MCA&F

By Lynn Montross - Originally Published July 1951

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade lost no time at going into action in Korea. On 14 July 1950, when the ground troops sailed from San Diego, their destination was Japan for a brief training period. During the next 10 days, however, the military situation deteriorated so rapidly that Gen Douglas MacArthur ordered the Brigade to proceed directly to Korea.

On 2 August, as the men landed at Pusan, the enemy was about 40 miles from that seaport. The next morning the main body of the Brigade moved east by rail to a bivouac near Masan in Eighth U. S. Army reserve. And on 7 August, the eighth anniversary of the Guadalcanal landing, the Marines launched the first of three counterattacks which would restore Eighth Army lines.

Not much encouragement could be derived at that date from the political and strategic background. As early as 10 May the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea had warned the United Nations Commission that North Korean forces were moving toward the 38th Parallel. He estimated their total strength at 183,000 men and 173 tanks, including 25,000 veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns. The ROK army, hastily built up from a national constabulary, numbered about 100,000 men. Most of the units had received little training, but there was a general lack of such arms as tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons.

On 25 June 1950, when the first NK columns crossed the 38th Parallel, it could not be doubted that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea was carrying out Soviet policies. Nor was it any secret that the invading army had been trained by Soviet instructors and armed with Soviet weapons.

The United Nations and President Truman met the challenge with dramatic promptness. Military sanctions were ordered against the aggressors on 28 June, and four days later the first U. S. Army troops landed in Korea.

On 2 July the Chief of Naval Operations, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, granted Gen MacArthur's request for a Marine RCT with its own air. This was the inception of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, made up of the 5th Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, and MAG-33-a total of 6,534 men, including supporting troops.

BrigGen Edward A. Craig commanded this air-ground team composed largely of troops stationed in California. On 13 July, as Marine embarkation began, LtGen Wallon W. Walker assumed command of the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), numbering 43,140 men in Korea and Japan.

Gen MacArthur had already warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 July to expect a major conflict against a well trained and equipped enemy. His prediction was confirmed during the next three weeks as U. S. and ROK troops fell back before materially superior invaders. Taejon (Map, page 30) had to be evacuated on 21 July when the line of the river Kum could not be held. The out-weighed UN forces, their left flank dangling, were unable to prevent the enemy from making an end run in the direction of Pusan.

Nonsan, Namwon, and Hadong fell in dismaying succession to invaders sweeping around to the UN rear, opposed only by militarized ROK police. Gen Walker met the threat on 25 July by shifting the 24th Division (less the 21st Infantry) to the Chinju area with a blocking mission. The North Koreans continued to make daily gains, however, with an estimated two to three regiments of the 6th Division. On the last day of the month they drove southward and eastward to the occupation of Chinju, about 50 miles west of Pusan. On the central front other enemy forces reached the river Naktong, and on the east coast a NK column pushed southward to capture Yongdok from ROK defenders.

EUSAK spokesmen described the situation as "fluid," but the Pusan perimeter was already taking shape. Taegu, the hub of the rail net, was about 50 miles from Pusan, which meant that EUSAK had a larger perimeter than its scanty forces could defend except at key points. The intermittent "line" of defense positions stretched) from the secondary port of Pohang on the east coast toa the Naktong, then dipped to the south coast in the vicinity of Masan, only 35 miles from Pusan.

This irregular semicircle, about 120 miles in length, or a smaller one, had to be held at the peril of a new Dunkirk. The defenders had only seven understrength divisions on 1 August. EUSAK consisted of the 24th Division and most of the elements of the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions - 42,199 men in all, including supporting troops. Air Force units added 3,527 to the total. Alongside these U. S. divisions were four battered ROK divisions, in action since 25 June.

Eleven enemy divisions had been identified by this date. The seven which launched the invasion were those numbered from the 1st to 6th, including a large proportion of veterans of Chinese Communist campaigns, and the 15th. Four more divisions, hastily raised from border constabulary units, were thrown into action before the end of July.

At the outset Gen MacArthur had necessarily to draw upon occupation forces in Japan, including many recent recruits not ready for combat. The first contingents, making contact with the enemy on 5 July, found themselves plunged into a melancholy land of bleak mountains and fetid rice paddies. Friend could not readily be distinguished from foe in a swarming Oriental population, and too often a group of supposed South Korean civilians proved to be disguised enemy soldiers.

