The most significant factor that led to Marine vic-



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The 4th Brigade. (Photo from Bartlett and Sweetman, p. 141.)

tory was maintaining a pace that the Germans could not hold against. They had never faced such an adversary during the war. In addition, 4 years of war had destroyed the spirit of the Germans.

The principles of war had not changed significantly for hundreds of years. Basically they remained the same in terms of mission accomplishment and what it takes to win a war. There were, however, significant changes in the principle of warfare with the advent of tanks and airplanes. The Marine Corps has had to contend with becoming a second land army. This was the first occasion in which this occurred, and the leadership of the Corps realized the necessity to define itself as something else—an expeditionary force-in-readiness—or it would be done away with during postwar periods. The Marine Corps wanted organic artillery and air assets. The priority of air support must be determined by the Marine on the ground, with Marine support in the air and on the firing line. This was the assessment of Marine leadership after the Battle of Belleau Wood.

The changes and advancements that occurred in the Marine Corps during the 1920s and 1930s were pioneered by the young lieutenants who suffered through the Battle of Belleau Wood. They included the advancement of amphibious assaults (resulting in the successes of WWII, Normandy, and the island-hopping campaign). If not for the Marine Corps' amphibious focus, landing operations would have been as disastrous as Gallipoli. In addition, the changes made led to what is now

called the MAGTF where support is given by Marines for Marines, making them a self-sustaining unit with only a need of transportation from the Navy. The offensive operations by Marines evolved to reach and surpass the quality of the stormtroopers of Germany, taking small, fast-moving units and using the principle of small arms fire to get the enemy's heads down and explosives to blow them out, occupy the ground, hold it, and then do it all over again. This concept is still utilized by the Marine Corps in symmetrical warfare and in asymmetrical warfare when the enemy will stand and fight. The Germans had their own lessons learned as well. GEN Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff's offensives of 1918 were the model by which the Germans developed the blitzkrieg tactic allowing them to sweep through Western Europe.

The young lieutenants who survived the terrors of Belleau Wood and WWI went on to WWII and into Korea, leading and shaping the Corps into what it is today. Too little is known by Marines today about the revolutionary advancements made by Marines like Gens Clifton Cates, Lemuel Shepherd, Gerald Thomas, and Holland "Howling Mad" Smith, all of whom were young officers at Belleau Wood. Belleau Wood shaped these men into leaders and warriors who vowed to never again let the Corps reach the point of being so unprepared to face any adversary. This mentality is what led to the complete restructuring of Marine training after WWI, with the advent of intense and

thorough amphibious training and with the expectation of facing the Japanese in the Pacific. The Marines' success in WWII was due to more than 20 years of preparation developed from lessons learned in WWI, most specifically from the Battle of Belleau Wood.

The Battle of Belleau Wood was the single most significant American military action of WWI, grounding American military prowess and capability against European powers in symmetrical warfare. This battle was the foundation of the United States Marine Corps in its perceived doctrine and evolution for the next 30 years. The success of the Marines of the 4th Brigade at Belleau Wood put the Marine Corps on the map as a contender as one of the greatest military organizations in world history. Their accomplishments there are what has led to an organization teeming with the highest quality and most devoted officers and enlisted men and women. The significance of the Battle of Belleau Wood is that it was the cornerstone in earning respect and confidence from European powers in not only American military capability but also as an international superpower.

Notes

1. McClellan, Edwin N., "Capture of Hill 142, Battle of Belleau Wood, and Capture of Bouresches," *Marine Corps Gazette* (pre-1994), accessed at www.search.proquest.com/docview/206317?accountid=8289, p. 21.
2. Ibid., p. 25.
3. Alexander, Col Joseph H., USMC(Ret) with Don Hovan and Norman C. Stahl, *The Battle History of the U.S. Marines: A Fellowship of Valor*, Lou Reda Productions, Inc., a division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., New York, 1997, p. 21.



To see an excellent illustrated overview of the Battle go to <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/belleauwood>.

Bravery at Bladensburg

The Marine Corps in 1814

by Scott Stabler

“A Few Good Men” forms the motto of the United States Marines Corps. The motto embodies its reputation as an elite force in the U.S. military—a smaller branch of the U.S. Navy that has a repute for toughness and effectiveness on the battlefield dating back well before World War II. Where did the Corps get its exclusive status? There are a variety of reasons including the “island-hopping” battles of World War II and the famous flag raising over Iwo Jima. Popular Hollywood movies involving John Wayne and others, such as *Full Metal Jacket*, *Born on the Fourth of July*, and *A Few Good Men*, surely add to the Corps’ prestige. Finally, flashy ads that included forged swords and dragons support the Corps’ elitism. However, one incident that possibly saved the Corps’ existence and added to its regard has gone largely unnoticed. In the War of 1812 a contingent of 116 Marines fought bravely against overwhelming odds to slow the British attack on the U.S. capital. Though they ultimately failed in stopping the burning of Washington, DC, their steadfastness increased the Marine Corps’ honor and possibly assured its survival.

On a steamy summer day in August 1814, almost 7,000 Americans faced down 4,500 of Britain’s most battle-tested soldiers at Bladensburg, MD, 5 miles from Washington, DC, on the Anacostia River. Inexperienced state militiamen made up most of the force sent to resist the Crown’s attempts to capture the U.S. capital. Just over 300 American naval flotillamen and 116 U.S. Marines under the command of Commodore Joshua Barney joined the militiamen. When the amateur militia

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scattered at the first sound of the new British Congreve rockets, the Marines and sailors held their ground. Their efforts formed the only viable attempt to halt the British advance on the city. They not only held fast against overwhelming odds but also charged the British regulars with the cry of “board ‘em.” Although Barney and the flotillamen have garnered recognition for their efforts, many overlook the story of the 116 Marines led by Capt Samuel Miller. When the capital burned and

The general public has shown only modest concern for the War of 1812. . .

the government fled, most focused on the failures of the military. Nevertheless, on this day of defeat, the Marines endured the greatest casualty rate, yet little has been told of their story.¹

Before the War of 1812, the Marine Corps fought for its very existence. Some Congressmen had referred to them as fancy palace guards. When the country declared war in 1812, the Corps had only 10 officers and 438 enlisted men. Because of Marine bravery during several battles, especially at Bladensburg and New

Orleans, the prewar discussion of disbanding the Corps halted, and its ranks grew.² A cornerstone of the Corps was laid on a day of defeat at Bladensburg.

Lack of Recognition

The general public has shown only modest concern for the War of 1812, America’s second war for independence. The impressions of sailors, trade quarrels, and disputes over western lands that inflamed the relationship between the two countries spark little interest now. Perhaps some Americans recall the British burning of Washington, DC, and the legend of Dolley Madison saving the full-length portrait of George Washington from the then Executive Mansion. However, few remember the valiant stand of just over 100 U.S. Marines who tried to repel the attack on their capital by several thousand battle-hardened British regulars.³ The only formal remembrance of the Battle at Bladensburg comes in the form of a marker along a busy roadside that makes no mention of the stand made by the Marines or the Navy flotillamen.

The Preparations

In the summer of 1814, the war was not going well for the Americans. Dissenters wanted peace. New England states considered secession because of the war’s costs and unpopularity in the region.⁴ The British had defeated Napoleon and now transported their well-seasoned


troops to combat the Americans. During this summer, President James Madison and Secretary of War William Armstrong had made only the slightest preparations to defend the city.⁵ Madison and his secretary believed an invasion was highly unlikely. Neither supposed the community of just over 6,000 formed a better target than the equally undefended, more strategic, and more populous Baltimore.⁶ They were wrong.

The British Invade

Ironically, the conflict at Bladensburg did not involve warfare for which the Marines trained. Marines trained for short land combat operations supported by naval firepower and for the boarding of ships during sea battles. In the War of 1812, the Corps rarely affected the outcome of a sea conflict, mainly because the U.S. Navy wisely and rarely confronted the superior Royal Navy except on the Great Lakes where Marines battled valiantly.⁷

The Marines who fought at the Battle of Bladensburg found themselves stationed at the Washington Navy Yard for the first 2 years of the war basically protecting baggage. Capt Samuel P. Miller, the Marine Corps Commandant's adjutant, and his small contingent defended the yard, served on court-martials, and guarded naval supplies. This light and often boring duty gave Miller's men time to train for battle. In August 1814 they would need that training because the Marines' next mission involved stopping the British on the road to Washington, DC.⁸

Before any actual fighting took place, Gen William H. Winder had trouble deciding how best to use the Marines. First, he assigned Capt Miller and his men to guard the stores at Meeks Plantation. Then on Monday, 22 August, they were ordered to march in the humid summer heat back to the Navy Yard to protect ammunition and provision wagons. They arrived in the capital at 0100 on 23 August and slept at the Marine Barracks near the yard. The Marines arose early the next day and with little sleep found new orders from Marine Corps Commandant Franklin Wharton to fall under the naval command of Commodore



British and American troop movements. (Map accessed at <http://www.tc-solutions.com/croom/1812.html>.)

Barney's force at Woodyard, MD, 12 miles southeast of Washington, DC. The Marines hardly transported five navy guns, three 12-pounders and two 18-pounders. Unknown to Miller, Barney had orders from Winder to guard the Eastern Branch Bridge. Barney did not feel he needed the Marines to guard one bridge, so the Marines marched with the cannons back to the Marine Barracks, avoiding confrontation with nearby British forces.⁹

The Battle Commences


The following day the battle commenced. British MG Robert Ross' men marched through Bladensburg, the closest fordable crossing of the Anacostia River. They exited the deserted town just 5 miles from Washington before noon.¹⁰ Despite American numerical superiority, 4,500 British regulars to 7,000 mostly militiamen, command incompetence and lack of military discipline hindered the Americans.¹¹ Winder unexplainably placed the first two lines approximately a mile apart at varying heights, thus one could not support the other. The second line of militiamen did not even know there would be a third line. This third line contained Barney's late arriving flotillamen and Miller's Marines.¹² As the British marched up Bladensburg Road on that sweltering August day, British Subaltern George Gleig recorded that the American troops looked as if they would be more comfortable on the farm than on the battlefield.¹³

At roughly 1300 on Wednesday, 24 August 1814, the Battle of Bladensburg began. The British initially employed only 1,200 of their most experienced soldiers.¹⁴ Two British light brigades attacked the frontline American militiamen, who repulsed them quickly.¹⁵ The rebuff did not last long; the British quickly launched their new weapon, the Congreve rocket. British Marines fired the rockets from tripods, and though inaccurate in flight, they howled so loudly when streaking through the air that they struck fear in the first two lines of American militiamen who retreated in confusion and fear.¹⁶

At the start of the British attack, Commodore Barney's flotillamen and



Front of Marine Memorial. (Photo by author.)



Commodore Barney and Marine Monument, Fort Lincoln. (Photo by author.)

Miller's Marines were miles away. At 1000, Barney arrived at the Eastern Branch Bridge that spanned the eastern branch of the Patuxent River. He had orders from Winder to stop the British from crossing the link between Washington and Maryland.¹⁷ This assignment irritated the commodore, who by this time knew that the main British force had marched on Bladensburg. Realizing the waste of resources

in having 500 men guard one bridge, he left most of his contingent, including the Marines, back at the Navy Yard.¹⁸ When President Madison arrived to inspect the forces, Barney pleaded with the President to allow him and his men to hurry to Bladensburg to reinforce American forces. Overriding Winder's order, Madison concurred with the commodore's request.¹⁹

Riding ahead of his men, Barney realized how dire the situation had become when he arrived soon after the battle began. He sent word for the Marines and flotillamen to come to Bladensburg at a "trot."²⁰ Around 1400 they came on the field tired after a 5-mile double time march in the 98-degree heat, amongst rolling hills, carrying nearly 25 pounds in weapons—a musket, a cartridge box, and a bayonet or scabbard. This advance, according to Barney, "crippled his men," even before facing the well-trained British regulars.²¹

Amid these already challenging conditions, over 20 enlisted Marines (almost one-quarter of the force) hauled 5 heavy naval guns to the battlefield. These five ship's cannons, three 12-pounders and two 18-pounders, so named because of the weight of the balls they fired, were transported throughout the Bladensburg campaign by Miller's Marines.²² On field carriages, the 9-foot-long 18-pounders weighed 4,233 pounds and the 8 1/2-foot 12-pounders weighed approximately 3,150 pounds.²³ The Marines and their limited number of horses lugged these guns nearly 20 miles in 3 days. After Madison ordered Barney to Bladensburg, the Marines transported the cannons from the Navy Yard to the battlefield in 2 hours, averaging a rapid 2-miles-per-hour pace.²⁴

Soon after the tired Marines and flotillamen arrived on the battlefield the second American line fled. The professional soldiers deployed in line of battle roughly 2 miles from the Bladensburg River just outside the capital border on the crest of a hill.²⁵ Barney and his flotillamen laid the two 18-pounders directly in the road up which the British advanced. To Barney's front, the road descended about 50 yards to a ravine crossed by a small bridge. The ravine was wide and shallow, the bottom of

it producing grass and ending at an abrupt acclivity about 150 yards from the road.²⁶ Not surprisingly, the fleeing militia failed to blow up the bridge.²⁷ Miller, under Barney's command, supported the commodore's right flank with 116 Marines and a few hundred flotillamen.²⁸ They set up on the slope of an adjoining hill about 100 yards in advance of Barney's position with the three 12-pounders.²⁹ Here Barney, Miller, and the militia awaited the British advance.

The British marched confidently up the road expecting no further resistance from the fleeing Americans. Barney noted that the British followed "our own army retreating . . . apparently in much disorder."³⁰ After crossing where the American second line had stood, the British commander, COL William Thornton, paused briefly upon seeing the flotillamen's guns in the road. The heavy naval guns were a rare sight in a land battle. Nevertheless, the British formed in close order and attacked. Once the retreating militia passed, the American sailors unleashed the three 18-pounders with blasts of grapeshot and canister that cleared the road.³¹ The ground in front of Barney's battery was strewn with dead men and horses.³² An officer in the British Army confessed they "were so swept by the heavy cannon of the Americans, that the utmost peril menaced any approach to them."³³ The disoriented British made a short-lived retreat.³⁴

The Marines and flotillamen under Miller readied themselves as the British next tried to outflank the commodore's left. Thornton sent his men across an open field toward Miller where the Marines' three 12-pounders met them, raining canister and shot down upon the onrushing British.³⁵ Thornton fell wounded, and the British regulars retreated. Before the more numerous British could regroup, the Marines and flotillamen charged.³⁶ ³⁷ The Marines yelled "board 'em," jumped a fence, and rushed the enemy—the Marines flailing their bayonets, the sailors their cutlasses.³⁸ A British officer noted:

The riflemen likewise began to gall us from the wooded bank with a running fire of musketry; and it was not without

trampling upon many of their dead and dying comrades that the Light Brigade established itself on the opposite side of the stream.³⁹

The counterattack forced the British back into a small wooded ravine leaving many dead and wounded on the field.⁴⁰ The brief offensive, the only American attack during the battle, forced the British to regroup.

American militiamen, Barney, and British officers believed Winder had an opportunity to take control of the battle at this juncture, but Winder, wrong-headedly believing that withdrawal formed the only means by which to save the capital, ordered a general retreat.⁴¹ Barney and Miller either did not receive or ignored Winder's retreat order, even though it meant that Barney's 450 flotillamen and Marines alone faced approximately 1,500 British regulars.⁴² The British regrouped, dropped their knapsacks in the streets, and attacked, attempting to outflank Miller. Still Miller's command turned back the British advance three more times. Finally, the British 4th Regiment gained the upper hand by extending its lines and occupying an elevated position.⁴³ Now, without militia support, and with Congreve rockets having spooked the mules hauling their ammunition, the Marines and flotillamen had little defense.⁴⁴ British sharpshooters began to gun down individual Marines and seamen. The British reportedly had snipers aim for the American officers. Capt Miller was shot in the right arm. He would spend 10 months in the hospital and have seven pieces of bone extracted from his arm. Even after leaving the hospital, Miller could never again fully or painlessly rotate his arm.⁴⁵

Numerous British soldiers closed in on the Americans' position. Outflanked and outgunned, the situation proved dire for the Marines and flotillamen. Around 1600, under the threat of being overrun, 30 minutes without ammunition, and the British having control of the field, Barney ordered his men to spike the guns and retreat. Barney waited until the last minute. Gleig wrote that some of Barney and Miller's men died from bayonet punctures with fuses

still in their hands. The withdrawal left the wounded Barney and Miller in the hands of their captors. The battle lasted a little over 3 hours, and Barney's flotillamen and Miller's Marines held out until the very end.⁴⁶ British sailors carried Barney's and Miller's litters to a surgeon who assessed their wounds.⁴⁷ They both received excellent care. Barney called a British captain's treatment of him like that of "a brother." The British soon after paroled both Barney and Miller.⁴⁸

The Fallout


The lack of planning and the ease with which the British captured and burned the district caused Congress to call for a full investigation of the Battle of Bladensburg.⁴⁹ The British termed the clash the "Bladensburg Races" because of the militias' flight from the field.⁵⁰ A British naval officer wrote that "one of the greatest insults [that] could be offered to an American was to ask, in a bantering tone, with a grave face, 'If the gentleman had ever been present at Bladensburg races.'"⁵¹ One historian called the battle:

... a fiasco, with the undisciplined and ill-organized American forces being driven from the field in only three hours after fighting a smaller army, in unfamiliar surroundings, exhausted by a long sea voyage, and in an uncomfortable climate.⁵²

The only thing that lightened the pall over the burning capital was the fact that the Marines and flotillamen had fought courageously.⁵³ Yet praise came almost solely to the sailors. Even the British praised the defense put up by the flotillamen. Ross' official report recorded that the flotillamen "have given us our only real fighting."⁵⁴ Gleig wrote of the battle:

But the fact is, that, with the exception of a party of sailors . . . under the command of Commodore Barney, no troops could behave worse than they [the Americans] did. Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in terms, which conduct merits.⁵⁵

In front of the wounded Barney, British commander GEN Ross told his countryman, ADM George Cockburn, "I told you it was the flotillamen"



The Fort Lincoln Cemetery marker. (Photo by author.)

who had offered such stiff resistance. Cockburn agreed.⁵⁶ Though Ross complimented the flotillamen, the Marines and flotillamen were well integrated at the time of the battle. The compliments should apply to both groups. Little direct praise came to the Marines.

Some did praise the Corps. In all the reports and recordings, three explicit instances praised Miller directly, and one historian lauded the Marines exclusively. President Madison brevetted Miller, who had been a captain a few months, as a major for “gallant conduct” in the Bladensburg conflict, retroactive to the day of the battle.⁵⁷ Winder reported that Capt Miller “was wounded in the arm fighting bravely.”⁵⁸ U.S. Army MAJ George Peter called Miller a “gallant leader” who protected Barney’s flank and drew praise from the commodore himself.⁵⁹

Capt Miller and the Marines do gain some praise for their battlefield efforts in the form of three contemporary historical markers, but they all come with praise for Barney as well. Ironically, only one of the markers is completely accurate. A plaque at the Navy Memorial Museum at the Washington Navy Yard commemorates Barney and the Marines’ actions at Bladensburg as:

... the only bright star on the dismal day Washington was overrun by the

enemy. Hero of Bladensburg, Commodore Barney and his some 300 Marines made a heroic stand at the Battle of Bladensburg while all other American troops fled in disorder.⁶⁰

A stone monument sits behind the mausoleum at Fort Lincoln Cemetery in Maryland with the erroneous inscription, “It was here that Commodore Barney and his Marines were defeated in the War of 1812.” Both of the aforementioned fail to mention the flotillamen. The only accurate legacy left today is the historic placard near the entrance of the Fort Lincoln Cemetery, which gives the history of the area. The citation for the War of 1812 states:

Near this spot on August 24, 1814, Marines and Flotillamen under the command of Commodore Joshua Barney fought a gallant stand against the British Redcoats in the Battle of Bladensburg.

The Marines slowed the British, inflicted over 200 casualties, and suffered the most from the failure of the militias to support Barney’s and Miller’s positions. Out of the 116 Marines, 27 became casualties with 3 taken captive, a casualty rate of over 24 percent.⁶¹ They suffered one-third of all American casualties during the battle.⁶²

Little doubt remains that the Marines at The Bladensburg Races stood and fought against overwhelming opposi-

tion. Their legacy may not meet the standard of Marine Corps triumphs at Tripoli, Mexico City, and Iwo Jima, but they should at least gain acknowledgement and some credit for the Corps’ survival. In a historic moment, a few hundred tired men stood up to over 1,000 of the best trained and most experienced soldiers in the world. On a steamy August day in 1814, the Marines fought, died, and helped ensure the Corps’ very survival.⁶³ Perhaps because of the “races” and a “few good men,” the Marine Corps still forms an elite force.

Notes

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
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Farewell 5/10

Casing the Colors

by 1stLt Conor Dooley

Darling walks the railroad track that parallels the Hudson, lengthening his stride to step from tie to tie. A train whistle blasts twice, and he performs a controlled slide down the gravel embankment, arms outstretched in a wire walker's balance. He smokes a cigarette and tries to keep the smoke in. Meanwhile, McCartney lets his anger get the best of him, rips a mailbox clean out of its bolts, and then clotheslines himself on the guide wire of a phone pole. His friends walk a good distance behind, knowing anything in front is a red cape to a bull. Tired of farming dirt in Wolfe Creek, Wilburn hitches his way to Dallas to find work. His 2 years in the Civilian Conservation Corps are up. In that time he has built enough fences to stretch from here to sunny California, and whether he knows it or not, that is where he is headed. A few months later, these three boys will be Marines, standing together with salt-caked faces on a beach in San Diego simulating amphibious assaults and blinking against the sea spray. They are now members of what will become 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (5/10).

In July they are on a heaving ship somewhere in the Pacific wondering where Guadalcanal is and wishing they had an address for the girl they met last week with the loose curls and slightly looser morals. Come August, the first offensive rounds of artillery fire will unleash from the muzzles of their 75mm pack howitzers and cut into the canopy of coconut trees on Gaomi. With all of the noise and confusion of their initial entrance into the world, they are born again as warfighters and members of "The Forgotten Battalion."

During the island-hopping campaign, they are quickly hardened. On Gavutu, their 3-days-worth of rations

>1stLt Dooley was the Headquarters Platoon Commander and Fire Direction Officer, Romeo Battery, at the time of the battalion's deactivation.

cannot stretch 3 weeks. Food and water are gathered from the dead. Meals become a mix of wormy rice and taro roots. Hunger and hardship follow them to Guadalcanal, as enemy air superiority makes supply runs impossible. Wild horses rear in a crowded corral of concertina wire, and the Marines eye the sinewy haunches they hope to avoid eating.

The men go on to land at Tarawa, crowding the fantail to raise the bow and scrape a few yards closer to shore, Wilburn grabbing his piece of the howitzer and pushing aside the dead through chin-high water as the men fight toward what little ground has been prepared for them. From there it

is Saipan and Guam, where the men rain white phosphorous on a Japanese infantry battalion caught in a coral field. At D+2 they join their brothers on Iwo Jima. Few units can claim an origin as violent and frenetic, with roles in battles of such notoriety and in such a short span of time, as 5/10.

Following World War II, the battalion was deactivated, but like a phoenix or a wayward Christian, it is later born again. The battalion returns in 1954 where it will see little action until taking part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most recent incarnation occurs on 15 June 1978. Again the guns remain largely silent until the Marines of 5/10 are called up to Saudi Arabia as Operation DESERT SHIELD takes shape. As SHIELD becomes STORM, the battalion joins the artillery raid that crosses the Kuwait border and will again let off the first offensive rounds of a war. Gun 4 blows its engine before reaching its position, and as the remaining guns of



Battery S firing during predeployment training in September 2011. (Photo by PFC Ali Azimi.)

Battery Q fire and the ground thunders, those left in the pitch-black desert with a broken gun mistake outgoing fire for incoming artillery, and the gravity of war becomes instantly real.

“DESERT STORM was a rout,” says Cpl Jeffrey L. Pickering, with Battery Q. He continues:

The Marines of World War II knew they would be storming in mass and could expect high casualties. This was accepted and they still did it. The Marines of today deal with a non-uniformed enemy that is difficult to find and will use any means to cause damage.¹

In short, war changes, and as 5/10 prepares for actions in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan, they will have to change as well. Like any skilled fighting force, 5/10 remains flexible in its abilities while maintaining an unwavering foundation upon which those abilities and strengths are built and continuously restructured. As part of the initial invasion of Iraq, Marines of 5/10 fall in on maritime prepositioning squadron equipment and fight all the way to Tikrit. Later they will adjust and take over duties as provisional infantry, the commanding general’s personal security detail, and civil affairs. In Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, they serve as the Brigade Headquarters Group, 2d MEB, while deployed as part of Task Force Leatherneck. Throughout the war on terror, Marines from 5/10 are attached as observers and liaisons for infantry units and as members of teams sent to train various factions of Afghanistan’s army and police forces. The men of the “Five and Dime,” throughout the unit’s storied existence, have continuously surpassed evolving expectations across the ever-changing spectrum of conflict and mastered the skills necessary to raze, or raise, a city, as required.

In the end the battalion forms before the bleachers on W.P.T. Hill Field. It is 1 June and already hot and humid despite the early hour. As the band strikes up, the Marines march a wide rectangle to the beat of the bass drum, eyes snapped right and salutes crisply cut to the commanding officers. LtCol Walker M. Field calls for the battalion to retire the



Battery R gun crew during training. (Photo by LCpl Jeff Drew.)

colors, and the crowd watches as they would the public execution of a man unjustly sentenced; dignity, finality, and sadness accompany the graceful departure. The colors furl once more before being slipped into drab green sheaths and marched off the field, compelling

With a single word, the battalion is dismissed. It takes a step back, about faces, and is gone.

final salutes from all despite the fact that they cannot be seen or snap in the stiff breeze that has just picked up from the west. With a single word, the battalion is dismissed. It takes a step back, about faces, and is gone.

While the way in which wars are fought will continue to evolve, it is an unchanging breed of man who seeks it out; there will always be improvised games to pass the time, heavy things to throw at one another, girls to talk about, noses bloodied, egos bruised in good humor and, above all, a call to action and a sense of duty and brotherhood that is sought and embodied with the same fervor experienced by those drawn to serve a higher power.

As conflicts emerge and are resolved and the size of our forces expands and contracts in the oddly organic pattern of a breathing organism, there may well come a time when 5/10 is reactivated, and the story will pick up where it now leaves off. Young men and women yet unborn will be drawn to the coasts with the same knots in their stomachs that thousands upon thousands have carried before. Moreover, as they complete the final night hump of basic training, the headlights of some giant beast will play their shadows off the dense tree line at the road’s edge, a giant millipede that continues until the dark eats it up. The same shadow could have been cast by torches held atop elephants crossing the Alps. And in that moment they will become old and remember this night when all of their friends were still alive and the morning held great promise.

Note

1. Author interview with Jeffrey L. Pickering.

>Author’s Note: Special thanks to SgtMaj Ray V. Wilburn, USMC(Ret), and Jeffrey L. Pickering.



