MARINE CORPS
Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

MARCH 2014 Vol. 98 No. 3 www.mca-marines.org/gazette

8 **Cover Article: The Basic School**
Col Todd S. Desgrosseilliers & LtCol Randall Hoffman

21 **The Mountain Warfare Dilemma**
Capt Bryan Guiney

55 **Building a Quality Force for Tomorrow**
LtCol E. Keith Couch

72 **Leader of Marines**
Maj John J. Franklin

87 **On Not Forgetting**
Damien O'Connell

A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

Welcome to the digital edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*

Welcome to the March digital edition of the *Gazette*. We hope that you find it informative and thought provoking.

Semper Fi.

Editor, Col John A. Keenan, USMC(Ret)

V22 | DELIVERS HOPE.
WHEN ALL SEEMS HOPELESS.

Typhoon relief. Guiuan, Philippines.

COMBAT · **HUMANITARIAN** · LOGISTICS · RESCUE · SPECIAL OPS

Around the globe, V-22 Ospreys are making a critical difference in humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions—delivering food, water, medical supplies and time-sensitive cargo to those in need. The V-22's unique blend of helicopter flexibility, high speed and long range provides timely aid to remote areas that would otherwise be unreachable, saving lives in the balance.

Bell Helicopter®
A Textron Company

BOEING

March 2014
Volume 98 Number 3

MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines



8 Cover Article
TBS is changing. *(Photo by LCpl Samuel Ellis.)*

DEPARTMENTS

3 Editorial
4 Special Notices
6 Letters
93 Books
95 Awards
96 Index to Advertisers
96 Writers' Guidelines



93 Book Review

IDEAS AND ISSUES

Training
8 The Basic School — Col Todd S. Desgrosseilliers & LtCol Randall Hoffman
21 The Mountain Warfare Dilemma — Capt Bryan Guiney

Joint
26 U.S. Marine Corps Component C^2 — Col Gregory "Hal" Douquet & LtCol Nicholas Hale

Expeditionary Operations
31 Revisiting Advanced Base Operations — Col Scott D. Aiken
35 Increase ARG/MEU Capacity — LtCol Robert C. Rice
39 Avoiding the Archer — Capt Vincent DePinto

Operations
44 A Critical Vulnerability — Capt Eric Mitchell

COIN
48 The 21st-Century Afghan National Army — 1stLt Dominic Chiaverotti

Cyber
51 Offensive Cyber Attacks — Capt Nelson F. Candelario, Jr.

PME
55 Building a Quality Force for Tomorrow — LtCol E. Keith Couch
60 Read to Make Decisions — 1stLt Ariel L. Bowen

Leadership
62 So What Is the Problem? — Maj Daniel J. Gaskell
67 What's the Matter With Kids These Days? — 1stLt Evan Munsing
72 Leader of Marines — Maj John J. Franklin

Manpower
74 Performance Evaluation System — Capt Barrett P. Dupuy

Fires
78 Attacking the FiST Problem — Capt Jon Wilkins

Aviation
81 Proactive Aviation Safety — LtCol Geoffrey J. McKeel

Logistics
84 Military Sealift Command Vessels — 2dLt Michael Wisotzkey

Lessons Learned
87 On Not Forgetting — Damien O'Connell

Strategy
91 Searching for Ender — Col Tracy W. King

The *Marine Corps Gazette* (ISSN 0025–3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will advance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offices. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. "Marine Corps" and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual $35.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1–866–622–1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES to G. Scott Dinkel, 634 - 77th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11209. Phone 718–715–1361. E-mail s.dinkel@mca-marines.org. • COPYRIGHT 2014 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Phone 703–640–6161. DSN 278–2854. Toll Free 800–336–0291. Fax 703–630–9147. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: gazette@mca-marines.org. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Marine Corps Gazette*, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: mca@mca-marines.org. • For credit card orders, call 800–336–0291, ext. 331. PUBLISHER'S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsements by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F's name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion.

Marine Corps Writers...

WANTED!

to challenge the status quo and provide their insights on radical change.

The MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest

Submit entries anytime from 1 January to 30 April.

See p. 4 for instructions.

The writing contest is open to active duty Marines and members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

MarineCorps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

MARINE CORPS Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

MARCH 2014

Editorial: TBS

Ask anyone who attended The Basic School (TBS) and they will tell you that it was a great foundational education in the skills they needed to successfully do their duties as Marine officers. From tactics to leadership, TBS is the unifying experience for young officers no matter their source of commissioning.

The strongest impression and memories may be different depending on what decade you were a student aboard Camp Barrett. Since its founding as the "School of Application" by then-Commandant Charles Heywood in 1891, TBS's mission has not changed significantly. Its mission today is to "train and educate newly commissioned or appointed officers in the high standards of professional knowledge, esprit de corps, and leadership required to prepare them for duty as company grade officers in the Operating Forces, with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities, and warfighting skills required of a rifle platoon commander." In 1922 MajGen John A. Lejeune reformed the School of Application, renamed it "The Basic School," and gave it a mandate to stay abreast of current tactical changes to keep the curriculum relevant.

Those of my vintage remember a TBS with no women officers (they had their own TBS on mainside), searching the Vietnam village on Beaver Dam Run, and no Infantry Officer Course. Infantry officers went right to the fleet. Of course the liberty trips to Matt Kane's in DC were the stuff of legend. Blue jeans were banned and a collared shirt was required on liberty. An officer who acquired a tattoo was at risk of being expunged.

Because the school has kept Gen Lejeune's charter foremost in its curriculum changes, what a difference a few decades make. Today Marines attend Infantry Officer Course and are far better prepared than we ever were for duties as infantry officers. Women are fully integrated into the course. The only reading we did was in handouts like "BO 1010: The Infantry Squad in the Attack." Students are all still taught tactical fundamentals, but now are required to read professionally and discuss those readings in small groups.

The physical changes are immense. If you graduated 5 years ago you would not recognize TBS. Except for Reasoner Hall, Ramer Hall, and Graves Hall, all of the buildings have been replaced, including O'Bannon Hall. Graves will also soon be replaced. In their stead are student officer billeting, dining, and classroom facilities that are exceptional.

But it is not the changes in the physical plant that have moved TBS forward. In my tenure the student officers had no contact with enlisted Marines. On page 8 of this edition, Col Todd Degrosseilliers and LtCol Randall Hoffman detail the radical restructuring of the student companies to add enlisted instructor-advisors to each company. These instructor-advisors not only teach tactical or weapon fundamentals but serve as a paradigm of what lieutenants should expect and demand of NCOs, while providing them with the opportunity to learn from those closest to the deckplate. Lejeune's stricture on the relationship between officer and enlisted Marine as that of teacher and scholar has been updated. Learning is a two-way street and I think he would approve of the way TBS has moved forward to stay relevant and to continue to produce superb Marine officers who are prepared to lead Marines in harm's way.

John Keenan

Navy-Marine Corps Ball Committee

Benefiting The Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society

Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society Fundraiser: Celebrating the American Spirit

The 2014 Navy-Marine Corps Ball will be on Saturday, 22 March 2014, at the Washington Hilton in Washington, DC. The ball is the major fundraising event for the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS).

All funds raised by this event are used to provide financial, educational, and other assistance to Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their dependents. Assistance is available at Navy and Marine Corps bases located throughout the world and aboard Navy ships. These funds enable NMCRS to increase its assistance to in need Navy/Marine Corps personnel.

Guest speakers for the ball include wounded warriors LT Jason Redman (U.S. Navy SEAL), MSgt William "Spanky" Gibson, and Cpl Kyle Carpenter.

For more information about attending the ball, visit www.navymcball.org, call 202–889–8112/8113, or e-mail navmcball@aol.com. To donate or learn more about NMCRS, visit www.nmcrs.org.

Reunions

Org: **VMFA(AW) 332**
Dates: 14–16 March 2014
Place: Beaufort, SC
POC: Michael Parks
317–681–3858

Org: **3d Battalion, 26th Marines (Vietnam)**
Dates: 11–14 June 2014
Place: Ennis, MT
POC: Andy DeBona
406–581–6707
www.326Marines.org

Org: **Fox Co., Class 6–79, The Basic School**
Seeking classmates for possible reunion.
POC: LtCol Tom Conners
919–303–2697
tconners3@yahoo.com

MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest

Boldness earns rewards…

The annual Chase Prize Essay Contest invites articles that challenge conventional wisdom by proposing change to a current Marine Corps directive, policy, custom, or practice. To qualify, entries must propose and argue for a new and better way of "doing business" in the Marine Corps. Authors must have strength in their convictions and be prepared for criticism from those who would defend the status quo. That is why the prizes are called Boldness and Daring Awards.

Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for first place, $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place, and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

*** Instructions ***

The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submitted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a file and send to gazette@mca-marines.org. A cover page should be included identifying the manuscript as a Chase Prize Essay Contest entry and include the title of the essay and the author's name. Repeat title on the first page, but author's name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are accepted, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The *Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest in June and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry will receive an award.

Be bold and daring!

Deadline: 30 April

Send to: gazette@mca-marines.org
Mail entries to: *Marine Corps Gazette*, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134

Sponsored by
Battelle
The Business of Innovation.

Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

USAA®

USAA is proud to be the
Semper Fidelis Sponsor
of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

When it comes to financial obstacles, we're ready to help.

At USAA, we know military life is different. We've been there. So for current and former military members and their families, we offer free financial advice geared specifically to the realities of your life. Talk to a USAA Financial Advisor today. We make it easy to get started.

Contact us for your free financial assessment.

usaa.com/mca | 877-651-6272

USAA®

We know what it means to serve.®

Infantry Firepower and the IAR

In response to Capt James Oliveto's article, "Infantry Firepower," in the January 2014 issue, I was commanding officer of Weapons Training Battalion when the infantry automatic rifle (IAR) was being considered. All of the squad automatic weapon (SAW) proponents I dealt with, to include Gen Conway, extolled the virtue of the SAW, focusing on the "firepower" that it brings to bear. However, none could really define "firepower" other than a lot of lead that headed toward the enemy. In every objective test done, the IAR performed as well, usually because it almost never had a stoppage and required no pauses to change barrels. The IAR has the added virtue of accuracy. The author quotes a 10 percent increase. On the bipod, my experience was closer to 10 times more hits. A second virtue is training. The author concedes that a SAW gunner requires significant training and experience. To effectively employ the IAR requires almost no special training. I particularly recall our 35th Commandant putting 22 of 30 rounds on target from 300 meters in less than 20 seconds on the fourth magazine he had ever fired. Imagine what an experienced infantryman could do! Additionally, the IAR brings increased mobility to the fire team, as it is a true automatic rifle and not a machine gun. Machine guns, being "weapons of stability" (see *On Infantry* by John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson), are not designed or best suited to be used by small units in the assault.

Finally, a thought on improving the IAR—add a suppressor. Imagine an enemy attempting to identify the source of the high-volume, accurate fire he is receiving. He can't hear the source, and he dare not raise his head to look.

The IAR proved superior to the SAW in every objective head-to-head test. It is the best infantry weapon we've fielded in recent history.

Col William Costantini, USMC(Ret)

The ACE That Ate the Marine Corps

We congratulate LtCol James Hammond III, USMC(Ret), for his excellent and thought-provoking article, "The ACE [Aviation Combat Element] That Ate the Marine Corps" (*MCG*, Jan14). We agree with many important elements of this piece, particularly the author's emphasis on evaluating Marine Corps investment decisions across each element of the MAGTF, as well as more broadly across the naval Services, during this period of fiscal austerity. We specifically commend the author's call for an "opportunity costs" framework—i.e., what we are foregoing—as we go forward and look hard at every component of the MAGTF and Marine Corps. With that said, we believe the article undervalues the importance of enhanced aviation capabilities to the entire MAGTF. If taken out of context, this reasoning risks an internal struggle among elements of the MAGTF at the very time these uniquely powerful combat formations are poised to make increasingly prominent contributions to *joint power projection* and crisis response.

The enhanced capabilities of the ACE will be central to the MAGTF's contributions to joint power projection, especially in contested environments. First, in these operations, amphibious MAGTFs must be able to close amphibious forces to striking distances in the face of potential adversaries' expanded G-RAMM (guided rocket, artillery, mortar, and missile) capabilities. Closing these forces will require the increasingly sophisticated electronic warfare and strike capabilities currently being developed for and fielded to the ACE.

Second, with the enhanced ACE, the MAGTF will be able to conduct longer-range missions (such as raids, Embassy reinforcement, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, noncombatant evacuation operations, port and airfield seizures, and others) at demonstrably faster speeds. Whether for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations like those recently conducted in the Philippines, or supporting isolated diplomatic facilities, the expanded operational reach and speed enabled by the 21st-century ACE will be game-changing for the entire MAGTF.

Third, the MAGTF's improved ACE will be able to establish airborne and air-to-ground data links and digital connectivity that will serve as the "central nervous system" for highly dispersed, mobile, and mission-capable elements of the entire MAGTF. Marine leaders at every level are already benefiting from the improved situational awareness derived from the digital networks established and maintained across the MAGTF's airborne assets, and this will only grow in the future.

Fourth, improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across multiple disciplines will enable higher operational tempo and more precise operations—both critical in an information age. MAGTF aviation assets will support continually expanding imagery, electronic, and signals intelligence capabilities that can be rapidly exploited in MAGTF operations.

Fifth, the improved ACE will help sustain elements of the MAGTF and the joint force across a far more dispersed and distributed battlefield. As improved fire support and command and control capabilities enable greater dispersion, the 21st-century ACE will help to sustain more of these highly distributed formations.

Realizing the full potential of these burgeoning capabilities will require, as Hammond suggests, not only balanced investment decisions across each element of the MAGTF and the naval Services, but also full application of our intellect and imagination as we reconceptualize how amphibious power is projected. *And we must also remember that the true strength of the MAGTF is in its synergies and being built around the individual Marine*. Cost and capability tradeoffs must continue to be evaluated, but equally important, Marine leaders at all levels need to more fully examine how the MAGTF can leverage the enhanced capabilities of the modernized ACE, to include ground combat, logistics, and seabased operations.

By definition, ACE capabilities are MAGTF capabilities, and a stronger ACE will strengthen the entire MAGTF and joint force!

Cols William J. Bowers and Christian F. Wortman

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the *Gazette*. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to gazette@mca-marines.org. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

The entire *Gazette* is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

Panasonic

Panasonic recommends Windows 8.

intel inside
CORE i5 vPro

You need a mobile solution that's battle-tested. Panasonic Toughbook® and Toughpad™ mobile solutions, powered by the Intel® Core™ i5 vPro™ processor, offer the U.S. Marine Corps extreme mobility with a MIL-STD design that's ready for battle. Helping enhance situational awareness and increase productivity is how we're **engineering a better world.**

SOLUTIONS FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS

usmc@us.panasonic.com

Available on Marine Corps Common Hardware Suite Contract*

TOUGHBOOK®

*Toughpad tablets are currently not part of this contract offering.

The Basic School

Developing today's leaders through a common background of training, friendship, and mutual purpose

by Col Todd S. Desgrosseilliers & LtCol Randall Hoffman

"One of the reasons Marines were able to maintain such a close connection between their air and ground arms is that the men who made up these different branches were all products of the same training—in short, as Marines they all shared a common ethos enabled only by common experiences."

"[Their unique] entry-level school for commissioned officers in Quantico, known as The Basic School . . . was self-explanatory, accurately describing its function of ensuring that all newly commissioned second lieutenants, regardless of military specialty or commissioning source, all received a general instructional course of approximately six months."

"[The Marine Corps initiates] the bulk of its officer personnel into service with a **common background of training, friendship and mutual purpose***. This tends to bond together air and ground organizations into an extremely close-knit striking force with reciprocal confidence of all elements, each with the other." (emphasis added)*

—Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe Sanh[1]

The Basic School (TBS) is unique. Located aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, TBS is where the U.S. Marine Corps transforms its officers through a process founded in 1891. The Marine Corps relocated TBS to its present location at Camp Barrett in 1958. There are no other military Services in the world with an equivalent institution. Through TBS, the U.S. Marine Corps brings all newly commissioned Marine officers together for 6 months and imbues in them the uniqueness of their profession, the significance of their commission, and the basics of their craft. Year after year Marines continuously arrive at Camp Barrett as second lieutenants and leave as officers of Marines, possessing a fundamental imperative to build and maintain strong friendships of character with their comrades.[2] The common bonds built between student officers at TBS make it "the core of the Corps." This article details how TBS continues to meet the future's challenges and introduces changes aimed at improving the training and education of student officers and the officers and enlisted Marines assigned there through a common ethos, experience, and mutual purpose.

>Col Desgrosseilliers is the CO, The Basic School.

>>LtCol Hoffman served as the last commander of Support Battalion, The Basic School. He is currently serving on the International Security Assistance Force Commander's Action Group, International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan.

What Makes TBS Unique?

By understanding their Corps' combat history, Marine second lieutenants visualize those leaders who have gone before them and recognize that what's expected of their generation is an extension of that heritage. Through greater knowledge of their commission, lieutenants reflect upon their responsibility to the Nation and to the virtues they swore to uphold, as outlined in the U.S. Constitution and woven into all classes and training at TBS. Through trial, error, and occasional failure, second lieutenants learn the "basics" of their craft, confident that, regardless of individual MOS, they can lead Marines wherever and whenever commanded to do so. By understanding each of their comrades' unique and diversified backgrounds, TBS students gain the greatest advantage of the school. Each graduating lieutenant departs Camp Barrett with a unity of purpose, bonded in trust and friendship and driven by a solemn commitment to help each other whether on the battlefield or throughout their years of service together in our Corps. From 1891 to today, this is why the officers, the school, and the Marine Corps are unique, and why TBS exists.

Planning for the Future

Today's Marine Corps continues to evolve. Recent personnel reductions and fiscal constraints and restraints caused us to review our curriculum, but have not diminished TBS's commitment or its capacity to develop "men and women of exemplary character, devoted to leading Marines 24/7." Despite manpower drawdown and fiscal limitations, TBS remains on-azimuth and more capable of building officers "who are able to decide, communicate and act in the fog of war while embracing the Corps' warrior ethos, through mental toughness and physical strength."[3] We've made several changes at TBS over the past year to offset the effects of a 15 percent personnel reduction and possibly a larger one in the future. The changes to TBS's permanent personnel structure and the overall organization will ensure it can achieve 2010's *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*'s (*CPG*'s) tasks, while still producing the highest caliber Marine officers.[4]

The Realignment Plan

From June 2012 to January 2013 we conducted a top-to-bottom "troop-to-task" study and subsequently implemented an operational planning team tasked with eliminating Support Battalion and realigning the TBS staff permanent personnel in order to accomplish the following:

- Account for a 15 percent Force Structure Review Group manpower reduction.
- Prepare for future fiscal constraints and restraints.
- Simplify and improve the quality of military training and education at TBS.
- Increase the professional abilities and leadership of enlisted and officer instructors at TBS.
- Increase the leadership and cognitive development of student officers and permanent personnel at TBS.
- Increase options for trained, second-enlistment squad leaders returning to the Operating Forces from instructor tours at TBS (*CPG* Task 3–7) and facilitate additional *CPG* tasks as directed.[5]

The 7-month operational planning team resulted in the combining of all TBS and Support Battalion manpower and staff sections, and the integration of 17 enlisted Marines into every Basic Officer Course (BOC) company to serve as enlisted instructor-advisors. This realignment began as a proof of concept with BOC 3–13 (Charlie Company) in March 2013 and continues today.

Prior to the realignment, TBS and Support Battalion each comprised separate S–1 (personnel), S–3 (operations/training), S–4 (logistics), and S–6 (communications) shops; sergeants major; and several other duplicative supporting sections (see Figure 1). The enlisted Marines assigned to Support Battalion taught classes to lieutenants and routinely supported training in the field, but they rarely provided the constant interaction lieutenants would experience on a daily basis when assigned to Marine operational forces.

Efficiencies and Improvements

Initial observations indicate that the realignment significantly improved the capacity and quality of TBS's training and education. By reorganizing the school along functional lines, we improved our efficiency in executing TBS-wide administrative and operational requirements, field training and live fire exercise support, as well as instructional effectiveness in training and educating TBS students and permanent personnel. Realignment produced



Figure 1.



Figure 2.

a greater number of enlisted instructors to serve within the Warfighting Group, enabling it to augment instructional requirements both in garrison and field learning settings every day. The greatest advantage was the ability to embed 17 enlisted instructor-advisors into each BOC company (see Figure 2).

The "Company Model"

The example of embedding NCOs and SNCOs into American military training for officers is not new. GEN Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, a Prussian-born officer, first introduced the concept of the "company model" into the U.S. Continental Army during the harsh winter training of 1777–78 at Valley Forge, PA, to rebuild the Continental Army's discipline, invigorate its esprit de corps, and improve its warfighting skills. Von Steuben's training technique used a "model company," a group of 120 chosen NCOs who successively trained other personnel at regimental and brigade levels within the Continental Army.[6] Von Steuben made each company commander responsible for the training of his new soldiers, and "actual instruction [was taught] by selected sergeants, the best obtainable" (see Figure 3).

In an approach similar to Von Steuben's, TBS embedded within each BOC company a first sergeant, company gunnery sergeant, six platoon advisors, six squad advisors, two radio transmission operators, two corpsmen, and a company police sergeant (see Figures 4 and 5.)

The enlisted instructor-advisors complement the approved BOC period of instruction (POI) through augmented instruction, student preparation, student remediation, and mentoring sessions.

Enlisted instructor-advisors complete 2 or more 6-month BOC company billets, each covering the entire POI. The BOC company commanders now possess increased command and control over their companies, allowing them to make better use of their staff platoon commanders (SPCs) to teach, mentor, and coach student lieutenants. Through this change TBS increased its focus on building the lieutenants' confidence and proficiency in academics, military skills, and leadership with the benefits described below.

Benefits for Student Lieutenants

Last year's annual MEF commander survey comments identified a deficiency in our junior officers' abilities to understand NCOs' roles and of how to build professional relationships with them and their SNCOs.[7] During their first 6 months in the Operating Forces, lieutenants typically experience a growing phase where they learn how to interact with their new platoon sergeants, section leaders, or SNCOICs (SNCOs



Non-Commissioned Officers positioned in march order – Regulation Book Authored by Von Steuben

Figure 3.

Professional Support for the Green Machine... Our Enduring Mission Continues!

Every Membership Helps MCA&F Advance Leadership & Recognize Marine Excellence

PHOTO BY SSGT MAT EPRIGHT

Inspire, Connect & Support Marines with Us – Join Today!

CHOOSE YOUR MCA&F MEMBERSHIP TERM:

	Print Edition Both Magazines	*Print Edition One Magazine*	*Digital Editions Only Both Magazines*
1 Year	❑ $70.00	❑ $35.00	❑ $35.00
2 Years - Save 9%	❑ $128.00	❑ $64.00	❑ $64.00
3 Years - Save 15%	❑ $178.00	❑ $89.00	❑ $89.00

❑ ***MARINE CORPS GAZETTE*** ❑ ***LEATHERNECK*** **MAGAZINE** (Each option Includes access to Online Editions of Both Magazines)
❑ **ONLINE EDITIONS ONLY** – (Both *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Leatherneck*)
• Online Accessible, Environmentally Friendly, and More Convenient than Mail Delivery

NAML

Rank/Full Name: _____ Branch of Service: _____

Address: _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Telephone: _____ E-Mail: _____

Status: ❑ Active ❑ Retired ❑ Reserve ❑ Civilian ❑ Veteran ❑ Dependent

Last 4 numbers of SSN: _____ Date of Birth: _____

Method of payment: ❑ Check or Money Order enclosed ❑ VISA ❑ Discover ❑ MasterCard ❑ AmEx

Credit Card Number _____

Signature _____ Expiration Date _____
(Payment cannot be processed without signature.)

Thank You For Joining MCA&F!

P.O. Box 1775, 715 Broadway • Quantico, VA 22134-0775 • Toll-Free: 866-622-1775

Offer expires 30 Jun 2014

Membership Features the Magazines that Keep You Current on the Issues and Ongoing Story of our Corps and ONLINE Access to Both Magazines Comes with EVERY Membership.

Other benefits include exclusive member savings at *The* MARINE *Shop* at Quantico, Camp Lejeune and ONLINE at www.marineshop.net as well as with our affinity partners.
www.mca-marines.org

Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

JOIN TODAY!
www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775



Figure 4.

in charge). This period can sometimes make or break the enlisted-officer synergy, and in turn positively or negatively affect all the Marines in that unit (this is especially true in a combat environment); however, there are similar challenges for a peacetime Marine Corps as well. For a large number of lieutenants at both TBS and Infantry Officer Course (IOC), learning to interact with enlisted Marines is often the most difficult preparation and routinely comprises the majority of questions from student lieutenants to the TBS staff or IOC instructors.

Creating environments where student lieutenants can communicate with many NCOs and SNCOs builds and strengthens enlisted-officer relationships, effective communication skills, and teamwork. The lieutenant can also discuss the enlisted Marine's own experiences with previous mentoring and counseling, family support issues, operational stress control and readiness (known as "OSCAR") issues, fitness reports, and other topics that lieutenants routinely encounter in their first assignment.[8] In this new setting, lieutenants ask questions they might not ask in an open classroom or a one-on-one discussion with their staff platoon commanders.

The advantage enlisted leaders bring when they work in tandem with student lieutenants is an extremely valuable example. Student lieutenants daily see a "model company" staff and feel its battle rhythm. Student lieutenants still serve in company billet positions but now interact with real NCOs or SNCOs who observe and mentor the students' performances, offering technical, tactical, and leadership advice, which in turn builds overall confidence and understanding about their roles as officers. These changes also broaden the lieutenants' understandings about employing and communicating with their enlisted Marines after arriving at the operational forces. One of the greatest benefits that both the officer and enlisted Marine receive from the TBS realignment and BOC integration is the "common ethos, experience and mutual purpose" that each receives.[9] Many of the relationships developed at TBS last much longer than the 6 months of school. Many of these Marines will face each other again, serving in units together or supporting each other on the battlefield; in both situations, Marines will have a better understanding of each other's roles (see Figures 4 and 5.)



Figure 5.

Benefits for IOC

The realignment enabled 12 enlisted instructor-advisors to integrate into the IOC staff. These Marines serve in the following billets: operations chief, platoon advisor, joint terminal air controller, and joint fires observer. Seven squad advisors also serve as primary MOS instructors, along with two radio operators and four corpsmen. IOC conducts its POI at 3 military bases in 2 states,

and includes 1,071 hours of classroom and field instruction, 287 learning objectives, 100 concept cards, and 5 graduate learning outcomes injected throughout the curriculum.

In August 2013 IOC expanded training to 4 military bases in 3 states to prepare graduates to support the Marine Corps' *Enhanced Company Operations* and *Company Landing Team* concepts. IOC's 12 enlisted instructor-advisors played an integral role in training and educating IOC students to support *CPG* Tasks 2–6, "Lighten the MAGTF," and 2–8, "Increase Energy Efficiency."[10] These *CPG* tasks remain key components within IOC's *Enhanced Company Operations* and *Company Landing Team* initiatives, and the enlisted instructor-advisor integration is crucial to their success. In mutual support with Training and Education Command's (TECom's) efforts to improve instructors throughout the Marine Corps' training and education commands, IOC also improved its enlisted Marines' abilities to train and advise infantry officers at IOC.[11]

Benefits for Enlisted Marines

Like the student lieutenant, the enlisted instructor-advisor embedded in each BOC company or IOC class gains an enormous amount of training and education, which develops them into more capable, competent, and confident leaders of Marines. In Priority 3 of his planning guidance, the Commandant directed the Deputy Commandant of Combat Development and Integration to "develop options for training second-enlistment Sergeant Squad leaders to be capable of better operating on a distributed battlefield."[14] The Commandant directed the Deputy Commandant of Manpower and Reserve Affairs to "outline [possible] options for assigning trained, second-enlistment Sergeant Squad leader[s] to [operational] maneuver units."[15]

> ***"The young American responds quickly and readily to the exhibition of qualities of leadership on the part of his officers. Some of these qualities are industry, energy, initiative, determination, enthusiasm, firmness, kindness, justness, self-control, selflessness, honor, and courage."***
>
> ***—MajGen John A. Lejeune[12]***

> ***"We have always known hardship and challenge; we have never known what it is to lose a battle, because we have always prided ourselves on our devotion to self-discipline and combat excellence. This is who we are as Marines and we must never allow it to slide.* Discipline today leads to victory tomorrow. *You truly are strategic Corporals and Sergeants!" (emphasis added)***
>
> ***—Gen James F. Amos and SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett[13]***

Because TBS's focus to improve enlisted instruction mirrored the Commandant's 2010 planning guidance, we built a stronger synergy to achieve it through a collaborative effort with other commands. The Commandant also directed the Commanding General of Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commanding General of TECom; and the President of Marine Corps University to increase enlisted and officer professional military education and "consider changing traditional paradigms."[16] After careful study of the 2006 officer PME study (the "Wilhelm Report") and many internal reviews, discussions, and debates among the TBS staff sections, Support Battalion, and the Warfighting Group faculty, TBS scheduled several meetings with those commands and departments responsible for achieving the Commandant's goals.

The result of these meetings helped us develop expeditious training improvements to increase skill levels for enlisted Marines serving as enlisted instructor-advisors, while also meeting the responsibility to "provide options" to second-term maneuver squad leaders reporting to Marine Corps operational forces. Because we already own the POIs for the additional MOSs and resources to administer them, we accomplish this additional training without any additional cost to the Marine Corps. We believe our collaborative effort efficiently and effectively achieves the Commandant's intent, while creating "measurable" officer and enlisted training and education with learning outcomes that directly transmit to today's operational forces.

EWIC

Enlisted instructor-advisors train all newly commissioned and appointed officers, infantry officers, and infantry weapons officers. The Enlisted Warfighting Instructor Course (EWIC) ensures that all enlisted instructors at TBS can train, advise, and mentor student lieutenants throughout the BOC POI through a combination of field exercises and instructional and classroom techniques.

The subject matter expertise and instructional skill necessary to accomplish this outcome are consistent with all training and readiness (T&R) events taught in the Marine Corps Combat Instructor Course at the School of Infantry. The EWIC POI covers all

Marine Corps Combat Instructor Course T&R events, except five combat shooting events, which the Marine archives later in the Enlisted Warfighting Instructor Combat Marksmanship Training Course. Additional T&R manual events covered in the EWIC POI include decisionmaking; fire support planning; heavy machinegun operations and employment; maneuver warfare concepts pertaining to *MCDP 1, Warfighting*, and *Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Leading Marines*; platoon and company sand table exercises; and other tactical concepts and exercises. EWIC serves us well, and we continue to refine it through the course content review board formally establishing it as an approved course within Training Command. The Staff and Instructor Development Plan (SIDP) represents the next step in improving instruction at TBS.

SIDP

As part of a broader instructor development plan, the realignment reinforces TBS's requests for 122 special duty assignment billets (additional MOS 0913). Our objective for requesting these billets supports TECom's Small Unit Development Program, an educational continuum and knowledge base for officer and enlisted instructors throughout the Marine Corps. TBS uses the SIDP to "map" the "course and speed" and build an individual development plan for officers and enlisted instructors assigned to TBS.

TBS contains the BOC, which is the largest program of instruction in the Marine Corps, consisting of 1,760 hours, 840 learning objectives, 348 concept cards, and 5 graduate learning outcomes. Because of this, TBS was an obvious candidate to begin the process of testing the TECom continuum model. Over the last year, TBS worked with TECom and the Office of Naval Research's Human Performance Training and Education Branch. Both TECom and Office of Naval Research's Human Performance Training and Education Branch's assessments focused on three variables: The first variable is to measure the changes in the student lieutenant's educational and military skill performance after the inclusion of the enlisted instructors; the second variable, to observe and record the changes in the leadership and decisionmaking abilities of all student lieutenants and enlisted instructors here; and the third variable, to monitor the enlisted instructor-advisor's achievement mastery levels.

If approved, upon reporting to TBS, special duty assignment enlisted Marines will attain the minimum qualifications required to serve with a BOC as a first-term basic instructor, including EWIC 0913 certification, martial arts instructor 0916 designation, and 45 hours of observing key BOC and IOC lessons. After the first company, enlisted warfighting instructors will additionally attend the following courses and/or schools: combat marksmanship trainer 0933 designation, Marine Corps instructor of water survival 0918 designation, and OSCAR certification before assignment to a second or third BOC or while at IOC.

A balanced mix of new and returning enlisted instructor-advisors in each company or IOC class will ensure maximum benefit to students and BOC and IOC staffs. The basic, senior, and master levels within the continuum listed below outline the 0913 progression throughout the 36-month assignment at TBS from instructional support to leading instructional lessons to new instructor development in all POIs across TBS.

Waiting for the enemy during a field exercise. *(Photo by LCpl Samuel Ellis.)*

Basic Instructor

Basic instructors conduct the following duties:

- Provide in-stride instruction throughout the POIs.
- Augment formal instruction by preparing students before, supplementing during, and reinforcing after lessons.
- Serve as position safety officer and/or range safety officer during live fire exercises.
- Serve as tactical advisors during field and live fire exercises, including debriefs.
- Contribute to student observation reports and student performance evaluations.

Following two or more BOC companies or IOC classes and mastery of POI content evaluation, 0913s complete the requirements to be designated as senior instructors, including the IEP 100-series course, as well as a POI-specific small group and platform lesson qualification process.

Senior Instructor

In addition to basic instructor responsibilities, 0913 senior instructors conduct the following duties:

- Serve as independent lesson instructors in the BOC, Warrant Officer

Figure 6.

Basic Course, IOC, and/or Infantry Weapons Officer Course.
- Coach and evaluate students.
- Prepare and submit formal leadership observation and performance feedback to SPCs or class advisors.
- Develop basic instructors for particular lessons.
- Prepare and submit basic instructor lesson qualification records.
- Complete additional sustainment and professional development included in the IEP 200-series when not directly engaged with instruction.

Master Instructor

Master instructors represent the top-performing 0913s assessed during this period for designation as master instructors. Master instructors serve as EWIC or IEP course staff members, as well as mentors to enlisted warfighting instructors. In addition to basic and senior instructor responsibilities, 0913 master instructors conduct the following duties:
- Evaluate instructional systems.
- Develop basic and senior instructors.
- Plan and implement IEP 200-series sustainment lessons.
- Support curriculum review processes.
- Administrate TBS instructor development POIs (EWIC, IEP 100, and/or IEP 200). (See Figure 6.)

TBS Reorganization Survey Results

In September 2013 TBS's Academics Department conducted a written questionnaire and assessment survey of Charlie and Delta Companies student lieutenants, enlisted instructors, and TBS staff personnel in order to assess the effectiveness of the enlisted instructor-advisor integration. Both surveys strongly indicated positive ground floor reactions to the enlisted instructor integration within both companies. Further assessment is still necessary to measure student performance improvements upon graduation and gather Operating Force feedback for both graduates of TBS and the returning enlisted Marines. The following is a sample of answer percentages and responses from the first survey administered to the student officers of Charlie Company, BOC 3–13:
- 20 percent daily, 58 percent weekly, and 19 percent monthly seek out an NCO for advice on a POI or overall Marine Corps issues, and 3 percent never seek out an NCO for advice on a POI or overall Marine Corps issues.
- 59 percent agree and 20 percent strongly agree that they "feel more comfortable approaching the enlisted advisors for certain questions than they do officers."
- 61 percent chose "highly effective" and 37 percent chose "somewhat more effective" regarding the value of enlisted advisors being integrated into a company staff.
- "The NCOs are definitely a great asset for the platoons. I believe their experience and knowledge of their field and general Marine Corps topics benefits the students. I have sought them out on not only Marine related topics, but general life topics that may come up in my time as a Marine."
- "Cpl Vilevac is a machine gunner, so whenever I am writing an order where a machine gun squad is attached I seek his advice on whether or not my SOM best utilizes those assets."
- "Our SPC has clearly established the fact that our advisors are here to advise and not to assess, making them much more approachable."
- "They are a wealth of knowledge. They bring context to the doctrine taught here."
- "I don't often think of a question and find an NCO to bring it up, but in conversation with them, I constantly think of questions during the conversation and thoroughly appreciate the chance to ask someone with experience from the enlisted point of view."
- "The enlisted advisors for the platoon are very professional, and very knowledgeable. I seek their help and guidance on a daily basis on subjects that I do not fully understand. From tactics to customs and courtesies, they have been there to straighten me out and I am a better Marine because of them."
- "Their insight and the example they set. They are a great source of knowledge. . . . [W]e can get a perspective on [areas] we haven't seen before. They give a practical view that you don't see just by learning doctrine. Also they give us a positive example of how an NCO should look in the fleet."
- "Having enlisted [Marines] in proximity forces O1s to act like officers with actual responsibilities instead of pure students. When I am with an officer

Enlisted Marines guide lieutenants during training. *(Photo by 2dLt Devan VanArsdale.)*

instructor, I generally don't feel like I will be leading a platoon of Marines in a few months. When enlisted advisors, even the very senior ones, maintain the classic officer/enlisted relationship dynamic, it serves as a great reminder of the responsibility of my office."