Throughout July an atmosphere of failure and confusion oppressed the men at the front and communicated itself to the public at home. Pearl Harbor had been a shock that energized and united Americans in a day. Korea, in contrast, was only enough of a disillusionment to arouse grumbling. It was hard for soldiers and civilians alike to realize that an Asiatic peninsula might become the Spain of a third World War.

August threatened to be a critical month for Pusan, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Thus the arrival of the Marines was timely, following the debarkation of the 2nd Infantry Division and Army 5th RCT at Pusan the day before.

Reinforcements were sorely needed at a time when five of the seven UN divisions had neared exhaustion. Since the perimeter could not be held in strength everywhere,'EUSAK orders of 2 August called for counterattacks against penetrations to disorganize enemy columns, keep them off balance, and prevent them from launching a coordinated effort. At this turning point the Marine air-ground team constituted a welcome unit to be shifted from one sector to another as a mobile, selfcontained reserve.

On 4 August the Plans section of EUSAK completed a study of plans, later approved, for a counterattack along the Masan-Chinju-Hadong axis. Two days later Task Force Kean-named after MajGen William B. Kean, CG of the 25th Division-was organized with a mission of driving west toward Chinju to secure Masan, a secondary port, from future enemy attempts. The primary object was to prevent NK forces in the Chinju area from cutting the Eighth Army off from its Pusan base. This peril was considered imminent in view of reported large hostile troop movements toward the southern front. Later intelligence led to the conclusion that the main enemy effort would be made farther north in the Yongsan sector of the central front. But the plans were not changed, as it was hoped that the Chinju operation would relieve NK pressure on the threatened central front.

Task Force Keen had as its components the 25th Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (plus an ROK police company), and the Army 5th RCT. The main body of the Marine ground forces, after proceeding by rail on 3 August from Pusan to the Changwon bivouac near Masan, spent three days in EUSAK reserve. Routine patrols were sent out while the Brigade occupied tactical dispositions astride the Masan-Changwon corridor in preparation for further operations. Nervous bursts of night firing occurred in all battalion areas, but no casualties resulted.

These patrols were believed to have provided the occasion for the first air-drops of rations and water by helicopter as well as evacuation of heat casualties. The presence of an enemy patrol was confirmed only once, but no contact could be made with North Korean soldiers who abandoned their observation post and escaped.

The three days in EUSAK reserve were valuable as an orientation and training period. Despite its hasty buildup, the Brigade could be considered an outfit of combat-ready troops. The 1st Battalion, commanded by LtCol George R. Newton, was fairly typical. About 300 of the men had been training at Camp Pendleton when the Brigade was activated. Most of the remaining 400 troops of the battalion had thereafter joined from posts and stations on the West Coast. The latter had received no training with the battalion on field problems, but all were basically well grounded. An experienced and able group of officers and NCOs provided a high order of leadership. During the trans-Pacific voyage they conducted shipboard instruction at the squad and platoon level.

The Brigade moved into an assembly area at Chindongni (Map, page 30) on 6 August after being attached to the 25th Division. Relief of a battalion of the 27th Infantry was accomplished by 3/5, under control of CO 27th Infantry for this action. Gen Craig resumed full Brigade control after his other two battalions moved into attack positions that night.

A new chapter of Marine Corps history had begun, and it was fitting that a rifle platoon should draw first blood. Shortly after dark, while the Brigade was still under Army control, CO 27th Infantry directed that a platoon of 3/5 proceed several miles forward to protect the flank of a company reporting heavy pressure. The 1st Platoon of George Company and a MG section were sent by CO 3/5 with a mission of seizing a ridge line. During the advance the first Marine battle casualties of Korea occurred about 0500 on 7 August when enemy artillery shells wounded two men. Two hours later Lt John J. H. Cahill led 39 men up a slope swept by NK automatic fire. He took his objective at 0900, after making contact with the 27th's infantry company, and held for 24 hours under sporadic mortar and automatic fire until being relieved the next morning by Dog Company of 2/5. Six men of the detachment were killed and 12 wounded, in addition to heat casualties.

The story of the war in Korea might have been written in terms of such rifle platoon actions. Although the American public had been conditioned by irresponsible concepts of push-button warfare, the actual showdown called for the timeworn fundamentals of sound infantry training.