Civil-Military Operations

Déjà vu all over again: the CMO continuum in Marine Corps history

by Senior Enlisted Staff, Marine Corps CMO School

In his book, *Warrior Politics*, author Robert Kaplan writes:

The twentieth century was the last in history when humankind was mostly rural. The battlefields of the future will be highly urban terrains. If our soldiers cannot fight and kill at close range, our status as a superpower is in question.¹

According to Joel E. Cohen, professor of populations at Rockefeller University, by the year 2050, 85 percent of the world's populations will live in urban conditions.² What does this mean for America's future warfighters? Our most likely operating environment will not be mountain, jungle, or desert. It will be a city or other densely populated area. Operations in urban terrain come with several distinct challenges. As the German Wehrmacht discovered at Stalingrad in 1942, advantages in artillery or air support are negated. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines routinely saw how irregular troops can conduct ambushes and sabotage and then quickly fade into the general population. Civilians may participate in actions against our forces as direct combatants and auxiliaries or provide tacit and moral support. And, of course, combat operations in large population centers lend themselves to destruction of cultural and private property and frequent civilian casualties. An undeniable consequence to this trend is the necessity for all military personnel working in these environments to understand at least the basics of sound civil-military operations (CMO).

What Are CMO?

According to the Department of Defense (DoD), CMO are:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or ex-



Marines working as part of the Bangladesh Interoperability Program 2011. (Photo by Sgt Megan Angel.)

ploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, and consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs [CA], by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.³

While CA Marines or other military forces may be designated to perform CMO, the commander is ultimately

responsible for these types of operations in his area of operations. What this means is that *all* Marines can perform CMO, and it is the area commander's responsibility to see that it is executed in a professional and effective manner.

Most CMO fall within one of five Marine Corps core tasks. These tasks include populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA), manage civil information (CIM), and support to civil administration (SCA). Although they might not know it, most Marines have probably performed one or more of these tasks in the past. Establishing an entry control point is a type of PRC. Providing relief to earthquake victims in Haiti is FHA. Training foreign militaries like the Philippines, Georgians, or Afghans is part of NA. Creating iden-

ity cards for civilians using a biometric automated toolset is a form of CMO. Helping to repair local infrastructure like roads, bridges, or electrical stations is a type of SCA.

So then if this is CMO, what is CA? CA personnel are those designated Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Marines and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA operations and to support CMO. CMO is the “what,” while CA is the “who.” All Marines operating in the battlespace will undoubtedly encounter civilians to a greater or lesser degree. As a result these Marines will be conducting some form of CMO, even though they are not necessarily subject matter experts in this field; that is the role of the CA Marine. Just as every Marine is a rifleman, not all Marines are infantrymen. All Marines can participate in CMO, but not all Marines are trained in CA. Currently the Corps has AC CA detachments at 11th Marines, 10th Marines, and III MEF. There are also two RC CA Groups (CAGs), the 3d CAG at Camp Pendleton and the 4th CAG at Anacostia Naval Annex, VA. In addition to the AC detachments and the two RC CAGs, the Commandant has approved the Force Structure Review Group recommendation to add two additional RC CAGs.

History of CMO

As far back as ancient times, military forces were compelled to deal with civilians in conquered territories. Unless the invading military force simply wished to put all of the inhabitants to the sword and all cities and villages to the torch (a very fundamental version of populace and resource control), they had to execute some sort of administration of their territories. Territories within expansive and wealthy empires, such as the Persian, Greek, or Roman Empires, were conquered by force of arms but then had to often be administered by the same forces that conquered them in the first place. Rome, in particular, would garrison legions in different parts of the empire to protect its borders, patrol its highways, and maintain order among the civilian populations. This duty was



Marines and Bangladesh soldiers working side by side. (Photo by Sgt Megan Angel.)

very dissimilar to engaging large armies in the field but was, nonetheless, essential if the military victory was to have any lasting benefit.

Philippine Insurrection 1899

In insurrections, state-supported militaries engage rebellious militias, criminal organizations, insurgencies, and other entities that use the civilian population as a source of new recruits and material support. During these types of conflicts, properly executed CMO are essential to lasting success. In modern times our own Marine Corps history is replete with examples of effective CMO. During the last century, Marines conducted effective CMO in the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The conflict in Vietnam saw the development of the Combined Action Program. This was the brainchild of Marine Gen Lewis Walt. One of Gen Walt's instructors when he was a second lieutenant at The Basic School was none other than Chesty Puller, one of the preeminent irregular warfighters of the 20th century. Over the last 11 years the Corps has conducted extensive CMO in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marine Corps is no stranger to CMO or the types of irregular conflicts that require this specialized form of military operations. In fact we wrote the book on it—*The Small Wars Manual*. The Marine Corps' CA assets are force multipliers during these low-intensity conflicts. Rather than detracting from our lethal approaches to combat, professional CA personnel

increase effectiveness by informing the targeting cycle and improving the understanding of secondary and tertiary effects of lethal actions.

Marines and Civilians in Vietnam

Outside of combat operations, the Marine Corps has an impressive record in the area of FHA. Since the Corps is forward deployed around the world, it is often the first responder during natural disasters. With its capability to transport people and supplies by land, sea, and air, it is uniquely structured and equipped to assist in humanitarian operations worldwide. Recent examples of Marine Corps involvement in FHA include Operations SEA ANGEL (Bangladesh) 1991, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (Indonesian earthquake) 2004, UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti) 2010, Philippine mudslides, Pakistan earthquakes and, most recently, the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear relief effort in Japan.

Doctrinal Imperative

On 27 June 1994, the DoD issued *DoD Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs*. The directive states:

The Department of Defense shall maintain a capability to conduct a broad range of civil affairs activities necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD component responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout the range of military operations.⁴

This acknowledgement of the importance of CMO skills resulted in five core tasks being added to the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Universal Joint Task List. The Marine Corps then adopted them as Marine Corps tasks. They are enumerated as follows:

- 4.10.1.1-Facilitate PRC.
- 4.10.1.2-Facilitate FHA.
- 4.10.1.3-Facilitate NA.
- 4.10.1.4-Facilitate CIM.
- 4.10.1.5-Facilitate SCA.

CMO tasks are also mission essential tasks for MEBs. For the MEB command element, a core mission essential task is "plan and direct CMO." For the MEB ground combat element, core mission essentials tasks include "conduct stability operations, conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, conduct CMO, and conduct HA." One of the MEB logistics combat element's core mission essential tasks is "conduct CMO."

In order to ensure that Marines are properly trained to execute these tasks, the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued *Marine Corps Order 1200.17A, MOS Manual*, on 4 June 2009. This order requires all Marine CA officers to complete a Training and Education Command-approved CA program in order to hold the 0530 MOS. In the *U.S.M.C. Service Campaign Plan 2009–2015*, one of the Commandant's priorities reads, "We will better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments."⁵ This would have to include an increased institutional knowledge of CMO and CA capabilities.

Marine Corps Response

To improve the Corps' professional development of CA and CMO, the Marine Corps CA School was established in early 2009 at Marine Corps Base Quantico. Originally part of the Security Cooperation Education and Training Command, it has since been designated the Marine Corps CMO School. The school currently trains and qualifies all CA Marines, both officers and enlisted personnel (0530/0531), through a 4-week resident course. It also trains officers and senior enlisted personnel as CMO planners both during the MOS course and through a separate planners-only course. The school pro-



Cleaning up the area. (Photo by Sgt Megan Angel.)

vides mobile training teams for COIN leadership, stability operations, and CA employment, and to date has graduated over 425 MOS-qualified Marines in both the AC and RC. The majority of these have been active duty Marines. All instructors have several deployments as CA Marines, and the school continues to serve as a CMO center for excellence.

The Way Forward

As the operating environment in future conflicts will most likely involve large numbers of civilians, it is incumbent upon our current leadership to ensure that all Marines are properly trained in CMO. Although most Marines prefer the "standup fight" against another uniformed enemy, history has clearly shown that this is not the probable scenario we as warfighters will face. We need to be able to navigate and leverage the civil dimension of the battlespace in order to ensure success in combat and lay the groundwork for a smooth transition to a legitimate civilian authority. With regard to CMO, the Marine Corps is at a crossroads. It can improve upon what has been painfully learned during the last 10 years, or it can revert back to the old ad hoc approach to CMO. If the Corps follows through with its plan to stand up the two new CAGs, more MOS-qualified CA Marines will need to be trained to man these organizations. In the long

term, advanced CMO training should become part of the SNCO academies, and some introductory training should be provided at The Basic School with increased training at Expeditionary Warfare School and the Command and Staff resident and nonresident programs. All of this will require a professionalized cadre of instructors who can be leveraged from Marine Corps CMO School and the CA detachments and CAGs.

Notes

1. Kaplan, Robert, *Warrior Politics*, Random House, New York, 2001.
2. Cohen, Joel E., *World Population in 2050: Assessing the Projections*, Rockefeller University, New York, 2002.
3. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations*, Washington, DC, July 2008.
4. *DoD Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1994.
5. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009–2015*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.



Amphibious Warfare Conference, Department of State

A viable and flexible amphibious capability is necessary

by Gen Paul X. Kelley

First, I would like to thank each and every one of you for your participation in this important program. When Fred Haynes and John Conlin approached me some months ago with a “germ of an idea” for this meeting, I now regret that my reaction may have been less than enthusiastic. Like all Marines, however, we admit to our mistakes, and mine was to underestimate the professionalism and dedication of those who made these two days a reality. I thank them, one and all!

Even though it oftentimes doesn’t show, I have always been impressed by the important part which history plays in the development of our future. And, to emphasize this, I would like to share several quotes from yesteryear. [See box at right.]

It was the year 1976 that Washington was struck by an almost fatal disease which was sweeping the country. It was called the “heavy-up syndrome.” If you couldn’t wargame it on the Central Plains of Europe, then it had no relevance to a viable national strategy—or so they said! With that said, so were the often heard words, “Maritime operations are an anachronism.”

It was the year 1976 that a distinguished scholar, a respected expert on maritime operations, sat in my office at Quantico and told me, “Amphibious doctrine is woefully outdated.” I went to my desk, secured a copy of *LFM-01 [Landing Force Manual 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations]*, gave it to him, and said, “Show me where.” It should come as no surprise to learn that he

>Gen Kelley was the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1983–87. He gave this speech on 20 October 1982. It is still very relevant today.

“My military education and experience in the first World War has been based on roads, rivers and railroads. During the last two years, however, I have been acquiring an education based on oceans, and I’ve had to learn all over again. Prior to the present war, I never heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now, I think of little else.”

—George C. Marshall, 1943

“The amphibious landing is the most powerful tool we have.”

—Douglas MacArthur, 1950

“Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.”

—Liddell Hart, 1960

“The amphibious operation is a behemoth—a slow, ponderous relic of the past.”

—Nameless, faceless Washington analyst, 1976

had never seen—never touched, never read—the very document he was indicating as “being outdated.”

I have here in my hand a copy of *LFM-01*. Here it is—all you ever wanted to know and more about amphibious operations. Our bible! How many of you have ever read it? And, for those who have, when was the last time you cracked its covers? With minor changes, *LFM-01* is as valid today as it was on the day it was approved by all four Services some 15 years ago.

Each of you is here today for a different reason, but all, I hope, with a common goal—to better understand and improve our amphibious capability. Some may be here for profit, some for education, some just curious. But I sense that in the end you are all here to support or Navy/Marine Corps Team in this vital task.

In his opening remarks, Charlie Pier soll hit the nail right on its head. Four years ago he was nervous that the first program at Panama City would be a bust. What Charlie didn't say was that during this same period those of us who were concerned with the steady decline of our amphibious capability were in a state of shock. Let me be reflective for a moment. The Marine Corps was so destitute that it was facing a 10,000-man cut in end strength just so it could pay its bills. In August of 1979, we had not one amphibious ship in the first year shipbuilding program. MPS [maritime prepositioning ships] wasn't even a twinkle in an eye. OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] kept killing what turned out to be a hydra-headed pro-

gram—the AV-8B. Needless to say for those who were there, I could go on ad nauseum with a listing of program disasters, which, in the aggregate, left many of us to conclude that the Navy/Marine Corps capability to project power was “twisting in the wind.” How different we look today, just a few short years later. First, not only did we not lose our 10,000 precious Marines and reduce to below 180,000, but, as of today, we are over 194,000 and going to 203,000 by 1988.

LFM-01 is as valid today as it was on the day it was approved. . . .

If one were to believe the current SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] plan and the Extended Planning Annex, we will have a solid number of LSD 41 [Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship] class ships, LHD 1s [Wasp-class amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)], LCACs, and possibly LPD-Xs [amphibious transport dock] in the decade of the “80s.” The point is that as a part of the 600-ship Navy, we have included an amphibious lift capability for one MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] and one MAB [Marine Amphibious Brigade]. I might have mentioned the LCAC too quickly, for its importance cannot be overemphasized. It will be to the surface assault what the helicopter was for the vertical assault. It opens up new and significant horizons.



The AV-8B was just one example of the modernization of Marine aviation. (Photo by Cpl Gene Allen Ainsworth III.)

As if this isn't enough, with the recent signing of MPS convert and charter contracts, we now have a viable program to support three MPS brigades. As General Barrow has said, MPS is quite possibly the most innovative and dynamic program for the Navy/Marine Corps Team since the advent of amphibious operations.

Concerning the AV-8B, it was just a year ago that I spoke at the rollout of the first full-scale development model at MACAIR [McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Company], and currently we are looking to an inventory objective of 336. The AV-8B, F/A-18, CH-53E, and AH-1T are all examples of how we are modernizing Marine aviation to improve combat capability on the battlefield. Just over the threshold into the “90s,” we hope to have the JVX [joint vertical lift] to replace our aging medium lift helicopter force. This aircraft, based on tiltrotor technology, is under accelerated development and has the potential of increasing the speed of our vertical assault to speeds in excess of 300 knots!

On the ground side, it is equally exciting. In the next few years, we will increase the firepower of our infantry battalion by 25 percent, with a concomitant reduction of 10 percent in manpower. Moreover, we have just recently signed a contract for a light armored vehicle, which will provide our ground commanders with a significant increase in shock action, firepower, and mobility. In this regard, we hear a lot of rhetoric these days about a dynamic new concept known as maneuver warfare. I respectfully submit that the Navy/Marine Corps Team has, through a concept known as amphibious operations, been conducting a most sophisticated form of maneuver warfare for the past 207 years. Historians, please take note! If the concept of maneuver warfare means bringing the fight to the enemy—in simple words the spirit of attack—I lay claim to the fact that we are, indeed, the “duty experts.” Defense is a word alien to the lexicon of Marines, except as it relates to offensive operations.

President [Dwight D.] Eisenhower referred to the union of our military and



The light armored vehicle provided ground commanders with a significant increase in shock action. (Photo by Sgt Elyssa Quesada.)

industrial as the so-called “Military-Industrial Complex.” Unfortunately, this, to many, has taken on a sinister connotation. Personally, I would prefer to call it “The Military-Industrial Team.” Teamwork is what we must stress—you and I—and I would like to emphasize salient points of this essential team effort.

First, we in uniform must be totally honest and forthcoming in establishing our requirements. While they must manifest a capability to perform the task at hand, they must also be simple, straight forward, and above all, essential. In this day and age, all costs must be carefully weighed against the benefits derived. We cannot accommodate frills or marginal improvement. In simple language, we must stop “gold plating” and “nice to haves,” and live in a world of fiscal realities. We must cast our focus on the “doable” and stop wasting precious time and effort on the “ultimate dream.”

Second, those of you in industry must employ extraordinary costs and quality control measures. The days of “touching the brim of your cap” to cost overruns by blaming them on inflation are gone! If a program goes out of control with respect to cost, it immediately becomes a prime candidate for a vertical cut—and cut we will—I promise you! And, quality—a piece of equipment which goes to war must be perfect. The lives of young Sailors and Marines demand it. If our country asks them to lay their lives on the line,

they will, without hesitation, but your obligations are equally patriotic and demanding. The defense of our freedom is the responsibility of all Americans. For this reason, then, let quality be the absolute rule. There is no room for exceptions!

In closing, let me leave you with two thoughts—one provided by the recent Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Terence Lewin, in a speech before the Royal United Services Institute on 24 June, and the other by me in a speech prepared for presentation before the House Armed Services Committee in 1978. In his remarks, Admiral Lewin said:

You cannot produce confident highly skilled professional fighting men by keeping your aircraft on the ground, ships in harbor, or men and vehicles in barracks. You have got to fly in all weather, get to sea and stay there, and get out in rain, snow, mud, heat and never forget your job is to fight.

And mine:

When we Marines look at our responsibilities we see a map of the world. For anywhere on this map could be our battlefield of the future. Marines, in looking at this map, don’t see continents or the fact that 75% of the Earth’s surface is covered by water. We see approximately 272,000 miles of coastline. We see examples such as 34,000 miles of coastline in Europe and 31,000 miles in Africa. The reason we see coastlines is that these represent our most realistic battlefields of the future.

If you look at them carefully, you can’t help but feel awed by their diversity. You see frozen wastelands of the Arctic, precipitous cliffs and fiords of Norway, vast desert reaches of the Middle East, the diversity of terrain on the continent of Africa, tropical forests of the equator, and the rugged mountains of Korea.

This, then, gentlemen, is our challenge: To project and sustain essential combat power across the oceans of the world to every “clime and place.” With your help, and only with your help, can we give this Nation and the free world something it richly deserves—a viable and flexible amphibious capability.

Thank you.



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The Last Armada of Naval Gunfire Ships

The need exists for NGF capability

by Col Gerald H. Turley, USMC(Ret)

For over 75 years Marine Corps Operating Forces have relied heavily on a fleet of naval gunfire (NGF) ships moving just off distant shores. One immediately reflects back on their premier supporting role in the seizure of Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. These amphibious assaults could not have been successful without the Navy's NGF ships pounding the beaches and surrounding hills. For the assaulting Marines, this massive devastation was capable of destroying enemy emplacements just moments before the bow ramps dropped; the sights and sounds brought comfort to their searching eyes and ears. But the world's rapidly changing threats caused the U.S. Navy to reduce its small fleet of NGF ships. This decision, right or wrong, needs to be reflected on, and we need to fully recognize that a proven warfighting capability is gone.

The last armada of U.S. NGF ships came about at the close of the Vietnam War. President Richard M. Nixon's Vietnamization policy brought about the U.S. withdrawal of all its military forces from that war. The rapid downsizing had reduced our in-country forces from over 540,000 down to less than 140,000 by 1 March 1972. "Peace with honor" was the rule of the day as America, a badly divided Nation, sought to expeditiously close out a long-misunderstood conflict.

But wars and long-established plans and policies are often unexpectedly changed when opposing forces elect to change their own tactical strategy. This was the case when the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) leadership ignored the U.S. Vietnamization policy and launched their massive Easter Of-

>Col Turley is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Special Consultant to the Under Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Chief of Naval Operations. During 1972 Col Turley served as the Senior Military Advisor and directed battlefield operations to repulse the North Vietnamese Army during the Easter Offensive.

fensive on 30 March 1972 to capture all of South Vietnam. Both the U.S. and South Vietnamese leadership had been caught by surprise. The U.S. military was focusing on all measures to accelerate the drawdown of forces while the South Vietnamese civilian leadership was content with the diplomatic process to end the war. Both staffs' common

of these firebases was under attack and threatened to be overrun.

The NVA had timed its offensive to begin with the end of the monsoon season and while a prevailing overcast cloud layer remained low over MR-1. This prevented any tactical aircraft from flying low enough to discover and destroy their heavy concentrations of

"Peace with honor" was the rule of the day as America, a badly divided Nation, sought to expeditiously close out a long misunderstood conflict.

flaw was in not anticipating the NVA's change in strategy. They appeared to look only at the NVA's intentions, based on past history of maneuvering, and did not seriously analyze its increase in warfighting capabilities. The NVA cleverly changed its tactics from a guerrilla to a conventional warfare posture and roared straight across the demilitarized zone that divided the two nations.

The NVA skillfully executed a surprise 4-divisional attack, supported by nearly 1,000 artillery pieces and over 200 Soviet-made tanks. Earlier, when U.S. Marines of 3d MarDiv occupied this area of Military Region One (MR-1), they had built 10 major fire bases. Within hours the most northern line

artillery and tanks. At that time there was only one NGF ship steaming off the Cau Viet River that entered the South China Sea 5 miles from the city of Dong Ha. Within minutes of the enemy's first incoming artillery rounds on Fire Base Alpha-2, an NGF spot team requested gunfire support. CDR William J. Thearle moved his ship, USS *Buchanan* (guided missile destroyer, DDG 14), closer to the shallow shoreline and began what was to become an extraordinary 10 months of NGF support along the south coastline.

Tragically, the collapsing Army of the Republic of South Vietnam units necessitated the emergency evacuation of the spot team. A hasty plan was devel-



The Buchanan provided 10 months of NGF support along the coastline of South Vietnam. (Photo by author.)

oped and executed; regrettably, one Marine Corps officer was fatally wounded and one sergeant disappeared during the evacuation and was later declared missing in action. He remains missing to this day.

By 2 April other U.S. NGF ships joined the *Buchanan* on the firing line. The armada of NGF ships was growing, and NGF became a critical support weapon against the NVA forces within gun ranges. Figure 1 is a presentation of the manner in which the NGF ships would enter along the firing line and then fire from any of the 14 different points. An effective racetrack pattern was established for all ships to expedite movement into a fire position or steer out to replenish their ammunition lockers. The track became the routine for day and nighttime operations. The double green line reflects the range limitations of the DDG's gun. The spots along the track line represent firing positions. All ships would fire and then pull off the gun line to replenish their stores and return providing around-the-clock fire support. During one brief period, the cruiser *USS Newport News* (CA 148), with its 8-inch guns, salvoed enemy troop concentrations.

As the monsoon weather broke over Quang Tri Province, U.S. airpower was brought to bear on the NVA's conventional deployed forces. The NVA's multidivisional attacks ground to a halt after temporarily capturing Quang Tri City. The North Vietnamese leadership later stated that their offensive cost over

100,000 casualties. It was an intensive, hard-fought nationwide offensive that would last until the 27 January 1973 Ceasefire Agreement went into effect.

Throughout the final months of the war, U.S. NGF-equipped ships remained on station and provided vital support on calls for fires along the coastline. Sub Unit 1 of the 1st Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company NGF teams, commanded by then-LtCol Dwayne Gray, worked diligently to establish a series of predesignated positions where several ships could provide simultaneous support to the western flanks of the South Vietnamese forces as they moved north to recapture Quang Tri City. These ships fired an average of 1,100 to 1,400 rounds per day in supporting American advisors' requests.

During the last 10 months of the Vietnam War, the Navy's NGF ships,

the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam, and the Vietnamese Marine Division attempted to recapture Quang Tri City. On one occasion there were 14 ships delivering NGF in and around the city. Even the cruiser *USS Newport News* joined the armada and fired salvos into the rich enemy concentrations.

Moments before the 27 January 1973 ceasefire, the *USS Turner Joy* (DD 951) was requested to fire the last rounds of NGF into the Dong Ha beach area. With that the U.S. Navy ordered its many NGF-equipped ships back to the United States. Back in Washington, Congress declared a "peace dividend," and the Defense Department's budget was drastically reduced. For the Navy it meant reducing the fleet of nearly 400 ships. The decision was made to deactivate most of the DDGs and place them in the reserve mothball fleet. With this decision the Navy's NGF capability was reduced to a shadow of its former self—a condition that remains today. Table 1 is a copy of the Vietnamese Marine Corps' G-3 (Operations) advisor's log showing the monthly breakdown of NGF rounds fired.

Further, if there is a lesson learned here, it is that the volume of firepower (how many naval guns) is not the issue. The ability to execute precision strikes is the important issue. Now new technologies are entering Service inventories and can provide the few NGF ships in the fleet with precision kill capability at far greater distances than in 1972. Any future enemy will quickly learn that U.S. NGF in the 21st century can ac-



The USS Buchanan (DDG 14). (Photo from [wikimedia.org/wikipedia.U.S.Navy photo DNST9104197](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Buchanan_(DDG-14).jpg).)





Table 1. Naval gunfire expenditures. (From G-3 advisor's record of NGF support, June 1972–January 1973. Naval Gunfire Expenditures.)



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


Figure 1. The naval gunfire “race track.” (Illustration by author.)

curately strike its troops; its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence centers; and its equipment depots anywhere in the littorals. This knowledge will certainly affect the enemy's tactical planning and measures of approaching American forces—when NGF ships are just over the horizon.

Finally, we Marines must accept that the NGF of yesteryear is now gone forever. The Corps has always been the most adaptive of the Services, and the new challenge is to use the tools of new technologies to fill this gap of firepower with other means. Much of this has already been accomplished by the integration of global positioning systems, helicopter gunships, precision-guided munitions, laser designators, and 24/7 vision systems. Equally as significant is the utility of unmanned aircraft systems that can loiter over the battlefield, conduct surveillance, observe in realtime, and perform precision strike missions.

These new tools and other emerging technologies will be the most immediately available supporting arms systems of the 21st century.

The Navy needs to develop an NGS module. . . .

Additionally, with the constant advancements in technologies and changing environmental and socioeconomic conditions, warfare and its primary tools must also change. With the demise of NGF ships, other means, especially the newest technologies, must now be brought to bear. The Navy's littoral combat ships (LCSs) now arriving in the fleet are specifically designed to help defeat growing asymmetric littoral

threats and provide access and dominance in the coastal water battlespace. These ships can provide direct support to embarked MAGTF forces with their speed and capability to operate alone and close to any shoreline. In the era of insurgency/terrorist incidents, the LCS will provide Navy SEALs, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and Marine units a greater advantage for striking both fast and violently before arising conflicts are launched.

However, the LCS does not have an organic gun system capable of providing NGS. The ship is touted as a modular ship capable of accepting mission-specific modules. The Navy needs to develop an NGS module, perhaps modeled after the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency box-of-rockets concept, and the Marine Corps should consider how it might be able to deploy high-mobility artillery rocket systems when necessary from either the LCS or amphibious ships. In addition, now is the time to also seriously upgrade joint training and weave these technicalities and capabilities of the operating fleet of amphibious and LCS ships into every major fleet or live fire exercise. As with any new capability, a period of intense joint training must be undertaken to ensure the most timely and effective use of men and ships.

There are points to ponder now that this massive NGF capability no longer exists. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this situation:

- Short ranges of the guns limited the 1972 NGF support.
- The inaccuracy of the guns necessitated massive volumes of fire into targeted areas.
- Historic use of NGF for suppressive fires and harassment and interdiction was costly and often ineffective.

There will come a time, like the Easter Offensive, when every supporting arm must be employed to ensure complete success on any littoral battlefield.

Plan for it now.

A Study of Military Theory

Making *MCDP 1* accessible to junior Marines using
Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game*
by 1stLt Jordan A. Blashek & Cpl John S. Galloup

At some point in their careers, every Marine comes across *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1)*, *Warfighting*, the U.S. Marine Corps' doctrinal philosophy for how we think about war. Indeed, by the time a Marine has reached the rank of sergeant, he has probably been required to read *Warfighting* so many times that he is forced to suppress the inevitable groan as the next instructor or platoon commander places it on the required reading list. Yet it is important that every Marine, regardless of rank, reads and understands *MCDP 1* and the doctrine of maneuver warfare because it serves as the foundation for how we do business. Among other things, it provides a practical guide for leading Marines, a common language for tactical employment, and a particular way to think about combat, all of which makes the Marine Corps unique among Military Services.