- "I have really lost count of [the number of times I ask questions]. The enlisted advisors are good about making themselves available and I know almost any time we are in the field I learn something new and useful from [them] whether it is a more efficient way of packing gear or how some of the formations we see in the classroom diagrams actually look in the field."

The following is a sample of answer percentages and responses from the first survey administered to the enlisted instructor-advisors of Charlie Company, BOC 3–13:

- 83 percent of enlisted Marines surveyed strongly agree that "the presence of enlisted advisors has helped solidify the concepts being taught in terms of academics, military skills and leadership."
- 50 percent of enlisted Marines agree and 50 percent strongly agree that "student officers are more comfortable approaching the enlisted advisors for certain [questions] than officers on the staff."
- 92 percent of enlisted Marines believe their "value as an enlisted instructor-advisor is highly effective to the company [training/instruction] and the student lieutenants at TBS."
- "I am learning a lot and I think that it is helping me to prepare to become a staff NCO. I also think that it is making me a better NCO by exposing me to things that I had never been taught before. It is also helping me to understand the officer point of view."
- "Watching their progression gives me a different perspective on where they have been/are coming from which will help facilitate a more fluid and dynamic relationship."
- "As a gunnery sergeant I have had more mentorship in my short amount of time in the BOC than I have had as a SNCO. I am always learning from the examples provided by, and discussions with, my Company XO, CO, & 1stSgt. I believe that the captains and above spend plenty of time mentoring their enlisted Marines for their development."
- "It has also sparked interests in furthering myself academically inside and outside the Marine Corps."
- "I definitely think this experience is helping me to prepare to be an SNCO working with officers. By understanding their education and training, I am becoming more prepared to understand an officer's thought processes and how to communicate with him more efficiently."

The following are survey answer percentages and comments from the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, and SPCs of BOC Class 3–13:

- 40 percent agree and 60 percent strongly agree that the continuous exposure to enlisted Marines of various ranks and backgrounds will better prepare their student officers to lead in the Operating Forces.
- 60 percent agree and 40 percent strongly agree that the presence of enlisted advisors has helped solidify the concepts being taught in terms of military skills and leadership.
- "This is perhaps the advisors' greatest contribution to the students. The advisors are able to link TBS concepts and experiences to how their officers used TBS to make decisions and shape the command climate, both good and bad. This gives the students a very real connection to what they are doing here to how that affects enlisted Marines."
- "Their ability to mentor and educate the student platoon sergeants and squad leaders. Their contribution during field exercise preparation as the students are preparing the training

SALUTE.

We Sincerely Thank the Generous Supporters of the Marine Corps Association Foundation Birthday Campaign.

In Honor of the 238th Birthday of Our Corps, the Following Donated $238.00 or More!

THANKS FOR SUPPORTING MARINES!

E. Allard
F. Augustine
J. Baker
J. Boggs
J. Bratney
G. Brennan
R. Campbell
R. Carruthers
T. Chandler
S. Chen
J. Cipot
J. Cronin
R. Cunha
L. Davis
J. Doherty
W. Ewer
R. Flaherty
H. Fleear
R. Godeke
R. Hein
S. Hendrickson
W. Hill
J. Jackson
S. Johnston
W. Kain
D. Kee
D. Long
His Eminence Metropolitan Isaiah
K. Martin
N. Martin
R. Martin
W. Martin
W. McCarthy
D. McGee
C. Mills
T. Morris
M. Moser
J. Munro
S. Niemczyk
C. Rousseau
M. Saner
J. Schippel
C. Seyfarth
R. Siedle
H. Smith
R. Smith
M. Sperry
C. Squillaciotti
R. Stocker
R. Szpond
M. Taylor
W. Tillman
J. Walker
B. Wicks
P. Wickwire

MarineCorps
Association Foundation

plan and executing it [and] their contribution during field exercises to the effective and efficient conduct of squads [is extremely valuable]."
- "The advisors were instrumental in the students' progression in military skills in things such as rifle and pistol qualification and crew serve weapons."
- "The students were able to ask several questions outside of the instruction, during the practical application, etc, and constantly reminded on how to conduct each activity appropriately."

Summary: Benefits to the Marine Corps

> ***"A spirit of comradeship and brotherhood in arms came into being in the training camps and on the battlefields. This spirit is too fine a thing to be allowed to die. It must be fostered and kept alive and made the moving force in all Marine organizations."***
>
> **—MajGen John A. Lejeune[17]**

In his planning guidance, Gen Amos describes the way forward, stating that the Marine Corps will "invest more in the education of our NCOs and junior officers, [because] they have assumed vastly greater responsibilities in both combat and garrison."[20] The Commandant goes on to challenge commanders to "aggressively experiment" and "implement new capabilities and organizations" to "better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments."[21]

Given the Marine Corps' continual reductions in manpower and funding directly affecting training and education programs, the Commandant's call to action is more urgent today than it was in 2010. Both the Commandant and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps have aggressively engaged leaders throughout the Corps to "reawaken the soul of our NCOs," the sergeants and below who account for 144,570 of the 174,046 enlisted Marines on active duty today (83.06 percent of the total enlisted force).[22] Because of these realities, TBS "aggressively" worked to consolidate the school's officer and enlisted personnel over the last year to improve education and training synergies, while reducing redundancies. This approach meets Gen Amos' charge to concentrate on two principal groups: NCOs and junior Marine officers.[23]

> ***"My first thought on assuming command was that I needed to find Russ Armstrong…We were in a lot of actions together. In fact I always requested Russ when I had the opportunity—We became good friends—as much as a staff sergeant and lieutenant could be. He was extremely formal and was very conscious of the fact that he and I had an enlisted-officer relationship… He was very professional, very competent. His knowledge of what he was doing was impressive… He was 100 percent Marine—demanded a lot of the troops, was a stern disciplinarian, insisted on proper appearance and clean weapons all the time. He was right. He was very much the classic noncommissioned officer."***
>
> **—Ambush Valley[18]**

> ***"The relationship between Marine officers and enlisted men was (and is) different than any other Service. Marine officers tend to be closer to their men, in part because the Corps has always been smaller than the other Services and has a more people-centered culture."***
>
> **—The Lions of Iwo Jima[19]**

The realignment described in this article may seem innovative, but in reality, it is simply in-line with our warfighting ethos described in Marine warfighting doctrine and publications. As a starting point early on, we reviewed *MCDP 1–0, Marine Corps Operations*, which describes "maneuver warfare philosophy and mission command" as being "pertinent and applicable not only across the range of military operations," but also in how the Marine Corps "organizes [and] trains."[24] We also examined *MCWP 6–11, Leading Marines*, in which recruit and officer training are described as the "cement" that glues the Marine Corps together and gives Marines a "common outlook that transcends their grade, unit, or billet."[25]

To strengthen that glue, we turned to *MCDP 6, Command and Control*, to build a stronger "training organization" that could reinforce the "high levels of loyalty, cooperation, morale, and commitment to the group mission."[26] The enlisted instructor-advisors now understand the greater responsibility placed upon them in training, mentoring, and developing student lieutenants. They are "more committed to the group" in sharing that responsibility.[27]

Continuing with the tenets of command and control as described in *MCDP 6*, we increased our focus to teach, mentor, and coach student lieutenants to "exercise initiative and self-control" on the battlefield or in every day "ethical decision-making."[28] [29] Enlisted instructor-advisors, now integrated with student officers, can discuss the implications of these challenges. Throughout the academic year, all students and staff receive good and bad examples in ethics discussion groups and exercises. The realignment now provides a forum where junior officers and NCOs can discuss the "timeless attributes and habits that have defined our Corps for 238 years," to include persistent discipline, faithful obedience to orders and instructions, concerned and engaged leadership (24/7), and strict adherence to standards from the fire team leaders to the general officers.[30]

. . . all students and staff receive good and bad examples in ethics discussion groups. . . .

As we integrated NCOs into the BOC, we developed a learning environment "characterized by cooperation, reciprocal influence, lateral and vertical communication, and action-feedback loops operating continuously in all directions."[31] This "unconstrained communication" and "frequent and enthusiastic sharing of meaningful information throughout the [training] organization" . . . "[s]erves as a socializing function."[32] Separate from the quality or meaning of the information exchanged, communication between junior officers and NCOs strengthens bonds within TBS and the Marine Corps, "building trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding."[33]

The initial outcomes of the TBS realignment for both officer and enlisted Marines are very positive. The decision to assign special duty assignment enlisted instructor-advisors to TBS is currently awaiting approval by the Commanding General of TECom. The attention given to screening Marines for instructor duty at TBS is directly proportional to the quality of the graduating student lieutenant



returning to the Operating Forces. Integrating enlisted Marines into BOCs enhances junior officers' training and educational experience during a critical period of fiscal cuts and manpower reductions. The enlisted instructor-advisors are much better prepared to train, teach, lead, and mentor student lieutenants along with the thousands of enlisted Marines they will lead throughout their careers. Ultimately the enlisted instructor-advisors will share knowledge and expertise they gain at TBS with their future commands. No other Service or functional command can achieve similar enlisted-officer integration.

TBS's realignment meets the Commandant's requirement to focus on "NCOs and junior Marine officers," while also supporting TECom's Small Unit Development Program.[34] TBS will continue to use all resources to improve the quality of graduating officers. As always, TBS will continue to imbue its officers with the "uniqueness of their Corps, the significance of their commission, and the basics of their craft through the strengthening of a 'common ethos, experience and mutual purpose.'"[35] Since 1891, our commitment to train and educate the world's finest officers has only grown stronger.

Notes

1. Callahan, LtCol Shawn P., *Close Air Support and the Battle for Khe Sanh*, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Marine Corps Base Quantico, 2009, p. 28.

2. Ross, W.D., revised by J.O. Urmson, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Jonathan Barnes, editor, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984.

3. Commanding Officer, TBS, *Five Horizontal Themes for Marine Student Lieutenants Attending TBS*, training and education focus and philosophy, Marine Corps Base Quantico, 2013.

4. Amos, Gen James F., *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2010.

5. Ibid., p. 14.

6. Lanning, Michael Lee, *American Revolution 100*, Sourcebooks, Naperville, IL, 2008, p. 224.

7. Each year a team of officers from TBS conducts a survey and makes a command visit to each MEF to collect feedback on the performance of second lieutenants.

8. Meredith, Lisa S., Cathy D. Sherbourne, and Sarah J. Gaillot, *Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military*, RAND Corporation, Washington, DC, 2011, summary, chapter titled "Teamwork."

9. Callahan, p. 28.

10. Amos.

11. Director, School of Infantry-East, *School of Infantry-East, Advanced Infantry Training Battalion New Course Brief*, Camp Lejeune, 2012, PowerPoint brief, slide 2.

12. Lejeune, MajGen John A., *John A. Lejeune: Reminiscences of a Marine*, Dorrance & Company, Inc., Philadelphia, PA, 1930 (reprinted with permission of the Lejeune family by the Marine Corps Association, Marine Corps Base Quantico, 2003).

13. Amos, Gen James F., and SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett, "The Reawakening," white letter to corporals and sergeants, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 16 October 2013.

14. Amos.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Lejeune, Gen John A., *Marine Corps Manual*, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1921.

18. Hammond, Eric, *Ambush Valley: I Corps, Vietnam, 1967*, Pacific Military History, Amazon Online Services, 2009.

19. Haynes, Fred, and James A., Warren, *The Lions of Iwo Jima*, Holt Paperbacks, NY, 2009.

20. Amos.

21. Ibid.

22. Amos and Barrett.

23. Amos.

24. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–0, Marine Corps Operations*, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 1–3.

25. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6–11, Leading Marines*, Washington, DC, 2013, p. 22.

26. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control*, Washington, DC, 1996.

27. *MCWP 6–11.*

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 40.

30. Amos and Barrett.

31. *MCDP 6.*

32. *MCDP 6.*

33. *MCDP 6*, pp. 94–95.

34. Amos.

35. Callahan, p. 28.

The Mountain Warfare Dilemma

Capitalizing on an opportunity

by Capt Bryan Guiney

The Marine Corps is transitioning from a period of extended ground force stability operations to its true roots of a forward deployed, rapid response amphibious force. As this reorientation occurs, the Marine Corps faces difficult choices regarding what mission requirements should be retained or eliminated following a 10-year focus on the global war on terror and its inherent counterinsurgency missions. With the necessity to focus ever-decreasing resources, we must once again become masters of the MEU, special purpose MAGTF, and other force-in-readiness capabilities a combatant commander may require. To ensure the most effective, relevant, and employable MAGTF, the Marine Corps should designate a sustainable mountain warfare operational unit within III MEF.

The Marine Corps is not alone in defending its relevance and returning to its pedigree. The British Royal Marine Commandos have developed and continue to perfect two complementary disciplines that keep them a relevant and viable option for their civil leadership to consider. The Royal Marines' ownership and mastery of amphibious operations and mountain warfare is uniquely assigned to them and cannot be duplicated within the United Kingdom. Unlike the Marine Corps, the Royal Marines have career military mountaineers and a dedicated mountain warfare unit in 3 Commando Brigade.

The Marine Corps does not have a mountaineering MOS. We have no standing units trained, equipped, or at the ready to deploy to a mountainous environment today. We have no proponent within the operational forces charged with the advocacy of mountainous, high-altitude, skiborne, cold weather, over-the-snow, and the conduct of mountaineering-related skills (this collection of terms is subsequently referred to as "mountain warfare operations").

>Capt Guiney is the Future Operations Officer, MCMWTC.

The Navy-Marine Corps Team stands alone in its ability to respond rapidly to a combatant commander's tasking while adhering to another nation's territorial sovereignty, economic exclusion zones, and other international boundary restrictions. Operational maneuver from the sea enables the MEU or special purpose MAGTF to project and, more importantly, sustain forces from the sea. Although the MEU's principal missions are understood and represent the hallmark of its success and demand, few among us realize that Marine Corps Task 1.6.9 (MCT 1.6.9) specifies that the Marine Corps has the ability to conduct mountain warfare operations.

With renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific theater and the emerging focus on U.S. Africa Command, how does the Marine Corps set itself apart while remaining operationally relevant?[1] Is the aforementioned requirement for the Marine Corps to also conduct mountain warfare operations (but without an operational proponent) the optimal use of limited resources? Or, would another Service be better suited to the task?

Mountain, High-Altitude, and Cold Weather Warfare in History

From the Middle Ages to the Italian Campaign in World War II, European armies have long known that small bands of soldiers with mountaineering expertise could tie up large enemy for-

A mountain warfare combat instructor coaches an infantryman down a rappell lane. *(Photo by author.)*

Students conducting a long-range movement during Mountain Warfare Leader Course 2–13.
(Photo by Cody Downard Photography.)

mations and grind them down in a grueling war in the mountains. The United States' education in mountainous cold weather warfare began with the costly and arduous Aleutian Islands Campaign during the Second World War. Approximately 40,000 U.S. Marines deployed to Iceland during July 1941 to defend against a planned German amphibious invasion after its occupation of Denmark. The U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division was established using climbing guides, skiers, and Olympic athletes when the technical challenges of an Italian campaign were foreseen.

Recognizing the need for mountain warfare training, a cold weather battalion was established in 1951 outside of Bridgeport, CA, to train Marines bound for the Korean War. The immediate success of the newly established battalion served as the catalyst for what is today the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC).

Moving forward nearly three decades, Royal Marine Commandos fought Argentinean troops in arctic conditions in the mountains of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands during the 1982 Falklands War. India, China, and Pakistan have fought 3 major wars in the Himalayan and Karakorum mountain range since 1947 over the control of the Kashmir frontier. The United States' latest experience fighting in the mountains was Regional Command-East in Afghanistan's Hindu Kush Range.

Today there is a remote outpost in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of California still focused on conducting individual and collective training in support of the Marine Corps' task to be prepared to conduct mountain warfare operations. The MCMWTC emphasizes that, to achieve success in future mountain conflicts, Marines must have a firm grasp or history and be well versed in both geography and the current geopolitical situation. Students in the MCMWTC's Mountain Operations Staff Planning Course learn that mountains cover 24 percent of Earth's land mass and 64 percent of Asia (the most populous continent with approximately 4 billion inhabitants, or 60 percent of the world's population). Moreover, a majority of the world's rivers are fed from mountain sources; more than half of humanity depends on mountains for water.

The long and bloody history of mountain warfare demonstrates that armies that avoid training and preparation for this most difficult task do so at their peril.

MCMWTC

The MCMWTC has undergone many evolutions since its creation from a partnership with the Department of Agriculture and U.S. Forest Service in 1951. The Korean War, Cold War, and Operation Enduring Freedom have all produced incremental changes toward the training and execution of mountain warfare operations.

The MCMWTC is the Service-level doctrinal proponent for mountain warfare operations and the assault climber lead agent for the MEU's Special Skills Certification Program.[2] The mission of the MCMWTC is to:

> . . . conduct *unit and individual training* courses to prepare USMC, Joint, and Allied Forces *for operations in mountainous, high altitude and cold weather environments*; and the development of warfighting doctrine and specialized equipment for use in mountain and cold weather operations. (emphasis added)

Aboard the MCMWTC, the 4-week unit training package is conducted 6 times a year. The MCMWTC has recently offered the following Block IV training exercises and opportunities in response to the global war on terror and overseas contingency operations ranging from Exercise Mountain Viper, to the Alternate Mission Rehearsal Exercise Mountain Warrior, to the current Mountain Exercise (MTX). The scenario has undergone many redesigns from counterinsurgency, to near-peer conventional warfare, to requiring basic to highly technical military mountaineering skills. Every training unit conducts a preenvironmental training and basic mobility phase before transitioning into the field exercise portion, currently the Marine Corps' largest free-play, force-on-force exercise! The MCMWTC staff provides a summary of the training that has occurred and recommendations for improvements in tactics, techniques, and procedures following the unit's 23-day tenure in the field above 8,000 feet.

Individuals are trained in specialized military mountaineering skills in the varying formal schools' courses lasting 2 to 6 weeks. The Mountain Leader, Assault Climber, Scout Skier, Mountain Scout Sniper, Mountain Communications, Animal Packing, and Mountain Medicine Courses are overlapped and

aligned with the visiting unit's training schedule, so upon graduation from the shorter duration courses, the unit's personnel are reintegrated with their battalion for participation in the field exercise phase. Students from units not conducting an MTX training package return to home station and are expected to train their units in mountain warfare operations.

Unit and individual training is developed by the MCMWTC cadre from requirements in MCT 1.6.9, Conduct Mountain Warfare Operations. This training-related mandate defines Service capability, obligations, joint operational planning, deployment readiness, Department of Defense allocation of resources, and global force management as follows:

> Units and personnel may require specialized training in technical climbing, military mountaineering, snow mobility, field craft, survival, CASEVAC, navigation, use of pack animals and high angle marksmanship. Medical challenges include treatment of high altitude and cold weather illness and injuries, and casualty transport in a snow covered mountainous environment.[3]

NAVMC 3500.70A, Mountain Warfare Operations Training & Readiness Manual, is the Marine Corps' playbook for training to MCT 1.6.9.

Combatant commanders reference MCTs while developing operational, contingency, and crisis action plans, and for requesting and allocating joint forces for development throughout the range of military operations. Combatant commanders refer to the MCT to understand what capability a Marine Corps element brings to the fight.[4] However, with this said, there ostensibly is no requirement from the Operating Forces to be trained and evaluated to a standard without dedicated mountain warfare units or an operational proponent with a mountain warfare mission. The Marine Corps cannot succinctly field a unit today that meets the minimum deployment requirements mandated within MCT 1.6.9.

Jack of All Trades, Master of None

Individuals. The Marine Corps does not have a mountain leader MOS. The MCMWTC cadre trains individuals as summer (M7A) or winter (M7B) mountain leaders (a fully-qualified mountain leader has completed both courses). A mountain leader is a decisionmaker, advisor, and technical expert, leads an assault climber or scout skier platoon, and is charged with training his unit to conduct mountain warfare operations. Assault Climber Course and Scout Skier Course graduates are the executers under the leadership of mountain leaders and can be formed into independent maneuver elements or distributed across the infantry battalion.

Each MEU deploys with an assault climber platoon trained at the MCMWTC or the Special Operations Training Group. The mission of the assault climber platoon is to enable an amphibious assault or raid by establishing fixed climbing lanes and hauling systems on an enemy beachhead deemed inaccessible by LCAC or amphibious assault vehicle. Rope skills and construction of vertical hauling lines for casualty evacuation are also a must for the MEU tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel force. The assault climber platoon rarely deploys as an actual platoon, but is instead, in reality, disaggregated across the companies of the battalion landing team on different ships in the amphibious ready group.

Answers from postcourse surveys completed by Mountain Leader Course graduates over the past 2 years suggest that only 35 percent have conducted any sustainment training on skills in the *Mountain Leader Handbook* and *Mountain Warfare Operations T&R Manual*.[5] In contrast, Canadian Advanced Mountain Operators and Royal Marine Mountain Leaders mandate additional mountain training to sustain critical skills, yet the Marine Corps requires no sustainment training or recertification, nor is there a requirement to conduct unit-level training.

It takes 6 weeks to create a summer or winter mountain leader. Skills can atrophy or be lost in a matter of weeks without a requirement to sustain, refresh, and recertify technical mountaineering. Survey data suggests a mountain leader in the Operating Forces will require substantial retraining if identified to perform MCT 1.6.9 duties.

Last, distribution of mountain leaders, assault climbers, and scout skiers to Operating Force units is completely random because there is no HQMC manpower requirement to identify or track a certified mountain leader (M7A and/or M7B) or mountain warfare combat instructor.

Mountain warfare units. Up to 6 infantry battalions a year deploy to the MCMWTC for 34 days to participate in MTX, yet the Marine Corps does not identify a specific unit with the mission to execute mountain warfare operations. Units participating in MTX spend 23 days training at high altitude and return home with an introduction to mountain operations above 8,000 feet; however, no formal training, evaluation, or certification in mountain operations exists at the battalion level or above, yet the *Mountain Warfare Operations T&R Manual* contains the performance steps for evaluating units on their ability to conduct vertical hauling systems, fixed lanes, a cliff assault, skiborne attacks, and many other military mountaineering tasks. Similar to MEU-related certifications, an infantry unit could be graded and certified by controllers as mission capable to conduct operations directed in MCT 1.6.9.

Marine Corps doctrine mandates each infantry battalion have two mountain leaders in each rifle company and two per scout sniper platoon. *MCWP 3.35.1, Mountain Warfare Operations*, specifically tasks mountain leaders to "train their units for mountain and/or cold weather operations." Again, postcourse surveys completed by mountain leader graduates reveal that 33 percent provided unit-level training as prescribed in *MCWP 3.35.1* and the *Mountain Warfare Operations T&R Manual* within 12 months of earning their mountain leader certifications.[6] Therefore, the Marine Corps does not see a return in the increased abilities of units to conduct mountain warfare operations despite considerable investment of individual (mountain leader courses) and battalion-level (MTX) MCMWTC training opportunities.

No operational proponent. Battalions within the 2d Marine Regiment received 14 weeks of winter operations training to prepare them for the mission of protecting NATO's Northern Flank during the mid-1980s through early 1990s. These infantry battalions conducted 6 weeks of training aboard MCMWTC, 4 weeks of Exercise Alpine Warrior at Fort McCoy, WI, and then 4 weeks of amphibious and cold weather operations in Norway.

Exercise Cold Response above the Arctic Circle is NATO's second-largest amphibious exercise and involves 16,000 troops from 15 nations. Despite Exercise Cold Response involving ship-to-shore operations, reconnaissance, aircraft and fires integration, and a ground scheme of maneuver in a cold-weather environment, the Marine Corps has thus far offered token participation. The Marine Corps can demonstrate a commitment to mountain warfare by committing to Exercise Cold Response with an infantry battalion already trained at the MCMWTC to conduct mountain warfare operations.

The Way Ahead: Marine Mountain Units

Operational proponent for mountain warfare operations. Without designated mountain units driving innovation, the next best thing would be a requirement from the Operating Forces for a mountain warfare capability. The widely believed natural choice for this is III MEF with its existing commitments to Asia-connected operation and contingency plans. Unit deployment program battalions, the 31st MEU, and the 3d Marine Regiment would likely be the first Marine Corps units committed to a future conflict in Asia. A requirement from the Operating Forces for new capabilities would drive innovation and training far more effectively then directives pushed down from a training command. As demonstrated by the Royal Marines, mastery of mountain skills enhances the expeditionary capabilities of any unit and adds another specialized skill set to the Marine Corps not duplicated by any another Service. A III MEF forward deployed, scalable air/ground/logistics team in the Asia-Pacific theater with a mission to conduct mountain warfare operations would bring a powerful capability to the U.S. Pacific Command, nested within *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* and unique to the Marine Corps. This force would be tailor-made for existing commitments but poised to react to a range of contingences across Asia.

A new opportunity for training and cooperation. NATO expects to reposture from combat deployments to operational preparedness now that International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan's mission is scheduled to sundown in 2014. During a time of drawdown and reduced defense budgets across the alliance, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and Smart Defense Initiative (SDI) will maximize training opportunities by prioritizing a common standard for critical skill sets. These measures will also ensure units with similar capabilities can work effectively together.

The main requirements of CFI are to ensure that allies can communicate effectively, practice together, and validate and certify their ability to do so. Three fundamental and interrelated elements will be developed to address these requirements: expanded education and training, increased exercises, and a better use of technology.[7]

The purpose of the SDI is for:

> . . . alliance nations to give priority to those capabilities which NATO needs most, specialize in what they do best, and look for multinational solutions to shared problems. NATO can act as intermediary, helping the nations to establish what they can do together at lower cost, more efficiently and with less risk.[8]

The Marine Corps can leverage this new NATO-led direction by sending individual Marines and units abroad to simultaneously build relations with allied and coalition units with similar capabilities and learn from subject matter experts at established institutions. Using existing relationships with the Center of Excellence-Cold Weather Operations, the Multinational Center of Excellence for Mountain Warfare, and the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre, the MCMWTC Academics Section can validate and certify individual Marines and units who attend formal NATO training, hence reducing the expense of having to duplicate training at home station or MCMWTC. Engaging with NATO allies will reduce cost, capitalize on existing partnerships, and provide additional justification for continuing partnerships and bilateral training.

Block IV predeployment training above the Arctic Circle at the Allied Training Centre in Norway for a MAGTF with a mountain warfare mission would combine the best qualities and advantages of a theater security cooperation exercise with a MEU certification exercise.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps must embrace one of three courses of action to resolve the mountain warfare dilemma:

- No change.
- Completely cede lead agency responsibility for mountain operations to the U.S. Army (probably the special forces community).
- Commit to an operational proponent for mountain warfare operations.

The MCMWTC will continue to invest time, training dollars, and man-hours to produce individuals with highly specialized skill sets who have no requirement to train their unit, keep skills current, or recertify. Units participating in MTX are given an introduction to mountain operations, but no formal training, evaluation, or certification is required to drive the careful selection and allocation of available training. A Marine Corps infantry regiment or brigade today would find itself not as operationally capable as necessary to achieve victory in the mountains because of an inadequate training program.

In contrast, the U.S. Army has demonstrated an enthusiasm to expand mission sets and capabilities and to leverage available resources, and they have an ability to produce doctrine rapidly; the Army is ready to assume the lead in mountain warfare operations. In fact, one-fifth of all training aboard the MCMWTC in fiscal year 2013 was conducted for U.S. Army and non–Marine Corps units and personnel.[9] Mountain warfare operations are low priority (pri-

ority level 3 of 4) for Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and as a result, the Army has taken responsibility for producing Service-level doctrine back from the Marine Corps.[10] If the Marine Corps is to take the lead in mountain warfare operations, increasing the doctrinal priority to level 2 is required. Committing to a MAGTF or Pacific crisis response force to serve as the operational proponent would enhance future expeditionary operations, complement a middleweight force in any clime and place, and expand a capability unique to the Marine Corps.

With an exceptional combat history in both mountain and amphibious warfare, the Marine Corps can capitalize on this opportunity to assert dominance in mountain warfare operations. This commitment would require no grand restructuring or new installations; the combat formations and infrastructure exist today. The Royal Marines recognize the compatibility of the two disciplines from their centuries of experience in amphibious infiltrations of any beach, anywhere in the world. Royal Marines have successfully used their mastery of both types of warfare to carve out a niche for themselves as the expeditionary, rapid response, mountain force of choice within the United Kingdom. Taking into account the force reduction and current fiscal realities, the Marine Corps can leverage the principles of NATO's CFI and SDI to maximize training resources in both disciplines.

With the rapid advance and proliferation of antiaccess and area denial systems, the need for forcible entry from the sea by mechanized amphibious forces continues to fade.[11] From the Alay Mountains of Central Asia to the Kashmir frontier, and through Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, multiple potential enemies across the spectrum are thriving today in the mountains. An Asia-Pacific–focused MAGTF with a mission to conduct mountain warfare operations is the right force for the Corps during this time of transition.

Soldiers from 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) participating in Mountain Exercise 3–13. ***(Photo by Brandon Schroder.)***

Notes

1. Laird, Robbin F., "The U.S. Marine Corps in the Pivot to the Pacific," *The Diplomat*, 24 May 2013, accessed at thediplomat.com.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Bulletin 5603, Mountain Warfare Doctrinal Proponency Assignments*, Washington, DC, 21 August 2012; and Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3502.2A, Marine Expeditionary Unit(Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) Special Skills Certification Program, Assault Climber Lead Agent Assignment*, Washington, DC, 20 August 2004.

3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *MCO 3500, 26A, Marine Corps Task List*, Marine Corps Task 1.6.9, Conduct Mountain Warfare Operations, Washington, DC, 10 November 2008.

4. Services Headquarters, *Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3500.38B/Marine Corps Order 3500.26/U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Instruction M3500.1B/Marine Corps Task List 2.0*, Washington, DC, 1 June 2012. This is the Universal Naval Task List, a single-source document that combines the Navy Tactical Task List and the Marine Corps Task List. As applied to joint training and readiness reporting, this list provides a common language that commanders can use to document their command warfighting requirements as mission essential tasks.

5. Postcourse surveys are sent out annually to graduates of the summer and winter Mountain Leader Courses in accordance with *MCO 1553.2B, Management of Marine Corps Formal School*, (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, April 2011).

6. Ibid.

7. NATO Connected Forces Initiative, Brussels, Belgium, June 2013, accessed at www.nato.int.

8. NATO Smart Defense Initiative, Brussels, Belgium, 14 October 2011, accessed at www.nato.int.

9. In fiscal year 2013 the MCMWTC trained 6,068 Marine Corps, 1,047 joint, 303 coalition, and 21 civilian personnel.

10. Because Marine Corps Combat Development Command has still not published doctrine written in 2009–10, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate issued a program directive for the development of *Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3–97.6, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations*, with a dual designation of *MCWP 3–35.1* in October 2012, effectively taking the lead back from the Marine Corps.

11. Freier, Nathan, "The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 17 May 2012, accessed at csis.org. Also see the following:

- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity mid-range threat estimate for 2005–15, Marine Corps Base Quantico, July 2008.
- Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025*, Washington, DC, July 2008.
- Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2013*, Washington, DC, 2013.
- Department of the Navy, *Navy Marine Corps 3500.70A, Mountain Warfare Operations Training and Readiness Manual*, Washington, DC, September 2011.
- Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Reference Publication 3–35.1A, Small Unit Leader Guide to Mountain Warfare Operations*, Washington, DC, May 2013.

U.S. Marine Corps Component C²

Translating doctrinal command relationships into effective contingency and crisis response

by Col Gregory "Hal" Douquet & LtCol Nicholas Hale

As the Nation faces a future with less available and less frequent amphibious lift, regional Marine force (MarFor) component commanders will increasingly leverage special purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) as a complement to amphibious ready groups/MEUs to reassert the Marine Corps' traditional role as the Nation's 9–1–1 force. Forward postured SPMAGTFs are an economical and effective means to support multiple combatant commanders simultaneously and respond to crises and contingencies up to the midintensity level of the range of military operations (ROMO). As the Marine Corps establishes this global posture, it must focus resources at the tactical level to ensure "brilliance in the basics," but must also increase focus on regional MarFor structure, command relationships, and the critical tasks transition across command echelons that set conditions for the success of these tactical units.

Problematically, regional MarFors are task organized for economy of force and lack the capacity to command and control (C²) operational forces beyond the low-intensity level of the ROMO. Further, Marine Corps doctrine doesn't delineate C² roles, responsibilities, and tasks of the MarFors from subordinate MAGTF commanders.

This article contends that since regional MarFor headquarters do not have sufficient C² capacity, task transfer is a necessary and efficient way to make the MAGTF and regional MarFor more effective in delivering Marine Corps capability in support of combatant commander requirements and promoting mission accomplishment. This transition should be based on three C² transition factors: the size and echelon of the MAGTF command element, the phase of the operation, and where the operation falls along the ROMO.

>Col Douquet is Chief of Staff, Marine Forces Europe and Africa.

>>LtCol Hale is Assistant Chief of Staff, G–5 (plans), Marine Forces Europe and Africa.

Defining the C² Void

Given their span of responsibilities, it isn't practical or operationally sound for geographic combatant commands (CoComs) to C² a tactical-level SPMAGTF when operational-level (colonel or above) Marine Corps command elements aren't assigned, allocated, or apportioned. CoComs in which this operational C² void exists often default to their regional MarFor for operational control (OpCon) of the SPMAGTF. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MarForEur/Af), Southern Command (MarForSouth), and Central Command routinely step out of their doctrinal lanes and fill this C² void, exercising OpCon of rotational and allocated SPMAGTFs in the execution of Phase 0 theater requirements; however, as economy of force headquarters, regional MarFors have a structure-mission mismatch (in broad terms, they are not structured to C² at the tactical level) that manifests in challenges when responding to emerging crises and contingencies. C² of tactical forces constitutes a significant expansion in the role originally envisioned for these MarFors.

Background

To understand why we find ourselves with this structure-mission mismatch, it is instructive to review the events that initiated componency in the Marine Corps. The first Gulf War demonstrated that a single commander cannot effectively C² the warfighter (I MEF) and execute component responsibilities (MarCent) during a major campaign. In 1992, as noted in *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–40.8, Marine Corps Componency*, the Commandant incorporated lessons learned from Operation DESERT STORM by establishing two permanent component headquarters to support the five combatant commanders then in existence. Starting as liaison cells originating from these two Service component headquarters, the Marine Corps expanded its component headquarters structure to the present day in which all geographic and functional combatant commanders have a dedicated or dual-hatted Marine Corps Service component headquarters. Componency has played an integral if unheralded role ever since, with the high-water mark being MarCent's masterful effort in setting theater conditions for I MEF during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

Service component structure matured following the events of 11 September 2001, but since some CoComs had

higher-priority requirements, CoComs with lower priorities were structured as economy-of-force regional MarFors. In the event of a major operation, these regional MarFors would constitute a core Service C^2 capability, to be augmented at the time of a contingency. At a minimum they would coordinate, facilitate, and set conditions for the deployment of operational forces (with associated C^2) into theater.[1]

Thus, MarForEur/Af, MarForSouth, and until recently, MarCent, were never structured for the C^2 of tactical forces. Regional MarFors set theater conditions for rotational, allocated, and assigned forces. In coordination with their respective CoComs, regional MarFors posture the force, develop command relationships with higher and adjacent headquarters, and establish logistical, administrative, personnel, and operational conditions. In short, regional MarFors enable rotational forces such as SPMAGTFs; however, within the assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to the MarFors, this basic tenet is exceeded, creating a structure-mission mismatch, leading to the necessity to mitigate or task transfer to the SPMAGTF.

The Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan for 2012–20 and the European Command (EuCom) Theater Campaign Plan of 2010 specify regional MarFor roles, responsibilities, and tasks. Figures 1 and 2 identify those specified tasks of the MarFors and also highlight efficiency and effectiveness gains when designated tasks are transitioned to a subordinate MAGTF during crisis. Regional MarFors are unlikely to receive additional structure in the current personnel drawdown and fiscal environment. In order to meet their enduring tasks, efficiencies and effectiveness are gained by maintaining economy-of-force structure at the MarFors. While acknowledging the necessity to mitigate the risk of regional MarFor C^2 overstretch, it is necessary to transition some episodic tasks to rotational forces, such as SPMAGTFs, when appropriate.

