



MARINE CORPS Gazette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

JUNE 2013 Vol. 97 No. 6

www.mca-marines.org/gazette



- | | | | | | |
|----|--|----|--|----|--|
| 71 | Cover Article:
Battlefield
Surveillance
Company
<i>LtCol Michael J. Lindemann, Jr.</i> | 19 | Returning to Our
Roots
<i>Maj Monty J. Fontenot &
COL G.L. Lamborn</i> | 45 | Shift to the Pacific
<i>LtCol Michael Oppenheim
et al.</i> |
| | | 36 | Marine Armor
<i>Capt G.S. Slater</i> | 55 | The Navy-Marine
Corps Team
<i>LtCol Brad Farrar, USMCR</i> |

A publication of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation

Welcome to the digital edition of the *Marine Corps Gazette*

Welcome to the digital edition of June's *Marine Corps Gazette*. This month includes a wide array of articles that we hope you will find informative and provocative. Join the discussion and debate.

Semper Fi.

J. A. Keenan

Editor, Col John A. Keenan, USMC(Ret)

	For instructions on how to navigate your digital edition, click here .
	To obtain your USERNAME and PASSWORD, click here or call, 1-866-622-1775.

CONGRATULATIONS

TO THE 2012 WOUNDED WARRIOR REGIMENT AWARD WINNERS!



SSGT BRANDON W. MENG
The Wounded Warrior Regiment
Wounded, Ill or Injured
Service Member Award
Presented by Caterpillar



SSGT KIMBERLY A. MARTIN
The Wounded Warrior Regiment
Leadership Award
Presented by GE



KRISTA ANN DEKRYGER
The Wounded Warrior Regiment
Civilian of the Year Award
Presented by Google



Marine Corps
Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913






71 Cover Story
The battlefield surveillance company.
(Photo by Sgt Amber Blanchard.)

DEPARTMENTS

- 3** Editorial
- 4** Special Notices
- 8** Letters
- 10** Hogaboom Winners
- 77** Books
- 79** Awards
- 80** Index to Advertisers
- 80** Writers' Guidelines



77 Book Review

The *Marine Corps Gazette* (ISSN 0025-3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will advance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offices. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. "Marine Corps" and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual \$35.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1-866-622-1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES to G. Scott Dinkel, 634 - 77th Street, Brooklyn, NY 11209. Phone 718-715-1361. E-mail s.dinkel@mca-marines.org. • COPYRIGHT 2013 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Phone 703-640-6161. DSN 278-2854. Toll Free 800-336-0291. Fax 703-630-9147. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: gazette@mca-marines.org. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Marine Corps Gazette*, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: mca@mca-marines.org. • For credit card orders, call 800-336-0291, ext. 331. PUBLISHER'S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsements by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F's name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion.

IDEAS AND ISSUES

100th Anniversary	
12 Initiative in Battle: Past and Future	LTC (P) Douglas A. Macgregor
Attritionist Letter	
18 The Attritionist Letters (#14)	Anonymous
COIN	
19 Returning to Our Roots	Maj Monty J. Fontenot & COL G.L. Lamborn
Maritime Prepositioning	
23 Open for Business	Maj Robert G. Barber
Training	
27 Attending OCS	Maj Josh Jabin & Capt Michael Barikian
Culture	
31 Marines and Foreign Military Culture	Blago Tashev & Maj Thomas Ross
Mech Ops	
36 Marine Armor: Any Clime and Place	Capt G.S. Slater
Navy-Marine Team	
40 The New Fighting Tops	Maj Matthew Tracy
PME	
44 Curriculum Transition	CDET Staff
Strategy	
45 Shift to the Pacific and the East Asia Strategy	LtCol Michael Oppenheim et al.
53 Fourth-Generation Warfare	Maj Gregory A. Thiele
MAGTF Ops	
55 The Navy-Marine Corps Team	LtCol Brad Farrar
60 The Marine Expeditionary Unit	Maj David Handy
Awards	
65 The Broken Process	1stLt Gregory Moynihan
Commentary	
67 Let Us Fight for You	1stLts B.L. Brewster & R.K. Wallace
Intelligence	
71 Battlefield Surveillance Company	LtCol Michael J. Lindemann, Jr.

DIGITAL EDITION EXCLUSIVES

Available at <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/marine-corps-gazette-current-issue>

**China's New Regime
Tips for Program Managers**

1stLt Daniel P. Grant
Maj R.G. Du Vall

Annual LtCol Earl "Pete" Ellis Essay Contest

Inspire Operational and Tactical Thinking in Keeping with Pete Ellis' Visionary Approach to Expeditionary Warfare

- Open to anyone, civilian or military.
- 3,500 words maximum length.
- Entries due between 1 May – 30 June 2013 with entries judged in July 2013 and winners announced shortly thereafter.
- Articles judged by members of the Marine Corps Ellis Group & *Marine Corps Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel.
- All entries eligible for publication in *Marine Corps Gazette*.

Contest Theme: This contest focuses on preparing the Marine Corps for future conflict through perspectives ranging across doctrine, emerging threats, capabilities, technological advances, force composition, material solutions, and operational concepts. **The theme for 2013 concerns the need for maneuver capability with increased range and reduced signature due to developing challenges posed by area denial weapons.**



First Prize - \$5,000 & Engraved Plaque
Funded by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Unleash Your Visionary Ideas HERE!

Read more about contest details and submission requirements here:
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/ellis_contest

President & CEO
MAJGEN EDWARD G. USHER III, USMC (RET)
www.mca-marines.org/gazette • 1-800-336-0291

Publisher
COL WALT G. FORD, USMC (RET)

Editor
COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC (RET)
j.keenan@mca-marines.org Ext. 163

Senior Editor
LTCOL KERRY A. KNOWLES, USMC (RET)
k.knowles@mca-marines.org Ext. 109

Layout/Editorial Production Coordinator
CHARLENE K. MONROE
c.monroe@mca-marines.org Ext. 139

Assistant Editor
LYNNE CURRIE
l.currie@mca-marines.org Ext. 193

Administrative Assistant
TINA M. PEARCE
t.pearce@mca-marines.org Ext. 144

Web Content Editor
MARGOT CORNELIUS
m.cornelius@mca-marines.org Ext. 106

Advertising Director
G. SCOTT DINKEL
s.dinkel@mca-marines.org 718-715-1361

Editorial Advisory Panel
COL JOHN A. KEENAN, USMC (RET)
Chairman

COL THOMAS KEATING
Chief of Staff, MCWL

COL WAYNE A. SINCLAIR
CO, H&S Bn, MCRD San Diego

LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC (RET)

LTCOL MORGAN G. MANN, USMC
XO, 25th Mar

COL CHRIS HUGHES
Division of Public Affairs, HQMC

LTCOL CARL E. COOPER, JR.
Commanding Officer, 3d Bn, 9th Mar

LTCOL BRIAN E. RUSSELL
Training and Readiness Officer, MarSOC

LTCOL GARY W. THOMASON
Navy/Marine Corps Service Team Chief/NRO

MAJ SCOTT CUOMO
Director, Infantry Officer Course

MAJ JONATHAN P. BURGESS
Artillery Instructor, MAWTS-1

CAPT JOSEPH N. MAZZARA
MAGTF T&E Standards Division

SGTMAJ DENNIS J. COLLINS
1st Bn, 3d Mar

GYSGT BRIAN O. FAIR
WTBn, S-3 Chief and H&S 1stSgt

JUNE 2013

Editorial: Viewing Commanders and Commandership

The summer season is also the season of changes of command. In my opinion, there are two boards that are the most critical to the success of the Marine Corps. One is local—the corporals' selection board that decides whether a Marine with the cutting score is recommended for promotion to corporal. Results of the corporals' boards are some of the most critical in the Marine Corps, but are too often treated as a pay raise rather than a promotion based on leadership. The people making those critical promotion decisions are selected by a board held at the Marine Corps level—the command screening and slating board. I will argue that the command screening and slating board is the most important board in the Corps. We cannot afford to get it wrong, but we often do.

The *Gazette's* archive is replete with articles on toxic leadership styles and commanders who had deleterious effects on units and individual Marines, defying comprehension. How does this happen? How does someone who is well known for their bullying and toxic leadership style and dubious ethical values, or whose competence is questioned, get command? It is very simple. He got enough votes on the board. Boards only see one view of those being considered for command: that of the reporting senior. In the past, I have opined that every Marine leader has a three-dimensional view: the first view is that of his superiors, the second is that of his peers, and the third is that of his subordinates. In the very best and very worst Marine leaders, those views are in harmony. The best are seen as the best by all three components, and the worst are seen as poor leaders by superiors, peers, and subordinates alike. The worst leaders don't last long and are soon expunged from the ranks. Unfortunately, there are some—and not an inconsequential number—who have figured out that it is only one view that counts: that of his boss. Once in command, the boss has to have an undeniable reason to relieve. According to an analysis of the Services by the Associated Press, 41 Marine commanders have been relieved for cause since 2005. I believe these were the most egregious cases, and more poor leaders were allowed to continue in command until the end of their normal tour. *Why* is probably the subject of another editorial.

In a recent article in the *Army Times* ("DoD's Push to Dump Bad Leaders," 6 May 2013), it was stated that, at the behest of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Martin Dempsey, the Services must implement a 360-degree review for officers. The actual implementation will be up to each branch. First indications are that the Marine Corps will institute 360-degree reviews only for generals, and will continue command climate surveys for others. With all due respect to Gen Amos, that is too late. Command climate surveys are valuable tools to help ascertain the current climate within a command, or the climate left behind by a recently departed commander, but they have little utility in determining who should get command.

A search of the *Gazette* over the last 10 years quickly yields numerous articles on implementing a 360-degree review as part of the performance evaluation system. These reviews do not mean that a disgruntled lance corporal can exact revenge on a commander or superior. They do mean that a screening and slating board will have a broader perspective on who is selected to command. Perhaps we will cut down on the number of dyslexic commanders who have problems with consonants and think they were anointed, rather than appointed, to command.

John Keenan

Marine Corps Association & Foundation Honorary President, Gen John Paxton; Chairman of the Board, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC (Ret); General Counsel, BGen Joseph Composto, USMC (Ret); Board of Governors, MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC (Ret); LtGen Ronald Coleman, USMC (Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC (Ret); LtGen Robert Blackman, USMC (Ret); MajGen Jim Lariviere, USMC (Ret); MajGen Gordon Nash, USMC (Ret); MajGen Gray Payne, USMC (Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC (Ret); BGen Thomas Draude, USMC (Ret); Col William R. Costantini, USMC; Col Helen Pratt, USMC; Col Stephen Waldron, USMC; Col Daniel O'Brien, USMC (Ret); LtCol Maria McMillen, USMC; LtCol Greg Reeder, USMC; SgtMaj Michael Barrett (DoD Liaison); SgtMaj Kim Eugene Davis, USMC; MGySgt Steven Williams, USMC; Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Thomas Corzine; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. Jay Holmes; Mr. Jake Leinenkugel; Mr. John Lowry III; Mr. Michael Martz; Mr. James A. Mosel. Marine Corps Association & Foundation Board of Directors, Gen Peter Pace, USMC (Ret); LtGen Earl B. Hailston, USMC (Ret); MajGen Harry W. Jenkins, USMC (Ret); MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC (Ret); MajGen Gray Payne, USMC (Ret); BGen Joseph Composto, USMC (Ret); SgtMaj Richard Arndt, USMC (Ret); Mr. Skip Sack; Mr. Michael Hegarty; Mr. M.L. "Buzz" Hefti; Mr. Thomas Corzine; Mr. Jake Leinenkugel.

MCA President and CEO, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC (Ret); Chief Operations Officer, John T. "Tom" Esslinger; Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret); Marketing & Communications Director, Robert Rubrecht; Member Services, Lisa Pappas; Director of Finance, Johanna Ebel; President, MCAF, MajGen Edward G. Usher III, USMC (Ret); Operations Officer, MCAF, LeeAnn Mitchell.



MajGen Ed Usher, Col Todd Desgrosseilliers, 1stLt Brendon Mills, and Col Jack Kelly during the award presentation. (Photo by Ron Lunn.)

Lopez Honor Graduate Award

MajGen Ed Usher, USMC(Ret), President and CEO of the Marine Corps Association & Foundation; Col Todd Desgrosseilliers, CO of The Basic School; and Col Jack Kelly, USMC(Ret), present the Lopez Honor Graduate Award to 1stLt Brendon Mills of Fox Company, BOC 6-12. The Lopez Honor Graduate Award has been endowed in honor of Col Kelly's meritorious and heroic service while on active duty.

General Officer Announcements

On 22 March, the Secretary of Defense announced that the President made the following nominations:

LtGen John E. Wissler for reappointment to the grade of lieutenant general and for assignment as Commanding General (CG), III MEF; and Commander, Marine Forces Japan. LtGen Wissler is currently serving as the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources.

LtGen Steven A. Hummer for reappointment to the rank of lieutenant general and for assignment as Deputy for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command. LtGen Hummer is currently serving as Commander, Marine Forces Reserve; and Commander, Marine Forces North.

LtGen Kenneth J. Gluek, Jr., for reappointment to the rank of lieutenant general and for assignment as Deputy

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Strategic Command; CG, Marine Corps National Capital Region Command; Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces National Capital Region; and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Cyber Command. LtGen Gluek is currently the CG, III MEF; Commander, Marine Corps Bases Japan, and Commander, Marine Forces Japan.

MajGen Charles M. Gurganus for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and for assignment as the Director, Marine Corps Staff. MajGen Gurganus is currently serving as CG, I MEF (Forward).

MajGen Ronald L. Bailey for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and for assignment as Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and

Reunions

Org: Marine Air Groups (WWII to Present)
 Dates: 2-5 October 2013
 Place: Branson, MO
 POC: James Jordan
 417-535-4945
 james.m.jordan@hughes.net

Org: USS *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2/LHD 7) Shipmates
 Dates: 2-6 October 2013
 Place: San Diego, CA
 POC: Robert G. McAnally
 757-723-0317
 yujack@megalink.net

Org: USS *Canberra* (CA 70/CAG 2) Muster
 Dates: 2-6 October 2013
 Place: Reno, NV
 POC: Ken Minick
 740-423-8976
 usscanberra@gmail.com

Org: MCAS-6
 Dates: 11-13 October 2013
 Place: Havelock, NC
 POC: Gene Herrera
 757-484-0091
 geneathome@outlook.com

Operations, HQMC. Gen Bailey is currently serving as CG, 1st MarDiv.

On 11 April, the Secretary of Defense announced that the President made the following nomination:

LtGen Richard P. Mills for reappointment to the rank of lieutenant general and assignment as the Commander, Marine Forces Reserve; Commander, Marine Forces North. LtGen Mills is currently the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Strategic Command; CG, Marine Corps National Capital Region Command; Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces National Capital Region; and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Cyber Command.

MCA&F Members: Introducing the USAA Rewards American Express Card.

USAA Bank will make a contribution to MCA&F when you open an account and each time you make an eligible purchase with the Card. Get the MCA&F USAA Rewards™ American Express® Card and take advantage of:

- **No annual fee**¹
- **Purchase APR as low as 10.9%**¹
- **0% introductory APR for 12 months** on balance transfers and convenience checks made in the first three months (**10.9% to 25.9% variable APR on these balances after 12 months**)
- **2,500 bonus points** after your first purchase, 2X points on gas and groceries and 1 point for every \$1 spent on all other purchases. Redeem for cash, merchandise or other exciting rewards²

Apply today.

usaa.com/mcaamex | 877-651-6272

Insurance Banking Investments Retirement Advice



**EARN 2X POINTS
ON GAS AND GROCERIES —
YEAR AFTER YEAR.**

Unlike some other reward programs with temporary promotions, USAA Rewards offers you 2X points on gas and groceries as part of your standard reward terms.



We know what it means to serve.[®]

USAA means United Services Automobile Association and its insurance, banking, investment and other companies. USAA products are available only in those jurisdictions where USAA is authorized to sell them.

¹Offer subject to approval. As of 4/1/2013, regular APRs on purchases, cash advances and balance transfers are 10.9% to 25.9%, depending on your credit history and other factors. APRs will vary with the market based on the Prime Rate. There is a transaction fee of 3% on cash advances (\$200 maximum on balance transfers and convenience checks) and 1% on foreign transactions. Rates and fees subject to change. Please contact us for the most current information. ²Rewards points terminate if account is closed, delinquent or program ends. Earn 1 point for every \$1 in Card purchases. Other restrictions apply. USAA Rewards Program terms and conditions will be provided with your Card. Availability restrictions apply. Purchase of a bank product does not establish eligibility for, or membership in, USAA property and casualty insurance companies. American Express is a federally registered service mark of American Express and is used by USAA Savings Bank pursuant to a license. This credit card program is issued and administered by USAA Savings Bank, Member FDIC. MCA&F receives financial support from USAA for this sponsorship. © 2013 USAA. 143437-0613



USS Arlington. (Photo by Northrup Grumman Shipbuilding.)



Joint High Speed Vessel concept. (Photo by Wikimedia Commons.)

USS *Arlington* (LPD 24) Launched

On 6 April, the Navy commissioned the latest San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock (LPD) ship, the USS *Arlington*, honoring the first responders and the 184 victims of American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The *Arlington* is the eighth LPD in the San Antonio class. The ship will support the Marine Corps mobility triad, composed of the LCAC, amphibious vehicles, and the MV-22 Osprey.

Named for the county of Arlington, VA, two ships have previously shared the title *Arlington*: the first was a steel-hulled cargo ship (C1-B) that served during World War II, and the second a Vietnam War-era communications relay ship that assisted during a June 1969 conference between President Richard M. Nixon and Republic of Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu.

For more information, visit www.navy.mil.

Third JHSV Launched

On 20 April, the U.S. Navy christened the latest Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) *Millinocket* (JHSV 3). The future USNS *Millinocket* is the first naval vessel to be named in honor of the Maine towns of Millinocket and East Millinocket.

The 338-foot catamaran vessel is ideal for fast, intratheater transportation of troops, military vessels, supplies, and equipment. The JHSV will have an aviation flight deck and be capable of conducting day and night flight operations.

For more information on the JHSV, visit www.navy.mil.

Civil Affairs Group (CAG)

Force Headquarters Group, Marine Forces Reserve, is actively seeking Reserve officers and SNCOs for billets within its four Civil Affairs Groups: 1st CAG in Camp Pendleton, CA; 3rd CAG in Great Lakes, IL; 4th CAG in Washington, DC; and a CAG being established in Miami, FL. Prior civil affairs experience is preferred but not required. Interested Marines should contact LtCol John Wilson at john.p.wilson@usmc.mil or 504-697-7503.

MARINE CORPS Gazette

Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

Coming in the
July 2013
issue:

- Hogaboom essays
- Marine recon
- The split MEU
- Irregular warfare
- Kangaroos and kiwis

Marine Corps Association & Foundation

C4 AWARDS DINNER

CONGRATULATIONS! 2012 C4 AWARD RECIPIENTS



Captain Paul R. Bertolone

The Alfred M. Gray Trophy for Outstanding Command and Control Systems Leadership



Mr. Jonathan S. Page

The James Hamilton Information Technology Management Civilian Marine of the Year Award




Gunnery Sergeant Christopher R. Heindel

The PFC Herbert A. Littleton Staff NCO Trophy for Operational Communications Excellence



Sergeant Christian A. Lang

The PFC Herbert A. Littleton NCO Trophy for Operational Communications Excellence



Sergeant Jennifer M. Masters

The PFC Herbert A. Littleton NCO Trophy for Electronic Maintenance Excellence



Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28

The LtCol Kevin M. Shea Memorial Unit of the Year Award



Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913



IOC Training

■ In “Infantry Officer Course’s Palm-FEx” (*MCG*, Mar13), the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) faculty have written an excellent article about the IOC—who they are, how they got there, and options for the way ahead despite the “incoming” fiscal challenges. There are just a few points I’d like to offer for their consideration.

First a comment on the point made that each course graduate is prepared to immediately lead an infantry platoon within “a combined arms force, comfortable operating at the high and low ends of the threat spectrum, or in the shaded areas where they overlap.” The word “comfortable” implies the absence of disturbing, painful, or distressing features such as enemy automatic weapons, mortars, or even enemy air. Perhaps a better word could be “competent,” which means well-qualified and capable.

Second, comparing the cost of training a single Marine officer to the point that he is prepared to fly an F/A-18 in a deployable squadron to executing four 13-week IOC classes is quite a compliment. That pilot’s reason for existing is for the mission accomplishment of that infantry platoon. That is and always will be close air support as differentiated by what others try to occasionally emulate with air support. That’s, why all Marine aviators go through The Basic School. Last time I checked, Marine air still supports the infantry!

Third, I’d like to share a few thoughts on the interaction between mobility and maneuver, which is kind of like the “chicken or the egg—which came first?” debate. An infantry platoon can plan a shrewd or skillful step toward achieving its objective, only to have it abruptly change due to weather or a manmade obstacle. By training an infantry platoon in combat engineer skills (improvised explosive devices, demolitions, obstacle construction/destruction, breaching, etc.), an infantry company could maintain the momentum of its attack.

Finally, a note to the IOC faculty: We only hear good things about your demanding, realistic training.

LtCol Mike Janay, USMC(Ret)

The Correct Title for ACMC

■ Please accept my response to Ms. Amerman’s letter that appeared in the May *Gazette* regarding my March 2013 article on retitling the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) “Vice Commandant.” I think it was Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart who said, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out.”

In responding to my proposal, Ms. Amerman provides the historical context of the designation of Assistant Commandant, and she corrects the year in which the Commandant became a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, she does not offer reasons why the change should not be made today. Ms. Amerman notes that Gen Boomer, as ACMC, considered the title change but did not make it official. Almost 20 years have passed since he was ACMC.

Since then, the role of the ACMC has evolved. In accordance with 10 USC §181, *CJCS Instruction 5123.01* of 2 May 1997 chartered the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the membership of which comprises the Vice Chairman of the JCS, Service Vice Chiefs, and the Assistant Commandant. The powerful Marine Requirements Oversight Council was established with the ACMC as the chair (CMC Policy Letter 2-99). Clearly the ACMC’s role has evolved to include the critical one of integrator within the U.S. Marine Corps and the Department of Defense. Furthermore, I staffed the draft article to several general officers, two of whom were recent ACMCs. Each of them agreed with my position and also felt that it may be time for a change.