Yet the brilliance of maneuver warfare and its relevance to the individual warfighter is lost if we cannot find a way to make the publication enjoyable (or even simply accessible) for younger Marines. The answer to this problem might lie in a popular science fiction book written in 1985 by a man who had never served day of his life in the military. Orson Scott Card's *Ender's Game* (A Tor Book, NY, 1977, 1985, 1991) vividly and accurately illustrates tactical principles and leadership traits that are described in *MCDP 1*. Easily readable and very engaging, *Ender's Game* brings the theory of maneuver warfare to life, especially for young Marines who

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"Experience has shown that the warfighting philosophy described on these pages applies far beyond the officer corps. I expect all Marines—enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it."

—Gen Charles C. Krulak, referring to MCDP 1



You can use fiction to teach MCDP 1 principles. (Photo by Cpl Ed Galo.)

can relate better to Ender Wiggin, the young military genius and protagonist of the book, than to a German theorist like Carl von Clausewitz. In fact, Maj John F. Schmitt, the author of *MCDP 1*, considered *Ender's Game* such a good study of leadership and tactics that he taught the book during lectures at the Marine Corps University in Quantico. With this in mind, we will use *MCDP 1* to analyze the tactical and leadership lessons found in *Ender's Game* to show the value in reading the two works side by side.

Set in a near future, *Ender's Game* begins with a united human race on Earth engaged in a decades-long war against an insect-like race called the Buggers. After repelling the Second Bugger Invasion 70 years ago, the military has been searching for a brilliant commander to lead the human's spacefleet against the Buggers, who nearly wiped out the human race in their last invasion. For years the military has been selecting child geniuses and training them at the Battle School through elaborate and technologically advanced wargames in order to turn them into military commanders. At the beginning of the book, Ender Wiggin is selected to attend the Battle School at the age of 6 and is immediately separated out by the instructors as potentially the most brilliant military mind ever seen, which quickly earns Ender the enmity of the other students. Tormented by the other students and challenged ruthlessly by the teachers, Ender is forced to rely on himself and a small core of loyal friends to survive and become a commander.

For the next few years Ender develops into a soldier at the Battle School by participating as part of mock armies in the battle room, a zero-gravity chamber designed to replicate different elements of combat. Through his creativity, intellect, and initiative, Ender develops novel techniques and tactical ideas that propel him to become the best soldier and leader in the school. Given command of Dragon Army, Ender develops his own soldiers by training them to be military thinkers rather than automatons simply executing rote formations and maneuvers. Based on decentralized command, Ender's combat leadership style relies

on mission intent and initiative-based tactics, which allows him to easily defeat other armies. Eventually, the teachers at the school begin to stack the deck against Ender in every way they can, pushing him to his breaking point. Yet, against increasingly skewed odds, Ender always manages to win using his style of maneuver warfare.

After graduating from the Battle School, Ender goes to Command School to learn to be a starfleet commander, where he becomes the student of the legendary commander Mazer Rackham. Having defeated the Buggers in the previous invasion, Mazer Rackham prepares Ender to face the alien race using a simulator that replicates starfleet combat. Ender eventually takes command of a fleet of squadrons led by his former friends and subordinates from the Battle School. While Ender believes he is simply learning on a simulator, he is actually fighting the real Buggers by controlling the human starfleet using

a new technology called the Ansible, a communications device that allows him to instantly control the starships across the galaxy. In what Ender believes to be his final exam at Command School, he destroys the Bugger home world and the entire Bugger fleet, eliminating the threat to the human race.

Perhaps the greatest value in reading *Ender's Game* side by side with *MCDP 1* is the insight it provides into the theory of maneuver warfare. According to *MCDP 1*, there are two distinct styles of warfare—attrition and maneuver. In attrition, we attempt to defeat the enemy through the complete destruction of his forces. Simply put, we pit our strength against the enemy's strength in an attempt to destroy him through superior firepower. In contrast, maneuver warfare seeks to destroy the enemy "system" by attacking enemy vulnerabilities in order to destroy the enemy's will to resist. We seek to pit our strengths against enemy weaknesses.

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
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
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in order to maximize advantage and exploit success. While both styles exist on a continuum and rarely ever in pure form, the styles reflect an approach to war—a way of thinking about combat and how to thrive in it.

In *Ender's Game*, we find vivid examples of both styles put into practice by various armies in the battle room. In Bonzo Madrid's Salamander Army, attrition warfare finds perfect expression in the rehearsed battle plans and mass formations that Bonzo uses to destroy his opponents. Through rigorous drilling and instant obedience to orders, the soldiers of Salamander learned to execute these complex formations and patterns in order to bring massive firepower to bear on the enemy. Even as a young soldier, Ender quickly realizes the weakness of this style, as he notes:

The well-rehearsed formations were a mistake. It allowed the soldiers to obey shouted orders instantly, but it also meant they were predictable. The individual soldiers were given little initiative. Once a pattern was set, they were to follow it through. There was no room for adjustment to what the enemy did against the formation.

Similarly, Ender is able to analyze the strengths of maneuver warfare in Pol Slattery's Leopard Army. In its battle against Salamander, Slattery's army uses quick and chaotic attacks in order to demoralize its enemy, who quickly forfeit the initiative and huddle together in the center of the battle room. Though both sides lost roughly the same number of soldiers in the battle, the Salamander Army "felt defeated," ultimately allowing Leopard to achieve victory. However, while Pol Slattery has interesting ideas on maneuver tactics, Ender notices that they are still immature. His army's movements were too uncontrolled and chaotic, resulting in unnecessary casualties and nearly losing him the battle.

Eventually, Ender receives command of his own army and implements tactical ideas and leadership principles that could have been lifted straight from the pages of *Warfighting*. Relying on decentralized control and initiative-based tactics, Ender develops Dragon Army into a nearly unbeatable unit, despite having the youngest and most inexperi-

enced soldiers in the school. In the battle room, Ender leads his army by providing intent and mission-type orders, then relying on subordinate leaders to make quick decisions as necessary in order to accomplish his desired end state. By giving subordinates the freedom to exercise initiative, Ender's army is able to take advantage of the chaotic and unpredictable nature of war. Specifically, his soldiers are able to rapidly identify opportunities and exploit advantages as the battle unfolds, in turn creating a tempo and fluidity that overwhelm the enemy's system. Based on these qualities, maneuver warfare finds near perfect expression in Dragon Army.

Ender's Game also provides young Marines with a clear example of two of the more difficult concepts in *MCDP 1*—centers of gravity (COGs)/critical vulnerabilities (CVs) and orienting on the enemy. To defeat an enemy system, maneuver warfare relies on the related concepts of COGs and CVs. A COG is an important source of strength that allows the enemy to impose his will on us. It may be an intangible factor, such as morale, or a specific capability, such as an armor column or fortified machinegun position. A CV is a weakness in the enemy system that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy's ability to resist our will. *Ender's Game* does a very good job of showing how these concepts can be used to fight an enemy. In his final battle against the Buggers, Ender defeats the enemy only after he successfully identifies the Bugger's CV—their unprotected planet where their queens live. By avoiding the enemy's COG—the massive Bugger space fleet—Ender annihilates the Bugger race by attacking the queens on the unprotected planet, eliminating their command and control system.

Similarly, as a young soldier in the battle room, Ender learns the principle that all combat is determined and decided in relation to the enemy. According to *MCDP 1*, "orienting on the enemy" is fundamental to maneuver warfare by focusing our attention outward rather than on our own internal procedures. By understanding the unique characteristics that make an enemy system

function, we can penetrate that system in order to disrupt its operation and destroy its component parts. When Ender first enters the battle room, he quickly figures out that there is no standard orientation in the chamber because of the zero-gravity effects. So he orients himself on the enemy and determines that "the enemy's gate is down." By doing so, Ender gains an advantage over everyone else for two reasons: (1) he is able to orient himself to his environment more quickly by focusing on the gate, and (2) the downward orientation places his feet toward the enemy, which creates a smaller target profile.

MCPD 1 further explains that we must try to "get inside" the enemy's thought processes and see the enemy as he sees himself. Ultimately Ender is chosen as a military commander for his unique empathy, which allows him to understand his enemies better than anyone else. In his last battle with the Buggers, he uses this understanding of his enemy to attack the Bugger planet, a course of action he knew the Buggers had never considered possible. Yet, overwhelmed initially by the enemy's COG, it is not until one of his subordinates reminds Ender that the enemy's gate is down that he reorients himself on the enemy and finds their CV.

The approach we have taken in this article is that *Ender's Game* serves as a valuable tool for making *MCDP 1* and the theory of maneuver warfare more accessible to junior Marines. But the reality is that the leadership principles and tactical lessons contained in the novel have something valuable for Marines of all grades. We strongly recommend that leaders use *Ender's Game* to teach their Marines about *MCDP 1* and maneuver warfare. Often, to fully grasp a concept, we need to see it in practice, and *Ender's Game* provides us with a dramatic example of maneuver warfare in action.



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Women in Combat

The bogus old arguments rise again (a rebuttal)

by Maj Amy "Krusty" McGrath

Twenty years ago a major debate ensued on the national stage about the role of women in the Armed Forces. The Service Chiefs at the time mostly advocated for the continued ban on women serving in combat positions. When it came to the issue of women serving in combat aviation, the prevailing argument was that women did not have the physical strength required to fly certain airframes. They speculated that women could not pull the G-forces required and would be unable to make it through the rigorous training. Nevertheless, Congress rescinded the "combat exclusion law," and the Services opened some previously barred positions to women, including aviation and most naval ships. We have reached another time period of debate and change. Now is the time for the Marine Corps to embrace the opportunity to open more positions to women.

The basis for excluding women from ground combat positions lies in Department of Defense (DoD) policy, not in statute, thus the DoD holds the power to change the policy. From a legal perspective, DoD must simply inform Congress of any change to its existing policy. In the Marine Corps, application of the ground combat exclusion policy results in women being denied the opportunity to serve in the infantry, artillery, tanks, and assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) MOSs. Despite being only 8 percent of MOSs in the Corps, these four MOSs consist of almost 25 percent of the total positions Marines fill.¹

Clear "frontlines" on the battlefield in the past 10 years have not existed, and arguably all MOSs, including those with females, will continue to be in harm's way. In addition, new critical skills have placed many women front and center in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq causing the restrictions placed

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DoD has the power to change the policy excluding women from ground combat positions.
(Photo by Evan Isentein-Brand.)

on women in traditional ground combat positions to be reassessed.

In response to the increasing suggestions to open up MOSs currently not available to women, numerous studies in the last few years have all come to the same conclusion: The DoD policy is not suited for operations in today's wars.² Keeping women out of direct-combat units and combat-related specialties hurts career opportunities for women, and the restrictions on women serving in combat roles should be eliminated.

The overall consensus is that women should be able to fill all roles in the military as long as they are capable and qualified for the job.³

Over the past few years the Marine Corps has tap danced around the ground combat exclusion policy by placing female Marines in assignments such as the Lioness Program and female engagement teams, effectively circumventing the outdated "collocation" policy. Most commanders in the field found the combat exclusion rule

restricted combat effectiveness because a commander is legally prohibited from attaching female Marines to units that might need their skills. Furthermore, to say that females *can* collocate in engineer, communications, logistics, and aviation detachments but not with members of an infantry company no longer matches the needs on the ground.

Instead of fighting policy change, the Marine Corps should *embrace the abolishment of the collocation policy*. This would eliminate an inconsistent policy that damages a commander's operational flexibility to assign the best Marine to any unit based on his/her skills. The Corps should *open the MOSs of artillery, tanks, and AAVs to women immediately*. Ironically, for the past 15 years in the Marine Corps, a female Marine can fly an F/A-18 in combat but cannot drive a tank. If collocation is no longer an issue, then there is no reason a woman could not do these jobs. Is driving a tank or an AAV more physically taxing than pulling seven Gs in a fighter jet? Twenty years ago then-Commandant Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr., declared that removing the ban on women in the combat arms would "harm combat effectiveness and distract male Marines."⁴ We see these same old arguments in recent commentaries on this topic.⁵ Facts simply do not support this prejudice. For example, women are fully integrated into aviation squadrons and have flown combat missions in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM over the past 10-plus years of war lockstep with their male counterparts. None of the fears presented by the likes of Gen Gray came to fruition. Similarly, opening artillery, tanks, and AAVs to women will not cause the fear-based disruptions that skeptics predict.

The Marine Corps should be the first Service to open the infantry to women. This is arguably the most concerning step to some Marines. By opening the other three combat arms MOSs first, the Corps could use many of the lessons learned as it develops a plan for opening the infantry. The infantry is no doubt a tough profession. It is physically demanding and not everyone has what it takes, neither does everyone (male or female) want to do these jobs. The key to successfully integrating women is

maintaining clear standards. However, determining those standards may take some study. Not all effective performance on the battlefield is accurately measured by being able to do 20 pullups. For example, there are stellar Marines who can score 300 on the physical fitness test (PFT), yet after 48 to 72 hours of little sleep and no food, they are rendered completely ineffective, while some women are able to endure much better in that sleep- and food-deprived environment. These types of tests in training (e.g., survival school), along with the performance of women who have fought in combat, reveal that effectiveness in harsh conditions and in ground combat is not necessarily dependent upon one's race, background, or even gender.

Forcing the same PFT standards for all Marines regardless of gender is often an argument given in the context of the women in combat debate. The PFT is an administrative test given to Marines to measure general health and fitness. The PFT is not a unique test taken to become an infantry Marine. We don't make a 6-foot 5-inch male Marine fit into the same height/weight standards as a 5-foot 5-inch male Marine because we recognize that there are differences in weight that will be based upon one's height (and gender for that matter). We don't determine that all infantry Marines have to be 6-feet tall because height doesn't determine performance as an infantry Marine. We don't have standards for our pilots to have to do 15 or 20 pullups because pullups don't determine one's ability to fly a combat aircraft. Much like the Corps' height/weight standards, administrative measurements (like the PFT and height/weight) do not necessarily test one's ability to perform in any given MOS.

SgtMaj David K. Devaney, the author of "Women in Combat Arms Units: We're not culturally ready," cites a study that has no research applicability to combat stresses and mental health for either gender. Furthermore, he attempts to extrapolate from scientific data obtained using an instrument that is more than 20 years old. What we have learned about the prevalence of depression in both men and women, as well as the impact of combat stress on both

genders, has clearly changed in the last 20 years. The understanding of mental health before and after combat is evolving. There are no controlled studies that look at mental health in men or women as a precursor to combat tolerance. Recent news and medical literature is full of references that speak to the need for more mental health research with regard to combat stress. No one is arguing that women have the same physical strength as men, not even the "feminists," but there is no evidence whatsoever at this time to connect the issue of women doing certain MOSs with mental health.

Even if one acknowledges the random stories of failed integration from 20 years ago, such as those cited by SgtMaj Devaney, the facts are that we have already successfully opened a large-scale combat arms MOS to women. We did it in Marine aviation. Clearly in the 15 years since women began flying combat aircraft, we have learned that the testimony in 1991 claiming women couldn't fly fighter jets was inaccurate. We've found that it does take a great deal of strength and endurance to fly certain airframes and that, in fact, there are some women who can't sustain the G-forces, just as there are some men who can't. Some men get airsick while some do not. The same holds true for women. Because the standards are solidly set (such as swim qualifications in early aviation training all the way to night carrier landings at the end of a jet pilot's training), some people will meet those standards and some will not. Success is not gender dependent. Most importantly, because the standards have been clearly articulated, the product of that training is known by all to be ready for the position and worthy of the job. If clear qualifying standards to become an infantry Marine can be determined, then even the infantry can be opened to women who qualify. *Having the same training standards for everyone to make the cut in that MOS is a must.*

The issue of women in combat is not going away. The current new policy opening up more assignments for women Marines is a step. However, the practice of placing a female with a combat service support MOS in combat arms battalion staffs is not full integration and should not be treated as such.

Doing so is akin to claiming one has opened fighter squadrons to women by allowing them to be intelligence and maintenance officers but not pilots. In addition, the current attempt by the Marine Corps to “study” how women perform in infantry school is also flawed. The Marine Corps is allowing women to volunteer to attend infantry school, yet these volunteers will not be awarded the MOS upon successful completion of the school. The Marine Corps must, at a minimum, award the infantry MOS to these women.

We have female Marines who can do these ground combat arms MOSs. We can recruit more. The same arguments that women don’t “desire” to go into ground combat MOSs were heard 20 years ago, particularly when it came to fighter aviation.⁶ The most difficult thing for a young female entering the military to do is to become a U.S. Marine, and yes, (like 15 or 20 years ago) there will be some women who will be

attracted by these challenges. Of all of the Services, we are fortunate enough to have the reputation to attract the brightest and the toughest-minded women into our ranks. We should be the Service that leans forward and propels these elite women into these positions first.

Let’s not dwell on the same old prejudices from 20 years ago, but let’s look at what our female Marines have done since. The Marine Corps should open the combat arms of artillery, tanks, and AAVs immediately. With a proactive opening of these three combat arms MOSs, the leadership of the Corps could ensure that solid standards are in place so the lethality of the Marine infantry is neither diminished nor compromised.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2011*, Programs and Resources Department, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 316 and 321.

2. RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women*, Arlington, VA, 2007.

3. Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Service 2009 and 2010 Reports, available at <http://dacomits.defense.gov/Reports>.

4. Senate Armed Services Committee on Manpower and Personnel Hearing, “Restrictions on Women in Combat,” 18 June 1991, available at <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/18459-1>.

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6. Ibid.





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
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A Company Grade Officer's Rejoinder

Make PME compete for the top tier

by Capt Sean Barrett

In “The Officer PME Continuum” (*MCG*, Jun12), Col William F. Mullen III focuses on the importance of officer education, self-study, and professional growth, and provides a comprehensive series of recommendations in order to help the Marine Corps avoid a “decline in the intellectual ethos that has enabled the success we have enjoyed over the past several decades.”¹ That his recommendations are grounded in over two decades of experience and dedication to the Marine Corps is undeniable. However, the colonel’s recommendations do not logically follow from his statement of the problem and desired end state because he overlooks the crucial differences between training and education. The colonel exacerbates this mistreatment by stressing uniform standards—the antithesis of *self*-study—over an individual pursuit of knowledge. In doing so, Col Mullen reinforces the very same acceptance of baseline minimum standards that his recommendations are ostensibly designed to help the Marine officer corps overcome.

Instead of uniformity, the Marine Corps should encourage more diversity in educational backgrounds and outcomes among its officers—for example, by leveraging civilian graduate school programs, even in lieu of Service schools—in order to harness the initiative of its officer corps. This will not only benefit Marine officers at the individual level by providing them with more challenging educational environments and more renowned graduate degrees, but will also benefit the Marine Corps as a whole by increasing its diversity in thought and providing a more effective signaling mechanism that the Marine

>Capt Barrett is an intelligence officer and is part of the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program. (See MarAdmin 703/11.) He recently graduated from NIU and is currently assigned to the Treasury Department in the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes.



We need to encourage more diversity in educational programs. (Photo by LCpl Ian M. McMahon.)

Corps can utilize to better evaluate the initiative, performance, and future potential of its officers.

What Is Education?

Col Mullen bases the apparent need for his proposed program of study on the notion that today’s “increasingly complex” operating environment demands Marine officers who are able to think more critically and creatively.² It is ironic then that his proposed program of study is comprised almost exclusively of doctrinal publications and MarineNet courses, culminating in a “competitive exam” that would serve as a filter for resident professional military education (PME). By definition, *doctrine* means that first principles

have already been identified and one simply needs to become well versed in and accept them, while MarineNet courses followed by an exam imply rote memorization of what someone else has already determined to be the “correct” answer. This constitutes training—or the development or formation of habits, thoughts, or behavior—not education. Education refers to the act or process of developing the powers of reasoning and judgment. Answers sought are not necessarily already known, and the process of seeking answers and challenging established thought is of as much value as that which is learned. Col Mullen, however, never makes this distinction. His statement of the problem seems to imply a need for more *education* for

Marine officers, yet his recommendations instead constitute *training* and suffer as a result.

The Problem With More Training Requirements

Col Mullen claims that little has been done to institutionalize self-study programs. However, this assertion overlooks the fact that PME is already a metric by which officers are judged on their respective fitness reports and that reporting seniors have the ability to hold accountable those officers who do not pursue learning as a “continuous and life-long endeavor.”³ Currently, reporting seniors have the autonomy to tailor PME to their individual officers’ learning styles and MOSs and their unit’s operational constraints. That some officers fail to spend adequate time in self-study and their reporting seniors allow this to occur goes without saying in an organization as large as the Marine Corps, but a lack of institutionalized

requirements and documentation is not in itself proof that such shortcomings are widespread, as the colonel contends. Additionally, officers who require even

Levying additional training requirements on Marine officers reinforces a mindset that simply meeting the baseline requirements is “good enough.”

more handholding are likely not the officers a downsizing Marine Corps should be targeting to retain in the first place.

Levying additional training requirements on Marine officers reinforces a

mindset that simply meeting the baseline requirements is “good enough.” Rather, the Marine Corps should provide an open-ended criterion toward which officers can strive and use to differentiate themselves from their peers. Facing the need to ensure that enough of its officers meet mandated training standards, there will be a tendency in the Marine Corps to teach to and write competitive exams for the bottom quintile, further discouraging creative thought and professional curiosity. The effects of the imperial literary examination system on Imperial China prove relevant in this regard. While the examination preserved the cultural unity and political stability of China, it also impeded originality and experimentation.⁴

PME under Col Mullen’s proposed program of study will be less tailored to the needs of the individual Marine officer, and a situation will be perpetuated wherein some officers receive too

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
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Encourage more education and make PME compete for students. (Photo by Cpl Jovane M. Henry.)

much training and education and others too little for their given ability levels. While the Marine Corps promotes on the basis of time in service and date of rank, and enforces a large degree of equality among its members, the Corps should incentivize its officers to seek more education by providing them with *more* autonomy in this pursuit, thus providing officers another vehicle by which to signal competence and future potential to the institution.

Recommendations: Encouraging Diversity in Thought (and Outcomes)

If the Marine Corps accepts that the first element of a successful program in PME is imparting an ability to think critically and creatively,⁵ then it should encourage more education and not simply more training. In this regard, 1st Lt Jesse Sloman's article, "Toward the Ivory Tower: Providing civilian education options for Marine officers," (*MCG*, Mar12) proves relevant. Increasingly, leveraging civilian graduate programs provides officers with more renowned (thus, likely more respected by civilian interagency peers) degrees upon their graduation and increases the officers' exposure to a more competitive academic environment and different opinions and points of view, thereby building the healthy negative entropy of the Marine officer corps.⁶ 1st Lt Slo-

man's recommendations, however, view civilian graduate education as merely a complement to military training and education. A more radical idea would entail civilian graduate degrees serving as substitutes instead.

In Gen Charles E. Wilhelm's 2006 study on officer PME (*U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings*, Marine Corps University, Quantico), the authors note that the second crucial element to a successful program in PME is "the ability to draw from a breadth and depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines."⁷ However, the authors also note that this has resulted in staff and war colleges attempting to "teach everything—the 'Pecos River approach,' a mile wide and an inch deep."⁸ Current joint PME (JPME) curriculum, unfortunately, does not seem to have changed much since the time the study was conducted and features a core curriculum heavy on current events, global trends, and buzzwords, and light on theory and functional or regional expertise—in short, a diluted international relations degree.⁹ Similarly, quarter-long classes on a specific region or religion hardly make one an expert in the field. In order to capture expertise of sufficient breadth and depth, the Marine Corps should not try to make all of its officers generalists in every field. Rather,

leveraging the basic economic principle of comparative advantage, the Marine Corps should encourage its officers to pursue studies in the field in which they most excel. Doing so will increase both the quality and quantity of expertise resident in the officer corps as a whole.

Building on the recommendations proffered by 1st Lt Sloman, another way to incorporate civilian graduate school programs into Marine officer education would be to afford those officers eligible for resident staff and war college education (and possibly Expeditionary Warfare School, even though it is more akin to training) the opportunity to apply to civilian graduate schools prior to the selection board's convening. The board would receive a quota of civilian graduate school positions to fill and would evaluate an officer's candidacy based not only on his professional accomplishments, but also on the quality of the school to which he has been accepted and on the proposed subject of study.¹⁰ Current fellowship programs at elite universities and corporations might be used as a model but would be significantly expanded.¹¹ Resulting differences in educational experiences and outcomes will not only foster more diversity in thought and leverage the principle of comparative advantage to build the expertise of the officer corps, but will also provide officers with the opportunity to self-select and pursue the course of study that most interests them.

Additionally, the Marine Corps can leverage civilian graduate school programs' abilities to evaluate the totality of a prospective student's curriculum vitae in order to better evaluate the past accomplishments and identify the future potential of its own officers—something most large corporations in the private sector already do. The Marine Corps would not treat all graduate degrees as the same and weigh the resulting degree from graduate education—be it from a civilian or Service school—as an end or "check in the box" in itself. Rather, the resulting degree would serve as another way of differentiating between the quality of the Corps' officers. Increasing the number of ways to evaluate officers is a task that will only become increas-

ingly more important given current downsizing requirements and the incredibly experienced and accomplished officer corps that has been produced in the past decade's global war on terrorism.¹² I acknowledge that such investments in human capital might not be so readily quantifiable, thus justifiable, and that funding education in such a manner does not demonstrate the same economies of scale as relying solely on Service schools does. However, forcing the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College and War College to compete for the top tier Marine officer might also improve the quality of education they provide and further incentivize their efforts to become "world class."

The Marine Corps' unrivaled technological warfighting capabilities are only as good as the Marines who employ them, and the individual Marine is still the Corps' most precious asset and should be invested in accordingly. An officer corps that has risen to meet the challenges of a decade-long deployment cycle needs to be similarly challenged in the classroom, not have their hands held. After all, education that "inculcates both creative and critical thinking demands an approach that does not spoon-feed the students."¹³

Notes

1. Mullen III, Col William F., "The Officer PME Continuum," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 2012, p. 46.
2. Ibid. I note that implicit in Col Mullen's argument, and Marine Corps PME in general, is an assumption that education in fact develops critical and creative thinking abilities and that academic achievement is not simply a signal for such abilities. I, however, will operate within the colonel's chosen parameters.
3. Wilhelm, Gen Charles E., USMC(Ret); Lt-Gens Wallace C. Gregson, Jr., USMC(Ret), Bruce B. Knutson, Jr., USMC(Ret), and Paul K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.; and Williamson Murray, *U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings*, Marine Corps University, Quantico, 2006, p. 12.
4. Cressey, Paul F., "The Influence of the Literary Examination System on the Development of Chinese Civilization," *American Journal of*

Sociology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, September 1929, pp. 250–262.