How we combine regional MarFors and MAGTFs within existing authorities highlights how we conduct C^2 to best deliver Service capabilities to support combatant commander requirements. Figure 3 designates by green dots those component OpCon authorities that, when executed by regional MarFors, complement both component and MAGTF roles and responsibilities while

MARFOR Task	Phase 0	Crisis	Crisis w/MAGTF HQ in Theater
1. Command all U.S. Marine Corps Forces assigned to COCOM. Exercise OPCON of all attached USMC forces or as directed by the COCOM. When directed, retain ADCON of any assigned forces allocated to another COCOM.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
2. Recommend the allocation and coordinate provision of Marine Corps forces or individuals and recommend command relationships to support COCOM operations.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
3. Make recommendations to the COCOM, or to other joint force commanders or component commanders, on the proper employment of USMC forces.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
4. Conduct deployment/redeployment planning and assign execution of assigned/attached USMC forces.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
5. Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF	MAGTF
6. Conduct joint and combined training, including the training, as directed of components of other Services in joint operation for which the Service Component Commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility, or for which the Service Components facilities and capabilities are suitable.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
7. Coordinate U.S. Marine Corps support to USEUCOM and Joint Staff (CJCS) directed exercises with USMC capabilities in order to participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises focused on enhancing host nation capability to conduct joint and combined operation in support of regional stability, USEUCOM, and the DOD ongoing operations and campaigns.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
8. Identify, develop and program bilateral and multilateral relationships, cooperation, training, and exercises with those allied and partner nations that provide littoral access and/or maintain a Marine Corps and/or naval infantry forces to enhance partner capability, Joint/Combined/NATO interoperability, and regional stability.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
9. Conduct deliberate and crisis action planning (joint, component, and combined) in support of COCOM requirements.	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF	MARFOR/MAGTF

ADCON: Administrative control

USEUCOM: U.S. European Command

Figure 1.

MARFOR Task	Phase 0	Crisis	Crisis w/MAGTF HQ in Theater
10. Ensure Marine Corps internal requirements are met for assigned, and as directed, attached forces. These requirements include, but are not limited to: internal administration and discipline, conducting or directing joint training for assigned forces, logistics functions normal to the command, and Service intelligence matters/oversight of intelligence activities.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
11. Ensure commanders, staffs, and forces are trained and equipped to conduct or participate Joint, Combined, and Service exercises and operations.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
12. Provide and/or coordinate logistic support and inform the COCOM of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability.	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF	MARFOR/MAGTF
13. Manage, analyze, and assess requirements, capabilities, and processes, and provide input to various COCOM and Service assessments, including the Integrated Priority List.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
14. Provide support to partner nations, regional governments, and international organizations through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities in support of the COCOM's Theater Campaign Plan (TCP).	MARFOR	MARFOR	MAGTF
15. Plan, program, budget, execute, evaluate, and report funding from all sources in support of COCOM and Service requirements.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
16. Plan, provide, and/or coordinate C2 systems and C4 architecture in support of COCOM requirements.	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF	MARFOR/MAGTF
17. Plan and execute a mission assurance program.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
18. Assist in the development, coordination, and execution of the theater posture plans.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
19. Ensure planning, coordination and execution of information operations.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF
20. Conduct planning, coordination and oversight for Special Technical Operations (STO).	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR
21. In the absence of a Marine Corps Installation, provide coordinated support to the MITSC-EUR. MITSC-EUR will provide information technology support services to USMC forces in the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs.	MARFOR	MARFOR	MARFOR/MAGTF

AOR: Area of responsibility

MITSC-EUR: MAGTF Information Technology Support Center Europe

Figure 2.

OPCON Authorities	"Component OPCON"
1. Exercise or delegate OPCON and TACON, establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.	●
2. Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.	
3. Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.	●
4. Organize subordinate commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.	
5. Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.	
6. Assign command functions to subordinate CDRs.	●
7. Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.	
8. Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the ISR activities of the command.	
9. Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the CJCS, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.	●
10. Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.	●
11. Assign responsibilities to subordinate CDRs for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more CDRs.	●
12. Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such operational areas for subordinate CDRs as deemed desirable.	
13. Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic operational areas of subordinate CDRs.	

TACON: Tactical control

Figure 3.

complying with joint doctrine and associated authorities. Those authorities not highlighted can be selectively transferred to the MAGTF to enable the unique capabilities inherent to the force.

Case Studies

A review of historical case studies highlights how the three C^2 transition factors (size of the MAGTF command element, phase of the operation, and where the operation falls along the ROMO) have or have not determined C^2 transition points between components and MAGTFs. These case studies point to opportunities for improved transitions in future operations.

Case study 1: SPMAGTF BSRF exercising OpCon of allocated forces during Phase 0/TSC. When conducting Phase 0/theater security cooperation (TSC) in the EuCom area of responsibility, SPMAGTF Black Sea Rotational Force (BSRF) is a tactical organization reporting OpCon to the Service component commander, Commander, MarForEur/Af, as directed by the combatant commander. BSRF is enabled through a command element with sufficient C^2 systems and command, control, communications, and computers (C^4) architecture to tie into the EuCom joint architecture, execute hub-and-spoke distributed actions, support current operations, and conduct future operations planning and coordination. Because of these capabilities, BSRF is able to execute Phase 0 activities while remaining postured to support crises and contingencies.

C^2 risks are more likely when BSRF is required to conduct crisis or contingency operations. To mitigate this risk, MarForEur/Af coordinated the transfer of BSRF tactical control to designated functional component commanders in the event of contingencies. This ensures C^2 at the level where staff capacity exists and the MarFor remains focused on component-level equities. During such contingencies, BSRF has sufficient C^2 to assume MarFor Task 5 (employ forces within the command). Additionally, component OpCon is operationalized via a MarFor(Forward), which extends the component commander's span of control by collocating with the SPMAGTF. By posturing for crisis and contingency support, component OpCon assumes task transfers for Task 5, but also Task 9 for planning and Task 16 in supporting C^2 and C^4 architecture, which ensures BSRF maintains an appropriate posture for rapid response at the time of a contingency. During the execution of Phase 0, component OpCon supports selective task transfers of Tasks 8 and 14, being able to leverage scheduled engagement to either improve upon those events or exploit emergent opportunities to improve relationships, build capacity, and develop interoperability with allies and partner nations. Thus, BSRF supports mission accomplishment through selective task transfers.

Case study 2: Allocated forces for midrange ROMO—VMAQ–1 in OUP. From July to October 2011, VMAQ–1 (Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1) was allocated to EuCom OpCon via MarForEur/Af and transferred to a coalition (NATO) joint force commander in support of Operation Unified Protector (OUP). MarForEur/Af again employed a MarFor(Forward) element in support of Service componency to set basing, life support, and C^2 with higher/adjacent headquarters; facilitated a relief in place/transfer of authority with joint forces; and transferred VMAQ–1 to a NATO joint force commander. This relief in place/transfer of authority occurred effectively due to a mature theater with established procedures for establishment of a NATO joint force commander and associated command relationship for contributed U.S. forces, coordination with MarForCom and II MEF for aviation logistic support, and component-to-component and local coordination for basing support issues. Although not a MAGTF, selective transfer of key MarFor tasks to VMAQ–1 gained C^2 efficiencies and facilitated mission accomplishment. VMAQ–1 assumed Task 5 in the execution of assigned operational missions and supported Task 16 by integrating into joint/combined C^2 architecture with sufficient future operations planning capacity to support Task 9 and the theater air tasking order planning process. VMAQ–1 also maintained close coordination with II MEF and 2d MAW for aviation-specific logistics requirements in support of MarFor Task 16. Identifying these VMAQ–1 C^2 capabilities enabled key task transfers for it to seamlessly integrate into an ongoing operation and achieve immediate impact.

Case study 3: Foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in 2010 in Haiti—task transition in support of an emergent contingency. On 12 January 2010 a 7.0 earthquake hit the country of Haiti with an epicenter near the town of Léogâne. The Marine Corps'

contribution to joint and combined relief efforts—Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE—caused the Marine Corps to reexamine how regional MarFor headquarters are resourced and supported by Service headquarters, and how command relationships are established. From 13 January through 30 March, the Marine Corps responded in support of the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission by augmenting the MarForSouth staff with II MEF command element personnel, redirecting the 22d MEU with Africa Partnership Station–10 attached, diverting the 24th MEU to support, and coordinating the arrival and utilization of the USNS *Lummis*.

MarForSouth's principal actions centered on coordinating appropriate command relationships for the most effective employment of Marine Corps and naval forces, identifying augmentation requirements to transition Service component headquarters to an operational posture, placement of Service liaisons across the enterprise to identify and address Service equities, and setting conditions and coordinating support for all responding forces. Command relations for both MEUs' OpCon to Commander, MarForSouth, was transferred to Commander, Joint Task Force-Haiti (Commander, JTF-Haiti) tactical control. The Commander, JTF-Haiti, further transferred these forces to joint force maritime component commander (CTF–41) tactical control for employment once functional componency was established.

MarForSouth coordination was effective once all the liaisons and command relationships were in place. The key was transferring the MEUs to the employing commander tactical control, enabling the MAGTF commander to employ the force based on assigned tasking. Placement of liaisons proved to be critically important. Command relationships, communications architecture, and logistics infrastructure were established in stride as relief was provided. MarForSouth's ability to rapidly plug into the critical nodes of this developing support enabled immediate employment of the MEUs upon arrival. Both MEUs assumed significant MarFor task transfers upon arrival in the operational environment, immediately executing Task 5 (accomplishing assigned missions); support to Task 9 (crisis action planning); support to Task 12 (coordinating logistics support); and Task 16 (C^2 and C^4 architecture support). With the MEUs in execution, MarForSouth coordinated support for the MEUs, meeting staff requirements both for the combatant commander and Service headquarters, and set conditions for and coordinating the redeployment of MarFors upon mission completion.

Case study 4: SPMAGTF CR, task transition in Phase 0, postured for crisis and contingency. MarFor C^2 requirements for the establishment of U.S. Africa Command's SPMAGTF-crisis response (CR) are similar to those discussed in the BSRF case study, but significantly greater scope, scale, and time pressures magnified seams between the MarFors and the MAGTF. In the complicated political/diplomatic/operational terrain of the new norm, Marine Forces Europe and Africa will identify basing requirements, command relationships, authorities, etc., without the necessary staff depth, authorities, or leverage to speed coordination. Setting conditions for the MAGTF also required unprecedented levels of coordination between regional MarFors as SPMAGTF-CR established a forward posture in the EuCom area of responsibility as a force OpCon to Commander, Africa Command, in support of Africa Command requirements. To meet time-critical theater requirements, SPMAGTF-CR conducted Tasks 8, 14, and 18 (training, sustainment, engagement, and support to theater posture). SPMAGTF commenced local coordination with base commanders, defense attachés, and Offices of Defense Cooperation to conduct the sustainment training the mission demanded. This results in occasional roles and missions challenges with the CoComs due to the force being assigned as an Africa Command force conducting coordination in the EuCom area of operations. SPMAGTF-CR also supported transfers of Tasks 5, 9, 12, and 16 related to mission execution, planning, logistics support, and C^4 architecture.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Analysis of these case studies according to the three C^2 transition factors reveals the following:

- The size of the MAGTF command element, the phase of the operation, and where the operation falls along the ROMO provides insight for mitigating operational C^2 gaps and seams through task transition between the component and the MAGTF.
- Regional MarFors and MAGTFs are different, and Service capabilities are best employed when certain MarFor tasks are transferred to the MAGTF to leverage strengths inherent in the MAGTF.
- SPMAGTF BSRF is a good example of how the MarFor and CoCom can more readily compensate for operational C^2 shortfalls when they know and understand the capabilities the Marine Corps is providing. Forward deployed MAGTFs not only reduce time and space risk, but also develop habitual relationships and trust

between the regional MarFors and CoComs for which there is no substitute. EuCom and MarForEur/AF compensate for BSRF's slim command element by subordinating BSRF to a functional component commander in the event of contingencies.

- VMAQ–1's deployment in support of OUP demonstrates the value of a mature joint force commander operating in a mature theater. Just as in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, mature theaters require less-intensive regional MarFor coordination.
- MarForSouth required staff augmentation to meet the demands of a component headquarters setting conditions and coordinating support for forces responding to crisis; however, for a fast-moving operation such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, placement of liaisons at key nodes within the enterprise set critically important conditions for the arrival of the MAGTF(s) with key task transfers, allowing component roles and responsibilities to continue during execution.
- In the case of MAGTFs (other than MEUs) structured for crisis response mission execution, planning, logistics support, and C^4 architecture are significant enough that the operational C^2 should be sourced by a JTF headquarters, perhaps a MEB command element, or at a minimum a robust SPMAGTF command element with a colonel commander. For SPMAGTF-CR, the command element is robust enough to support not only operational C^2, but also local training, sustainment, engagement, and support to theater posture. But since these command elements aren't plentiful, it is unlikely that the Service will source them for anything short of a crisis or enduring contingency support (as in the case of the newly established SPMAGTF-CR in support of Africa Command). Consequently, the operational C^2 shortfall resides at MarFors without an assigned SPMAGTF in routine operations—Phase 0/TSC while awaiting the call to crisis—and in setting the conditions and enabling a deploying SPMAGTF.
- A more binding definition of regionally aligned MarFors in support of CoCom requirements would go a long way in satisfying these requirements. Regionally aligned MEFs and MEBs facilitate the time, space, and forward posture advantages associated with habitual planning relationships, standing operating procedures, and confidence-building measures—all of which ensures timely, effective, and efficient response at time of contingency.
- MEB JTF certification and transition from "regionally aligned" to apportioned and allocated may be a logical follow-on confidence-building measure with geographic combatant commands. The paucity of JTF headquarters and the ever-increasing requirements for them will increase demand. The Service must balance this demand with the challenges of registering, apportioning, and deploying allocated rotational forces vice assigned forces. While these measures would certainly increase CoCom confidence and substantiate the relevance of Marine forces through physical presence, such a commitment would also constrain force providers from rapidly responding to emerging crisis and contingencies as is fitting for the Nations' 9–1–1 force.
- To mitigate MarFor structure-mission mismatch, component-to-MAGTF task transfer should be standardized according to the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, but greater rigor must be applied to the MAGTF tasks and those tasks that cannot be accomplished by the regional MarFors. Tasks that would be more appropriate for the MAGTF include: (9) "Conduct . . . crisis action planning in support of CoCom requirements," and (11) "Ensure commanders, staffs, and forces are trained and equipped to conduct or participate in Joint, Combined, and Service exercises and operations" (see Figures 1 and 2). There may be other tasks that would require transition to the MAGTF depending upon the size of the MAGTF command element, the phase of the operation, and where the operation falls along the ROMO.
- Establish policy in which some regional MarFors have C^2 responsibility and some do not. Those that do not should have a permanently assigned or allocated MAGTF of appropriate size to meet assigned combatant command tasks and responsibilities as delineated through tasking to the MarFor. Those that do have a C^2 responsibility should be structured as such.

The purpose of this article is not to ease the burden on higher headquarters, but instead to identify that regional MarFors as currently structured have a C^2 void. Therefore, task transfer is a necessary and efficient way to make the MAGTF and component more effective. Challenges remain, many of them structural and unlikely to change soon given our fiscal environment. Selective application of the crisis augmentation cell can ameliorate regional MarFor structure-mission mismatch, but only temporarily and if the cost is borne by the sourcing headquarters. Unless we either guess right or we address these C^2 shortfalls with doctrine and habitually regionally aligned command relationships, the time/space challenges in seeking to respond to crises and contingencies in an ever more dangerous world with reduced Service end strength means the Marine Corps' ability to respond rapidly to emerging crises will diminish.

Note

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–40.8, Marine Corps Componency*, Washington, DC, 13 February 2009, p. 2–16. The size of the Marine Corps prevents the manning of numerous, large Marine Corps component headquarters. The combatant command–level Marine Corps component headquarters is manned primarily by permanently assigned personnel who are augmented by additional personnel from sources throughout the Marine Corps during operational commitments and times of war. Globally sourced personnel may come from the Marine Corps Reserve, the Supporting Establishment, or other Marine Corps component organizations. Individual augments, liaisons, and representatives are also necessary for component operations, along with the basic core of personnel required to man Marine Corps component headquarters.

Revisiting Advanced Base Operations

The current Pacific situation is strikingly similar

by Col Scott D. Aiken

"The extent to which the Marine Advanced Base Force will participate in these operations will very likely depend upon the number of Marines available—and their military worth in advanced base operations. If skilled in ship-shore operations and inculcated with a high morale and offensive spirit, they will doubtless be used to the limit. . . ."

—FMFRP 12–46[1]

The visionary 1921 work of then-Maj Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* (saved for posterity as *Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12–46* (*FMFRP 12–46*)), provides amazing insight into what would become the United States' overall concept for the prosecution of the Pacific Campaign against the Japanese Empire during World War II. The contents of Ellis' work can once again prove useful as we define the "Coming Naval Century."[2] His ideas, modified for modern challenges and today's operational environment, can enable littoral maneuver and provide geographic combatant commanders with relevant, well-positioned amphibious forces in an antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) environment. This article describes Ellis' ideas and design for the amphibious campaign against the Japanese in terms of today's A2/AD challenges. While the following ideas are applicable to other potential amphibious campaigns against significant A2/AD threats in the eastern Mediterranean Sea or the Arabian Gulf, they will focus on the Western Pacific, based on the specificity of Ellis' work.

>Col Aiken is currently assigned as the Fleet Marine Officer with U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, VA. He has held a variety of command and staff billets.

Similar Operating Environments

From the perspective of the United States, there are several similarities between 1921 and the present security environment. First we see a rising power in the Far East that possesses an excellent array of weapons that can serve to counter access and deny areas (Japan in 1921 and China in 2013). Second, we see a supplemental power in the Far East that can be termed "chaotic" (China in 1921 and North Korea in 2013). Finally, as Germany was a rising power in Europe, we presently see nations rising in other regions of the world (Russia and Iran) that divert our Nation's attention and resources from a potential Far Eastern near-peer competitor.

The operating environment described in Ellis' work is geographically similar to the area of potential future conflict with China. Note that of the "Marshall, Caroline and Pelew [Palau] Islands" mentioned by Ellis, two—the Caroline and Palau Islands—comprise the "second island chain," a geographic fixture of Chinese doctrine for offshore defense.[3]

Three other factors within this potential operating environment apply. First, as described in Ellis' paper, we must assume that Micronesia will once again be contested. This provides a distinct aiming point for efforts at access. Current Chinese military expenditures and attempts at capability serve as ample proof toward this assumption. Second, while the Pacific is characterized by vast expanses, long-range precision weapons are appearing in increasing numbers. The volume and capability of these weapons can reduce the effect of the Pacific's expanses from the perspective of targeting and fires. Additionally, the domains of space and cyberspace overlay the traditional Pacific domains of sea, undersea, land, and air, and challenges to their dominance will further facilitate the growing A2/AD threat. Third, as outlined by CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN(Ret), in *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, scouting and reconnaissance perform a vital role in naval warfare. Hughes states the following:

> At sea better scouting—more than maneuver, as much as weapon range, and oftentimes as much as anything else—has determined who would attack not merely effectively, but who would attack decisively first.[4]

As with targeting and fires, scouting and reconnaissance will extend into space and cyberspace. U.S. and coalition forces will spend substantial effort

U.S. and coalition forces will include a Marine contribution. *(Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3d Class Ricardo R. Guzman.)*

per Hughes' comments; we should plan for a Marine Corps contribution in this crucial endeavor.

One Solution: Advanced Base Operations

While Ellis outlines an overall strategy of executing a Pacific campaign toward the Far East, his thinking at the operational and tactical levels is most applicable to any future Marine Corps contribution to a fight in an A2/AD environment. Ellis generally outlines the latter two levels in terms of the amphibious landing, the occupation, and then the defense of littoral terrain, specifically islands. Ellis characterizes three reasons for reducing an enemy-held "island position." First, littoral terrain would be reduced to control anchorages and airfields, denying their use by the enemy. Second, such locations would be reduced to permit their use by friendly forces. Finally, an entire island or island group would be reduced to allow for unrestricted use by friendly forces and deny the enemy complete access, including observation.[5]

A modern description of the previous three reasons in the context of A2/AD is in order. One should note that Ellis made the assumption that at the outbreak of hostilities, certain geographic locales would be overrun by the enemy, thus his sequence of landing, occupation, and defense applies, as the United States would initially battle westward in a deliberate attempt to recapture lost ground. The advent of long-range weaponry and the prospect of asymmetric warfare make such assumptions less valid today. At the outbreak of any future hostilities in the Pacific, initial force dispositions will be much more uncertain, making the requirement for defensive positioning likely. U.S. and coalition forces stand a high likelihood of expending much initial effort in securing and protecting the advanced bases needed to prosecute a campaign.

The growing threat from China makes the future unsure with regard to basing during potential hostilities. With likely friendly island positions targeted, U.S. forces will have to reinforce and strengthen current U.S. and friendly basing to withstand kinetic attack, occupy friendly or neutral territory to establish new bases, and potentially seize hostile territory later in the campaign. In short, while the U.S. Navy leads the world by a large margin in the ability to replenish at sea, protected areas for ship maintenance and damage repair will still be required. Despite the technological advances in aeronautics, airfields are still needed to project power over extended ranges, maintain persistence, and rearm and refuel. Modern military campaigns require sophisticated logistics systems, so the ability to have locations to conduct the reception, staging, onward movement and integration function, treat casualties, and facilitate resupply will be vital. Additionally, modern island positions can serve to provide an area in which U.S. forces can exercise operational superiority over certain domains from which to project power against an adversary. Such operating areas can take the form of an amphibious objective area in this aspect if a preponderance of naval forces is employed.

In the context of advanced base operations, Marines can deliver a capability to the joint force that facilitates the projection of U.S. forces within an A2/AD environment. Seizing and defending advanced littoral bases, the key action by the Marine Corps during the Pacific Campaign of World War II, will once again be required if war comes to the Pacific Ocean; secure bases for continued operations are imperative. To reiterate, these bases may be preexisting before hostilities, occupied without conflict, or seized kinetically.

Once bases are seized or occupied, they must be defended. In his work, Ellis states that in the defense of bases:

> . . . the primary object of the defense forces will be to prevent the enemy from damaging property within a certain area (anchorages, port facilities, etc.), not necessarily to destroy enemy craft. The defense required is only that necessary to render an enemy attack so dangerous as to be unreasonable. . . .[6]

The same holds true for the penetration of an A2/AD environment; terrain retention may trump destruction of attacking forces for the sake of campaign sustainability. Ellis provides the keys to base defense as "good observation, quick communication and rapid, accurate gun-fire."[7] Developing the force structure that could excel in these areas was essential. The time-tested Fleet Marine Force of World War II ultimately realized Ellis' vision, and its continued refinement throughout the years into the current MAGTF force structure places Marine participation in the counter-A2/AD fight in good stead.

Countering A2/AD Threats: The MAGTF Applies

Ellis describes his concept of an ad-

Advanced Base Force	
Force Headquarters Detachment	125
1 Base Defense Brigade	5425
3 Landing Brigades	18075
Total	**23625**
Base Defense Brigade:	
Brigade Headquarters Detachment	25
3 Regiments	5400
Total:	**5425**
Base Defense Regiment:	
Headquarters Company:	
(1) Operations & Intelligence	125
(2) Fire Command	
(3) Administration	
Supply Company:	
(1) Rations	
(2) Clothing & Equipment	
(3) Ordnance	
(4) Transport	
Heavy Gun Company: 4 7-in., tractor	125
Heavy Gun Company: 4 5-in., pedestal	125
Howitzer Company: 4 8-in., tractor	125
Field Gun Company: 6 155-mm., tractor	125
Field Gun Company: 8 75-mm., tractor	125
A-A. Gun Company 12 largest, pedestal	125
Searchlight Company (8 30-36 inch))	125
Searchlight Company (8 12-18 inch))	
Searchlight Company (Paraboloids))	
Sound Locator Co. (Magnetic Loops))	125
Sound Locator Co. (Radio Compasses))	
Engineer Company	125
Communications (1 large radio set))	125
(2 small radio sets))	
Air Detachment (8 pursuit))	300
(8 scout-bombers))	
Total:	**1800**

Figure 1. Ellis' composition of the force and base.

Landing Brigade:	
Brigade Headquarters Detachment	25
3 Regiments	6000
Total:	**6025**
Landing Regiment:	
Headquarters Company:	125
(1) Operations & Intelligence	
(2) Pioneers: 4 searchlights 12" & 18"	
(3) Communications: 1 large radio set, 3 small radio sets;	
(4) Administration	
Supply Company:	125
(1) Rations	
(2) Clothing and Equipment	
(3) Ordnance	
(4) Transport	
Gun company: 12 37mm., 8 75mm.,	125
Machine Gun Company: 30 guns	125
3 Battalions riflemen (500 men each, minimum)	1500
Total:	**2000**

Figure 2. Ellis' composition of the landing brigade.

vanced base force that would land, occupy, and defend littoral terrain during a Pacific campaign. The advanced base force was organized around a base defense brigade (consisting of base defense regiments) and three landing brigades largely formed by landing regiments. Figures 1 and 2 show these proposed task organizations.[8]

As seen in the figures, Ellis' proposed advanced base force contains all elements of the modern MAGTF. A quick analysis of the force's structure is in order. Note the heavy emphasis on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR—Hughes' scouting and reconnaissance) within the base defense regiment. The scout-bombers provided scouting at distance; the searchlight and sound locator companies more close in precision. These assets provided the "good observation" needed for the task of defense. The communications, operations, and intelligence, and fire command personnel provided for the "quick communication," and the gun companies, the "rapid, accurate gunfire" as envisioned by Ellis. The landing regiments were infantry-centric and optimized for the short-duration assaults required for island positions. Obviously the supporting arms provided by the U.S. Navy in the form of aviation and naval gunfire would augment the infantry. Other follow-on forces, such as a base defense regiment or U.S. Army garrison units, would be much better suited to relieve the landing regiments and assume a defensive posture.

In comparing the advanced base force with considerations for optimizing a MAGTF to overcome an A2/AD threat, the following broad considerations are provided. Two scenarios are offered: one defensive in nature and aligned toward a modern version of the base defense brigade, and the second, offensively oriented and aligned toward a modern version of the landing brigade.

The first scenario involves defending an island with an anchorage used by forward deployed naval forces for ship maintenance and damage repair. The island is also home to an airfield and a logistics hub, to include a Level III medical facility. Using Ellis' keys to base defense, a force optimized for good ob-

servation, quick communications, and rapid, accurate fires is needed. With the firepower available to an adversary who possesses an A2/AD arsenal, the author adds "force protection" to Ellis' keys to base defense. As such, a MAGTF defending an advanced base should be shaped accordingly:

- *Good observation/robust ISR.* Aviation will be needed for scouting. While U.S. Navy and coalition maritime patrol aircraft will surely be operating in the objective area, augmentation by MAGTF aviation assets will reduce the potential for operational and tactical surprise. Signals intelligence will replace the sound location and searchlight capabilities of old. Human intelligence will be required, largely in a counterintelligence role, searching for any Level I threats (agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, and terrorists) in the area.
- *Quick communications.* The MAGTF command element should be robust enough to facilitate rapid and effective communications across the region and must be able to maintain communications and coordination at the joint level. Additionally, in leveraging the domains of space and cyberspace, liaison cells and reach-back coordinators must be on-site and accessible. With the MAGTF in the defense, communications nodes will require redundancy to withstand adversary action. Finally, the MAGTF must be able to operate in a communications/GPS-denied environment.
- *Accurate fires.* In defending the littoral base, the MAGTF should strike at adversary forces preemptively if possible, and at the maximum range feasible once an enemy attack is launched. The queuing of U.S. cyber assets will be crucial at this point, facilitated by the "good communications" described above. MAGTF aviation assets will have the greatest striking range and should seek to "render an enemy attack so dangerous as to be unreasonable." Raid force packages can destroy vital enemy assets and serve as spoiling attacks to disrupt the adversary's timing and momentum. The MAGTF, in concert with nearby joint and naval forces, should turn the tables on the enemy, forcing them to experience the full range of A2/AD systems to hamper their attack.
- *Force protection.* Countering the systems and mitigating the effects of long-range precision weaponry is now a necessary function in the modern A2/AD fight. While on the defense, the MAGTF should leverage its engineering capability to the maximum extent possible for survivability missions. Additionally, in most areas of the Pacific, existing infrastructure will be accessible, and the engineer surveys to optimize available assets for the best defense should occur. Antiair and antimissile assets will be required, and a natural partner of the MAGTF is a U.S. Navy surface combatant operating in the vicinity that is ballistic missile defense capable. Joint possibilities for missile defense include Army Patriot assets, if available. Finally, if an adversary unleashes its full potential of A2/AD systems, casualties will be inevitable. Robust medical capability will prove essential not only for the MAGTF, but the joint force as a whole.

The second scenario involves seizing an island with an anchorage and an airfield, and with facilities suitable for development into a logistics hub. Ellis' organization and thoughts on the landing brigade/regiment are more traditional (and the basis for) what many Marines would consider offensively oriented MAGTF operations; however, a MAGTF seizing an advanced base should be optimized for the mission. Considerations toward robust ISR, quick communications, and accurate fires oriented toward the offense will affect task organization accordingly.

Conclusion

An operational task while operating against an A2/AD threat will be to seize and defend bases. The modern MAGTF can provide the joint force with the ability to operate from advanced bases as it penetrates and maneuvers in A2/AD environments of considerable size within the vast Pacific region. While this article focuses on the Pacific as an example in parallel with the prophetic Ellis, the considerations outlined herein are applicable for the other littoral regions of potential conflict. As during Pete Ellis' day of the advanced base force, the extent to which the MAGTF will "participate in these operations will very likely depend upon the number of Marines available—*and their military worth in advanced base operations*. If skilled in ship-shore operations and inculcated with a high morale and offensive spirit, they will doubtless be used to the limit . . . ."[9] (emphasis added)

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12–46, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 21 August 1992, p. 29.

2. For more information on this concept, see: Work, Robert O., "The Coming Naval Century," *Proceedings*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, May 2012, p. 311.

3. The "second island chain" is considered the next chain of archipelagos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast, beyond the first island chain (that is principally composed of the Kuril Islands, Japanese Archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, northern Philippines, and Borneo, and extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula.) The second island chain is generally composed of the Bonin, Marianas, and Caroline Islands, and extends from Honshu to New Guinea.

4. Hughes, CAPT Wayne P. Jr., USN(Ret), *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, second edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, p. 212.

5. *FMFRP 12–46*, p. 78.

6. *FMFRP 12–46*, p. 79.

7. Ibid.

8. *FMFRP 12–46*, pp. 82–83.

9. Ibid.

Increase ARG/MEU Capacity

Responding to today's crisis with today's force, today

by LtCol Robert C. Rice

Marine Corps Commandant, Gen James F. Amos, testified the following to Congress:

> . . . [A]s America's crisis response force, we maintain a high state of unit readiness. You're either ready to respond to today's crisis, with today's force . . . today . . . or you risk being irrelevant.[1]

The Marine Corps' ability to respond to a crisis is best represented by the amphibious ready group/MEU (ARG/MEU) program that is the gold standard for crisis response, as evidenced by the fact that each geographic combatant commander (GCC) has registered a requirement for persistent ARG/MEU coverage. Unfortunately, no ARG/MEU was available to effectively respond to the attack in Benghazi, Libya, which exposed the limitation of the current ARG/MEU employment model. Today's ARG/MEU construct only provides a persistent presence to Central Command (CentCom) and Pacific Command (PaCom). The increasingly complex and uncertain world situation has intensified the ARG/MEU requirement, therefore the Navy-Marine Corps Team must do better to meet the demand. This article offers a concept to increase persistent ARG/MEU coverage with a forward presence of four ARG/MEUs in support of GCCs, while taking into account the constraints of fiscal austerity and the strategic rebalance to the Pacific.

"Crisis—An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives."

—Joint Publication 3–0, Operations

(Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 11 August 2011)

The most critical item that an ARG/MEU offers national policymakers is decision space.

The Requirement Is for an ARG/MEU

An ARG/MEU is a composite force that includes aviation, ground, logistics, and naval capabilities, and is trained to plan and execute rapidly in response to a crisis. The most critical item that an ARG/MEU offers national policymakers is decision space. Figure 1 represents crises during the past two decades to which ARG/MEUs have responded; what is not depicted in Figure 1 is the tenfold number of crises to which ARG/MEUs have planned and postured, but not executed. An ARG/MEU, with all its embedded capability, provides GCCs a scalable response option across the spectrum of conflict, from providing presence by loitering off the coast to putting approximately 2000 Marines ashore. This gives the President, GCCs, and U.S. Ambassadors a wide range of response options, all with built-in branches. For example, if executing an Embassy reinforcement mission with a platoon, a MEU can self-reinforce with additional Marines, armored vehicles, aircraft, information operations, nonlethal weapons, consequence management, and robust medical capability. By being staged afloat, MEUs offer flex-

>LtCol Rice is Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. He has deployed as a light armored reconnaissance company commander with the 13th MEU (2001–02); as Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2007–08); and as Operations Officer, 11th MEU (2009–10).

Examples of ARG/MEU Crisis Response 1990-Present		
Year	Location	Mission
1990	Liberia	Embassy Reinforcement, NEO
1991	Philippines	HADR
1991	Somailia	NEO
1993	Haiti	Peace Operations
1995	Bosnia	Strike, TRAP
1996	Liberia	Embassy Reinforcement, NEO
1996	Central African Rep	Embassy Reinforcement, NEO
1997	Sierra Leone	NEO
1998	Eritrea	NEO
1998	Kuwait	Reinforcement (Op Desert Fox)
1999	Macedonia	HADR
1999	East Timor	Peace Operations
2001	Afghanistan	Strike, Amphib Assault
2002	Afghanistan	Reinforcement (Op Anaconda)
2003	Iraq	Amphib Assault
2003	Liberia	Embassy Reinforcement, NEO
2004	Philippines	HADR
2006	Lebanon	NEO
2007	Bangladesh	HADR
2010	Pakistan	HADR
2011	Libya	CAS, TRAP
2012	USA	Defense Support to Civil Auth

CAS: Close air support
HADR: Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
NEO: Noncombatant evacuation operation
TRAP: Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel

Figure 1.

ibility as the situation on the ground evolves, all while maintaining a minimal footprint ashore.

> ***"We will develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives."***
> **—Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense**[2]

In response to GCC requirements, it has become common for ARG/MEUs to operate forward in a disaggregated manner, where their elements are beyond the range to mutually support each other. While disaggregation provides expanded coverage, at some point the tyranny of distance is too great for a three-ship ARG/MEU to cover (for example, the ARG/MEU in CentCom was unable to support Africa Command (AfriCom) during the Benghazi crisis). To offset the lack of current ARG/MEU capacity, the Marine Corps has developed ad hoc security forces to support the growing requirements in AfriCom and elsewhere. The challenge with these small, predominately landbased formations is that they lack inherent mobility and have limited capacity to flex to changing circumstances on the ground the way an ARG/MEU can.

While GCCs are happy to accept ad hoc security forces or other units (such as a special purpose MAGTF), what they really desire and need is persistent ARG/MEU presence. In addition to creating decision space, ARG/MEUs are designed to serve as enablers for follow-on forces and/or a joint task force created for a specific crisis.

Getting to a 4.0 ARG/MEU Forward Presence

Today CentCom and PaCom have persistent ARG/MEU coverage with some additional presence afforded to European Command (EuCom) and PaCom as part of ARG/MEU transits between the United States and CentCom. Getting additional persistent ARG/MEU presence forward deployed to better meet GCC demand and to position the Navy-Marine Corps Team as the most relevant force for today's security challenges requires innovative thought and the willingness to challenge paradigms.

The challenge is to increase the ability to respond to crisis given that the Department of Defense's incoming era of fiscal austerity means that the number of amphibious ships, specifically big-deck LHDs (the platform that forms the nucleus of an ARG/MEU) will remain static and that the Navy and Marine Corps will be unable to grow manpower post-Afghanistan.