It is simple logic: A “deputy” designation is widely accepted as senior to “assistant.” All the other Services and departments apply this approach, so ours being different only muddies the waters. I believe we should be progressive and keep up with modern times. It is time to change the designation.

CWO5 Ray Grundy, USMC(Ret)

Demise of Airborne EW

■ While on LtGen Tom Miller’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Aviation, staff in 1976, I had the honor of writing a *Gazette* article for the May 1976 issue about the future of electronic warfare (EW), the sixth function of Marine aviation. The centerpiece of the article was the introduction of the EA-6B Prowler as the third generation of Marine jet EW aircraft, a first for any Service. Who would have thought that the EA-6B would become the longest-serving turbojet aircraft in Marine Corps aviation history? Like the EF-10B and EA-6A before it, Marine Prowlers would become one of our Nation’s first responders in support of combat operations. Proving itself first in the Gadhafi raid in 1986, then in the Persian Gulf War where no Marine air strikes over Iraq were allowed without EA-6B support, then to Kosovo, back to Iraq patrolling no-fly zones, and finally in overwhelming Saddam’s air defenses during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

As MAGTF operations in Iraq shifted to stability and security operations, the utility of the EA-6B was called into question as per its “relevance in the objective area,” to paraphrase Gen Anthony Zinni. That challenge was quickly answered thanks to the ingenuity of Marines in the VMAQ (Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare) squadrons and the defense industry that converted the EA-6B platforms to take on a vital new mission against asymmetric threats to ground operations. This critical new VMAQ mission would be carried over to the long war in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, as the Corps moves to upgrade its tactical fixed-wing force with the fifth-generation F-35B Lightning II in a fiscally constrained environment, a decision has been made to phase out the EA-6Bs by 2019 without a functional replacement. The resulting MAGTF EW plan would focus on lower-cost solutions to support ground operations, foregoing the expeditionary airborne electronic attack mission that has been the forte of Marine aviation for nearly 60 years. Barring a change of perspective, this means the end of the sixth function of Marine aviation as we know it, and for

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the *Gazette*. They should not exceed 200 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to gazette@mca-marines.org. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared.

The entire *Gazette* is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

the first time in history, the ACE cannot be employed in typical hostile air defense environments without external support. This was not the final chapter I envisioned when I wrote *Silent Heroes: U.S. Marines and Airborne EW 1950–2012!*

Col Wayne Whitten, USMC(Ret)

Rapid Planning

■ I read 1stLt Blashek's article, "Rapid or Vapid Planning Process?" (*MCG*, Jan13), with much interest. It has been some time since I taught and evaluated the subject at Expeditionary Warfare Group Atlantic and thus supported the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/MEU cycle evaluations through Special Operations Training Group. I was fortunate to have received a great education watching the "pros from Dover" develop their command element (CE), work with our Navy brethren, and extend their capabilities into the joint environment during the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/ENDURING FREEDOM timeframe. I wanted to offer some thoughts that I believe add value to understanding R²P².

As 1stLt Blashek related his concerns and the necessity to return to doctrine in support of R²P², it reminded me that, as an instructor, fundamental to successful R²P² are the implied relationships that must be forged prior to the confirmation brief and mission execution. Internally, the Marine staff (MEU CE, GCE, ACE, and CLB), the Navy (ARG, surface warfare, etc.), and now the joint community must all be connected and know their respective counterparts, thus breaking from a narrow focus or sole focus on one's own warfighting function. In short, they must know the battlespace larger than their warfighting function may require. Additionally, a key consideration for successful R²P² planning and execution is the essential and required parallel planning that goes on below the command deck. Call-away of the crisis action team and the subsequent warning order issued enable the 1/3–2/3 rule in support of planning and execution. The warning order effectively allows for Marines/sailors and others to begin to stage, prepare, rehearse, and review critical information

absent the details that are being planned above the plate decks. The crux of action emanates from the unit's standing operating procedures that must be developed, rehearsed, and instilled into the units and cross-pollinated with counterparts in order to ensure success and synchronization.

To improve the process, one must understand that the mission confirmation brief is not the main event, and R²P² is not a single event in support of the mission confirmation brief. R²P² is a summation of maintaining situational awareness and developing the options in order to shape or react to the scenario presented. To do so, it is imperative that every member gain and maintain situational awareness while conducting staff synchronization across the warfighting functions with their respective counterparts. Every day the ARG/MEU (CE, GCE, ACE, CLB) should be building the commander's battlespace area evaluation, thus informing him of his higher headquarters' intent, adjacent/supporting units' capabilities, enemy situation, area of influence/interest, and the centers of gravity he must protect, sustain, or attack. The byproduct of this situational awareness is the dissemination of information to the Marines/sailors executing the actions. Daily situational awareness and understanding of the potential mission sets will instill confidence when the plan generated from R²P² is actually briefed and subsequently issued. Lastly, confidence in the plan is gained and maintained through rehearsals. Prior to any mission, there is no downtime. Tactical decision games, walk-throughs, and rehearsals in the well deck sharpen our warriors and ensure successful R²P² and quickly understood mission confirmation briefs, no matter the situation or the plan approved.

In short, the beauty of R²P² is that the bulk of the planning and mission rehearsals are already done prior to deployment. Marines/sailors gain confidence with rapid planning through their own parallel planning/actions that support the unit standing operating procedures, and are verified through the mission rehearsals that the ARG/MEU inherently execute. Any change from the R²P²

mission sets requires deliberate planning. No matter which, situational awareness through commander's battlespace area evaluation is the most important and often forgotten step that will support either R²P² or deliberate planning.

LtCol Chad Drake

Qualified People in Combat

■ Mr. Birdzell's article, "Are All Marines Really Created Equal?" (*MCG*, Apr13), argues that if women in the Marine Corps really want equality, there should be only one physical fitness test/ combat fitness test that isn't gender normed. The true issue here isn't whether or not women should be allowed to join combat MOSs; it is about giving everyone who meets the standard the opportunity to try. Now that the Services are required to find out whether or not to open combat MOSs to women, what they should be researching is how to put

**... the standards
need to change to put
the best-qualified people,
men or women, in
the appropriate MOS.**

the best-qualified people in every MOS, regardless of gender. Times are changing, and the standards need to change to put the best-qualified people, men or women, in the appropriate MOS. At the end of the day, I don't care what race, religion, or gender you are. What I care about most is whether or not my Marines are technically and tactically proficient, demonstrate leadership skills to lead subordinates, and set the example. Instead of seeing so many articles about why women can't do something, the *Gazette* would be better served by publishing articles with solutions to controversial issues versus complaints.

Capt Michelle E. Augustine

Join the debate. Post your opinions on our discussion board at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest Results


The 2012 Gen Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest, sponsored by the Battelle Corporation and the Hogaboom family, received almost 100 submissions. On 22 March, the *Gazette* Editorial Advisory Panel met to select the winners. The following are this year's awardees.

First place goes to LtCol Mike Jernigan for his essay, "Otis' Raible Defines Leadership." On 15 September 2012 at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, LtCol Chris "Otis" Raible, Commanding Officer, Marine Attack Squadron 211, was returning from chow when the Taliban attacked the camp's airfield. In recounting the story of LtCol Raible's rallying his Marines and directing the defense, the author chronicles some of the leadership beliefs held by LtCol Raible: "Keep things simple and easy to execute; run

to the sound of the fight; rally the Marines; ... engage the enemy." LtCol Jernigan will receive a plaque and \$3,000.

Second place goes to Capt Gordon W. Emmanuel for his essay, "No Combat? No Problem." Capt Emmanuel writes about the "dilemma" that will face many young Marines who report to their new units without any combat experience and will repeatedly hear, "That's not how we did it when." The author maintains that leaders lacking combat experience can be just as effective as veterans who served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Traits are shared by all who serve in the Marine Corps, which are "... used toward the accomplishment of a common goal." Capt Emmanuel will receive a plaque and \$1,500.

Capt Benjamin J. Stafford's "Genuine Concern" and 2dLt Patrick Whalen's



Gen Robert E. Hogaboom

This contest is named for Gen Robert E. Hogaboom, USMC(Ret), who served the Corps for 34 years. Upon graduating from the Naval Academy in 1925, Gen Hogaboom saw service in Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. Following action in a number of key Pacific battles in World War II,

he later served first as Assistant Division Commander, then Division Commander, 1st MarDiv, in Korea from 1954-55. Gen Hogaboom retired in 1959 as a lieutenant general while serving as Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, and was subsequently advanced to the rank of general.

"Leaders of Friends" were chosen as honorable mentions. Each Marine will receive a plaque and \$500.

Battelle
The Business of Innovation.



LtCol Michael Jernigan



Capt Gordon W. Emmanuel



Capt Benjamin J. Stafford



2dLt Patrick Whalen

Professional Support for Rain Cooled, Foot Propelled, Green, Amphibious Monsters — Our Calling for a Hundred Years!



Help Us Inspire, Connect and Support Marines by Joining

CHOOSE YOUR MCA&F MEMBERSHIP TERM:

	Print Edition Both Magazines	Print Edition One Magazine	Digital Editions Only Both Magazines
1 Year	<input type="checkbox"/> \$70.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$35.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$35.00
2 Years - Save 9%	<input type="checkbox"/> \$128.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$64.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$64.00
3 Years - Save 15%	<input type="checkbox"/> \$178.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$89.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$89.00

MARINE CORPS GAZETTE **LEATHERNECK MAGAZINE** (Each option Includes access to Online Editions of Both Magazines)

ONLINE EDITIONS ONLY – (Both *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Leatherneck*)

• Online Accessible, Environmentally Friendly, and More Convenient than Mail Delivery

NAML

Rank/Full Name: _____ Branch of Service: _____

Address: _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Telephone: _____ E-Mail: _____

Status: Active Retired Reserve Civilian Veteran Dependent

Last 4 numbers of SSN: _____ Date of Birth: _____

Method of payment: Check or Money Order enclosed VISA Discover MasterCard AmEx

Credit Card Number _____ Verification # _____

Signature _____ Expiration Date _____

(Payment cannot be processed without signature.)

Thank You For Joining MCA&F!

P.O. Box 1775, 715 Broadway • Quantico, VA 22134-0775 • Toll-Free: 866-622-1775

Offer expires 31 Dec 2013

Membership Features the Magazines that Keep You Current on the Issues and Ongoing Story of our Corps and ONLINE Access to Both Magazines is **AUTOMATIC** with EVERY Membership.

Other benefits include exclusive member savings at The MARINE Shop at Quantico, Camp Lejeune and ONLINE at www.marineshop.net as well as with our affinity partners.

www.mca-marines.org

www.mcafdn.org



Marine Corps
Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

JOIN TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775



Initiative in Battle: Past and Future

Originally published: August 1997

by LTC (P) Douglas A. Macgregor, USA



Serious students of modern warfare understand that a host of factors contribute to success in battle. Focusing on only one aspect of effective warfighting—in this case the exercise of initiative in battle—potentially risks skewing the analysis and missing other factors of equal or greater importance.¹ Yet, initiative is a recurring theme in military literature. In the U.S. Army's doctrinal writings, initiative is defined as action that sets or changes the terms of battle.² In the U.S. Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine, junior officers are encouraged to make decisions on their own initiative based on their understanding of their senior's intent.³ In the Army and the Marine Corps, initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority in combat to the lowest practical level. In offensive operations, initiative entails never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. In the defense, initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations while negating the attacking enemy's initial advantages.

Without oversimplifying the problems associated with the exercise of initiative in battle, this essay argues that while it may not be possible to win wars at the company or battalion level, it has always been and will continue to be possible to lose them there. This is, in part, because the successful exercise of initiative in battle is inseparable from the adaptation of methods and tactics to the chaotic and rapidly changing nature of warfare.

Blindly following the orders of higher headquarters cannot be the guiding

principle of platoons or teams, let alone battalion task forces, in future war. In fact, new weapons and digitized communications technology will not fulfill their promise of shaping the future battlefield to American advantage if everyone in the chain of command waits passively for orders and is not trained to take the initiative—to notice, to anticipate, and to exploit opportunities. As long as warfare remains exploratory in character, it will never be possible to foresee all contingencies, nor will the planning structures abstracted from the battlespace ever coincide precisely with conditions in combat.⁴

For real-time information and intelligence to be of any value in future battle, tactical leaders will have to be trained to exercise their initiative, to act decisively and often without orders or permission from higher headquarters. Just as it is necessary to move beyond deliberate planning to rapid decisionmaking based on limited and time-sensitive information in the training of military leaders, it is equally important to develop the capacity of junior officers and non-commissioned officers to act independently and frequently without orders, but within a known tactical and operational mission framework.

To some readers in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps, these observations will seem dated. Instantaneous communications are becoming so responsive and the faith in the infallibility of surveillance technology and precision-guided weapons so widespread that many contemporary military leaders are concluding that the responsive, but unimaginative military technician

is all that will be needed in future war.⁵ With the ability to control from afar in real-time, the inclination among many senior military leaders will be to do so constantly. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the problem. However, it is against this background that a discussion of initiative in battle must begin.

Old Concerns, Current Realities

In theory, military leaders who exhibit initiative are much sought after commodities. In practice, this is rarely the case. This is because initiative is, for the most part, only evident in action when there is little or no time to seek and receive guidance from higher headquarters. In fact, it is always the absence of time that compels the responsible military leader to act, and to act immediately when information or plans are overtaken by events. However, without the opportunity to exercise initiative in training, the possibility that officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers will do so in combat when initiative is essential is always remote.

Today, advances in microcircuitry, directed energy, and materials are creating a new dilemma for the Army's senior leaders. A brief look at what current observers inside the Army say about initiative in training is illuminating. One former senior observer/controller (OC) at the National Training Center (NTC) stated recently that:

Commanders are not taking risks. We continue to see cookie-cutter approaches with regard to tactics, like keeping two up and one back . . . that generally results in frontal at-

tacks instead of any really innovative or risk-taking effort on the part of unit commanders.⁶

In an article published in the *Washington Times* on 30 May 1996, LTG Theodore G. Stroup, USA, assistant chief of staff for personnel, referred to anecdotal accounts from the field of “stifled initiative, lack of trust of subordinates, and a culture that overemphasizes perfection.”⁷ It is clear that inhibiting initiative and innovation at lower levels is not a uniquely Russian problem.

To combat the obstacles that traditionally obstruct the development of initiative in the Army’s officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers requires an understanding of the many reasons for the apparent gap between the theory and practice of exercising initiative. First, given the opportunity to remain quiet as opposed to taking a risk and being wrong, most American military leaders prefer to keep a low profile. Officers and noncommissioned officers learn early that to raise one’s profile in training by doing things successfully in a new way or to question the plans or views of a superior is always hazardous. Why? Displaying initiative is a risk, because if a decision to act differently from the norm is incorrect, liability is placed immediately on the person who made the decision, and as LTG Stroup implied earlier, the sanctions for doing things differently or making a mistake are likely to be hard on a soldier’s career. In other words, when rewards in terms of promotion are structured to emphasize efficiency and control in a centralized decisionmaking environment, it is difficult to avoid imposing sanctions for violating established norms in what is really a low-risk situation.

Second, military leaders who do not display initiative are frequently a comfort to their commanders. Contrary to popular belief, military leaders in war or peace who are willing to risk action—the essence of initiative—are viewed with considerable apprehension. In contrast, military leaders who urge caution and conservatism are always welcome additions to any planning meeting or counsel of war.

Third, military leaders who display initiative are usually a mixed blessing

for large military organizations that thrive on stability. Given the choice before the outbreak of the Civil War of serving with George McClellan, who exemplified the qualities of caution and conservatism, or Thomas Jonathan (Stonewall) Jackson, almost nobody in the U.S. Army’s high command would have chosen Jackson over McClellan. Although Jackson possessed considerable originality, energy, intelligence, determination, and tenacity, those very traits that made him a gifted soldier and commander ensured that he would be, at the same time, a demanding leader and a difficult man for superiors to work with. The same would be said later of GEN George S. Patton, Jr.

These points notwithstanding, when professional understanding, intelligence, self-confidence and a strong will are united in one person, the exercise of initiative in battle produces stupendous results. As the word is applied in this context, however, initiative is not the result of an untutored individual response based on a sudden, creative impulse. Rather the successful exercise of initiative in battle involves recognizing the relationship of an individual’s personality attributes—physical and moral courage, intelligence, and character—to developed professional expertise and making decisions under the adverse conditions of combat that will contribute to mission success. In this sense, the exercise of initiative presupposes a concrete knowledge of the higher commander’s intent, tactics and weaponry, extraordinary self-confidence, and a willingness to accept responsibility for taking actions that were neither planned in advance nor ordered by higher headquarters.⁸

Developing the Capacity for Initiative

Communications is at the heart of command and control in modern warfare. Advances in communications technology continue to extend the range of coverage, the reliability, and speed of modern communications. The U.S. Army is nearing the point when a digitized shared situation map at every level—battalion, brigade, division and corps—will fuse near real-time intelligence with near perfect friendly situational awareness.⁹ At the same time, the

greater the ability to control, the greater the desire to do so at every echelon of command and control. In fact, the emphasis in contemporary Army training on the leading role of the commander in all activities makes it very likely that commanders at every echelon will seek to carefully plan and control the actions of their subordinates. It is safe to assume that the struggle for dominance between the commander on the scene and the responsible higher command authority remote from the scene of conflict will remain a significant source of conflict within all future military organizations. But to believe that the wars of the future, thanks to dramatic advances in such fields as computers, microwave transmission, and remotely controlled sensors will be less opaque and therefore more easily conducted by remote control is sheer delusion.¹⁰ In the course of describing the chaotic nature of warfare to his readers, S.L.A. Marshall explains why:

In combat almost nothing has the appearance of juncture and of hanging together. Viewed from above, an attack would appear not unlike the disparate movements of a colony of water bugs. The first effect of fire is to dissolve all appearance of order. This is the most shocking surprise to troops who are experiencing combat for the first time. They cannot anticipate the speed with which their own forces become fractionalized or the extent to which the fractions will become physically divorced from each other as the movement is extended and enemy resistance stiffens.¹¹

Today, the situation is not much better. Although the effects of fire on armored and air mobile forces may or may not be as great in the future as the effects of fire on dismounted light infantry in 1944, the probability that combat will be sudden, swift, and unpredictable makes the half-life of useful information and intelligence on the tactical and operational levels potentially quite short. More simply stated, if people are not prepared to exploit tactical opportunities based on real-time information without first gaining permission from some higher headquarters, real-time information probably won’t make much difference. GEN Bruce Clarke, com-

mander of Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division, during World War II, made the point directly:

That's why you've got to get your senior ground force commander to give you his final goal, not a bunch of phase lines. Once you're rolling, any break in the game may give you the opportunity to go all the way. In three, four or five hours, you may be able to grab off what he has scheduled for three days. So make him tell you the final goal. Saves lives and a lot of grief and bloodshed.¹²

Far from determining the outcome of future battles, sophisticated communications and information processing will only shape the environment in which decisions involving the exercise of initiative will have to be made. Martin van Creveld argues in his work *Command in War* that transcending the limitations of new communications and weapons technology will necessitate rather than obviate the need for initiative in battle:

In war, given any one state of technological development, to raise decision thresholds and reduce the initiative and self-containment of subordinate units is to limit the latter's ability to cope on their own and thus increase the immediate risk with which they are faced; in other words, greater certainty at the top (more reserves, superior control), is only bought at the expense of less certainty at the bottom.¹³

These points suggest that while a brigade or battalion task force commander can create the conditions conducive to victory in battle through leadership and training, once the battle begins, the commander's ability to influence the critical events that will determine the eventual outcome will be quite limited. No commander is capable of leading an entire unit in combat whether it is a company or a division. More important, modern technology is pushing the human mind to and beyond its normal limits of comprehension. Computers, satellites, signal intelligence of all forms, and instantaneous communications already create a situation in which far more information is available to a unit commander at any level than he can possibly digest in the time available. And this situation will not improve

in the future. This is a fact of life in combat that was well-known to the Germans in the interwar period and which supported a training doctrine that relied for its success more on the quality of its junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers than on any particular weapons technology.

Anyone who had the privilege of leading American combat soldiers under fire during DESERT STORM will attest to the high quality of American manpower in Army and Marine combat units. Is there any reason why a philosophy combining new technology with high quality American manpower cannot also shape the structure and content of contemporary training in the Army and the Marine Corps?

In order to obtain a more initiating training structure and command climate, it is necessary to give soldiers at the lowest level more decisionmaking authority.

Ready for Change?

In order to obtain a more initiating training structure and command climate, it is necessary to give soldiers at the lowest level more decisionmaking authority and much broader input into the command and control of their units on a regular basis than is presently the case in most American military formations. As the following example will illustrate, when American combat soldiers' freedom of action is less restricted, their performance is impressive. Consider this example:

Task Force (TF) 1-77 Armor rotated to the NTC for the first time in March 1983. Initially, the unit's performance against the opposing force (OpFor) was poor. One of the TF's elements, Company C, participated in two successive operations that resulted in dramatic defeats for the Task Force. Although they played a minor part in these ac-

tions, Company C's troops and its commander were notably depressed by the events. When the third mission order was received for a deliberate defense, Company C was positioned in a traditional "goose egg" battle position near an outpost in the NTC's southern corridor. A mechanized infantry platoon was supposed to join them, but maintenance difficulties prevented it. Preparations for the defense went ahead without them. A few hours after preparation for the defense had already begun, a private from the third platoon showed his platoon sergeant a dry stream bed on the extreme flank of the battle position along an old impact area that allowed for the concealed approach of enemy armor. The platoon sergeant promptly called the tank company commander and urged him to look at the stream bed. On seeing the stream bed, the company commander thanked the soldiers for their suggestions and changed the disposition of Company C's 16 tanks. Instead of occupying the battle position on the overlay, the company commander extended his line of defense for nearly 2,000 meters to cover the approach on the right flank. The commander and his dismounted tankers then physically placed 600 mines in an angular belt nearly 700 meters in length designed to drive attacking forces from the stream bed into the center of Company C's engagement area. When the tank company commander informed his TF commander of what he had done without consulting him, the TF commander grudgingly approved the change saying that he was prepared to try anything after the last two mission failures. The next morning, 123 OpFor vehicles were destroyed in less than 38 minutes in front of Company C's unorthodox position.¹⁴

At first glance, initiative in battle seems to be in conflict with the interests of synchronization and control. Yet, without the opportunity to develop a working relationship inside the organization that welcomes broad input and independent action to cope with changing circumstances, synchronization and the technical expertise to engage and destroy the enemy would have made no difference to the outcome in this

example. Today, however far reaching the influence of information age technology may be, the assumption that technology will always work in anyone's hands or substitute for human judgment and intelligence is a prescription for failure.