5. Wilhelm, et al., p. 16.
6. Ibid., p. 12. The authors note the perils of a closed system, which inevitably tends toward disorder or uncertainty. In contrast, an open system can build negative entropy and forestall this disorder.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 16.
9. I recently attended the National Intelligence University (NIU), which is in the process of becoming an accredited JPME I institution and uses the core JPME I curriculum to serve, in large part, as its own core curriculum. I note that admissions standards to Service and government schools are also much less academically strenuous than those for elite civilian graduate school programs. For example, NIU only requires a 500 verbal score (and no math score) on the graduate record examination—a requirement that can simply be waived—and nothing else. The faculty at NIU also features a significant number of faculty who do not hold doctorate degrees.
10. I accept that current joint qualification requirements would still force those officers selected for this program to complete the non-resident offering of a staff or war college so as not to put themselves at a disadvantage against their peers. However, this proposal should be billed as a pilot program that will eventually allow civilian graduate education programs to serve as substitutes for Expeditionary Warfare School and JPME requirements in the future, thus creating a mixture of generalists and specialists in the officer corps.
11. I also acknowledge the special education program and foreign area officer program, which provide similar functions. However, even they would have to be significantly expanded and still lack the diversity in thought and academic competitiveness of civilian graduate school programs.
12. I acknowledge that officers can currently differentiate themselves by taking graduation education classes on their own but note that billet requirements and an inability to be a resident student at many potential schools drastically limits their options.
13. Wilhelm, et al., p. 16.



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Want Tough, Independent Warfighters?

Then treat them like it

by Capt Daniel W. Nidess

LtGen Krulak's quote lies at the heart of what we depend on to guide our Marines' decisions and actions. In the absence of everything else, this belief drives a Marine to do his duty in war; it is also what we hope will guide him to behave like a responsible adult in garrison. For this to be an effective driving force, though, Marines have to actually believe that they *are* better and different than both their counterparts in the other Services and their civilian peers. For them to believe it, we have to treat them like it.

In combat we generally do an outstanding job of giving Marines our intent and then giving them the freedom to decide how to meet it. Leaders as junior as corporals are given the trust and authority to lead their Marines outside the wire and to fight them as they best see fit to accomplish their mission. We trust, and expect, Marines of every rank to employ their weapons in accordance with the engagement criteria and rules of engagement on their own initiative, and not to ask for permission. In garrison, though, this trust disappears. Mentorship and confidence in our Marines' abilities to meet our intent is being steadily replaced by a growing body of standardized, impersonal classes and regulations on how they

"Marines are convinced that, being few in number, they are selective, better, and, above all, different."¹

—LtGen Victor H. Krulak

conduct their daily lives. We need to reverse this trend, replace the check-in-the-box classes with NCO and junior officer mentorship, and trust our Marines' abilities to conduct themselves in a manner that meets our expectations. At the same time we need to adjust our expectations away from the zero-defect goal we seem to be striving for and accept that, in an organization

as large as ours, we are going to have those who fail to meet our standards. This is inevitable. We cannot mandate right behavior to everybody all the time; that defies human nature. What we can do is ensure that those who do fail to meet our standard are dealt with appropriately, and that the standard of the Corps is maintained without destroying the independence and trust that are



We have given our Marines the trust and authority to lead in combat. (Photo by author.)

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essential to a warfighting organization that prides itself on decentralization and individual initiative.

We Do Not Trust Our Marines

In combat we treat our Marines with a greater degree of trust, confidence, and latitude than any other Service, yet while in garrison we treat them with less trust, confidence, and latitude than we treat the average civilian. It is as if the Marines whom we expect to decide whether another human lives or dies cannot be relied on to drive their cars legally. Instead of trusting our Marines to ensure that they have a license and that their cars are registered and insured, units verify and track these documents as if our Marines are not capable of meeting this standard that every American adult is expected to meet on their own. In III MEF, any Marine who wants to engage in mixed martial arts now needs to get permission and an operational risk analysis from his commander.² The crosswalks at Marine Corps Base Quantico have grown pedestrian crossing signs, and then added flashing lights in areas where the speed limit is 25 miles per hour. Running Marines are required to wear reflective belts in the middle of the day. Can we really not count on Marines to not run each other down without all of this? Do we really need base orders to include chapters on safety precautions for mowing grass, a mundane activity that most of us did safely as kids?³ Do commands really need to train Marines in accordance with Navy Bureau of Medicine orders before letting them do a barracks burger sale?⁴ If we can trust our Marines' judgment to meet our intent in combat, why can we not trust their judgment at home without an overwhelming number of regulations and precautionary measures?

This overboard approach to safety systematically undermines Marines' belief that they are selected and better than their peers in the civilian world. When we manage the most basic aspects of their lives as if they are still children, the words *trust* and *confidence* ring hollow. The message it sends is that they

are not trusted to make the most basic decisions on how they live their lives, that the "difference" in being a Marine is less the difference of shouldering additional responsibility and more the difference of being treated with less trust than a civilian.

to completion, and the random NCO or officer from outside a Marine's immediate chain of command or, worse yet, a civilian safety specialist, holds little influence. And while NCOs and officers do need to be held accountable for mentoring their Marines, it needs


Some might argue that Marines' immediate leaders fail to provide sound mentorship, so it falls upon higher headquarters to ensure that it gets accomplished through the use of standardized classes and rosters.

Being a Responsible Adult

Most newly enlisted Marines leave directly from their parents' homes to the highly controlled environments of recruit and MOS training. Brand new Marines typically have little or no experience as independent adults. Some come from environments where their parents were poor role models. All of this raises the argument that they *don't* know how to act when given independence. In everything from personal finances to behavior when off-duty to how to maintain healthy relationships, Marines need counseling and mentorship. However, we are missing the mark on how we provide this guidance. MarineNet classes are not the answer. Neither are mass classes by random Marines from outside the chain of command. This is not mentoring. Real mentoring happens "knee to knee" from the Marine's immediate superiors—his fire team and squad leaders and his platoon and company commanders. These are the men who have earned his respect and who he knows will be the ones to hold him accountable if he fails to meet their expectations.

Some might argue that Marines' immediate leaders fail to provide sound mentorship, so it falls upon higher headquarters to ensure that it gets accomplished through the use of standardized classes and rosters. We are deluding ourselves if we think that these are actually accomplishing the intent. MarineNet classes and PowerPoint slides get rapidly clicked through

to be by their immediate superiors, not by an attendance roster that gets turned into a report for Headquarters Marine Corps. When the emphasis becomes the roster, the focus shifts to checking the box.



Marines Do Reckless Things

Taking risks is in the nature of the people we attract and, moreover, the people whom we need. Writing of his experiences as a battalion surgeon with the Royal Army in World War I, Lord Moran observed that the truly effective soldiers he encountered were:

... a breed of men who do not seem to fit into the structure of society; these men are vaguely discontented with the vast inhuman life of cities . . . its daily stress on the need of security; they find in the army at least an alternative to the prison life of great towns. . . .⁵

The Marine Corps acknowledges this trait; it is apparent in our recruiting, which seeks to promise that “alternative to the prison life of great towns” and to attract those who are willing to run to the sound of the guns.

We need to accept that some Marines, being young, hotheaded and, to a large degree, adventure seekers, are going to get into trouble. There are going to be Marines who hurt themselves fighting in mixed martial arts events, lose some hearing cutting grass, and maybe someday, somewhere in the vast acres occupied by Marine Corps bases, get run over in the middle of a sunny day because they were not wearing reflective belts. Give them mentorship, make it known that there are more resources available if they want them, and then trust them to meet your intent.

Trust and Accountability

Increased freedom and trust needs to be balanced by strict enforcement of the standards when they are breached. Be they Marines who, through demonstrated irresponsibility, need to have their personal lives more directly managed by their NCOs or those who violate our laws and regulations, Marines need to be held accountable. If they are incapable of meeting the standard then they need to be cut from the Service, regardless of the years they may have served. The nature of elite organizations is not to talk about high standards, it is to maintain them.

Hand in hand with this policy is the need to hold leaders accountable. Officers and SNCOs who cannot mentor their Marines or enforce the standards



Reflective belts will be required when they return to garrison. (Photo by SSgt Robert Storm.)

need to be viewed the same as those who are not tactically or technically proficient; i.e., as incompetent. The rosters submitted up the chain seek to hold leaders accountable, but again, it is a case of form over function. Instead of holding leaders accountable, they actually only give poor ones an easy way out. Effective supervision doesn't happen on an Excel spreadsheet, it happens by getting out of the office and talking to our Marines. Commanders can check to see if their subordinates are effectively mentoring their Marines the same way they check to see if they are giving effective operations orders, by listening in on them or asking the Marines questions about the relevant issue. Similarly, when Marines fail to meet the standard, as some are bound to do, the emphasis needs to be on their leaders holding them accountable for their failure. By asking “did he get the class?” instead of “what did you do about it?” we absolve leaders of their responsibility to actually enforce standards and replace it with the responsibility of checking the box. The solution to leaders who cannot enforce the standards is the same as it is with the junior Marines who cannot meet the standards—remediate them and, if unable to be remediated, replace them.

When a Marine proves unreliable and fails to meet our standards we need to deal with him accordingly, but right now we have it backward. Because some Marines inevitably prove themselves irresponsible, we are essentially

assuming that they all are irresponsible before we have given them a chance to prove themselves. We need to reverse this trend, while simultaneously holding our subordinate leaders accountable for enforcing the standards, not for filling out rosters. The alternative is that we continue to propagate a lack of trust and a checklist mentality toward standards, with the end result that our character as a decentralized warfighting organization will be replaced with that of a centralized bureaucracy.

We Exist to Fight

Do we really expect that a Marine who has to ask permission before participating in martial arts is going to believe that we trust him to make the decision to end another man's life? Do we really expect that a commander who has spent his career conducting operational risk analyses for his Marines' recreational activities is going to suddenly turn into a bold combat leader willing to take risks with his Marines' lives? Do we really expect that Marines will honestly maintain an “unyielding conviction that we exist to fight”?⁶ It is hard to continue telling Marines this when upon arrival to their first combat zone they are confronted with the sight of Camp Leatherneck—a base where we do not even trust them with loaded weapons.

The fact is that, although we do still do an outstanding job of trusting our Marines in the field, this trust is in jeop-

ardy. From being more concerned with the possibility of a negligent discharge than the Marines' ability to defend themselves to taking the decision on minimum patrol sizes away from the local commanders, the trust we place in our Marines and our junior leaders to make decisions is fading. In its place is a growing trend of micromanagement and risk aversion. This mindset starts in garrison, where Marines spend the bulk of their time and where their habits are built. As we continue to draw down our presence in Afghanistan and our attention refocuses on garrison life and noncombat deployments, we need to ensure that our emphasis is on developing a Corps of tough, independent warfighters.

MajGen John A. Lejeune's quote that "[t]he relation between officers and enlisted men . . . should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son . . ." should not be misinterpreted to mean that we should treat our Marines like children who must be

safeguarded from life.⁷ Rather, it should be the relationship between a father and the now-grown sons and daughters they are. Mentor them, guide them, and then let them make their own decisions and deal with the consequences. They have left their parents' homes and earned the title and responsibility of United States Marines. They are, in fact, selected, better, and different. We need to treat them like it.

Notes

1. Krulak, LtGen Victor H., USMC(Ret), *First to Fight*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, 1984, p. 155.
2. Commanding General, *III Marine Expeditionary Force/Marine Corps Installations Pacific Policy Letter 1-12*, Camp Smith, Hawaii, 19 January 2012.
3. Commanding General, *Marine Corps Base Order P5100.1C*, Chapter 11, Marine Corps Base Quantico, 25 May 2007.

4. Department of the Navy, *Navy Medicine Publication 5010-1, Manual of Naval Preventive Medicine Food Safety*, Washington, DC, May 2004, see Chapter 1-3, pp. 8 and 9 for definition of "Food Establishment" used to justify inclusion of burger sales.

5. Lord Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage*, Constable and Company Ltd., United Kingdom, 1945 , pp. 164-165.

6. U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-11, Leading Marines*, Washington, DC, 1995, p. 8.

7. Lejeune, MajGen John A., *Marine Corps Order No. 29*, Washington, DC, August 1920.



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Professional Attire in the Workplace

Distinguish ourselves

by WO1 Patrick D. Ward

On 20 June 2011, the United States Army “decided soldiers assigned to the Pentagon no longer need to wear combat uniforms as a reminder that the nation is at war.”¹ Instead, the Army decided that soldiers will report to work in a more formal Army Service uniform rather than the digital-patterned Army combat uniform. SGM of the Army, Raymond F. Chandler III, stated one of the reasons for the uniform change is that “there are certain standards of attire associated with certain activities.”² Much of the workday for U.S. service-members assigned to the Pentagon consists of discussing policy with political leaders dressed in suits, which is the typical business attire for civilians in the U.S. Government. “Despite the respect an Army uniform commands in public, some people in Washington fall short of treating a soldier in combat attire as an equal.”³ With the U.S. Army’s change in uniform policy for soldiers at the Pentagon, I believe the Marine Corps should follow suit. Granted, Marines assigned to the Pentagon wear their respective Service uniforms, but Marines should always take the standard up a notch, as we are accustomed to distinguishing ourselves from the other Services.

Thousands of U.S. Marines stationed throughout the world work from behind a desk day in and day out, carrying out their official duties. It can be argued that over 90 percent of Marines on a given day wear their issued Marine pattern battle dress uniform (MarPat BDU) as opposed to their Service uniform. U.S. Marine Corps Service uniforms exemplify our naval traditions and are arguably one of the best looking uniforms worn by the Services.

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Take pride in the uniform. (Photo by GySgt Scott Dunn.)

U.S. Marines need to take pride in their Service uniforms and wear them during the course of their professional duties, especially when they work at locations like the installation personnel administrative centers, Marine headquarters groups, MEF command elements, Marine Forces command elements, and Headquarters Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps Service Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie uniforms are roughly the equivalent in function and composition to a business suit. The Service Alpha is the prescribed uniform when serving on a court-martial; making

official visits and calls with American and foreign dignitaries, officials, and military officers; visiting the White House, except when in a tourist capacity or on an occasion where another uniform is specified; and reporting for duty onshore.⁴ Currently, it seems the Marine Corps Service uniform is only worn when Marines check into new commands and on Fridays at various units. Because we rarely wear our Service uniforms, Marines may only wear one of the three Service uniform combinations issued to them during Marine Corps recruit training.

Today the uniform of choice is the MarPat BDU. Based on its unique woodland and desert patterns, it has become a trademark of the Marine Corps due to its number of small rectangular pixels of color that mimic the textures and rough boundaries found in natural settings. Marines wear the MarPat uniform daily because it is comfortable, machine washable, and resistant to staining and tearing. Yet, according to *Marine Corps Order P1020.34 (MCO P1020.34)*, Chapter 2, Paragraph 2007:

... the camouflage utility uniform is not authorized for wear except when in the field, for field-type exercises, or for those work conditions where it is not practical to wear the service uniform.⁵

This statement raises the question about why we wear our MarPat BDUs all of the time if the MCO says otherwise? Simply put, we wear our uniforms out of convenience and laziness; Marines do not enjoy dropping off their Service uniforms for dry cleaning as do their civilian counterparts. Some people believe it to be an inconvenient



Wear the uniform more often than just for inspections or promotion photos. (Photo by LCpl Austin Hazard.)

physical shape, with large bellies draping over their trousers and with their front trouser pockets protruding outward, do not look presentable in the Service Bravo or Charlie uniform. If we were to implement the wearing of

In today's society, professional business attire in a professional atmosphere should be adopted universally around the Marine Corps. After all, Marines were issued the uniforms to wear more than just once a year for their official photographs for the promotion board.

... Marines in poor physical shape, with large bellies draping over their trousers . . . do not look presentable in the Service Bravo or Charlie uniform.

habit that can be expensive over time in conjunction with other costs, such as getting weekly haircuts. Marines also don't enjoy the time it takes to place their ribbons and badges on their khaki shirts, trim threads with scissors from their shirts and trousers, or clean and edge dress their dress shoes. Arguably, the primary reason Marines do not like wearing their Service uniforms is because of shirt stays. While shirt stays ensure that our uniforms look immaculate, they are incredibly uncomfortable, especially when they dig into your skin and tear out your leg hair.

Furthermore, many Marines do not like wearing their Service uniforms due to their poor physical shape. The Service Bravo and Charlie uniforms are semi-form fitting, and Marines in poor

the Bravo and Charlie uniforms more often, Marines might actively engage in vigorous workouts in order to ensure that their uniforms fit.

As United States Marines, we fancy ourselves as the utmost professionals. Col Robert D. Heinl, distinguished Marine Corps officer, journalist, and historian, is famous for stating that:

... [t]he U. S. Marine is a professional who stands ready to fight anytime, anywhere, any enemy that the President and Congress may designate and to do so coolly, capably, and in the spirit of professional detachment. He is not trained to hate, nor is he whipped up emotionally for battle or for any other duty the Corps may be called on to perform. Patriotism and professionalism are his only two 'isms'.⁶

Notes

1. Vogel, Steve, "Army Changing Uniform for Pentagon," *The Washington Post*, 20 June 2011, accessed at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/post/army-changing-uniform-for-pentagon/2011/06/20/AGrnYFdH_blog.html.

2. "Army Ditching Fatigues for Formal Uniform at Pentagon," FoxNews.com, 14 June 2011, accessed at <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/14/army-calls-for-soldiers-to-wear-formal-uniform-at-pentagon>.

3. Ibid.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCO P1020.34, Marine Corps Uniform Regulations*, accessed on 1 October 2011 at <http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/mcub/library/MCUR/URCH2.htm#UR2007>.

5. Ibid.

6. Staff, "Marine Corps Quotes," *Leatherneck*, accessed on 1 October 2011 at <http://www.mcamarines.org/leatherneck/marine-corps-quotes>.



TACPs

A change in training

by Maj Devin A. Smiley

A change is needed in the initial certification training of Marine Corps forward air controllers (FACs) and joint terminal air controllers (JTACs). The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Course is taught at both Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGLant) and Pacific (EWTGPac) and integrates both FACs and JTACs in the same basic 4-week course. The TACP Course is an entry-level course designed to produce initially certified terminal air controllers (TACPs) qualified and certified to direct the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support (CAS) and other offensive air operations. The model to combine FACs and JTACs in the same basic course doesn't recognize the disparity among TACP Course students and must be changed in order to provide more effective, time-efficient, and fiscally responsible training.

History

The past 10 years have seen a significant change in the way FACs and JTACs are trained during initial certification in the Marine Corps. The TACP Course was initially designed to certify winged naval aviators as FACs. The course is no longer composed of only winged naval aviators but has been opened up to the JTAC community as well. The JTAC community is composed of sergeants, SNCOs, and officers of the artillery, infantry, assault amphibian, tank, and communications communities. TACP School trains and certifies both FACs and JTACs during the same course without any recognition of differences in experience, education, or rank. Training both FACs and JTACs in the same course does simplify training, education, administration, and logistics while also providing intercommunity

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Provide a more effective, time-efficient TACP training program. (Photo by LCpl Brian D. Jones.)

interaction. However, in the current fiscally constrained environment, the TACP community must take a closer look at more effective and efficient ways to conduct training while tailoring the learning to its audience. A one-size-fits-all model for FAC/JTAC training is wasteful in both time and money.

Current Challenges

The variety of students is significant and limits the efficiency of the class. On one end of the experience spectrum is an 0861 artillery sergeant with 3 to 4 years total experience in the Marine Corps. At the other end of the spectrum is a major winged naval aviator, weapons

and tactics instructor (WTI), in a tactical aviation (TacAir) platform, with 10 years of CAS experience. (WTI is a 6-week graduate-level course designed to certify naval aviators as instructors in all facets, duties, and responsibilities of their aircraft platform and includes a secondary MOS designation.) TacAir is a term used to describe aviation platforms that perform offensive air support and other attack-related missions including CAS. Marine TacAir aviators perform CAS as one of their primary missions and are trained extensively in the delivery of aviation fires in support of ground troops. The standard 4-week TACP Course model is arguably not

long enough for the sergeant 0861 to absorb the required knowledge, but it is too long for the CAS-experienced naval aviator.

The aviators in the TACP Course can be further broken down into two separate groups: aviators from TacAir platforms with CAS backgrounds (F/A-18, F-35, AV-8B, AH-1W/Z, and UH-1N/Y) and aviators without (C-130, EA-6B, MV-22, CH-53, and CH-46). Breaking down aviators in this manner is indicative of their success based on the resident CAS knowledge within their respective communities.

TacAir aviators with a CAS background tend to excel and display a sufficient understanding of the material in much less time than other students. The primary reason for this predisposition for success is the culture of CAS in these platforms. The flight syllabus for TacAir platforms requires numerous flights dedicated to performing and mastering CAS. TacAir platforms also supply all of the FAC (Airborne) (FAC(A)) qualifications for the Marine Corps. Not only are TacAir aviators more experienced in CAS than non-TacAir naval aviators and JTAC students, but the community also has an established progression for creating and instructing airborne TACs. The terminal controller experience is resident in the TacAir community. TacAir aviators regularly practice controlling airspace and the integration of aviation fires into the battlespace. This background enables the TacAir aviator/JTAC student to grasp the dynamic concepts of terminal control and fires integration faster than aviators/JTAC students without this CAS background. Lastly, the feedback on TACP Course critiques from TacAir students is that the length of the course is too long. Their performance during the course supports this claim with the highest graduation rate of any group of TACP Course students. On the other hand, naval aviators without a CAS background do not have the aviation fires experience. Attrition from the TACP Course comes almost exclusively from the non-TacAir aviators and the JTAC students.

Complicating the issue is the lack of an identified and sustainable refresher syllabus for FACs/JTACs returning to



"One size fits all" doesn't work for the tactical air control community. (Photo by Cpl Nicholas J. Lienemann.)

the operational forces. When a FAC or JTAC goes beyond 24 months without the required controls, he is no longer current and must refresh in order to regain qualification and currency. The current training and readiness manual directs refresher students to the EWTGs or to the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) Air Officer Course (MOS 7502s serving as a regimental or MEU air officer only) in order to provide academic instruction and refresher controls. Neither the EWTGs nor MAWTS-1 can support significant throughput to support refresher training with the current course structures. There is not an identified long-term solution for refreshing prior JTACs/FACs outside of attending the TACP Course again for 4 weeks. A refresher student must be given a "by name" assignment seat to the course in order to guarantee that he will complete the required controls to regain qualification.

As JTACs become more numerous and leave the operational forces, refresher numbers will increase, impose an additional burden on the EWTGs, and drain available training resources and funds. The artillery community will also provide JTACs to B billets in order to support their career progression and advancement. As the artillery JTAC community grows, more and

more JTACs will leave the operational forces, requiring refresher training on their return. Should JTACs who complete a B billet or nonoperating JTAC tour be expected to attend the TACP Course again for 4 weeks? Have JTACs' skills atrophied to the point that another 4 weeks is required in order to refresh? Using aviation training and readiness manuals as a model, refreshing aviators returning from DIFDEN (duty in a flying status not involving flying) orders complete their syllabus in a significantly shorter period of time. There is a more efficient and fiscally responsible way to both train initial FAC/JTAC students and refresh prior FACs/JTACs.

Solution

The 4-week TACP Course should be split up into separate courses for future training of FACs and JTACs. A shorter course with tailored, focused instruction could be designed for students with a CAS background as well as prior JTACs who need to refresh. The time has come to adjust TACP training pipelines for students based on their experience and background. In order to gain maximum efficiency in time and cost, several sacred cows will have to be sacrificed. The TACP community must split up students within the TACP Course. The standards for

terminal attack control must remain standardized and consistent across the TACP/JTAC/FAC communities.

The decision to separate the students based on background is required to regain efficiency within the course. A shorter TACP Course should be designed for students with a CAS background. This course would be designed for refreshing JTACs and naval aviators/naval flight officers (NFOs) with CAS experience/CAS as one of their mission sets (F/A-18, AV-8B, AH-1W/Z, UH-1N/Y). An additional benefit of a shortened TACP Course is the savings in temporary additional duty funds and time to train while a student is away from his parent command.

The TACP Course for initial JTACs (08XX, 03XX, etc.) and non-CAS naval aviators/NFOs (EA-6B, CH-53, CH-46, C-130, MV-22) should remain longer in order to provide more detailed instruction on CAS and TACP integration. Recent feedback during course content review boards and the MAGTF Fires Operational Advisory

Group presented an option of extending the TACP Course in order to remodel the program of instruction. This remains an option for the longer TACP Course as well as maintaining the current 4-week course as the status quo for initial certification of this group.

A significant argument against this model is the benefit of interaction between naval aviators, NFOs, and JTAC students. While separating the current one-size-fits-all TACP Course decreases interaction between communities, it also allows more focused training based on the skill and experience level of the students. Also, interaction

of the initial certification course for all TACP Courses could also be evaluated as an option if the learning analysis supports this requirement.

The cost savings of transitioning to this model would also be significant. Thirty-six percent of FAC/JTAC students could have their training costs cut in half, not to mention a decrease in TACP Course training time and time gained in their units. Cost savings could be leveraged further by analyzing increased use of contract CAS and additional simulator events.

In order to realize the potential benefit of a shortened TACP Course, an operational planning team should be conducted to look at the way ahead for JTAC/FAC initial certification. While this idea has been mentioned previously during course content review boards, no detailed study has been conducted to evaluate the feasibility. Initial certification training of all terminal controllers, both FACs and JTACs, is governed by the *Joint Close Air Support Action Plan Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 2004-01 JTAC (Ground)*. Any modifications to the TACP Course must comply with the requirements and joint mission task list identified in the above MOA.

... *interaction continues between naval aviators and JTAC students.* ...

continues between naval aviators and JTAC students in both course length options. The shortened course would include refresher students, and non-CAS background naval aviators would be in the longer course with JTAC students. There have also been TACP courses where there have been no CAS-experienced naval aviators in the class without an increase in the attrition rate. Interaction between CAS-experienced naval aviators is beneficial to the learning of the JTACs in the class, but it is not necessary for successful completion of the course.

Solution Feasibility

TacAir students constituted approximately 36 percent of the total TACP Course JTAC students at EWTGPac from fiscal year 2010 through the first half of fiscal year 2012. A possible class spread would be two to three shortened/refresher courses per year and three to four normal length courses. The numbers at EWTGLant would be equivalent and would allow for the short and long TACP Course to be spread intelligently across the year in order to prevent surges of FACs or JTACs. Extending the length


Conclusion

Recent high-profile courses have been remodeled and have shown that courses can be adjusted to be more efficient and with less cost to the Marine Corps. Efficiency can be gained through careful analysis and detailed planning in order to determine the optimum course length for separate courses. There is enough TacAir student throughput to support separate courses. The bottom line is that a single course length for FAC/JTAC initial certification needs to be reevaluated in light of recent fiscal and personnel issues. A one-size-fits-all TACP Course should no longer be the model for training FACs and JTACs.

>Author's Note: The opinions and proposal presented in this article are mine alone and do not reflect the official stance of the EWTGPac TACP Course or program manager.

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MEF-Level COC

The next step in implementing the MAGTF C² vision

by LtCol Debra A. Beutel, USMC(Ret)

The recently published paper on mission command takes the tenets of *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control (C²)* (Washington, DC, 1996) a step or two further and emphasizes the importance of “commander’s intent.” It also emphasizes the importance of feedback from subordinate commanders to allow the senior leadership to reframe the problem space based on additional information and “shared situational awareness.” As the Marine Corps continues to develop and field capabilities in support of the MAGTF C² vision, we continue to look at new and emerging guidance, doctrine, and lessons learned from recent engagements.