As depicted in Figures 2 and 3, the concept is to forward-base two ARGs—one in the Arabian Sea and one in Australia. These two ARGs would be in addition to the ARG already home-ported in Japan that supports the 31st MEU. For the purpose of this article, "forward-basing" is defined as "ships that are forward-postured but not home-ported," meaning that the crews' permanent duty stations and their families remain based in the United States. For simplicity, this article only focuses on big-deck amphibious ships, but the concept maintains the current three-ship ARG construct with associated LPD- and LSD-class ships collocated with an LHD. This concept supports the strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific by increasing to two the number of ARG/MEUs forward in PaCom, and ensures that CentCom maintains a persistent ARG/MEU and supports an ARG/MEU for rotational deployments in the Mediterranean that can support a majority of

Figure 2. Notional ARG/MEU global presence.

EuCom and AfriCom requirements. Each coast would maintain an ARG/MEU for training and another would be factored into shipyard maintenance. This leaves one additional ARG/MEU based on the east coast to support theater security cooperation deployments to Southern Command and AfriCom, as well as the ability to surge in the event of a major crisis. This proposed ARG/MEU laydown postures the Marine Corps to conduct a broad spectrum of crisis response activities, including humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, counterpiracy operations, peace operations, protection/reinforcement of U.S. Embassies, and the evacuation of American citizens along the littorals, primarily focused on the Middle East and South Asia where future crises are most likely to occur and where the current defense strategic guidance says that the Department of Defense will focus.[3]

Finally, this ARG/MEU laydown supports the concept of regionalization at the MEF level as tasked in *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan*.[4] II MEF would support rotational deployments to the Mediterranean in support of AfriCom and EuCom, I MEF would support the CentCom ARG/MEU, and III MEF would be responsible for the two ARG/MEUs in PaCom (utilizing forces assigned from I MEF via the unit deployment program).

There will be issues, especially with command and control. . . .

Making this concept practical requires paradigm changes in both the institutional Navy and Marine Corps. For the Navy this would mean rotating crews between forward-based locations and home ports, which entails relooking at the concept of "sea swap" (which was validated in 2004 with destroyers).[5] The Navy is successfully forward-basing mine countermeasure ships in the Arabian Gulf.

From the Marine Corps' perspective, this paradigm change would mean accepting that the intense MEU predeployment workup cycle can be accomplished on a set of ships different than those the MEU will be forward-deployed on. There will be issues, especially with command and control and communications equipment; however, these issues may be the catalyst to resolve which communications systems should be the baseline for a MEU. On a limited scale, the Marine Corps has already demonstrated a variation of this concept; consider the initial stages of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya when the ground combat element of the 26th MEU was committed ashore in Afghanistan and a replacement battalion was sent forward. This concept also builds on the experience

Notional LHA/D Amphibious Ship Posture				
Hull	Ship	Homeport	Fwd Base	COCOM
LHA 5*	USS Peleliu	West Coast	N/A	Training
LHD 1	USS Wasp	West Coast	N/A	Maintenance
LHD 2	USS Essex	East Coast	N/A	Training
LHD 3	USS Kearsarge	East Coast	N/A	**EUCOM/AFRICOM
LHD 4	USS Boxer	East Coast	N/A	**EUCOM/AFRICOM
LHD 5	USS Bataan	East Coast	N/A	Maintenance
LHD 6	USS Bonhomme Richard	Japan	Japan	PACOM
LHD 7	USS Iwo Jima	West Coast	Australia	PACOM
LHD 8	USS Makin Island	West Coast	Arabian Gulf	CENTCOM
**Note- LHD 5 will be replaced by LHA 6- USS America*				

Figure 3.

of sourcing the 31st MEU where the battalion landing team from I MEF does not train on the ARG based in Japan prior to deployment. The MEU's gear (with the potential exception of the MEU's aviation assets, which can self-deploy) would stay with the forward-based ARG and the Marines would deploy by air and link with their equipment and the ARG in-theater, similar to the way Marine units have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade.

Benefits

The clear benefit of forward-basing is increasing the Navy/Marine Corps' relevance by increasing the forward-deployed presence of the Nation's premier crisis response force. There would be substantial cost savings in fuel by eliminating the current 40-plus day one-way transit ARG/MEUs make from the west coast to the CentCom area of responsibility. With the exception of a short period of turnover, the overall number of days that the ARG/MEU would be ready to respond would increase, reducing the opportunity cost of not having the force available during transit.

This proposed ARG/MEU posture offers the President, the Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Ambassadors additional flexibility in responding to crises. It also supports the ability to marshal two or more ARG/MEUs based on the situation across GCC boundaries at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. If a crisis warrants two or more ARG/MEUs, then there is the additional option to fly in a MEB command element and/or an expeditionary strike group headquarters, creating a crisis response force under flag officer command.

Most importantly, from a national security perspective, this concept supports the defense strategic rebalance to Asia-Pacific by doubling the ARG/MEU presence in PaCom by giving the Marine Rotational Force in Australia legitimate mobility and capability to operate afloat while simultaneously maintaining focus on the Middle East. This concept solidifies the premier role of the Marine Corps as the Nation's force-in-readiness with its primary lane being that of crisis response.

Certainly there are many challenges to implementing the concept put forward in this article, to include blue/green interoperability, equipment maintenance, turnover procedures, predeployment training/certification, and forward-basing agreements.

Conclusion

Certainly there are many challenges to implementing the concept put forward in this article, to include blue/green interoperability, equipment maintenance, turnover procedures, predeployment training/certification, and forward-basing agreements. However, with detailed analysis and creative thinking, these obstacles can be overcome, resulting in better support to the GCCs at an overall lower cost. Crisis response harkens the Marine Corps back to the turn of the 20th century when, due to numerous overseas interventions, Marines were known as the State Department's troops, and also back to the role the Marine "fire brigade" played in the early stages of the Korean War. Innovative thinking and a willingness to break paradigms can lead to a more global and persistent ARG/MEU presence, despite the limited number of LHDs available in the U.S. Navy's inventory. Pursuit of this concept will position the Navy-Marine Corps Team to remain the Nation's 9–1–1 force, ready and capable of worldwide crisis response.

"The Marine Corps fills a unique lane in the joint fight, one that leverages the sea as the primary conduit for global power projection. The sea provides the primary global common through which American power is projected, and Marines with amphibious warships that carry them are purpose-built for exploiting this avenue."

—Gen James F. Amos, address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 November 2012

Notes

1. Amos, Gen James F., testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2011.

2. Obama, President Barack, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, The White House, Washington, DC, 5 January 2012.

3. Ibid.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2012–2020*, Washington, DC, 24 April 2012, p. 22.

5. Dickson, Hendrick L., "CNA Reports SURFPAC's Sea Swap Experiment a Success," Washington, DC, 19 July 2004, accessed at news.navy.mil.

Avoiding the Archer

We must focus on tactical and technological innovation

by Capt Vincent DePinto

>Capt DePinto is an 0207 currently serving as Intelligence Officer, MAG–24, Kaneohe Bay, HI. Before MAG–24, he served 2 years in the 1st MAW G–2 (intelligence) on Camp Foster, Okinawa. Capt DePinto deployed with HMH–463 to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, from February 2011 to August 2011. He is a graduate of Expeditionary Warfare School (distance) and Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, has earned a certificate in Intelligence Studies, Chinese Intelligence Concerns, from the National Intelligence University, and is working toward a master's degree from the Naval War College.

The U.S. Marine Corps is in danger of becoming operationally irrelevant and strategically unviable. The lethality, range, and precision of modern antiaccess and area denial (A2/AD) weapons systems threaten political and military costs that will likely deter the employment of naval assets at the necessary distances for the Marines to execute forcible entry operations. The Marine Corps should accept this lack of access as a "Sputnik moment" and realize the existential threat that is posed to the Corps. If the Marine Corps cannot execute amphibious operations against strategic adversaries, its survival as a distinct Service will be in jeopardy. The Corps, therefore, must adapt to operating in nonpermissive maritime environments.

By questioning the fundamental assumption of using surface shipping, one arrives at a surprising solution: submarines. The use of submarines in support of amphibious landings would not only provide a survivable and credible forcible entry option in times of crisis, but the platforms could enhance the flexibility of such operations. If existing naval systems are leveraged, this capability could be acquired at a feasible price and on a manageable timeline.

The People's Republic of China (PRC), the world's second-largest economic power, sets the standard in the design and employment of A2/AD weapons systems. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–96) was a watershed moment for the Chinese Communist Party. Fearing a potential change to Taiwan's "One China" policy during its first democratic elections, the PRC began a year of military demonstrations and missile tests to deter a change to the Strait's status quo. After China executed the largest amphibious exercise of the decade, the United States deployed two carrier strike groups to the coasts of Taiwan. The exhibitions promptly ceased. The Party's capitulation to a foreign power was not only embarrassing, but led some factions inside China to question the legitimacy of the Party altogether. Accordingly, the PRC has since invested in a counterintervention strategy that intends to use diplomatic, cultural, economic, and military stratagems to raise the costs of access to its environs, or to forbid it entirely.[1]

The People's Liberation Army has therefore created a network of space, undersea, counterspace, long-range strike, and information warfare systems to deter the employment of U.S. naval assets.[2] The crown jewel of these systems is the DF–21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) that has been deployed in vicinity of the Taiwan Strait. The ASBM is a potential game changer, allowing the People's Liberation Army to target surface combatants (specifically aircraft carriers and helicopter landing ships) at ranges of over 1,500 kilometers with little to no warning.[3] The ability for an adversary to target naval task groups at such distances necessitates a sober revaluation of the Corps' forcible entry capabilities and the role those operations play within a larger national strategy.

The Corps, therefore, must adapt to operating in nonpermissive maritime environments.

A common response to the argument that such changes are necessary is that the A2/AD threat is one exclusively posed by China. Some argue that state-on-state conflicts are anachronistic, as the modern globalized world order has led to a degree of interdependence that would make conventional war economic suicide. The Marine Corps, therefore, should disregard the A2/AD threat and focus on irregular conflicts or cyber warfare for future relevance.

Such an assessment is as misguided as it is dangerous. First, while China at present employs the most credible counterintervention strategy, she will not remain alone. Weapons and capabilities have a tendency to proliferate. There is no historical basis to argue that A2/AD systems will not follow a similar path, especially if a "cool war" develops and proxy wars become the norm. Second, many argue that future conflicts will be characterized by short, rapid, and intense operations where objectives are seized before the international order can intervene. Such campaigns have the potential to force the United States into accepting a fait accompli, exploiting the distance between North America and Asia, as well as the United States' traditional aversion to casualties. And

last, to argue that the A2/AD problem is limited to China fundamentally misunderstands the geography and strategic significance of Asia. Robert Kaplan notes that by 2025, "Asia is likely to account for almost half of the world's economic output and four of the world's top 10 economies."[4] The PRC's A2/AD capabilities overlap this region in depth, making antiaccess a regional problem.[5] The PRC will—and is—utilizing its overwhelming size and military strength to secure its strategic interests in Asia. The lack of a credible counter to A2/AD systems will likely erode the credibility of U.S. security commitments in the Pacific. By failing to adapt to the threat posed by Chinese systems, Asia will, in effect, be ceded as a "no-go" zone for the Marines, to the detriment of America's strategic standing.

The Navy and Air Force's answer is known as *Air-Sea Battle*. The *Air-Sea Battle* concept aims to attack the Chinese A2/AD capabilities as a system, using "networked, integrated attack-in-depth" to "disrupt, destroy, and defeat" the threat.[6] As Randy Forbes explains, "If we can consider these lines in terms of an enemy archer, one could choose to blind the archer (disrupt), kill the archer (destroy), or stop his arrow (defeat)."[7] The Marine Corps should be uncomfortable with this counter, as it is presently ill-suited for meaningful contribution.

This doesn't mean it cannot contribute. The Amphibious Capabilities Working Group proposes that Marines could play a part in an A2/AD campaign. Ground forces could "deny key terrain to the enemy, influence populations, close selected chokepoints, seize, defend forward missile defense sites or establish expeditionary airfields."[8] As budgets shrink, if the Marine Corps is to continue as a relevant and distinct military Service, it must embrace these missions. Neither cyber operations nor irregular warfare justify the Marine Corps' existence—amphibious operations do. Therefore, the question is not *why* conduct forcible entry operations, but *how*.

In order to frame the problem, it is necessary to understand the strategic setting. Future crises in the Pacific are likely to be characterized by the need for extended deterrence, with the United States required to demonstrate that it will incur costs to defend an ally far removed from the homeland.[9] In the past, surface combatants have been used to demonstrate resolve and provide the requisite coercive credibility. As mentioned earlier, in 1996 two carrier strike groups were able to deter China and facilitate the peaceful resolution of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The large-decks' vulnerability would likely preclude their employment in a similar scenario today. The trends of antiship weaponry are allowing the defender to achieve a favorable balance of power, making past approaches obsolescent.

Future crises in the Pacific are likely to be characterized by the need for extended deterrence, with the United States required to demonstrate that it will incur costs to defend an ally far removed from the homeland.

This creates skepticism as to whether the United States possesses the political will to place its symbolic and expensive capital ships in danger to defend a third-party's interests. Either the United States will concede, thus surrendering the strategic Pacific to a rival power, or alternative options will be used. In either situation, large expeditionary strike groups will be strategically irrelevant. *Operational Maneuver From the Sea* states that "to influence events overseas, America requires a credible, forwardly deployable, power projection capability."[10] The Marine Corps can fulfill this charge by using submersible assault support platforms to provide stealthy and survivable forcible entry options in times of crisis.

By questioning the use of surface shipping, the Marine Corps would not only preserve its traditional capabilities, but also enhance operational flexibility in the execution of amphibious operations. The main argument for this approach is survivability. The use of submarines would eliminate the threat posed by cruise missiles and ASBMs by using the cover and concealment of the ocean. Instead of blinding archers or destroying arrows, the enemy's defensive



The USS* Perch *(ASSP 313). *(Navy photo accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org.)*

strong points can be bypassed; the sea can become the Marines' Ardennes.

Additionally, the use of subsurface shipping allows the Marine Corps to fulfill the objectives laid out by the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group. In *Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century*, one of the key principles in future operations would be "battlespace shaping through littoral maneuver."[11] Littoral maneuver creates opportunities for friendly forces to apply strength against weakness, but current expeditionary support is not capable of fulfilling this charge.

The slow movement of large amphibious ships can be tracked by space-based systems, signals intelligence, and both over-the-horizon and shorebased radar. In times of crisis, near-peer intelligence organizations with modern collection capabilities and basic analytic skills would able to identify and properly defend the limited set of suitable beaches. Then, the subsequent ship-to-shore connectors will not be sailing into a position of strength, but into one of prepared defenses. When the enemy is able to track the location of surface combatants with accuracy, maneuver becomes movement. The use of submersibles would not only allow for true maneuver; by harnessing their ability to close clandestinely with shore, simplified connectors such as inflatable boats could be used to access beaches heretofore considered unfeasible. This development would enhance friendly flexibility while simultaneously forcing the adversary to stretch his defensive perimeter.

Through the low signatures of submarines, the Marine Corps could reclaim the element of surprise. By embracing the inherent stealth of submarines, Marines could "strain" the situational awareness of the enemy. This vulnerability could be exploited by minimizing the role that threat plays in selecting landing sites, allowing a commander to concentrate on factors that would result in a marked operational advantage, such as mobility inland and proximity to high-value targets, or, most importantly, to those that will lead to the destruction of the adversary's will and capacity to resist. While survivability is the initial argument, the ultimate attraction of employing submarines is that they could serve as a catalyst for amphibious forces to seize the initiative.



USS* Perch *(ASSP 313) preparing to launch an LVT amphibious tractor during a 1949 exercise. The vehicle could be carried in the cargo hangar and launched by flooding down the submarine. **(The American Submarine *by Norman Polmar, courtesy of Robert Hurst.)***

While radical, the idea is not original. At the close of World War II, the U.S. Navy created preliminary sketches of a submarine LST (landing ship, tank). One such design was intended to embark 2,240 Marines on a 10,000-ton submarine measuring 720 feet long by 124 feet wide.[12] While these ambitious designs never left the drawing board, more moderate ones did. The USS *Perch* (ASSP 313) was reclassified as a transport submarine, inserting Marines and underwater demolition teams in support of combat operations in both Korea and Vietnam. Of note, the *Perch* was able to carry a tracked landing vehicle in the cargo hangar and launch it by submerging.[13]

In the modern era, the Navy and special operations forces (SOF) have embraced the concept of using submarines to put landing forces ashore. The *Ohio*-class SSBN was originally built to hold 24 Trident missiles, but was later converted to support SOF and land attack missions as the need for a survivable thermonuclear deterrent diminished. Of the 24 tubes, 22 were retrofitted with vertical launch systems, primarily for Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles. Tubes 1 and 2 were converted to serve as lockout chambers for 66 embarked SOF personnel.[14]

It might be wise to consider such an option on a grander scale. The *Ohio*-class is expected to retire in 2029; these sizeable boats could be retired early and reconfigured to support larger contingents of Marines. Dry dock shelters could be equipped to support amphibious vehicles, similar to that of the USS *Perch*.

While the *Ohio*-class is aging, it could be cost effective to leverage existing legacy systems rather than attempt to create something likely to be impossible: a long-range, armored, fast, and affordable expeditionary fighting vehicle, for example. Moreover, due to the submarines' abilities to surface silently in close proximity to potential landing areas, the need for such

an expensive ship-to-shore connector could be eliminated. This might result in a "dividend" to aid in justifying reconfiguration. It is notable that where approximately $3 billion and several decades were spent on the failed Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program, the *Ohio*-class SSBN/SSGN conversion cost less than $1 billion per boat and took less than 5 years to complete.[15] Viewed within the context of present and future budget restraints, the affordability and condensed timeline of utilizing existing naval capabilities to accomplish future missions could make an outlandish idea startlingly feasible. It is imperative to remember that the Marine Corps not only needs to find a solution to the threat posed by A2/AD systems, but that it needs to be able to afford one.

Last, the period between the phasing out of these boats and their reconfiguration would allow the Marine Corps time to write the doctrine, tactics, and techniques necessary to maximize the potential capabilities and solve the inevitable problems. This time will also allow the Corps to take candid look at what role it will play within conflict characterized by a nonpermissive maritime environment.

If Marines are to continue considering themselves the "tip of the spear," they must reconnect with their Title 10 duties such as the "seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and . . . such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."[16] There exist significant possibilities for the use of light infantry to seize key terrain, psychologically harass adversaries, or attack high-value targets in support of naval operations. Instead of large mechanized formations, it may be prudent to revisit the concept of the Raider Battalions. Indeed, the Raiders' textbook raid on Makin Island was executed using two submarines. Such operations would add another domain to which an adversary would have to react, not only increasing the credibility of *Air-Sea Battle*, but also cementing the future of the Corps as a relevant and unique Service.

The way forward may be a quick reaction force, perhaps using the Marine Corps' quick reaction force in Spain as a loose template. This would eliminate the need for Marines to suffer long, submerged deployments, and increase the carrying capabilities of the submarines. Short transits would allow initial planning, coordination, and embarkation to take place at traditional force generation nodes such as Okinawa or Guam, or via potential sites at Subic Bay, Singapore, or Darwin. This would limit the need for onboard planning spaces, reduce connectivity requirements, and offer immediate, scalable options to a combatant commander.

The way forward may be a quick reaction force, perhaps using the Marine Corps' quick reaction force in Spain as a loose template.

To make such a small force credible, the Corps would have to invest heavily in lightweight mobility, antiarmor, and antiair weapons to facilitate independence in a contested environment. Fire support solutions would prove troublesome, but not insurmountable. Nevertheless, current logistics doctrine and supply concepts would have to be practically reinvented. Admittedly, logistical support is the Achilles heel of this approach. However, in some scenarios, mobility, surprise, and precision will be more important than firepower en masse. As the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group noted, smaller units are able to provide effects on target that were once thought possible only through larger formations.[17]

The role of the aviation combat element is also unclear. While Marines would be able to get safely ashore, the potential absence of air cover poses significant risks to their safety and ability to impose a combined arms dilemma. This drawback could be mitigated by landbased fighter support. It is not the credibility of the F–35 that is in question, but that of the "big, expensive, and vulnerable" large-decks.[18] While in the past, unilateral action was deemed as a strategic necessity, such may not be the case as smaller nations look to hedge their security against increasingly belligerent regional powers.

The problems are daunting, but they will be encountered regardless of the way forward. If Marines continue to focus on what is safe, traditional, and popular, the future of our Corps will be in jeopardy. Now more than ever, Marines must embrace their historical lineage of tactical and technological innovation to meet their core missions and preserve their autonomy. The Marine Corps must remember that war—as well as congressional budget debates—is a battle for survival. Therefore, the Marines must embrace a central lesson from Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*: It is not the most intellectual or the strongest species that survive. The species that survive are the ones best able to adapt to their changing environments.[19] The Marine Corps of today must understand that the past isn't always an effective guide for the future. We are lucky that the Marines who came before us did.

Notes

1. Holmes, James R., "Grand Strategy and the Art of the Possible," *The Diplomat*, Tokyo, Japan, 17 June 2013.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2013.

3. Ibid.

4. Kaplan, Robert, "The Asian Power Web," *Forbes*, 12 June 2013, accessed at www.forbes.com on 30 June 2013.

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

6. Forbes, Randy, "America's Pacific *Air-Sea Battle* Vision," *The Diplomat*, 8 March 2012, accessed at thediplomat.com on 30 June 2013.

7. Ibid.

8. Amphibious Capabilities Working Group, *Naval Amphibious Capability for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC, 2012.

9. Huth, Paul, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *The American Political Science Review*, Washington, DC, June 1988, pp. 423–43.

10. Department of the Navy, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea*, Washington, DC, 1996.

11. Amphibious Capabilities Working Group.

12. Polmar, Norman, *The First Soviet Giants*, 2001, accessed at www.navy.mil on 30 June 2013.

13. There was also considerable interest in subsurface assault design in the Soviet Union where wartime experiences led to more elaborate plans. In 1942 the Soviets were forced to rely on submarines to provide logistic support to the besieged city of Sevastopol because of heavy surface ship losses. This influenced original designs to create cargo and transport submarines. While not finished during the war, over the next two and a half decades, the Soviets dedicated a considerable amount of energy to designing minelayer, transport, and amphibious support submarines. After many revised specifications and stillborn initiates, the Soviets approved the construction of Project 717 in October 1971. Intended to be one of the largest submarines with a surface displacement of 17,600 tons, Project 717 was designed to carry up to 800 Marines, 20 amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers, and a significant portion of their necessary logistics and supply requirements. Severodvinsk shipyard intended to build five boats, actually creating full-scale mockups of the control room and cargo spaces. The fielding of the *Ohio*-class, however, necessitated a Soviet counter and Severodvinsk became exclusively dedicated to the construction of *Typhoon*-class SSBNs. If the Soviet Union would have been able to construct both simulteanously, this argument might be a moot point.

14. Department of the Navy, *Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC, 14 July 2005, accessed at www.history.navy.mil on 30 June 2013.

15. Ibid.

16. 10 USC § 5063 - United States Marine Corps: composition; functions, 10 August 1956, Ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 278, § 5013; renumbered § 5063, Pub. L. 99–433, title V, § 511(b)(3), Washington, DC, 1 October 1986, 100 Stat. 1043.

17. Amphibious Capabilities Working Group.

18. Hendrix, CAPT Henry J., USN(Ret), "At What Cost a Carrier?" Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, 2013.

19. Megginson, Leon C., "Lessons from Europe for American Business," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, Norman, OK, 1963, p. 4.

A Critical Vulnerability

Satellites may potentially become a major threat

by Capt Eric Mitchell

>Capt Mitchell is a signals intelligence officer (MOS 0206) currently attending MAGTF Intelligence Officer Course. He deployed with the 15th MEU and in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In the late 1950s the U.S. military recognized the potential of satellites to enhance military capabilities.[1] Since then, the military use of satellite technology has continuously increased to a point where, at present, satellite-provided services are an integral part of all of the doctrinal warfighting functions. There can be no doubt that satellites have significantly contributed to the technological superiority of the U.S. military and have enhanced the military's capability in war and in peace. However, as the role of satellites has increased, dependence upon them has also increased commensurately. It is vitally important that we do not become so dependent upon satellites that they become our critical vulnerability; therefore, leaders must ensure that Marines are prepared to effectively fight in an environment in which satellite use is limited or denied.

Scope of Military Satellite Use

The satellite is a significant factor in U.S. combat power, and its impact is apparent across all six warfighting functions. In the intelligence community, satellite reconnaissance provides imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence, as well as a means to transmit this intelligence worldwide.[2] [3] Satellites support maneuver commanders by enhancing situational awareness through friendly-force tracking and by providing precision navigation through the GPS. Satellite communications (SatCom) play an ever-increasing role in command and control functions, particularly at higher echelons. In expeditionary environments, tactical data networks are heavily reliant upon satellite connectivity.[4] Weapons systems using GPS guidance were once limited to the air domain, but now include ground systems as well, and these satellite-based weapons systems are an important part of MAGTF fires planning. In sustainment operations, logisticians use satellites to track shipments and movements of supplies across the battlefield.[5] Satellite technology is even part of the force protection warfighting function, comprising a significant portion of the national early warning system.[6]

Satellites have become a significant factor in all warfighting functions. *(Photo by Cpl Meghan J. Canlas.)*

Not only has the military's use of satellite-provided capability steadily increased in scope, now, more than ever before, satellite technology can now be found at lower levels. Satellites are no longer simply a strategic asset relevant only to those at the higher echelons of the military; they are also a tactical asset used at levels all the way down to the individual Marine with a handheld GPS receiver and SatCom radio.

The Marine Corps' present focus on expeditionary and distributed operations can only increase the tendency to rely on satellite services, as small units may be located in even more remote areas and further from higher and ad-

jacent units than ever before. Indeed, a significant number of the systems in *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2011* use SatCom or GPS technology, including the Warfighter Network Services-Tactical, the amphibious assault vehicle C7 command and control upgrade, the Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Equipment Program, the FA-150-T Mil Fly-away, the Expeditionary Pack-Up Kit component of the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program II, Mobile Tactical Air Operations Module, the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System-Ultra Light Weight, and Tactical Hydrographic Survey Equipment, along with many others.[7] [8]

Are Our Satellites Vulnerable?

The unembellished reality is that our satellites cannot be considered invulnerable. After the fall of the Soviet Union two decades ago, American space superiority became nearly absolute; and as U.S. military reliance on satellite-based systems grew, so did the tendency to take the perpetuity of these systems and capabilities for granted. However, ignoring the potential risks to our satellite systems creates a potential vulnerability that could be exploitable by a savvy foe.

Of all possible threats to our satellite capabilities, physical destruction of the actual satellites by a hostile actor would be the most catastrophic. In January 2008 the People's Republic of China shattered any lingering illusions about the invulnerability of satellites by demonstrating the ability to successfully destroy an orbiting satellite with a kinetic strike from a groundbased missile.[9] Although the capability to kinetically target satellites is only known to be held by the United States, China, and Russia, the number of nations that achieve this level of technological sophistication will undoubtedly grow in the future.[10]

Hostile actors can also conduct groundbased or airbased attacks against satellites using nonkinetic means. Directed laser beams from ground stations or airborne platforms are capable of temporarily blinding satellite sensors (e.g., when the satellite passes over a certain area of the earth) or damaging the sensors. The future of antisatellite/space warfare will very likely involve lasers powerful enough to inflict irreparable damage to satellites, rendering them inoperable.[11]

The most likely threat to our satellite capabilities is electronic attack (either jamming or spoofing) against the ground systems and devices that receive satellite signals. When the communications link between a satellite and its ground receiver is severed, the satellite becomes no more useful to the warfighter than a random, orbiting chunk of metal. Antisatellite attacks using ballistic missiles or laser systems require vast resources and highly advanced technology; therefore, those types of attacks are realistically limited to state-level actors. In contrast, the equipment needed to conduct an electronic attack is widely available, relatively inexpensive, and can be feasibly operated by terrorists or other nonstate actors—which is the reason why this type of attack is the most likely to be encountered. GPS-jamming devices in particular can be acquired by nearly anyone who wants one, either by purchase on the open market or by improvised construction.[12] Even more disturbing than the concept of GPS

Satellite sensors can be temporarily blinded, thereby adversely affecting command and control. ***(Photo by Cpl Daniel Wulz.)***

signals being jammed is the possibility of GPS signals being spoofed—that is, fooling a GPS receiver by mimicking a satellite signal and transmitting faulty location data. Such an attack could have grave consequences for units and systems relying on GPS.[13]

There are two additional nonhostile threats to our satellites: a massive solar flare and collisions with "space junk." These two events have a low probability of occurrence but should not be ignored. A massive solar flare, or solar superstorm, could physically damage or destroy satellites and disrupt radio signals to the point where GPS is nonfunctional. Although a solar event of this magnitude statistically occurs approximately once every 500 years, scientists are unable to predict when they will happen.[14] If such an event should take place, the effect on our satellite capabilities could be absolutely catastrophic, considering that hostile actions would likely only disable one or a handful of satellites, but that a solar flare could potentially affect an entire sky full of satellites. Lastly, satellites may be vulnerable to collision with orbiting clouds of debris known as "space junk." The current space junk threat is low; however, the amount of space junk orbiting the earth is increasing at an alarming rate, leading scientists to conclude that it is only a matter of time before it becomes a significant threat to satellites.[15]

The various hostile and nonhostile threats to our satellite systems and capabilities demonstrate that there is no place for complacency regarding their vulnerability; therefore, Marine leaders cannot afford to operate on the assumption that the satellite-provided services they use will always be available.

We need to avoid overdependence on satellites. *(Photo by Cpl Meghan J. Canlas.)*

Mitigating Risk

Given the widespread reliance upon satellite technology and the inherent vulnerabilities of satellite systems, satellites could become our critical vulnerability if mitigating steps are not taken. Marine leaders at the tactical level can do little to make our space assets less vulnerable, and organizations within the Department of Defense already exist for the purpose of finding ways to protect and preserve them. Leaders, however, can most certainly reduce the criticality of this vulnerability to their respective units, thus it is imperative they take concrete steps to ensure that Marines remain capable of effectively operating in an environment in which satellite services are degraded or denied. The enhanced capabilities provided by satellite technology can be an important force multiplier, but Marines must be prepared to fight without them.

How can Marines avoid overdependence on satellites? As with most combat skills, this can be accomplished through training and exercises. Leaders should take the concrete step of developing or maintaining proficiency in satellite "workarounds," and exercise planners should incorporate simulated satellite blackouts into training exercises in order to force Marines to function without the satellite support they have become so dependent on. Communicators and radio operators must maintain a high level of proficiency in high-frequency communications, since it is the only over-the-air, long-haul communications alternative to SatCom. Marines at all levels should be periodically placed in situations wherein they must use only traditional navigation and geolocation. Intelligence personnel must seek to develop and employ nontraditional intelli-

gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods to supplement the intelligence that is derived from satellites. Decision-makers should use exercises to rehearse making tactical decisions in situations in which the normal amount of available intelligence is drastically reduced, and in which friendly-force information provided by satellite tracking or SatCom is nonexistent. If these steps are taken, Marines will remain combat effective even when our satellite systems fail.

Conclusion

It is possible that our satellites will never be successfully attacked, that they will never experience a debilitating natural disaster, and that the services they provide will remain uninterrupted far into the future; however, leaders have the responsibility of ensuring that their Marines are trained and prepared for the worst-case scenario, as this is their duty to the country that made them leaders of Marines. America enjoys a distinct technological advantage over its foes provided by its space programs and satellite assets, and Marines can help ensure that this advantage does not turn into a critical vulnerability.

Notes

1. Baumann, Paul R., "History of Remote Sensing, Satellite Imagery, Part II," 2009, accessed at www.oneonta.edu.

2. Behling, Thomas, and Kenneth McGruther, "A New Doctrine: Planning Satellite Reconnaissance To Support Military Operations," *Studies in Intelligence*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, winter 1998/1999, accessed at www.cia.gov.

3. Block, Robert, "U.S. to Expand Domestic Use of Spy Satellites," *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, 15 August 2007, accessed at online.wsj.com.

4. Welch, Rory D., "Satellite Communications and the Future of American Expeditionary Warfare," *High Frontier*, U.S. Air Force Space Command, Patterson Air Force Base, CO, pp. 1:59–65, accessed at www.afspc.af.mil.

5. Weigner, Heather E., and John E. Laudan, "MTS: A Success Story for Battlefield Logisticians," *Army Logistician*, Fort Lee, VA, September/October 2005, accessed at www.almc.army.mil.

6. "DSP Satellites: Supporting America's Early Warning System," *Defense Industry Daily*, September 2012, accessed at www.defenseindustrydaily.com.

7. Headquarters Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2011*, Washington, DC, 2011. This publication is referred to by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, as "an encyclopedic reference of all our major programs and operational concepts for 2011."

8. Ibid., pp. 75–206.

9. Staff, "China Confirms Satellite Downed," *BBC News*, last modified 23 January 2007, accessed at news.bbc.co.uk.

10. Hoffman, Carl, "China's Space Threat: How Missiles Could Target U.S. Satellites," *Popular Mechanics*, Harlan, IA, last modified 18 December 2009, accessed at www.popularmechanics.com.

11. Butt, Yousaf, "Effects of Chinese Laser Ranging on Imaging Satellites," *Science & Global Security*, Cambridge, MA, 2009, pp. 20–35.

12. Thomas, Martyn, "Global Navigation Satellite Systems—Accidental systems and unintended consequences," *Ingenia*, London, June 2010, accessed at www.ingenia.org.uk.

13. Warner, Jon S., and Roger G. Johnston, "GPS Spoofing Countermeasures," *Homeland Security Journal*, Washington, DC, 12 December 2003, accessed at www.ne.anl.gov.

14. Odenwald, Sten F., and James L. Green, "Bracing for a Solar Superstorm," *Scientific American*, New York, 2008, pp. 80–87.

15. Gilbert, David, "Space Debris Threat at a Tipping Point," CNN, Atlanta, GA, 15 September 2011, accessed at www.cnn.com.

The 21st-Century Afghan National Army

Integrating communications technology into a developing military force

by 1stLt Dominic Chiaverotti

>1stLt Chiaverotti served as the Communications Advisor, 1st Brigade, 215th Corps, ANA, in Helmand Province. He is currently the Data Platoon Commander, Communications Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st MarDiv.

Even though the Afghan calendar is only at the year 1392, the call for the military of Afghanistan to step up to modern-day technology is now. With the dangers of convoys and improvised explosive devices ever present, the use of communications technology can help to mitigate some of these risks while at the same time making command and control of Afghan National Army (ANA) units much more effective and efficient. While it sounds like a great idea, the realities of incorporating this technology into a less-developed military are proving to be problematic at best.

Issues in the communications realm of the ANA essentially boil down to three distinct topics: maintenance issues, improper use of radio capabilities, and lack of infrastructure needed for accessing the Internet. While maintenance concerns mainly stem from supply system incompetency, little progress has been made on the latter two topics, even with heavy coalition force influence.

Improper use and enforcement of encryption is inhibiting ANA development and independence. *(Photo by GySgt Jeremiah Johnson.)*

More Harm Than Good

The Marine Corps' ability to send encrypted radio messages is one of the most important and relied upon methods of commanding and controlling a unit without "outsiders" listening in. While we have been able to do this effectively for years with top-of-the-line Harris radios, the ANA is forced to rely upon much less sophisticated equipment produced by a company called Datron (based in California). While simpler may sound better, in this case, it most assuredly is not. Afghan commanders refuse to use the encryption setting on Datron equipment because the transmissions from this less refined waveform come across "sounding like a robot" and in most cases, extremely muffled. The commanders instead settle for clearer but unencrypted transmissions that can be (and often are) infiltrated by insurgents with a basic adjustable frequency radio receiver. This unfortunately results in operational security breaches that translate into lost initiative and often death on the battlefield.

Regardless of the weak encryption capabilities of their radio equipment,

the solution for this budding professional military is most definitely not to stop using encryption altogether. This is where the second issue with ANA encryption lies: policy. The Marine Corps does two very important things to ensure encryption is utilized down to the lowest level: First, it employs Electronic Key Management System managers to be accountable for and take ownership of encryption distribution at every unit, and second, it trains entry-level radio operators on the importance of encryption and to ensure its use at every available opportunity. In the ANA, the "personnel tashkiel" (think "manning document") provides for cipher and security officers down to the brigade level, but does not hold them accountable for ensuring the use of encryption at their respective units. This is magnified by the fact that none of the basically trained radio operators who run most of the equipment throughout the country understand the importance or necessity for encrypted transmissions. With no one to point the finger at for this capability gap, systematic failure results, and with it comes widespread loss of secret information and, unfortunately, dead soldiers. For the ANA to improve on this aspect in the long run will require a revamping of policy and education from the Ministry of Defense level and below. For now, however, it is imperative that they designate and hold commanders accountable for encryption usage and they can start now by educating their radio operators on the importance of its employment.

