MCA&F

April 21, 2014. The successful test flight of two CH-53s marked a significant milestone for the U.S.’ alliance with Australia: 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (TF 1/5), the first battalion-sized task force to rotate to Darwin, Australia, as the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D), achieved full operating capability. Throughout the next 6 months, the Marines and sailors of TF 1/5 proved the utility and feasibility of larger MRF-D rotations: they capitalized on access to world-class training areas, identified unique opportunities for combined interoperability training with the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and served as military diplomats to the local Darwin community while enjoying Australian hospitality.

After the first MRF-D rotation in 2012, the Gazette published two articles introducing MRF-D to the Marine Corps.³ While the second rotation was substantially unchanged from the first, TF 1/5’s deployment marked a crucial expansion in the development of MRF-D. This 2014 rotation broke new ground in validating the long-range MRF-D growth plan because it marked the dramatic increase in the rotational force’s size and capability. Just 2 years after the initial rotation of a single rifle company, the 2014 rotation brought a special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) to Australia. The growth from a force of roughly 200 Marines to a MAGTF was significant in terms of expanded capabilities and increased personnel and material footprint—more than 1,100 Marines and sailors along with 142 military vehicles, 106 containers, and 4 heavy lift helicopters. As a MAGTF, TF 1/5’s use of exceptional training facilities and its opportunities for interoperability with the ADF were robust to a degree that was not previously possible.

Because of the important role that MRF-D plays in the Marine Corps’ future force posture in the Pacific and the unique nature of this recent rotation, TF 1/5’s leadership is writing a number of articles about aspects of the deployment. As an overview, this article summarizes the deployment and introduces the other articles. It covers basic facts about this MRF-D rotation, comments on some of the successes and lessons learned, and suggests areas for development during future rotations.

Mission and LOOs

Initially announced in November 2011 by President Barack Obama and then-Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, MRF-D is the most tangible aspect of the Pacific rebalance and a critical aspect of the U.S.-Australia alliance. It is an important part of the Marines Corps’ future. and the MRF-D rotational model could serve as a model for conducting other regional engagements. The longer presence allows increased training opportunities, particularly regarding interoperability development when compared to a transiting MEU or episodic theater security cooperation exercises. Yet the rotational basis alleviates political sensitivities associated with permanently basing U.S. forces in a foreign nation.

Given this strategic background, TF 1/5’s mission focused on ensuring that we set the conditions to get to “Phase IV”—the final phase in the force growth plan in which MRF-D rotations will be MEU-sized MAGTFs of approximately 2,500 personnel. To achieve these conditions, we focused on four lines of operations (LOOs).⁴

1. Readiness. Proving that a unit executing MRF-D could maintain and even increase combat readiness while deployed by taking advantage of world-class training areas.

2. Interoperability. Capitalizing on the unique relationship of being partnered and collocated with the ADF’s 1st Brigade (1BDE), TF 1/5 exercised command and control of combined Australian and U.S. task forces and developed procedures for integrating fire support, logistics, and other combat capabilities.

3. Military diplomacy. Ensuring the Marines and sailors of TF 1/5 represented the U.S. and the USMC to the local civilian population as well as the ADF, and recognized our presence as valued added to their communities.

4. Range and training area development. Viewing the Australian training areas from afar, they are clearly promising despite having been only lightly used by Marines (and some even by the ADF). We set out to prove what was in the realm of the possibility by actually doing it.

Task-Organization

A unique SPMAGTF built around 1/5 executed the third MRF-D rotation in 2014. The ACE consisted of a four CH-53E detachment from HMH-463 and included a Marine aviation logistics squadron, Marine air control group, and Marine wing support squadron enablers from the 1st MAW. The LCE consisted of CLD-331 (Combat Logistics Detachment 331), a task-organized company from CLB-3 (Combat Logistics Battalion 3) augmented with enablers from 1st Marine Logistics Group. Each had roughly 160 personnel. Lacking a separate command element (CE), 1/5’s staff, augmented by a few enablers,⁵ served as both the GCE headquarters as well as the overall task force CE. The augments were critical as the battalion task force reached the limits of its command and control capabilities. An aggressive operational tempo as well as exercises dispersed across the continent of Australia required splitting the headquarters to allow concurrent planning and execution on a scale normally associated with higher-level headquarters.