COCs

With the initial successful fielding of the combat operations center (COC) program’s COC (V)2–4s, the Marine Corps has done a remarkable job of creating a common operating environment for C² capabilities and applications that supports shared situational awareness from the major subordinate commands to the battalions, but we have yet to address the requirements for a MEF-level COC. The COC (V)2–4s are now in the operations and support phase and will continue to receive planned hardware and software (S/W) upgrades and refresh to maintain interoperability with joint C² capabilities and the technical advantage. These systems are designed to support the processing and staffing requirements of the battalion, regiment, and major subordinate command. The COCs have been used extensively in the theater of operations, and the program office has continued to look for ways to provide upgrades and improve support to the warfighter. Until recently, the MEF-level COC solution was simply an

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“Traditional ‘mission orders’ focuses attention on the senior commander’s intent down to subordinate commanders, which remains a critical aspect of Mission Command. However, Mission Command seeks to better balance the reciprocal command relationship by placing equal emphasis on the ‘feedback’ up from subordinate commanders that allows seniors to ‘re-frame’ the problem as they better discern its nature and iteratively refine and reshape their guidance for successive efforts.”

***—Art Corbett,
G–3/G–5 (Operations/Plans),
Combat Development and Integration,
Headquarters Marine Corps***

informally integrated configuration of two COC (V)2s. While this supported the mission, it did not provide the ideal solution for warfighter requirements, modularity, and scalability.

DJC² as the MEF COC (V)1

An analysis of alternatives was conducted in 2010, and the results suggested that a modified deployable joint C² (DJC²) system, currently the C² system supporting the combatant commanders, was the most cost-effective solution and met the majority of requirements. That decision was based on the fact that the DJC² was a previously fielded system in

use by many organizations, a proven system that was already tested and certified and could be fielded to the warfighter faster than any system designed from the ground up. Overseas contingency operations funds were approved and provided for the procurement of three MEF-level COCs in May 2011.

MEF COC (V)1 Specifications

The MEF-level COC design is more scalable than any of the other variants and supports up to 62 users with the core configuration and a total of 182 users with the two expansion kits that will be fielded with it. The DJC² system




Figure 1. Architecture will support a wide variety of C² requirements. (Provided by author.)

has four configurations: rapid response kit (5/15 seat), en route (10/20 seats), early entry (20 seats), and core (60 seats). It will provide all of the Marine Corps-unique S/W applications that currently reside in the COC (V)2–4 S/W baseline, as well as wireless Internet and functionally integrated transit cases for a scalable configuration of networks and switches. (See Figure 1.)

The architecture will support four networks, providing access to two unclassified and two classified local area networks. A total of three video teleconference suites will be provided with each system. It will incorporate an extensive virtual local area network capability to increase redundancy and flexibility, and it will leverage many of the existing features of the DJC² system to include the current look and feel of the DJC² collaboration portal. The sustainment approach for the MEF-level COCs will mirror the current COC performance-based logistics sustainment model and provide a guaranteed operational availability of at least 85 percent. There is no change in the sustainment concept, in that (V)1 owning units perform operator-/crew-level maintenance, and contractor logistics support provides field-level performance-based logistics

to the system's commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology components. The COC (V)1 is an integration of over 95 percent COTS material. There is no COC (V)1 sustainment (depot) maintenance requirement. The COC (V)1 design includes organically sustained mobile electric power, environmental control unit, and power distribution that provide commanders additional flexibility and reduce the need for contracted field service support.

elements of the MAGTF, to plan collaboratively, develop and maintain situational awareness and understanding, synchronize across domains, and communicate commander's intent and guidance. It also enhances operations by directly contributing to the overall expeditionary, interoperable, and network needs for MAGTF and joint operations. The environment and the capabilities provided within the (V)1 and family of COC systems fosters

The sustainment approach for the MEF-level COCs will mirror the current COC performance-based logistics sustainment model and provide a guaranteed operational availability of at least 85 percent.

New equipment training will be delivered in conjunction with system fielding. The first system will be delivered in the spring of 2013 and will be used for a field user evaluation. The following two systems will be fielded before the end of calendar year 2013. (See Figure 2.)

The (V)1 COC will support the commander's requirement, across all

shared situational awareness across all echelons, thereby supporting the balancing of the reciprocal command relationship. When the (V)1 is added to the COC family, the full continuum of communications and mission command can be easily recognized and the commander's intent more easily understood.

(V)1 2013-2014




Figure 2. The (V)1 delivery timeline. (Provided by author.)

Marine Corps Benefits

Future enhancement and upgrade plans include an intercom solution that will be compatible with the upgraded

intercom in the COC (V)2-4s, a common S/W baseline with all COC products, and implementation of the tactical services-oriented architecture in a future

S/W release. The modularity of the architecture of the MEF-level COC will likely inspire future modifications to the previously fielded COC (V)2-4s. With the fielding of the MEF-level COC, the Marine Corps will have fielded a common operating environment for C² capabilities from the MEF down to the battalion. The next extension of C² capabilities below the battalion will be provided with the fielding of networking on-the-move Increment 1. The network-on-the-move Increment 1 systems will be fielded with the current COC S/W baseline to ensure that commanders at all levels have access to the same information and visualization tools and graphic user interface. This commonality will better-enable shared understanding and shared situational awareness and the feedback from subordinate commanders to senior leaders that is necessary in order to reframe the situation as the scenario develops.



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Seizing the Opportunity to Change

Optimizing Marine Forces in the Pacific

by LtCol Maria McMillen

As the Nation looks to save money and the Department of Defense streamlines itself to be more fiscally tolerable, the Marine Corps finds itself in the middle of a “once every generation” reduction of forces. The Marine Corps can approach this reality in one of two ways; it can cut around the edges and provide a smaller and less capable version of its former self, or it can look at this fiscal belt-tightening as an opportunity to make drastic changes and reemerge on the other side as a more capable and better-designed fighting force. It is time for the Marine Corps to let go of its preconceived ideas of change. Instead of approaching the fiscal reductions, force structure changes, and shifts in operational warfighting focus as separate and nonintersecting actions, the Corps must instead view the solution as a holistic one, resulting in a better force in structure and geographic positioning.

The proposed restructuring will focus on the Pacific, specifically III MEF, for two reasons: the Pacific area of operations (AOR) has been heralded as the new focal point of the national military projection strategy and because of the opportunities for force positioning. Right now the Marine Corps in the Pacific, specifically III MEF, is in the process of gearing up to implement a number of initiatives, including the

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Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) and Defense Program Review Initiative (DPRI), which if left on track will produce task organizations that are out of sync with changing priorities. President Barack Obama recently called for a focus on the Pacific. Although the

FSRG report was published in late 2011, it was conceived in late 2010 with final distribution stalled until the budget and end strength were finalized.

The future posture of Marine forces in the Pacific continues to percolate up as a more and more “unknown.” In the past, the Futenma Replacement Facility (the movement of the airfield to the northern portion of the Okinawan island) seemed a certainty. As of spring 2010 the relocation of the Marine airfield was officially behind schedule. The inaction has not impacted operations;



The Corps is facing a reduction in forces. (Photo by Cpl Ryan Carpenter.)

however, it has done little to convince either the Japanese or the Americans that Marine forces will be redistributed across the Pacific. Although the Pacific has always been critical to U.S.-international policy, there has been renewed emphasis on the Pacific region. During November 2011 President Obama made the announcement that in short order the Marine Corps would have 2,500 troops operating on the Australian continent.

Doctrinally, the updated *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, of June 2011 and the results of the FSRG point to a renewed emphasis on the MEB—the medium-sized MAGTF. This move transitions the MEB from a nonpermanent structure to a standing MAGTF. Although the MEB is a “back to the future” concept of the Marine Corps, it is by no means a new concept or even one that was ever completely abandoned. Regrettably the inclination is to construct and employ a MEB in the same old ways. The truth is that the MEB on a day-to-day basis is a hollow force, with only an 88-man permanent headquarters in place. It awaits an activation order to have an aviation combat element, ground combat element, and logistics combat element assigned with the intent that the same major subordinate elements (MSEs) are always assigned to round out the force.

DPRI has proposed Marine forces distributed across Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. With the additional task of providing a force on Australia, the current environment requires Marine forces on four geographically dispersed islands across the Pacific, covering an area greater than that of the continental United States. Arguably the DPRI laydown has digressed into a numbers game without regard for optimizing the MEF. It focuses on the number of individuals vice provided capability, thereby essentially “fixing” forces in multiple locales with little regard for the mission or the logistics required to marrying up units to form a force or carry out a mission.

As we transition out of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan we would be remiss to think combat is over. The reality is that we will be fighting for our very existence as budgets and missions are



Change the way one envisions employing a MEB. (Photo by PO2 Mark R. Alvarez.)

scrutinized to a level of detail not experienced in recent memory. We must approach the efficiency and positioning of our forces with the same attentiveness we put to finding the right approach to counter the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a battle we won't be raising a glass to at the Marine Corps Birthday Ball, but it is a battle that may determine if we have a Marine Corps Birthday Ball.

... we will be fighting for our very existence. . . .

The confluence of all of these distinct but operationally related policies and programs provides a unique opportunity to operate Marine forces in the Pacific in a manner consistent with providing robust support to national policy in the Pacific. Marine forces can be structured and aligned so they provide the best defense of the region and account for the best strategic laydown. The proposed laydown provides multiple permanent MAGTF options in support of national

military objectives, while reducing costs and time to deploy forces. Additionally, the proposed laydown would provide relief to the number of permanent Marine personnel assigned to Okinawa and would truly validate the MEB concept.

Forming III MEF for the Future

GEN Douglas MacArthur kept a map of the continental United States superimposed over the immensity of the Pacific Ocean in his office. The map served as a reminder of the vastness of the region. The time has come to look at the Pacific as a unique geographical area that requires a unique command and control solution.

In our fiscally constrained environment we do not have the luxury to follow the same old pattern, but instead we need to provide task-organized units tailored to the mission. A laydown of III MEF that provides permanent forces for swift utilization while preserving resources would disperse forces across Okinawa, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, and Australia. Instead of personnel just filling spaces across the Pacific, the best way to manage and employ the dispersed capabilities would be to provide MEUs or special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) to meet the unique geographical demands of the

Pacific theater. Each MEB would have a specific focus but be capable of performing other missions: security cooperation, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), major theater warfare, and a general-purpose MEB. The Australia SPMAGTF could provide a site similar to Mu Juk, Korea, while providing training opportunities with our Australian counterparts with a training emphasis on common equipment.

Reestablishing the MEB allows the Marine Corps to purposely develop units suited to both the geography and the mission. This would provide the Nation with multiple ready-to-deploy forces. This prepositioned packaging saves both time and money thus ensuring a rapid response to crises as they arise.

Guam

Although there is the possibility of basing up to 10,000 troops on Guam, the island is small (basically one-quarter the size of Okinawa). The training opportunities are challenging at best. Most of the weapons training would have to occur on nearby islands (Tinian, Saipan, and others); units would rely on transportation and weather to favorably accommodate even the most basic training. Because of these limitations the number of Marines slated for Guam should be minimized. Guam

could host 9th MEB, the HA/DR MEB. The centralized location of Guam would allow quick response to the most likely candidates for HA/DR missions—the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand.

Korea

Korea would be the site for 12th MEB, the major theater war MEB. It would be dedicated to the defense of Korea and would minimize reaction time if North Korea should show aggression to South Korea. Korea offers some of the best training ranges in the Pacific Command (PaCom) AOR. The location allows a MEB to be prepositioned/forward-based and ready to respond to the Korea operations plan. The risk is that the force, over time, becomes incapable of other missions. Therefore it would be vital that the 12th MEB maintain the flexibility to perform theater security cooperation missions throughout the AOR. As the Army draws down, the gaps left in Korea would allow Marine forces to be stationed on the peninsula without increasing the overall footprint of U.S. forces in South Korea. The 12th MEB would provide support and forces to all of the Korean exercises throughout the year. The savings in transportation would be in the tens of millions of dollars each year.



Combined training opportunities will become more important. (Photo by Cpl Jonathan G. Wright.)

Okinawa

Okinawa would host the MEF headquarters and the 3d MEB, the theater security cooperation MEB. It would have the largest aviation footprint of all of the PaCom MEBs. The premier exercise each year would be COBRA GOLD. Additionally, the MEB would expand the relationships with militaries around the Pacific that are developing and progressing to the point where they are capable of conducting bilateral staff exercises—phase 0 operations—in countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam.

Australia

In Australia the numbers mentioned by President Obama would limit the MAGTF to a MEU or SPMAGTF. Due to strict Australian quarantine and inspection requirements regarding the movement of equipment into and out of the continent, as well as the sheer distance from other PaCom areas of interest, the focus of the Australia SPMAGTF would be interoperability training with the Australian Army. In a broad sense, the force would provide forward projection of power as well as an arc of deterrence in response to the ever-expanding influence of the Chinese Navy.

Hawaii

Hawaii would host the 15th MEB. Its main mission would be to provide maritime presence and force projection along the outer ring of the maritime silk trade route. This would leverage the large Navy presence in Hawaii as well as provide opportunities for the Marines to truly return to their amphibious roots.

Details

The MEB commanding generals (CGs) would be sourced from the current MEB, MarDiv, MAW, and Marine logistics group (MLG). As the DPRI dissects the commands, there is no unity of command left, so the CGs would be assigned as MEB CGs. As the commands they were once in charge of begin to be parceled out across the Pacific, it no longer makes sense to have a command and control structure that is detrimental to the Marines and the mission. The Okinawa MEB would be led by the MAW CG, the HA/DR



Combat skills will always be required. (Photo by Cpl Jonathan Wright.)

MEB would be led by the MLG CG, the Korea MEB would be led by the MEB CG, and the Hawaii MEB would be led by the MarDiv CG.

Benefits/Costs

With this capabilities-based laydown in the Pacific, the CG, III MEF, would be provided with unity of command for collocated forces; this hierarchy of leadership for collocated forces is an important factor in a region where missteps can be costly not just to the individual Marine but also to U.S. foreign policy. The MEB concept provides the foundation for a commonsense laydown in the Pacific. It provides forces with a cogent chain of command. Otherwise MSE CGs have a span of control that exceeds the physical boundaries of the continental United States, with units as low as the squad individually dispersed across the area of operations. Having a succinct chain of command simplifies many administrative functions as well as providing unit cohesion. Items as simple as a request mast, reenlistment package, or nonjudicial punishment can be Herculean tasks even in the “connected” environment in which we currently operate.

Focusing on the MEB as the force of choice allows a force-in-readiness postured throughout the Pacific that will have to spend less time and, more

importantly, less money to form the force for deployment. In the new world bound by fiscal constraints, it makes sense to make the laydown of III MEF more efficient. One of the byproducts of the laydown is that expertise and experience will reside with units that will be slated to prosecute real-world contingencies.

While the distributed MEB concept provides a geographically collocated chain of command at the MEB level, it does disperse the MEF CG's subordinate commanders, making planning at the MEF level significantly more complex.

Conclusion

As our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan quickly draw to a close, the Marine Corps will be forced to rethink its place in the defense of our Nation. For the past decade the mission was a given; we were at no time striving for relevance. At the same time those operations and techniques that once defined us (amphibious operations) as Marines slowly fell to the wayside.

III MEF has primary responsibility for the PaCom AOR, which covers an area of roughly 35 percent of the globe. By taking a new approach, III MEF can contribute to national strategy while still being able to provide operational reach within the constraints of the future.

The current view is locked into a paradigm that is reliant on endless levels of funding to support both exercises and contingencies. A command structure needs to be created that is both operationally and fiscally mindful. Creating collocated commands provides a viable alternative. Gone are the spendthrift days of a command being spread across a theater eating up resources (duplicate admin, etc.), funding (temporary additional duty, command and inspector general visits), and time (commander's time, admin time, etc.). This new approach doesn't just save money and streamline chains of command; it just makes sense.



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Reorienting on the Pacific

The Marine Corps is value added to Pacific AOR contingencies

by 2dLt Luke Mannion

There has been much talk and excitement surrounding the Marine Corps' realignment to the Pacific and the reaffirmation of our amphibious doctrine. This is a strong step in posturing the Marine Corps to being, as Gen James F. Amos says in his planning guidance, "America's expeditionary force-in-readiness," or as we've also been referred to, "America's 9-1-1 call."¹ A quick study of international relations trends will find that the rising trouble spots around the globe include Africa, South America and, most notably, the area in the Pacific Command area of responsibility (PaCom AOR) referred to as the South China Sea.

Inevitably, operating in the PaCom AOR will put the United States in direct competition in all forms of national power (economic, military, and political) with the major Asian powers—Japan, China, Russia, and the Koreas. Japan and South Korea remain steadfast allies in the region, and our goals there are mutually supporting. Russia views itself as a check on U.S. power not only in Europe but also in Asia. Through strategic partnerships we have developed a relationship that makes direct competition very nearly a nonissue; yet the Russian might and ambition cannot fully be discounted. On 2 February then-Russian Prime Minister (and now President) Vladimir Putin wrote an article that was published in the Russian newspaper *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, and which was also reprinted in an abridged version in *Foreign Policy Magazine*, where he firmly laid out a framework for his foreign policy objectives. The title of the article is "Being Strong." Putin primarily focused on gaining a strong

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presence in the Pacific and throughout the Asian Continent.² The worldwide focus is clearly shifting toward the Pacific. While Russia remains a major factor in events in the PaCom AOR, it is not the most pressing concern for U.S. foreign policymakers. The Asian power of most concern to the United States in the Pacific is the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The PRC is spreading its influence throughout the Pacific region and around the world at an alarming pace. There are several schools of thought on

what their intentions are, particularly in the realm of their foreign policy in the PaCom AOR. Over the past decade, while other nations in the region have been cutting defense spending, China has been increasing its budget by an average of 15 percent per year. They went from \$14.6 billion (¥121 billion) to \$70.27 billion (¥480.60 billion) in 2009, and in 2011 up to \$91.5 billion (¥601.1 billion).³ While the increases have been marginally less drastic in later years, the result is still the same—large increases in military spending that are well outside the norm for other nations. Most of this increase can be attributed to a rise in its capital as the nation grows as an economic powerhouse. The possible intent behind such spending is what should give a nation so indebted to the PRC a moment of pause.



Operations in the Pacific put us in contact with major Asian powers. (Photo by LCpl Bryan M. Johnson.)

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the national defense mechanism of the Chinese Communist Party, have been instituting a doctrinal shift toward more amphibious capabilities and a stronger navy in order to increase its influence regionally throughout the Pacific.⁴ They have already challenged American technological supremacy by surfacing a submarine within torpedo range of the USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63) in 2006.⁵ They are also developing antiaccess/area denial systems to counter the influence of the blue-green team of Seventh Fleet and III MEF in the Pacific.⁶

Recently it has been noted that the PRC has been more forceful in its assertions of territorial claims throughout the PaCom AOR. Most of these claims are in highly disputed areas, such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. These Islands, at least in part, are claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the PRC. The PRC has also been asserting claims on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea as well as challenging the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) claimed by Japan that surrounds the Okinotorishima Atoll. This EEZ includes the Shirakaba/Chunxiao gas fields, which both nations have an interest in controlling. One nonlittoral contested territorial claim, but also between PaCom and Central Command, is an area in the contested Kashmir Region between India and Pakistan where India claims the Chinese are illegally occupying 5,180 square kilometers, which Beijing claims were given to them in the 1963 Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement between the two nations. There are two other territorial disputes between India and China, both trying to cope with rapidly growing populations, amounting to a total of 143,180 square kilometers.⁷ China is clearly attempting to solidify its position as the power in the region through enforcement of these claims.

These disputes could at any time (particularly surrounding the Paracel and Spratly Island chains) lead to a humanitarian or military crisis that will almost certainly require the U.S. military to



There are concerns about the costs of maintaining bases overseas. (Photo by Cpl Christian O. Acevedo.)

respond. Likewise, we cannot ignore the constant turmoil and uncertainty surrounding the sovereignty of Taiwan, as well as the threat of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, both of which will involve the intervention of the U.S. military.

With these contingencies in mind, it is clear that our Marine Corps is in the best position strategically to provide immediate competition against the PLA/PLAN as well as influence any other possible scenario that occurs in the PaCom AOR. Our partnership within the blue-green team affords us the unmatched ability to rapidly influence situations in littoral regions from our forward deployed positions in Okinawa, Camp Fuji, and Guam. These bases, along with our ability to embark upon Navy vessels and not rely on strategic lift from U.S. Air Force bases in the continental United States, position us as most able to provide humanitarian relief and operate across the range of military operations with unparalleled rapidity as has been demonstrated repeatedly over the past decade in the wakes of tsunamis, earthquakes, revolutions, and floods around the globe.

There is a discussion on Capitol Hill, the campaign trail, and in some policy circles that our forward deployed bases in places such as Okinawa and Yokusuka are too expensive and unnecessary. I cannot speak to the pricetag associated with running such bases; however, through some analysis we can see that closing these bases is not only bad for the national security and foreign policy

of our Nation, but also for our allies. Our presence, particularly in the Pacific, serves not simply as a deterrent against the aggression of Asian powers that would otherwise have their way with our interests in the region, but also as a springboard for the world's most responsive foreign policy. Either through humanitarian or combat operations throughout the region, we rely on these bases to place our forces as close to those whom we most need to help.

The Marine Corps is also in the best position tactically and doctrinally to challenge military action by the PLA. The core PLA doctrine is based at least partly on Mao Tse-tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*. If one reads this book through, it is easy to pick up on the connections to maneuver warfare. Likewise, Mao put stress on the fact that the only way for guerrillas to truly conquer a conventional force was to conduct operations in conjunction with a partnered conventional force. Also, the only way to defeat such a partnered force was with a similar partnered force.⁸ This relationship can be equated to that of Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC) and other special forces with our standing regiments and divisions. In line with the Commandant's planning guidance, the strengthening of MarSOC will become increasingly important in any action in Asia.

The Asiatic mind, however, cannot be ignored in this analysis. The Western mind thinks of strategy in terms of the game of chess, where the object is the annihilation of the opponent's forces

with rapidity and carefully thought out moves. The Chinese think of strategy in terms of their equivalent wei qi, where the goal is the encirclement of the opponent with no pressure of time.⁹ Games can last for days. While we may have initial success as a Marine Corps, we will have to rely on the patience and robustness of the U.S. Army to endure with us in a prolonged conflict anywhere in Asia. While operating in the Pacific, particularly in Asia, the Marine Corps is in a position of advantage to exploit initiative and achieve initial success against any competition in the PaCom AOR. It is not the 100 percent solution by any means. Our advantage comes from our ability to provide a rapid response for any contingency and to buy national leaders time to establish a full strategy and deliver a stronger plan and solution. As we retain and refine our expeditionary and amphibious mindset and capabilities, we will posture ourselves to be most readily available and prepared to be


the tip of the spear, most notably adding value to the response of the United States in any Pacific contingency.

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Character Education

TBS and beyond

by Maj Clinton A. Culp, USMC(Ret)

There is no shortage of unethical or immoral conduct, whether in garrison or in combat. MajGen Spiese's question at right was asked during the 2010 change of command ceremony at The Basic School (TBS) and came on the heels of a land navigation cheating scandal where 13 officers were released from service. Adam Ballard (one of the 13 and a Naval Academy graduate) told the *Marine Corps Times* that he felt the "problem [cheating and other unethical conduct] is more widespread than the Corps wants people to believe."¹ At a minimum, Mr. Ballard's allegation cannot be ignored, especially when one considers TBS' five horizontal themes that state a Marine officer is:

- A man or woman of exemplary character.
- Devoted to leading Marines 24/7.
- Able to decide, communicate, and act in the fog of war.
- A warfighter who embraces our Corps' warrior ethos.
- Mentally strong and physically tough.

It was under this shadow and in the light of TBS' new program of instruction (POI) that Col J. Dale Alford asked me to study the ethics curriculum and pedagogy to determine if TBS is accomplishing its five horizontal themes and make recommendations to better accomplish them, if needed.^{2 3} Lieutenants are the small unit moral compass; therefore, it is imperative that their moral compass is calibrated to the Marine Corps' ethics prior to leaving TBS.

The Study and Results

We identified three purposes for this study.⁴ First, identify the difference, if any, in moral reasoning between pre- and post-POI lieutenants and nonmilitary college undergraduates. Second,

>Maj Culp deployed to Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE as an enlisted infantryman. As an infantry officer he was an advisor to an Afghan commando kandak and a liaison officer to the United Nations Joint Election Management Body, Kabul, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM he commanded Weapons Company, 3d Bn, 6th Mar, and participated in Operations IRON FIST and STEEL CURTAIN. He retired in 2009 while the Marine Officer Instructor, University of Idaho and Washington State University. He is currently the Program Manager, University of Idaho, Center for Ethics, which focuses on the pedagogy of ethics and moral development.

"How are we going to deal with a different value system of those who are to become Marine officers?"

—MajGen Melvin Spiese, 2010

evaluate courses and teaching methods that are relevant to character education (CE) and make modification as needed. Third, if necessary, implement the modified CE POI and assess its effectiveness.

In our assessment of moral reasoning, pre-POI lieutenants were no different than their average nonmilitary college peers, regardless of commissioning source or sex.⁵ In addition, there was no significant difference between post-POI lieutenants and pre-POI lieutenants, regardless of commissioning source or sex. Two conclusions can be inferred. First, regardless of commissioning source or sex, pre-POI lieutenants do not necessarily arrive at TBS with better moral reasoning skills than the average nonmilitary college undergraduate. Second, the old POI did not affect moral reasoning. As a result we continued with the second purpose of the study, which will be detailed below.

The results of the modified CE POI (i.e., the third purpose of the study) indicated a significant overall increase in the moral reasoning of lieutenants. This was true across commissioning sources; how-

ever, females scored significantly higher than males.⁶ All results supported the effectiveness of the CE modifications.

Measuring Moral Reasoning

The Defining Issues Test 2 was used to measure moral reasoning; it is a valid and reliable instrument that has been used for over 20 years to measure general moral reasoning. It is a scenario-based instrument requiring an action decision for the scenario's protagonist. Then one rates (from no importance to great importance) the reasons why he chose the action. Finally, the top four reasons for choosing the action are ranked. The lieutenants were compared to a database of over 30,000 college undergraduates.

Moral development is a growth process by which one learns to consider others when making decisions that are evaluated morally or ethically and hinges on conducting one's self in a morally or ethically praiseworthy manner. Moral development occurs through stages, or schemas, typically moving from a lower reasoned perspective to a higher reasoned perspective. These reasons are

placed into three schemas: personal interest (PI), rules based or maintaining social norms (MN), and principles (P) or values. Higher moral reasoning is a function of PI and P scores, an N2 score; a low PI score and a high P score result in higher moral reasoning. High N2 scores are the goal. The Marine Corps wants lieutenants to make moral decisions based less on PI and more on Marine Corps values and principles.