Internet: Is It Feasible?

In order for the ANA to transmit mission-essential documents from one unit to another, they often must plan and execute long and dangerous convoys to carry the information to the intended recipient. In the Marine Corps we often take for granted our ability to send such documents around the world in seconds in the form of an e-mail. The ANA has been working toward acquiring Internet capabilities down to the brigade level for years, but, as of the summer of 2013, brigades throughout the entire country are without Internet access. This is absolutely unacceptable, and the reasoning for it is an unimpressive lack of practical thought. Instead of relying on small satellite systems that can be purchased with relatively high data rates for only a few thousand dollars, coalition force contracts instead vied for static groundbased microwave links that involve local national contractors completing large installation projects. Rather than having a relatively small piece of equipment that the ANA already owns, trains on, and maintains, they instead have been forced to have local nationals install large Internet towers which the ANA cannot move, repair, or adjust. The other issue is that the contracts for the work of the local nationals are not specific or detailed enough to hold the contractors accountable for completing their projects in a reasonable amount of time. Entire brigades have planned, built, and moved into a completely different site in the time it takes for an Internet contract to come to fruition at the original site.

An additional alternative, and one that is a popular talking point within the topic of large-scale development in the country as a whole, is the countrywide fiber ring that is under con-



Poor planning in regard to Internet contracts and equipment acquisition have put the ANA years behind where it should be. *(Photo by Cpl Lin Adkins.)*

struction. While this has the potential to provide a long-term, stable Internet solution to a vast area of Afghanistan, it is not without its own significant downfalls. Aside from being an extremely expensive project, the fiber ring requires hundreds of miles of digging several feet into solid ground, which is often unforgiving in a place with terrain like Afghanistan's. The fiber line is also easily susceptible to damage, and if a portion of the line is cut or a critical node destroyed, Internet services will be indefinitely impaired. The fiber ring solution also does not have the flexibility to move with a unit if it relocates after the construction is complete. While it may be of assistance to the development of Afghanistan in the long term, it is likely not the right solution for ANA units when a satellite solution is not only feasible but also much easier and much more practical. The way ahead is to advise the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense to not renew the contracts with local companies and instead invest in more of the moveable satellite systems.

The way ahead is to advise the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense to not renew the contracts with local companies. . . .

Can It Be Done?

In summary, developing the ANA to effectively make use of modern-day technology involves two crucial concepts: ensuring the proper use of encrypted radio transmissions and providing realistic and feasible Internet solutions. If we can influence ANA commanders to designate and hold accountable a responsible individual for encryption usage, and make their operators understand its necessity, it is not too late to allow the ANA to make large gains in effective, secure command and control of their units. Secondly, if we can steer away from civilian Internet contracts that employ static, complicated systems and instead employ mobile satellite systems that their military already owns, we can provide Internet to needing units in a realistic amount of time. Only time will tell if these developments in communications technology will come before the Afghan calendar reaches the 21st century.

USMC

Offensive Cyber Attacks

The improper classification of cyber operations as a "use of force" or "armed conflict" subject to the international laws of armed conflict

by Capt Nelson F. Candelario, Jr.

In recent years the growing potential for economic, military, and governmental devastation posed by one nation-state's use of computer network technologies to destroy or damage another nation-state's critical cyber systems has incited dispute over the nature of such operations. Most state and military officials commonly describe this use of cyber technology as an "offensive cyber attack." At the forefront of these cyber attack debates are questions of whether or not these acts constitute a use of force as defined by U.N. charter, and if not, is the United States in particular nonetheless required to apply the law of armed conflict (LOAC) when conducting offensive cyber attacks. Current U.S. policy is to treat offensive cyber attacks as a "use of force," as defined by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, thus subject to LOAC.[1]

An examination of whether or not offensive cyber attacks may constitute a violation of international legal paradigm other than the U.N. Charter is beyond the scope of this article. For instance, offensive cyber attacks may, depending of the facts and circumstances, constitute an "attack" as defined by Article 49(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; however, an analysis of international treaty and customary law strongly suggests that, with limited exceptions, offensive cyber attacks constitute neither a use of force against the territorial integrity of a foreign state as prohibited by the U.N. Charter, nor an international armed conflict triggering LOAC. Consequently, in the absence of new treaty law or additions to existing international law, the U.S. Government and its military officials should plan offensive cyber attacks in accordance with strategic political goals.

>Capt Candelario is a judge advocate. He has deployed to Afghanistan as a regimental deputy staff judge advocate and battalion judge advocate. Capt Candelario is currently assigned to Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. He wrote this article as a student at Expeditionary Warfare School, academic year 2012–13.

Do cyber attacks constitute a use of force? *(U.S. Air Force file photo.)*

Use of Force Under the U.N. Charter and International Law

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, Allied Forces established the foundations of an international charter that, among other things, set the governing standards for the use of force by nation-states.[2] The majority of nation-states accept this charter as international customary law that governs when it is acceptable to resort to the use of force.[3] Specifically, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,"

subject to two exceptions.[4] [5] The first exception, found in Article 39 of the charter, involves the powers of the Security Council.[6] The second exception is the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as defined by Article 51 and international customary law.[7]

The precise meaning of the language "use of force" has long been a subject of dispute. In 1945 Brazil submitted a proposal to extend the scope of Article 2(4) to include taking actions of high impact on nation-state governments, such as one nation-state's use of economic coercion tactics against another.[8] The U.N. and its members rejected this proposition then, and did so again 25 years later when another nation-state proposed a similar interpretation of "use of force."[9] The U.N. instead retained the understanding that what constitutes "use of force" must be determined by analyzing the instrument used (e.g., military weapon). The consensus among the international community is that this prohibition on the use of force applies to armed force and does not extend to, as some smaller states often argue, economic sanctions and similar coercion tactics.[10] These rejections are strong indications that both the drafters and the majority signatories meant for a narrow definition of "use of force."

Cyber Attacks and Use of Force

A narrow definition of "use of force" would preclude its extension to the majority of offensive cyber attacks. In recent years, however, many academics and government representatives have challenged the premise that nation-states should define "use of force" so narrowly. They have instead adopted a "consequence-based" approach to analyzing the legality of offensive cyber operations and whether a cyber attack qualifies as use of force. The consequence-based approach shifts focus from the means or instrument used to the result of the cyber attack.

Professor Michael Schmitt, former chairman of the International Law Department at the U.S. Naval War College, was the first to advocate this consequence-based approach.[11] Schmitt proposed a seven-criteria examination for evaluating the consequences of cyber attacks on the target state: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and responsibility.[12] The severity factor focuses on the amount of harm, i.e., physical harm to individuals or property.[13] The immediacy factor focuses on the timing of consequences in relation to the alleged cyber attack.[14] The directness factor focuses on an alleged attack, the resulting consequences, and the causative relationship.[15] Invasiveness looks to the level of intrusion necessary to execute the attack.[16] Measurability evaluates how much damage the attack causes.[17] The presumptive legitimacy factor addresses whether international law explicitly prohibits the act.[18] And the final factor, responsibility, stands for the following premise:

> [T]he closer the nexus between a state and the operations, the more likely other states will be inclined to characterize them as uses of force.[19]

At first glance Schmitt's model seems to permit a flexible approach to cyber attacks. A closer look reveals several problems. First, Schmitt's factors are nondeterminative criteria.[20] Consequently this is a case-by-case evaluation system that will change depending on the facts and circumstances of each cyber attack.[21] This leads to a second problem, namely that the system is only useful in evaluating cyber attacks after they occur, but does not provide a mechanism for "characterizing real-time operations."[22] This is contrary to what the U.N. Charter drafters intended. Schmitt's proposed factors advocate an expansion of Article 2(4) that would change its meaning. Such a change must occur through treaty revision or development of new treaties.

. . . the system is only useful in evaluating cyber attacks after they occur, but does not provide a mechanism for "characterizing real-time operations."

The current working U.S. definition of "cyber attacks" further demonstrates the inapplicability of Article 2(4). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has defined "cyber attack" as "[a] hostile act using computer or related networks or systems . . . intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary's critical cyber systems, assets, or functions."[23] This definition focuses on attacks "intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary's critical cyber systems, assets, or functions," i.e., the objective of the attack.[24] This definition falls outside the means-based categorization "state actions as use of force." Consequently, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's classification of what constitutes a cyber attack insinuates that they do not qualify as use of force for the purposes of Article 2(4).

Concluding that Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the use of force applies to cyber attacks clearly changes the meaning of "use of force" as intended by both the original drafters and signatories. Such a change should not be made without an amendment to the charter requiring ratification by party nations, an addendum specifically addressing use of force within cyberspace, or an entirely separate treaty on the subject.

Cyber Attacks and Applicability of LOAC

LOAC, also known as the "laws of war," applies during the conduct of armed conflict as defined by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Department of the Army defines LOAC as:

> . . . [c]ustomary and treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land and to relationships between belligerents and neutral States . . . [which] requires that belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for military purposes and that they conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry.[25]

Armed conflict does not necessarily have

to amount to a state of war for LOAC to apply. According to the commentary in the Geneva Conventions:

> Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict. . . . It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place."[26]

The United States has taken the position that LOAC applies to all U.S. military operations regardless of whether or not they involve an armed conflict as defined by the Geneva Conventions.[27] U.S. strategic and political goals necessitate operating in all military theaters under a LOAC construct. Consequently, the application of LOAC is rooted in U.S. policy, not international legal requirements.

In the recently released *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, a group of experts assert that offensive cyber operations "which [rise] to the level of an 'armed attack' in terms of scale and effect . . . which is conducted by or otherwise attributable to a State, qualifies as a 'use of force.'"[28] However, this view once again focuses on a consequence-based assessment as to what qualifies as an "armed attack," and only applies the existing body of international law through shaped analogy (e.g., equating cyber attacks to chemical weapons based on the indirectness of their effects). Using analogy-based methods to interpret the international legal validity of cyber attacks versus specifically applicable law (such as that which a treaty revision addressing cyber operations would provide) is not conducive to preexecution analysis. Therefore, this approach, like the previously described factor analysis, leaves operators with a less-than-adequate tool for assessing the legal validity of an offensive cyber operation without first analyzing the results.

Moreover, similar to Article 2(4)'s use-of-force analysis, the key in identifying armed conflict is the means, i.e., "armed." Although cyber attacks can have the same effect as traditional weapons, the current body of international law's definition of "armed," thus "armed conflict," does not account for "cyber weapons."

There is, however, one exception to applicability of LOAC to cyber attacks. If offensive cyber operations cause physical harm, death, or injury to persons, or physical harm to property, international law may require nation-states to abide by LOAC. With the exception of the aforementioned instance, though, cyber attacks do not qualify as an armed conflict as defined by the Geneva Conventions. Consequently, application of LOAC to most cyber attacks would also be a policy-based decision.

For the United States, making policy-based decisions rather than strictly adhering to international law is not a

novel concept. For instance, the United States ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but did not ratify the two protocols of 1977 that were addendum to the original conventions.[29] The majority of the international community ratified the protocols and views its provisions as customary international law. Although the United States' policy is to treat much of the protocols as international customary law, not ratifying them denotes that the U.S. Government is arguably not legally bound to adhere to the protocols' provisions. As a result, U.S. adherence to the Geneva Conventions' 1977 protocols is almost exclusively based on strategic political goals.

Conclusion

U.S. Government and military officials should plan offensive cyber attacks in accordance with strategic political goals and not under the inapplicable provisions Article 2(4) use-of-force construct or with strict application of LOAC. Although this method will likely result in the United States' application of most, if not all, of the provisions of aforementioned legal constructs, policy-based application permits flexibility in dealing with cyber attacks in the future. The novelty of cyber operations conjures a great deal of uncertainty, and this uncertainty necessitates the U.S. Government's ability to adjust. Until the development of a new treaty or additions to the existing international law addressing the conduct of cyber attacks occurs, the United States should make policy-based decisions in its treatment of the protocols to the Geneva Conventions when planning offensive cyber attacks.

Notes

1. Koh, Harol Hongju, "International Law in Cyberspace," Department of State, Washington, DC, accessed at www.state.gov on 17 December 2012.

2. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations: Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, New York, accessed at www.un.org on 21 December 2012.

3. Gervais, Michael, "Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War," *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, Los Angeles, CA, 2012, p. 525, accessed at www.lexis.com on 21 December 2012.

4. Charter of the United Nations.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Buchheit, Lee C., "The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Philadelphia, PA, 2012, pp. 983–1011.

9. Ibid.

10. Schmitt, Michael N., and Brian T. Donnell, *Computer Network Attack and International Law*, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2002.

11. Michael Schmitt, "Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited," *Villanova Law Review*, Villanova, PA, 2011, p. 569, accessed at www.lexis.com on 23 November 2012.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 576.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Folt, Andrew C., "Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber 'Use-of-Force' Debate," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Washington, DC, 2012, pp. 40–48, accessed at www.ndu.edu on 31 December 2012.

21. Ibid., p. 43.

22. Ibid.

23. "Cyber_Lexicon," Air Force Research Institute, Montgomery, AL, accessed at www.afri.au.af.mil on 3 January 2013.

24. Hathaway, Oona A., "The Law of Cyber-Attack," *California Law Review*, Berkeley, CA, 2012, p. 817, accessed at www.lexis.com on 22 December 2012.

25. *Field Manual 27–10, The Law of Land Warfare*. In *U.S. Army Field Manuals Complete Set*, Progressive Management, Mount Laurel, NJ, 2008.

26. International Committee of the Red Cross, *Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea*, Geneva, Switzerland, 1949.

27. Department of Defense, *DoD Law of War Program*, Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, VA, 19 October 1979.

28. *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, edited by Michael N. Schmitt, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2013.

29. Bovarnick, Jeff A., et al., *Law of War Deskbook*, International and Operational Law Department, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, VA, 2010.

Building a Quality Force for Tomorrow

Recruit, train, equip, and retain the best

by LtCol E. Keith Couch

>LtCol Couch is an AV–8B pilot. He has deployed with the 22d MEU, Landing Force 6th Fleet, in 1999; to Dynamic Mix in 2000; with 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, to Okinawa in 2001; and to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, III, and IV. He is currently assigned to the Commandant's Strategic Initiatives Group.

We must educate our most valuable asset—junior Marines. *(Photo by LCpl Paul S. Martinez.)*

> We exist today—we flourish today—not because of what we know we are, or what we know we can do, but because of what the grassroots of our country believes we are and believes we can do. . . . The American people believe that Marines are downright good for the country; that the Marines are masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens—citizens into whose hands the nation's affairs may safely be entrusted. . . . And, likewise, should the people ever lose that conviction—as a result of our failure to meet their high—almost spiritual—standards, the Marine Corps will quickly disappear.[1]

This statement (and the message therein) remains as relevant now as it did when it was written over 55 years ago. Whether one looks at the operational excellence displayed in combat, the inherent flexibility required of humanitarian assistance operations, or the agility required to build strong partners, Marines continue to set the standard for the mental and physical agility required to be the Nation's 9–1–1 force-in-readiness. But questions remain: Are Marines still committed to this vision of the Corps? Are we as committed to our personnel as we say we are? Or are we in fact more concerned about materiel?

As we enter the austerity era, recruiting and retaining the type of quality Marine alluded to above will become more difficult. Further, given the complexities of future operating environments, it is imperative that actions be taken now to ensure the Marines of tomorrow remain those who America view as best in military adeptness. We can no longer view cost savings as simply cutting personnel, programs or operations, and maintenance funds. We must seek to save and become more efficient wherever opportunity lay, and do so while leveraging quality within the existing system. We must seek to stretch all five pillars of readiness in order to maximize every cent of every dollar. But how do we strengthen our force in a time of fiscal constraint while saving taxpayer dollars? How do we continue to attract the highest caliber recruits? How do we keep the highest quality Marines?

The Marine Corps must continue on the path it started long ago—recruit the best, then train, educate, and keep a fair share of the best of them. The following paragraphs will briefly look at why this concept was and is still important, while also providing one possible solution as to how the Marine Corps can enhance its current approach to building a quality force. Educating our most valuable as-

set, our junior Marines, will be critical in this endeavor and key to maintaining the character portrayed by then-BGen Krulak so long ago.

What Will the Future Demand of Our Marines?

By 2020 some 85 percent of the world's inhabitants will be crowded into coastal cities—cities generally lacking the infrastructure required to adequately support their burgeoning populations. Requirements for U.S. intervention will likely increase as long-simmering ethnic, nationalist, and economic tensions continue to rise. Compounding these challenges will be the emergence of an increasingly complex and lethal battlefield. The widespread availability of sophisticated weapons and equipment will "level the playing field" and negate our traditional technological superiority. We will continue to see the lines separating the levels of war and the metrics distinguishing combatant from noncombatant blur. Further complicating the situation will be the ubiquitous media, whose presence will mean that all future conflicts will be acted out before an international audience. These are not new concepts, but are ones that will likely continue to morph over time.

In order to succeed under such demanding conditions, we will require unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character from our young Marines. In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. The Marine's actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation, and he will truly become the "strategic corporal" of tomorrow.[2] Reason dictates that the Marine Corps must adapt not only technologically but also mentally to a conceivably more complex future operating environment.

We Must Add to an Already Solid Foundation

How do we prepare Marines for the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical battlefield of tomorrow? How do we develop junior leaders prepared to deal decisively with the sort of real-world challenges likely to be faced in future conflict? How do we do this in the face of huge budgetary constraints? The first step of the process is, in general, unchanged. Bold, capable, and intelligent men and women of character are drawn to the Corps and subsequently recast in the crucible of recruit training, where time-honored methods instill deep within them the Corps' enduring ethos. Honor, courage, and commitment become more than mere words to recruits as they receive their Eagle, Globe, and Anchor—they become the foundational blocks for each Marine's soul. This has not and must not change as we broaden the scope of our innovative lens.

The Marine Corps' emphasis on character remains the bedrock upon which everything else is built. The active sustainment of character in every Marine is a fundamental institutional competency—and for good reason. As often as not, the really tough issues confronting Marines will be moral quandaries, and they must have the wherewithal to handle them appropriately. While a visceral appreciation for our core values is essential, it alone will not ensure an individual's success in battle or in the myriad potential contingencies short of combat. Much, much more is required to fully prepare a Marine for the rigor of tomorrow's battlefield. Consequently we must require much more out of those wearing the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor. The Marine Corps must continue to lead and be innovative in this regard, while further strengthening one of its most important pillars of readiness: high-quality people.

We must ensure the pillars of our Corps are stronger. . . .

A Bold New Era in Educating Our Most Precious Asset

In recent years the Marine Corps has made progress with both how it recruits and the educational opportunities provided for Marines of all ranks. Despite these enhancements, however, we have not reached the full developmental potential of this endeavor. Particularly now, as dollars and force structure become more constricted, we must attack the issue on varying fronts and with a singular focus. We must ensure the pillars of our Corps are stronger, beginning with the foundation. If we are to require more out of our Marines on the battlefields of tomorrow, then we must, in turn, ensure those Marines we recruit and retain have what it takes to flourish in more complex environments. As leaders, we have a magnificent opportunity to do something institutionally significant to a level that has not yet been seen in our Corps.

In an era of looming budget cuts, a force drawdown, and an uncertain economy, there have been questions as to what is truly necessary for the Corps to maintain and build upon its already highly qualified accessions. After all, the Marine Corps already provides an opportunity to join one of the best fighting organizations on the planet, gain an unparalleled level of experience, work, and earn a living, all while serving the country. What we do not provide, however, is a robust enlisted educational system that not only challenges Marines mentally, but also sets the conditions for institutional success. We can and must provide more sophisticated educational opportunities for our Marines, while also taking more robust measures to keep these educated, high-quality enlistees longer. Our Marines need a system within which they can learn and excel as Marines while expanding their intellectual capacity and MOS accreditation. What instrument can forge this path for our future enlisted leaders?

Enlisted Marines need their own college. Currently we have Marine Corps University (MCU), an institution that provides quality, accredited resident education and degree opportunities to our officer corps, but which provides no degree opportunities for enlisted Marines. There is no available opportunity within MCU for our bright enlisted Marines to achieve that which the majority of them seek and future

Gen John A. Lejeune. *(File photo.)*

employers require: a college degree. We can and must do better for our Marines and our institution. The Marine Corps could and should create what I would call "John A. Lejeune College," nested as its own curriculum within MCU. Leading the way for all naval and land forces, the Marine Corps would set the standard for the future of enlisted education. This innovative approach would, in theory, serve to strengthen our educational foundation, widen the recruiting aperture, increase quality of life, and help retain more of those high-quality Marines we will need on the complex battlefields of tomorrow. So how would it work and what would it do?

The concept. John A. Lejeune College, or Lejeune College, for short, could serve as the premiere platform for Marine Corps enlisted personnel education. In the beginning the college could provide associate's degree educational programs (program evolution would ideally lead to a bachelor's degree curriculum) to enlisted members of the active and Reserve Marine Corps, while enhancing follow-on degree opportunities. These degree programs could be designed to aid Marines in meeting the future technological and leadership challenges of the Marine Corps by combining technical training (MOS schools, on-the-job training (OJT), enlisted professional military education (EPME), MOS qualifications, MarineNet courses, etc.) with general education coursework from affiliated civilian accredited academic institutions. Lejeune College could award associate's degrees in broad occupational areas (i.e., logistics, operations management, public and support services, electronics and telecommunications, and aircraft and vehicle maintenance, to name a few) by capitalizing on MCU's relationship with its regional accreditation entity.

The short-term goal will be to offer and award job-related associate's degrees and other academic credentials that serve to enhance mission readiness, contribute to recruiting, assist in retention, and support the career transitions of Marine Corps enlisted members. The long-term goal would be to further develop the concept to include bachelor's degrees on a merit-based scale for those Marines serving beyond their first terms of enlistment. The Marine Corps requires well-trained, educated, and professional Marines who are prepared to meet the current and future leadership, managerial, and technological challenges of an increasingly sophisticated and complex future environment. In turn, the Corps should provide a medium to enhance this maturing process. Personal and professional growth through collegiate programs will be essential and beneficial to the Corps' mission, our enlisted force development, and, ultimately, the Nation.

How would Lejeune College function? Placed within the framework of MCU (a program similar to or used in conjunction with the College of Distance Education and Training), Lejeune College would seek to elevate existing EPME by utilizing collegiate-level coursework in conjunction with MOS-specific schooling/training. To facilitate this critical process, to the max extent possible, MCU could utilize existing structure, faculty, and staff and its relationships with affiliated schools, realizing that there may be some additions to staff and structure because resident, satellite, and online programs will be utilized. Additionally, MOS schools, EPME schools (Corporals Course, Sergeants Course, etc.), and OJT technical training will be used as credit, while standardized courseware, teaching aids, and instructor credentialing courses must be developed and certified.

Conceptually the degree and credentialing programs provided by Lejeune College would begin as the Marine enters the School of Infantry, Marine Combat Training, and follow-on MOS schools, and would continue as he enters the Fleet Marine Force. By utilizing a combination of MOS schooling, technical training, and college credit earned either via Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (known as DANTES), College-Level Education Program (known as CLEP), or through accredited schools, Marines will work their ways to associate's degrees (ultimately bachelor's degrees) and/or professional credentials that complement their MOSs and enhance their skills.

Lejeune College could offer a multitude of degree programs that fall within the more broad occupational areas previously mentioned. Degree programs would represent the full range of MOS opportunities. The requirements levied for such degrees would follow a specific outlay of standards that represent both the technical and academic sides of the equation (determined by accrediting authority), whereas credentialing will more closely mirror the civilian-equivalent licensure and/or certification programs (determined by government or nongovernment schools, etc.). In the end the Corps would have an accredited college for its enlisted Marines that would provide them the maximum flexibility to succeed, a quality education, and an environment that is well suited for collegiate-level learning and future success.

What would this program example look like? The following is one possible outlay of programs, requirements, and credentialing options (not all-inclusive) that could initially be made available to our Marines:

- Associate's degree examples:
  - Lejeune College could offer degree programs in five broad general areas. Individuals may only participate in degree programs designed for their MOSs:
    - Logistics.
    - Operations management.
    - Public and support services.
    - Electronics and telecommunications.
    - Aircraft and vehicle maintenance.
- Degree program electives/technical/specialty education options (match with MOS):
  - Aviation operations.
  - Aviation management.
  - Aviation maintenance technology.
  - Air traffic operations and management.
  - Aircraft armament systems technology.
  - Avionics systems.
  - Criminal justice/law enforcement.
  - Cyber security.
  - Emergency management.
  - Explosive ordnance disposal.
  - Fire science.
  - Information systems technology.
  - Intel studies and technology.
  - Logistics.
  - Maintenance management.
  - Metals technology.
  - Munitions systems technology.
  - Multimedia production.
  - Music.
  - Personnel recovery.
  - Public affairs.
  - Quality control.
  - Safety.
  - Vehicle maintenance.
  - Weather technology.
- Degree requirements example: Each associate's degree program consists of 64 semester hours and combines Marine Corps education and training with a core of general education requirements obtained from civilian education sources.
- Professional credentialing programs: The mission would serve to research and evaluate those national professional credentials applicable to specific occupational specialties for possible award of Lejeune College credit. This program would serve to align Lejeune College degree programs with industry standards that lead to credentialing eligibility upon completion of an applicable degree. Credentialing options would include either licensure or certification. Licensure is a credential normally issued by Federal, state, or local governmental agencies. A license is issued to individuals to practice in a specific occupation.

Degree programs consist of a minimum of 64 semester hours, with requirements typically as follows:	**Semester hours:**
Technical education (MOS schools, EMPE, OJT, etc.)	24
Leadership, management, and military studies	6
Physical education	4
General education	15
*Oral communication	3
*Written communication	3
*Mathematics	3
*Social science	3
*Humanities	3
Program Electives	15
Total hours	64
Must be obtained from DANTES, CLEP, or civilian-accredited colleges or universities.	

Certification is a credential normally issued by nongovernmental agencies, associations, schools, or industry-supported companies. A certification is issued to individuals who meet specific education, experience, and qualification requirements.

- Credentialing examples:
  - John A. Lejeune College Instructor Certification Program.
  - Airframe and Power Plant Certification Program.
  - Engine mechanic.

The following are examples answering the question of why awarding associate's degrees and professional credentialing would be important to the Marine Corps and our Marines:

- Helps develop a more diversely skilled force.
- Broadens the professional development of our Marines.
- Validates Marines' professional knowledge and skills gained through Marine Corps education and training.
- Helps prepare our Marines to meet mission challenges of the future.
- John A. Lejeune College awards collegiate credit to Marines who possess specific national professional credentials that satisfy applicable degree program requirements.
- Some civilian colleges and universities award credit for specific professional credentials.
- Saves Marine Corps tuition assistance funds toward degree program completion.
- Prepares Marines for transition to civilian life and increases job opportunities.
  - Many companies, in absence of any other standards, view education as a key element for hiring new employees (associate's degrees are a must).
  - Many companies use a screening process that automatically deletes those applications without at least an associate's degree, making it much harder for Marines who leave active service without a degree to find work.
  - In fiscal year 2011 the Marine Corps spent over $180 million on unemployment payments to Marines who left active duty without employment. These dollars come from our operations and maintenance funds. Providing Marines an incentive to stay Marine while better preparing them for life after the Corps will help eliminate huge fiscal losses in this area.

Conclusion

The John A. Lejeune College concept presents the Marine Corps with a unique opportunity to invest in its future intellectual capital while facilitating a more capable force and setting the conditions for increased savings, efficiency, and capacity. Moreover, the concept would be a quality-of-life improvement and retention incentive for our Marines, opening the door of possibility to lower—and therefore cheaper—recruiting, training, and retention budgets. In theory, the Marine Corps would appeal to a wider recruiting pool, could increase contract lengths based on increased academic opportunity, or would "convert unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens," ready for transition to civilian life.[3] Mentally, morally, and fiscally, it just makes sense.

The underlying opportunity provided by Lejeune College would not just be limited to our most junior Marines.

The underlying opportunity provided by Lejeune College would not just be limited to our most junior Marines. In fact, in broadening the scope just a little, one can see that opportunity would translate into more opportunity for all within our enlisted ranks. Whether taking the form of college degrees, licensure, certifications, or advanced instructor certifications, the opportunities are there for the entire force. Creating more opportunities for our entire enlisted force would quickly translate into a force better prepared for the complexities of modern conflict while maintaining compliance with *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*'s third priority: "We will better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments."[4]

In closing, MCU already does a phenomenal job with EPME and distance education, but we can do better. John A. Lejeune College would not supplant these programs, but rather would serve only to broaden and greatly enhance our EPME and the quality of our force. In fact, providing a quicker avenue to an associate's degree or bachelor's degree would further validate these programs and in turn lead more Marines moving toward higher level programs. Young Americans enlist in the Marine Corps for many reasons, one of the biggest of which is opportunity. Lejeune College will add to this opportunity while simultaneously improving and strengthening a key pillar in our readiness foundation: quality people. It will further solidify the Marine Corps as the Service of choice for many more of those looking to serve their country, while providing recruiters another tool with which to recruit higher quality individuals. In an era of all-volunteer forces, we compete for human capital, and to remain on top we must be innovative in how we manage our most precious asset—our Marines!

Notes

1. Krulak, LtGen Victor H. "Brute," *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1999. Gen Charles C. Krulak used this quote in his 1999 "Farewell to the Corps," published in the June 1999 issue of *Leatherneck* magazine.

2. Krulak, Gen Charles C., "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines*, January 1999.

3. *First to Fight*.

4. Headquarters Marine Corps, *35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant's Planning Guidance*, Washington, DC, 2010.

Read to Make Decisions

Finding the underlying signature of a complex phenomenon

by 1stLt Ariel L. Bowen

If you ask any Marine why he reads, you will most likely receive several answers. He might say he reads to experience more, improve performance, or increase knowledge. Some may have even heard that you should read many books to achieve a 3,000-year-old mind. While these statements read well, they lack meaningful purpose. The truth is that we read professionally to develop our decisionmaking abilities. One way we can develop our decisionmaking abilities is by improving our reading processes. We can improve our reading processes in three steps: studying decisionmaking systems, focusing our paradigm, and simultaneously reviewing while reading. These three steps will focus readers' efforts in identifying critical details, recognizing patterns, and increasing book exposure rate, ultimately improving our decisionmaking processes.

Have you ever read a book and gotten the sensation that you didn't understand what you just read? You are not alone. You may have missed the author's purpose because your paradigm may not have been set to notice. Without proper focus you will always be distracted and miss pieces of the author's purpose. Our paradigms have to be conditioned to reduce the frequency of these events. To do this I suggest conditioning our paradigms with a couple of readings. I will first list the readings and then briefly discuss the purpose for each book. The listed books are not the only available books that can assist with a paradigm shift, but they are a starting point. The two suggested readings are *Sources of Power* and *Blink*.

The first book, *Sources of Power*, suggests that "when experts make decisions, they don't logically and systematically compare all available options," but they instead act intuitively.[1] The book will reinforce that experts act intuitively by providing and reviewing several detailed case studies of decisionmakers. One case study discusses how a fire ground commander makes a decision with a "sixth sense," intuitively making a decision based on missing patterns.[2] The commander reported utilizing the following abnormal factors to call his men out of a burning house before the floor collapsed, saving his men's lives:

- The fire did not respond to their initial sprays.
- The room was hotter than suspected for a room of that size.
- The fire was very quiet.

Almost unconsciously, the commander was able to make a sound decision on a snapshot of information, indentifying an abnormal pattern to justify his decision.[3] This narrative is a glimpse of one of the book's thorough case study assessments, and demonstrates that decisions can be made with quick precision by noticing patterns or specific critical factors.

Blink reaffirms pattern recognition and introduces the concept of "thin slicing," which is "the ability of our unconscious to find patterns in situations and behavior based on very narrow slices of experiences [or information]."[4] *Blink* explains, analyzes, and reviews many relevant case studies of decisionmaking to propose that ". . . extra information isn't actually an advantage at all," and "in fact you need to know very little to find the underlying signature of a complex phenomenon."[5]

Understanding that sound decisions are made based on critical details is the purpose of these books. They utilize examples and scientific analysis to exemplify the components, factors, and processes professional decisionmakers utilize to make sound decisions. After reading these books, you will be convinced to agree with their conclusions and seek to apply the lessons learned. You will almost effortlessly begin to shift your paradigm, searching for those critical details in your readings.

With our new paradigm in place, we are ready to apply it to our readings and simultaneously review while reading. But how do we do this? First we must choose a topic such as counterinsurgency (COIN), for example. We must then determine what we know and what we want to know about the subject. After determining what we want to know, we need to choose a book to start our journey. The book we choose needs to be more objective than subjective, because an objective book cites more references. Continuing with the example subject and our objective requirement, let us choose *Counterinsurgency* by David

>1stLt Bowen is currently serving as Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon, Echo Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. He recently returned from Afghanistan.

The listed books are not the only available books that can assist with a paradigm shift. . . .

Kilcullen. The book begins by defining COIN and then dives into analysis, peeling back the layers of COIN. As we read the book we begin to notice simple statements that spark questions and interest, like, ". . . [A] government which is losing to an insurgency isn't being out-fought, it's being out-governed."[6] Or that there are four functions of government (penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and apply those resources to identified group ends) and that these "four functions are exactly what insurgents also have to do if they want to establish the competitive control."[7] Is there a connection between governments being out-governed and insurgents having to perform the same functions as a government to win? Could these statements illuminate the details needed to make sound decisions? Our interest piques, as we may just have found some specific focus points that form a pattern.

Our immediate explanations to our questions are unfulfilling and need more clarification, so we search the book's references and use search engines for our own evaluation to test the theories we just discovered. At this point let us narrow our search to a historical comparison to test our theories and continue this example by choosing Vietnam. Then let us search for works that contain information on COIN and Vietnam, starting with *Counterinsurgency*'s references. Within the book's references we find another book, *On Guerilla Warfare*. Next we search the Internet or a library database for a book that offers a perspective of the guerrilla or insurgent and we find *How We Won the War*. In our search for the first two additional sources we realize we need a book with possible tactical applications. Then it hits us. We remember a book on the Commandant's Professional Reading List, *The Village*, and realize that is fits our needs, so we add it to our collection. Although you may not choose these specific books, the point is that you utilize the references of one objective book and keyword search to identify other books to cross-analyze.

Similar to *Counterinsurgency*'s four functional areas, *On Guerilla Warfare* explains the necessity of a guerilla force's understanding of the political objectives and that the force must have unity with the people in three functions: unity within the force, unity of the force and people, and unity in destruction of the enemy's cohesion.[8] In *How We Won the War*, GEN Vo Nguyen Giap explains his assessment of his enemy, identifying that they were "hostile toward the people," and calling his enemy's government a "puppet administration" failing in all fields of government.[9] The mind works in overdrive from the comparisons made, and a pattern starts to emerge connecting "people, unity, and governance," although right now the pattern is a baseline of theories, explanations, and ideas.

. . . improving our reading process is one way to develop our decisionmaking abilities. . . .

But how do these patterns of ideas apply? To answer this question, we now must seek a tactical level of understanding to make the connection. That is where *The Village* comes in handy. With our paradigm focused by the pattern of theories, ideas, and concepts of counterinsurgency, we can search *The Village* for critical indicators to validate our analysis. As we read *The Village*, we discover that every effort made by the Marine squad was teamed up with the local defense force, enabling the people to care for themselves and delegitimizing the enemy through a series of specific tactical actions.[10] Throughout *The Village* there are realistic examples of tactical application—decisions that can be utilized. We have now made a distinct connection from our analysis to our tactical reading (simultaneously reviewing while reading) and increased our book exposure. Then and only then does a pattern fully surface identifying an underlying signature of COIN, and the signature strengthens our decisionmaking capability within a COIN environment.

Again, the purpose of this article is to suggest that improving our reading process is one way to develop our decisionmaking abilities and that we can do this by utilizing the previously mentioned approach. This approach will assist any reader with improving his reading process. With an efficient reading process, readers will quickly dissect books, identify critical details, and increase their book exposure rates. Consequently, readers will more readily apply the lessons learned from the books they read, thus enabling their decisionmaking processes. Additionally, readers will have conditioned, matured minds that filter copious amounts of information and focus on crucial decision points, thereby successfully developing improved decisionmaking capabilities.

Notes

1. Klein, Gary, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, p. 35.

2. Ibid., p. 33.

3. Ibid., p. 31.

4. Gladwell, Malcolm, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*, Back Bay Books, New York, 2005, p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 136.