The attack plan of 7 August provided for the Army 5th RCT to jump off at 0630 from positions just beyond Chindong-ni after a brief air-artillery preparation. These assault troops had orders to pass through and relieve the 27th Infantry before advancing to clear the road junction west of Chindong-ni (Map, page 30). When that mission had been accomplished, the Marine Brigade was to jump off from the road junction and initiate its attack along the route toward Kosong. Meanwhile the 5th RCT would continue to advance along the northern fork of the road toward Chinju.

This plan remained in effect until the Army 5th RCT was held up by opposition northwest of Chindong-ni. CG 25th Division then directed that a battalion of Marines relieve the 2d Battalion, Army 5th RCT, so that the attack could proceed. This mission fell to 2/5 of the Marines, and at 1100 the battalion moved out from Sangnyong-ni. Enemy automatic and mortar fire held up the advance, but the extreme heat did as much to delay troops making an exhausting climb. At dusk the Marines had not been able to complete the relief, and an early morning attack was necessary to fight through and relieve the Army battalion. Eight men were killed and 28 wounded in the Marine battalion.

Such stubborn enemy resistance had developed in this area that three days and nights of slugging would ensue before the road junction had been fully cleared. This task absorbed the efforts of the Marine Brigade as well as elements of the Army 5th and 27th Regiments. At 1120 on 7 August Gen Craig was directed by CG 25th Division to assume command of all Army as well as Marine units in the area-a responsibility which he held until relieved by oral instructions late in the afternoon of 9 August after the road junction was cleared.

Where possible the Marine Brigade operated in a column of battalions passing through and relieving one another at successive objectives. Not only was the rugged terrain a factor, but the battalions still had only two rifle companies.* The great frontages typical of the Korean operations required battalions to commit two companies abreast, leaving no reserve echelon.

*At Camp Pendleton, as part of the transition from a peace to war footing, third platoons were activated on 5 July. Third companies did not join the Brigade, however, until after operations ended in the Pusan Perimeter.

Slow progress in clearing the road junction was made during the daylight hours of 8 August by the Brigade and Army troops against enemy units identified as the 83rd Motorized and the 13th and 15th Infantry of the 6th Division. The Marines learned to respect a hardy enemy for his skill at camouflage, ambush, infiltration and use of cover. They learned that supporting air and artillery fires often had limited effect on a foe making clever use of reverse slope defenses to offset Marine concentrations. Thus a ridge might protect and conceal an enemy strong point until attackers were too close for supporting fires. At that stage the affairs turned into a fire fight with small arms in which the North Koreans were at no disadvantage despite their handicap in air and artillery.

Rear areas and supply routes were seldom safe from infiltration. A noteworthy example was supplied on the night of 8 August when the enemy threw a road block across the Masan-Chindong-ni MSR behind 2/5, delaying the relief of that Marine battalion by a battalion of the 24th Infantry. CG Brigade ordered 3/5 to the rescue from positions in the vicinity, with two battalions of the 24th Infantry in support. Slow progress was made in staggering heat on the morning of 9 August. Artillery fires and napalm strikes were delivered to enable How Company to seize the high ground commanding the road block. Not until late that afternoon was the weary 2d Battalion relieved.

Meanwhile 1/5 had been ordered on 8 August to advance from defense positions at 2300 in conjunction with an Army 5th RCT effort to complete its mission of clearing the road junction. Although the Leathernecks had to cross a mile-long rice paddy to relieve an Army 5th RCT battalion, not a shot was fired at the single-file column. At 0600, after completing relief, the Marines attacked to seize Objective 1, the high ground to the immediate front. Again the lack of resistance was bewildering, and orders were received to continue the advance along the road toward Paedun-ni. About a third of the distance had been covered without opposition when the battalion set up defense positions for the night.

The late afternoon of 9 August dated a turning point. Army 5th RCT reported that the road junction had at last been cleared, permitting forward movement along the northern route toward Chinju. Three days of hard and often confused fighting had dislodged the enemy and forced him into full retreat along both roads in the direction of Kosong and Chinju. These results had been accomplished during a decisive first phase in which Gen Craig held overall command in the forward area. Then, on 10 August, Army elements of the 5th and 27th Regiments reverted from Brigade command to 25th Division control.

The fleeing enemy offered little opposition to the advance of the 10 August. After occupying Paedun-ni at dawn, the Marines advanced 10 miles along the road without any serious action except an attempted enemy ambush defeated by LtCol Harold S. Roise's 2d Battalion with air and tank support.