Changes to the CE POI

In order to understand CE changes to the POI, a quick word needs to be said on defining morals, ethics, and dilemmas. *Morals* are the values, principles, and practices of a person while *ethics* are values, principles, practices, and rules held by a group. Problems arise when one's morals do not align with the ethics of the organization. This is the problem that MajGen Spiese was addressing at the TBS change of command. *Dilemmas* occur when someone has moral or ethical reason to take at least two courses of action but can only take one. There are three main components to moral dilemmas: a person has the ability to take each action, he can only take one action and, regardless of the action taken, he feels he has done wrong by not taking the alternative action.⁷

CE paradigms flow from the educator to the student. They include the educator's philosophy of learning, which drives pedagogy, and has the intent to enable the student to embody the organization's ethic. Additions needed to be made to TBS' philosophy of learning, in particular, its moral education theory. The old theory basically relied on the three decisionmaking modes: analytical, intuitive, and emotional. The addition of Rest's four-component model and moral schema theory allowed for changes in CE pedagogical methodology.^{8,9} (See Figure 1.)

Minor, but important, recommendations for changes to the curriculum were made that further integrated the horizontal themes and core values. Content knowledge and motivation were on solid ground. According to Col Alford, "The captains are the focus of effort for all education and training [at TBS], including ethics." The instructors are




Figure 1. Curriculum and content knowledge.

subject matter experts with the content-specific knowledge needed for CE. They are motivated. They believe in the core values and embody them through the horizontal themes. For the most part, they are exemplars of the Marine Corps warrior ethos. They understand that the lieutenants will soon be leading young Marines in fluid and chaotic situations that require a true moral compass.

Moral Education Theory

The main issue was not with the cur-

riculum, content knowledge, or motivation of the educator. The issue was with *how* the curriculum was being taught. TBS' moral education theory and pedagogical method needed to be improved to support its curriculum. Based on the new CE theory, a new pedagogical method was developed focusing on four skills:

- Rest's four-component model.
- Environment and timing.
- Listening, being able to identify reasons for making moral decisions (Rest's schemas theory).

- Communicating by developing Socratic lines of questioning that promote moral growth.

The four-component model includes moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. Moral sensitivity is one's ability to identify situations that can be evaluated morally and how one's conduct may affect others. Moral judgment is the ability to decide which course of action is the most morally justifiable. Moral motivation is one's commitment to taking personal responsibility for one's actions. It is also how one prioritizes his values. Moral character is having the courage to overcome obstacles and persisting in the implementation of conduct, which has moral implications. This model is naturalistic and open to being nonlinear, nonlogical (emotional), nondeliberative (intuitive), and noninteractive, and can be likened to a "moral" Boyd cycle (Air Force Col John Boyd's orientation, observation, decision, action loop).¹⁰

Skills. Within the new model, instructors learned to be better educators. Listening and communication are critical skills when using the dialectic method of education. The following are examples of listening for lines of reasoning that may be provided for moral decisionmaking. (L is the leader; S is the student.) The examples refer to a video of a Marine acting badly toward a local Afghan boy.

- Example of PI reasons (e.g., acting with the intent of not getting into trouble or advancing one's career):

□ L: Would you act like the Marine in the video?

□ S: No, I'd get chewed out.

- Example of MN reasons (e.g., acting solely because of a regulation or rule or to maintain his status within a social group):

□ L: Would you act like the Marine in the video?

□ S: Well, you get tired of those kids asking for pencils all the time; besides, everyone is doing it.

- Example of postconventional (values based) reasons (e.g., acting because it is the right thing to do; embodying Marine Corps core values and TBS' horizontal themes):

□ L: Would you act like the Marine in the video?

□ S: Marines don't act that way.

Identifying the schemas through listening is only half of the education process. Dialectic or Socratic questioning creates cognitive dissonance and moves reasoning to a higher or more sophisticated schema of reasoning.

Behavior. Didactic questions ask the student to recall facts, explain how something works, and clarify facts or explanations. In contrast, to dialectic questions the instructor learned to ask the student to explain why something is or to justify the why, and then link the how and why together. Rhetorical questions can fall into either category. Learning "tactical patience," pausing to allow the student to think about his answer, is as vital as the type of question asked. A pause of 4 to 9 seconds is appropriate.

In the following dialogue, the student starts with a PI reason, and the leader asks questions that challenge the student to question his justification and arrive at a principled understanding of the application of values, in this case respect.

□ L: Would you act like the Marine in the video?

□ S: No, I'd get chewed out (PI).

□ L: What kind of message is the corporal sending to his fellow Marines?

□ S: That it's okay to treat the local kids that way.

□ L: Do you think that the other Marines saw him as a role model?

□ S: Sure, most likely.

□ L: What if he treated the local kids with more respect?

□ S: Well, the other Marines might follow his lead, but won't the kids still pester you (MN)?

□ L: Sure they might, but to whom could you talk to keep them from bugging you?

□ S: You could talk to the elder.

□ L: Do you think that he will listen to you if you are being disrespectful to the kids?

□ S: Probably not.

□ L: What if the Marines were trying to be nice to the kids?

□ S: He might tell them to stop pestering us.

□ L: Why?

□ S: They were trying to be nice to the kids (MN, P).

□ L: What value is that?

□ S: Respect.

□ L: Why?

□ S: Because it's what Marines do (P).

Under the new paradigm, the instructors used both didactic (to a lesser degree) and dialectic (to a greater degree) methods to facilitate creating a cognitive dissonance between the individual's values and the core values of the Marine Corps when they conflicted. The student was able to reinforce or align for himself his values to those of the Marine Corps, which is keeping with the current CE theory and practice.¹¹

The environment. Improvements to the learning environment were made in the classroom, discussion groups, and ethical decision exercises (EDEs). The classroom moved from a predominantly didactic method (e.g., direct instruction) to a more dialectic method (i.e., Socratic method). Students were challenged to arrive at the best decision, given the situation, in contrast to seeking an "approved solution." Ethics classes also used microdiscussions of three to four students lasting 5 minutes and clicker technology, which provided realtime feedback from the microdiscussions to the class.

Discussion groups. Assistant instructors (AIs) attended the new pedagogical ethics class prior to leading their small group discussions and used their listening skills and the Socratic method to guide discussion.¹² A few key points should be noted with regard to how they guided moral and ethical discussions.

- The AI was a *guide* and avoided lecturing or preaching, key for promoting better moral reasoning. They set the conditions for learning:

- Use of small groups, one to two squads worked best, platoon size at the largest.

- Sought diversity within the group, which allowed for diversity of thought.

- They listened and were not "judgmental."

- The AIs were aware that each member was unique and brought his own life experience, which influences the group member and the group.

- Group member's beliefs, values, culture, prejudices, education, and



Teaching new officers to grapple with ethical issues is harder than close combat. (Photo by LCpl Lucas G. Lowe.)

attitudes are the beginnings of his thoughts and behavior.

- Loyalties to family, religion, or social groups also played a role.
- Emotions and feelings influence member's thoughts and behavior.
- The AIs understood that each participant had something to offer the group. The AI was responsible for facilitating each participant's contribution to the group.
- AIs guided the discussion back to Marine Corps core values and horizontal themes. It was not sufficient to settle on a rules-based reason; they dug for the values and principles behind the rules.

EDEs. The old EDEs did not necessarily create moral dilemmas for the students. The timing was off for some exercises, which typically resulted in the student either having more than one option or having already taken a course of action that was mitigating the moral dilemma. Neither case presented a moral dilemma.

The new EDEs were specifically designed to place the student in a moral dilemma. The purpose was to solicit an action response from the student and then conduct an in-stride debrief using the dialectic method as soon after the action as possible. The importance of the in-stride debrief cannot be un-

derstated. This allowed the student to reason through, justify his actions, and allow reinforcement of good decisions and behavior or correction of bad decisions and behavior before the details were forgotten.¹³

The new EDEs followed a specific teaching model for the instructors and can be applied to any level or type of field exercise. In order to detail what was done, yet keep the specifics of TBS' EDEs intact for future lieutenants, the following is used as an example:

- **Dilemma:** While conducting a movement to contact, the platoon commander has an ethical reason to properly handle an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) and a moral reason to locate the main body of the enemy as fast as possible. (Other units are relying on you in order to complete their mission with minimal friendly casualties.)
- **Task:** Place the student in a moral dilemma involving the proper handling of an EPW and the necessity to complete the assigned time-sensitive mission.
- **Purpose:** To have the student make a moral decision in a time-competitive, chaotic, and fluid field environment that simulates combat conditions.
- **Method:** This EDE will be conducted during the offensive phase of

the platoon engagement within Field Exercise X. During a brief in-stride debrief the platoon commander will have to justify his action based on core values and horizontal themes.

- **End state:** The platoon commander takes action, which has moral implications; enforces his decision within the unit; and justifies his actions by associating them with core values and horizontal themes.

- **Scheme of maneuver:** The AI will ensure that the platoon captures one EPW while en route and before making contact with the enemy main body. The EPW will initially be compliant. Depending on the situation the AI may direct the EPW to become less compliant, thereby creating more friction for the platoon.

- **Core values:** This is not an all-inclusive list; other core values, horizontal themes, or rules may also be in conflict.

- Honor (responsibility), having an ethical responsibility to properly handle the EPWs and a moral responsibility to complete the mission.

- Courage (valor versus loyalty), having an ethical duty to be valorous in your actions with regard to the EPW and a moral obligation to be loyal to your fellow Marines by completing the mission.

- Commitment (concern for people versus teamwork), because everyone is of value you have an ethical duty to be benevolent toward the EPW and a moral duty to do your part as the larger team and complete your mission.

- **Horizontal themes:**


- Man of exemplary character; possesses a moral compass that unerringly points to "do the right thing"—an ethical warrior.

- **Rule:**

- Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC).
- EPW handling procedures; safeguard.

- **Possible student actions and AI questions:** actions that do not adhere to core values, horizontal themes, or the rules:

- Shoot the EPW. Not only does this action violate the above core



Their moral compasses need to be strengthened and reinforced from time to time so they make the right ethical leap. (Photo by LCpl Lucas G. Lowe.)

values and horizontal themes, it is a *clear* violation LoAC. This is both a moral and legal violation of one's duty as a commissioned officer.

▲ What precedence does this set for your Marines? It allows them the freedom to take such an action in the future.

▲ How will this action morally affect your Marines in the future? It makes your Marines morally callous.

▲ Could this action affect the operational and strategic mission? Actions such as this make it more difficult for others to conduct their mission in the future due to further constraints on operations.

■ Tie up the EPW and leave him. While this may not be a direct moral violation, depending on how you tie up the EPW (e.g., so as not to be able to survive), it is a violation of the LoAC. Once you have taken custody of the EPW you have a legal duty to handle him in accordance with the LoAC.

▲ How will this action affect your mission? The EPW may be able to provide information to the enemy about your capabilities, limitations, and possible objective.

• Possible AI actions to induce friction:

■ The AI can have the EPW become noncompliant. Noncompliance can range from making noise to sitting down, thus making the platoon carry the EPW to the dropoff point.

■ If the platoon commander takes the EPW to the dropoff point, the AI could pressure the platoon commander to "just handle it (implying to shoot the EPW) and move on. I don't have time for this."

■ The AI could pressure the platoon commander to tie up the EPW, leave him in the woods, and continue the mission.

■ The AI can have the EPW bargain for his release by offering to show the platoon where the local weapons cache is buried.

(i.e., use of dialectic communication methods). The primary purpose of the new CE POI was to have new lieutenants align their moral reasoning to the Marine Corps' core values by embodying the horizontal themes. This was accomplished! TBS is calibrating the moral compass of new lieutenants to true north.

A Further Recommendation

As with any compass, moral or otherwise, this one needs to be recalibrated from time to time. The CE paradigm can be used as a tool for all leaders to calibrate and recalibrate their Marines' moral compasses. An additional tool that can aid in moral development is writing. As leaders it is our duty to get to know our Marines, including what they value and why they value it. The act of writing does at least two things. First, it allows the Marine to think about the subject, and second, it allows a rethinking of the subject while writing. Writing is a very powerful tool that a leader can use to identify and clarify values. The bottom line is that writing gets one to think multiple times about one's values and why he values them.

- Have your Marines write a short autobiography, but have them include

Summary

The methodology is derived from a philosophy of learning that includes a sound moral education theory. The CE pedagogical method encompassed moral skills (i.e., four-component model and listening for and identifying moral schemas), environment (i.e., altering classroom and discussion group methods and refining EDE), and behavior

a short list of things (5 to 10) they value and why they value them.

- Have your Marines write a short paragraph on what each of the core values (including the subvalues) means to them and how they plan on living up to each core value.
- Have your Marines write leadership profiles of prominent Marines (or other leaders) about how their leadership embodied core values and horizontal themes, how core values were (or were not) exemplified, what was done right, and what could have been done better.

The key to CE writing exercises is to focus on core values. These are but three examples of writing exercises that will assist your Marines in identifying their values and how they compare to the core values of the Marine Corps.

Conclusion

Making better moral and ethical decisions does not just happen; it only

comes about with a continual and concerted effort via a specific methodology. As with any training and education program, the intent is for those trained and educated to apply their new knowledge to better the Marines they lead. Small unit leaders in the Operating Forces can implement this program to help keep the moral compass pointing to true north.

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5. Commissioning sources were categorized by Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program and Enlisted Commissioning Programs, United States Naval Academy, Officer Candidates School, Platoon Leaders Course (Junior/Senior, and Combined), and others.

6. These results are typical for successful CE programs that use the Defining Issues Test 2. There is debate in the CE community as to why this phenomenon occurs, but this is beyond the scope of this article

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"At the potential end strength level resulting from sequestration, we're going to have to make some tough decisions and assume significantly more risk. We will not be able to do the things the nation needs us to do to mitigate risks, or to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commanders."¹

***—Gen James F. Amos,
Commandant of the Marine Corps***

End strength and budget reductions are going to get worse. How much worse? The answer remains unknown, but if current legislation concerning sequestration is not changed, the Marine Corps will suffer even further cuts. The looming budget crisis and sequestration is important for all Marines to understand because, if implemented, it will be the largest drawdown of U.S. military power since World War II.

Sequestration is the automatic budget cuts legislated in the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). According to that law, the Super Committee was tasked last fall to agree on Federal budget cuts totaling \$1.5 trillion. If it failed, the BCA legislated that defense programs would be cut by a total of \$54.7 billion each year from 2013 through 2021, with nondefense programs cut by the same amount. Together, these program cuts total \$109.3 billion per year or \$984 billion through 2021. Sequestration calls for cuts across every program,

equally cutting all without the ability to prioritize what remaining money is left in the budget for future programs. The original idea of sequestration was supposed to be a negotiation mechanism to force the Super Committee to find savings in the Federal budget; it was *not* intended to be a budget strategy.

The biggest challenge for the Department of Defense (DoD) will be managing the immediate decrease to \$472 billion (11 percent reduction), bringing the budget back to fiscal year 2007 (FY07) funding levels adjusted for inflation.² Numerous senior leaders, including the Secretary of Defense and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, have argued that sequestration would be devastating to the DoD and

the Marine Corps, leading to a “hollow force.” A reduction of this magnitude will lead the DoD to deep cuts in personnel, procurement, and veteran pay and benefits.

If our government decides not to change the BCA and the process of sequestration, it is likely that the Marine Corps would undergo another round of deep personnel and budget cuts in addition to the budgetary cuts and reductions that are already planned. A report released by the Center for a New American Security predicts a Marine Corps of 150,000 and massive cuts to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and other programs if sequestration is implemented.³

The new strategy of “pivoting to the Pacific” described by the current administration calls for greater reliance on air and naval forces. Although the Marine Corps’ role in support of naval operations will be significant, pressure to cut Marine Corps resources focused on large-scale military operations under the current budget strategy will more than likely make the Marine Corps’ essential support role to large-scale combat operations unaffordable.

Despite these implications, the DoD and the Marine Corps have been reluctant to publicly plan for sequestration. This is largely because, if the DoD can show a viable course of action to implement sequestration, it may be turned into

>LtCol Clark is currently a Commandant's Fellow, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC. He is an artillery officer who has deployed in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM with the 22d MEU and the Joint Warfighting Center.



Manpower takes a direct hit. (Photo by Sgt Michele Watson.)

reality by civilian policymakers. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has said that planning for sequestration was to begin in late summer of this year at the earliest. However, this lack of public planning is a miscalculation. Rather than taking the attitude that sequestration is an option that is untenable, the DoD should show our civilian decisionmakers how much of a real threat to our national security and our strategic priorities sequestration may become. By specifically laying out the reductions that the DoD and the supporting industrial base will undergo through 2021, as well as the strategic risks to the country as stated by the Commandant at the beginning of this article, our country may be prompted to make a final decision concerning this legislation. By showing the American people and civilian policymakers that the Marine Corps' ability to conduct operations (both combat and humanitarian) would be severely degraded once sequestration is put into effect, the DoD can help convince policymakers that sequestration must be avoided. For example, the DoD's ability to implement the new strategic goals of pivoting to the Pacific while maintaining a presence in the Persian Gulf will be limited, and a new strategy may have to be formulated entirely. Furthermore, tens of thousands of veterans and civilian government workers would be put out of work. Finally,

sequestration would diminish the defense industry, severely limiting its ability to ever recover and putting our long-term national security at risk even after the cuts expire in a decade.

The American people and civilian policymakers ought to understand the true effects and future strategic risks associated with sequestration legislation. The possibility of sequestration being implemented post-31 December 2012 offers a real threat to the future structure of the DoD and the Marine Corps.

To give a historical comparison, during the post-Operation DESERT STORM drawdown in the early 1990s, the Marine Corps went from an end strength of 196,652 in 1990 to an end strength of 171,637 in 1997.⁴ This personnel end strength was also accompanied by a Department of the Navy budget reduction of approximately \$20 billion over the same 7-year period.⁵ During the same period, the U.S. Army went from a high in 1990 of 18 active duty divisions and a personnel end strength of 732,000 down to a personnel end strength of 491,000 and 10 active duty divisions in 1997.⁶ The current FY13 Department of the Navy budget is \$155.9 billion, which represents 29 percent of the DoD budget. If sequestration is implemented, the Department of the Navy's expected fair share of cuts (29 percent) of \$54.7 billion per year would be approximately

\$15.9 billion if the DoD decides to cut along current Service shares.

The Marine Corps must continue to argue for an end strength of 182,100. As stated by Col Robert K. Dobson:

The proposed structure should be viewed as a personnel ceiling vice a floor. Based on FY12 manpower costs, each \$1 billion spent for manpower buys approximately 12,000 personnel. Reducing manpower costs results in immediate savings that accumulate year over year.⁷

However, one interesting turn coming out of the last round of DoD budget cuts was a digress from the historical precedents of spreading DoD cuts equally across all four Services. The current strategic guidance of pivoting to the Pacific and maintaining a footprint in the Middle East plays into the Marine Corps' strengths and should be exploited during future budget battles. Strategic guidance:

... is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles, and highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed strategy.⁸

The Marine Corps must continue to return to its amphibious roots and project an image of America's force-in-readiness, while at the same time countering its growing reputation within Washington, DC, as a second land army and a force ever more reliant on expensive tools to complete its trade. Lawmakers have grown weary of expensive procurement battles, and ideas of how to improve our current equipment sets smartly require greater exploration.

This historical budget review is relevant as it puts into perspective what Marines who entered the Marine Corps in the President Ronald Reagan plus-up years of the 1980s faced during the 1990s. Marine leaders had to adjust from a time of ever-increasing budgets, as well as plenty of new gear and ammunition, to a time of extremely limited budgets, an almost complete shortage of spare parts, and limited ammunition supplies to conduct training.

This time frame can be compared to the budget reduction and personnel end strength drawdowns that are occurring in today's Marine Corps. Young officers and SNCOs who entered the Marine Corps during the past 10 years have matured in a time of intense combat and deployment cycles and in a Marine Corps that had an almost unlimited budget, especially for units that were in and out of the combat theater on a continual basis. This younger generation of Marines has never had to concern itself with creating a training plan that justified the use of every bullet during training. Young Marine leaders never had to walk a line of vehicles in the motor pool with 60 percent of them deadlined and, after a review of the daily process report, noting that all had a valid status showing short parts or short funds. My generation and Marines senior to me lived through the 1990s. We can draw upon our experiences from the 1990s and must assist with the transition that younger Marine leaders will face in the coming years. The message to younger Marine leaders is that the Marine Corps will survive and continue to produce Marine units that are capable of successfully executing the missions asked of them. However, making Marines ready to accomplish these missions will take much more work and creativity.

In May 2011 LtGen Richard Mills summed up the problem when he said:

I know we are going to look at some reduction in numbers. I've gone through this a couple of times in my career. Each time the military has had to tighten its belt, we continued to function very well. . . . I can remember times when it was tough to get fuel for vehicles to go to the field to train, so you walked; when it was tough to get ammunition to shoot for training, but you made do. And when the Corps—when the country—called, we were ready to go and we will be again.⁹

Senior leaders will face the challenge of walking a fine line with managing a decreasing budget without becoming micromanagerial during the process. The consequence of too much management may lead to an exodus of top quality young officers and SNCOs who

have grown used to operating independently during combat operations. How the Marine Corps manages the challenge of maintaining top quality during a drawdown cycle will have serious impacts in the future.


The final answer concerning sequestration will probably not be known on 31 December. Rather, because of political reasons, the sequestration/budget cut debate will be delayed by Congress and the administration. Since the BCA and sequestration is the current law of the land, the Marine Corps must prepare for additional cuts and must not fall victim to a hollowing of the force and the horror stories that resound from the 1970s.

The first place to look is in end strength. To accomplish a reduction to 186,800, the Marine Corps convened the Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) 2010. The outcome of the FSRG, and subsequent approval by the Commandant, implemented a reduction of an infantry regiment headquarters, five infantry battalions (four active and one Reserve), two artillery battalions, four tactical air squadrons (three active and one Reserve), and a combat logistics battalion. The Marine Corps was told to reduce to a number of 182,100 in the guidance laid out by the Secretary of Defense.

I argue that 182,100 is the first round of cuts. Let's assume for a moment that the current sequestration legislation is repealed by Congress and is approved by the President. In this best case scenario, that leaves the current cuts to DoD spending of \$487 billion over the next 10 years outlined in the BCA of 2011. From that \$487 billion, the DoD has planned and budgeted for a reduction of \$259 billion over the next 5 years (FY12 to FY16). The additional \$228 billion cuts in the 5 preceding budgets (FY17 to FY21) are sequenced in as long as the cost of business does not increase beyond current expectations.¹⁰ If increases are experienced in programs, such as the F-35 or the joint light tactical vehicle, unexpected overseas contingencies, or large increases to active duty and retiree entitlements, the difference will have to be passed on to the Services to absorb to achieve total cuts of \$487 billion. It

can be argued that in a time of great uncertainty the DoD will experience unforeseen circumstances costing the department money. Therefore it is safe to assume that the Marine Corps will be directed to absorb at least 8 percent of possible future cuts. The Marine Corps must continue to argue for an end strength of 182,100, as that level is in line with the DoD's current strategy. However, the current structure should be viewed as temporary and will more than likely continue to decrease beyond the next 5 years.

After articulating the bad news of future budget cuts and being trained at a young age by the Marine Corps that you never tell your boss bad news without offering at least somewhat of a solution, an area that may offer savings in resources and personnel is operational-level headquarters. This cost-saving measure is in line with one of the Commandant's priorities as discussed in *The Posture of the United States Marine Corps* report to Congress:





Limited supplies of ammunition are part of the future. (Photo by Sgt John Odette.)

"Rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future and aggressively experiment with new capabilities and organizations."¹¹

During recent planning discussions coming out of the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group and EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 12, observations emerged that during large-scale future amphibious operations the Marine

TIONARY WARRIOR 12, several times the argument was made that Marine and Navy component headquarters require more interoperability in order to transition from a Service component headquarters into a joint force maritime component command (JFMCC) and operate more coherently during joint operations. The Navy and the Marine

requires Service component commands to operate as a joint force headquarters. Secondly, this organizational construct saves both the Navy and the Marine Corps personnel and operating costs of maintaining two separate headquarters elements. There are obviously drawbacks to this organization as the true flavor of the Service headquarters is lost by combining the headquarters into a full-time JFMCC. A detailed memorandum of understanding highlighting the rotation of commanders, senior enlisted leaders, principal staff members, and other staff members can be established setting all of these billets on a rotational basis between the Services. By establishing a full-time JFMCC at the combatant and functional commands, the Marine Corps and Navy could eliminate friction during staff "standup time" in the event of a crisis. In addition, the resident knowledge, professional relationships, and experience of Marines and sailors serving on these staffs with respect to their sister Service would greatly increase. This knowledge and these professional relationships will be spread across the Navy and the Marine Corps as members of the staffs move on to different assignments throughout their careers. The professional integration of Navy and Marine staffs would ultimately lead to better cooperation throughout the Navy and Marine Corps.

Another area that this model may apply to is in the growing capacities of cyber operations. Since the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command in 2009, each Service has established a Service component command within Cyber Command. The Commandant plans to increase Marine Forces Cyber Command by 700 Marines in 2013.¹² The Navy and Marine Corps should also consider combining these commands for the same reasons listed above. Granted, a joint maritime cyber command will not contain the all-Marine focus that Marine Forces Cyber Command contains. However, in this age of budget austerity and hard choices concerning looming further budget and personnel cuts, can the Marine Corps afford to sacrifice another infantry battalion worth of Marines to man an all-Marine

Corps will always operate as a joint force. In addition, Service component headquarters at the combatant command level is tasked to quickly form the nucleus of a joint force in support of these operations. Recent operations, from the Beirut noncombatant evacuation operation in 2006 to Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in 2011, reinforce the validity of this premise. However, we organize our component headquarters by Service. The organization by Service is an option directed by *Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0), Joint Operations*, for the purpose of securing logistics and ensuring the training of the Service component's unit. During EXPEDI-

Corps should move one step further and combine the Marine Corps and Navy Service component headquarters subordinate to the geographic combatant commanders and the functional component commanders and organize by function even during peacetime. *JP 3-0* states that subordinate commands of the joint force commander may organize by either Service or function; in other words, by maritime, ground, or air components. The advantage of organizing by function is that the staffs are completely integrated during peacetime and do not have a time gap in capabilities as they integrate into an operational-level headquarters during a contingency that

cyber and other Service component command headquarters? The option of pooling our resources with the Navy and working more closely with our sister Service to provide a capability that can still accomplish the mission with a significant subtraction of resources, both manpower and fiscal, should be explored further.

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Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, October 2011, pp. 20, 22, 36, and 37.

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8. DoD, *DoD Strategic Guidance*, Washington, DC, January 2012, p. 4.
9. DoD bloggers round table with MajGen Richard Mills, Former Commander, Regional Command (Southwest); subject: The evolving security situation in Afghanistan, 3 May 2011.
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12. Ibid., p. 17.



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Biography Of an Icon

reviewed by Col Gary Anderson, USMC(Ret)

When the last U.S. Marine departed from Saigon in the 1975 evacuation operation from Vietnam, the Marine Corps was perhaps at its lowest point since the end of the Civil War. Drugs were rampant, racial unrest swept the barracks, and readiness was at a 20th century low point. Few then could foresee that just 16 years later, the Corps would enter its next major conflict with the best trained and most combat-ready force that it had ever taken into the first battle of any war in its illustrious history. This accomplishment was due mainly to the efforts of four truly remarkable commandants.