6. Kilcullen, David, *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, p. 149.

7. Ibid., p. 150.

8. Tse-tung, Mao, *On Guerilla Warfare*, Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, MN, 1937, p. 90.

9. Giap, Vo Nguyen, *How We Won the War*, Recon Publications, Philadelphia, PA, 1976, p. 25.

10. West, Bing, *The Village*, Pocket Books, New York, 1972.

So What Is the Problem?

A look at our core values

by Maj Daniel J. Gaskell

In 1996, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Charles C. Krulak, released the Marine Corps Values Program. The Marine Corps Order sought to:

> . . . generate a constancy of purpose in promoting our core values . . . [ensuring] quality young people continue to seek careers and serve proudly in the honor and traditions of the Marine Corps.[1]

One of the products of the Marine Corps Values Program was the pocket card issued to all Marines. The front of the card displayed our core values—three distinct words with brief, clear definitions. On the back were simple reminders of what Marines do.

While somewhat humorous—thinking that possessing a card means that one possesses our core values—the Commandant's intent ran deeper. By carrying the card, one carries the responsibility of these core values throughout their lives.

This Marine Corps Order remains active, but its spirit appears to have diminished. Over the past several decades, the Marine Corps, along with its fellow Services, has faced many serious social challenges. Servicemember hazing, suicide, domestic violence, child abuse, sexual harassment, and sexual assault have become common front page news. As these issues arise, the Service's goal is to face these challenges, attempting to solve the problem while also charting a clearer path forward. Looking at the problems facing the Corps over the past decades, one major thread underlies these issues: a lack of adherence to the core values. Reembracing our core values of honor, courage, and commit-



The values card, 1996. *(Photo by author.)*

Marine Corps Values Pocket Card

Front of the card (shown):
Honor: Integrity, responsibility, accountability
Courage: Do the right thing, in the right way, for the right reasons
Commitment: Devotion to the Corps and my fellow Marines

Back of the card (not shown):
Marines . . .
1. Obey the law
2. Lead by example
3. Respect themselves and others
4. Maintain a high standard of integrity
5. Support and defend the Constitution
6. Uphold special trust and confidence
7. Place faith and honor above all else
8. Honor fellow Marines, The Corps, Country, and Family

>Maj Gaskell is an infantry officer currently serving as Observer/Trainer, Deployable Training Division, Joint Training Directorate, J–7 (Suffolk), Joint Staff. He has served as a company commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom and battalion operations officer during Operation Enduring Freedom.

ment is the true path to solving serious issues in the Marine Corps.

On paper, exposure to the Marine Corps Values Program occurs in three phases: initial entry training occurring at Officer Candidates School and the Marine Corps recruit depots; reinforcement education at Marine combat training, MOS schools, and at every level of professional military education; and sustainment education as demonstrated in the "daily course of events by leaders at all levels from squad to force commander."[2] Gen Krulak's commander's intent was clear:

> Our goal is to continue to produce Marines who are exemplary citizens and who will act honorably and intelligently, whatever their situation or level of responsibilities.[3]

In short, the Commandant meant for us to "live and act" our core values. Every Marine, past and present, can recite the three words we cherish, but what do they really mean? If we truly cherish these values, why does the Marine Corps have issues that counter these beliefs?

Our Keystone: Honor

In 1755, *A Dictionary of the English Language* defined "honour" as having several senses, the first of which being "nobility of soul, magnanimity (virtue of being great in mind and heart), and a scorn of meanness." Some 20 years later the concept of honor was embraced by generations of Marines to come. In our hymn we promise to "keep our honor clean." All the Armed Services address honor in their core values: "honor" for the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard, and "integrity first" for the Air Force. Integrity, also utilized by the Army, is the firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values. Traditionally, honor and integrity are included in the same breath. The bedrock foundation for honor comes from families, churches, and schools across our Nation that help instill fundamental values in today's youth.[4] This is the starting point for the Marine poolee, officer or enlisted. Colleges and universities across the Nation operate on honor codes or concepts. The baseline

Marines must believe in and live our core values. *(Photo by Sgt Scott McAdam.)*

for most schools is academic integrity, ensuring that a student's work is original, referenced correctly, and not plagiarized. Many schools raise the bar beyond academics to develop the individual. The University of Southern California Marshall School of Business "seeks to create a culture that reinforces honorable conduct and rejects dishonorable conduct as unacceptable."[5] At the

. . . honor and integrity are included in the same breath.

University of Virginia, students make a commitment not to "lie, cheat, or steal within Charlottesville, Albemarle County, or where they represent themselves as University students," and are "also expected to conduct themselves with integrity and are presumed honorable until proven otherwise."[6] Our Service academies, as well as public and private military colleges, put honor at the forefront, where cadets "do not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate those who do."

Marion Sturkey captures the Marine concept of honor in his book, *Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines*:

> Honor requires each Marine to exemplify the ultimate standard in ethical and moral conduct. Honor is many things; honor requires many things. A U.S. Marine must never lie, never cheat, never steal, but that is not enough. Much more is required. Each Marine must cling to an uncompromising code of personal integrity, accountable for his actions and holding others accountable for theirs. And, above all, honor mandates that a Marine never sully the reputation of his Corps.[7]

Honor is a heavy responsibility and one that must be protected day and night, on and off duty.

Courage

Courage is hard. Courage does not equal "tough" and is not about brute strength. We pride ourselves as being the toughest on the block, where it is easy to focus on the physical aspect in a combat or deployed environment. As Marines, with our dedication to the mission and love for our fellow Marines, we know that we will perform the same as 2dLt Bobo, 1stSgt Kasal, and Cpl Dakota Meyer did when faced with the will to persevere despite uncertainty.

Beyond a wartime understanding, courage goes much deeper. It is both physical and moral. The Marine Corps fitness report describes courage as "per-

sonal acceptance of responsibility and accountability, placing conscience over competing interests regardless of consequences."[8] Moral courage extends in many forms. The courageous first step of a young Marine aboard an amphibious ship for a 7-month deployment, leaving behind a spouse and newborn, is enormous for many in our ranks. The Marine, regardless of rank, reminding a fellow Marine to remove a civilian hat indoors at a Marine Corps exchange is doing the right thing, not just because it is policy, but because it is proper social etiquette. The Marine politely asking a table of Marines at a restaurant to curb their language may face the same dangers as charging an enemy machinegun emplacement.

When dealing with today's serious issues, the courageous Marine recognizes distress in a fellow Marine, asking the hard questions about what that Marine is thinking, caring about what the Marine is saying, and escorting that Marine to the appropriate link in the chain of command, regardless of his personal schedule, appointments, and commitments. A Marine, regardless of rank, actively discouraging inappropriate behavior in his unit, stepping in before things get out of hand, and reporting incidents if they do occur may as well be raising the flag over Shuri Castle on Okinawa. Courage is physical, mental, and emotional, and is tested daily.

Ask hard questions and care about what our Marines are thinking. *(Photo by LCpl Suzanna Knotts.)*

Commitment

The Marine Corps Values Program pocket card identifies Marines, Corps, Country, and family. Sturkey sums up commitment as the "total dedication to Corps and Country."[9]

Commitment is a pledge that one will be devoted to the Marine Corps beginning at the lowest level, be it the battle buddy or fire team, all the way up to the Corps as an institution. It is a pledge that a Marine adheres to the laws of the land, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Service policies, and general and special orders as issued.

Commitment is a pledge to families. A Marine will strive to do the best for his family, just as his family did for him. Being available for a spouse whenever possible, whether it is emotional support or providing a much-needed breather is one part. Ensuring children are cared for through proper health and nutrition and proper daycare when required, and being fully engaged in the education process is another. Another level may be giving 100 percent effort at work, studying our tradecraft, striving to be better, or seeking to get promoted to the next level for the betterment of the family. Commitment may also be based in one's religious beliefs. Regardless of the commitment, this pledge should be enduring.

Commitment may also be based in one's religious beliefs.

So Where Is the Disconnect?

The Corps and our sister Services are facing serious social issues. The Services seek to frame and analyze the problem, arriving at the most appropriate course of action not only to solve the immediate problem, but to also ensure root causes are extinguished from the culture. So where are the core values?

Federal, state, and military laws existed long before the recent increase in sexual assault and sexual harassment reporting. A by-product of the Marine Corps Values Program, *Marine Corps Reference Publication 6–11B w/Ch 1, Marine Corps Values: A User's Guide for Discussion Leaders* (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 20 October 1998), thoroughly covers topics such as professionalism and ethics, ethical leadership, right versus wrong, and, yes, sexual harassment. While this publication does not cover sexual assault directly, if a Marine understands right versus wrong and sexual harassment, then where is the criminality of sexual assault misunderstood, whether by a violator or adjudicator? If honor, courage, and commitment define us as Marines, how do we as a Service have any problems? The only possible exceptions would occur by entry-level Marines during their first 4 years of service. At this initial stage, officer and enlisted alike may not fully grasp the gravity of our core values, only serving as "renters" of the institution. By raising their right hands for a second time, Marines become "owners" in the Corps, acknowledging the full weight of these values.

A *Marine Corps Gazette* article, "Preventing Sexual Assault," by LtCol Robert G. Bracknell (April 2013) highlights a misunderstanding of our core values. LtCol Bracknell discusses where

"commanders occasionally assume the authority to grant 'exceptions' to policy [i.e., 21 years of age as the minimum drinking age for active duty Marines worldwide]."[10] For the renter who upholds the core values, or even just references the pocket card, the underage Marine should obey the laws, do the right thing, and remain devoted to the Marine Corps, adhering to the policy prescribed by our Commandant. A Marine who is provided an exemption is going to take it. For the owner, how can a commander who embraces the core values provide an exception to a law? Where is the courage to do the right thing even if an unpopular decision? Where is the commitment to the Commandant who made the policy based on a comprehensive understanding of the problem of underage drinking? This break in core values does not lie only with the underage individual and the commander. The battle buddy, team leader, NCOs at all levels, and junior officers should know to uphold special trust and confidence, placing faith and honor above all else once again with an easy reference to the pocket card.

Easy and Not-So-Easy Answers

The Marine Corps is not broken and all is not lost. Every day at home station, at sea, or on foreign soil, Marines are "keeping their honor clean." In today's social media world, every action (and inaction) taken is reported on, and Marine is always capitalized. The following recommendations are offered as part of the problem-framing and possible courses of action for consideration.

Reinforce the cards! A renewed emphasis on the Marine Corps Values Program is required. New concepts, buzzwords, or slogans are not required. The 1996 Marine Corps Order and associated Marine Corps Reference Publications are still valid as written. The core values and right versus wrong, along with an understanding of current Marine Corps Orders and policies such as equal opportunity, sexual assault prevention and response, and suicide awareness lead Marines to make the right decisions and report accordingly when wrong actions are taken. Acknowledge up front that the card is a mere symbol. In the 1990s many Marines felt animosity toward the card, where a card was required to have core values, yet today many Marines remember the card as part of their "Old Corps." Some Marines still carry the card as a never-ending special order. Similar to a common access card or weapons card, the values card should be carried at all times, serving as a reminder that we carry our core values with us wherever we go. The bright orange survival cards required when training in the high California desert may not save lives directly, but can serve as a reminder in a time of isolation. The Marine Corps Values Program pocket card serves the same purpose. The card works and should be reinforced Corps-wide, stressing that the back of the card is just as important as the front. Issuing of the pocket card should be just as celebrated as the right to wear the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor, or a promotion or award, further reinforcing the importance to all Marines involved.

The Corps is not broken. *(Photo by Cpl Matthew Manning.)*

Evaluate Marines on core values. Core values should also be viewed as an oath. Most servicemembers only take two oaths in their lives: an oath of office or enlistment and an oath of marriage (or wedding vows). "Supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States . . . bear[ing] true faith and allegiance to the same" is a serious responsibility.[11] Just as we evaluate leadership, marksmanship, and physical fitness, all Marines, regardless of rank, should be evaluated from a core values perspective. Fitness reports address sergeants and above on courage. What about honor and commitment? Whether a meritorious board, recommendation for promotion, proficiency and conduct marks, or fitness report, an individual's merits related to core values should be discussed and annotated. With permanent changes of station, leaders of new-joins should seek out prior leaders for their assessments. Following the core values training outlined in the Marine Corps Order, our performance in respect to the core values should follow us individually starting at the recruit depots and officer candidate programs through our end of active service, be it 4 or 40 years.

Hold Marines accountable for core value violations. One could argue that this is already done. If a Marine receives nonjudicial punishment or court-martial, it is easy to identify a specific violation. Incidents should be reviewed from an additional core values perspective. Did that Marine display honor, courage, and commitment in his actions? This should not promote a zero-defect mentality for core value violations or tattletales to get ahead of peers, but should drive all Marines to do what is right, embracing the core values in all aspects of their lives. The first 4 years, both officer and enlisted, are when Marines are most vulnerable. They may not fully understand the connection between how a white lie or covering for a buddy slowly chips away at their own honor and integrity. As Marines are evaluated on the core values and held accountable for violations, the smaller Marine Corps of the future will retain those who fully embrace those values, thus further advancing the institution.

Once a Marine, Always a Marine?

Recently Walmart announced that it is committed to hiring 100,000 veterans over the next 5 years, appreciating the "contributions and sacrifices" that have been made by servicemembers over the past decade. Walmart's business version of core values seeks individuals whose "time in the military sharpened your leadership, focused your dedication and put you on a path with purpose."[12] The future veteran workforce is looking for men and women of good character. Beyond business, Marines will enter the political landscape. A 2012 *USA Today* article compared the U.S. House and Senate from 1977 to today, where, at one time, 80 percent of lawmakers boasted military service, a number that has fallen to 19 percent today. With 2.4 million military personnel deployed since 2001, veterans should appear in local, state, and national politics over the next 20 years, similar to the post–World War II era.[13] Former Georgia Governor and U.S. Senator Zell Miller served in the Marine Corps for 3 years and attributes his success to this time:

> In the twelve weeks of hell and transformation that were Marine Corps boot camp, I learned the values of achieving a successful life that have guided and sustained me on the course which, although sometimes checkered and detoured, I have followed ever since.[14]

Our future workforce and the business and political leaders that rise from within the Marine Corps must continue to carry our core values into the civilian sector, honorably representing the Corps beyond their active service.

Beyond business and politics, the main focus is today's smaller Marine Corps, steeped in tradition and forged by recent combat. Addressing problems in the Marine Corps is nothing new. Following Vietnam, the Marine Corps had the human relations program. In the 1980s and 1990s, Total Quality Leadership was the focus. While our core values are eternal, *MCO 1500.156* and the associated *MCRP 6–11B* from the 1990s are offered as viable solutions to today's issues facing the Commandant and the Corps as a whole. We praise and sing our core values daily. These existing tools answer a moral imperative framed by our current Commandant, "reawakening" our Marine Corps for the future.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 1500.15, Marine Corps Values Program*, Washington, DC, 16 December 1996.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. University of Southern California Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, accessed at classic.marshall.usc.edu.

6. "Short History of Virginia," accessed at www.virginia.edu.

7. Sturkey, Marion F., *Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines*, Heritage Press International, South Carolina, November 2009.

8. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order P1610.7F w/Ch 2, Performance Evaluation System*, Washington, DC, 19 November 2010.

9. Sturkey.

10. Bracknell, LtCol Robert G., "Preventing Sexual Assault," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2013.

11. Oath of Office, accessed at usmilitary.about.com.

12. Walmart, "The Veterans Welcome Home Commitment," accessed at www.walmartcareerswithamission.com.

13. Davis, S., "Number of veterans in Congress continues to decline," *USA Today*, Springfield, VA, 20 November 2012.

14. Miller, Zell, *Corps Values: Everything You Need to Know I Learned in the Marines*, Bantam, New York, 1998.

What's the Matter With Kids These Days?

Military discipline for modern warriors

by 1stLt Evan Munsing

>1stLt Munsing is a light armored reconnaissance officer from 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion currently assigned as a company advisor to the 3d Mobile Strike Force Kandak Security Force Assistance Advisory Team. He previously worked at the National Defense University where he wrote about organizational management issues.

Moral force, discipline, and combat effectiveness are linked. *(Photo by LCpl Sullivan Laramie.)*

Although dwarfed by hot button issues like military downsizing and the inclusion of females in the combat arms, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised important questions about the state of discipline within the American military so much so that the Commandant of the Marine Corps devoted a considerable amount of time in 2012 traveling to every Marine Corps installation to make just that point and recently reinforcing it with a letter to senior leaders to increase the presence of officers and NCOs in the barracks and on duty in order to strengthen discipline among junior Marines. These same sentiments have been echoed by many officers and SNCOs who feel that younger generations of Marines are increasingly not up to the challenge, and that the system of training and discipline now in place has allowed military standards to erode. Abstract concepts like discipline always get overlooked in discussions about the future of the Marine Corps, which tend to be dominated by talk of weaponry and tactics. But nothing could be more important. Moral force, discipline, and military effectiveness are inextricably linked. As the social context of the military changes and the civilian world increasingly penetrates the military, we are likely to end up with something which is not so much a coherent system of discipline, but rather a series of renewably futile bureaucratic processes that ineffectively shape the behavior of our Marines, making us unable to successfully wage the wars of the future.

In speaking of discipline, we must take a broader view than just punishments or ordering soldiers into battle. We must include the ways that individuals are taught to think and the ideological structures that allow a unit to be "spiritually stronger than the sum of its parts, controlled by one will, standing fast, so that even the soul-shaking excitement, the melee, the noise, the fear, the danger of death in battle" cannot break it up.[1] Warriors exist in an ethical universe that is organized and made coherent by discipline; as individuals they are continuously confronted by both big and small choices that must be

navigated and understood on the basis of a very particular code of behavior. A common worldview rooted in a logical system of thought and action is the most basic requirement for success in combat and is the backbone around which all other things are built. Tactics and weaponry have no meaning if individuals cannot be controlled or inspired with a shared vision. Binding men together into a cohesive unit, motivating them to do the nearly impossible under extreme conditions, overcoming hardships, and facing death requires a shared structure of belief and a confidence in one's superiors and comrades that can exist only under very particular conditions, as Jonathan Shay explains:

> Any army, ancient or modern, is a social construction defined by shared expectations and values. Some of these are embodied in formal regulations, defined authority, written orders, ranks, incentives, punishments, and formal task and occupational definitions. Others circulate as traditions, archetypal stories of things to be emulated or shunned and accepted truth about what is praiseworthy and what is culpable. Altogether, these form a moral world that most of the participants most of the time regard as legitimate, "natural," and personally building. The moral power of an army is so great that it can motivate men to get up out of a trench and step into enemy machinegun fire.[2]

Ultimately, good discipline not only mediates the actions of the soldier, it helps him order his thoughts as well, finding greater strength and comfort through self-identification with the organization.

However, the moral world that frames military discipline is always under assault from the society within which we are embedded. The American military has for a long time lived on the borrowed capital of traditions of public virtue that predate the rise of economic and social liberalism, and has tried to avoid evolving to reflect those changes. As American society changes, the tenets that once legitimized military service are increasingly supplanted by social values that do not inspire service toward the common good, thus the ideas that formed the basis of our current system of military discipline are increasingly anachronistic. The classical military virtues of fortitude, loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice go largely untaught in civil society. The loyalties that once bound individuals together, endowed them with direction and unity of outlook on life, and guided and supported their actions have largely disappeared. Even those particularly American values of hard work, sobriety, and self-improvement have lost their traction in a society bedazzled by the ephemeral and easy.

This erosion of traditional virtues threatens the very basis of military discipline; as the values of civilian society continue to evolve and place ever-greater emphasis on mindless individualism, those we recruit will be less and less suited for the obligations and demands of military service. The republican ideals that formed the framework of our Nation recognized the connection between military virtues and good citizenship, scorning both self-gratification and self-aggrandizement. Even Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, regretted the decline in martial prowess he witnessed among the merchant classes, noting that the "general security and happiness which prevail in ages of civility and politeness" give "little exercise to the contempt of danger, to patience in enduring labor, hunger and pain." It is politics and war, not business or entertainment, which serve as the "great school of self command."[3]

. . . military discipline seeks to eradicate individual differences. . . .

At the same time that these virtues are disappearing, the penetration of civil society into the military through media and congressional scrutiny will force us to be increasingly circumspect with how we exercise control within our organizations. As much as possible, we need to resist the tendency for the moral character of the military to approximate contemporary American values. It has long been an accepted truth that there are functional reasons for why military organizations should not hold the same values or be governed by the same principles of individual freedom, which characterize the society they defend. John Adams noted the following:

> There can be no liberty . . . where the laws are not revered and most sacredly observed, nor can there be happiness or safety in an army for a single hour when discipline is not observed.[4]

But today most people find this unnerving. While contemporary America celebrates the ephemeral and the different, military discipline seeks to eradicate individual differences, or at least to subordinate those differences to the needs of the unit, and to establish in the minds of soldiers commitment to the unit and the Nation to the point of a willingness to die for these things. As GEN Sir John Hackett wrote:

> The military virtues—fortitude, endurance, loyalty, courage, and so on—these are good qualities in any collection of men and enrich the society in which they are prominent. But in the military society, they are functional necessities, which is something quite, quite different. I mean a man can be false, fleeting, perjured, in every way corrupt, and be a brilliant mathematician, or one of the world's greatest painters. But there's one thing he can't be, and that is a good soldier, sailor or airman.[5]

The fashionable values of contemporary society cannot give us resolve in the face of hardship nor help us understand the consequences of our actions in the face of ambiguity or contradiction. They lack the certitude and the timelessness that inspire discipline and selflessness. Classic military virtues, with their demand for sacrifice and fortitude in the face of the unspeakable, require the greatest strength and are the most at odds with contemporary America. One must ask how military leaders can be expected to shape the lives and control the actions of young men and women imbued with modern, postheroic values, given the sharp limits imposed on our authority.

It is easy to hope that we can forestall the inevitable decline in discipline by simply upholding current standards using the methods now in place, but the time when such methods would work has passed, and we need to instead completely rethink the subject. We have bureaucratically preserved an outdated means of organizing fighting men and we still use the same (albeit watered down) disciplinary code of a previous era, even though the values and behaviors of contemporary servicemembers have significantly changed. We managed to preserve many of the structures that impede the administration of meaningful rewards and punishments at the same time that most servicemembers no longer exhibit the individual virtues that would allow the current disciplinary system to work. Military rewards rely largely on outdated notions of service and social identity. Meaningful punishments barely exist, depending as they do on empty threats and social pressure—a butt-chewing doesn't hold the same power that it once did, shame carries less water, and veiled threats simply ring hollow as everyone knows there is no force behind such things. To put it in a familiar analogy, both the carrot and the stick are too small to be useful.

Rewards for Contemporary Americans

Our military is, as we are so proud of reciting, an all-volunteer, professional military. But our system of rewards has not changed to match this context; we rely on outdated notions of service to incentivize individuals who grew up in a society that prizes money much more than it does the fulfillment of obligations. We are professionals, but we do not tie performance to salary.

Many people have a knee-jerk reaction against tying military performance in general, and combat performance in particular, to monetary rewards. There is a feeling that such things would lead to the fetishization of body counts or loosen unit cohesion or cheapen the sacrifices of war by replacing service to nation with pursuit of profit, but this is not a convincing argument. For one thing, Hollywood has done a far better job at glorifying violence and celebrating the rogue individual than the military ever could do. More to the point, however, is that providing substantive rewards for good performance is probably as old as war itself. From the promise of loot and slaves that motivated the Greeks to sit outside the walls of Troy for 10 years to the rewarding of prize money to successful naval vessels in the 19th century, monetary rewards have long been a part of military tradition. Indeed, the idea of not taking plunder is a relatively recent one and we have not yet reconciled the need to prevent battlefield excesses with a means of rewarding victorious performances. Instead we did away with tangible rewards for victory and bravery and replaced them with a token economy of ribbons and medals. Thus instead of rewards we have awards, which are less useful for incentivizing behavior, as they represent increasingly little in society. In the past, and in other militaries, this might represent an easy access to good jobs or social dignity for the bearer; in contemporary America, although medals and awards might offer access to free drinks and a modicum of prestige, they no longer necessarily represent either political heft or economic security.

Our military is an all-volunteer force. *(Photo by LCpl Bridget M. Keane.)*

Meaningful and Acceptable Punishments

Over recent decades the range of punishments available to military leaders of all levels has precipitously declined. The persistent penetration of the military sphere by the media and civilian oversight has caused the military to pull back disciplinary authority and limit the flexibility of junior leaders in enforcing discipline. Ironically, in doing so, we effectively enshrined hazing as the method of last resort for correcting disciplinary problems because there are simply too few useful legal options for correcting bad character. Bureaucratic impediments to punishments mean that we generally impose disciplinary force later rather than sooner and at a scale that is neither appropriate nor effective for solving the problem we are facing. Discipline needs to be imposed not just for immediately compelling reasons, but also to address less-than-vital concerns that will forestall greater problems—that is to say, if we correct the small problems, the bigger ones are less likely to occur. The weightiest punishments take so long to be administered and occur at a level so far removed from the problem itself that they have little effect in dissuading others from repeating bad behavior. And the punishments available to company grade officers, those most intimately connected with maintaining the "good order and discipline" of the Services, are generally so watered down or so intimately tied to

Small unit leaders may need some tools for disciplinary authority. *(Photo by LCpl Jeff Drew.)*

bureaucratic processes as to be almost meaningless for correcting behavior. In fact, the amount of paperwork any punishment or corrective action requires makes it almost more painful for the punisher than the offender. Such exhaustive documentation may be useful in a long campaign to end someone's career or prevent his promotion, but these things are much less useful for immediately correcting the behavior of individuals and units—and ultimately, in many cases, Marines with serious transgressions are often simply separated from the military rather than "punished," which communicates an entirely wrong message to other Marines.

At the moment, correcting misbehavior is a mostly informal process that relies largely on the initiative of junior leaders. It is hugely dependent on junior leaders' forces of personality, and because it is unstructured and informal, it is a poor substitute for a real system that would give meaningful and legitimate authority to those who are most intimately tied to troop leadership. How much can we rely on the willingness of corporals and sergeants to face the resentment of their peers in order to fix disciplinary problems if we do not give them real tools to make their threats meaningful? Without giving our small unit leaders some measure of real disciplinary authority, we force them to conserve their social capital and preserve their authority by trying to seem agreeable to their subordinates rather than focusing on upholding standards and maintaining combat effectiveness. It is tempting to look for the solution to this problem by hoping for a return to the "good old days" in which smoke sessions and breaking big rocks into small ones were normal punishments for misbehavior. Although there is an instinctive appeal to such ideas, most physical punishments are no longer considered legitimate by civilians or Marines. Trying to reinstitute physical punishments would, in the short term, lead only to resistance; in the long term it would mean a mass exodus from the military.

> ***. . . most physical punishments are no longer considered legitimate. . . .***

Unfortunately, the only culturally acceptable punishments left are those that are already familiar in the civilian world: loss of pay and loss of employment. We must do our best to avoid the latter—the military, more so than any other sphere of society, has such a great amount of time, money, and hope invested in the training of its personnel that rollover needs to be prevented. Loss of pay, however, remains a largely unused tool within the military. For one thing, it requires substantial documentation and oversight and is often seen as more trouble than it is worth. But pushing down disciplinary authority to a lower level, and allowing, say, a day's wages to be docked for those failures that currently go largely unpunished (like poor performance or bad leadership) would allow problems to be corrected much more quickly and would be a more effective means of shaping behavior than is allowed in the current system. This would also help solve our problem of what economists call "adverse selection"—that is, because wages and rank (particularly at the junior levels) are more closely tied to time in service than they are to actual performance or ability, there is little reason outside of the moral rewards of a job well done for very capable individuals to perform at a high level or even just to reenlist. Although we are never going to be able to match what the private sector could offer in financial rewards, even moderate wage discrimination would go a long way to reinforcing good leadership and maintaining standards.

Discipline can also be made more meaningful by making it a more intimate process. Increasing the authority of junior leaders and using small units with a defined group identity and relatively stable composition will increase individual discipline and commitment to the larger unit. Hyperindividualized American youths have no particular reason to feel compelled by the wants and needs of large organizations or higher leaders with whom they have limited interaction, but they care very much what their friends think, and the smaller the unit, the greater their share of responsibility and the more they will identify with the organization as a whole.

Conclusion

It is often said that the future is like the present, only more so. For this reason, we can say with some confidence that the particular strains of individualism and self-gratification that are most obvious in American society today will

be even stronger tomorrow. We can do nothing to fight this process in society at large, but we can control how these things are expressed in our own units. Successful organizations don't leave good decisions up to chance, but instead create structures of rewards and punishments that make it easy for people to make the right decision and hard for them to make the wrong decision; in doing so they reinforce individual virtue by making "doing the right thing" a habit that requires no thinking or moral debate. Thus, even if we cannot convince every Marine to uphold standards for altruistic reasons, we can shape their actions, and in doing so reinject traditional virtues back into individual behavior.

Ultimately, military power and the security of our Nation is built not on weaponry and budgets, but on organization and discipline. We have continuously outspent the rest of the world in military affairs, and we should be proud of how technologically advanced we are, but we have largely ignored the deeper influences that control the military: the way we structure our forces and the way we structure their thoughts. Such changes are always much more difficult to implement than adding on new weaponry or tactics, for they quite literally require changing the worldview of all the constituent players, whereas changing tactics and weapons simply requires retraining. But to remain effective, independent, and relevant, we must evolve to work within the political and cultural contexts of the moment and find ways to maintain high standards regardless of political whims and social fads.

>Author's Note: Special thanks to Dr. Christopher Lamb of the Center for Strategic Research, and Fletcher Schoen, scout sniper with the 25th Infantry Division, for their help in revising this article.

Notes

1. Delbruck, Hans, *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History*, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1975, p. 416.

2. Shay, Jonathan, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995, p. 6.

3. Lasch, Christopher, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 1994. p. 143.

4. Smith, Page, *John Adams*, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1969, p. 289.

5. Dyer, Gwynne, *War*, Crown Publishing, New York, 1985, p. 140.

Leader of Marines

A letter to my brother

by Maj John J. Franklin

>Maj Franklin is an aviation command and control officer. He is currently assigned as the Tactical Air Command Center Division Head, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. He will soon transfer to the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies. Maj Franklin has deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom I (January to May 2003) and Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2009 to April 2010).

Dear Dan,

First and foremost, congratulations on earning a commission as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. Through blood, sweat, and tears you proved you possess the capability to serve as a leader in the world's greatest fighting force. You are now an officer of Marines, and I am proud to not only call you my brother, but also my brother-in-arms. I write to you today as a field grade officer, a 12-year veteran of our officer corps, hoping to help you as you start down the road of your new profession of leading Marines. The best way I can help you is by telling you what I learned not only from others, but mostly from the mistakes I made during my time as a company grade officer. I write to you in the hope that you will take my leadership lessons and make them your own, while not repeating the same mistakes I made. Take these lessons to heart; being a good leader will help others more than you will ever know. At the same time, the consequences of your actions often extend further than you realize.

I joined my first unit with a certain sense of entitlement. I thought I deserved to be looked up to simply because I was an officer. I was wrong. It took more than one "come to Jesus" fitness report counseling and a billet reassignment by my CO to make me understand my role as a second lieutenant. Your place as a second lieutenant may be out in front of your platoon, but your job is to learn. The majority of your Marines have probably been in the Corps longer than you have; give them the respect they have earned. Show both initiative and humility in equal measure. Seek out a squared-away SNCO and ask him to mentor you. Listen to what he has to say. Seek his counsel and advice. You may be in charge, but he knows what is going on. If you do this, you will excel. If you do not do this, your platoon will suffer while your short time in the Marine Corps will be miserable.

Study your profession constantly. Learn all you can, first about your job, then about the MAGTF, and then about the joint force. Gain an understanding of how your unit works. Know your unit's standing operating procedures cold. Get out of your office and join the Marines (this will cause you to get dirty and sometimes be uncomfortable as you crawl under trucks and run slash wire over hills in the rain, but you will leave for the day with a better understanding of what Marines do and how they do it). Take a sincere interest in the jobs of each of your Marines and the other Marines in your unit while also making sure not get too much in their way. Stay at work late when required. Work until you know your work is done for the day.

Manage your weight. This will become more of a challenge the older you get. It took me awhile to figure out how to exercise and eat in order to maintain my proper weight, and I still have to adapt as I get older. This process will be different for you than it was (and is) for me; the sooner you find out what works for you, the better. The Marine Corps, with good reason, has an idea of how it wants its Marines, and especially its officers, to look; make sure you fit that mold. In that same vein, you must be able to make weight and appearance in order to effectively counsel and, if required, take action against your Marines for not being within standards. Enforce standards equally across the board, starting with yourself, continuing through your SNCOs and NCOs, and down to your Marines. On a lighter but equally important note, always try to outperform your Marines during physical fitness. You will be surprised at what you can accomplish, even as you get older.

Properly writing fitness reports will become perhaps your greatest responsibility; this is one area where I have performed well overall as an officer, solely because I was taught by my first reporting senior how to do so. Seek out an officer senior to you and ask him to teach you how to properly write a fitness report. Read the instructions on the report itself. Grade according to the descriptions on the pages. Learn how to write accurate and appropriate comments. Always submit fitness reports on time. You are literally shaping the Marine Corps and Marines' careers by writing fitness reports; you cannot take this responsibility lightly.

Second only to writing fitness reports is counseling your Marines. This is an area where I did not succeed as a company grade officer. I did not learn how to effectively counsel my Marines until I was a senior captain. Do not be like me in this respect. Find an officer senior to you who you respect and ask him how he conducts counselings. The sooner you learn how to properly counsel your

Marines, the better your unit will be. Your Marines will have a clear expectation of what they are required to do. Marines who understand their expectations will most often exceed them. My time as an officer in charge of a section would have been much more successful had I understood this going in.

Make every effort to seek billets of increased responsibility, but do so by working hard and putting in the effort required to achieve tactical excellence and a very high degree of technical proficiency. If you do this you will find yourself in situations where you can put leadership into practice. Volunteer, but more importantly, let your hard work display your potential for future responsibility. I was fortunate to have deployed to combat twice as a company grade officer; with the current and future uncertain state of world affairs, you may or may not get the same chances. Nevertheless, even in peacetime you will have opportunities to lead, both in garrison and in the field. Always seek those opportunities and be ready for them by putting in the hours to prepare.

Complete your formal professional military education as soon as possible. The nonresident seminar programs are actually interesting and useful; they will help you become a better and more well-rounded officer. Additionally, extend your outlook beyond formal professional military education. Keep abreast on current events. Read as much as possible, especially doctrine and military history. Read from the Commandant's Professional Reading List, and require your Marines to do the same. Work on earning your master's degree, if at all possible. The more you educate yourself, the better an officer you will be. More importantly, your Marines will begin to emulate you if you develop a culture of learning in your unit.

Seek balance in your life. Do not let yourself burn out. Being an officer of Marines is your profession—it is not all you are. When able, take time to step back, recharge, and reset for the professional challenges ahead. Take time to not only develop as a leader but as a person. Stay true to yourself, your conscience, and to what you know is right. Make measured choices, and let your sense of what is right guide you in your decisionmaking process. You will get things wrong and you will make mistakes. Those mistakes will not be fatal, either to you or, more importantly, to others, as long as you do what you know to be right.

I hope these words of advice help you prepare for your time at The Basic School and for your first assignment in the Operating Forces. Being a company grade officer of Marines is one of the best professions in the world; you will have a chance to go places and do things that most cannot even fathom. You will be tactically leading the warriors who put our operational plans into action and achieve the strategic goals of our Nation. Enjoy your time and cherish the present. It will be over before you know it.

>Author's Note: I do not actually have a brother named Dan who is a new second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. I employed this fictional relationship as a vessel to take an honest, realistic look at what leadership, either positive or negative, means to me, and then articulate ways and methods of being an effective leader of Marines.



A good way to share thoughts and advice. *(Photo by LCpl Crystal Druery.)*

Performance Evaluation System

The system is flawed and we're doing our Marines an injustice

by Capt Barrett P. Dupuy

>Capt Dupuy is Deputy Comptroller, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma. He has deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom 10.1 as CO, Headquarters & Service Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 5.

The system that evaluates their performance has flaws. *(Photo by Cpl Brianna Christensen.)*

The Performance Evaluation System (PES) is killing the careers of Marines. A recent career designation board after-action presentation noted, "These Marines . . . would have been otherwise retained had some extra effort been put in the report."[1] Marines are not being allowed to continue their service in the Marine Corps because of a flawed system of assessing Marines that depends on evaluations written by similarly flawed individuals. The efforts of the evaluator should have no bearing on a Marine's career. Additionally, contrary to its name, the PES does not evaluate performance, but rather evaluates character or the perception thereof. In other words, the PES is the evaluation of how the reporting senior (RS) feels about the Marine reported on (MRO) instead of being an objective review of what the MRO actually accomplished. Compounded by reporting officials' blunders and selection board misinterpretations, the flaws of the system provide an injustice to Marines and serve to shape a force that may not be our "best and brightest."