Fatigue and heat continued on 11 August to be the main foes of troops who had known little sleep or rest in four days and nights. As the Brigade moved toward Kosong against light opposition, the 35th RCT had covered most of the distance to Chinju along the northern axis. Pockets of resistance were encountered, but the enemy was withdrawing everywhere and even abandoning equipment. The 1st Battalion, llth Marines hastened this process by shelling Kosong. Enemy transport led a disorderly flight from the town, and Marine air had a turkey shoot at the expense of a column estimated at 40 vehicles. About half were destroyed and the rest damaged in repeated attacks by the Corsairs.

Although the UN forces were criticized for being roadbound, this episode hinted that the enemy had fewer difficulties because he had fewer vehicles. Only human transport could traverse the rice paddies and hilltops; but the North Koreans were driven to that expedient by UN planes which controlled the roads in daylight hours.

The enemy, according to EUSAK estimates, began the invasion with 122 planes of all types, most of which were destroyed by the middle of July. Only infrequent flights by single aircraft were reported afterwards, and Marine fliers met no resistance in their element. Despite the enemy's lack of air reconnaissance, his artillery was surprisingly effective at times. As an example, a 122mm projectile knocked out one of our 105mm howitzers with a direct hit on 7 August, killing two men and wounding eight of B Battery, 11th Marines. Enemy intelligence commanded respect, and his intermittent firing practices permitted well camouflaged gun positions to be long concealed from air observation.

The evacuation of Kosong occurred just as LtCol Robert D. Taplett's 3/5 passed through the other two battalions. Beyond the town the fast-moving advance troops bore down on the NK 83rd Motorized in the confusion of escape, and infantry combined with air to leave the road strewn with enemy dead and wrecked transport. Some of the Soviet-made vehicles were captured intact and put to good use by Marines slowed by transport shortages and limitations.*

*Many vehicles were left on the dock at San Diego because of shipping shortages. But the Brigade discovered that even the full allowance of equipment would not have been sufficient.

At dusk on 11 August, after reaching high ground 2,400 yards west of Kosong, the Brigade halted with orders to attack toward Sachon in the morning. The 1st Battalion leapfrogged the 3rd at daybreak and advanced for seven hours against negligible opposition to a ridge within sight of Sachon. It could hardly have been imagined at this moment that a beaten enemy was coiled to strike his two boldest blows of the campaign.

The first developed when 24th Infantry elements were surprised by enemy infiltrating 25 miles to the rear and overrunning artillery positions on the MSR west of Chindong-ni. At noon on 12 August, CO 5th Marines, carrying out 25th Division instructions, ordered 3/5 to the new road block by motor lift. Arriving at 1600, G and H companies attacked to secure their first objectives before dusk. Several hot fire fights took place the next day before How Company advanced with supporting air, artillery, and 4.2 mortar fires to clear the MSR.

Meanwhile, as the other two Marine battalions continued the advance toward Sachon, the enemy demonstrated that ambush as well as infiltration was an ever-present threat of North Korean tactics. At 1400 on 12 August the 1st Battalion, with a reconnaissance company detachment leading, entered a U-shaped defile east of the town.

This was the beginning of the affair known as the Sachon Ambush (Map, page 35). As a test of Marine and enemy techniques, it is perhaps the most instructive fire fight of the operation.

The reconnaissance detachment, acting as the point, promptly unmasked enemy intentions by spotting four NK soldiers hurrying toward their machine gun emplacements (Point C). Fire was immediately opened when return fire revealed additional positions (Points A). Baker Company deployed on the left side of the road and Able on the right.

A platoon of tanks, attached to the battalion, soon got into the fight. Maneuver was prevented by rice paddies lying between the road and high ground. But tank fires were directed by platoon leaders using such SCR 536s as had not been put out of commission by mud and water. CO Baker Company, after orienting himself, further briefed the tanks on his SCR 300. After rogering for this orientation, the tanks put down the fire requested by platoon leaders.

Tanks covered the laborious advance of the 3rd Platoon of Baker Company across an ankle-deep rice paddy to seize a hill on the left flank. Covered by these supporting fires, the 3rd Platoon reached the crest of Hill 202 but was driven back by superior enemy numbers counterattacking from the reverse slope. Artillery was called into action to get the platoon off the hill. The Corsairs strafed the indicated area with repeated runs, and artillery laid down about 30 minutes of fire.