Gen Louis Wilson probably saved the Corps by purging its war bloated ranks of the druggies, malcontents, and racial agitators with an expeditious discharge program and a promise that he would have a quality Marine Corps if

>Col Anderson is on sabbatical from his position as an adjunct professor at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, and is with the Department of State leading a District Support Team in Afghanistan.


Gen Alfred M. Gray, Jr., who would craft the doctrine and vision that would make the Corps' magnificent performance in Operation DESERT STORM, Iraq, and Afghanistan possible. Col Gerry Turley has written a tribute to Gray designed to ensure that future generations of Marines do not forget his legacy.

Al Gray came from a stable and hard-working family background. His father was a railway conductor during the depression and he brought

... Gen Gray followed an unconventional career path, blooming where he was planted in assignments ranging from tours with artillery to special communications, and from electronic warfare to reconnaissance.

all that was left was the Commandant, the Sergeant Major, the flag, and the Bible. Gen Robert Barrow was the architect of the Marine Corps of the future and a new regimen of tough and realistic training. Gen P.X. Kelley was the programmer for the 21st century. Under his stewardship, virtually every weapon system from the basic rifle on up was modernized. But it was

home discarded magazines and newspapers from the trains which began young Al's lifelong habit as a voracious reader. Gray would care for his mother to the end of her life. A talented high school athlete, the future Commandant dropped out of college to enlist in the Marine Corps, and his talents would be recognized with a commission from the ranks.



THE JOURNEY OF A WARRIOR:
The Twenty-Ninth Commandant of the US Marine Corps (1987-1991): General Alfred Mason Gray. By Col Gerald H. Turley USMCR(Ret). iUniverse, Bloomington, IN, 2012
ISBN 1469761327, 528 pp.
\$31.95 (Member \$28.76)

His superb combat performance in Korea would be the beginning of his reputation as a "Marine's Marine."

Although an infantryman by MOS, Gen Gray followed an unconventional career path, blooming where he was planted in assignments ranging from tours with artillery to special communications, and from electronic warfare to reconnaissance. This probably contributed to his lifelong distaste for conventional careerism. In combat in Vietnam, he distinguished himself on several occasions by saving other Marines from mine fields. He truly made his mark as a colonel by being the primary tactical organizer and executor of Operation FREQUENT WIND, the evacuation of Americans and others from Saigon in the waning moments of the war in Vietnam. Those actions probably earned him his first star, and from there he began his drive to impart his vision and sense of innovation on the rest of the Corps.

As Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade (later MEB), 2d MarDiv, and finally as commander of the entire "Carolina MAGTF," Gen Gray began the innovations that he would institute throughout the Marine Corps when he became Commandant. These ranged from making MAUs (later MEUs) special operations capable, to the take down of oil platforms, and pushing the Marine Corps to acquire the light armored vehicle. Perhaps his greatest contribution was the eventual institution of maneuver warfare as the Marine Corps' fighting doctrine.

Gray was a dark horse for Commandant, but then-Secretary of the Navy James Webb saw in the tobacco chewing maverick the kind of leader the Marine Corps would need to take it to the next level. As Commandant, Gen Gray broke some crockery, particularly at Headquarters Marine Corps.

disrupted the hated colored routing system and fiercely resisted attempts to manage his schedule. In the field he challenged those of us who were his commanders, but made command fun again. All of this paid off handsomely in the run up to the Gulf war when MEU(special operations capable)s and

As Commandant, Gen Gray broke some crockery, particularly at Headquarters Marine Corps.

special purpose MAGTFs validated Gray's special operations capable vision with noncombatant evacuation operations, deception operations, and other nontraditional missions.

In Operation DESERT STORM, his maneuver warfare concepts were first validated under fire as they would be again in Afghanistan and Iraq.


Col Turley states at the beginning of the book that he did not set out to write a standard academic biography. This is a tribute to Gen Gray and should be read in that spirit. The book deserved better editing than it got, and pickers of nits will have a field day. Whoever the editor is, he can probably expect an ironic note from the General congratulating him on an "interesting" proofreading job. The Marine Corps owes Gen Gray and his three immediate predecessors a debt of gratitude that it can never fully repay; Col Turley, however, has submitted a down payment on that bill.



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Note: The award records in the Marine Corps' award processing system and improved awards processing system were used to populate this list, which reflects personal combat awards from the start of the global war on terrorism presented to Marines and sailors serving with Marine Corps forces only. This list may not reflect certain personal combat awards processed outside of either system and/or approved by another branch of Service. Any questions on the content of the list should be submitted in writing to the Personal Awards Section (MMMA-2) at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower Management Division, MMMA-2, 3280 Russell Road, Quantico, VA 22134.

Silver Star

Haralovich, Alexander V	SSgt	3d Recon Bn 3d MarDiv
Lurz, Joseph F	GySgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC

Bronze Star With Combat "V"

Dunfee, William B	GySgt	MarCor Augmtn & Transn Spt Unit
Homiak, Travis L	LtCol	8th Mar Regt 2d MarDiv
Hunt, Ryan M	Capt	1/5 1st MarDiv
Kightlinger, Robert G	Sgt	1/5 1st MarDiv
McCafferty, Patrick N	SSgt	9th ESB 3d MLG
Singh, Gurpreet	Cpl	1/5 1st MarDiv

Bronze Star

Agres, Joseph S	Maj	5th ANGLICO MHG III MEF
Ahern, Stephen M	SgtMaj	3d CEB 1st MarDiv
Allena Jr, Joseph T	LtCol	1st MarDiv (Fwd)
Armas, Jason C	Maj	3/3 3d MarDiv
Bala, Adam B	1stSgt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Baldwin, Scott A	LtCol	CLR 15 1st MLG
Bell, David M	Capt	3/8 2d MarDiv
Beltran, Cecil R	CWO4	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv
Brock, Casey M	Capt	1/5 1st MarDiv
Brown, Mark C	Maj	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv
Burris, Donald W	SgtMaj	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv
Buxton, Eben C	Capt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Conboy, Kevin M	SgtMaj	5th ANGLICO MHG III MEF
Fisher, Aaron F	Capt	9th ESB 3d MLG
Fitts, Michael L	Maj	3/7 1st MarDiv
Francis II, Garry L	Capt	5th ANGLICO MHG III MEF
Gasser, Christopher S	1stSgt	2/11 1st MarDiv
Genarri, James P	LCDR	2d Supply Bn (Rein) (Fwd)
Gross, Joseph S	LtCol	MEF Hqtrs Grp II MEF
Heider, Ryan T	Capt	9th ESB 3d MLG
Hickman, Troy A	MSgt	1/5 1st MarDiv
Hoopii, Ernest K	SgtMaj	RCT-5
Hostetter, Nathan T	GySgt	Hqtrs MarFor CentCom

Kerg, Brian A
Langerud, Shane A
McDowell, Michael S
McKinley, Patrick A
Parry, Keith A
Reeves, Zachary A

Schaffer, Wesley L
Scudder Jr, Jay F
Sullivan Jr, John P

Capt
MSgt
Maj
Maj
LtCol
MSgt
Capt
GySgt
LtCol
SgtMaj
GySgt
LtCol
Hqtrs MarFor CentCom
9th ESB 3d MLG
11th Mar Regt 1st MarDiv
3/7 1st MarDiv
MEF Hqtrs Grp I MEF
MarCor Augmtn & Transn
Spt Unit
9th ESB 3d MLG
Hqtrs MarFor CentCom
1st MarDiv (Fwd)

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation With Combat "V"

Basho, Brian M	LCpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Blasi, Nicholas E	SSgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Boundy, Kyle J	Sgt	1/8 2d MarDiv
Bowden, Joseph A	SSgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Bullock, Marc L	Capt	1/8 2d MarDiv
Carr, Eric W	Cpl	1/8 2d MarDiv
Cartheuser, Kyle J	SSgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Christian, Jeffrey T	SSgt	3/3 3d MarDiv
Cicchi, Michael P	Capt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Fritsch, Elliott M	LCpl	1/5 1st MarDiv
Garcia, Juan A	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Garcia, Kyle L	Sgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Gipson, Samuel H	Cpl	1/5 1st MarDiv
Grady, Sean R	Cpl	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv
Graves, Justin P	LCpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Hannon, Kyle P	LCpl	2/6 2d MarDiv
Haydel, Kyle J	Cpl	2d CEB 2d MarDiv
Jeffrey, Fitzwater D	PO1	2/11 1st MarDiv
Johnson, Eric C	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Kosh, Gregory W	Capt	1/5 1st MarDiv
Leon, David A	Sgt	1/5 1st MarDiv
Lovato, Reginald J	Sgt	3d CEB 1st MarDiv

Marcucci, Albert J	SCPO	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC	Espinosa Vanegas, Carlos A Farrell, Brian K	Sgt Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv 1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC
Martinez, Ernesto R	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Fattahy, Hussein E	PO3	2/4 1st MarDiv
Medina, Jesus M	SSgt	3/9 2d MarDiv	Forelle, Luke A	1stLt	3/3 3d MarDiv
Montano Jr, Jorge F	SSgt	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv	Franko, Michael J	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Obrien, Kyle R	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv	Fredonis, Jairo A	GySgt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Oman, Joshua T	LCpl	1/6 2d MarDiv	Friedrich, Carson T	LCpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Palmer, Greg M	Sgt	9th ESB 3d MLG	Fruehbrodt, Colin A	Cpl	5th ANGLICO MHG III MEF
Patrick, Larry S	GySgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC	Fryer II, Stephen D	Sgt	3/5 1st MarDiv
Pedroza, David R	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Galvan, Jose A	Cpl	1st CEB 1st MarDiv
Pulliam, Graham J	Capt	1st Recon Bn 1st MarDiv	Geiger, Caleb J	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Ramirez, Rafael A	Cpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Golden, Duriel C	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Reid, John P	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv	Green, Cory	SN	2/4 1st MarDiv
Roseberry, Ricky E	1stSgt	3d CEB 1st MarDiv	Greenleaf, Michael B	Cpl	3/7 1st MarDiv
Ross, Jason M	Sgt	3/8 2d MarDiv	Grove, Justin A	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Sanders III, Marvin W	Sgt	1/6 2d MarDiv	Halstengard, Tylor J	LCpl	2/6 2d MarDiv
Satcher Jr, Walton L	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Hansen, Casey L	LCpl	2/4 1st MarDiv
Shoemate, Jacob S	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Harrington, Timothy D	Sgt	1/25 4th MarDiv
Simmet, Brandon M	Sgt	Hqtrs Bn (Fwd) 2d MarDiv	Hinson, Collin C	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Sosa Jr, Ricardo	SSgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC	Hohl, Alexander J	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Southerland, David B	SSgt	9th ESB 3d MLG	Holland, Winston B	SN	1/6 2d MarDiv
Wickersham, Randall A	SN	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv	Ingram, Adam	SN	3/7 1st MarDiv
Williams, Thomas L	SSgt	9th ESB 3d MLG	Injerd, Russell P	Sgt	3/3 3d MarDiv
			Jonesfrance, Miles F	Sgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn MarForSOC

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement With Combat "V"

Adams, Dwayne	Sgt	1/5 1st MarDiv	Keffer, Joshua R	PO2	2/4 1st MarDiv
Amos, James M	Sgt	1/5 1st MarDiv	Kutch, Zane A	Cpl	3/7 1st MarDiv
Andrews, Ciaran M	Sgt	1st Radio Bn I MEF	Lee, Shields C	Sgt	1/6 2d MarDiv
Archer, Brian A	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv	Lindsay, Spencer S	LCpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Baia, Brandon M	LCpl	1/6 2d MarDiv	Louck, James L	SN	2/4 1st MarDiv
Bailes, Joshua D	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv	Magnacca, Christian D	Cpl	1/6 2d MarDiv
Bailey, Zachary J	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Maloney, Patrick H	Cpl	6th Mar Regt 2d MarDiv
Barnett, Benjamin M	Sgt	2/9 2d MarDiv	Marcucci, Steven	Sgt	1/8 2d MarDiv
Barrera, Garrett O	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Martinez, James R	LCpl	2/9 2d MarDiv
Barrett, Adam R	2dLt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Maxwell, Michael J	LCpl	2/9 2d MarDiv
Bellflower, Nicholas	SN	2/4 1st MarDiv	McAninch, Terry B	Cpl	2d Radio Bn II MEF
Bernstein, Maxwell F	2dLt	2/4 1st MarDiv	McElvenny, Eric M	Capt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Booten, Jonathan G	PO2	8th Mar Regt 2d MarDiv	Mitzlaff, Aaron D	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Bornowski, Clay D	LCpl	2/4 1st MarDiv	Murphy, Brian P	Cpl	3/7 1st MarDiv
Bosch, Ibrahim	Cpl	3/8 2d MarDiv	Naus IV, William F	Cpl	2/6 2d MarDiv
Boulton, William C	Cpl	1/5 1st MarDiv	Ornbaun, Cody R	SN	3/7 1st MarDiv
Bradley, Adam D	Sgt	2/6 2d MarDiv	Owen, Michael F	1stLt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Brewer, Ronald M	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Ponce, Emilio	PO3	2/6 2d MarDiv
Brown, Ryan M	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv	Price, Robert A	LCpl	6th Mar Regt 2d MarDiv
Burbank, Justin T	LCpl	2/6 2d MarDiv	Pritchard, Matthew T	LCpl	1/8 2d MarDiv
Coelho, Nata D	LCpl	1/6 2d MarDiv	Reck, Brandon L	PO2	2/4 1st MarDiv
Crandall, Nicholas B	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv	Rehberg, John E	2dLt	2/4 1st MarDiv
Cullen, Andrew M	PO3	2/5 1st MarDiv	Rogers, Derek J	SSgt	3/8 2d MarDiv
Czerepka, Joshua C	Cpl	1st CEB 1st MarDiv	Ruiz, Hiram V	Sgt	1/8 2d MarDiv
Davis, Robert E	LCpl	3/8 2d MarDiv	Runyan, Thomas A	LCpl	1st LAR Bn 1st MarDiv
Decou, Dustin P	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Skinner, Jovi L	LCpl	3/7 1st MarDiv
Doyle, Joshua W	Sgt	2/4 1st MarDiv	Swanson III, Roland D	2dLt	2/9 2d MarDiv
Earhart, Joshua L	LCpl	1/5 1st MarDiv	Whisenhunt, Jonathon R	Sgt	2/6 2d MarDiv
Eldridge, Kelvin J	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv			
Ennis, Christopher	PO3	2/4 1st MarDiv			
Escuela, Dominic A	Cpl	2/4 1st MarDiv			



**MARINE CORPS
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Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

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The Professional Association for All Marines

Editorial Policy and Writers' Guidelines

Our basic policy is to fulfill the stated purpose of the Marine Corps Gazette by providing a forum for open discussion and a free exchange of ideas relating to the U.S. Marine Corps and military capabilities.

The Board of Governors of the Marine Corps Association has given authority to approve manuscripts for publication to the editorial board and editor. Editorial board members are listed on the Gazette's masthead in each issue. The board, which normally meets once a month, represents a cross section of Marines by professional interest, experience, age, rank, and gender. The board reads and votes on each manuscript submitted as a feature article. A simple majority rules in its decisions. Other material submitted for publication is accepted or rejected based on the assessment of the editor. The Gazette welcomes material in the following categories:

- **Commentary on Published Material:** Submit promptly. Comments normally appear as letters (see below) 3 months after published material. BE BRIEF.

- **Feature Articles:** Normally 2,000 to 3,000 words, dealing with topics of major significance. Manuscripts should be DOUBLE SPACED. Ideas must be backed up by hard facts. Evidence must be presented to support logical conclusions. In the case of articles that criticize, constructive suggestions are sought. Footnotes are not necessary, but a list of any source materials used is helpful.

- **Ideas and Issues:** Short articles, normally 750 to 1,500 words. This section can include the full gamut of professional topics so long as treatment of the subject is brief and concise. Again, please DOUBLE SPACE all manuscripts.

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- **Book Reviews:** Prefer 300 to 750 words. Please DOUBLE SPACE. It is a good idea to check with the editor in advance to determine if a review is desired. Please be sure to include the book's author, publisher (including city), year of publication, number of pages, and cost of the book.

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

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
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A World War I Memoir

Recounting the war

by Ivan E. Kennedy



Left photo: Pvt and Effie Kennedy (front); Ballard Bryant (left) and Clara Erwin (right) in May 1918. (Photo by author.) **Right photo:** Pvt and Effie Kennedy, 3 May 1918. (Photo by author.)

I enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps at Cincinnati, OH, on 27 February 1918, and had basic training at Parris Island. After completing about 8 weeks of training at Parris Island, we spent a few days at Marine Corps Base Quantico before leaving from New York for France. The trip over was without incident, except that I was very seasick most of the time.

We landed at Brest, France, on 8 June 1918, and were there a few days quartered in old stone barracks used by Napoleon's Army. From Brest, we went to Chatillon, France. Here we got our gas masks and helmets. We loaded into

>Mr. Kennedy served with the 96th Company, 6th Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps, 2d Division, American Expeditionary Force, in France and Germany in 1918–19. Kennedy passed away on 4 November 1974.

railroad box cars and were taken to the frontlines, or just back of the front, in Belleau Wood, near Chateau Thierry. The last few miles were made in trucks and by foot.

We unloaded from the trucks late in the afternoon in dense thickets just

back of the position we were to occupy in a wooded ravine. The woods were under heavy shell fire by the Germans, so we waited until sometime in the night to move into the ravine. Some of our men never made it at all but were killed before we even got to the position we were to occupy.

It was there that the German Army reached the nearest point to Paris and was stopped by the American Marines on 6 June 1918. The woods were full of dead bodies from the battle, even parts of bodies were lodged in trees and hanging from limbs by clothing. During lulls in the artillery fire we bur-

ied all of the bodies near us. We dug a trench alongside the bodies and pushed them in with poles. Usually the toes of their boots were left sticking out of the ground. While here, we got food and water once a day, and that was carried in to us at about 0300 or just before daybreak.

Our next major engagement was near Soissons on 19 July 1918. We had been in a town on the Marne River called Nanteuil Sur Marne. We got new outfits here and baths in the river. A railroad bridge across the river and highway was being shelled by German artillery at regular intervals. I believe it was about noon on 19 July that we moved out of Nanteuil Sur Marne for the Soissons line. As we approached the railroad bridge, which also crossed the highway, I knew another shell was due to hit near the bridge. The truck I was in had just passed under the bridge when a German shell struck the bridge or the approach of it. Our truck was showered with shell fragments, rocks, and dirt, but no real damage was done. Some men were killed in the trucks immediately behind us and others were wounded. We were all night and most of the next day in the trucks before unloading near a ration dump. We broke open cases of canned rations, sacks of sugar, bread, and anything else we could find. This was the last food we had until after the Soissons battle was over and we had moved back from the frontlines. During the night after the Soissons battle (19 July), one of our boys went out foraging for food on the bodies of dead Germans. He found some canned meat, similar to our small cans of potted meat. I tried to eat some of it, but it would not stay down.

On our way up to the front, we met several bunches of German prisoners on their way back. There were also a lot of our own wounded men trying to get back. Some of the less seriously wounded were helping others who were not able to make it alone. All along the road were a lot of our men dead and dying.

We saw the French artillery in action and the French cavalry moving up. At the time, I could not see how men on horseback could be effective against machineguns and artillery. I still believe it was suicidal. We saw the cavalry ride

off toward the German lines but never saw any of them again. I doubt if any of them survived the attack.

We formed into lines or waves, with 100 yards between lines and 5 yards between men in the lines. There were four lines or waves of infantry with a line of tanks in front of our lines. I was in the third line or wave and near the left of the American unit. On the left of us was a unit of French Colonial Infantry. I believe they were Moroccans. They were tall, well-formed Negroes and seemed to me to be very calm and unconcerned about the whole business. It was not that way with us. I am sure we were all excited and scared. I know I was. My clothing was saturated with perspiration; even my shoes were full of perspiration.

Our captain (Clifton B. Cates) was struck in the back by a spent bullet.

Our lines extended across a valley that was a mile or more wide with low ridges on each side and with gentle slopes from the valley to the tops of ridges. Our position was a little below the top of the ridge on the left side of the valley. I could not see very far to my left, but I could see for a mile or more across the valley and the top of the ridge to the right. It was quite an impressive sight to see thousands of polished bayonets gleaming in the bright July sunlight.

A few enemy shells began falling among us as we formed our lines and a few men from our company were killed before we started to move toward the German positions. I remember that a lieutenant of our company was killed instantly by a shell about 40 or 50 feet from my position. Our captain (Clifton B. Cates) was struck in the back by a spent bullet. The bullet was hot and caused him to do some wiggling around before he reached back and pulled it from his clothing. His remark was, "Boys, I got the first bullet."

Now the tanks in front of us started moving toward the German lines, and

we followed them. At first, not many shells fell on our side of the valley. Most of them seemed to be falling down in the valley to our right. We could see men's bodies being blown high into the air. Some were hurled along on the ground like a bundle of rags. Some were just knocked down from the force of the explosion and got up again uninjured.

For a while we kept perfect formations. As gaps were torn in the lines, men on either side of the gaps moved to the right or left to fill the gaps again. Of course this thinned the lines but did not affect our formation. Our perfect formation was broken up by a barbed wire entanglement in front of the German trenches. They had left passageways through the barbed wire about 20 feet wide. We just simply broke formation and poured through the gaps in a mob. I could never understand why the Germans did not concentrate their machinegun and artillery fire on these gaps or passageways and wipe us out completely. After I got through the wire, I saw that machinegun bullets were kicking up dirt directly ahead of me about 20 feet away. I simply moved over to the right, out of the line of fire, and kept going.

Soon after getting through the barbed wire, we came up to the Germans in trenches. A lot of them surrendered. Some of them ran into a deep, wooded hollow or ravine a few hundred yards behind their trenches. By this time I was up in the front of our outfit. By getting up there I had gotten out of the artillery fire that was tearing us apart farther back. When we saw that some of the Germans were getting away, about 15 or 20 of us took after them hoping, I suppose, to capture them. The ravine bisected the valley and broke away from near level ground to a very steep wooded slope. We did not realize at the time that the Germans had a second line, or reserve, along the edge of the ravine. They did not fire on us coming in, probably because we were too near their own men. Anyway, the men we were trying to capture disappeared into the woods. We went over the edge of the ravine and into foxholes the Germans had dug into the hillside. The Germans immediately turned machineguns on our position,

and then we realized that we were in serious trouble.

Near us was an old brick building with no roof, doors, or windows in it. We ran into this old building, and they turned their machineguns on it. We were in a desperate situation and knew that before very much longer we would be captured or killed. We huddled in the corners of the building for a few minutes keeping out of their line of fire coming in. About 100 yards back toward our men was a line of slit trenches, just deep enough to allow a body to be below ground level by lying flat down. We decided to make a dash for these trenches. Most of us made it, but a few did not. One boy, Solomon Isaacs, was

paid little attention to their sniping because they were too far away to be accurate.

Our next major battle was the salient at St. Mihiel. The German Army had pushed this salient into the French lines in September 1914 and had occupied and fortified it for 4 years, threatening the cities of Verdun and Paris. This was an all-American effort under the command of GEN John J. "Black Jack" Pershing. There were several French divisions used by GEN Pershing, as well as much of the artillery and air support.

We practiced for this battle for several days. We marched back and forth through woods and thickets, in the rain, for 3 or 4 days. This was the kind of

We marched back and forth through woods and thickets, in the rain, for 3 or 4 days.

killed at the ravine. I was talking to him, urging him to get into a foxhole, when he was struck in the head by a bullet. Another boy was hit soon after leaving the old building. We were pinned down in the shallow trenches by machineguns until after nightfall.

Sometime in the night we were relieved by some other outfit and moved back to where our rolling kitchens were. We got a good meal there, the first food we had had since we had broken into the ration dump 3 days before. The woods here were literally shot to pieces from the barrage 2 days before. I came near to being killed by a falling tree while asleep. Some boys were killed by falling trees and falling limbs. Casualties for our regiment in this engagement were 63 percent. Only 55 men of our company were there at roll call. This meant that casualties for our company were greater than for the regiment average.

From there we went to a quiet section of the front and lived in a good-sized town. The town was Pont-a-Mousson. We were there about 10 days and got some much needed rest and sleep. We were about a mile from the German line, which was on high ground. They amused themselves by sniping at us with rifles as we went to and from mess. We

terrain we were to encounter when attacking the German positions, and we needed to learn how to keep our formation without getting lost or separated in the woods. Finally, we were ready.

We moved into position the night of 11 September 1918. The rain was pouring down, and the night was black as pitch. The congestion of men and equipment moving up was terrific. There were long delays in moving at all, and during these delays we either sat down or lay down in the road. Water from the downpour of rain was running down the road in rivulets and would even damn up against bodies if we were lying down.

At about 0100 our artillery opened up. This fire was so great that the whole countryside was lighted up. It was the greatest artillery barrage I had ever seen before this. It must have had a very demoralizing effect on the German Army. We reached our jump off positions at dawn the next morning. It was a line of trenches along the top of a ridge, and there was about a foot of water in them from the rain the past few days. We saw the first line of our men form about 1,000 yards ahead of us. As they started moving we climbed out of the trenches and followed.

At the foot of the hill was a small village. By the time we got there a dressing station had been set up and wounded men were being carried in, most of them by German prisoners. My memory of what happened after this is somewhat hazy. I do not remember if we relieved the front wave or if we merged with them. We spent that night in a deep cut through the top of a hill. The sides of the cut were very steep. Having an automatic caused me to have to stand watch all night. I dug a place out of the steep bank to stand on near the top of the cut and stood there in cold drizzling rain all night expecting a counterattack. The attack did not come, but it was a miserable night. The next day we reached the town of Thiaucourt. It was there that the Germans lost a great number of men, supplies, and guns. They even had trains standing on railroad sidings loaded with equipment. We dug in a hill above the town and watched it burn that night, having been set afire from artillery shells. From here until the end of this battle, we kept running into enemy positions.

The next morning we left Thiaucourt and at one place ran into enemy positions near a railroad. I believe it was there that our company commander was killed. He was Capt Minnis. Capt Cates had been promoted to major or colonel. We had almost reached the railroad under heavy machinegun and rifle fire when Capt Minnis was struck in the chest by a bullet from a rifle or a machinegun. He fell forward and died within a very few minutes. I was within 6 feet of him when he was hit. I can't remember much more about what happened there. The enemy in front of us may have surrendered, or we may have passed them. Anyway, we crossed a deep wooded hollow ending up on top of a hill on the other side. In front of us was open, level country with the enemy in a fortified stronghold about 500 yards away. As soon as we were in sight of them, they opened up on us with trench mortars and machineguns. We did not advance on this stronghold but moved to the right or left just under the hilltop, trying to keep away from the worst of the shell fire. We were relieved and moved at once to the Meuse Argonne front.



On the way to France, November 1917. (Photo from Merrill L. Bartlett and Jack Sweetman, *The U.S. Marine Corps: An Illustrated History*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 135.)