The most notable aspect of this task organization was the nonstandard aviation command relationship in which the aviation detachment was attached directly to an infantry battalion. This created a host of questions and had multiple implications for risk and safety assessments, training, and maintenance management: How does an infantry battalion commander with no aviation experience acquire the requisite awareness to understand the risks he is accepting when approving flight schedules? Who owns the aircraft? How does readiness reporting for this task force work? How does the aviation detachment, attached to the infantry battalion, report aviation-specific reporting?

With no precedent, we worked to arrive at acceptable solutions, though they required a great deal of flexibility by all parties. While initially difficult, the result of this task organization was an exceptional level of integration between ground and air elements that permeated all levels of the command. Over the course of the deployment, every infantry company executed multiple company-level live fire air assault operations, and almost every week the task force conducted air assault tactical exercises with key leaders riding in the CH-53Es and talking directly to the pilots and air crewmen. The quantity and quality of this interaction is found nowhere else. More profoundly, the leaders from both the battalion and aviation detachment got to know each other in settings beyond just tactical planning; the social interaction, chances for junior infantry leaders to sit in the jump seat, tour each other’s facilities, and the aviation maintainers and air crewmen opportunities to observe infantrymen conducting live fire attacks in the field led to a much better understanding of each element’s perspective of the battlefield.

Exercise and Training Schedule

Through the 6^1/2 month deployment, TF 1/5 executed an aggressive schedule of independent, bilateral, and theater security cooperation (TSC) exercises that honed the task force’s combat readiness, provided numerous opportunities to enhance interoperability with ADF and other partner nation units, and validated the capacity to conduct complex, large-scale live fire combined arms exercises in the Australian training areas. Additionally, we executed numerous independent exercises executed during the first 3 months that included company (reinforced) air operations integrated into both blank and live fire training, key staff traveled to New Zealand to participate in Exercise Alam Halfa, and Marines and soldiers participated in several individual- to platoon-level integrated training exercises. Crucial during these first 3 months was the detailed planning and command post exercises (CPXs) that set the conditions for successful large scale bilateral exercises during the deployment’s latter half. These exercises included Southern Frontier (SOFRO), Hamel, and Koolendong.

SOFRO is a 1st MAW bilateral exercise focused on offensive air support and executed with limited ground integration. However, TF 1/5’s presence enabled the integration of a battalion-level fire support coordination center, 81mm mortars, the tactical air control party, and company fire support teams. It also afforded the unique opportunity to form and employ combined ADF-USMC observer teams that included ADF observers and a communications exercise (COMMEX) with an ADF artillery battery. The ability to integrate these fire support agencies and nodes in this way was, as best we can tell, unprecedented and served as a critical step to executing more aggressive integrated combined arms training during Exercise Koolendong.

Hamel provided TF 1/5 the ability to exercise command and control as a part of an Australian combined task force while conducting a multiweek force-on-force exercise. Integrated into the Australian opposing force (OPFOR) element, TF 1/5 reported to an ADF higher headquarters, and received an attached ADF rifle company and electronic warfare and ground-based air defense units. The immersive multiweek force-on-force scenario enabled the task force staff to participate in the Australian military planning process while responding to live intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that reported on an evolving enemy situation. While USMC units have participated in Hamel and Talisman Saber, this was the first time Marines participated to this scale. Having a battalion-level headquarters, along with multiple company-sized maneuver units allowed us to develop a degree of interoperability that was previously not possible.

TF 1/5’s culminating exercise was Koolendong, a month-long exercise at the remote Bradshaw Field Training Area (BFTA) involving combined arms, live fire and maneuver training from platoon- to battalion (reinforced)-level and showcased groundbreaking integration between Australian and U.S. forces. The ADF attached more than 300 soldiers from aviation, fire support, armor, logistics, and command and control units to TF 1/5. Not only did this exercise provide an exceptional level of integration between ADF and USMC forces, it was the first time BFTA had been used to this scale and proved its potential as a premier training facility. Because Koolendong was such a robust and novel exercise—and will likely grow in importance in the future—a separate Gazette article will provide additional details and discuss opportunities for future expansion.