Nearly every supporting arm had figured in a combat which might otherwise have cost Baker Company far more than the actual three dead and 13 wounded. At 1745 the battalion advanced again to occupy the high ground to defend for the night. This advance caught the enemy withdrawing and killed 38 at no cost to the Marines in casualties.

Word came just before midnight that the Brigade had 25th Division orders to move to a new front. In the 1st Battalion area the two rifle companies were separated by a gap of 800 yards covered by 4.2 mortars and artillery. At 0450, with the withdrawal beginning, a flare revealed artillery as well as 4.2 and 81 mortar fire laid down almost in the laps of the infantry. As a final touch, three 3.5 rocket launchers were credited with knocking out two machine guns and killing the crews.

By daybreak Baker Company had reorganized for a counterattack, but Battalion ordered the withdrawal to continue as supporting fires escorted the covering 2nd Platoon safely down the slope. This last fight cost the company 12 killed, 16 wounded, and nine missing, presumed dead.

The Leathernecks were reluctant to turn their backs on Sachon with the final objective within grasp. It doubtless seemed to them that the six-day operation had accomplished nothing, since Army units advancing on Chinju were also pulled back from their objective. But events were to prove that the enemy had been stopped cold after penetrating within 35 miles of Pusan-the high tide of the North Korean advance. Never again would the invaders be able to mount a serious threat on this sensitive southern front. In this operation Brigade estimates placed the casualties of the three NK regiments at about 1,900.

CG 25th Division ordered the Marines to withdraw from the vicinity of Sachon by motor and LST to the Chindong-ni area, and the 3rd Battalion (with its road clearing mission completed) reverted to Brigade control. The men proceeded from Chindong-ni by motor lift to the railhead at Masan, where they had their first hot meal since landing in Korea nearly two weeks before. Unhappily, the train pulled in before half of them had eaten. The Brigade reached its assembly area at Miryang on 14 August. There it passed by EUSAK orders to operational control of the 24th Division.

The Marines had scarcely time to clean their weapons at Miryang before being sent back into action again. Enemy pressure in the Naktong Bulge of the central front had created a menace even before the SachonChinju operation ended. This situation resulted in 24th Division orders for the Brigade to move by Army and organic motor lift on 16 August to previously reconnoitered positions in the Yongsan area (Map, page 35).

The NK 4th Division had established two Naktong bridgeheads and crossed to occupy strong positions along ridge lines. Farther north in the U. S. 24th Division sector, the NK 29th Regiment of the 10th Division had also penetrated east of the river. EUSAK concluded that the enemy would drive toward Taegu or attempt to sever the Taegu-Pusan MSR, and counterattacks were ordered to hurl the invaders back across the river.

Along the line of departure the Eighth Army forces consisted from left to right of the Marine Brigade, 9th Infantry, 34th Infantry, and 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry. Enemy forces east of the river were estimated at a reinforced division supported by artillery and tanks.

The fight of 17 August will always be known to the Marines by the name of Obong-ni Ridge. This enemy strongpoint in the immediate front of the Brigade consisted of mortar and machine gun emplacements along the reverse slope of a barren, rocky spur ranging from 100 to 150 meters in height.

The 2D Battalion led the Marine advance from a Brigade line of departure just east of the ridge, designated as Objective 1. As the men climbed the slope on a twocompany front, they were held up by flanking automatic fire from the vicinity of Tugok (Map. page 38) on the right and right rear. This opposition came from the zone of the 9th Infantry, which had met heavy resistance on ridges north and east of Tugok.

The delay in the 9th Infantry advance compelled the Marine Brigade to ask permission for neutralizing the Tugok area with air and artillery fires. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion fought its way to the top of Obong-ni Ridge three times, only to withdraw to defense lines halfway down the slope after finding the position untenable. Repeated Marine air strikes blasted the enemy along the reverse slope, but in effect was limited by a shortage of the napalm bombs which would have been better for this work than the high explosive used.

Dog and Easy Companies held tenaciously as the enemy rolled fragmentation and concussion bombs down the slope. At 1500 the 1st Battalion passed through to continue the assault. Advancing in platoon columns against flanking as well as frontal fire, Able and Baker companies paid with casualties for every foot of stony ground. The sun had set when the battalion fought its way to the top, and during the last minutes of daylight three NK tanks approached on the road curving around the ridge into Marine positions.