Sometime between St. Mihiel and the final phase of the Meuse Argonne we were sent to the Champaign front. After reaching the front, it was decided that we were unfit to go into the battle, and we were taken out for a few days of rest. As for myself, my shoes had worn out. Another pair had been found for me somewhere around the rolling kitchen. They were too large for me, and when we reached the Champaign, I was a cripple. The next morning when we started back, I was unable to walk. My feet were a raw, bloody mess. I was put on an ammunition cart or a wagon and came out with the company riding. After coming out of the Champaign sector we were in or near the frontlines on the Meuse Argonne front until the war ended on 11 November.

I can remember a few instances when we had real trouble with the enemy. At one time we were to start a major attack at daybreak. In front of us, at the foot of the hill we were on, was a system of trenches and dugouts held by Germans with machineguns. A small detail of my company was selected to take this section of trenches on the night before the main attack. We went out of our trenches at dusk, running and yelling, toward the German trenches. Before reaching the German trenches we ran into terrific machinegun fire. I ran into

some barbed wire entanglement that crossed a trench where I was. Instead of trying to go through the barbed wire, I decided to get in the trench and go under the wire. I had made one step over the sloping side of the trench when a machinegun bullet hit the top of my helmet. I fell forward into the trench and was stunned for a time. I don't know for how long. When I came around again, blood was running down my neck. I had a severe headache. My bayonet was sticking in the bottom of the trench with the rifle standing in the air. A machinegun was still firing bursts of bullets overhead through the barbed wire, and sparks were flying out of the wire. All of the men to the left of me were killed. There were three or four of them.

I soon realized that I was not seriously hurt. I kept still where I was lying until I felt a little better, and then I followed the trench on down to where the other men were. I never did know what took place in the German trenches. When I got there, no Germans were in sight. A French observer who had come along with us was firing his rifle, now and then, into some dugouts. I found out that all of the boys to the left of my position in the line were killed. Another bullet had gone through my clothing but had not touched me.

We started the main attack the next morning in heavy fog. We started up a slope toward a wooded ridge. It was open pasture land on the lower slope. There was a French unit on our left. A short distance up the slope we saw a group of German soldiers walking around in the open. They were not in front of us but were over to the left in front of the French who were not keeping up even with us. One of our boys walked over to a fence and laid his rifle on a fence post to get a steadier aim at the Germans. Since they were not firing on us, I believe they were simply waiting to surrender, and they persuaded the boy not to fire on them but to leave them for the French to take care of.

Our artillery was now putting a barrage into the wooded slope ahead and onto the top of the ridge. As we neared the woods, two German soldiers, possibly sentries or lookouts, came out of hiding and started for the top of the ridge. It seemed to me that it would be easy enough to take them prisoners, so one other boy and I took out after them. One of them went down, either from rifle fire or artillery shell fragment. We caught up with the other one who was squatted down at the entrance to a dugout made into the hillside. I was feeling pretty good at being able to make a capture when more Germans began pouring out of the dugout. I was very surprised and very scared. I backed away about 50 feet and held my rifle on the dugout entrance until they were all out and lined up in a column of fours. There were about 20 of them in all. I feel sure they were driven into the dugout by our artillery barrage and that if we had not gotten there before the barrage lifted, we would have had to face their machinegun fire. The prisoners were sent to the rear with a few guards. One of them was my buddy, Philip Redd.

I believe it was soon after we captured the Germans that we ran into serious trouble. At first we made some progress across fairly open country. There were dense groves of pine trees scattered over this area. We came to some trenches leading up a hill that was covered with pines on top. We had almost reached the end of one of the trenches when we were fired on by a

machinegun and rifles. A few of us were hit but not very many. We could see the Germans, with just their heads and shoulders showing above the trench. Most of us went down on our stomachs and started firing at them. This fight lasted only a few minutes when their machineguns stopped firing. A few minutes later we rushed into the trench. What Germans were left had escaped through the trench to the top of the hill. We did not capture a single man or get the machinegun. However, we did find nine of the Germans dead. They had all been shot through the head. There were no wounded among them.

At this time we didn't know what was on top of the hill, but we found out when we got there that it was an enemy stronghold. There was an elaborate system of trenches and dugouts, occupied by 400 of the enemy with dozens of machineguns and mortars. After taking the trench at the foot of the hill, we formed our line again and started up. Our line now extended across the trench with myself and three or four other men on the left side of it. We were instructed to stay on the left side and not to cross the trench. For a way the trench went straight up the hill then turned to the left around the side of the hill. We followed the trench through the pine woods to where the woods ended. As we stepped out of the woods into an open space, we saw a lot of Germans running for their trenches. They had seen us at about the time we had seen them. We ran into the trenches we had been following just in time to avoid a storm of machinegun bullets. All we could do now was stay in the trench back to where we had become separated from our company and follow them up to the top of the hill. They had been stopped by machinegun and trench mortars. Directly in front and to the right of the German position was open country. Evidently the outfit to the right of our company had attacked across open space and had been cut down in great numbers. There were American dead everywhere, as well as a lot of German.

It was here that I got myself into a very bad situation again. With me was a big Swede from Chicago who was up front for the first time, having come

over with a late replacement battalion. Since we were still separated from our company, we were acting on our own better judgment. Our attack had been stopped, and there was nothing we could do at this time. The thing we should have done was find some kind of shelter and stay there. Since Anderson had never been in combat before, he wanted to get up to where we could see what was going on in the German trenches. We managed to get into a deep cut across the top of the hill, about 100 yards from the German position. It was not necessary for us to be there, and it was a foolhardy thing to do.

There were about 15 of us in the cut, and we were soon spotted by the Germans. They pinned us down with machinegun fire and began lobbing trench mortar shells into us. The machineguns could not hit us, but the shell fragments could. A lieutenant near me was wounded. Another boy tried making a run to get out and was killed crossing the road. I knew we could not last long where we were and told Anderson to be ready to make a run across the road for the pine woods beyond. As soon as there was a little lull in the shelling, I gave the word to go. We got across the

road when a flock of shells came in. There were several men behind the bank of dirt and Anderson dived in among them. I kept going and found a utilities building with a concrete basement under it. This was a reasonably safe place. I had been in the basement a short time when stretcher bearers started coming in with wounded men. Anderson was the first to come in with both his legs broken. Three of the others were killed by a mortar shell. I never saw Anderson again but corresponded with him for a long time after the war.

We were held up in front of this stronghold until the next day. The 79th Company of Marines was brought up and went over on the Germans' position at dawn. Not a shot was fired by either side. Then the Germans surrendered. There were more than 400 of them.

One incident should be mentioned that happened before our company reached the German position at the top of the hill. It is of a personal encounter between our Capt Cates and an officer of the German Army. The German officer leaped out of a trench and leveled his lager pistol at Capt Cates. His pistol jammed, and he failed to kill Capt Cates. Capt Cates killed the German



Marines manning a 37mm gun in the Argonne. (Photo from Bartlett, p. 147.)

before he could free the jammed gun. A sergeant of our company then killed the German officer's orderly with a rifle.

After capturing the German stronghold on top of the hill, we moved ahead and soon ran into another stronghold as formidable as the one we had just taken. And our company made the attack and got close to the German position before we were stopped. There were just too many machineguns, and besides that we had reached the limit of our endurance. We backed out of the pine woods and into trenches. The Germans' long-range artillery now started bombarding us, while at the same time our own artillery was falling short of the German position and coming down on us. It was a time of almost complete despair for me, and I believe for nearly all of us. We were near collapse from exhaustion, having gone without rest, sleep, food, or water for more than 2 days. Fortunately we were relieved that night by some other outfit. I believe they were French.

I do not remember much that happened after this until we started the final drive of the war through the Argonne forest. The weather was bad. It rained nearly all the time, and when there was no rain, there was frost at night. We were wet and miserable most of the time. On our way to the front we passed through the town of Suippes. We met most of the population coming out of the town. The rain was pouring down, and the people were wet and plastered with mud. Some of our service organizations had set up shop by the road and were passing out cookies, hot coffee, and hot chocolate to them.

My job during the last few days of the war was directing traffic at a cross-road. It was under shell fire by the German artillery. While on duty there an American woman drove a car right into the intersection. I suppose she wanted a closeup look at what war was like. She saw it, for shells were falling all around.

At one time I had stopped traffic to allow a column of German prisoners to pass through. As they passed, a German shell struck squarely in the column about 100 feet from my situation. Bodies of men were scattered all over the place, including one of the guards. His legs were both cut off above the knees.

On 9 November 1918, 2 days before the armistice was signed, I came down with the flu and was in a hospital for a week or so. On Christmas Day, I rejoined my company at Rheinbrohl on the Rhine River. In the late spring of 1919, and due to the influence of Congressman C. Bascom Slemp, I was sent home. We left Marseilles, France, on an Italian ship and arrived in New York sometime in July. A few days later, I was home.



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'Fix . . . Bayonets!'

Spanning the spectrum of lethality

by Col Michael F. Belcher, USMC(Ret)

"The bayonet is always loaded and always operative."
—Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-1,
Marine Bayonet Fighting, February 1965

The evening of 27 July 1953 found Marine Corps forces manning a maze of interlocking trenches along a hotly contested ridge, aptly named Bunker Hill in South Korea. Over the previous year, American and Chinese forces fought repeatedly for control of the hill. As peace talks dragged on the opposing forces continued to dig in and actively aggress one another. Separated by less than 50-meters of barren earth, the Marines occupied the southern crest of the hill while Chinese occupied the north.

To the west of Bunker Hill on Hill 224, a platoon of Marines under the command of Lieutenant John "Obie" O'Brien, manned a small outpost. Lieutenant O'Brien was under strict orders to hold his post, and prevent the opening of an exploitable gap in the friendly lines. At 1000, 27 July 1953, the Peace Accords were signed, calling for a ceasefire effective at 2200 that evening. Despite the agreement, the Chinese continued to tunnel furiously toward Hill 224, intent on breaching the Americans' line and pushing them off the hill. Compounding Lieutenant O'Brien's predicament was the order by higher headquarters that roughly stated 'cease fire at 2100 and if one Marine so much as farts he is going to be strung up.' Confused, confounded, and growing ever more anxious, Lieutenant O'Brien called the Company Gunnery Sergeant to question the wisdom of this guidance. 'Gunny, they're still digging and are only a few feet away. What do I do if they get in

>Col Belcher was the Director, Marine Corps War College. He previously commanded 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, "The Cutting Edge," during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I, and 25th Marine Regiment, "The Cold Steel Warriors."

the trenches and I can't shoot?' The Gunny responded, 'Use your blades, Mr. O'Brien . . . Use your blades!'

With that, the command was relayed down the trench line from squad to squad, team to team, 'Fix . . . Bayonets!' Through the long, fitful night, the platoon sat silently in their trenches, poised with their safeties on and bayonets fixed. When daylight came without a shot fired, the Chinese and American forces rose up in their positions and stared at one another. The 'blades' had held the line.¹

While inspiring, 1st Lt O'Brien's heroic stand raises numerous questions regarding the bayonet's role on the modern battlefield. Is this ancient weapon of linear first-generation warfare still effective in asymmetric fourth-generation warfare? Are bladed weapons as applicable in today's Afghanistan as when Alexander's Macedonians conquered the region? Or have time and technology reduced bladed weapons to curious relics of the past, more useful for ceremony than conflict? Most importantly, can "the blades" still hold the line in counterinsurgency operations? To

answer these questions, it is necessary to take a step back in time to examine the bayonet's history before evaluating its application.

Historical Background

Originally a tool of defensive operations, the modern bayonet is a descendant of the 17th century pike. Pikemen, armed with a knife mounted on the end of a quarterstaff, shielded musketeers from infantry and cavalry attack as they reloaded. The joining of the musket and pike into a single weapon came in 1647 when Seigneur Marcel de Puysegur ordered his soldiers to insert their daggers into the muzzle of their muskets during a battle at Ypres, France.² Known as "plug bayonets" since the bayonet was lodged directly into the muzzle, they were effective at blunting cavalry charges but rendered the musket useless for further firing. In 1688 Sebastian Le Prestre de Vauban overcame this shortfall by designing the socket bayonet that slipped over the muzzle.

As the accuracy, range, rate, and lethality of rifled weapons improved, forces dispersed across the battlefield, and the bayonet's usefulness decreased. By the time of the U.S. Civil War, bayonets were responsible for less than 1 percent of battlefield casualties.³ Nonetheless, the bayonet retained brutal psychological effect on anyone facing it. On 2 July 1863, during the Battle of Gettysburg, COL Joshua Chamberlain's 20th Maine Brigade clung precariously to its position atop Little Round Top. Having repulsed two charges by the Confederate 15th Alabama infantry regiment, the brigade was fatigued, depleted, and dangerously low on ammunition. Recognizing the severity of the situation, Chamberlain shouted, "Bayonet!" The command "ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout."⁴ Inspired, his soldiers "sprang

forward" and charged down the hill, breaking the Confederate ranks and saving the Union flanks. In his report of the day, Chamberlain observed, "At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough."

The trench warfare of World War I sparked a resurgence of bayonet fighting. Mired in static positions by advances in artillery and machinegun technology, opposing forces often found themselves in close proximity. While artillery fire could demolish an enemy trench line, only an infantry assault could effectively clear and hold it against the inevitable counterattack. Consequently, the bayonet reemerged as an offensive weapon, generating many of the bayonet fighting tactics, techniques, and training practices still used today.

Modern military history is peppered with stories in which the bayonet was the decisive factor in the fight. During the Korean War, U.S. Army CPT Lewis L. Millett led the soldiers of Company E, 27th Infantry Regiment, in a bayonet assault against a Chinese machinegun position perched atop Hill 180, Soamni, for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor. More recently American and

British units engaged in bayonet assaults during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The most noteworthy of these occurred on 21 May 2004 when 55 miles north of Basra, Iraq, approximately 100 Shi'ite militiamen ambushed 20 British troops from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Forced from their vehicles and running low on ammunition, the British troops fixed bayonets and charged the enemy. Assaulting across 600 feet of open terrain, they engaged in intense hand-to-hand fighting, killing 20 gunmen and capturing 12 without a single friendly loss.⁵

Every Marine a Rifleman

Since 1775 when Marine sharpshooters first manned the rigging of naval ships to snipe at enemy combatants, the Marine Corps has taken great pride in rifle marksmanship. Adhering to the credo, "every Marine a rifleman," and that a Marine's primary weapon is his rifle, the Service has relegated the bayonet to a weapon of last resort. Because its weight alters a rifle's balance thus impairing long-range accuracy, Marines have traditionally been reluctant to fix bayonets until the situation was either

decisive or dire, either during the final assault or the last stand. Summing up generations of common perception, the 1957 Marine Corps manual *Bayonet Fighting* stated:

It is the spirit of the offense. The bayonet is an offensive weapon. It is symbolic of the spirit of aggressiveness. Cold steel at the end of a rifle brings fear to the enemy and an extra charge of courage and confidence to the man who can use it. Cold steel is the symbol of individual aggressiveness in the final assault.⁶

The manual goes on to describe the instances wherein the bayonet was effective:

- The final assault to drive the enemy from his defensive position.
- At night, on infiltration missions, when secrecy must be maintained.
- In close combat when hand-to-hand fighting makes the use of bullets impracticable or the loading of a rifle infeasible.

A later edition of the manual acknowledges another use citing, "In addition to its offensive roles, the bayonet can serve as a last ditch protective measure."⁷ This bias for offensive action, this singular focus on the assault, is reflected throughout the Service's bayonet fighting and training manuals. Accordingly, generations of Marines have viewed the bayonet as a binary weapon with an on/off switch of functionality, vice a rheostat of scalable capabilities. More simply stated, when the bayonet is drawn, the fight is on! Death is the only outcome. This combative psyche is captured in one manual's guidance that:

The bayonet fighter should be aggressive, ruthless, savage, and vicious. Herein lies the key to success with the bayonet. He must never pause in his attack until he has killed the enemy. He must follow each vicious attack with another, remembering that if he does not kill his opponent; his opponent will kill him. . . . The successful bayonet fighter strikes the first blow and follows up with the kill.⁸

Nowhere in its training manuals does the Corps recognize other, less extreme, less-than-lethal uses for the bayonet. It acknowledges no other tactical utility for the bayonet before the first blow or



A disarming technique demonstrated by Cpl Alvin "Tony" Ghazlo (right) at Montford Point, 1945. (Official USMC photo.)



Marines practice bayonet techniques aboard the USS Makin Island, 2011. (Photo by Cpl Gene Allen Ainsworth III.)

between the first blow and the kill. By not employing the bayonet across the spectrum of conflict—from lethal to non-lethal, kinetic (physical) to nonkinetic (psychological)—the Corps fails to fully capitalize on the capabilities inherent in this weapon. The first place to look for the bayonet's effectiveness is not in the hand but rather in the head of the combatants.

Warrior Mindset

By its very presence, the bayonet is a symbol of command authority and the courage necessary to employ it. Simultaneously a kinetic and nonkinetic weapon, the bayonet transmits a clear, unmistakable message not only to the intended target, but also to the combatant who draws it, and to all those who observe its use. The willingness to employ bayonets imposes significant psychological effects on the user, the unit, the adversary, and the audience at large.

Throughout history, edged weapons such as bayonets, pikes, and swords, have inflicted psychological effects on the enemy far beyond their physical

effects. Historically, bayonet charges were highly effective, regardless if any wounds were inflicted on the enemy. This is because the purpose of a bayonet charge was not to kill soldiers but rather to rout them and seize the ground they held. It was the flourish of the blade and the determination of its owner that sent shock waves through the enemy's lines, inciting them to capitulate or retreat. In his book, *On Killing*, LTC Dave Grossman, USA(Ret), observed:

Units with a history and tradition of close-combat, hand-to-hand killing inspire dread and fear in an enemy by capitalizing upon the natural aversion to the 'hate' manifested in this determination to engage in close-range interpersonal aggression.⁹

The second psychological effect is on the unit leader who gives the command, "Fix . . . bayonets!" Through his words, he announces to his Marines and all observers that he is fully in control of the unit and prepared to unleash its violence, if required. By voicing the command, the leader has to come to terms personally with what may lie ahead. He must overcome his natural fear of the

unknown and demonstrate the same to the Marines under his charge. His decisiveness in doing so sets the tone for all other orders that follow. Similarly, as the command echoes down from the platoon to the squads to the fire teams to Marines, it reinforces each subordinate leader's control of his unit, reiterating his authority to direct action and demonstrating his willingness to do so.

The command, "Fix . . . bayonets!" also alerts the members of the unit that the tactical situation has or will shortly change, and that they should mentally prepare to inflict violence. Like a preparatory command during drill ("Right . . . face") the order to affix bayonets provides the individuals with a mental moment to pause and prepare for violence. While normally a simple task, the physical act of affixing a bayonet in a hostile situation requires physical and mental self-awareness. It necessitates the individual to overcome his trepidation, muster his composure, and calm himself to perform this normally mundane function. This operational pause affords the Marine a moment to contemplate the tactical situation and

where within the spectrum of conflict he stands. Is the bayonet being affixed to fight or defend, to protect, kill, or control? Aware of himself and the tactical situation, the Marine is now better prepared to face any eventuality and respond accordingly.

Counterinsurgency Applications

Despite a storied history as an assault weapon, the bayonet's capabilities in counterinsurgency operations remain largely unrecognized and untapped. Nonetheless, by virtue of its multiple and mutually reinforcing physical and psychological effects, the bayonet is a superb tool for shaping the environment and "winning hearts and minds." It is the ultimate strategic communications device. Its presence broadcasts an unmistakable message to all audiences, louder and clearer than any bullhorn ever could.

First, by drawing or affixing bayonets, a unit or individual physically demonstrates the willingness to escalate the level of violence, as required. Frequently, this symbolic act alone is sufficient to dampen aggression and keep neutral and even hostile individuals at bay. Unlike rifles which require abstract thought from the observer to perceive their destructive effect, edged weapons produce an immediate instinctual fear in their target audience. Having seen or suffered lacerations in the past, individuals are intimately familiar with the danger that edged weapons pose, and they respond accordingly. Second, affixing a bayonet affords the Marine additional standoff distance between himself and a hostile individual. With the M9 bayonet affixed to the M16A4 Service rifle, a Marine is afforded 45 inches of standoff distance between himself and a potential adversary. Third, an affixed bayonet reduces the likelihood of an individual attempting to seize a Marine or his rifle. A person would be foolish to lunge at a Marine knowing that a slip or simple pare could result in a severe laceration. Fourth, effective employment of a bayonet allows a Marine the opportunity to incapacitate a hostile individual without inflicting life-threatening wounds. The bayonet can be employed along a spectrum of

violence from non-lethal to lethal in a series of progressively more destructive steps. For example, if a Marine is threatened he can level his weapon with the bayonet affixed to coerce his adversary to cease hostile action. If that action fails to deter his aggressor's behavior, the Marine can escalate his use of force by jabbing or slashing his opponent. If that is unsuccessful in deterring his foe, he can employ greater violence to include striking at vital areas or firing his weapon. If at any point the adversary becomes compliant or incapacitated, the Marine can revert to less aggressive means to subdue or secure his opponent. Last, the bayonet is a superior tool for controlling volatile populations, such as crowds and prisoners. It coerces compliance without risking the detrimental effects of an unintended or misdirected rifle shot. A bayonet strike is silent and subtle and therefore less likely to provoke a widespread response. Conversely, the sound of a single rifle shot can inject fear and hostility into the most docile group. Also, unlike a rifle round which can't be recalled once fired, a bayonet strike can be limited, isolated to a single individual, and more easily treated. But precision requires practice.

Training

To reap the tactical rewards of the bayonet, Marines must train with the bayonet on a routine basis. Too frequently training commences with a unit's bayonets secured in the armory, safe from rust, damage, or loss. Worst, when taken to the field, they are more often affixed to the hip than to the rifle and more likely to be used during chow than training. Unfamiliar with the weapon's capabilities, too many commanders are hesitant to direct its use, unknowingly sacrificing bayonet proficiency at the altar of safety to the detriment of both.


Despite fears to the contrary, the bayonet's benefits in training far exceed the risks. The first benefit is the warrior mindset it instills. The bayonet is a clear symbol to each Marine that he is a member of a profession of arms and may be called upon to inflict various levels of violence to achieve a mission. By using

it routinely in training, the commander signals to his Marines that they are expected to be proficient with the tools of their trade and are trusted to handle them appropriately. It is patronizing to train Marines for combat, yet not allow them to aggressively train with the bayonet for fear of injury or loss. Despite the best of intentions, such paternalism contradicts the intent of combat training, dampening the warfighting spirit of the training audience. Such overly protective habits instill reluctance not confidence, hesitancy not proficiency. In seeking safety, such restrictive safety measures shift the risk from the training venue to the battlefield where the consequences for hesitation or failure are much more severe.

Second, routine training with bayonets enables Marines to better understand the spectrum of conflict and the tools at hand to inflict lethal or non-lethal force. Armed solely with a rifle in a volatile and ambiguous situation, a Marine faces the unenviable and unretractable decision of whether to kill or not kill. His only options are black or white, diametrically opposed alternatives at either end of the spectrum of conflict. Conversely, the bayonet is adaptable to the tactical situation. It enables a Marine to traverse back and forth between nonkinetic and kinetic effects, between non-lethal and lethal actions, as required. By demonstrating in training that less lethal means are not only available but also potentially more applicable, Marines are more likely to capitalize on these options in conflict.

Third, the bayonet significantly enhances muzzle awareness, thereby preventing injuries due to negligent or misdirected fires. To observe a rifle and determine that it can cause severe physical injury requires abstract thought. It requires the observer to perceive intellectually that the unseen round will detonate, leave the barrel, and strike him producing damaging results. As a consequence, Marines routinely endanger the lives of their unsuspecting comrades by errantly sweeping the muzzles of their weapons across their bodies during training as well as combat operations.

The bayonet, however, is not an abstraction. It is immediately recog-



The French 151 Rifle Company during bayonet training. (Photo accessed at www.151ril.com/frencharmy.)

nized as being a threat. By its visceral effect and visual nature, the bayonet warns all observers where the end of the barrel is pointed. While Marines may not perceive the damage a rifle round can do, all are intimately aware of the injuries a sharp blade can inflict. Consequently, when bayonets are affixed to a rifle (whether sheathed or unsheathed), nearby Marines take notice and are acutely aware of the weapon's direction and distance. The change in weapons-handling procedures is immediate. No longer do individuals allow themselves or their fellow Marines to cavalierly sweep their weapons' muzzles across the bodies of unsuspecting comrades. Recognizing the danger, Marines quickly police their own, correcting errant weapons-handling procedures on the spot. Nowhere is this more evident than in urban operations. With bayonets affixed, entry teams allot great distance between members of the stack and exercise more care in the direction of their weapons while still maintaining an aggressive posture.

The risks of such training are real, but if properly managed, they can be minimized. A comprehensive operational risk assessment must be conducted of each potentially hazardous training event. Also, appropriate protective measures need to be implemented to include the posting of trained safety and medical personnel and directing the use of

sheathed bayonets, rubber bayonets, or personal protective gear. However, should an injury occur due to a mis-handled bayonet, the results are likely to be a single puncture or laceration, significantly less severe and more treatable than a negligently fired rifle round.

The Multipurpose Tool

In counterinsurgency operations as in combat, the bayonet has proven itself to be an effective offensive and defensive weapon, one that produces kinetic and nonkinetic effects well beyond its size and across the spectrum of conflict. It is the ultimate utilitarian warfighting tool, capable of shifting, incrementally or immediately, between non-lethal and lethal effects as the tactical situation warrants. Yet the weapon's effectiveness in combat is contingent upon the commander's willingness to employ it in training. Consequently, bayonet training must expand beyond its cursory role in the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program. It must be incorporated in all aspects of training—in the assault and defense, in conventional operations and counterinsurgency operations, while keeping the peace and controlling crowds, while patrolling streets and clearing buildings. Through more routine, repetitive, and realistic training, Marines must become accustomed to the bayonet and confident in its use. Concurrently, leaders at all levels must

become knowledgeable of the weapon's physical and psychological effects. They must learn to leverage its benefits and mitigate its risks. Growing "cautiously comfortable" with their Marines' routine handling of the weapon, they must gain increased confidence in their own ability to command and, subsequently, control its use. Only then will the blades continue to hold the line, but only if the first command—in training, combat, and contingency and counterinsurgency operations—is "Fix . . . bayonets!"

Notes

1. Letter from Col Robert Kummerow, USMC(Ret), to author, dated 1 June 2002, p. 1.
2. Since de Puysegur and his unit were from Bayonne, France, a town known for its dagger production, the dagger attached to the musket gained the title "bayonet."
3. Information accessed at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayonet>-cite_note-1#cite_note-1.
4. "Report of Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, July 6, 1863," *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 127 volumes, index, and atlas, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1880–1901, series 1, volume 27, part 1, p. 624.
5. Halpain, Edward, and Justin Walker, "Bayonets in Basra: A Case Study on the Effects of Irregular Warfare," Urban Warfare Analysis Center, Shawnee, OK, 27 January 2009, p. 5.
6. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Navy Marine Corps 1135–A03, Bayonet Fighting*, Washington, DC, 22 March 1957, p. 1.
7. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Fleet Marine Force Manual 1–1, Marine Bayonet Training*, Washington, DC, March 1965, p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Grossman, LTC Dave, USA(Ret), *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1995, p. 126.



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
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