Successes, Challenges, and Lessons Learned

Of the many unique opportunities and challenges on this deployment, four stand out as particularly important: (1) developing command and control, aviation, and fires interoperability with ADF forces; (2) observing and learning from Australian training practices; (3) serving as military ambassadors to the local population; and (4) participating in the Australian Mess and developing esprit de corps among the task forces’ officers and SNCOs. Several of these topics merit detailed attention—namely interoperability, military diplomacy, and the Mess—and are each the subject of a separate article.

After spending the past decade executing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq alongside host-nation military and police forces that are vastly inferior to the United States military, working with and learning from the highly competent ADF was refreshing. While obvious in retrospect, a decade of focusing on “putting an Iraqi or Afghan face” on low-level operations required a significant paradigm shift. In particular, integrated operations at the platoon- or squad-level that involved pairing Marines with soldiers from a foreign military were of limited value. While we did execute some tactics, techniques, and procedure exchanges with the ADF at the individual and small unit level,⁶ the goal of the small unit training events was building camaraderie, mutual respect, and understanding vice directly developing the partner’s combat capability. Instead, bilateral training focused on higher order interoperability such as command and control while integrating cohesive company-sized units and capabilities such as fire support, aviation, and intelligence. Fire support and aviation integration proved particularly challenging and rewarding; after several months of developing procedures to account for doctrinal differences in employment, we were able to employ live-fire Australian artillery and rotary-wing fires in support of USMC ground and heliborne maneuver forces.

Working with the Australian Army was also rewarding as we observed several practices they execute particularly well which could be adopted, when appropriate, by Marines. Most notably, the ADF does an excellent job of integrating tactical planning and decision making into their exercises. Almost all training, from live fire events to lane training rotations include well-developed tactical scenarios that force small units to practice fieldcraft and maintain a tactical mindset while allowing intelligence integration and providing a greater context to leaders’ tactical decisions. Relatedly, the ADF expends significant resources to execute large-scale, relatively free play, force-on-force exercises. These events provide leaders at the company, battalion, and even brigade level the opportunity to exercise decision making and staff planning as they plan in the midst of an evolving scenario with real-time intelligence reporting. For instance, memorable moments from Exercise Hamel include those when updated intelligence reports forced the task force to shift from its primary course of action to a backup contingency plan less than 4 hours before execution and then, during execution, unanticipated enemy action required the development of a radio issued battalion fragmentary order within minutes. Lastly, except for some basic static live fire ranges, ADF ranges are all designed and built by the unit. This allows a great deal of freedom in choosing objectives and allowing units to develop their own scheme of maneuver. It also forces unit leaders to work with terrain and vegetation, analyzing and selecting key terrain for tactical control measures, rather than relying on the pre-cleared positions associated with the range regulation’s prescribed scheme of maneuver. This flexibility allows live fire ranges to be part of a comprehensive tactical scenario vice a discrete event. These practices do come at a cost—they require significantly more time to plan, set up, and execute—and as such they reduce throughput at any discrete event. However, the benefits for tactical decision making are tremendous.

As with any deployment involving residence in a foreign country, MRF-D is as much a political endeavor as it is a military one. One of the main goals for the unit was to cultivate and project a positive image of the United States Marine Corps to the Australian locals. Our ways for doing this were multifaceted and included everything from volunteering in local schools and participating in civic ceremonies to media engagement to deliberate regulations regarding liberty, which encouraged Marines to self-police each other while on liberty in order to prevent embarrassing liberty incidents. While initially nervous about the large Marine presence, civic leaders ended the deployment with unanimously favorable impressions about the Marines and are eagerly anticipating the next rotation’s arrival.

Lastly, the Australian Mess is an institution that is unfamiliar to Marines, but its tangible and intangible benefits merit examination for features that we might emulate. Based on the British system, the Mess functionally serves as a dining facility and club. The Australians and British, however, capitalize on this functionality to encourage social interaction, unit camaraderie, esprit de corps, and even family readiness. These benefits indirectly enhance professional development and unit effectiveness. The mess is a critical part of the Australian military’s social ecosystem; having been a member of the Robertson Barracks’ Officer Mess for the past 6 months, there are aspects of the experience that are worth implementing in CONUS.