But the major obstacle to exploiting the initiative of subordinates is not information age technology! It is more likely to be the absence of trust between echelons of command arising from a sense of discomfort in senior commanders with independent subordinates. Instead of trusting subordinates to exercise judgment and exploit opportunities, many of history's unsuccessful wartime commanders simply preferred to hold subordinates "liable" for their actions. Only repetitive training that emphasizes improvisation on the basis of known human and technological capabilities in the face of the unexpected can instill the initiative that frequently lies dormant in today's American soldiers. Without oversimplifying the issue, a possible formula for developing the capacity for initiative in battle that embraces the elements outlined in this essay might look like the following:

the "cookie-cutter solution" mentioned earlier. A deliberate training approach to develop soldier initiative can result in constructive initiative based on trust in the chain of command, in new technology, and in greater individual self-confidence.

Concluding Thoughts

In the words of Frederick the Great: "To advance is to conquer!" Blind indeed is the commander who fails to understand this simple formula for victory and who suppresses rather than develops subordinates who seek to advance! Almost always, the pivots of strength in combat are those with the skills, intelligence, character, and physical courage to exercise initiative. Today initiative on the tactical level is still vital because modern firepower compels ground forces to disperse as well as to accomplish a multitude of complex tasks within a given mission.

To dismiss the emphasis on initiative in training risks reducing future joint task forces to inert masses; paralyzed, rather than empowered by new communications technologies and access to "real-time" information and surveil-

And while initiative in battle will never be enough to win wars on its own, without initiative in battle, victory is unlikely. Nothing contained in the record concerning the true performance and impact of surveillance technology and precision guided weapons in DESERT STORM suggests that greater reliance on these capabilities in the future to substitute for initiative in battle will work in the future.¹⁵ As the U.S. Armed Forces discovered in Vietnam, an increase in the responsiveness of applied firepower through digitized communications will not translate automatically into positional advantage in a tactically rigid and centralized command climate. Information age technology can augment, but not replace the American soldier's capacity for initiative in battle. This problem manifested itself when a container ship, the SS *Mayaguez*, was seized by armed forces of Cambodia's Khymer Rouge Government in May 1975.

In 1975, recently developed global communications structures in the Department of Defense created the notion that higher commanders who were remote from the scene of the action could exert the synchronizing influence on the

$$\text{INITIATIVE IN ACTION} = \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{TRUST, EXPERTISE \&} \\ \text{SELF-CONFIDENCE} \end{array} + \begin{array}{l} \text{TRAINING AND} \\ \text{LEADERSHIP} \end{array} \right) \times \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{INFORMATION} \\ \text{AGE} \\ \text{TECHNOLOGY} \end{array} \right)$$

Computer simulations and field training exercises can all be structured and exploited in conformity with this equation to produce constructive initiative in battle. Commanders can create opportunities in training for subordinate initiative or they can exclude it from the menu. Opportunistic situations can supplant "no win" scenarios. Near real-time intelligence can be provided and commanders can practice exploiting it. Emphasizing the skilled employment of fires and forces to ensure that every enemy is attacked from at least two directions simultaneously and compelling subordinates to break the rules in order to win are additional ways for today's combat troops to avoid

lance. "Digitized communications" has the potential to magnify the problem of overelaboration of detail in excessively long orders with the result that subordinate leaders enjoy little freedom of action or decision. Or digital communications technology, such as the commander's digitized, shared situation map, can potentially facilitate the swift changes in position and tactics at the lowest level that will support dexterity on the operational level. Still, this involves subordinate initiative "pulling" combat forces into action at the point of the sword, rather than fighting the detailed plan provided by higher headquarters at the expense of battlefield opportunism on the tactical level.

conduct of Marine operations to liberate the SS *Mayaguez* from Cambodian control. The airborne command and control platforms jammed with sophisticated communications technology that orbited in the skies over the Cambodian coast convinced senior Navy and Marine officers that they could coordinate Marine combat actions on the ground, direct accurate fire support and impose order on the untidy combat operations below them. The opposite turned out to be the case. As noted by John F. Guilmartin in his excellent study of the action, instantaneous communications that are exploited for the purpose of micromanaging tactical operations from operational headquarters do not

result in more effective command in battle or a more precise application of force: "No amount of communications can replace a competent and responsible commander on scene. To attempt to do so is to invite disaster."¹⁶ Contrary to expectations at the time, it turned out to be Marine initiative in battle that averted disaster and rescued the *Mayaguez*.

Having said this, American fighting forces will only do in war what they have learned in prewar training. And while there is plenty of confirmation in the historical record that American enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and junior officers can exercise initiative and make good decisions under the pressure of combat, there is also a lot of evidence to suggest that they will only make the right decisions if they are trained and encouraged to do so before the war begins.¹⁷ This is because action without specific orders from higher authority requires independent judgment. But it is unrealistic to expect that American military leaders will demonstrate the

requisite physical energy, mental agility and moral courage to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and exercise initiative in battle if they have never been allowed to do so in training.

To achieve the aim of developing leaders in training who will exercise initiative in battle, American military leaders at every echelon must (as always) be prepared to share the danger and discomfort of close combat with their soldiers, support and promote unconventional and often difficult subordinates that accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks and devise new ways of accomplishing assigned missions. These are not easy tasks for today's senior military leaders, but the benefit to the combat troops in the Army and the Marine Corps will be a degree of internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability in the face of constant change.¹⁸ And, most important, the capacity for constructive initiative in battle at every level, as well as across Service lines, will guarantee that future joint task forces will be living organisms, endowed with irresistible fighting power.

Notes

1. Robert M. Epstein *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), p. 183.
2. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *FM 100-5*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 2-6.
3. *FM 1, Warfighting*, (Department of the Navy, Hqtrs USMC, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 62.
4. The author is indebted to Dr. Fred Kagan, assistant professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy for his suggestions contained in this paragraph.
5. Thomas L. Friedman, "The No-Dead War," *New York Times*, 23 August 1995, p. 21.
6. LTC G. Chesley Harris, IN, "Topic: Battle Staff Proficiency," in "Notes from the Box: A Directed Study Project of the Army War College, Senior O/C's Observations and Comments on Training for Success," *CTC Quarterly Bulletin*, 4th Qtr, FY95, No. 95-11, September 1995, p. II-20.

7. "Report Shows Distrust Prevalent Within Army," *Washington Times*, 30 May 1996, p. 4. Also see Patrick Paxton's "You Will Not Fail: Fear of Mistakes Throttles Initiative in the Ranks," *Army Times*, 12 February 1996, pp. 12-15.

8. Mary Zey-Ferrell, Arlene Parchman and Jerry Gaston, *Initiative and Innovation in the Soviet Military*, (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, The Texas Engineering Experiment Station of the Texas A&M University System, 1984), p. 7.

9. COL Patrick Lamar, USA, LTC Billy McCollum, USA, LTC John A. Collier, Jr., USA, MAJ Edwin Kuster, Jr., USA, "Battle Command Battle Laboratories: Where Tomorrow's Victories Begin," *Military Review*, May-June 1996, pp. 58-59.

10. Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 266.

11. S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War*, (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 122978), p. 90.

12. William Donohue Ellis and Col Thomas J. Cunningham, Jr., *Clarke of St. Vith: The Sergeants' General*, (Cleveland, OH: Dillon/Liederbach Inc., 1974), p. 166.

13. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War*, p. 274.


14. The author was the company commander in this incident.

15. See Tim Weiner's article: "Smart Weapons Were Overrated, Study Concludes: War Boasts Were Wrong, Review of Persian Gulf combat Questions Priorities of Pentagon's Arms Policy," *New York Times*, 6 July 1996, p. A1 and A14.

16. John F. Guilmartin, *A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang*, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995).

17. Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus, *The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 141.

18. Gen Hermann Balck, "Observations Related to Moral Conflict," quoted by Col John R. Boyd, USAF, in an unpublished manuscript entitled: "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," August 1987.



Officer Professional Military Education

Distance Education Program

Expeditionary Warfare School Command and Staff College

Contact Your Regional Coordinator
www.tecom.usmc.mil/cdet
 1.888.4DL.USMC



Presenting The 2013 Birthday Ball Catalog

View the Digital
Catalog **ONLINE** at
www.marineshop.net



Use the attached
card to request
a print copy of
the catalog!



All purchases help support Marines through MCA&F programs that provide funding to advance leadership, recognize excellence, and provide Marine unit libraries. Learn more about the MCA&F programs that inspire, connect and support Marines: www.mcafdn.org



JOIN TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org

866-622-1775



The Attritionist Letters (#14)

Women in the infantry

by Anonymous

I have no intention of explaining how the correspondence, which I now offer to the public, fell into my hands. The general who authored them is almost certainly retired, for he writes with such careless disregard—and one might suggest some contempt—for our beloved Corps. The young captain to whom he writes is a more puzzling case; there are far too many Capt Wormwoods in the global access list to determine which is being addressed. Nevertheless, it is the essence of these papers that I find disconcerting—and this the urgency with which I submit them to you, the reader. Read on.

My Dear Wormwood, I find it interesting that your “friends” are discussing the idea of having women in the infantry. Whatever is there to discuss? Your job is not to think about such issues (or anything else, for that matter). You are to do as you are told, as I have had to remind you on several occasions. My peers and I will make this decision and we will be guided only by our consciences in doing so. My conscience tells me that I will not be promoted if I do not support the policy of allowing women in the combat arms. As you can therefore imagine, I am four-square in favor of dropping all barriers immediately.

Some sluggards will call for “studies” and “surveys,” but this is mere eyewash. The ultimate result will be exactly the same. How can we benefit from dragging our feet on this issue? After all, in our effort to cozy up to

our political masters in Washington, we must acknowledge no limitations. Marine Corps policies will inevitably be compared to much more liberal policies that the other Services are likely to pursue. The writing is on the wall.

The key now is to do nothing that will mark you as an opponent of the policy.

As someone who “supported” this measure from the beginning, I will steal a march on those with whom I must compete for promotion. You should profit from my experience.

I can almost hear the “maneuverists” prattling on about “combat effectiveness” and how integrating women into the combat arms will have deleterious effects. Do not be concerned by this; pay it no mind. The Marine Corps is the most powerful fighting force the world has ever seen—all of our advertising says so. What does it matter if we lose a little effectiveness? We will still be better than the Army (which is, after all, our

real competition). The true battlefield, dear boy, is political, not military.

If anyone you know expresses an opinion against allowing women in the combat arms, you must muzzle them. This is easy to do. Simply frame the discussion as an equal rights issue. Who in their right mind would dare to openly oppose the idea of equal rights? To do so would be to announce oneself as an enemy of freedom and democracy as we have currently defined them. Say that their logic masks their elitist, sexist bigotry. The carping will stop almost instantly, I assure you. Equal protection under the law is no longer the goal; equality of outcome has become our ideological totem. See how easy this is? I myself am practically convinced. I find that I almost believe the things I am writing!

Once those around you resign themselves to the coming changes, tell them that the best way to adjust is to simply forget that men and women are physically different in any way. Do not entertain any discussion regarding differing physical standards. That will all be cleared up in time. They will also need to forget that when young men and women are placed in close proximity, hanky-panky is often the result, with potentially disastrous results on the cohesion of a combat unit. No matter. We will call it a “leadership challenge” and add yet another rock to every junior officer’s pack.

It is easy to see which way the winds are blowing when it comes to allowing women in the infantry. I plan on trimming my sails so as to make the most favorable port possible. I suggest you do the same.

Gen Screwtape



Returning to Our Roots

Marine advisors in the 21st century

by Maj Monty J. Fontenot & COL G.L. Lamborn, USAR(Ret)



We need capable advisors on the ground. (Photo by Sgt Ryan S. Scranton.)

Politically unstable nations will continue to plague humanity, perhaps for eternity. Many of these countries are vulnerable to internal warfare and terrorism. It only takes a minute or two to look at a world map to see where nascent insurgencies are starting to gain footholds in areas that today seem of little importance, but which, if ignored, will fester into costly and complex problems involving the prospect of war. Marines will note with interest that a majority of these problem countries lie within the littorals, accessible by sea, from the 30th parallel north latitude to the 30th parallel south latitude.

A potential revolutionary situation exists in any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to ensure at least a minimally decent

standard of life for the great majority of its citizens. If there also exists even the nucleus of a revolutionary party able to supply doctrine and organization, only one ingredient is needed: the instrument for violent revolutionary action.¹

So-called “full-spectrum” military action in many of these unstable areas may either be impractical or unwise, and, in any case, such operations are

highly likely to be both costly and difficult. Through hard experience we have found that it is easy to become involved in military operations in volatile areas of the Third World, but far more difficult to extricate ourselves from our hasty entanglements. Military intervention in politically sensitive areas often has long-lasting, unpleasant consequences—negative social and political outcomes merely add to the high cost of our involvement.

Now imagine that, as a part of a thoughtful, proactive Marine Corps effort to preempt revolutionary violence, we had capable advisors on the ground, able to mitigate some of the regime’s failings that spawn extremist groups. By working with local forces well before instability turns into violence, advisors can put the Commandant in a position of being able to walk into the Secretary of Defense’s office and saying, “Mr. Secretary, let me tell you about the problem you don’t have, thanks to a team of politically and culturally savvy Marines.” Rather than stationing a MEU off of the coast, or putting ashore a battalion landing team for short-duration missions that only have marginal effects, a relatively small number of highly trained advisors could address some of the political or economic root causes

>Maj Fontenot, formerly with the Center for Irregular Warfare, Combat Development Command, is currently in the AfPak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) Hands program completing Dari language training, and will return to Afghanistan for his third tour as a Marine Corps advisor.

>>COL Lamborn is the author of *Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty-First Century*, released by Casemate Publishers in July 2012.

of a nascent insurgency, especially as they relate to the military security of the aided country.

Perhaps we are so intent on “war-fighting” that we ignore the more important military function of keeping the peace. As early 20th-century BG Frederick W. Lewis said, “The time to win a fight is before it starts.” Advisors are uniquely positioned to help allied governments prevent the outbreak of war. This is good news for a Secretary of Defense who may be grappling with many other crises.

Choosing the Best Tool for the Job

By itself, being “amphibious” is not enough, nor is it even the primary tool by which small wars are won. Ships are simply modes of transportation—they get you places. The question is: What will you do when you get there? Moreover, how will you do it? It is unrealistic to assume that we could cruise to a foreign shore, quickly land a MEU, defeat an insurgency conventionally in 30 days, get back on the ship, and declare victory. Seizing an island, airstrip, or port is certainly possible by using amphibious means, but defeating—or better, preempting—an insurgency is not.

Section II, Strategy, of the Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* defines the situation:

The application of purely military measures may not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. . . . The solution of such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and should be applied only to such extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures.²

This is remarkably farsighted advice for 1935–40, but is nevertheless completely accurate in the 21st century.

A recently published book, *Arms of Little Value*, adds to this definition by calling insurgency “armed politics,” and making the following point:

Third, because insurgencies can take place only under certain conditions and involve an insurrection against

an established regime, and because the heart of any insurgency is its political basis, the chief weapons are intelligence and counterintelligence, subversion, propaganda and political warfare, passive resistance, sabotage, and time.³

It is vital that our senior leadership clearly understand that the tools required to seize a Tarawa or Peleliu are vastly different from those needed to effectively cope with an insurgency. Firepower is required to seize ground from a conventional enemy; brainpower is essential for helping local security forces deal with internal problems.

The Marine Corps has a unique history of advising local forces and civil authorities, using only minimal force when absolutely required, but emphasizing teaching, training, and mentoring to develop capable indigenous defense forces. In the past, the Marine Corps did this through a series of talented and dedicated advisors. Many were familiar with the languages and cultures of the people with whom they worked. Given the likely spread of political instability and low-intensity violence around the globe in the coming years, the need to rebuild a body of Marine Corps advisors is imperative.

National policy speaks to this very issue. The President’s most recent guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, lists three key takeaways relating to advising and security force assistance:⁴

- “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”
- “As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance.”
- “. . . [T]he United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue

to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

The message should be clear that what is desired by the policy community is greater emphasis on advisory capabilities, security force assistance, and military-to-military cooperation to achieve our national objectives.

It is immediately obvious that advisors who have established close professional relationships with host-nation military leaders, and who are conversant with local political and economic conditions, will serve national interests more effectively than would a MEU which probably has few individuals who have much, if any, knowledge of the local people or situation. It is clear which is the better tool for the job.

An Effective Advisor

As matters stand, there is little that most U.S. Embassies can accomplish relative to their host-country’s security forces, certainly as it relates to hands-on advising and training, even if a given country team is fortunate to have a talented and energetic Defense Attaché. There is simply no possibility that a busy Attaché can meet on a daily basis at the working level with host-nation officers and NCOs; he is far too busy at the Defense Ministry level and with his duties at the Embassy. Unless there is a military advisory group—of which few exist—the absence of advisors leaves a void that cannot otherwise be filled.

Advisors bridge the gap that exists between a country team and the host-nation’s forces. Advisors have the capability to work independently in either contested or uncontested areas while conducting a broad range of security cooperation activities, working with and through their host-nation counterparts. Advisors will have a level of training and experience that will facilitate integration and interoperability of indigenous forces, as required, with special operations forces or general purpose forces. An advisor is, first and foremost, a seasoned, professional Marine.

Advisor skill sets are more comprehensive and multidimensional than

trainer skill sets. Advisors provide expert opinion, advice, and good counsel by focusing on both personal development (interpersonal and communication skills) and professional development (technical and tactical knowledge) of their counterparts while developing mutual trust and respect. Every advisor has to be a trainer, but not all trainers can perform the more demanding task of advising. Training occurs in a controlled environment, with the trainer frequently following a fixed program of instruction in order to improve certain unit skills. By contrast, advising often requires the advisor to develop a broader program and then coach foreign units on a continuing basis under actual circumstances where the outcomes are real. Perhaps the advisor's single most important obligation to his host-nation counterparts is to help them become professionally competent and develop the leadership qualities they need to be more effective commanders and soldiers. This duty goes far beyond presenting training on specific skills.

To qualify for such a demanding and important duty, advisors will go through a careful selection process that identifies their aptitude for working with foreign partners, often from very different cultural backgrounds. Advisors must have regional expertise and the ability to understand their counterparts' perspectives in their specific cultural contexts. Ideally an advisor should speak the language of his counterparts and know quite a bit about that country's history and politics. His first task is to establish good rapport; his second task is to turn rapport into strong mutual respect. It is largely through personal relationships and force of character that an advisor accomplishes his difficult mission. This agenda requires a Marine officer or NCO with high intelligence, cultural "fluency," and a rare set of strong interpersonal skills.

Above all, advisors influence the host-nation and its security services. As noted, advisors must be able to quickly establish credibility and rapport with their hosts. To do this, advisors need to be of sufficient rank and maturity to be seen as credible, well-rounded professionals. They must have sufficient



Carefully selected and trained for their advisor mission. (Photo by Cpl Michael S. Cifuentes.)

experience and expertise for their hosts to perceive that they "add value." While advisors may bring particular military occupational skills to the table, when they become advisors, they must show competence across the board in a wide variety of disciplines. Again, an advisor is more than a narrow specialist or trainer; he is to advise host-nation forces in many areas and bring about gradual—but real—improvements in both military and civil matters.

Among specialty disciplines, all advisors must be familiar with stability operations, how to conduct effective influence operations, basic intelligence and counterintelligence skills, and the principles of local governance as practiced within the cultural context of the host-nation. Knowledge of local governance is essential because insurgencies are not conventional wars fought between nations, but are instead internal struggles resulting from local political, administrative, or economic failings. If a Marine advisor is merely a good infantryman and nothing else, he can do little to bring about the reforms and improvements necessary to preempt the possibility of revolutionary violence.

A final consideration concerning the value of advisors is their low cost and small military footprint. Advisors are able to live off of the local economy at roughly the same standard of living as

their foreign partners. Advisors would be screened for their willingness to accept and accommodate different social norms, to include eating local fare three times a day, if required. There is no need for U.S. vehicles and the associated maintenance price tag that goes along with them, since an advisor would use local and partnered vehicles shared with his counterparts. Moreover, by their nature, advisors travel with a light footprint and operate with minimal burden to their hosts.

Consider for a moment the cost to the U.S. taxpayer of deploying even one company of regular infantrymen to some distant land, compared with the deployment of several advisors. The logistical cost of transporting abroad, then feeding and housing even one platoon, far exceeds the cost for a team of several advisors. There is also the central factor of what an infantry company could achieve with host-nation forces versus the broader political-military results achieved by skilled advisors.

Knowledge of Culture and Language are Valuable Operational Tools

The problem faced by conventional forces attempting to operate in an unconventional environment is that, culturally, they are "fish out of water." The greater the cultural distance between the average Marine and the local people,

the greater the burden on both parties to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial ends. Very few Marines speak non-Western languages, and too often we have seen serious problems arise between Marines and local people due to what might be called a “clash of cultures.”

While it is true that you may be able to communicate through an interpreter—and most conventional Marine units must do this—it is even more important that you understand the nature of the problem that you face. This understanding can only be gained through a working knowledge of the language and the culture of which it is a part. According to the *Small Wars Manual*:

A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language.⁵

Based on my own experience as an advisor in both Iraq and Afghanistan, I can attest to the way in which people will open up to you if you can hold even a minor conversation in their language. I was fortunate enough to receive formal language instruction in advance of my last deployment; being able to speak at a very basic conversational level made me acutely aware of the people and events and the situation around me.

Mao Tse-tung speaks of insurgents as being fish that swim through the water of the population. They have the advantage of knowing the local culture and language. If we hope to be more effective in unconventional operations, it is time that we also start learning to swim. Nearly every day we see heavily armed Marines driving armored vehicles in valleys and villages, occasionally stopping to talk to a villager through a “terp” (interpreter), and then driving on. Imagine the impact, though, of a Marine who can speak the local language and is not afraid to sit down with a villager and have a conversation. That Marine is treated like an honored

guest and receives a traditional Pashtun blessing that predates Islam from a village elder. He walks into a restaurant in Kabul and is treated like anyone else, having conversations over supper with locals who ask, “Why are the Americans scared to get out of their cars and talk to us?” He gets invited to civilian homes for a meal, or to weddings as a guest. Advisors who have language capability are able to penetrate the greater society and have a better understanding of the people and their concerns—sadly, many conventional Marines simply cannot do this.