MCO P1610.7F w/ Ch 2, Performance Evaluation System, known as the PES manual, governs the PES and defines its scope as providing "for the periodic reporting, recording, and analysis of the performance and professional character of Marines in the grades of sergeant through major general."[2] The PES manual lists the fundamental concepts of the system as accuracy, accountability, simplicity, and consistency. The purpose of the PES is to facilitate the selection, promotion, and retention of the most qualified Marines. The PES manual dictates that evaluations must be an appraisal of performance during a given period against an understood set of standards. The manual also stipulates that the fitness report is not a counseling tool or a communication to the MRO.

Conceptually, the system is fairly simple and straightforward. In practice, however, something gets lost in translation. The following analysis of the system is largely anecdotal, albeit appropriate, since the system is used by ordinary Marines where concepts and theories are shaped by other Marines, the "lieutenant underground," senior officers and/or reviewing officials, and SNCO counterparts. Even with the best of intentions, the guidance that comes from any one of those groups, or the combination thereof, does not always reflect the true intent or design of the system. Sometimes the advice given is so far off the mark that it would be comical if it were not so tragic. A perfect example of this type of advice is the "room to grow" theory, where it is said that an RS should mark the first report on a new MRO low on his RS profile in order to allow room to "show

improvement." This type of attempt to manipulate the system demonstrates that the reporting officials lack a full understanding of the PES and serves to make the system ineffective.

Reporting officials are not entirely to blame for their lack of understanding of the PES. While the PES is straightforward in its application, it becomes somewhat mystic in its implementation and interpretation. The manual itself contains nearly 200 pages on the administration of the system, not completely free of ambiguity or contradiction. The board process, which is ultimately the only time fitness reports matter, is abstract to most reporting officials who have never been a member of a board. This causes a lot of guessing as to how a report will be interpreted. The PES, with all its intricacies and exceptions and its nebulous implementation, ought to be taught in an upper-level university course. The Marine Corps thought it best, though, to teach it over a few hours of lecture to a group of tired, hungry, and disgruntled lieutenants at The Basic School in between field exercises and 10-mile walks through the woods conducting land navigation.

After graduating from The Basic School, now deemed fully equipped to measure the performance of Marines, a new second lieutenant can begin writing fitness reports as an RS. The RS now has the responsibility to evaluate the performance of the Marines under his supervision. In addition, the RS has to manage his RS profile. The RS profile is essentially a sliding scale specific to him in which the highest rated Marine (by that RS) earns a relative value (RV) of 100 percent, the lowest rated Marine is 80 percent, and all others fall somewhere in between. The RS profile is a means of translating a report based on intangible characteristics and assigning it a numerical value. This method is basically a guise for putting Marines in categories of "above average," "average," and "below average" without seeming as callous. One problem with the RS profile or RV system is that it is ever-changing. The system has the potential to become more accurate as the sample size increases (as the RS writes more reports), but it can be extremely inaccurate with a few reports. An RV is assigned to a report once an RS has accumulated three reports written on Marines of the same grade. An RS profile with 3 reports, as matter of mathematical necessity, has one Marine assigned an RV of 100, one 90, and one assigned an RV of 80. The difference in the three Marines could have been marginal (or expansive for that matter), however, the RS profile only shows that one was above average, one was average, and one was below average. At this point, one may speculate that the narrative of the report will amplify the imprecision of the RV; that concept will be discussed later. The RS now has a profile with which to work and reference the performance of other Marines. It follows then that the next MRO, if he is an average Marine, receives marks equal to 90 percent. Henceforth, with few exceptions, Marines will fall somewhere between the original 80 and 100. An RS with so few reports on his profile has little choice than to assign grades to achieve the desired RV.

However, the PES manual states that grades "are not given to attain a perceived fitness report average or relative value."[3] The RS is to assign grades by determining each of 13 attributes' positions on the performance-anchored rating scale (PARS) according to the MRO's effort during the reporting period, without regard to the RV. In doing so, while having few reports on his RS profile, the RS has inadvertently (or unconsciously) determined that one of the MROs is below average (80 percent). The MRO assigned an RV of 80 may stay at 80 for years on the RS profile, though only marginally less than the 90, while the RS accumulates more reports. Theoretically, most reports would be in the 90 range, since that is the average. Not until the RS observes a truly below average Marine would the 80 now become 85 (or somewhere between 80 and 90 depending on the number of reports), while the below average Marine becomes the new 80. However, in the meantime, the original 80 was on a promotion board and not selected because of an 80 that probably should have never been an 80, based on the prescribed method of grading without regard to RV.

In well-intentioned efforts to avoid injustice, reporting officials assign grades to place each MRO in the appropriate position on the RS profile. Considering that the graded attributes are so intangible that they render grading unfeasible, it is logical that most reporting officials default to the RV method of grading. Shannon Phillips and Adam Clemens noted in their study of the fitness report system that ". . . although some PARS are probably more applicable to some billets than others, each is treated with equal weight in calculating the report average."[4] For example, courage is graded for every Marine using the same PARS, whether in garrison in an administrative billet or during combat. The courage required of the two are so far beyond compare that it is entirely impractical to rate them using the same scale, yet if there ever were an RS with the responsibility of grading these two Marines, he would have to do exactly that.

In addition to having to rate attributes of Marines from different backgrounds or MOSs on the same scale, the RS now has to fit them both into the same RS profile. How does the admin Marine compare to the infantry Marine? (Note: This is an extreme example to illustrate a point. Where it is unlikely for an RS to observe an infantry Marine and an admin Marine, it is entirely possible that an RS will evaluate Marines in the same grade with different MOSs, backgrounds, experience, and time in grade.) Ideally the reviewing officer (RO) would serve to advise the RS on such matters. However, in many cases, the RO has never met (and probably never heard of) the MRO. Personally, I have only met one of at least half a dozen of my ROs (all of whom have marked observation as sufficient). The role of the RO has become so ineffective that the previously mentioned career designation board noted, "It was obvious when a senior RO simply cut/pasted recommended comments from a Lt/Capt RS."[5] The board continued, "No offense to the junior officers' writing ability, they just cannot communicate at the O–5/O–6 [lieutenant colonel/colonel] level."[6] Apparently neither can lieutenant colonels or colonels. The RO

effectively doubles the impact of the RS's opinion of the MRO by applying comments written by the RS. The role of the RO would be much more effective if it were simply to review for administrative correctness.

Without effective clarification or amplification from the RO, fitness reports are left up to interpretation. Boards of any type usually publish an after-action PowerPoint presentation that details the philosophies used to make selections. The board members usually—in fact, always—describe some type of ineffective reporting by the RSs or ROs. These after-action presentations convey much more than ineffective report writing, though. The ineffective process for interpretation of fitness reports is also revealed. Worse, the after-action presentations provide a moving target for reporting officials to try to hit. Reporting officials attempt to appease members of boards by addressing concerns mentioned during the presentations. For example, a board presentation stated, "A comment or recommendation on the officer's potential for retention is a must. Not putting a comment has meaning."[7] The presentation then continues to explain that "'retain and promote with peers' pales in comparison to a comment such as 'A must for promotion and retention.'"[8] Naturally, any reporting official who read the cited presentation would begin to put the comment, "A must for promotion and retention," on even mediocre Marines. The board members are now left to decipher which comments are gratuitous and which are sincere.

Not that the board members did not already have their work cut out for them. The same after-action describes a report on which the RV is less than or equal to 90 (average or below average), but a comment in the narrative describes the MRO as "above the majority of peers." In this particular case, the board favored the RV over the comment and made the assumption that the MRO is average or less. However, it could have easily been the case that the comment was entirely true, but the RS failed to correctly manage his RS profile. Similarly, remember the scenario above where a reporting official has few reports on his profile? It could be the case that the MRO is above the majority of peers but below only the few on which the reporting official has written. The current format of fitness reports leaves the true meaning up for conjecture.

Don't leave their fitness reports up to interpretation. *(Photo by LCpl Shaltiel Dominguez.)*

Another matter of conjecture from the same board was the interpretation of a report with a below average RV and standard or average comments. The board again favored the RV over the comments. However, in this case, the report was the second report written by the RS on Marines of the same rank. That means that no RV was assigned at the time the report was originally processed. At the time of the board, though, the RS had written seven reports on Marines of that same rank. The board simply does not know what was the RS's opinion of the Marine at the time it was written. If the cumulative RV was correct and the MRO was below average, it should be expected that the comments not match the RV. Since negative comments automatically render a report adverse and counseling-type statements are not allowed (because the fitness report is not a counseling tool), the best the RS can do to qualify a below average RV is to enter benign, standard comments about the Marine. Any comment that hints at adverse will promptly get the report rejected by Headquarters Marine Corps (Manpower Management Selection Board (MMSB)).

The inability of reporting officials to make negative remarks further weakens the PES. In practice, all comments must be positive, thus a reporting official can write, "MRO accomplishes assigned tasks." What is really meant by such a statement is, "MRO needs to be constantly supervised," or, "MRO does the bare minimum." The latter two statements probably paint a better picture of the Marine to the board members, but the statements would render the report adverse. It may be the case that the Marine is not an overall adverse Marine, but the comment is accurate. It could also be that the report should be marked adverse, but few reporting officials are willing to go through the rigors of submitting an adverse report. Adverse reports undergo such scrutiny that it takes months to submit an adverse report to MMSB. Adverse reports require a third officer sighter to review the report and the MRO to sign and comment on the report. Adverse reports are often reviewed by the Judge Advocate General's office as well. Any changes made on the report after the MRO signs it require the report to be routed back to the MRO, further adding to the processing time. Since as few as three officers, and probably four to

five, have reviewed the report, most assuredly every "t" is crossed and every "i" is dotted before the report gets submitted to MMSB. The appeal process for the MRO, however, can have an adverse report removed from his record without any chance to reclama by the three officers who administered the report. After three officers were in agreement that an adverse report was justified, should there not be a more expansive appeal process? Arguably, the appeal process itself makes the cumbersome effort of administering adverse reports seldom worth the effort. The result is that less accurate information gets presented to the board.

In order to present more accurate information to the board members to ensure that only the best and most qualified Marines are selected for promotion, special programs, reenlistment, etc., the PES should be overhauled to include a standard scale (as opposed to the sliding RV scale), allow for more accurate comments, and eliminate no-value-added comments from ROs who do not know the MROs. It is absolutely unacceptable that the best and most qualified Marines are not being allowed to continue service because of the efforts, or lack thereof, of reporting officials. It is also unfair to board members to be left to interpret information presented because of the flawed, incorrectly implemented, and inaccurate PES.

Notes

1. McNeil, Capt Stephen, MMOA–3, "Career Designation Brief," slide 13, accessed at www.manpower.usmc.mil.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order P1610.7F w/ Ch 2, Performance Evaluation System*, Washington, DC, 19 November 2010, p. 1–3.

3. Ibid., p. 4–23.

4. Phillips, Shannon, and Adam Clemens, "The Fitness Report System for Marine Officers: Prior Research," Center for Naval Analyses, 2011, p. 6, accessed at www.cna.org.

5. McNeil.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

Attacking the FiST Problem

One course at a time

by Capt Jon Wilkins

When applied correctly by an adroit, well-trained military force, the concept known as "combined arms" can produce devastating effects on an opponent. Its benefits are so renowned that the concept plays a central role in current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine. As defined in *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1*, *Warfighting* (*MCDP 1*), "[c]ombined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another."[1] Before a deployment outside of the continental United States, most infantry battalions and light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions will first deploy to Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) Twentynine Palms. Stationed on MCAGCC is an organization called the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group (TTECG). TTECG is in charge of an exercise termed INTEGRATED TRAINING Exercise (ITX). This exercise allows infantry and LAR battalions to plan and execute combined arms using maneuver forces and live ordnance, specifically at the company and battalion levels. The evaluators at TTECG (commonly referred to as "Coyotes") have identified an unfortunate training deficiency at the company level, one that is directly tied to the concept of combined arms. The vast majority of company fire support teams (FiSTs) (of which there are three in an infantry battalion and four in an LAR battalion) that come to ITX arrive in desperate need of training in the fundamentals of FiST operations (i.e., their ability to execute combined arms at the tactical level is substandard). While TTECG has developed a comprehensive FiST training package that company FiSTs receive during the first week of ITX, it is not enough to adequately combat this deficiency. To illustrate, from 2009 through 2012, 44 infantry and LAR battalions executed ITX. TTECG evaluated each FiST using one event code from the 2008 *Infantry Training and Readiness Manual* (*T&R Manual*), specifically "INF–FSPT–6302: Conduct Fire Support

We have a training deficiency that needs to be addressed. *(Photo by LCpl Matthew Bragg.)*

>Capt Wilkins is assigned to 2d LAR Battalion and is currently deployed to Romania.

Team (FiST) Operations."[2] TTECG also utilized the following scoring system: untrained (0–49 percent), partially trained (50–79 percent), and trained (80–100 percent).[3] Over the past 4 years, TTECG concluded that a mere 20 percent of the battalions had FiSTs that were considered "trained."[4] In other words, only 9 of the 44 battalions had FiSTs that met the standard. This is an unsettling statistic, especially when looking at the importance combined arms play in Marine Corps doctrine. Undoubtedly this is an issue that needs to be readdressed by the Marine Corps. In an effort to increase the number of proficient/trained FiSTs that leave ITX and eventually deploy, the Marine Corps should create a formal, 1-week FiST course.

Problem: What Is the Problem and Who Should Be Held Accountable?

It seems that the current problem with infantry and LAR FiSTs is that too many arrive at ITX unprepared for the Coyotes to evaluate them. TTECG identified and appropriately characterized this issue as a shortfall in training. To avoid evaluating an untrained FiST, TTECG decided (as previously mentioned) to create a FiST training package. The problem with this solution is that it does little to prevent successive battalions from bringing untrained FiSTs to ITX in the future. Therefore, it can be said that TTECG's FiST training package only addresses a symptom to an underlying problem.

The underlying problem is that most infantry and LAR company commanders are failing to adequately train their FiSTs prior to executing the ITX exercise. As stated in the 2012 *Infantry T&R Manual* (which replaced the 2008 version), the rifle company commander (or LAR company commander) "is responsible for [the] training and employment of his unit."[5] Moreover, in *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–16*, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*, it is pointed out that:

> A company does not have an FSCC [fire support coordination center]. The company commander is responsible for coordination of his own fires and organizes his personnel accordingly. . . . The company commander may assign an officer as the company FSC [fire support coordinator] to coordinate supporting arms with the company's scheme of maneuver.[6]

In other words, even if the company commander designates a lieutenant (typically a first lieutenant) to be the FiST leader for the company, this does not absolve the company commander from the responsibility to train his unit (i.e., the FiST). In fact, by delegating this important role to another officer, it becomes even more critical that the company commander properly train the FiST. This is because the company commander now must communicate his guidance, intent, and desired effects for fires to his FiST leader. To avoid wasting time in a time-compressed environment, the company commander and FiST should reach a point in their training whereby the FiST leader (and to a degree, the other FiST members) understands how the company commander thinks and communicates, and vice versa. It is not TTECG's responsibility to train the FiST; it is the company commander's responsibility. With this in mind, it is noted in *MCDP 1* that "[c]ommanders should see the development of their subordinates as a direct reflection on themselves."[7] Therefore, if a FiST is untrained when it begins ITX, the company commander is not only responsible, but it also is a reflection of the company commander's lack of capabilities in this area.

Cause: Why Are Company Commanders Not Training Their FiSTs?

The company commanders that perpetuate this problem are, as previously noted, incompetent in regard to FiST operations. There are many potential reasons for this incompetence. One, the rifle or LAR company commander was not a FiST leader as a lieutenant (this assumes, of course, that he was properly trained as a FiST leader). Two, he did not attend resident Expeditionary Warfare School as a first lieutenant or captain prior to becoming a company commander. Three, during his B-billet, he did not work in the fire support community (e.g., Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company). Four, he did not dedicate sufficient time to self-study regarding fire support (in general) and FiST operations (more specifically) before becoming a company commander. Without the aforementioned experiences, it is easy to see why a rifle or LAR company commander would lack the necessary knowledge and skills to train his FiST.

But this does not fully explain why FiSTs are not being trained prior to arriving at ITX. If a company commander is incapable of personally training his FiST and he chooses not to seek outside assistance (e.g., utilizing the battalion fire support coordinator), it is reasonable to presume that he simply avoids the issue altogether.[8] To help get a sense for the type of training a rifle or LAR company commander should provide to his FiST leader and FiST, the *TTECG Battalion Fires Handbook* provides a great depiction of communication between commander and FiST leader:

> The essential fire support tasks (EFST) methodology is the Marine Corps' technique that translates the commander's intent into usable information for the FSCC [fire support coordination center] and FiST. It focuses the FiST on critical tasks that must be accomplished to achieve the commander's intent . . .. This process needs to be studied, understood, and rehearsed to be utilized effectively in combat operations. It is important that the company commander take the time to train the FiST leader on this process and develop a relationship that fosters implicit communication.[9]

It is a shame more company commanders do not (or cannot) adhere to this model of behavior.

At this point in the analysis, some may be inclined to ask: Why doesn't The Basic School or Infantry Officer Course correct this problem? In response, neither one of these schools is training second lieutenants to be proficient FiST leaders, nor should they. Second lieutenants, specifically infantry officers, rarely check in to their battalions and become either a weapons platoon commander or a company executive officer (generally, an officer in one of these two billets is chosen to be the FiST leader). While it is not unheard of to give a second lieutenant

FiSTs must be capable of executing combined arms to a standard. *(Photo by LCpl Paul S. Martinez.)*

a weapons platoon or make him the company executive officer, it is uncommon; typically infantry battalions place their first lieutenants in these positions. Consequently, it would be foolish for either The Basic School or Infantry Officer Course to attempt to make FiST leaders out of second lieutenants when the chances of them becoming FiST leaders after checking in are so small and the skills required to be a FiST leader so perishable.

A Feasible Solution

The TTECG training package is fantastic; however, it is presented too late in the training cycle. Instead of receiving this training during the first week of ITX, FiSTs should receive it at their home stations when it is both convenient and early in their training cycles (preferably after new company commanders check in and/or when new FiST leaders are designated). The course material already exists (i.e., the PowerPoint classes and the *TTECG Battalion Fires Handbook*). The Coyotes could create a cadre of two or three instructors as part of a mobile training team (MTT); this way the small cadre can travel to the requesting units' home stations instead of 30 or 40 students from a battalion traveling to MCAGCC Twentynine Palms. The MTT can use existing infrastructure to teach the course at the various Marine Corps bases. In fact, because each infantry and LAR battalion is stationed on a base that already has a Supporting Arms Virtual Trainer or Combined Arms Staff Trainer, this will help the Coyotes train the FiSTs using a variety of scenarios (none of which expend live ordnance). When these elements are factored together, this approach proves to be a low-cost solution.

There are two reasons why this approach will solve the problem and be successful. First, if the company commanders and FiSTs from the infantry and LAR battalions could attend this course early enough, it would force them to address FiST operations. The company commander, regardless of his level of fire support experience and/or competence, could get himself and his FiST to a common starting point. Put differently, this course would set a foundation for the company commander and FiST to build off of during future training events. Second, if company commanders attend the course and continue to work with (or train) their FiSTs before ITX (ideally in the manner taught at the course), then Coyotes could focus on evaluating the FiSTs at ITX rather than training them.

Conclusion

It is still the rifle and LAR company commanders' responsibilities to train their FiSTs; however, this is not occurring in all cases, as demonstrated by the disturbing trend at ITX. To help rifle and LAR company commanders begin the process of training their FiSTs (instead of avoiding it), the Marine Corps should establish a formal, 1-week FiST course using the TTECG FiST training package (currently used during ITX) and form a 2- or 3-man MTT to provide the course to requesting infantry and LAR battalions. If implemented, the vast majority of infantry and LAR company FiSTs will soon be capable of executing combined arms to standard, thereby improving the Marine Corps' overall ability to fight and win using this critical concept.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 94.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Infantry Training and Readiness Manual*, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 5–38.

3. Maj Allen R. McBroom, phone conversation with author, 14 January 2013.

4. U.S. Marine Corps, *Tactical Training Exercise Control Group's FiST [Fire Support Team] Assessment Matrix*, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 2013.

5. *Infantry Training and Readiness Manual*, p. 9–9.

6. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–16, Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*, Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 1–5 to 1–6.

7. *MCDP 1*, p. 63.

8. U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group Battalion Standing Operating Procedures for Combat Operations*, MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, 2012, p. 5–5.

9. *Tactical Training Exercise Control Group's FiST [Fire Support Team] Assessment Matrix.*

Proactive Aviation Safety

Teaching the tired dog new tricks by building a new strategy

by LtCol Geoffrey J. McKeel

>LtCol McKeel is the Deputy, Operations Branch, CMC Safety Division, HQMC. He is an EA–6B pilot and has deployed twice to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (06–08 and 08.2), and to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom from 2009–10.

Aviation mishaps generate more discussion overall than do successful aviation operations. *(Photo by Sgt Marcy Sanchez.)*

Fiscal year 2004 (FY04) remains a pivotal year in Marine aviation. With 18 Class A flight mishaps—defined as loss of life, more than $1 million in damage (updated to $2 million after 2009) to an aircraft, or a permanent total disability—FY04 sounded the alarm for an immediate intervention in operations to stem the tide of this unsustainable spike in mishaps. The 2 years prior to 2004 were just as attention-grabbing with 15 and 11 Class A flight mishaps in 2002 and 2003, respectively. As 2004 ended, the Marine Corps responded swiftly with the introduction of several enterprise-wide safety initiatives that had the collective objective to abate the underlying reasons these mishaps were occurring. Since then, the Class A flight mishap trend has ebbed, hitting low points in FY09 and FY10 before slowly trending back up in the years following.

However, these arguably more positive points in mishap rates have obscured more insidious mishap trends. While Class A mishaps tend to merit more discussion due to the involvement of loss of life and/or the destruction of an aircraft, trends among Class B and Class C mishaps have become more and more problematic to the overall safety direction of the Marine Corps. More to the point, Class B mishaps of all types—flight, flight-related, and aviation ground mishaps—have remained steady at just below 10 per year for the last 10 years. That trend is fairly flat across all years of the past decade. Class C mishaps of all types have been trending up in the last 5 years, reaching a peak of 36 in FY10 before falling off slightly in the last 2 years. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps is averaging almost 28 Class C mishaps per year over the past decade, with that average mostly being buoyed by incidents occurring in the last 5 years. In 2011 and 2012 combined, Class B and C mishaps were responsible for $29.7 million in damage to Marine Corps aircraft, roughly cost equivalent to destroying a commercial regional jet every 2 years.

While a congratulatory acknowledgement is appropriate in quickly addressing the dangerous trends back in FY04 and before, all mishap rates, especially those Class B and C events, remain stubbornly elevated and counter any notion that the enterprise is reducing accidents. The time has come to acknowledge that the Marine Corps did indeed tackle many of the fundamental problems that led to the staggeringly high rates of 2004 and the years preceding it, while also acknowledging that another similar response to that of just after 2004 is needed presently to further drive down mishap rates of all categories and types. Continuing to push the mishap rates downward requires another substantial complete and total overhaul of all existing safety programs and paradigms as part of an effort to craft a holistic, enterprise-wide aviation safety strategy for the future.

First, this overhaul has to start with the creation of a new and coherent safety vision. At present, there is no articulate vision for aviation safety, other than the nebulous mantra of "no preventable mishaps." This idea lacks any method of measuring success, while also begging the question of what defines an

unpreventable mishap. A definitive vision would be the logical starting point around which the Marine Corps could construct a comprehensive strategy to begin driving down all categories of mishaps. As a stepping point, a possible vision statement for a safety strategy should be "no mishaps attributable directly to actions or omissions by Marines and sailors at the organizational level," or something similar. Any vision statement should also include language that emphasizes the requirement for perpetual and proactive risk mitigation by all members at all times. Further refinement of this vision should endeavor to marry aspiration with reality—"no preventable mishaps" is distinctly misaligned with the frequency of clearly preventable mishaps currently occurring.

Second, the Marine Corps must identify which current programs to champion or expand and those anemic areas of its overall safety program outlay that need examination in order to remain on the offensive against mishaps that fall within the influence of organizational-level Marines. Some programs that have atrophied or been routinely ignored include the following:

- *Operational risk management (ORM).* All Marines are now more or less familiar with the five steps of "identify the hazard, assess the hazards, make appropriate risk decisions, implement controls, and supervise," yet the statistics indicate that too often these basic steps have not been followed. As an example, of the 12 Class A mishaps of all types in 2011, simple risk mitigation tools (namely adherence to procedures) failed to prevent exactly half of those mishaps, resulting in lost lives and $91 million in lost or destroyed airplanes.
- *Crew resource management (CRM).* This program has continued to languish for over a decade. Marine aviators are more than familiar with the acronym SADCLAM (situational awareness, assertiveness, decision-making, communication, leadership, adaptability/flexibility, and mission analysis), which has come to define CRM. However, due to its stagnation, its effectiveness is becoming marginal. Even a basic application of CRM principles may very well have prevented exactly half of the Class A flight mishaps in 2012. In stark contrast, the airline industry is now on what it considers the "sixth iteration"—a program of "error management"—of CRM, which seeks to both instill in aircrew a tenuous balance of strict adherence to procedure while adapting to changes in technology.[1] In some ways it is a fusion of operational risk management and CRM programs and is a testament to how they have evolved their program to facilitate safe operations in the face of a rapidly changing aviation landscape.
- *Maintenance resource management (MRM).* Marine maintenance and ground personnel were responsible for 44 percent of Class C mishaps in FY11 and 43 percent in FY12, resulting in $4.3 million in damage to Marine Corps aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration published an advisory circular on the develop-

The Marine Corps must be proactive and address problem areas within the safety program.
(Photo by Cpl Manuel A. Estrada.)

ment and implementation of MRM as far back as September 2000.[2] The basic principles of MRM resemble those of CRM—situational awareness, teamwork, communication, and decisionmaking.[3] These are all fundamental tools that assist the various departments in a maintenance division to coalesce and work through the physical divisions between shops. It is an initiative that is long overdue for implementation consideration by the Marine Corps.

Finally, a strategic safety team, or oversight committee, of Fleet Marine Force command leadership, operations, maintenance, and safety personnel would meet to initially craft the overall strategy, and then meet again at an interval of approximately every 5 to 7 years to analyze and shape strategy for the future. It would be the committee's duty to review the vision statement and all of Marine aviation's safety programs to make changes and adjust the programmatic outlay to tackle future challenges. This team would utilize its practical knowledge of the ground-level effects of the existing safety program architecture to make recommendations for changes in the overall aviation safety portfolio. In the present, and possibly future, austere fiscal environment, the Marine Corps needs to employ those tools that identify only the most effective safety programs, as well as those that need to be molded or discarded because their effectiveness has started to diminish.

Instead of being taken aback by another year like 2004 and summoning a vastly overdue amount of vigor to beat back another spike in mishap rates and trends, Marine aviation has to recognize that the time to revisit its holistic safety strategy is now. The energy that went into buttressing the dynamics that contributed to 2004 has either waned, or the Fleet Marine Force in general has adapted its battle rhythm to these programs, as evidenced in the mishap rates of the past few years. Of particular note, the Class C mishap rates, even after being reestablished from a minimum cost threshold of $20,000 in damage to, after 2009, a cost threshold of $50,000, rose in the years after this cost adjustment. The proliferation of these lower cost mishaps indicates a very fundamental weakness in an overall safety effort that, for the past decade, has spent much of its influence on Class A incidents and very little on future mishap prevention of all types.

It is time to recognize that almost a decade has elapsed since Marine aviation has collectively sat down and thought through how to slow the proliferation of mishaps.

In a greater sense, Marine aviation is simply not putting its full weight behind stopping aviation mishaps. By contrast, domestic airlines have done this with considerable success. In 2011, American air carriers flew 17,765,000 hours and 7,685,600,000 miles without a fatality.[4] Their mishap rate for that year was 0.175, far below mishap rates of any class for the Marine Corps in 2011.[5] While it is fair to say that the airlines do not do the tactical, dynamic type of flying that is the hallmark of Marine Corps aviation, they do fly into Atlanta (the busiest airspace in the world), as well as Chicago (fourth busiest), Los Angeles (sixth), and Dallas-Fort Worth (ninth) on a routine basis and typically without incidents of any kind.[6]

Instead of waiting for another catastrophic year to occur and have the highest levels of Marine aviation leadership circle the wagons to address the dysfunctional trends after they have occurred, the Marine Corps should recognize the leading indicators of Class B and Class C mishap trends and be forthright about what is happening across the fleet. Instead of manufacturing after-the-fact responses to hazardous trends, the time has come to admit that any semblance of a comprehensive safety strategy has been missing as a pillar of Marine aviation. And if the responses to 2004 are to be counted as some form of a safety strategy, it is time to recognize that almost a decade has elapsed since Marine aviation has collectively sat down and thought through how to slow the proliferation of mishaps. The time is now to create a vision and develop the tactics that help Marine aviation achieve that vision. Now is also time for innovative solutions that address the changes in airplanes and technology. And finally, it is the time for critical stakeholders—commander leadership and key billet holders at the organizational level—to be a part of the strategy development and validation. Without such a deliberate process, mishap rates will rise, detrimental trends will grow, and Marine aviation will find itself with another 2004 on its hands and a need to respond after it is too late.

Notes

1. Bjellos, David M., *Multicultural CRM*, Flight Safety Foundation, accessed at flightsafety.org on 25 March 2013.

2. Federal Aviation Administration, Advisory Circular 120–72, "Maintenance Resource Management Training," accessed at www.airweb.faa.gov on 25 March 2013.

3. Ibid.

4. National Transportation Safety Board, "Aviation Statistical Reports," accessed at www.ntsb.gov on 25 March 2013.

5. Ibid.

6. Airports Council International, year-to-date passenger summary, accessed at www.aci.aero on 25 March 2013.

Military Sealift Command Vessels

The answer to Pacific focus and sequestration

by 2dLt Michael Wisotzkey

With Afghanistan deployments quickly coming to a halt, the future of the Marine Corps is uncertain for many. In March 2013 the Commandant of the Marine Corps released his personal guidance for all Marines on the subject of sequestration.[1] It has been known for some time that the Marine Corps is drastically downsizing. Promotions, reenlistments, bonuses, and career designation for junior officers are no longer guaranteed.[2] Although we are in this state of sequestration, Gen Amos has also made it clear that the new focus for the Marine Corps will be the Pacific. Many wonder how we plan to expand our presence in the Pacific, as our current bases in Okinawa and Iwakuni can only accommodate so many Marines. For Marines stationed on the east or west coast, many feel helpless in this call for Pacific expansion. For such units, Iraq and Afghanistan deployments have consumed their operational tempo over the last 10 years. For Marines stationed in Japan, some get the fortunate opportunity to support humanitarian aid exercises in other Southeast Asian countries, such as COBRA GOLD in Thailand or BALIKATAN in the Philippines. Outside of these annual exercises, most Marines stationed in Japan will not get a chance to leave the country. I would like to present an idea that could facilitate our Pacific expansion and potentially get stateside Marines involved, all while consuming a minimal cost.

To supplement unit deployment programs and MEUs, the Marine Corps needs to take advantage of the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) and its ships as a means of embarking troops in an expeditionary role. The T-AKE (T is for civilian crewed, AK is for auxiliary cargo, and the E is for ammunition (a dry cargo ship)) is particularly well suited for this. For 12 of the 14 ships in the class, the primary mission of these T-AKE ships is to resupply and rearm Navy combatants at sea, with a secondary mission of moving cargo between ports. The remaining two are assigned to maritime preposition squadrons located in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In the performance of their mission, these ships often travel to or near other areas throughout the Pacific where we might want to place Marines for mutual training, already planned exercises, or other reasons. With proper planning and preparation, arrangements could be made to insert a group of Marines into a region for a period of time using the ship's organic assets, then remove that unit at a later date with either the same ship or a sister ship passing through the same region. While this would require extensive coordination, it could be done.

>2dLt Wisotzkey is a combat engineer currently serving as a platoon commander with 9th Engineer Support Battalion in Okinawa, Japan.

I was assigned to deploy aboard the USNS *Matthew Perry* (T-AKE 9) for 1 month with a small team of Marines and U.S. Navy Seabees to support a subject matter expert exchange in Brunei. This particular exercise in Brunei was hosted by the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), basically the NATO of Southeast Asia. The exercise, known as the ADMM-Plus HADR & MM EX (ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting plus Humanitarian Aide and Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise), was a 1-week-long exercise assessing the disaster relief readiness capabilities of

***The Marines and Seabees on the flight deck of the USNS* Matthew Perry.** *(Photo by Sgt Robert Walker.)*

nations within ASEAN. There were a total of 19 participating countries, including Australia, Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and, somewhat oddly, the United States. While my team played a minor role in the actual operation (we provided a water purification unit that is currently in testing prior to being fielded to the Marine Corps), our presence and participation in this exercise was truly monumental. Not only was this the first time that ASEAN has hosted such an exercise with this magnitude of diverse personnel present, it was the first time the United States has provided personnel to work alongside such a variety of forces.

Every day for a week, my team was inserted into various locations by the ship's organic helicopter detachment. At the end of the day, the ship's helicopters picked us up and returned us to the ship for overnight accommodations. The next day we were off again. My team was fortunate enough to cross train with all of the participating nations, specifically Brunei, Singapore, and China. The Marines and sailors of my team were well received by all; we shared a plethora of stories, shook hundreds of hands, and took more pictures than we had in our entire lives. As a combat engineer officer, I was pleasantly surprised to learn of the many similarities that Marine Corps combat engineers share with similar detachments of New Zealand and Australia. Our training focus, equipment, and unit structure were almost identical. I can confidently say that by the end of the exercise, we had accomplished the Commandant's intent of expanding our presence in the Pacific.

With a normal complement of 129 personnel in ship's company and another 8- to 32-person (depending on whether it is a military or civilian detachment) air detachment, the ship has room for an additional 35 to 59 personnel without exceeding its maximum space. The ship has facilities for physical training, as well as weapons and live ammunition storage. Even at maximum capacity, no more than two personnel can be assigned a room, each of which is furnished with a personal bathroom and shower. As with any mission, the key is proper research, planning, and coordination. ADMM-Plus proved the concept. Mission parameters, funding, and scheduling are just a few issues that would have to be researched and coordinated in advance. Prior arrangements with the host country would need to be made, diplomatic clearances would have to be arranged, the mission scope would have to be understood and agreed to by all sides, and the priority focus would be whatever mission the ship may have already been tasked with.[3]

There is an opportunity for stateside Marines to gain better access to the Pacific, as well. One of the major ports utilized by T-AKE ships is in San Diego, CA. This could allow west coast Marines an opportunity to deploy to the Pacific without being stationed in Japan or as part of the unit deployment program. Other port options include Portland, OR; Washington state; Pearl Harbor; and Guam; all of which could also act as potential boarding sites for Marines. Even if a T-AKE is not available for the boarding of Marines on the west coast, it is feasible to fly a detachment for boarding at a port in the Pacific.

Participants in ADMM. *(Photo by PO1 Scott Hampton.)*

The USNS* Matthew Perry *(T-AKE 9). *(Photo by USNS* Matthew Perry.*)*

Our daily transportation—a Puma helicopter. *(Photo by author.)*

As we continue to pull troops from Afghanistan and the Marine Corps continues to downsize, we need to maintain our operational tempo and regain our expeditionary roots. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–0*, *Marine Corps Operations* (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, September 2001), lists "Marines will be ready and forward deployed" as a Marine Corps principle. We need to break the mindset that being forward deployed only refers to Afghanistan or floats aboard Navy amphibious units. The future utilization of MSC ships could help to revive our amphibious, expeditionary roots while in a state of sequestration. We must become more resourceful and proactive in taking advantage of opportunities like the T-AKE vessels to deploy our Marines and expand our Pacific presence—it is absolutely paramount for the future of our Nation and our beloved Corps.

Notes

1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, issued this guidance in March 2013 with the intent for Marines to understand the future financial challenges of the Marine Corps.

2. This is not meant to be taken in the literal sense; however, there has been a significant decrease in all of these accolades within the last few years.

3. These facts on MSC ships came from interviews conducted with Chief Mate Anton Clemens and CAPT William Baldwin aboard the USNS *Matthew Perry*, 23 June 2013.