The Future of MRF-D

TF 1/5’s MRF-D 2014 deployment suggests several ways in which the program should continue to expand and how it could continue to increase in importance within the Marine Corps and the Nation’s Pacific Rebalance. First, TF 1/5’s experiences demonstrate that increased capabilities provide unprecedented opportunities for integrated interoperability training. MRF-D should be recognized as more than a symbolic and tangible example of the U.S.–Australian alliance, but as the premier means for testing, exercising, and enhancing interoperability between the ADF and USMC. It could be the means for experimenting with new procedures and techniques to operate as and employ a combined bi-/multilateral force. Viewed in this light, the sooner additional capabilities—indirect fire assets, rotary-wing attack platforms, and armored vehicles should be the priorities—are brought to Australia for the MRF-D, the sooner we can validate, refine, and exercise our procedures for conducting an even greater degree of combined operations.

As a corollary to this principle, the exercise schedule for MRF-D rotations should receive higher level attention from both U.S. and Australian operational commands and at the Service level as they deliberately schedule combined bilateral exercises designed to allow the kind of interoperability experimentation necessary to maximize combat readiness as a combined force. A grass roots approach to interoperability, as was executed during by TF 1/5 during the 2014 rotation, can validate potential and make some progress; however, additional attention at the combatant commander and Service component (U.S.) and Joint Operations Command/Forces Command (Australia) level to set priorities, allocate resources, and jointly agree to times for exercises is critical to developing a lasting institutional capability. Further, as the ADF are in the process of developing an amphibious task force capability, the presence and location of the MRF-D could be aggressively leveraged to develop amphibious partnered capability. This is an area that has no precedent, but it might involve a combined U.S. and Australian task force embarked on ADF shipping, or even a combined amphibious group with Australian and U.S. Navy ships operating together with a mixture of embarked Australian and U.S. forces.

Second, as the Nation examines ways to execute the Pacific rebalance and increase engagement with countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, the rotational deployment may prove to be a valuable model. While MEUs have historically provided the opportunity for short duration engagements, these exercises are limited in duration and, recently, have been increasingly hindered by the Navy’s amphibious readiness. A rotational deployment model is not dependent on amphibious shipping and provides the opportunity for deeper engagement, bilateral training and interoperability, and stronger nonmilitary ties with the partner nation. If rotated properly, such a scheme might even ease political pressure in Okinawa by reducing the unit deployment program presence on the island. There are challenges that would have to be met—language barriers in non-English speaking countries as well as the problem of sourcing permanent equipment sets to each of these locations—but the potential benefit is at least worth investigating the option.

In just over 2 years, MRF-D has grown substantially and proved its value as a part of the Pacific rebalance and the Marine Corps’ future. Those who were part of this inaugural deployment have been fortunate to participate in it, but many more Marines will be part of MRF-D rotations in coming years as future task forces continue to capitalize on the unique opportunities to train, enhance interoperability, and serve as military diplomats to the Australian people.

Notes

1. Information accessed at http://www. whitehouse.gov.

2. Information accessed at http://www.state.gov.

3. 1stLt Gregory Jurschak, “Inaugural Marine Rotational Force-Darwin,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: March 2013), 63–66. See also Maj John W. Black, “Marine Rotational Force-Darwin.” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: March 2013), 60–62.

4. We had a fifth LOO, Crisis Response, which was not exercised during this rotation. The extent of our progress in this LOO was devel oping plans for embarkation in case of rapid deployment.

5. Eleven total command element augments: one staff judge advocate, four admin/IPAC clerks, a CHD (counter-intel HUMINT detachment)Det with two Marines, one criminal investigative division agent, a combat arms captain as the future OPSO, and one 0802 battalion fire support officer (FSO) and chief.

6. We invited ADF soldiers to participate in our fire team leaders, corporals and MCMAP MAI (martial arts instructor) Courses. We also sent several platoons to participate in their squad-field exercise, and a squad (minus) competed in their annual military skills competition (roughly equivalent to a squad competition).