Advisors, Past and Future

Without a doubt, there will be some who deprecate the idea of Marines being advisors. There are even some who, probably unwittingly, view the Marine Corps as being merely a “second land army,” complete with armor, artillery, and air power. But the deeper historical tradition of the Corps—perhaps its unique niche—has been its ability to deal with so-called small wars. The Marine Corps can point with pride to its *Small Wars Manual* that is, in many ways, timeless.

The Marine Corps also should bear in mind that among its advisors have been “stars” such as Gen Robert Barrow, the 27th Commandant; Chesty Puller; and numerous others. In our recent history, the Marine Corps has manned military training teams, embedded training teams, and police training teams. While these Marines have gained valuable experience and training, we currently have no formal method by which we can leverage this experience or maintain these skills for future service. It is clear that, if we are to follow the *35th Commandant’s Planning Guidance* as well as *Vision and Strategy 2025*, the Marine Corps must recognize and track Marines with unique skills for advising.⁶

The logical career path for Marine advisors would follow one similar to a regional affairs or foreign affairs officer. Advisors would alternate between their primary MOS and advising duties that capitalize not only on their individual skill sets, but their broader advising and mentoring skills.

While serving in their primary MOS, advisors ideally would be assigned to the MEF or Marine forces aligned with their special region of interest. Tours as advisors would be interwoven with each Marine’s normal career path and schooling. It therefore follows that, to identify Marine advisors having area and language knowledge, a distinctive MOS should be created. This would enable a regionally oriented MEF headquarters to more easily keep track of its trained advisors.

Many observers predict that political instability in the “thirty-to-thirty belt” will become more common as the 21st century unfolds. If that view is correct, the Marine Corps would find that, at very modest cost, it could create a cohort of regionally focused advisors having the requisite skills to deal with the challenges faced by a combatant commander in his area of responsibility. If this course is taken, and a team of skilled Marine advisors forestalls a festering situation in a country of interest, the Commandant will have the pleasure of telling the Secretary of Defense about a problem he does not have.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12–18, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, Washington, DC, April 1989, p. 5.
2. U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1940, p. 15.
3. Lamborn, G.L., *Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century*, Casemate Publishers, Havertown, PA, 2012, p. 58.
4. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, Washington, DC, January 2012, pp. 3, 4, and 6, respectively.
5. *Small Wars Manual*, p. 26.
6. Amos, Gen James F., *35th Commandant’s Planning Guidance*, HQMC, Washington, DC, 2010, and Headquarters Marine Corps, *Vision and Strategy 2025*, Washington, DC, 2008.



Open for Business

Operational employment of the MPF

by Maj Robert G. Barber

Commissioned in 1804 by President Thomas Jefferson following the Louisiana Purchase, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, accompanied by a brave 16-year-old Native American named Sacagawea, embarked on a transcontinental expedition westward across America to the Pacific Ocean. This successful expedition opened diplomatic relations and strengthened America's presence throughout North America. Some 206 years later, the Marine Corps integrated 2 auxiliary dry cargo/ammunition (T-AKE) vessels into the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) program named for these early Americans. USNS *Lewis and Clark* (T-AKE 1) joined Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2 (MPSRon-2) in September 2012, and USNS *Sacagawea* (T-AKE 2) joined MPSRon-3 in February 2013. Both MPSRons are assigned to Commander, United States Pacific Command, and apportioned for planning to all combatant commanders.¹

Through fiscal year 2017 (FY17), the Marine Corps' MPF program will continue to transition to a seabasing-enabled capability.² The integration

of T-AKE vessels provides combatant commanders with the capability to selectively offload a variety of equipment and tailorable sustainment packages to support the MAGTF both afloat and ashore. The MAGTF can operate from and be sustained by a seabase. The new MPF posture and MPSRon composition will generate operational relevance for MPF assets, potentially help mitigate the current amphibious shipping deficit, and save combatant commanders and Marine force components millions in exercise transportation costs.

In March 2010 and May 2011, HQMC published guidance on the employment of T-AKE vessels as they become a part of the MPF program. The current published T-AKE concept of employment allows MPF to better support employment options used in low- to mid-spectrum operations. This provides an immediate operational ben-

efit to the combatant commanders as an additional low-end employment option while retaining a high-end deployment capability and allowing use of MPF assets that are scalable across the full range of military operations (ROMO).

Proof of Concept

BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012, an exercise conducted off the East Coast of the United States, included a "proof of concept" to sustain forces ashore using a U.S. Navy combat logistics force T-AKE to attempt to validate the Marine Corps' published concept of employment.³ Building on that proof of concept, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MarForPac), conducted an additional proof of concept for operational employment of the T-AKE vessel in October 2012 during Exercise COCONUT GROVE 12 (CG12). COCONUT GROVE is a bilateral exercise conducted biannually with the Maldivian Marine Corps. October 2012 was the inaugural exercise using a Marine Corps' MPF T-AKE vessel, and the next step in showing operational usage of MPF in support of ground forces ashore. CG12 provided an opportunity to test T-AKE concepts and to continue development of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Marine Corps' use of this class of ship in this role.

On 29 September 2012, 98 Marines boarded a plane in Southern California bound for the USNS *Lewis and Clark*, located 9,547 miles away in the Indian Ocean. She loaded sustainment stocks just 40 days before at Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL, and

>Maj Barber is a prior-enlisted Marine who received his commission in 2000. He has deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq, and is currently the Maritime Prepositioning Officer, MarForPac, Hawaii.




The Lewis and Clark conducts a vertical replenishment. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Katrina Parker.)

ammunition stocks at Charleston, SC. She completed her transit of 33 days and arrived on station for just 1 day prior to embarking Marines and sailing the additional 450 nautical miles to the exercise location in Gan, Maldives. Upon arrival, the exercise force offloaded its personnel and equipment, including four HMMWVs, using a contracted commercial barge to move personnel and equipment approximately 1 mile from ship to shore. Over the course of the 10-day exercise, the Marines ashore and afloat received 100 percent of their sustainment from stocks loaded aboard the *Lewis and Clark*. This marked the first time an entire exercise force, its equipment (including rolling stock), and its sustainment were completely supported from a military sealift command (MSC) vessel of any kind. The lessons learned during this inaugural operational employment of the T-AKE validated the operational viability of this type of vessel to support ground forces ashore, and will be further refined in future exercises.

Operational Relevance

Without *Lewis and Clark's* participation, CG12 would have been just another routine exercise conducted in the Pacific by U.S. Marines. In the end, *Lewis and Clark's* role and the validation of operational employment of the T-AKE vessel was just as important as the engagement and training activities conducted by the company of Marines ashore. Not fully confident if the load plan was optimal, or of the complete operational impact of the *Lewis and Clark*, CG12 also offered the ideal scenario to refine and validate the load plan for *Sacagawea* (T-AKE 2). This small-scale, company-level exercise provided the perfect "crawl" phase observation of the T-AKE vessel in direct support of ground forces ashore. *Sacagawea* loaded in January 2013 with both an increase in sustainment stocks and a more optimal load as a direct result of lessons learned at CG12. Within days of arriving on station, she participated in exercise BALIKATAN 13/FREEDOM BANNER 13 (FB13) in March 2013 in the Republic of the Philippines.



Civilian mariners aboard the *Lewis and Clark* load a Marine Corps HMMWV onto a ferryboat. The MPF program is a combined Navy and Marine Corps effort, helping Marines fulfill their role and responsibility as the Nation's force-in-readiness. (Photo by Cpl Isis Ramirez.)

Currently, FREEDOM BANNER is the only combatant commander-funded annual MPF exercise in the Marine Corps, and continues to be the mainstay for MPF concept validation. FREEDOM BANNER is held annually in conjunction with other Commander, United States Pacific Command, exercises such as COBRA GOLD in Thailand, BALIKATAN in the Philippines, and FOAL EAGLE events in South Korea. Future

MarForPac continued to build up on and refine the T-AKE concept of employment. . . .

iterations of FREEDOM BANNER will maximize usage of the equipment and sustainment stocks aboard the T-AKE in support of the MAGTF. MarForPac continued to build up on and refine the T-AKE concept of employment at FB13 by conducting full experimentation with the assistance of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, while supporting ground forces ashore.

Available ship-to-shore connectors continue to be the limiting factor in providing sustainment from the seabase

to the MAGTF ashore. During CG12, a commercial barge was used in lieu of military watercraft due to availability. During FB13, the MAGTF used both vertical connectors in the form of MV-22 Osprey aircraft, and surface connectors in the form of landing craft, utility (LCU), and landing craft, mechanized, "Mike 8" (LCM 8) boats loaded aboard MPF vessels. These dedicated ship-to-shore connectors not only enabled the standup of the MAGTF, but also provided sustainment to exercise forces ashore during the conduct of the exercise. This use of the T-AKE and MPF in general is more operationally and fiscally sound than the use of commercial black-bottom shipping, and allows Marine forces to exercise doctrinal arrival and assembly organizations.

Potential Cost Savings

According to Department of Defense transportation regulations and the regional domestic cargo and freight contract for the Pacific, all military forces are required to submit surface-lift requirements through the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) under Commander, Transportation Command. SDDC coordinates surface shipment of military cargo to and from anywhere in the world. Each year, MarForPac forces conduct numerous exercises throughout the Pacific using

SDDC for shipment of equipment and sustainment. Exercises COBRA GOLD and BALIKATAN each require approximately 500–700 pieces of equipment and 20 containers of ammunition to support the field training events. This transportation requirement costs approximately \$2.5 million per exercise for surface lift from Japan to locations in Thailand and the Philippines. This equipment is already resident in the MPF, and any additional sustainment requirement is either already loaded or could easily be loaded on the T-AKE to support these exercises and other theater security cooperation events. The total cost for both exercises using MPF assets under exercise FREEDOM BANNER would be approximately \$1 million per exercise, generating a potential savings of \$3 million per year in strategic lift funding.

While MPF vessels are funded by MSC to remain operational 365 days a year, they are only funded by the U.S. Navy's budget for approximately 6 steaming or underway days per month.

These steaming days are intended for normal operations and training, are not accumulated or transferrable, and are not planned for exercise use. Since 2009, Marine and Navy MPF exercise planners have been successful in optimizing funded steaming days to support the exercise, and avoided having to fund additional steaming days. Working within this planning construct, each vessel cost approximately \$300,000 per exercise. Per *Operational Naval Instruction 4627.1B*, U.S. Navy component commanders are required to annually participate in and provide funding for MPF exercises, but only those that can be supported by the funding made available to them from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav).⁴ Unfortunately, this instruction gives fleet commanders an alibi, permitting only partial compliance due to budgeting constraints, thus MPF exercises are rarely funded by fleet commanders.

MSC is a working capital organization, which means it must recover all

costs for goods and services rendered for use of the vessels. MSC receives no Federal funding to support MPF operations, and only receives money when the exercise sponsor pays for the use of the MSC vessel. This practice is commonly referred to as "pay to play." As a working capital organization, MSC can receive funding from any Service or organization regardless of the origin of the funds. Transferring the cost savings generated by using MPF vessels to support planned annual exercises vice surface lift through SDDC could fund this pay-to-play requirement and buy additional steaming days and/or vessels for increased exercise participation from the MPSRons to support a broader operational use of the MPF.

The Department of the Navy and OpNav staff will continue to pursue budget efficiencies that will potentially decrease funding for the MPF program. In FY13, through an approved OpNav budget efficiency initiative, MPSRon-1 was divested from the MPF program,



Command and Control Training and Education Center of Excellence

(C2 TECOE)



Home Station

MISTC POCs

I MEF

MISTC West

Mr. Marty Almquist
martin.almquist@usmc.mil
(760) 763-2180

MISTC 29 Palms

Mr. Robert Niemi
robert.niemi1@usmc.mil
(760) 830-9204

II MEF

MISTC East

Mr. Chris Branham
christopher.branham@usmc.mil
(910) 450-0130


III MEF

MISTC Okinawa

Mr. Chad Hartman
chad.hartman@usmc.mil
011-81-611-723-2053

MISTC Hawaii

Mr. Garrett Sullivan
garrett.sullivan@usmc.mil
(808) 554-5416



Courses Include:

C2PC/JTCW

CPOF

CPOF Advanced

CPOF Sys Admin

AFATDS

JADOCS

EMT

BFT/JBC-P

BFT/JBC-P ULM

Sharepoint, I, II, III

BAT/HIIDE/SEEK

CLC2S

TCPT

CCAC (COIC Tools)

TBMCS

BCS3

TCPT Resource and
Mission Mgr

COC BattleStaff Training

Watch Officer / Chief

Commander's C2 Overview

IOS V1/TCS

JADOCS Sys Admin

Digital Fires Interoperability

TCPT Admin

COC Equipment Course

Common Tactical Picture Mgr

IS YOUR COC READY?



Marines with Company A, 1st Bn, 4th Mar, 1st MarDiv, board the Lewis and Clark while in transit to the Maldives for CG12. (Photo by Cpl Isis Ramirez.)

leaving only two MPSRons afloat. A second MPSRon is rumored to be the target of budget cuts in FY15, leaving only one MPSRon afloat, and further decreasing global crisis response and forward presence.

Potential Amphibious Shortfall Mitigation

The Marine Corps continues to operate with a known shortfall of amphibious capability, and this deficit will only increase in the future. The Navy and Marine Corps have determined that a minimum force of 33 ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force requirement.⁵ At any time, there are an additional 10 percent of *available* amphibious ships in maintenance and not mission-capable for tasking, further decreasing 33 ships to 29 available for tasking. Under current shipbuilding plans, this gap in amphibious capacity will not be resolved. As nonavailability of traditional amphibious ships with embarked Marines continues to impede the Marine Corps' ability to respond to combatant commander demands across the full ROMO, embarking Marines on not only T-AKE vessels, but also legacy MPF vessels and conducting Phase 0/1 events with partner nations similar to COCONUT GROVE

further shows operational relevance for the MPF program and provides some mitigation to the current amphibious shortfall. I want to be clear that using available ships such as MPF to move Marines throughout the Pacific does not alleviate the stated Marine Corps amphibious shipping requirement of 38 ships. The reality is that the Marine Corps will never receive its full amphibious lift requirement, and must rely on alternative and nontraditional means for employment in the Pacific. If the MEB has to fight in the next 10 years, it will do so using MPF rather than embarking on amphibious ships.

Like their namesakes, these vessels need to be employed boldly throughout the Pacific, conducting expeditions with embarked Marines and participating in exercises and engagement activities that strengthen America's presence throughout the region. The use of nontraditional platforms, including MPF assets, is a viable option to potentially mitigate the deficient amphibious capacity, and provides operational relevancy of MPF assets across the ROMO. In the current constrained fiscal environment, it appears relevancy is the only vital link between potential program termination and program endurance.

Notes

1. "Apportioned forces" are types of combat and related support forces provided to combatant commanders as a starting point for planning purposes only. Forces apportioned for planning purposes may not be those allocated for execution. See Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5, Joint Operation Planning*, Washington, DC, 11 August 2011.

2. "Seabasing" is a naval capability that provides joint force commanders with the ability to conduct selected functions and tasks at sea without reliance on infrastructure ashore. Seabasing is a concept for employing a variety of platforms versus a specific type of platform. See Headquarters Marine Corps, Concept Development and Integration, *Seabasing for the ROMO*, Washington, DC, March 2009.

3. Mulvey, Maj Matthew, "Sustaining the *Single Naval Battle*: Enhancing USMC Expeditionary Logistics with the Addition of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Auxiliary Dry Cargo I Ammunition Ships (T-AKES)," Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, 18 April 2012, pp. 18–19.

4. Chief of Naval Operations, *Operational Naval Instruction 4627.1B, Policy and Budgetary Guidance for Exercise of the Maritime Prepositioning Fleet (MPF) and Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB)*, Washington, DC, December 2007, p. 2

5. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Director, Warfare Integration, "Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011," Washington, DC, February 2010.



Join the debate.
Go to www.mca-marines.org/forum.
Don't forget our blog at mcgazette.blogspot.com.

Attending OCS

Should Naval Academy graduates attend OCS?

by Maj Josh Jabin & Capt Michael Barikian

The U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) is the only Marine Corps commissioning source whose students do not attend Officer Candidates School (OCS). Instead, midshipmen attend Leatherneck, a 4-week summer program that trains them in basic infantry skills and evaluates their demonstrated leadership potential. Though midshipmen attending Leatherneck and candidates attending OCS operate in different environments with unique programs of instruction (POIs), both programs equally serve to evaluate future second lieutenants and prepare them for The Basic School (TBS).

Although there is no reason to believe current Marine Corps leadership would like Naval Academy midshipmen to attend OCS, they *did* from 1988–92, and this policy continues to generate discussion.¹ Marines have argued that midshipmen should attend OCS for a variety of reasons. For example, in a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, Maj Todd Finley raised concerns that USNA midshipmen “receive special treatment” because they aren’t screened and evaluated “under the watchful eyes of Marine drill instructors.”² In a *Marine Corps Gazette* article, Robert Burrell and Ted Veggeberg claimed that “the [OCS] program is the best way to train future midshipmen for the Marine Corps.”³ Charles Dunne, also in the *Gazette*, argued that USNA midshipmen should attend OCS because it is a “rite of passage,” and it promotes “camaraderie, discipline, professionalism, and a common bond.”⁴ It is clear that the Naval Academy is a different rite of passage than OCS, and this difference leads some officers to conclude that USNA midshipmen should therefore attend OCS. Conceding they are different, this article will explain how USNA also ac-

>Maj Jabin is assigned to the Department of Mathematics, USNA. He served on the Leatherneck staff and MSAB.

>>Capt Barikian is assigned to the Department of Economics, USNA. He previously served as an SPC and company XO, Officer Candidates School, and on the Leatherneck staff and MSAB.



OCS can be viewed as the best program to train midshipmen for Marine Corps service, but is it necessary? (Photo by Cpl Scott L. Tomaszynski.)

complishes the OCS mission to “train, evaluate, and screen officer candidates to ensure they possess the leadership potential to serve successfully as company grade officers in the Operating Forces.”⁵ We will then provide statistical evidence that graduates of both commissioning sources performed equally at TBS from 2002–11.

Both Leatherneck and OCS train future second lieutenants in the military skills necessary to prepare them for TBS. These programs teach individual infantry skills such as land navigation, the operations orders process, and safe weapons handling techniques. Addi-

tionally, midshipmen and candidates learn offensive combat techniques at the fire team and squad levels. The culminating event in both POIs is the evaluation of students leading a squad attack on a designated objective.

Physical training standards at Leatherneck and OCS are also closely aligned. Both programs evaluate performance on the physical fitness test, combat fitness test, obstacle course, endurance course, and a 9-mile conditioning hike.

Although there is not sufficient time in the Leatherneck POI to cover OCS’s entire academic curriculum, USNA midshipmen receive instruc-

tion on nearly all of the same topics throughout the Naval Academy's 4-year POI. All midshipmen take a course in military law, and there is a great deal of classroom instruction and practical application devoted to leadership development. Additionally, those midshipmen selected to commission as Marine Corps officers take a practicum course during the spring of their senior years which covers topics such as Marine Corps history and uniforms.

During this past summer, Leatherneck midshipmen visited OCS for 2 days and trained on courses that are unique to OCS, such as the combat course, leadership reaction course, and Tarzan course. Having USNA midshipmen complete these courses provides future second lieutenants from both OCS and USNA with an important sense of shared experience. For example, many officers consider the "Quigley" a rite of passage to becoming a Marine Corps officer. When they arrive at TBS next year, this will be a common bond

that USNA and OCS second lieutenants share.

Though many similarities exist between Leatherneck and OCS, there are also significant differences stemming largely from the fact that the Naval Academy has a 4-year POI, whereas the OCS POI consists of one 6-week training cycle (Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC)), one 10-week training cycle (Officer Candidates Course and Platoon Leaders Course combined), or two 6-week training cycles (Platoon Leaders Course, Juniors and Seniors). At USNA, the 4-week Leatherneck program merely serves as one component—albeit a very large one—of a midshipman's training and evaluation for future service as a Marine officer.

The most significant difference between OCS and Leatherneck is the operating environment. OCS operates in a high-stress environment of military indoctrination in order to train, screen, and evaluate candidates. At USNA,

military indoctrination occurs during plebe (freshman) summer and throughout that year. By the time midshipmen attend Leatherneck, they are 3 years into USNA's POI and are ready to assume the highest leadership responsibilities within the Brigade of Midshipmen. The leadership experience and feedback midshipmen receive during Leatherneck facilitate that transition.

To most effectively evaluate leadership potential, Leatherneck places midshipmen in different types of leadership billets and simulates the TBS operating environment. Due to Leatherneck's compressed timeframe, most midshipmen are evaluated for 3 days while serving as a platoon commander, platoon sergeant, or squad leader. Additionally, every midshipman receives a tactical evaluation while leading a squad attack and leading a fire team through the leadership reaction course. These leadership opportunities, combined with 4 weeks of general observation, provide staff platoon commanders (SPCs) a window to evaluate a midshipman's ability to decide, communicate, and act.

All midshipmen who complete Leatherneck receive an evaluation and recommendation from their SPC that assesses their decisionmaking, communication, command presence, and ability to lead subordinates. This evaluation contains a leadership ranking within the platoon, as well as physical training and academic performance rankings. The SPC will then make one of four possible recommendations: recommended with enthusiasm, recommended with confidence, recommended with reservation, or not recommended.

Following Leatherneck, USNA convenes a Marine Service Assignment Board (MSAB) that serves as the Naval Academy's screening process. The MSAB, comprised of six Marine officers and one Marine SNCO, seeks to select the most qualified midshipmen for commissioning in the Marine Corps. While the MSAB strongly considers a midshipman's Leatherneck evaluation, it also considers the recommendation from the Marine representative assigned to each company. The Marine representative's role is to incorporate feedback from USNA officers, senior enlisted

Our Mission...

Advancing Leadership & Recognizing Excellence

Member Dues and Donations Resource Our Programs to Support a Tremendous Number of Marines:

- **Marine Excellence Awards Program** — Recognizes Professional Achievement. Nearly 8,800 Marines were recognized with more than 10,000 awards in 2012.
- **Commanders' Professional Library Program** — Provides Marine Units Complete Libraries. MCAF provided 296 complete libraries in 2012 fostering the professional development of over 94,000 Marines.
- **Commanders' Forums** — Provides support for Commanders' Professional Development Programs. In 2012 MCAF supported 11 events including battle studies in Okinawa, France and Civil War sites in Virginia.