Up to this time Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had encountered no enemy armor. But on the evening of 17 August a Marine tank platoon, supplemented by 75 recoilless and 3.5 rocket fires, finished off the three hostile tanks in a few seconds, killing all crews. More lessons would be needed, however, before the enemy amended his suicidal tactics of attempting to harass infantry or raid supply lines with unsupported armor. Meanwhile the Marines continued their close cooperation between tanks and infantry, each supporting and protecting the other.

The men of the 1st Battalion expected a counterattack on Obong-ni Ridge and they were not disillusioned. At 0230 on 18 August the glare of 81mm illuminating shells revealed the enemy closing in rapidly. Each NK squad in turn ran forward, hurling grenades and firing burp guns, then hit the deck while another squad advanced. Although the Marines opened up with everything they had one platoon area was isolated and two others penetrated. It was nip and tuck until daybreak, when air and artillery supporting fires aided in restoring positions. By that time Able Company had four officers and 100 men left, while Baker Company had been reduced to two officers and 110 men.

At 1000 the 3rd Battalion passed around the right flank and swept on to take Objectives 2 and 3, the high ground beyond Obong-ni Ridge. Opposition was light and large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured. Enemy resistance seemed to have been broken by heavy losses, and North Korean troops were swimming the Naktong to escape.

Marine ground forces agreed that the close air support in this operation merited superlatives. VMF-214 and VMF-323, operating from aboard the CVE Sicily and CVE Badoeng Strait, had worked out an effective alternating system for tactical air. After aiding in the reduction of all three objectives, the Corsairs found lucrative targets in the North Korean forces streaming back across the Naktong in disorderly retreat.

In the haste of withdrawal the enemy abandoned much equipment, including artillery, after suffering casualties estimated as high as 4,000. The Army units had met much less resistance on the Marine right, and all forces continued on 19 August to mop up the last pockets of resistance east of the river. Marine patrols were able to make no contact with the enemy that afternoon as orders released the Brigade from 24th Division to EUSAK control. Relief was effected by elements of the 24th Division in defense lines along the high ground of Objective 3. all units closed Yongsan that night and proceeded on 20 August to an assembly area at Changwon in EUSAK reserve.

The period from 22 August to 2 September was devoted to training in weapons familiarization and small unit tactical problems. Several hundred replacements joined the Brigade. Patrols were sent out behind the 25th Division zone of action, and the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines was detached to CG of that division by EUSAK orders to conduct supporting fires in the Chindong-ni area.

Late in August it became evident that the enemy was poised for a strong new effort to smash through the Pusan perimeter. Several new units had been hastily organized from constabulary troops, so that NK strength was estimated at 13 infantry divisions, three security regiments, an armored division, and two separate armored regiments - a total of about 133,000 men.

On 1 September, when the blow fell, the Marine Brigade was alerted at 0810 by CG EUSAK for a possible move to some unknown destination. At this time all units were engaged in transferring heavy equipment and supplies to Pusan for the contemplated amphibious landing which would later be known as the Inchon-Seoul operation. Brigade orders were immediately issued to suspend embarkation preparations and stand by for EUSAK orders.

At 1215 EUSAK directed the Brigade to proceed by motor to Miryang (Map, page 35). The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines reverted to Brigade control on this dale and rejoined the infantry battalions.

All units closed Miryang by 0630 on 2 September and moved by orders of CG EUSAK toward Yongsan (Map, page 39). Enemy gains east of the Naktong had created the urgent necessity for counterattacks. Yongsan itself had fallen when EUSAK ordered a reinforced Marine battalion to move into the vicinity and protect movement of remaining Brigade elements into an assembly area. There the Marines were to prepare for operation in the 2d Division sector.

After being briefed by CG 2nd Division in regard to the enemy breakthrough, Gen Craig made recommendations for the employment of the Brigade. The 2d Division plan of maneuver called for the 9th Infantry, which had retaken Yongsan, to hold the high ground 800 yards to the west until the Brigade could pass through the next morning and continue the attack. The 23rd Infantry and 38th Infantry were in line to the right, and the high ground on the left was occupied by a special task force made up of the 72nd Tank Battalion and the 2nd Engineer Battalion. No other force was available to protect 2d Division's left flank. Enemy forces in the immediate front were believed to be elements of the 2nd, 4th and 9th NK Divisions.