On Not Forgetting

Why (and how) to institutionalize the experiences of the last 12 years

by Damien O'Connell

Imagine that the year is 2025. You are a second lieutenant, newly graduated from Infantry Officer Course, and just arrived to your battalion. After completing an intensive training program, your unit sets sail as part of a MEU. While finding your berthing area, you spot something on a nearby bunk: a well-worn 400-page book titled *Tips of the Trident: Small-Level Infantry Units Serving With MEUs, 2001–2014*. You read it over the next few months, closely studying the decisions of dozens of lieutenants and captains who faced challenges that you, too, could face: bilateral training with foreign forces, Embassy protection, raids, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief, and counterinsurgency operations. *Unfortunately, nothing resembling the book above exists. This article is about changing that.*

The war in Afghanistan is ending. As it does, the U.S. Marine Corp's facing a host of other problems. From an austere budget and the challenges of America's Pacific pivot to the scourge of sexual assault, staffs and commands have plenty to keep them busy for the foreseeable future. In the midst of all this, however, another crucial matter is receiving little attention: the individual experiences of Marine leaders and, in particular, their decisions of the last 12 years. Indeed, unless some sort of action is taken, the Marine Corps may quickly lose most of the vast experiential capital it has gained at the cost of so much blood and treasure.

Unfortunately, this is an old problem. In the wake of the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps (like the other Services) did a poor job of both capturing and institutionalizing the individual experiences of its leaders—especially at junior levels.[1] Then as now, policymakers and senior-level officers quickly shifted the attention of the Marine Corps to new challenges. This all but ensured that, as the Marines of Vietnam left for civilian life, so too did most of their experiences. It is true, of course, that many veterans remained in uniform, eventually reached senior ranks, and put their experience to good use. The shelf life of that good, however, generally expired with their retirement; when they departed, they took with them what they had seen. The result of this was an inexorable slide toward what might be best described as "institutional amnesia," an amnesia that proved deadly for a good number of Marines of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF). Indeed it is not a far cry to say that some (if not many) of the heartaches of those wars could have been lessened if the Marine Corps had kept and disseminated detailed accounts of the challenges of the Vietnam Marines and how they attempted to solve them. (The most obvious example of this, of course, is the improvised explosive device (IED). Once known simply as "mines" or "booby traps," IEDs often proved a major threat to Marines in South Vietnam.[2] Accounts of the more conventional fighting against the North Vietnamese Army also may have been useful, especially during the opening stages of our recent wars.)

The Marine Corps seems poised to forget once more.[3] Much like before, many veterans of today's wars will remain within the ranks and no doubt benefit the institution for decades. They, too, however, must eventually leave. Fortunately there is a simple solution to this problem. The first step is to start capturing these experiences—and quickly. How might we best do this?

***>Mr. O'Connell is a Senior Fellow for the Case Method at Marine Corps University. This is his first article for the* Gazette.**

Capture the experiences of 12-plus years of war. *(Photo by SSgt Ezekiel R. Kitandwe.)*

Borrowing From a Big Brother

While searching for ways to capture these experiences, the Marine Corps need look no further than its "big brother"—the U.S. Army. Beginning in the years immediately after the First World War, students in several courses at the Army's Infantry School were given the assignment of writing a monograph, generally between 15 to 25 pages long, on one of their own operational experiences. Each monograph had to follow a standard format, include citations, and, usually, visuals aids (maps, sketches, photos, etc.).[4]

The Marine Corps could easily adopt this practice, starting with Corporals Course, Sergeants Course, Career Course, and Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). The students there are young, enthusiastic, not far removed from their time with the Fleet Marine Force, and, memory being what it is, more likely to accurately recall their experiences than more senior Marines. Moreover, starting with these institutions affords the opportunity to reach the majority of the Marine leaders.

The assignments at each institution would closely mirror those of the Army's Infantry School. Students would write a monograph on a personal experience (which, depending on the course, would range between 8 to 25 pages). In contrast to the Army model, they could choose from *either operational or garrison experiences*, thereby greatly expanding the number of choices available to them. Furthermore, students would be required to write in detail about the decisions they made during the experience, including the rationale behind those decisions.

Determining the success of this project would be simple. "In-house" surveys would ask students to rate both the usefulness of the assignment and provide feedback on the prospect of having future classes participate. If responses were consistently positive over a 1 or 2 academic year period, other schools and courses (such as Command and Staff College, Marine Corps War College, SNCO academies, etc.) could adopt the practice.

The benefits of this plan could be enormous. First, it would provide a record of a part of Marine Corps history that has long received little attention (see below). This in turn could both serve as a source of pride for Marines and as research materials for members of the Marine Corps History Division, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), and independent scholars. Second, each year tens of thousands of Marine leaders would have an opportunity to seriously sharpen their writing, research, and critical thinking skills all on a project in which the stakes were truly personal. Third, the information contained within the monographs would help increase general professional knowledge. Fourth, these monographs could be organized by theme, edited, and then published as collections. With the Fleet Marine Force and Marine Corps Schools as the target audience, these would provide readers with the chance to study how other Marines handled actual, specific problems, thereby helping them improve their own decisionmaking. Literature like this already exists and enjoys widespread use within the Marine Corps. Indeed, for decades the students and instructors at The Basic School have attested to the usefulness of experience-based books such as *Infantry in Battle*, *Infantry Attacks*, and *Battle Leadership*. Fifth and finally, collections based on recent experiences could go a long way toward preserving future Marines from having to relearn the lessons of the past. A question then remains: Who will organize, edit, and produce these collections?

Mind the Gap

The two institutions that immediately spring to mind are MCCLL and the History Division. MCCLL provides the Operating Forces with "observations, insights, lessons (OILs), trends, after-action reports (AARs) and Marine Corps lessons learned reports"—in other words, publications that contain practical information of immediate and near-term use.[5] Without question, these are helpful for units going on deployments or exercises, and have doubtlessly saved lives. As a rule, however, they lack the specific details of the experiences from which they are drawn (that is, a context). This can leave readers with little idea of the often-subtle reasons behind a particular trend, insight, or lesson. *These products, therefore, are distillations of experiences—not accounts of the experiences themselves.* (To cite a common example, a report might advise units deploying to Afghanistan "to train additional generator operators for patrol bases." While useful information, it says nothing about the peculiar reasons behind the recommendation. Does the problem actually lie with inadequate numbers of generator operators? Or are we operating too many patrol bases? If so, is this because our units are overstretched?)

The History Division, on the other hand, tells the history of the Marine Corps as an institution. It does this primarily through works on the wars, campaigns, and battles of the Marine Corps, along with unit histories and special studies.[6] The History Division's operational accounts generally focus on the actions of units at the battalion level and above. *Thus, barring a few exceptions, the experiences of individual leaders (especially junior officers and NCOs) receive little space.*[7]

The History Division's mission also includes preserving personal experiences and observations through oral interviews. This task falls to the Field History Branch, the staff of which consists of mobilized Reservists doubling as field historians. While conducting oral interviews, it is common for historians to let interviewees direct the conversation, discussing whatever topics they choose. For example, a squad leader in Afghanistan interviewed immediately after a patrol may talk about the weather, the quality of Afghan food, his interactions with locals, etc., rather than the patrol itself. *Thus, while oral interviews are invaluable to military historians and researchers for many reasons (such as the vivid pictures they paint of war and the daily life of the Marines waging it), they usually tell us little about the specific experiences of leaders or their decisions.* To further complicate matters, accessing these interviews can prove difficult. The OEF and OIF oral history collections are massive, and with no public online search mechanism available, Marines must work directly with members of

Organization	Purpose	Parent Organization	Source of Funding
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned	Provide operating forces with practical information based on recent operational experience.	Marine Corps Combat Development Command	Department of Defense
History Division	Record and recite the history of the Marine Corps.	Marine Corps University	Department of Defense
Center for Operational and Garrison Experience	Collect and disseminate the experiences of Marine leaders, with an emphasis on decisionmaking.	History Division	Private organizations and donors

Figure 1. MCCLL, History Division, and COGE.

the History Division to both access and review the materials.[8]

It should be noted that the History Division has been neither neglectful nor shortsighted. Indeed, like MCCLL, it produces a great deal of first-rate, useful work. The chief culprits of its limitations are, in fact, a persistent lack of funds and personnel, and as the end of sequestration seems long off, it can scarcely expect improvements in either area.

Therefore, a significant gap exists between the efforts of MCCLL and the History Division. The first organization deals primarily in the dissemination of practical knowledge based on unit experiences and the second in telling the story of the Marine Corps from a more or less bird's-eye view; neither, however, is presently equipped to support a program to help institutionalize the recent experiences of Marine leaders. Given this, what might be the best way forward?

An Experiential Treasure Trove

One answer is to establish a privately funded organization *under* the History Division. Since the work in question is historical in nature, the Division makes for the most appropriate home.[9] This organization, with a name like "The Center for Operational and Garrison Experience" ("COGE"), would fulfill two purposes: to serve as a repository for the operational and garrison experiences of Marine leaders; and to collect, edit, corroborate, and publish experienced-based works with a focus on decisionmaking. Its staff would be comparatively small, consisting of five winter and summer seasonal interns and a director.

The interns would edit monographs, corroborate their facts, and then organize them into themed collections (like the "The MAGTF," and "Infantry Platoons in Garrison"). Applicants would need strong skills in researching, writing, and conducting interviews, and a solid understanding of recent military history. The director (who would report to the director of the History Division) would oversee their work; educate them in the details of Marine Corps organization, weapons, and doctrine; and promote the activities of COGE throughout the Marine Corps. This position would require someone with an intimate understanding of how the Marine Corps works (particularly at the small unit level), an equally strong grasp of recent military history, empathy for the trials of military service, strong editorial and writing skills, and, ideally, liberal connections within active and retired communities of Marines. Readers may notice that college degrees (bachelor's and higher) are absent from the requirements of either position. The reasons for this are simple. First, doing without them greatly increases the number of potential applicants. Second, and more important, a degree of any sort does not guarantee an applicant would excel at, or even be suited for, the work described above. Therefore, COGE would hire individuals based on their demonstrable talent—not their credentials.

One answer is to establish a privately funded organization under the History Division.

COGE, using the organic publishing capabilities of the History Division, would regularly distribute its works in either printed or electronic form. To achieve the greatest and most immediate effect, EWS, the SNCO academies, The Basic School, Infantry Officer School, the Schools of Infantry, and other entry-level organizations and MOS schools would receive them first, followed soon thereafter by other organizations.

To test its viability, COGE would initially operate under a 3-year charter, at the end of which it would either be renewed or canceled. An initial budget of approximately $700,000 (or 70 percent of the average cost of a single MRAP) would provide enough funding for the director's salary ($75,000 per year) and

Future Marines need to know and profit from our experiences. *(Photo by Sgt Anthony Ortiz.)*

the salaries of the 5 interns ($12,000 a person/season), leaving $115,000 for overhead and any sort of operating costs.[10]

Conclusion

The plan above would fill the gap between MCCLL and the History Division, leaving Marines with an experiential treasure trove—and all for a small price (see Figure 1). Whether this approach is ever implemented, it is crucial that the Marine Corps take action now to stem the loss of experience. Already, Marines pass through the doors of The Basic School and the Schools of Infantry knowing little (or nothing) of how their predecessors attempted to solve the peculiar challenges of places like Najaf, Ramadi, Garmsir, and Now Zad, or, as useful, those of garrison service. The Marines of tomorrow deserve to profit from the experience of the past 12 years. Let us ensure it is there for them when they need it.

Notes

1. The major exception to this is the Marine Corps' *Small Unit Actions in Vietnam: Summer 1966* (1967), a 122-page work of 9 small unit vignettes. Unfortunately, as the title suggests, it covers but 3 months of a war that, for Marines, lasted 8 years. The Army, for its part, released several somewhat similar works, including *Seven Firefights in Vietnam* (1970), *Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point* (1973), and *Mounted Combat in Vietnam* (1977).

2. It is quite disturbing, as 1stLt Michael Orzetti implies in a recent article for the *Gazette*, that very few of today's Marines have ever read—let alone know of—*Fleet Marine Reference Publication 12–43, Personal Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam, 1969, Special Issue, Mines and Booby Traps*, a work that contains a great deal of practical information on the kinds of IEDs in South Vietnam. (Orzetti, Michael, "Ownership of Lessons Learned," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2013, pp. 73–74.)

3. The Army, on the other hand, is producing generous amounts of experience-based works. So far, these include *In Contact!: Case Studies from the Long War* (2006); *Tip of the Spear: Small-unit Action in Iraq, 2004–2007* (2009); *The Battle of Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008* (2010); *A Platoon Leader's Tour* (2010), *Vanguard of Valor Vol. I: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan* (2011); *Vanguard of Valor Vol. II: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan* (2012); *Between the Rivers: Combat Action in Iraq, 2003–2005* (2013); and *Thunder Run: A Case Study in Mission Command, Baghdad, 2003* (2013).

4. The veterans of World War II alone wrote on a wide array of experiences, including "Battalion Landing Operations on Hostile Shores," "Rifle Company in a Night Raid," and "Combat Engineer Platoon in Support of Infantry in Attack and River Crossing Operations." Today some students attending the Army's Maneuver Captain's Career Course continue to write such monographs.

5. The mission of MCCLL reads: "The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) actively collects, analyzes, publishes and archives lessons-learned materials to include observations, insights, lessons (OILs), trends, after-action reports (AARs), and Marine Corps lessons learned reports. These efforts support training and planning for both exercises and operations, and the warfighting capability development process. MCCLL focuses on tactics, techniques, and procedures of immediate importance to the Operating Forces thereby identifying gaps and best practices, and recommending solutions across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum." This information can be accessed at hwww.mccll.usmc.mil.

6. The mission of the History Division is "to research and write the Marine Corps' official history. The History Division also provides reference and research assistance; preserves personal experiences and observations through oral history interviews; and deploys field historians to record history in the making." (From www.mcu.usmc.mil.)

7. The only exceptions to this are the previously mentioned *Small Unit Action in Vietnam: Summer 1966*, its 108-page OIF companion, *Small Unit Actions* (2007), and, to a lesser extent, the three volumes in the series, *U.S. Marines in Battle*, covering the battles for Najaf, an-Nasiriyah, and al-Qaim (2009, 2009, and 2013, respectively).

8. Presently, the only History Division publication that lists oral interviews from either OEF or OIF is *Marine History Operations in Iraq, Operational Iraqi Freedom I: A Catalog of Interviews and Recordings, Historical Documents, Photographs, and Combat Art* (2005). It is available at www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision.

9. Private organizations that exist to support the Marine Corps, such as the Marine Corps University Foundation, the Marine Corps Association, and the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation, could aid in finding donors.

10. Accessed at nation.time.com.

Searching for Ender

The importance of genius to the development and implementation of effective strategy

by Col Tracy W. King

> ***"Bonaparte rightly said . . . that many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a* Newton *or an* Euler."**
>
> ***—Carl von Clausewitz***

Due to the universally complex and fluid nature of the strategic landscape, the presence of genius during the formulation and implementation of strategy is the single most important element necessary to ensuring successful achievement of desired strategic effects—a bold statement indeed, but one nested in the reality that any tool used to develop strategy is only a tool. And like all tools, it can be used well or badly.

Among the key elements of strategy, four broad categories (strategic environment, policy goals, ends/ways/means, and strategic skill of practitioners/theorists/leaders) emerge, providing both order and reference. Relentlessly interrelated, never seamless, and ever changing, these elements form a basic strategic framework that facilitates application of a methodical approach to the exceptionally difficult task of formulating strategy. The importance of each strategic element can be quantified, measured, and captured empirically. Simply put, this methodical approach is the "science" of strategy. Although the discipline and common framework provided by this approach are pivotal to both formulation and progress assessment, "[they are] not a substitute for genius."[1]

While the science of strategy is important, it is in the "art" of determining the relative importance of each element, the true nature of respective interrelationships between the same, and in the successful implementation of strategy that the presence of genius gains unique importance.

> ***". . . 'genius' refers to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation."***
>
> ***—Carl von Clausewitz***

Searching for Ender

Orson Scott Card's science fiction novel, *Ender's Game* (Tor Science Fiction, New York, 1994), depicts Earth in peril of losing an interstellar war. Twice defeated by an alien race, Earth scours her population in search of genius, subjecting all with promise to a series of increasingly difficult strategic scenarios. The end result is Ender, a genius capable of developing and implementing a successful strategy. Card's central thesis, albeit delivered via a science fiction novel, is that Earth realized what was missing in her strategy: the genius to see the overall situation as it truly existed, and to properly utilize her available resources.

The need for an Ender in the strategic framework is clearly highlighted in Carl von Clausewitz's counsel on the importance of genius:

> [A] ny complex activity . . . calls for appropriate gifts of intellect . . . [as] circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated. . . . What this task requires in the way of higher intellectual gifts is a sense of unity and a power of judgment raised to a marvelous pitch of vision, which easily grasps and dismisses a thousand remote possibilities which an ordinary mind [cannot].[2]

Clausewitz stressed the necessity of genius for acceptance of, and the ability to act appropriately within, the ever-changing nature of war. Unlike the tangible aspects of the strategic framework (e.g., environment, interests, etc.), the relativity of each aspect and indefinable circumstances present during the "human intercourse" of competing strategies require a commander/statesman of greater-than-mean skill and aptitude.

Adding to the complexity of the strategic realm is the need to understand and manage the interrelationship between policy and the use of force. Several current theorists further this argument, believing simply that "more can go wrong" at the strategic level.

>Col King is the CO, Combat Logistics Regiment 15, 1st Marine Logistics Group, I MEF.

Colin S. Gray notes the importance of genius, stating that:

> . . . success in strategy calls for a quality of judgment that cannot be taught. [Although] [t]hese necessary truths about strategy are almost too easy to state; they can be abominably difficult to put into consistently successful practice.[3]

Historical Precedents

Successful strategies invariably reveal a linkage to specific personalities. Each of these personalities possess definitive strategic skill as a leader with vision, a practitioner able to translate broad policy into executable strategy, and as a theorist able to expand upon and mentor others in strategic thought.[4]

Otto von Bismarck possessed such skill. With regional hegemony as the ultimate objective, Bismarck set clear strategic goals (e.g., unification and select/limited use of force). His ability to discern the changed European post–Crimean War political landscape, where the onset of industrial revolution set conditions for realpolitik power politics to replace the status quo system, served as guide for manipulation by his political acumen, effectively allowing him to translate German national power into tangible strategic results. Further proof of Bismarck's genius became clear in the failures of his successors who ". . . remembered the three wars which had achieved German unity but forgot the painstaking preparations that made them possible, and the moderation required to reap their fruits."[5]

Among the great captains, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte, strategic genius is often readily apparent. Seizing upon the opportunities provided by an unparalleled operational prowess, Bonaparte's ability to "see things as they are" and coalesce France's entire resource base toward the achievement of singular aims, highlighted strategic execution in raw form.[6] Like Bismarck, Bonaparte completely reshaped the European political landscape by harnessing the latent power of his nation-state, recognizing the inherent flaws in his string of adversaries and applying available resources with precision. His expertise at all three strategic roles (leader, practitioner, and theorist) and, more importantly, his integration of each, virtually assured his achievement.

Where the presence of genius can serve as a catalyst to success, even a cursory review of situations where the implementation of strategy failed reveals how a lack of genius can have an equally dramatic effect. GEN William Westmoreland's failure to understand the political nature of the Vietnam War, GEN George McClellan's fear-induced atrophy during the Civil War, and Neville Chamberlain's failure to understand second-order consequences of appeasement are all notable examples.

It can be argued that the sheer complexity of the modern strategic framework precludes an individual from having singular effect. . . .

Counterarguments

It can be argued that the sheer complexity of the modern strategic framework precludes an individual from having singular effect: "It is . . . too difficult for a single person—even a genius—to comprehend all the nuances of the modern world."[7] Simply put, strategy formulation is best served by organizational process. This argument correctly identifies the changing nature of modern strategy, but ignores that strategy is simply human interaction in the extreme. This interaction is, and will always be, best served by those armed with effective organizational processes and a healthy dose of "mental aptitude."

Worthy of note is the counterproductive tendency of successful strategies to effectively *replace* policy, especially when the development of both resides in a single individual. Bonaparte's strategic successes, albeit substantial, eventually led to France's demise as strategic success subsumed prudent policy. History is replete with such examples; power corrupts—true genius is no exception.

Conclusion

This "marvelous pitch of vision," genius, is key to success in both statecraft and war. Whether resident in a key commander or replicated via dedicated processes, it is the presence of skill that can most guarantee success. Our Nation requires that her uniformed Services continue to develop extremely capable commanders and the corresponding staff officers and processes required to ensure that this marvelous pitch is achieved. No, we shouldn't search for Ender, but the necessary aptitude that genius guarantees is required. Genius gives life to the other elements of strategic framework, conceptualizes the importance of their interrelationships as they mix *in the future*, and seizes upon required action necessary to achieve the desired results.

Notes

1. Yarger, Harry R., *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2006, p. 3.

2. Von Clausewitz, Carl, *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984. Although Clausewitz's writings speak specifically to the dynamics and immutable aspects of war, these considerations are both subordinate and directly attributable to the strategic framework.

3. Gray, Colin S., *Explorations in Strategy*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1998, excerpts.

4. Yarger, pp. 3–4. Yarger postulates that a master of the strategic art who is proficient in all three of these areas may approach Clausewitz's definition of genius.

5. Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 135.

6. Green, Robert, *The 33 Strategies of War*, Penguin Group, New York, 2006, p. 34.

7. Yarger, p. 4.

A Tale of Battle and a Leader

reviewed by Scott Laidig



ONE MAGNIFICENT BASTARD.
By Mark Huffman. R.H. Rositzke & Associates, LLC, 2013
ISBN 149276944, 200 pp.
$20.00 (Member $18.00)

If you don't know BGen Bill Weise very well, you need to read *One Magnificent Bastard*. If you only know about the Battle of Dai Do and think that is the Bill Weise story, you need to read *One Magnificent Bastard*. If you only know Bill Weise as a Marine, you need to read *One Magnificent Bastard*.

Many Marines know that the men of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines (2/4), are commonly referred to as the "Magnificent Bastards." LtCol "Bull" Fisher, 2/4's commanding officer (CO), gave his men that moniker shortly after they landed in Vietnam in 1965. LtCol Gene Bench, the CO from 1966–67, formally adopted the name in 1966. By the time then-LtCol William Weise assumed command of the battalion in September 1967, the Magnificent Bastards had seen lots of action. Reflecting the 13-month individual rotation policy in effect during the Vietnam War, 2/4's "veterans" had seen a couple months of combat service, but very few had extended their tours. Personnel change was constant, exacerbated in 1967 by constant fighting in and around the Demilitarized Zone, fighting that produced many casualties—including Bill Weise's predecessor as CO.

>Mr. Laidig was a platoon leader with 2/4 from 1966–67. He is the author of* Al Gray, Marine *(Potomac Institute Press, 2012).

One Magnificent Bastard is the biography of a fighting Marine general, and seldom has a book been more aptly titled. Bill Weise's entire life built toward his assumption of command of 2/4. A scrapper from Philadelphia, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951, though he was quickly commissioned after graduating from Parris Island. His time as a junior officer reflected not only the professionalism with which he approached his life's work, but also the bond that he established with his officers and men. He truly is one of the officers who took to heart John A. Lejeune's admonition regarding the relationship between the officer and enlisted Marine as being one of teacher and scholar.

. . . the victorious result of the action was the product of dedicated warriors led by superb men, from fire team leaders up.

While the Battle of Dai Do defined Bill Weise's time as a Marine and served as the seminal event in the lives of many, many of his officers and men, the victorious result of the action was the product of dedicated warriors led by superb men, from fire team leaders up. The infectious, demanding, aggressive leadership of Bill Weise set the tone for the battalion. The officers, many of whom were decorated as a result of the action (including two Medals of Honor and numerous several Silver Stars), were as fine a group as was ever assembled within a Marine battalion. The SNCOs, led by the incomparable SgtMaj John Malnar, were equally professional. The quality and steadfastness of the Marines in the ranks was unquestionably superior. However, the man who orchestrated the music, who set the tone and the temperament, who demanded excellence, dedication, and service to each other, and who imbued a fighting spirit throughout the battalion, was "Wild Bill" Weise. Before receiving a serious wound, Weise's actions at Dai Do earned him a Navy Cross. More than 80 of his men were not so fortunate and paid the ultimate price, but 2/4 and its supporting units had shattered a well-equipped and committed North Vietnamese Army

For Further Reading



WRONG TURN: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency. By COL Gian Gentile, USA. Having done extensive research on counterinsurgency, the author, who was a battalion commander in Iraq and a professor at West Point, takes a contrarian view of the strategy's efficacy as the overriding doctrine applied in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. His is a cautionary tale of institutional embrace of doctrine without rigorous examination as to what we want to achieve and the means to reach those ends.
The New Press, New York, 2013
ISBN 9781595588746, 188 pp.
To order, go to: http://amzn.to/1dvXjcw



THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE. By David Finkel. After being embedded with them in war, this Pulitzer Prize–winning author follows up with the soldiers of 2–16th Infantry after they return home. Although the book details an Army unit, the trials, tribulations, challenges, and adjustment issues faced by these warriors are the same as they are for Marines.
Sarah Crichton Books, New York, 2013
ISBN 9780374180669, 256 pp.
To order, go to: http://amzn.to/1c3Eotl



UNDERSTANDING WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A Guide to the Land, the People, and the Conflict. By Joseph J. Collins. A retired Army colonel and professor of strategy at the National War College, the author provides a primer on America's longest war and the complexity of the endeavor. Every war is fought against a backdrop of the enemy, the land, and the people, and Dr. Collins' illuminating work makes the Rubik's Cube of Afghanistan more understandable.
Skyhorse Publishing, New York, 2013
ISBN 1098765432, 137 pp.
To order, go to: http://amzn.to/19O2Obw

division, sending it back into North Vietnam.

After Vietnam, Bill Weise was widely recognized as a superior Marine officer, and he was elevated to general officer rank. That hardly changed Bill Weise. He remained committed to trying to improve the lives of his Marines and the quality of the weaponry used in the Service, having remained the source of enthusiasm and professionalism in each assignment.

Like many of us, Bill Weise was not without personal issues, but he put away those demons like he met the enemy—directly and without hesitation. With his blessing, the book openly discusses his personal devils—yet another measure of the quality of this fine warrior.

One Magnificent Bastard is an easy read; it's full of illustrations and leaves the reader filled with admiration for this fine man. Weise was a great Marine, and he is an even better person. Interestingly, his accomplishments in retirement are every bit equal to those from his time on active duty; for example, Weise was one of the stalwarts whose vision and tireless work led to the creation of the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

Bill remains very active to this day and continues to put Marines ahead of himself. His current project (benefitted by proceeds from the book) is the placement of a commemorative brick at Semper Fidelis Park for each 2/4 Marine killed in action in every war. In 2009, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines Association, spearheaded by Bill Weise, placed a beautiful monument to the battalion at that same park, just down the hill from the Semper Fidelis Chapel. The bricks will be placed around the base of the monument. This project has been driven by BGen Weise's energy, commitment, and hands-on attention, and his love and respect for the Marines who gave their all.

While there have been many, clearly Bill Weise is *One Magnificent Bastard*.

USMC

'Takes pleasure in awarding the...'

Note: The award records in the Marine Corps' award processing system and improved awards processing system were used to populate this list, which reflects personal combat awards from the start of the global war on terrorism presented to Marines and sailors serving with Marine Corps forces only. This list may not reflect certain personal combat awards processed outside of either system and/or approved by another branch of Service. Any questions on the content of the list should be submitted in writing to the Personal Awards Section (MMMA–2) at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower Management Division, MMMA–2, 3280 Russell Road, Quantico, VA 22134.

Bronze Star With Combat "V"

Brandfass, Aren C.	SSgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Dunlap, Ian G.	Capt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Ledbetter, Bradley M.	Maj	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Pletts, Jesse D.	Capt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC

Bronze Star

Davenport, Jon W.	LtCol	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Deantoni, Christopher E.	Maj	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Miller, Michael A.	SgtMaj	3/4, 1st MarDiv

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation With Combat "V"

Buras, Cody P.	Capt	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Eskandary, Ryan J.	Sgt	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Harrison, Matthew A.	SSgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Valencia, Wesley	Sgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Wade, Joseph	SSgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarFor SOC
Witkowski, Kyle D.	SSgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement With Combat "V"

Cornn, Dillon J.	Cpl	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Gonzales II, Mario J.	Sgt	3/4, 1st MarDiv
Gregory, Joshua A.	Capt	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Nyenhuis, Luke T.	LCpl	MEF Hqtrs Grp, II MEF
Wilson, Brandon W.	Sgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Wilson, Jr., Ronnie	SSgt	2d Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC
Zastawrny, William J.	Sgt	1st Mar Spec Ops Bn, MarForSOC

To see previous personal awards from 11 September 2001 to the present, go to www.mca-marines.org/gazette/archives.

Index to Advertisers

Boeing CII
CDET 19
Chase Prize Essay Contest 2, 4
GovX 53
John Deere CIII
MCA&F 11, 29, 54, 94
MCAF 17
Marine Corps Gazette 54, 77, 86
Marine Expo South 43
Marine Military Academy 47
Panasonic 7
The Marine *Shop* 50, 71, 96
USAA ..... 5, CIV

Editorial Policy and Writers' Guidelines

Our basic policy is to fulfill the stated purpose of the *Marine Corps Gazette* by providing a forum for open discussion and a free exchange of ideas relating to the U.S. Marine Corps and military capabilities.

The Board of Governors of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation has given authority to approve manuscripts for publication to the Editorial Advisory Panel and editor. Editorial board members are listed on the *Gazette's* masthead in each issue. The Panel, which normally meets once a month, represents a cross section of Marines by professional interest, experience, age, rank, and gender. The Panel reads and votes on each manuscript submitted as a feature article. A simple majority rules in its decisions. Other material submitted for publication is accepted or rejected based on the assessment of the editor. The *Gazette* welcomes material in the following categories:

- **Commentary on Published Material:** Submit promptly. Comments normally appear as letters (see below) 3 months after published material. BE BRIEF.
- **Feature Articles:** Normally 2,000 to 3,000 words, dealing with topics of major significance. Manuscripts should be DOUBLE SPACED. Ideas must be backed up by hard facts. Evidence must be presented to support logical conclusions. In the case of articles that criticize, constructive suggestions are sought. Footnotes are not necessary, but a list of any source materials used is helpful.
- **Ideas and Issues:** Short articles, normally 750 to 1,500 words. This section can include the full gamut of professional topics so long as treatment of the subject is brief and concise. Again, please DOUBLE SPACE all manuscripts.
- **Letters:** Limit to 200 words or less and DOUBLE SPACE. As in most magazines, letters to the editor are an important clue as to how well or poorly ideas are being received. Letters are an excellent way to correct factual mistakes, reinforce ideas, outline opposing points of view, identify problems, and suggest factors or important considerations that have been overlooked in previous *Gazette* articles. The best letters are sharply focused on one or two specific points.
- **Book Reviews:** Prefer 300 to 750 words. Please DOUBLE SPACE. It is a good idea to check with the editor in advance to determine if a review is desired. Please be sure to include the book's author, publisher (including city), year of publication, number of pages, and cost of the book.

The best advice is to write the way you talk. Organize your thoughts. Cut out excess words. Short is better than long. Submissions may be sent via regular mail and should include one hard copy of the manuscript and a disk with the manuscript in Microsoft Word format. Photographs and illustrations must be in **TIFF, JPG, or EPS** format (**300dpi, 5x7 inches**, color preferred) and **must not be embedded in the article**. **Please attach photos and illustrations separately.** (You may indicate in the text of the article where the photos are to be placed.) Include the author's full name, mailing address, telephone number, and e-mail address. Mail to: *Marine Corps Gazette*, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Articles may also be submitted via e-mail to gazette@mca-marines.org. Please follow the same instructions for format, photographs, and contact information when submitting by e-mail. Any queries may be directed to the editorial staff by calling 800–336–0291, ext. 144.

WE'RE JOHN DEERE, REPORTING FOR DUTY.

Whether you're requisitioning equipment for construction, material handling, reclamation, or conservation, we'd like to be your ally. Expect quality machines, responsive customer service, and 24/7/365 genuine John Deere parts availability through our FLASH™ ordering system. What's more, all our military construction models run on either diesel or JP8 jet fuel. A full line of attachments and custom armor solutions are also a phone call away.

Contact John Deere Direct Government Sales at 800.319.3757 today and put our duty-bound dozers, loaders, graders, and excavators to work in your theater of operation.

JOHN DEERE

To view our complete line of military equipment, scan this image on your mobile app.

www.JohnDeere.com

Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

USAA®

USAA is proud to be the
Semper Fidelis Sponsor
of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

Use the card. Benefit MCA&F.

The MCA&F USAA Rewards™ World MasterCard® helps advance the mission of MCA&F. USAA Bank contributes to MCA&F with every new credit card account opened and with each eligible purchase you make. You can enjoy USAA Bank's competitive rates and legendary customer service.

Apply today.

usaa.com/mcacc | 877-651-6272

USAA®
We know what it means to serve.®

J.J. Montanaro
USAA CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER™ PRACTITIONER

Take control of your financial future with a TSP.

The Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) is the military's version of a civilian 401(k), and it's an easy, tax-advantaged way to save for the future. Whether you're days or decades from separating from service, it's never too early to understand your options with the TSP when you shed the uniform.

Review Your Savings Options

Pretax contributions and tax-deferred earnings of the traditional TSP can help you save on taxes and add to your nest egg. The Roth TSP requires after-tax contributions but withdrawals of contributions and earnings are tax-free. Either way, your contributions to the TSP are a convenient way to save. Too often servicemembers don't realize that they have a lot of flexibility and control of the funds they save in the TSP when they leave the military. And that becomes a misguided reason to take a pass on this valuable plan.

Don't Cash Out

In most cases, any of the actions featured in the chart on the following page (inside back cover) will be better than withdrawing your TSP funds. Cashing out before age 59½ won't just rob you of the money you'll need for retirement. You'll also have to pay taxes on the withdrawal and typically have to hand over a 10% penalty.

With the Roth TSP, upon separation you're allowed to withdraw contributions without taxes or penalties. However, Roth earnings withdrawn before age 59½ are generally subject to taxes and a 10% penalty.

Roll the Right Way

When you request a rollover distribution from the TSP, don't have the TSP funds sent directly to you. Instead, have the funds transferred to the IRA or 401(k) custodian through what is called a direct rollover. It's possible to do a rollover yourself, but with mandatory withholding and deadlines, it could be a move you'll regret.

Special Rules for Combat Pay

If some of your TSP contributions included tax-free combat pay, stop to consider how to make the most of these funds. You would almost certainly want to roll your tax-free contributions into a Roth IRA. A traditional IRA or 401(k) would require you to pay taxes on the future earnings.

Tax-free combat pay could be an exception to the rule against early withdrawals. You can withdraw tax-exempt combat pay contributions without triggering taxes or penalties. Ideally, you should roll over that money into a Roth IRA and keep it growing for retirement. However, if you really need the money now, it's nice to know it's there.

Keep Contributing

After you've left the military, chances are you'll need to keep building your savings to ensure a comfortable retirement. So, before you fall out of the habit, start contributing to your new civilian retirement plan and make monthly contributions to your IRA. It's important to keep your retirement savings momentum.



USAA®

A convenient guide to your TSP choices from USAA Certified Financial Planner™ practitioner J.J. Montanaro:

Option	Pros	Cons
Leave your money in the TSP	• Low investment expenses • Easy — no action required • With separation at 55 or older, penalty-free access to funds	• Limited investment selections • Can't contribute after separation • Inflexible withdrawal options compared to an IRA
Roll over the funds to a traditional IRA	• More investment choices • Can use as a consolidation tool • Greater flexibility when withdrawing money • No income tax on rollover • Ability to add future contributions	• Potentially higher expenses than TSP • May require new IRA application and rollover paperwork • More work building and managing investment portfolio
Roll over the funds to a Roth IRA	• Potential for tax-free income in retirement • Great place for tax-exempt combat-pay contributions, which can grow tax-free	• Pay income tax on taxable balance, which could significantly increase immediate tax liability • Requires new application and investment decisions
Roll over the funds to your new employer's retirement plan	• Convenience of all retirement investments in one account • Attractive investment options (depending on plan) • Potential to access funds via loan	• Plan may have limited or expensive investment choices • Not all employers offer plans

Talk to an advisor about your TSP options.
Call 877-651-6272 or visit usaa.com/mca today.