Learn more about ways to give: <http://www.mcafdn.org/ways-giving>
and about our programs which support Marines: www.mcafdn.org

1-877-4MY-MCAF (1-877-469-6223) or 703-640-0174 • Email: mcaf@mca-marines.org
PO Box 1775, 715 Broadway Street • Quantico, VA 22134

MCAF is a 501(c)(3) charitable foundation and a Member of the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC # 19821)



Company	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	Total
Total	2655	2680	2663	2540	2396	2284	814	16032
USNA	89	135	64	226	811	534	157	2016
Percent of company	3.35	5.04	2.4	8.9	33.85	23.38	19.29	12.57

Table 1. Naval Academy graduates as a percentage of each TBS company.

	Mean	SD	0 percent	25 percent	50 percent	75 percent	100 percent	n
OCS	86.90	3.80	61.80	84.19	86.93	89.70	96.93	13055
USNA	87.76	3.56	76.90	85.27	87.84	90.37	96.67	1965

Table 2. Numerical summary of overall GPA at TBS, comparing USNA graduates and other commissioning sources.

	Academic GPA	Military Skills GPA	Leadership GPA
OCS	88.32	87.42	85.18
USNA	89.6	88.65	85.33

Table 3. Numerical summary of academic, military skills, and leadership GPA at TBS, comparing USNA graduates and other commissioning sources.

	Overall GPA	Academic GPA	Military Skills GPA	Leadership GPA	n
ROTC	87.59	89.17	88.13	85.72	1858
USNA	87.76	89.60	88.65	85.33	1965

Table 4. Numerical summary of mean overall, academic, military skills, and leadership GPA at TBS, comparing USNA and ROTC graduates.

leaders, coaches, and faculty members who know each midshipman best. This provides the MSAB with a more intimate sight picture of each midshipman considered. Additional data provided to the MSAB includes academic grade point average (GPA), military order of merit, honor and conduct history, and performance on physical fitness events throughout the 4-year POI.

Some years, the Naval Academy has more midshipmen request a Marine Corps commission than there are spots available. For example, in 2012, 326 midshipmen requested a commission in the Marine Corps, and the Naval Academy only had 270 available spots. In these cases, after determining which midshipmen requesting a Marine Corps commission are qualified, the MSAB

then has to rank them against each other. Midshipmen who are deemed unqualified to become Marine Corps officers are denied. Leatherneck's focus on evaluating leadership potential enables MSAB members to make better decisions when deciding between qualified midshipmen.

In order to gauge the effectiveness of the Leatherneck program and USNA's POI, we analyzed TBS performance data from 2002–11 and compared the performance of USNA and OCS graduates. Using a 2 sample *t*-test with a 99 percent confidence level, we determined whether or not a statistically significant difference exists—meaning the results considered a large enough sample size that the difference is unlikely a result of chance—between population means. A

statistically significant difference should not be interpreted as a practically meaningful or important difference.

To be clear, we used performance at TBS as the measure of effectiveness and do not attempt to evaluate performance in the Operating Forces. Although evaluating performance as a company grade officer in the Operating Forces would be ideal, there are too many confounding factors to find a reliable measure of effectiveness. Since all officers operate in the same environment and are specifically evaluated in leadership and military skills, we feel performance at TBS is the most appropriate method to compare OCS and USNA graduates.

Naval Academy graduates comprised 12.57 percent of TBS graduates from




Figure 1.

2002–11. Naval Academy graduates as a percentage of each company are provided in Table 1. USNA and OCS graduates perform equally at TBS. From 2002–11, USNA graduates achieved an overall mean GPA of 87.76, compared to 86.90 for other commissioning sources. Though Naval Academy graduates perform statistically significantly better (p -value=0) than other commissioning sources at TBS, the magnitude of the difference is small. A numerical summary is provided in Table 2.

In an NPS thesis, Capt Richard Gannon explains that, during the 1980s, Marine Corps leadership was concerned that “Naval Academy graduates were stratified in two groups, the top of the class and bottom of the class” at TBS.⁶ For the time between 2002–11, this is not the case. Overall GPA for both USNA and OCS graduates is similarly distributed. Also, the standard deviation for USNA graduates is slightly lower than standard deviation for OCS graduates, indicating less variation. The box plots in Figure 1 compare the median and quartiles for overall GPA and overall class standing of both groups.

Naval Academy graduates perform statistically significantly better than other commissioning sources at TBS in both academic GPA (p -value=0)

and military skills GPA (p -value=0), but the magnitude of the difference is small. There is no statistical difference in leadership GPA (p -value=0.13). A summary is provided.

In an effort to isolate the impact of Leatherneck and OCS, we compared the TBS performance of ROTC graduates and Naval Academy graduates, as these are the only commissioning sources with a 4-year POI. There is no statistically significant difference between USNA and ROTC overall GPA (p -value=0.07) or leadership GPA (p -value=0.014). USNA graduates perform statistically significantly better than ROTC in both academic GPA (p -value=0.0008) and military skills GPA (p -value=0), but the magnitude of the difference is very small.

Objectively analyzing the POIs at OCS and USNA, it is clear that both effectively accomplish the mission to train, evaluate, and screen future second lieutenants. The high-stress environment of military indoctrination best enables OCS to accomplish its mission during a 6- to 10-week POI. The TBS-style leadership environment utilized at Leatherneck best enables USNA to accomplish the same mission within the structure of its 4-year POI. Though USNA is a different rite of passage than

OCS, the performance data shows Naval Academy and OCS graduates perform equally at TBS, and are equally prepared for the Operating Forces.

Notes

1. Gannon, Capt Richard, “The Naval Academy-Marine Corps Relationship: An Examination of the Marine Corps’ Influence on the Academy and the Academy’s Professional Impact on the Marine Corps Officer,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2000, p. 150.
2. Finley, Maj Todd R., “A Statistical Analysis of the Performance of Naval Academy Graduates at the Basic Officer Course,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2002, p. 81.
3. Burrell, Robert S. and Ted Veggeberg, “Finding the Best Relationship With the U.S. Naval Academy,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2004, pp. 31–36
4. Dunne, Charles M., “Aspiring Marine Officers from the Naval Academy Should Attend Officer Candidates School,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2001, pp. 43–45.
5. OCS mission statement accessed at www.trngcmd.usmc.mil/OCS.
6. Gannon.



Marines and Foreign Military Culture

Why do Marines need knowledge of foreign military culture?

by Blago Tashev & Maj Thomas Ross

“... [T]he human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors.”

—Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting¹

>Dr. Tashev is a researcher providing contract support to the CAOCL.

>>Maj Ross is an intelligence officer and regional affairs officer assigned to the CAOCL.

Through doctrinal publications, the Marine Corps articulates the importance of understanding human factors in order to effectively exploit its opponents' weaknesses. Acknowledging the dictum of ancient military strategist Sun Tsu, the U.S. military has dedicated significant resources to “know thy enemy.” However, much of the emphasis has been on tangible materiel capabilities, including the number of enemy personnel, number and type of armored vehicles, size of the air force, etc. The U.S. military seems to struggle with understanding the intangible moral factors that are integral to the human dimension of warfighting. This is not surprising, as intangibles are difficult to grasp and impossible to quantify. We cannot easily gauge forces like national and military resolve, national and individual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, morale, leadership, or esprit.² These forces, coupled with several other similar factors (collectively referred to

in this article as “military culture”), have a powerful effect throughout the battlespace.³ Furthermore, in today's battlespace, it is not only about two combatants slugging it out. Much of our Marines' interactions with foreign peoples involve working with, rather than against, foreign military personnel. Therefore, missions across the range of military operations require Marines to understand friendly foreign security forces. National security documents and policy papers point out that the American military will increasingly rely on engaging partner and allied security forces to meet national security objectives.⁴ Accordingly, the Marine Corps is increasingly called upon to engage in missions:

... to improve the capabilities of local governments and their security forces to increase stability and prevent conflict. This requires Marines who are not only fighters, but also trainers, mentors and advisors—roles requiring unique and highly desirable skills.⁵

Thus, the applicability of understanding the “other” extends beyond exploiting opponents' weaknesses, and requires Marines to understand the cultural factors shaping a foreign military in order to use them for mutual benefit. Such understanding requires going beyond the tangible capabilities of a foreign force to hone in on those intangible influencers that shape how it trains, learns, adapts, builds cohesiveness, and fights.

Military Culture Is Different

To varying degrees, each state's military culture is different from the prevailing cultures in society. The military organization can be a powerful instrument in changing the culture of those joining its ranks. In fact, in many cases, the values, beliefs, and behavior of members of the armed forces are inconsistent with those of society at large. The armed force's steep hierarchy, strict discipline, and readiness to subordinate one's self for a brother-in-arms and the mission can be quite incompatible with civilian life's individualism, self-indulgence, and dissent. While military culture is different from the general culture of society, military organizations have varying abilities or willingness to change the culture of their members. Some militaries are apprehensive of changing the culture of personnel too much, thereby creating a gulf between society and the armed forces in terms of outlook, values, and beliefs. Others simply lack the skills to cultivate a desired culture among personnel. This problem points to another important issue in the study of foreign militaries: When trying to understand the culture of a military, what matters is not the organization's self-proclaimed values,

beliefs, and norms, but its personnel's *actual* behavioral patterns, values, and beliefs.

The Problem of Evaluating Foreign Security Forces

The Marine Corps currently uses various approaches to evaluate foreign security forces, including service and unit assessments that employ the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) nation-specific construct to evaluate partner nations' capability and capacity gaps. There is also the intelligence approach to evaluating an opposing force, utilizing various methods from intelligence preparation of the battlefield to political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information analysis. All these approaches focus mostly on tangible capabilities and capacities and do not take into consideration the effects of various intangible elements. Furthermore, DOTMLPF was designed as a combat development tool, not as a tool to evaluate a foreign force, yet it is used for the purpose of planning for security cooperation missions with foreign forces because it is familiar to us; it is how we evaluate our capabilities. However, since the Marine Corps believes it understands its own intangibles, its analysis is not part of

the process. Therefore, when used to evaluate a foreign military's capabilities gaps, DOTMLPF fails to take into consideration that there, for example, may be wide discrepancies between official doctrine and missions on the one hand, and what the military actually does and how it does it on the other. Doctrine does not determine behavior; it is but one influence on a force's behavior,

The Marine Corps currently uses various approaches to evaluate foreign security forces. . . .

which is also affected by local culture (which has substantial influence over personnel), and by the organizational culture of the military (which cultivates in its personnel desired values, norms, and behaviors through training, awards, promotions, and punishments). What explains these discrepancies? Military culture.

This knowledge gap is especially glaring given the Marine Corps' intense focus on culture when readying its own force. Starting with boot camp, where

the "primary objective is the development of character and a warrior ethos" and the transformation of recruits into basic Marines who embrace core values and a shared legacy, this focus persists in Marine Corps' policies, where cultivating a specific type of belief system, leadership, and behavior—in other words, a distinct type of culture—among all Marines helps make the Corps the force it is.⁶ Yet, the Marine Corps lacks a method to evaluate the culture of a partner nation's or opponent's foreign force. The foreign personnel's belief system, values, and attitudes have enormous influence over how they operate, sometimes despite what their doctrine dictates. These cultural factors, along with organization-wide cultural patterns, provide insights into probable behavior in various operational contexts.

A Military Culture Framework for Marines

Existing approaches to analyzing military cultures are inherently limited, as they treat countries' militaries as organizations with consistent cultural patterns, thereby excluding contradictions, nuances, and paradoxes, as well as larger social and political contexts. Differences in missions, roles, training, tradition, and leadership can lead to discrete cultural profiles for each unit within the same Service. Marines need to be able to account for diversity within a single military organization, as well as various units of that organization in order to anticipate how culture may impact the outcome of a mission. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, some individual units within the armed forces are tasked with ensuring the survival of ruling elites, and may be made up exclusively of members of a particular ethnic group. These units not only have unique functions, missions, and capabilities, but also personnel who are not representative of the ethnic makeup of the society at large. Accordingly, the unit's culture and behavior are distinct from any other unit in that nation's armed forces. The ability of Marines to appreciate these sorts of cultural differences can enhance their planning effectiveness and enable them to overcome potential cultural friction points. Therefore, a



Cultural factors provide insight into how best to execute our mission within a foreign military culture. (Photo by Cpl Timothy Lenzo.)



He can successfully navigate a foreign culture. (Photo ID #120928-M-JS123-019.jpg)

military culture framework that not only helps Marines gain understanding of the prevailing culture in a military organization, but also assists them in navigating the culture of the units with which they will interact, may serve to decrease some of the current complexity in partnership and engagement relationships.

A military culture framework provides the means to systematically analyze a foreign military culture. This framework is not intended to provide the answers, per se, but rather a general set of guidelines or tools for Marines to use to seek out relevant information prior to and during deployments. The framework can be thought of as a menu of considerations wherein Marines can focus only on those elements that are most relevant to their mission. On the other hand, analysts and curriculum developers, having relatively more time, can analyze all elements in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the foreign military culture.

The framework addresses how to identify the “big picture” of a foreign military culture, including, for example, the strategic and military implications of a state’s strategic culture, the functions of the military organization in the context of the state’s national security system, and the interplay of military and civilian/national culture. Addi-

tionally, it addresses how to identify the cultures of that military’s numerous subgroups and organizations, and how to figure out what makes individuals join, stay, serve, share, endure, and sacrifice in these subgroups and in the organization as a whole. The framework also helps Marines operationalize this knowledge. Cultural information can be very abstract unless its relevance is demonstrated. For example, in training missions, knowing the cultural makeup of the foreign unit may be useful, as it

Cultural information can be very abstract unless its relevance is demonstrated.

can help Marines gain insight into how the foreign unit processes information and incorporates new practices. The military culture framework provides the tools to examine the following:

- *Strategic culture.* How does the state see its place and goals in the international security environment? What is the state’s outlook on international cooperation and conflict? What are its enduring national interests?

- *National security system.* How does the state’s strategic culture influence the role and functions of the national military? How does the state attain domestic and international security? What are the functions of the military in the national security system? What are the politics of national security?

- *Civil-military relations.* What is the role of the military in the political system? What is the extent of civilian and democratic control of the armed forces? What are the relationships between military and society? Are national and military policies aligned?

- *Organizational culture.* What are the organization’s doctrine and mission? What are the formal core values, symbols, and important narratives? What is its experience in warfighting and other operations? What is the formal view on what represents legitimate violence? What are the differences/similarities between military and prevailing civilian cultures? What are the officer/NCO/enlisted/draftee relationships? What are its decision-making and planning processes? What are the levels of horizontal, vertical, and organizational trust? What is the capacity for joint and combined operations? What is the level of risk tolerance? What is the system for career-long education and training? How do military personnel process information and learn and incorporate new skills and knowledge?⁷ How do they handle death and injury, including physical, psychological, and moral injuries? What are the promotion and punishment processes?

- *Military subcultures.* In addition to most of the factors from the previous bullet, the element of military subcultures also includes the following: What are the formal and informal values and beliefs? How do subgroups interact? What is the informal understanding of legitimate violence? How is unity of effort established and maintained? How is commander’s intent interpreted? To what is the extent of esprit de corps? To what is the degree of unit cohesiveness and how is it achieved and broken? What are the degrees of flexibility and adaptability? What is leadership? What is the level

of initiative? What is the individual's motivation to join, stay, serve, endure, and sacrifice? How do individuals and units learn, train, adapt, and fight? What are seen as heroic and cowardly? How do they perceive the U.S. military and U.S. Marines?

The first three sets of factors above provide an essential geostrategic, political, and social context without which understanding military culture is very difficult. They include the issues and factors that shape the culture of the military organization, and also point out how this organization interacts with other institutions and how such interactions change organizational culture. The last two sets of factors directly address the culture of the military organization and its personnel.

The framework also includes sections operationalizing the elements and providing strategies to help answer the "so what?" considerations for Marines. These strategies provide Marines insight into how the elements are related, what range of unit behavior is probable, and, in general, helps them anticipate the second- and third-order effects of actions and policies. At the same time, it must be made clear that this is not a predictive framework. In other words, gaining insight into the culture of the foreign military unit does not lead to prediction of behavior. Rather, it is about anticipating the ranges of the possible, probable, and likely. Because information may be unavailable and planning time limited, the framework also provides sets of questions guiding the Marines in capturing the needed knowledge once their interaction with their foreign counterparts commences.

How to Study a Military Culture

Military culture displays both persistent and dynamic tendencies. As with any culture, military culture is enduring as values, organization, and functions persist over time. Concurrently, military culture changes in response to variations in the state and society, the impact of war, the role of leadership, the advance of technology, and aggregations of changes in individual thought and behavior. Therefore, understanding another military culture requires

that Marines and analysts capture both tendencies. It requires historical perspective, the collection and analysis of current information, and observation through their ongoing interactions with the other military.

How do we get this knowledge? Some of it is already available in after-action reports and debriefs of U.S. units that have interacted with foreign counterparts. Some information is also widely available in open sources.⁸ There are many national-level

CAOCL's Role

Efforts to date to infuse cultural learning into the Marine Corps' training and education continuum have mostly emphasized the value of understanding the cultures of local populations, and have yet to formalize learning about the cultures of foreign security forces. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) has made important steps in addressing this knowledge gap. Combatant commanders' desks produce culture briefs, which,

Efforts to date to infuse cultural learning into the Marine Corps' training and education continuum have mostly emphasized the value of understanding the cultures of local populations. . . .

history books that provide information on the role of the military in the history of the country. Some history books outline the traditional role of the military and describe how it sees itself in the life of the nation, how it has performed in various conflicts, and what its relationship is with the society and the state. This body of knowledge also describes what the military values, what it measures itself against (Is this a social standard or enemy force to be measured against? It could be both, as we are talking about the measuring stick with which the military in question uses to gauge its worth.), and what it sees as its traditional internal and external allies and enemies. Furthermore, the organization's doctrine and missions, studies of its attitudes, self-image, and relationship with society and state institutions as published in journal and news articles can provide a more contemporary snapshot of the role of the institution and its culture. In some cases, however, information may be simply unavailable, particularly with regard to the specific units with which Marines may be interacting. In this case, the Marines will have to gather information through observation and questioning while working with their counterparts.

along with information on regional and country-specific operational culture, provide military culture knowledge tailored to specific mission demands. In-house subject matter expertise enables CAOCL to provide information that addresses not only the culture of the entire foreign military organization, but also, when possible, the culture of the service or unit with which the Marines are about to interact. In addition, the Marine Corps has formally approved the CAOCL-developed regional, culture, and language familiarization program, a career-long training and education initiative intended to build and sustain a baseline operational regional, language, and cultural capability in the general purpose force. Along with other cultural and regional topics, the program addresses the issues Marines face when working with other organizations, including foreign military organizations and their distinct cultural patterns.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps has a long tradition of working with foreign militaries, a tradition reflected in many of its doctrinal publications. The *Small Wars Manual* (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1940) first captured the Corps' thoughts on interacting with

foreign security forces, and many of its concepts were reworked as part of *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency* (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, December 2006). Recent extensive engagements with coalition and local forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have further added valuable lessons. However, despite these accumulated experiences, we have not yet fully equipped ourselves with the needed understanding to be most effective in interacting with allies and partners. Budget constraints and political realities in the near future will lead to continued combined activities across the range of military operations. Marines' participation in combatant commands' theater security cooperation efforts will expand significantly. Marines will continue to be involved in the training and advising of foreign security forces and building partnership capacity in conflict prevention and warfighting. At the same time, Marines will have to build upon the Corps'

ability to plan and execute missions in a variety of settings with traditional allies. These activities demand a detailed understanding of foreign security forces' culture. For this reason, a comprehensive approach to learning about military culture is needed to prepare Marines for their future operations. This comprehensive approach must be suitable not only for the needs of the intelligence community, but also for the requirements of the general purpose force.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting*, Washington, DC, 1997, p. 13.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
3. "Military culture" is used in this article as shorthand for the intangible qualities of a military organization, including values, beliefs, morale, behavior, cohesiveness, trust, esprit de corps, leadership, etc.

4. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Washington, DC, January 2012, p. 5.

5. Amos, Gen James F., *35th Commandant's Planning Guidance*, Washington, DC, 2010, p. 6.

6. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Eastern Recruiting Region, *Beginning the Transformation*, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, 28 May 2008.

7. Wendy Chambers, "Your Smarts Aren't Like Mine: Understanding Intellect Across Cultures," *CAOCL Dispatches*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2012. The article discusses how Marines can gain understanding of what intelligence in the local culture is, but similar approaches can be applied to understanding how the local culture understands bravery, cohesiveness, leadership, etc.

8. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity also produces unclassified, for-official-use-only military culture studies.





No Excuses!

Order Today and Show Your Patriotism in July!



10% off

All Flags/Accessories
Throughout June

Use code "FLAGSALE" if ordering by phone or online

The Marine Shop • 300 Potomac Ave. • Quantico, VA • 703-640-7195
The Marine Shop at Camp Lejeune • Building 84, Exchange Annex • Camp Lejeune, NC • 910-451-7500
www.marineshop.net **888-237-7683**





Marine Corps

Association & Foundation

Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

GET MEMBER VALUE PRICING
JOIN TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775

Marine Armor: Any Clime and Place

Lessons learned for the tank-infantry team

by Capt G.S. Slater

Overcoming doubts about its ability to operate and sustain tanks in the austere Afghan environment, the Marine Corps deployed the first U.S. tank company to Afghanistan in January 2011. Four company rotations have now been completed or are underway, and their success has once again demonstrated the viability of Marine armor in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Useful lessons learned have been captured—often relearned, in actuality—regarding the employment of armor in support of infantry, and of armor during COIN. Marine armor will likely continue to have a role to play in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) even as the Marine Corps shifts focus to security force assistance. As the transition from OEF proceeds, care must be taken to ensure that Marine armor remains fully integrated in future training and exercises, lest the hard-won lessons of the past few years be relearned yet again at great cost. In this era of ever-increasing fiscal constraints, maintaining the Marine Corps' investment in its armor forces is a prudent and economical undertaking in securing victory in future battles.