At 0300 on 3 September the Marines moved out to attack positions only a few miles northeast of Obong-ni Ridge. This was the first time that the Brigade used a formation of two battalions abreast and one in reserve. The jump-off was delayed 30 minutes by necessity of fighting to the line of departure 800 yards west of Yongsan. But shortly after dawn the infantry went forward against heavy resistance consisting of automatic, tank and artillery fires.

Brigade tanks destroyed four T-34s and the ground troops inflicted an estimated 500 casualties during the first day's advance. The 2d Battalion, which met particularly stiff opposition, had casualties of 18 dead and 77 wounded.

At dusk, after seizing high ground about 3,000 yards west of Yongsan, the 1st and 2nd Battalions dug in and occupied defense lines for the night. On 4 September the Brigade continued the attack at 0800 as the 3rd Battalion passed through the 2nd and advanced on the right of the 1st. The assault troops gained an average of 3,000 to 4,000 yards against moderate opposition and took the high ground designated as Objective 1.* CG 2d Division authorized a farther advance to phase line two, and the Brigade pushed ahead about 1,000 yards past Objective 1 before consolidating positions for the night.

*Fewer and briefer reports were made of the second Battle of the Naktong than the two preceding operations. This is understandable when it is recalled that the Brigade had on short notice interrupted active preparations for embarkation to help meet this new threat in the Naktong Bulge area.

Again Marine close air support was magnificent, accounting for many of the enemy dead which littered the roads along with abandoned equipment. Marine tanks and antitank fire knocked out two T-34s and four antitank guns during the day. Counterbattery work by 1/11 resulted in the destruction of an estimated nine field pieces and the killing of several hundred retreating NK troops.

On 5 September the Brigade advance scheduled for 0730 had to be postponed until 0815 because of an enemy counterattack in the 9lh Infantry area on the right. Rains favored the enemy by making OY observation and close air support impossible. Marine artillery fires, moreover, had to be given the 9th Infantry to aid that regiment in restoring its positions. These factors limited the Brigade artillery preparations to barely five minutes. Nevertheless; the Leathernecks covered 2,500 to 3,000 yards that morning against moderate opposition.

Another NK counterattack developed at 1410 in the 1st Battalion area as an estimated 300 enemy struck with three tanks. Two of our M-26 tanks, firing on troop targets in infantry support, did not observe the approach of the T-34s and were disabled by enemy tank fire, though both crews escaped. All three NK tanks were destroyed by rocket fire laid down by the 1st Battalion.

Meanwhile Baker Company succeeded in stopping the counterattack with 81 mortar fire at a cost of two killed and 26 wounded.

That afternoon EUSAK orders released the Brigade from 2nd Division operational control for movement to Pusan by motor and rail. After securing high ground and consolidating positions overlooking near-by Obongni Ridge, the Marines were relieved at midnight by elements of the 2nd Division. The movement of the Brigade to Pusan was completed by 1100 on 7 September, and heavy equipment arrived by rail from Miryang.

The Leathernecks were not in on the finish, but the back of the enemy offensive had been broken before they left. And the second battle of the Naktong ended with 2nd Division forces pushing the invaders back until the central front was out of danger.

Altogether, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had fought three difficult operations in a month while traveling 380 miles with a third of its organic transportation plus Army vehicles. It is a safe assumption, on the basis of field estimates, that these fights resulted in troop and equipment losses that the enemy could ill afford. And though there is no such thing as a "light" casualty list from a personal viewpoint, a total of 169 Marines killed in action, 720 wounded in action and 12 missing in action was a remarkably low price to pay for the gains achieved.

After the arrival of replacements, third companies joined the Brigade on 7 September. Already the men were training for the next test amid preparations for debarkation. The 3rd Battalion had been designated as the advance landing force for the forthcoming amphibious operation, and rehearsals were conducted in the Pusan area before embarkation on 12 September.

Lacking the perception of hindsight, the departing Marines could not evaluate their contribution to the counterattacks which held the Pusan perimeter. But the Brigade had been summoned three times as a hard-hitting mobile reserve, and on each occasion the Leathernecks sent the enemy reeling back at a critical moment. Events would prove after 15 September that these operations were comparable to solid left jabs setting up an opponent for the knockout. For it was a bruised and bleeding North Korean Army, still hammering futilely at the Pusan perimeter, which had the key to its communications, threatened a week later in the Inchon-Seoul amphibious operation.