Several challenges delayed the introduction of Marine armor into Afghanistan, foremost of which were institutional misconceptions of the role and value of armor in support of a population-centric COIN strategy. Despite ample evidence from operations in Iraq and Vietnam, a level of reluctance to commit this iconic offensive weapon system in the Afghan environment remained. The success of the tank-infantry team in OEF since 2011, often during highly kinetic offen-

>Capt Slater has deployed with 1st Tank Battalion to Iraq; with the 15th MEU; and most recently to Afghanistan with Company A, 1st Tank Battalion. He is currently serving as an armor officer at the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group, Twentynine Palms.

"Fighting will be necessary, and cannot be avoided: counterinsurgency is not peacekeeping, and there is no known method of conducting it without using armed force to kill or capture insurgents."

*—David Kilcullen,
The Accidental Guerrilla
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2009)*

sive operations that resulted in minimal collateral damage, should assuage any lingering doubts about the suitability of tanks in COIN.

Second, concerns related to the significant logistical requirements inherent in maintaining mechanized equipment, coupled with the vast distances and extended lines of communications that characterize the Afghan area of operations, contributed to justifiable concerns regarding the sustainment of heavy armor forces. This challenge was surmounted by the MAGTF, with both the logistics combat element and the aviation combat element contributing to the sustainment of a ground combat element unit. Letting the maintenance management and supply system work as

designed ensured adequate repair parts were stocked in theater or rapidly flown in as required to address critical deadlining discrepancies. Marine Corps Logistics Command maintained a small set of fully mission capable tanks forward in stores, which were used when appropriate to quickly replace battle-damaged tanks. Not only did the logistics combat element sustain tanks during extended operations, but it also conducted a full principal end-item rotation of the entire OEF tank fleet while enabling maximum operational capability during a nearly seamless transition. Addressing the tyranny of distance, the aviation combat element was frequently called upon to transport vital repair parts and other supplies to distributed tank units



The tank company has successfully supported infantry units at all levels. (Photo by author.)

operating well forward of existing bases. On numerous occasions, assault support aircraft skillfully delivered supplies just in time to enable tanks to sustain operations. This unity of effort across the MAGTF is a successful example of Marine Corps doctrine and philosophy in practice, and served to overcome a key challenge posed by introducing armor into OEF.

In 2 years of combat, the OEF tank company has successfully supported infantry units from the squad to battalion task force levels across the range of military operations. Displaying the versatility of Marine armor forces, the OEF tank company has conducted a wide variety of missions, operating as task-organized company teams down to section-level units. Missions ranged from combined tank-infantry patrols, to simultaneous ground and air assaults, to temporarily assigning the company battlespace while it cleared and secured highly contested communications ground lines. The OEF tank company was originally attached to a regimental combat team, but has been employed throughout the Regional Command (Southwest) area of operations. The inherent mobility of tanks allowed the company to task-organize and provide forces to support regimental combat teams, various coalition partners, and special operations forces. The one constant across the span of missions

conducted is that Marine tanks rarely operate alone as armor-pure formations. The primary reason the Marine Corps has tanks—to closely support the infantry as equal members of a combined arms team—remains the most effective employment of armor in Afghanistan and beyond.

The capabilities that tanks bring to a ground combat element commander are immense and varied. The M1A1 remains the most lethal, responsive, accurate, and survivable direct fire support platform available. When properly

The capabilities that tanks bring to a ground combat element commander are immense and varied.

integrated into a combined arms team, Marine tanks are devastating to the enemy in any type of conflict. This was proven time and again in OEF, as the tank's long-range, precision direct fire weapons quickly became the option of choice in many situations. This occurred primarily for several reasons. The first and most common occurred when other supporting arms were simply not

responsive enough to engage fleeting enemy targets. The second was when collateral damage estimates of air delivered or indirect fire munitions were deemed by the on-scene commander or higher headquarters as too risky. Lastly, the enhanced fire control system on the M1A1 was used to great effect by supported infantry units to refine target location and provide instant range, elevation, direction, and 10-digit grid location with the push of a button.

Tanks in Afghanistan have been targeted by the enemy with every weapon available, including improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles, mortars, and small arms fire. The M1A1's armor protection, augmented by an underbelly armor package, has largely blunted the effects of all forms of enemy fire. The only significant battle damage incurred has been the result of improvised explosive devices, which typically damage the suspension system and require 24–48 hours of repairs before regaining fully mission capable status. Due to this unique combination of survivability, precision firepower, and unmatched mobility, tanks quickly adapted to the OEF COIN fight, and were rapidly incorporated where they could best support the ground combat element and devastate the enemy.

In addition to traditional roles for armor forces, the OEF tank company also successfully modeled the integration of general purpose forces with special operations forces, including extensive operations with our coalition partners. The combination of heavier armor forces in support of lighter special operations forces enhances the capabilities of both units while minimizing their respective limitations. The OEF tank company was usually the best-suited (and often the only available) ground force capable of closing the considerable distance required to link up with special operations force units conducting aerial inserts into remote objective areas. The presence of mobile heavy armor possessing overwhelming firepower greatly increased the operational reach, combat power, and survivability of supported special operations force units. Integrating the OEF tank com-



Combined arms training closely replicates recent tank missions in Afghanistan. (Photo by author.)

pany into special operations force missions expanded the range of objective areas where tanks could be gainfully employed, catching the enemy off-guard and significantly disrupting enemy safe havens. This was achieved while simultaneously enabling special operations force units to engage the local population under the protective over-watch of tanks, dissuading the enemy from interfering through deterrence, or quickly overmatching and defeating the enemy through armor-protected firepower and shock effect. This blending of general purpose forces and special operations force units is far from a novel concept, but has often proven difficult to implement. The inclusion of the OEF tank company into special operations force missions has been a clear success and provides a case study of useful general purpose forces and special operations forces integration, as well as the impetus to look for training opportunities to further refine this concept.

Building on Success

The most reliable method to sustain the success of the tank-infantry team is to incorporate these lessons learned into future training and combat operations. At the most basic level, this starts with

a renewed emphasis on combined training. Tank-infantry integration training works and it saves lives. In the space of just one 6-month period in 2012, the OEF tank company closely supported five different Marine infantry battalions in sizable combat operations. Without a baseline of tank-infantry training, planning and executing these complex operations would have been even more challenging and considerably less successful. Building upon and refreshing the training conducted during Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER (EMV), the OEF tank company has conducted reset training at every available opportunity with infantry battalions prior to commencing operations. This understandably pays large dividends and leads to increased awareness on both sides as well as appreciably more effective and better coordinated actions. Reset training, although essential, can only augment the knowledge base required from battalion commander to fire team leader that is needed to maximize the proficiency of the tank-infantry team. Home station training opportunities for tank and infantry units to conduct comprehensive tank-infantry integration training are available but limited. The natural venue for this type of training

is aboard the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms. As the premier combined arms training center and host of EMV, Twentynine Palms is often the only place that many Marines are exposed to Marine tanks—especially in a live fire setting—prior to combat.

Transition from EMV to ITX

Tank companies deploying to OEF have been incorporated into the EMV cycle as predeployment training program companies. The entire spectrum of events at EMV, from lane training, to combined arms offensive and defensive events, to the OEF scenario final event, have served as the appropriate mission rehearsal exercise for OEF-bound tank companies. The OEF scenario events are helpful, but contrary to what may be conventional wisdom, it is the company- and battalion-sized combined arms events that most closely replicated recent tank missions in support of infantry in Afghanistan. As the Marine Corps transitions from EMV to the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX), it is imperative that ITX maximizes full integration of tank units where appropriate. When possible, tank companies should participate in ITX as full companies, permitting task-organized team tank and team mechanized units and providing supported infantry battalions with an additional maneuver company with a highly mobile and lethal fire support team. The dual result would be increased proficiency for tank units in supporting the infantry, and significant exposure to tank-infantry operations across the ground combat element. When combined with formal assessments for tank units at ITX, a clearer and more comprehensive picture of where we stand as a tank-infantry team will emerge.

Modernize the USMC Tank Fleet

Two active duty tank battalions and one Reserve tank battalion provide the MAGTF with the appropriate level of armor support needed to win the day as the “middleweight fighter” and support the MAGTF across the range of military operations. The current tank fleet simply needs to be maintained and

modernized to continue providing the best available armor forces. With no replacement for the M1A1 emerging in the near future, several upgrades need to be prioritized. Equipping Marine tanks with blue force tracker systems and satellite communications suites that saw widespread use with the OEF tank fleet will enable the distributed, dispersed, and simultaneous operations that have characterized the OEF tank company's missions and will likely remain the model for the future operating environment. This will further integrate the tank-infantry team across multiple command and control systems. The multipurpose high-explosive (MPHE) tank round has been proven, after extensive use in OEF, to be the round of choice. Performing as designed with reliable and deadly effects in all three modes of fire (point detonation, delay, and air burst) MPHE should be made an immediate program of record with expanded production until joint efforts

with the U.S. Army produce a superior round. No further testing or end-user evaluations are necessary; MPHE has been demonstrated as ready for prime time and should be fielded wherever

With no replacement for the M1A1 emerging in the near future, several upgrades need to be prioritized.

Marine tanks deploy, to include aboard maritime prepositioning force shipping. Lastly, although continuous improvements have dramatically increased the effectiveness of the M1A1's optics, they are still not good enough, especially in COIN where establishing and maintaining positive identification of fleet-

ing enemy targets is critical. Increased magnification and clarity for both day and thermal sights should be an ongoing priority effort for the acquisitions community.

With these minimal investments, coupled with the ongoing modernization efforts currently underway, the Marine Corps can be assured of maintaining the armor forces required to provide dominant combat overmatch against potential future adversaries. Fully incorporating tank-infantry training into the new ITX will substantially increase the proficiency of the tank-infantry team and better prepare the Marine Corps for current and future missions. Accurately predicting the exact time and place of future conflict is an exercise in futility. Ensuring the Marine Corps' tank-infantry team is up to the challenge is a well-proven path to prevailing against any adversary.



2013 TOUR SCHEDULE



*Serving Veterans, Educators,
Historians and Their Families
Since 1987*



Some guys look good in hats!

VIETNAM BATTLEFIELDS

- 8 - 21 Jun - I Corps "Chu Lai to the DMZ"
- 24 Aug - 6 Sep - I Corps "Chu Lai to the DMZ"
- 24 Aug - 7 Sep - I, II, III & IV Corps "Delta to the DMZ"
- 15 - 28 Feb '14 - I Corps Tet & Battle of Hue City

24 Mar - 4 Apr '14 - 50th Anniversary of Vietnam War

PACIFIC BATTLEFIELDS



19 - 28 JULY
LIBERATION OF GUAM & TINIAN PLUS SAIPAN
Post Tour: 28 Jul - 1 Aug - Hawaii

Saipan Wreath Laying



At start of Great Wall

- 2 - 11 Aug - Guadalcanal & the Solomon's "Up the Slot"
- 14 - 27 Oct - "China Marines" in Peking, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai plus Terracotta Soldiers too!

60th Anniversary Subsidized Korea Revisits
SOLD OUT in 2013! SIGN UP NOW for 2014!

EUROPE BATTLEFIELDS

2 - 14 Jul - 70th Anniversary Battle of Kursk
Moscow - Stalingrad - Tank Battle Reenactment
Post Tour: St. Petersburg

4 - 13 Jul - 70th Anniversary of "Operation Husky" Invasion of Sicily 1943!

7 - 18 Sep - 70th Anniversary of "Op Avalanche" Invasion of Italy 1943!

19 - 27 Apr '14 - WWI Gallipoli Campaign Turkey

16 - 26 May '14 - WWI USMC Battlefields & Paris

17 - 25 May '14 - Seine River Cruise D-Day & Paris

8 - 13 Nov - BERMUDA GOLF GETAWAY, USMC BIRTHDAY & REMEMBRANCE DAY PARADE



Boarding ship Incheon Ceremony



On the Volga, Stalingrad



Touring Pompeii



Aisne-Marne American Cemetery



MILITARY HISTORICAL TOURS, INC.

13198 Centerpointe Way Ste 202 Woodbridge VA 22193
Colonel Warren Wiedhahn, USMC (Ret) President/CEO
703-590-1295 • 800-722-9501 • Fax 703-590-1292
Email: mhtours@miltours.com • Website: www.miltours.com



The New Fighting Tops

Reinvigorating a modern ship's company

by Maj Matthew Tracy

From a platform high in the rigging, our green-coated for-bearers fired upon the enemy sailors manning the opposing ship. Meanwhile, below on the gun deck, Marines stood behind the sailors operating the cannons, providing moral and physical support to sustain the cannonade. Finally, as the ships enmeshed, the Marines forcibly boarded the enemy vessel and decided the outcome through close combat.¹

One may lament the passing of the age of sail and foregone missions. Now, with advances in enemy antiaccess technologies and reduced friendly budgets, amphibious operations seem to be going the way of flintlocks and powder horns. The Department of the Navy has new technologies to enhance access to foreign shores; however, it lacks the budget to man these capabilities. This presents an opportunity for the Marine Corps to return to its original continental naval mission—ship's company. The return of the Marine Corps' ship's company, tailored to assist the U.S. Navy in achieving maritime superiority inside the enemy's weapons exclusion zone, will enable the Navy-Marine Corps Team to set the conditions for future forcible entry.

The greatest naval icon in western history, Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson, quipped, "A ship is a fool to attack a fort."² This maxim remains the essence of the present problem facing today's forcible entry operations. Technological advances and the proliferation of sensing and striking technology have converted the land into a deep-attack fortress, pushing the doctrinal amphibious staging areas well beyond the feasible limits of delivery and support.

>Maj Tracy submitted this article for the LtCol Earl "Pete" Ellis Essay Contest.

As MajGen Timothy C. Hanifen, Director, Expeditionary Warfare Office, Chief of Naval Operations, painfully admits, "U.S. and allied joint forces and combined fleets are potentially under near continuous combat engagement and attrition during force closure from near strategic distance."³ Because of the grave danger from advancements by some countries in antiaccess and area denial technologies, the U.S. Navy wants to push dollars and sailors toward near continuous combat engagement and attrition during force closure from near strategic distance."³ Because of the grave danger from advancements by some countries in antiaccess and area denial technologies, the U.S. Navy wants to push dollars and sailors toward blue water platforms at the expense of amphibious lift. Estimates are gloomy for projected expeditionary lift capabilities. One must assume that we will have more MEB than the Navy will have the lift to accommodate. A Marine Corps too large to transport and too vulnerable to deploy in an antiaccess sea is an attractive target for deep budgetary

cuts. However, a return to the Corps' historic continental and maritime roots provides a solution to gain access, grow a new MAGTF capability, and reaffirm our naval character and heritage.

A Manning Windfall for the U.S. Navy

One of the best solutions for gaining access in order to conduct forcible entry is the development of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. Experiments using unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles have demonstrated success against three antiaccess technologies: submarines, mines, and missile attacks.⁴ These vehicles could be used as defensive platforms which cloud, spoof, or jam antiaccess sensors. They would be offensive weapons which carry antiship missiles to engage small fast-attack vehicles far forward of the mother ship. Lastly, they could tow antimine sleds, prepping boat lanes for forcible entry or opening sea lanes of communications.⁵

It is counterintuitive and most certainly ironic that manning issues may



Return Marines to ship's company. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dominique Pineiro.)



Fighting from the masts. (Smith, Charles R., *Marines in the Revolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution 1775–1783*, History and Museums Division, HQMC, Washington, DC, 1975, pp. 242–43.)

be the fatal flaw that dooms the Navy to substantially suboptimize its enormous investment.⁶ The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) unmanned systems integrated roadmap lists six challenges that must be overcome. Four of the six challenges currently require an *increase* in manpower and include interoperability, manned-unmanned teaming, communications, and training.⁷ With the U.S. Navy trending toward multi-mission platforms manned with smaller crews, there are no available sailors to learn, maintain, and fight these weapons. Fiscal constraints of the future will cut deeply into the number of sailors available to sail the ship, let alone conduct additional duties. For example, even without the additional burden of unmanned vehicles, the Government Accounting Office’s study on the littoral combat ship noted that “. . . crew fatigue could affect missions which could be mitigated by temporarily augmenting the crew or modifying how mis-

sions are conducted.”⁸ A modern ship’s company could fulfill these manning requirements. Similar to the Continental shipboard Marines’ contributions, a modern ship’s company would maintain and employ the unmanned sea service vehicles (USSVs). Once manned appropriately, each ship’s company would provide its Navy ship with a dedicated asymmetric attack and defense capability, fought by Marines.

The Navy would naturally want to conduct the intermediate and advanced training for those on their battle networks. Since the capabilities and command and control of USSVs involve dominating the electromagnetic spectrum, operators need extensive information technology training.⁹ Marines would report to a Navy facility to learn unmanned surface vehicle maintenance and employment while attending advanced electromagnetic instruction. This represents a return to the truest sense of Marine Corps/Navy integra-

tion. Much like the Continental Marines who embarked with basic drill and musketry expertise, the ship’s officers taught advanced skills such as cannon- eering. Such integration would allow for the synchronized employment of a potentially antiaccess-defeating capability at a low training and infrastructure cost to the Marine Corps.

A Capabilities Boon for the Marine Corps

Currently the number of cyber Marines is paltry. However, Marine Forces Cyber’s (MarForCyber’s) vision is sweeping. The Commander, MarForCyber, intends to:

. . . plan, coordinate, integrate, synchronize, and direct full spectrum Marine Corps cyberspace operations, Defensive Cyber Operations, and when directed, plan and execute Offensive Cyberspace Operations, in support of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).¹⁰

A modern ship's company would build a corporate knowledgebase of electromagnetic warriors. The electromagnetic battlespace is a burgeoning warfighting domain that will have major impacts for the future of all combatants. Yet the Marine Corps lacks an operational mission, the organizational infrastructure, and advanced training investment to fully operationalize this maneuver space. To be able to satisfy these tasks, the Marine Corps will need to provide advanced training and operational experience to a larger number of Marines.

The true benefit of ship's company will come when Marines return with a knowledge base that will enhance the MAGTF. As stated in *Naval Amphibious Capability for the 21st Century*:

Threat employment of guided rockets, artillery, missiles, and mortars (G-RAMM), whether at sea or ashore, relies on a battle network of observation, tracking, and targeting. This network contains vulnerabilities potentially exploited in the fight for localized dominance.¹¹

Marines who have operational experience manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum will have the skills to exploit network vulnerabilities. Soon, defeating an enemy's sensors and command and control will be a shaping requirement for any size attack, from a company to a MEB. Secondly, the Marines of ship's company would rotate back to MarForCyber with the training and operational skills to accomplish the tactical tasks assigned in the mission statement. MarForCyber's Chief of Staff, Col Steven M. Zotti, said, "Cyber planners will be fused into cyber cells to provide expertise and to advise on, and conduct cyber operations as the MAGTF requires."¹² The rediscovery of providing a ship's company offers the Marine Corps an opportunity to invest in growing these human resources on Navy dollars, and will pay future warfighting dividends for the Marine Corps and the Navy.

An Integration Enhancement for the DoD

While the Navy needs to prepare for a potential blue water conflict, labor intensive missions, such as visit,

boarding, search, and seizure (VBSS); policing illicit cargo; and interdiction of pirates currently dominate the Navy's global agenda. It has been suggested that the Navy's shrinking personnel numbers inhibits its ability to prepare for such missions. VBSS missions require a minimum of 12-man teams for

JOAC will require unprecedented integration between the ship and the shore.

the 141 underway ships. This equates to 1,692 sailors who should be driving, fighting, and maintaining the ship. Additionally, these hand-selected sailors need training in employing their ships for the cross-domain synergy required in the joint operational access concept (JOAC).¹³

JOAC will require unprecedented integration between the ship and the shore. JOAC is an overarching concept that lacks specific tactics, techniques, and procedures. These tactics, techniques, and procedures must be developed, promulgated, and rehearsed by the United States' air and naval forces in order to be effective. VBSS boarding officers and their teams need to be working on this larger blue water access issue instead of attending their required VBSS certification training and shipboard sustainment training.¹⁴ An embarked modern ship's company could not only dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, but perform the more pedantic VBSS missions in order to allow the Navy to focus on integrating access strategies for the DoD.

There are many challenges? to growing and operationalizing a modern ship's company, with the most difficult being Service culture. The Marine Corps loathes giving up structure, while the Navy equally detests giving up a mission. Just using the VBSS mission template, a squad per surface ship with a VBSS mission assignment equates to 1,692 personnel. In an era of already

shrinking manpower resources, transitioning almost 1,700 Marines onto surface combatants may seem unacceptable to the Marine Corps. However, the broader implications of the problem revolve around *legitimacy* and *relevance*. In order to gain legitimacy for the Marine Corps' forcible entry mission, the Navy must be able to gain access to the beach with some assurance of risk. Without access, there is no forcible entry. Consequently, without forcible entry, there is no need for a Marine Corps MAGTF. A relatively small investment in a modern ship's company will allow the Navy to fully employ the potential of an unmanned fleet, gaining access and allowing for forcible entry. A forward, integrated mine, missile, and submarine-defeating unmanned picket line returns legitimacy to the forcible entry mission, and thereby legitimacy to the Marine Corps MAGTF.

Concurrently, developing electromagnetic dominance grants the Marine Corps inroads into this burgeoning warfighting domain, which ensures future relevancy. Compare the relevancy of a new cadre of electromagnetic warriors to MEBs that cannot put to sea inside the enemy's weapon engagement zone. MEBs, which are marooned in garrison, become attractive targets for defense cost-cutters.¹⁵ Instead of seeing a modern ship's company as a tax, the Marine Corps should view it as an investment for legitimacy and relevancy which hedges against future cuts.

A modern ship's company is not a permanent mission for Marines, but a bridge to a new naval capability. The Navy should not view the Marine Corps as pilfering their unmanned and VBSS missions, but rather as legitimizing the capability until research and development can develop autonomous systems. The DoD has already recognized the need for truly autonomous vehicles to decrease the total ownership cost and increase their numbers. A group from Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command writes in the December 2011 issue of *Proceedings* magazine, "The way ahead for future unmanned systems is for them to provide their own command and control and self-synchronization."¹⁶ Efforts have already begun to address

the engineering problems in command, control, communications, and computers and artificial intelligence. Intangible problems of ethics, intent, and decision-making must all be overcome. The pace of microprocessing and artificial intelligence development will eventually make the one joystick, one human, and one USV obsolete.¹⁷ Once fully autonomous vehicles become a reality, Marines can again say goodbye to shipboard duty. However, for advances in unmanned systems to continue, the Navy needs to leverage Marine manpower in order to ensure continued investment. To gain legitimacy for this potentially game-changing technological innovation, the Navy must show lawmakers incremental capability returns. Unmanned surface vehicles controlled by Marines onboard ships will not only expand the offensive and defensive capabilities of the strike group, but guarantee future investment.

In this, the year after the bicentennial of the War of 1812, the blue-green team should harken back to a time when we shared the burden of fighting for the seas. The burgeoning of antiaccess technology has forced the Navy and Marine Corps once again to fight side by side. With sailors on the gun deck and Marines in the fighting top, the United States' maritime force will be able to cut a swath through the sea, the air, and the electromagnetic spectrum to deliver a Marine Corps MAGTF ashore. Once ashore, follow-on operations will be shaped by nonkinetic fires in the new electromagnetic domain from Marines integrated into MAGTF headquarters trained on the sea. Our Corps must look back to the future for relevancy and legitimacy. In the words of LtGen Bernard Trainor, "I must go down to the sea again."¹⁸

Notes

1. History and Museum Division Headquarters of the Marine Corps, *A Pictorial History: The Marines in the American Revolution*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1975, p. 27.

2. Hughes, Wayne P., *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, p. 36. Hughes uses ADM Horatio Nel-

son's quote as one of his six cornerstones of naval tactics.

3. Hanifen, MajGen Timothy C., "At the Point of Inflection," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, December 2011, p. 24.

4. Chief of Naval Operations, *The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan*, Washington, DC, 23 July 2007, p. 139. Also see Tim O'Hare, "A Sea Change in Mine Warfare," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, June 2011, pp. 48–53, which states that an 11-meter rigid hull can tow a full range of sweeping systems. The USV has successfully towed the MK–104 acoustic sweep at 21 knots, as well as the Australian Dyads at 28 knots. In addition, the Mk–103 mine-cutting gear has been employed successfully in a recent test—vessels limited to a sea state.

5. Office of Naval Research, News and Media Center fact sheet available at www.onr.navy.mil.

6. Galdorisi, George, Steve Koepnick, Rachel Volner, and Charles Weko, "More Brains, Less Brawn," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, December 2011, pp. 46–53.

7. Department of Defense, *Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011–2036*, Washington, DC, 2011, document reference number 11–S–3613.

8. Government Accountability Office report to the Subcommittee on Readiness and the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, *Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts*, Washington, DC, February 2010.

9. Antiship missiles and towed antimine equipment are easy to conceptualize, but USSVs will be able to operationalize three of five information operations core capabilities, including military deception by emitting radio and communication signatures of a larger ship; electronic warfare through jamming enemy sensors; and computer network attack through hacking or spoofing. Further discussion on information core capabilities can be found in *Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations*, Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 13 February 2006.

10. USMC Cyberspace Update, 31 March 2011, accessed at www.afcea-qp.org.

11. Amphibious Capabilities Working Group, *Naval Amphibious Capability for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC, April 2012.

12. Wilson, J.R., *MARFORCYBER: Marines Fight in a New Domain*, Defense Media Network, 5 January 2012.

13. Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept*, Washington, DC, accessed at www.defense.gov.

14. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3502.3B, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) Pre-Deployment Training Program*, Washington, DC, 30 April 2012.

15. Hewes, Col William T., USMC(Ret), "An Uncertain Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2011, p. 23.

16. Galdorisi, p. 47.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

18. Trainor, LtGen Bernard E., USMC(Ret), "I Must Go Down to the Sea Again," *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1999, p. 65.



PROFESSIONAL.
MARINE.
DISCUSSIONS.

Get Involved!

www.mca-marines.org/Forum

Curriculum Transition

Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education Program

by the CDET Staff

Beginning on 1 July 2013 (academic year 2014), the Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education Program (EWSDEP) will transition from the current 8650-series curriculum to the new 8660-series curriculum. The 8660 series is designed to ensure that all Marines participate in a seminar as part of their career-level professional military education.

The number of Marines enrolling in EWSDEP seminars has increased markedly over the last several years. There are currently 2,597 Marines actively en-

The EWSDEP is derived from and parallel to the resident EWS curriculum. . . .

gaged in EWSDEP seminars, and over 1,000 enrolled in the individual-guided-study (IGS) option. These increasing enrollments have strained the College of Distance Education and Training's

(CDET's) ability to staff the number of seminars required with highly qualified adjunct faculty. Scheduled to occur on 30 June 2014, the phasing out of the IGS option would significantly compound this challenge.

In order to provide all Marines in the program with a collaborative learning environment in which to pursue their professional military education, EWSDEP will transition from the present 2-year seminar construct to a 1 year of self-study and 1 year of seminar construct. The move to 1 year of seminar will significantly increase the availability of highly qualified adjunct faculty for that year, thereby facilitating CDET's ability to staff the additional number of seminars that will be required when the IGS program is phased out.

The EWSDEP is derived from and parallel to the resident EWS curriculum; this is and always will be the case regardless of how that curriculum is delivered. The 8660 series delivers the portions of the curriculum most conducive to self-study in that format as a prerequisite to enrolling in seminar. The vast majority of Marines will complete the seminar phase in an on-site venue. There will, however, be an online option available by exception to those unable to participate in an on-site seminar.

For more details concerning implementation of the 8660-series program and the transition itself, see *MarAdmin 058/13, Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education Program (EWSDEP) Curriculum Transition from 8650 To 8660 Series* (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 31 January 2013).



Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education Program



MarineNet



USMC College of Distance Education and Training

Contact Your Regional Coordinator

1.888.4DL.USMC

www.tecom.usmc.mil/cdet

Shift to the Pacific and the East Asia Strategy

Outside in or inside out?¹

by LtCols Michael Oppenheim & Virgilio Arcega, Jr. & Maj Randall Risher

This article addresses the need to revise the military Asia-Pacific architecture to better advance U.S. core interests, and also proposes a notional Marine Corps footprint spread throughout Southeast Asia that might contribute to the military's theater engagement plan in support of the larger "shift to the Pacific."

Part I: The Framework

To "get China right," the United States should rebalance its military Asia-Pacific posture to address core interests in a future environment likely characterized by significant Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts and an Asia-Pacific region that sees Southeast Asian influence rising throughout greater Asia. This will require an architecture that emphasizes greater dispersal of hard power throughout Asia, and an increased network of political-military (and interagency) engagement increasingly reliant on both soft power and presence, even if that presence is less robust.

The U.S. shift in strategic focus away from the Middle East and Europe to the Asia-Pacific region conveys the validation that its security and economic interests are inextricably linked. The vastness of this region that encompasses 50 percent of the world's population, 2 of the 3 largest global economies, the world's most populous country, the largest democracy, and largest Muslim-majority nation offers both challenge and

>LtCol Oppenheim is the Assistant G-4 (Logistics), II MEF (Forward); Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, Regional Command-Southwest, Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. He has served in China and Japan with III MEF; and in Korea with the J-4 (Logistics), U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command.

>>LtCol Arcega is a logistics officer currently serving as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, II MEF (Fwd), and the Deputy Assistance Chief of Staff, Regional Command (Southwest,) at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. He has served in III MEF's area of responsibility in the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, and Japan.

>>>Maj Risher is a logistics officer currently assigned as the Logistics Combat Element Concepts developer at Combat Development and Integration Naval Concepts Branch. He has experience at the battalion landing team, MEU, and joint levels throughout the Pacific, Korea, and Central Command areas of responsibility.

opportunity to the United States as it seeks to maintain its influence in global leadership and economic dominance.

The current U.S. strategic architecture overemphasizes China and posts a footprint in Northeast Asia that may not be fiscally sustainable, and seems disproportionate to the emerging landscape of Asia more generally. To justify this direction, one might briefly consider relevant trends in Asia and likely developments in the future, and U.S. and Chinese core interests, primarily as they affect Asian actors (both geographic and strategic sources of influence). From this review, one might then propose a new architecture for U.S. military presence in Asia to address trends, future probabilities, and U.S. core interests.

This approach assumes three points: first, that China cannot be "contained";

second, that engagement with China, both directly and indirectly, can ultimately shape the environment to the best advantage from U.S. core interests' perspective; and third, that U.S. *enduring national interests* are essentially synonymous with *core interests*. To be clear, the 2011 *National Security Strategy (NSS)* clearly articulates "four enduring national interests," identified as security, prosperity, values, and international order.²

Relevant Trends and Likely Developments in the Future

Relevant trends. There are at least three key current trends in Asia that affect, influence, or significantly involve Sino-U.S. relations as each country vies for leadership and influence in the greater Asia region. Moreover, each trend has

a particular significance and implication for consideration in rebalancing the U.S. military framework in Asia.

First, China continues to emerge on the global stage, but its hard power projection remains focused regionally in Northeast Asia and is increasingly pronounced in Southeast Asia.³ If war in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely, and if the U.S. military footprint has acted as a deterrent, can it continue to deter with a smaller, less expensive footprint?

Second, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea alliances remain strong and reinforced, but have not prevented China from increasingly asserting itself regionally in a manner sometimes contrary to U.S. and other alliance and partners' desires to shape the region.^{4 5} While likely contributing to regional stability and growth, if the U.S. military footprint in Northeast Asia has not "contained" or "engaged" China with favorable results, would a reduction in the military footprint in Northeast Asia make less of a difference?⁶

Third, U.S. rebalancing efforts suggest continued moves south—both on the Korean Peninsula, and from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii—without lessening stated U.S. commitments to treaty allies (i.e., Japan and Korea in Northeast Asia; and the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia in Southeast Asia). If movement south is already underway, why not reinforce success and exploit additional shaping opportunities now by reducing the Northeast Asian military footprint, and take some of the savings and reinvest it in an increased Southeast Asia military footprint?⁷

Likely developments in the future. First, the U.S. defense budget cuts will afford fewer resources, though stated intentions from the White House suggest cuts will not affect the Asia-Pacific region. It is hard to see how, at least indirectly, this can be true, with force generation and training back home in the U.S. likely to be affected by cuts. More likely is a less robust exercise participation schedule, fewer or less robust engagements, and, no less, increasing challenges put on getting out the strategic message of commitment while reducing presence.⁸

Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will eventually become a "nuclear state," and China will have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo—or at least stability—on the Korean peninsula.

Third, the relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the U.S. is indispensable, will increase its ties and activities, and has a direct and quantifiable bearing on Sino-U.S. relations.⁹

Sino-U.S. Core Interests in Asia

Chinese core interests. China's core interests have been described as sovereignty, security, and development. The State Councilor for External Relations, Dai Bingguo, further clarified these interests:

First, China's political stability, namely the stability of the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the socialist system; second, sovereign security, territorial integrity, and national unification; and third, China's sustainable economic and social development.¹⁰

U.S. core interests. When compared to U.S. core interests (i.e., enduring national interests), there is some commonality with China. Indeed, U.S. security and prosperity loosely correspond to China's security and development. Furthermore, to some degree, at least to the extent that China's economic development relies on an international order that ensures trade and access to resources, China's reliance on this and the U.S.'s identification of maintaining international order intersect in a way that allows more for cooperation than for divisiveness. Granted, disagreements on U.S. inclinations to promote democracy and human rights relative to China's tendency for authoritarian-led stability (or noninterference) and social rights do not match up well and may indeed be something that is managed as opposed to (ultimately) being solved.¹¹

In short, the system is moving in the right direction, but U.S. domestic economic concerns present substantive challenges, and a changing Southeast Asian landscape redraws areas of influence. Politically, the United States must judiciously assess China's intentions and hedge against capabilities, but

still be sure to not overreact either.¹² The United States might exploit this changing situation to its advantage in a time when husbanding resources must take priority to "get the most bang for the buck," which will require a deliberate and diplomatic rearranging of focus and intensity away from Northeast Asia and toward Southeast Asia. Critical to making such a shift successful is that it be managed carefully to reassure U.S. allies and partners that the United States remains committed to them and common values and principles.

A Proposal for the U.S. Rebalancing Act

The rebalancing act must accomplish a couple of objectives: achieving a minimum 10 percent cost reduction in U.S. Pacific Command (USPaCom) DoD personnel and materiel, and recognizing the rising influence of Southeast Asia (to help U.S. efforts within the greater Asian sphere) and diverting some U.S.-based Northeast Asian forces southeast (i.e., less in Japan and Korea, and more in Australia, Guam, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, etc.).¹³ In general, and without speaking for the other Services, as they are currently arrayed in Northeast Asia, the Marine Corps has plans for force reductions from Okinawa and corresponding relocation to Guam and elsewhere. We propose that some of this rebalancing contribute to the relatively small staffing requirements of our proposed detachments throughout Southeast Asia.

First, any plan must be affordable. Force reductions are certain.¹⁴ Ten percent reduction in the USPaCom bottom line, though perhaps disproportionate to U.S. future interests, nonetheless provides a metric to Congress and the American public that demonstrates proactive fiscal belt tightening in an age of increasing fiscally austere expectations. (However, the ability to rapidly respond and provide presence and overall capability of forward deployed naval forces will deliver the core defense strategy of the United States in this predominantly maritime region.)

What might a smaller footprint in Northeast Asia look like? One possibility is less "boots on the ground" and less

capital ships, but more “less expensive” ships and combat unmanned aircraft systems able to be launched from carriers to reinforce U.S. commitment to our Northeast Asian allies.¹⁵

No less important is the resourcing of the personnel. Each detachment of this article’s proposed regional pocket of excellence (RPOE) sets initial staffing at 12 Marines each, for a total of 3 sites initially (36 Marines total). In general, this structure might be captured from the Okinawa reductions.

Second, Southeast Asia is increasing its influence in trade and even military cooperation, policing global commons and enforcing international norms.¹⁶ This provides the United States an opportunity to engage in even more forums that might reinforce U.S. interests and principles, and, likewise, might in response draw China into a direction that is more apt to reinforce elements of the international order the U.S. wants to see continue. Why might China do this? Because to increase its influence, it will have to respond to increased U.S. influence. If Southeast Asia is the new focus in 21st-century Asia (even if the Sino-U.S. relationship is the most important relationship therein), China will have to go where that influence is being manifested or risk the perception of “losing” its ability to similarly assert its own influence. This allows the U.S. to try and dictate the rules of the game and better shape possibilities for more favorable outcomes in terms of securing U.S. interests and shaping China—from an “outside-in” approach—relative to the current approach, which relies more heavily on a pronounced (and I argue larger-than-necessary or effective) military presence currently positioned in Northeast Asia.

Singapore’s Permanent Secretary to the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently commented that Singapore sought out how to “create relevance” to make it successful.¹⁷ Thus, if creating relevance is what works, the U.S. might create more relevance by reinforcing the international order through creating more allies and partners in Southeast Asia or strengthening those bonds and perhaps drawing China into the game more deeply by

shifting focus there (where, presumably, the United States would seek to exploit an “upper hand”). That focus could be afforded by reductions in a Northeast Asia footprint, and allies and partners increased with more U.S. presence, but culturally attuned to not appearing to be “telling” so much as quietly “reinforcing,” but with a pronounced presence nonetheless.

. . . Southeast Asia is increasing its influence in trade and even military cooperation, policing global commons and enforcing international norms.

Conclusion

The U.S. can create more relevance by overtly increasing its presence and quietly taking a back seat to ASEAN initiatives that marry up with U.S. objectives (e.g., reinforcing the internationally recognized norms espoused in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (known as UNCLOS), antipiracy efforts, policing global commons, etc.). This would more closely follow President Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt’s advice to “speak softly and carry a big stick.” U.S. resolve and credible capabilities need not be diminished by a rebalancing of the force in Asia.¹⁸ The U.S. might also leverage Singapore as an interlocutor for U.S. agendas, and sell this more effectively with both patience and applied “cultural awareness.”

More importantly, if managed correctly, this presence could draw China out even more to work within existing frameworks to address (or attempt to counter) the U.S. emphasis in Southeast Asia.¹⁹ China already has such efforts underway in Southeast Asia; however, if one of the objectives is to bring China increasingly more into the existing framework of the international order, this is one way to do it—namely, to compel China to “up its ante” on cooperation with Southeast Asian nations.²⁰

Finally, insofar as market capitalism requires market access and, ideally, less trade barriers, shifting focus to Southeast Asia brings with it not only

expanded markets, but also intangible benefits such as goodwill, better international relations, better information, and educational exchanges that further solidify alliance and partner relationships. Consider the close relationships the United States now has with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; these go beyond mere existential ties, as we share common values with these states. Indeed,

Japan, at least publicly, expresses willingness to lessen the U.S. footprint; Strategic Alliance 2015 will see the South Koreans take a primary lead in defense of their country, and Australia will now facilitate a modest U.S. military force footprint. This, coupled with increased ASEAN efforts already underway, does not make it such a hard thing to imagine in successfully selling a new focus in how the United States exerts its influence under a Southeast Asian rebalancing effort.²¹

Part II: The Marine Corps Footprint

RPOE to Facilitate Training, Refine Planning, and Build Enduring Relationships to Leverage in Conflict

We believe the Marine Corps can better nest with this new Pacific shift strategy (which we contend ought to be Southeast Asia focused), improve its logistical support for the bilateral/multilateral training missions aspired to in the future, and finally, improve its regional RPOE by placing small expeditionary detachments of primarily combat service support Marines throughout the region, beginning with where we have and/or desire to establish and/or improve training ranges (and military-to-military relationships) throughout Southeast Asia. Reinforced with some engineer and foreign area officer support, these RPOEs might be leveraged for both training and detailed planning. We believe these RPOEs will develop

an institutional familiarity with the local conditions and an appreciation of civilian-military capabilities that might be leveraged in times of conflict. If nothing else, the relationships that develop will endure, and this, likely, more than hardware and use of force, is what will set us up for success in the Asia Pacific—specifically Southeast Asia—as we navigate the China-India-North Korea dynamic with our other five East Asia Treaty allies.

This section proposes general locations and a notional table of organization for the proposed RPOEs. The locations are not set in stone, but are consistent with the general footprint by country that the Marine Corps should look to exploit training opportunities in. We contend that setting up shop with a small footprint is simply a value-added approach, as opposed to relying on short-duration advance-party liaison. While the vehicle to accomplish this footprint may initially be incremental training programs, the value that we stand to gain from forging more permanent locations and relationships, in conjunction with more frequent and dispersed presence throughout Southeast Asia, is an idea worth pursuing. This opportunity might put us on the best footing for the coming decades in which the United States is attempting to influence the action more in an uncertain region; by exploiting opportunities in Southeast Asia to get at an uncertain competitor, this might be a relatively inexpensive investment that provides far more long-term benefits than any difficulties presented in the initial stages. We have attachés, foreign area officers (FAOs), and contractors, and plenty of logisticians and operators who know how the Marine Corps can make friends and develop training opportunities that last for the long haul. We should exploit this.

One final caveat is that this Marine-centric proposal assumes that the outside-in approach toward China (and much more broadly, the “pivot to Asia” policy) will be articulated in the NSS, and then further interpreted accordingly such that, ultimately, the Marine Forces Pacific Campaign Support Plan would advance the RPOE as a viable option to help accomplish the mission.²²



Figure 1. Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam . . . and eventually Indonesia, Malaysia, India.²³ (Photo by author.)

Locations

The Marine Corps currently has an enduring footprint in Japan and South Korea, will soon have a revolving footprint in Australia, and a reoccurring footprint (primarily via exercises) in Thailand, the Philippines, and Guam.

At the end of the day, this is a chess game.

The proposal in Figure 1 depicts recommended RPOEs for enduring small footprints to facilitate new training opportunities, build relationships, and develop civilian-military knowledge/expertise. They are based on countries we might potentially exploit for bilat-

eral or even multilateral military-to-military training opportunities with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia. These locations would further help spread a web that more fully covered the Southeast Asian landscape with an enduring Marine Corps presence. Notionally, if this first set of countries were successful and proved supportable, perhaps a second round of similar developments might be explored with Indonesia, India, and eventually Burma. At the end of the day, this is a chess game. If nothing else, our moves dictate our competitors’ moves, and so, by default, they react to us. In this regard, we can dictate the tempo—and so should—as we shape the future of this next century in Asia.

Logistical challenges are many. Locations for training ranges that might also support billeting and other life-support quarters for the RPOEs would

be chief among considerations for site selection. No less, the point behind the selection of the permanent sites would be to develop relationships, so the locations would need to be identified near population centers and, ideally, within reasonable reach of a military headquarters. (In this capacity, working with the military attaché from the corresponding U.S. Embassy, the RPOE would set the conditions for varying-sized MAGTF units to fall in on for theater support cooperation and partner-building exercises and training.) It is conceivable that basic billeting might simply be out on the economy. While force protection considerations might be primary drivers in this, the fact is, living out and alone, fearless, presents the type of confidence and engenders a sense of teamwork and cooperation better than living in a fenced-in compound. The mission is to integrate, so these types of considerations would need to be appropriately weighted. The lists for what might meet all requirements would be quite extensive, and would certainly require status-of-forces agreement arrangements, coordination with the country team, etc. We propose this is worth pursuing, as war is costly, but preventive engagement is less so.

Figure 2 provides a notional 12-man RPOE table of organization. The intent of the structure is to ensure minimal but sufficient liaison personnel familiar with training ranges to ensure they are maintained in a reasonable state of readiness and generally can be rapidly reinforced to support Marine Corps training requirements for combined arms training. In addition, the structure allows for some expansion into regional expertise. For instance, the contracting officer can become familiar with the local economy and what the Marine Corps might leverage for training or longer-term planning for various plans or operations. The contracting officer can then coordinate with Pacific Command J-46 Pacific Contingency Contracting Operations Working Group and the Navy's Fleet and Industrial Supply Center to establish and refine existing contracts with local and regional vendors to both

enhance training opportunities for Marine units and economic benefits to the host-country. The FAO can become more familiar with local politics and strategic (and open-source) intelligence that will help inform the detachment commander to make better use of his resources to build institutional relationships with the military and civilian players, but might also add value to relevant Marine Operating Force commanders with both actionable recommendations, unique perspectives, and so on.

Notional Table of Organization

Benefits. The detachment would ensure (via local contracting) that ranges were maintained in a sufficient state of readiness to be operational during short bilateral exercises of various limited scope. It would maintain a permanent footprint to ensure presence and build enduring institutional relationships. It would support the local economy by relying on local contracting for various

classes of supply, and actively seeking out ways to foster civilian-military relations. It would build sufficient cultural and military knowledge to be useful to leverage in planning from the Active and Reserve Components and Operating Forces in the Asia Pacific; East Asia desk officers at Plans, Policies, and Operations; extend to possible satellite training areas for FAOs and regional area officers; and even be an additional source of information for the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. In short, the RPOE would be a permanent advance team for Operational Force training, a Marine Corps ambassador to the country, and would become an expert in the local culture, knowledgeable in what the local economy—and corresponding military—has to leverage as a partner in Asia.

Conclusion

The RPOE locations expand U.S. presence and match up with some countries the Marine Corps would like to

Billet	Rank	MOS
Detachment OIC	LtCol	Combat Service Support
SNCOIC	MGySgt	0491
Operations Officer	Maj	Combat Arms
Operations Chief	MSgt	03xx
Range Chief	SSgt	03xx
Plans Officer	Capt	Combat Arms
Culture Advisor/ Integrator	Maj	FAO
Asst Culture Advisor/ Integrator	SNCO	Foreign Area SNCO
Logistics Officer	Maj	0402/3002
Logistics Chief	SSgt	0431
Contracting Officer	Maj	Contractor AMOS
Contracting Chief	SSgt	Contractor AMOS

Figure 2. Table of organization.

expand into in terms of bilateral training. The permanent detachment (i.e., RPOE detachments) would assure the host-nations of an enduring presence—albeit light—and also provide a foundation on which to build greater and enduring civilian-military relationships. No less, though perhaps a bridge too far at present, these ranges might also be leveraged in the future with trilateral training with Chinese forces.

Strategically, this would serve an additional purpose of integrating the U.S. and Chinese relationship in the larger international order—one that would further reassure the East Asian community.²⁴ Indeed, it would nest within the current cooperative strategy for 21st-century seapower by supporting long-standing alliances and strengthening emerging partnerships throughout the region.

Tactically, with a Marine Corps and even DoD-centric view, the training might allow a degree of insight into both the operational capability and the logistic sustainment capability of the Chinese. If transparent and reciprocal, this might meet the requirements for such training.

Finally, this initiative would connect a future Marine Forces Pacific Campaign Support Plan with a future NSS that addressed—directly or indirectly—the outside-in architectural redesign alluded to in the first part of this article.

Notes

1. Gregson, W.C., “Defense Policy in Asia,” speech at the 2011 Naval Postgraduate School-sponsored Joint Foreign Area Officer Skill Sustainment Pilot Program In-Residence Course, Monterey, CA. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Honorable W.C. Gregson, mentioned the outside-in approach in Asia with respect to addressing China. Part of this approach is to focus on “their” problems to increase influence and areas of cooperation. But this also extends, conceptually, to geographic military posturing. We suggest that we might better “shape,” or try to shape, China indirectly, and that path, in a future of fiscal constraints and rising Southeast Asian influence, is perhaps best suited to focusing a military presence less in Northeast Asia and more in Southeast Asia.

2. The White House, *National Security Strategy*, chapter III, “Advancing Our Interests,” Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 17. The following definitions are provided:

- Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
- Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
- Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
- International order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

3. Consider China’s engagement in ASEAN in various forums, attempts to create additional bodies to counterweight ASEAN (though not exclusively directed at Southeast Asia) such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and increased assertiveness in the South China Sea.

4. Christensen, Thomas J., “The Advantages of an Assertive China,” *Foreign Affairs*, New York, March/April 2011, p. 57. “The most dramatic change is in its North Korea policy: Rather than pressuring Pyongyang after its nuclear and missile tests in the spring of 2009, Beijing seems to have doubled down on its economic and political ties with Kim Jong Il’s regime.” This paragraph is set against the backdrop of a deviation from the previous years’ “positive momentum in its foreign policy” with the United States, but it highlights the point that even with very solid alliances with Japan and South Korea—and significant U.S. military forward presence in both—China still acts quite contrary to U.S. aspirations. (Additionally, even with China’s cooperation on the UN Security Council with condemning North Korea for its early-2013 nuclear efforts, we would offer that the U.S. military footprint had almost nothing to do with securing China’s cooperation in this regard. Again, this ought to inform a relook at balancing forces in Northeast Asia.)

5. This is not to say that the U.S. foreign policy intent, much less the advancement of U.S. core interests, is misplaced. Rather, to advance U.S. core interests, a revised tack is needed because the Asian chessboard is getting more play on the Southeast Asian part of the board, suggesting different lines of play are required to address such developments. Increasing the focus in Southeast Asia (and perhaps aided resource-wise by some proportional decrease in Northeast Asia) is in line with the “outside-in” approach referenced previously in this paper.

6. For that matter, would an increased presence in Southeast Asia provide a different oppor-

tunity to engage China with more favorable results? If nothing else, might it not require China to diffuse some of their Northeast Asian resources to execute new lines of play in Southeast Asia? Furthermore, if that were to happen, then might China be even more willing to lean toward a more U.S.-preferred tack with North Korea? In some ways, the decreased footprint in Northeast Asia might be “offered” in return for more cooperation with North Korea.

7. Would this provide more stability to all of Asia, open more trade opportunities for the United States, and further help stabilize the international order since the emerging Southeast Asian states are less powerful, thus more likely to buy into the existing “order” until they are powerful enough to try and reshape it themselves (like China’s current currency manipulation and positioning for far-off regional currency plays, trade agreements, etc.)?

8. Strategic messaging must at least include the following points: (1) The U.S. remains committed to its treaty allies, partners, and friends; (2) these treaty allies, partners, and friends also have ever-increasing ties and interests in Southeast Asia so U.S. shifts (or pivots) underscore the strength of the relevant relationships; and finally, (3) U.S. resolve and capability are in no way undermined by a “rebalancing” of forces. The USPaCom Theater Engagement Campaign Plan will need to be aligned with this, but that is more problematic than anything else, and working with Department of State to ensure proper informational resources are leveraged to communicate this is achievable.

9. At the 2011 Naval Postgraduate School-sponsored Joint Foreign Area Officer Skill Sustainment Pilot Program In-Residence Course’s Singapore conference, Bilihari Kausikan, Permanent Secretary to the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed the opinion that the United States was indispensable to Southeast Asia, but not the supreme power. He conceded that the U.S. military presence was indeed the foundation of stability and growth, and that most, if not all, of Southeast Asia recognized this. However, he cautioned that growth has created new dimensions, and that while U.S. power is necessary, it is not sufficient to continue this arc of growth. Moreover, he highlighted that there is an architectural experiment underway in East and Southeast Asia, and underlying this is the Sino-U.S. relationship. Indeed, in this regard, he argued that the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship was the most important in the world, for now, and will become more so in the future.

10. Jisi, Wang, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds Its Way,” *Foreign Affairs*, New York, March/April 2011, p. 71.

11. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton specifically used the term “social rights” in expressing views she understood were important to China. The fact that she used the term so publicly was perhaps an acknowledgement that there is room to maneuver and that this will not be an obstacle to more fundamental cooperation across the spectrum of possibilities in which the United States and China have many intersecting interests. Regardless, the economic realities are that the major powers, and those aspiring to raise themselves to greater levels of prosperity and regional influence, are invested in a globalized trading system, and there is ample room to accommodate a rising China. Moreover, however slowly, China is taking steps that indicate it is willing to take on greater responsibilities as a responsible (and global power) stakeholder (consider, for example, its participation in Combined Task Force 51, counternarcotics cooperation, elevating principal minister-level defense discussions into the strategic and economic dialogues, etc.).

12. Wei, Da, “Has China Become ‘Tough’?” *China Security*, Washington, DC, March 2011, p. 102. One example of how the lack of transparency aggravates United States’ reading of Chinese intentions is Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Wei argues that the anxiety of the United States’ ceding influence in Asia due to China’s increased modernization is a bit misplaced, or at least a misunderstanding that has consequences on misreading the real situation. The Chinese Navy’s military exercises in the South China Sea have also been cited as proof of a tougher China. But military exercises are best understood and interpreted in the context of China’s military modernization. As China’s Navy modernizes, exercises will inevitably expand and take place in various bodies of water, including the South China Sea. China’s focal point is the Navy’s need to conduct exercises, not where they take place. From an external viewpoint, the fact that these exercises take place in the South China Sea is emphasized. Within American strategic psychology there exists anxiety and a sense of urgency, and the overall feeling is that China has pushed aside U.S. influence in Asia while the United States was preoccupied elsewhere, thus any action by China will be linked to these worries.

13. I have no basis for this somewhat arbitrary number. However, bold changes are required of U.S. spending. Although the Obama Administration has indicated its “pivot to Asia” will not see a decrease in military resources, the fact remains that Federal outlays indicate roughly 20 percent are put toward defense. Accordingly, in light of almost certain budget cuts and suggestions from the new Secretary of Defense, it is reasonable to expect budget cuts having

either a direct or indirect impact on what the United States can apply to USPaCom efforts. Consequently, 10 percent seems like a reasonable metric from which to begin the discussion.

14. For example, the Marine Corps has already announced a reduction to 186,000 active troops upon the conclusion of its participation in the Afghanistan Campaign. Other Services and weapons systems will follow. For the time being, the Obama Administration has stated that U.S. forces will largely be out of Afghanistan by December 2014.

15. Barnett, Thomas P.M., “The Rise of the Air-Sea Battle Concept,” *China Security*, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 71. Barnett argues that there is a way to provide sufficient reassurances to our allies that is less expensive and essentially available to incorporate into our military structure now. The United States also has at its disposal significant near-term force structure opportunities for further signaling its strategic resolve. The most salient example: If the U.S. Navy was to move decisively toward fielding unmanned combat air vehicles on its carriers (a good idea for all sorts of reasons), our now-vulnerable big decks could—at a moment’s notice—mount strike operations at suitably standoff distances to effectively diminish China’s first-strike strategy. Provided that less “big decks” to support “boots on the ground” did not commensurately equate to additional carriers to launch a sufficient number of unmanned aircraft systems, then the savings ought to be extensive—less ships, corresponding personnel, and related costs, facilities, etc.

16. Feigenbaum, Evan A., “Could America Fade in Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 4 April 2011, accessed at www.business-standard.com on 30 May 2011. “Gradually, but inexorably, the region is becoming more Asian than ‘Asia-Pacific,’ especially in its economic and financial arrangements; more continental than sub-continental, as East and South Asia become more closely intertwined. . . .”

17. At the 2011 Naval Postgraduate School-sponsored Joint Foreign Area Officer Skill Sustainment Pilot Program In-Residence Course’s Singapore conference, Bilihari Kausikan, Permanent Secretary to the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, relayed his view on the notion that one often says Singapore “punches above its weight class.” He said this was folly because in boxing there are rules, but in the real world someone could come into the ring and shoot you.

18. Glaser, Charles, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” *Foreign Affairs*, New York, March/April 2011, p. 85. “The combination of clear alliance

commitments, forward deployed conventional forces, and large survivable nuclear forces should enable the United States to deter a Chinese attack on either Japan or South Korea.” Of course, the number of “forward deployed conventional forces” is what we’re really talking about. Even so, a mere 50 percent reduction in boots on the ground would still present a sizeable military footprint in Northeast Asia, and the ability of the 31st MEU to respond on short order within the USPaCom theater, coupled with the U.S. triad, is no small measure of capability.

19. Irvine, Roger, “Primacy and Responsibility,” *China Security*, Washington, DC, 2008, p. 80.

20. During the Chinese Civil War, Mao Ze Dong used a tactic referred to as “drawing the enemy in deep,” whereby he brought the enemy into the valley and away from the cities (making him more vulnerable to attack without the benefit of strong lines of communications), further away from the industrial base of operations (the enemy’s center of gravity). Once the enemy was sufficiently weakened, he would attack him all-out. Might a U.S. strategy designed to draw China deeper into Southeast Asian cooperation (on U.S.-driven terms) via this outside-in approach prove equally viable? The exception would be that instead of “attacking” China, the strike would compel China to adopt, or be co-opted in, more international norms in line with both the U.S. and emerging Southeast Asian states’ interests, and less in line with China’s efforts to reshape the international system to its benefit (and, in theory, away from U.S. benefit). Ironically, one might caution the United States to be sure it was not being similarly co-opted into a Southeast Asian framework that worked to the benefit of Southeast Asia at the expense of U.S. advancement, but this is unlikely given relative positions of power and influence the U.S. plays in continuing to shape both stability and growth opportunities for ASEAN states at this stage of the 21st century.

21. A former USPaCom commander commented that five small ships floating around were much better than one brand new big ship. The permanent Secretary to Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his deputy both stated that everyone wants the U.S. in Southeast Asia, but suggested that the U.S. needed to find a way to be less of a “bull in a China shop” (authors’ paraphrasing). This is something the U.S. could and should do to posture itself for the next 25–50 years of success in achieving its core interests in Asia.

22. Generally, one would expect to see guidance begin with the President of the United States via the NSS, then strategic guidance disseminated by the Secretary of Defense via both the Quad-

ennial Defense Review and *National Defense Strategy*. This in turn would be further refined via *National Military Strategy*, produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the operational level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would issue the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and then the Secretary of Defense would issue both the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force*, and *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*. *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* provide guidance to the theater commanders. So, the global combatant commanders produce a theater campaign plan that has regional annexes and country campaign plans. The components of the combatant commands issue campaign support plans. A more detailed explanation of this process can be found in an article titled “Security Cooperation Strategic and Operations Guidance: Translating Strategy to Guidance” by Dr. Daniel A. Gilewicz in *The DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, available at www.disamjournal.org.

23. Fuentes, Gidget, “Rebalancing Act: As the Corps transitions to the Pacific, opportunities to forge new partnerships, re-engage allies,” *Marine Corps Times*, Arlington, VA, 1 October

2012, p. S6. For this article, the author interviewed LtGen Terry Robling, the Commander of Marine Forces Pacific since June 2012. LtGen Robling discusses four key requirements, namely rotational and permanent units that are properly manned; strategic lift; training ranges, including live-fire and maneuver areas; and equipment, weapons, gear and vehicles ready for training and operations. Moreover, LtGen Robling envisioned these four key command focuses being incorporated into the rebalancing and resetting of the force, requiring Marines to go to many other places we haven’t gone to for a while, or new ones to which we aspire to go.

24. Rudd, Kevin, “Beyond the Pivot: A New Road Map for U.S.-Chinese Relations,” *Foreign Affairs*, New York, March/April 2013. Rudd argues that with the United States clearly focused on communicating that it intends to be a player in Asia for the long haul, and shaping China’s increasing role/influence in the region (and larger international order), than it must seek out opportunities to engage China and reassure other East Asian community members that the relationship can be managed and continue to produce the stability that has underpinned the economic growth provided under the U.S. security umbrella—even with a rising China and increasing assertiveness. We argue that ex-

tending opportunities to engage China in other countries, for the Marine Corps, at the RPOE ranges, for trilateral training, provides a forum to glean useful information about Chinese capabilities, and, more importantly, telegraph to the host-country—and throughout greater Asia—that the United States and China can manage a partnership of sorts, maintain stability, develop a system to work on not overreacting to miscommunications, and work within the existing international order that benefits the United States and other East Asian nations (at least with respect to international norms, economic trade, and other nation-to-nation interactions). Finally, we suggest that spreading the (here, Marine Corps) footprint throughout Southeast Asia is a viable way to nest within the U.S.-Southeast Asian regional political strategy, increase the required presence to reinforce the message of staying power the United States hopes to signal with its pivot to Asia, build relationships, and reinforce national and military objectives that have enduring characteristics and benefits that far outweigh any shorter term cost for establishment and maintenance.



All Seasons – All Reasons

Stylish Gifts for Marines



106714
Member Value Price: \$6.26
Non-Member Price: \$6.95



106754
Price: \$9.99



106763
Member Value Price: \$26.96
Non-Member Price: \$29.95



106715
Member Value Price: \$5.36
Non-Member Price: \$5.95



106755
Member Value Price: \$11.66
Non-Member Price: \$12.95



106740
Member Value Price: \$10.76
Non-Member Price: \$11.95



106712
Member Value Price: \$6.26
Non-Member Price: \$6.95

Visit us in Person:

The MARINE Shop • 300 Potomac Ave. • Quantico, VA • 703-640-7195

The MARINE Shop at Camp Lejeune • Building 84, Exchange Annex
Camp Lejeune, NC • 910-451-7500

www.marineshop.net • 888-237-7683

Your purchases at **The MARINE Shop** help fund the MCA&F Programs that support Marines! Learn more at www.mcafdn.org.



Marine Corps Association & Foundation
Advancing Leadership and Recognizing Excellence Since 1913

GET MEMBER VALUE PRICING – JOIN TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775



Fourth-Generation Warfare

The canon

by Maj Gregory A. Thiele

In order to be successful on the modern battlefield, Marines must possess the broadest possible perspective. Such attainment is the product of education—and given the relative infrequency of formal schooling, this often means self-education. Marines that are not committed to lifelong learning are failing themselves, their peers, their subordinates, the Marine Corps as an institution, and ultimately their Nation. Marines should do more than read; they should think about what they read and attempt to put it into context. Marines need a framework to understand the lessons that history has to teach. Reading without such a framework is like navigating on the open seas without a compass—you have no idea if the discoveries you make along the way are leading you to anywhere productive. The four generations of modern war (fourth-generation warfare, or 4GW) concept provides a useful framework for understanding history.

Very briefly, 4GW begins with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, an event marking the emergence of the state as the only legitimate agent for waging war. First-generation war (1GW) is tactics of line and column. Second-generation war (2GW) employs centrally controlled firepower to win by attrition. Third-generation war (3GW) is maneuver warfare that focuses on destroying the enemy's cohesion. 4GW is marked by the state's loss of its Treaty of Westphalia-established monopoly on war. The origin of 4GW is neither technical nor tactical, but moral. The state is suffering a crisis of legitimacy, which is causing citizens to transfer their primary loyalties away from the

>Maj Thiele is the Assistant Operations Officer, 23d Marines, San Bruno, CA.



GEN von Scharnorst laid the framework for an earlier revolution on military affairs. (Photo from wikimedia.org.)

state to other causes, in service to which they are willing to use violence.

The emergence of 4GW has only begun, and it may take a great deal of time for it to fully unwind. In the meantime, Marines desiring to learn more about the 4GW model are not without guidance. There is a series of seven books which, if read sequentially, will guide the reader from 1GW to the emergence of 4GW. In order, the books are:

- *The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militaerische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805* by Charles E. White (Praeger, Westport, CT, 1989).
- *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939* by Robert A. Doughty (Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1986).
- *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918* by Bruce I. Gudmundsson (Praeger, Westport, CT, 1989).
- *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and*

German Armies, 1888–1918 by Martin Samuels (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1995).

- *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* by Robert A. Doughty (Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1982).
- *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945* by Martin van Creveld (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1982).
- *The Transformation of War* by Martin van Creveld (The Free Press, NY, 1991).

The emergence of 4GW has only begun, and it may take a great deal of time for it to fully unwind.

Perhaps a brief explanation regarding the importance of each book is in order. While it describes 1GW, *The Enlightened Soldier*, through the example of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, also shows the qualities a professional officer must have. This book serves as a stark warning of what happens to militaries that fail to change as war changes. For example, the Prussian army was defeated (and Prussia nearly erased from the map of Europe) in a single day.

The next two books, *The Seeds of Disaster* and *Stormtroop Tactics*, describe the emergence of 2GW and 3GW in the French and German armies, respectively. Both emerged during World War I as a response to the pressures and constraints of that war. The French attempted to solve the riddle of the Western Front trenches by ever-increasing amounts of firepower and ever-more intricate “synchronization” (the concept has French origins) of troops and fires. On the Eastern Front, due to its extent, the Germans had continued to conduct mobile warfare. This experience, in addition to the recognition that Germany could not win a battle of materiel, led the German Army to adopt a form of warfare based upon maneuver.

In *Command or Control?*, Martin Samuels describes the command philosophies that underpinned the British (2GW) Army and German (3GW) Army during World War I. What the reader should discern immediately is that philosophy and culture matter, and that, to be effective, they must be supported by leaders, doctrine, and equipment. For example, if unmanned aircraft systems had been available to both the British and Germans during the Great War, it is not difficult to imagine British generals using them to direct small units on the battlefield. Their German counterparts, in contrast, would probably have employed them to look at the “big picture,” seeking opportunities for maneuver at the operational level.

The fifth book, *The Breaking Point*, illustrates what happened when these 2 systems collided in 1940. The French, unable to cope with the rapid tempo of the German attack, were defeated in a matter of weeks. The French and British were superior in virtually every measurable respect to their German opponents; the German victory came from better ideas, not hardware.

The last two books in the canon are by Martin van Creveld, one of the world’s preeminent military thinkers. In *Fighting Power*, van Creveld shows why the German Wehrmacht was far more combat effective than any of the World War II Allied armies. In van Creveld’s most important book to date, *The Transformation of War* builds on some of his previous work, detailing the decline of the state in an attempt to anticipate the future of war. Published in 1991, the book is eerily prescient in describing the rise of 4GW (although van Creveld does not label it as such).

The canon is an essential addition to any thoughtful Marine’s reading list. The above books are not “light reading.” Each requires careful thought, but this effort will be repaid 100 fold. Simply reading books is insufficient; Marines must attempt to make sense of what they are reading. The canon will give direction to this critical effort.



MARINE CORPS
Gazette
Professional Journal of U.S. Marines

**Read the Blog
WE DARE YOU!**

**Join the Debate
WE DOUBLE DOG
DARE YOU!**

mcgazette.blogspot.com

The Navy-Marine Corps Team

Crisis responders in a dynamic threat environment

by LtCol Brad Farrar, USMCR

Against the backdrop of austere budget conditions, expanding missions, institutionalized asymmetry, and the vagaries of political will, the Navy and Marine Corps' operational focus is best defined by an understanding that "military operations other than war" inadequately captures the breadth of today's range of military operations (ROMO); the Navy, Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard combine to deliver six core capabilities of *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* critical to the majority of the ROMO; prowess in amphibious warfare, while always important, is not an exclusive narrative to be relied upon for maritime force relevancy; and the U.S. Government's (USG's) failure to properly plan for and execute phases 0, 4, and 5 of the continuum of operations presents a national critical vulnerability "someone" within the USG must take a pivotal role in shoring up. Specifically, the naval Service—and particularly the Marine Corps—must maintain the highest personal and professional standards to prepare its members for tactical scenarios with potentially strategic consequences in areas of responsibility where geographic combatant commanders are not just warfighters, but are looked upon in today's threat environment as modern Roman proconsuls.

Maritime Primacy in the ROMO

Prior to 2006, U.S. joint doctrine categorized military operations as either war or "other than war."¹ This point of demarcation may reflect a national failure to recognize that this change probably occurred much earlier—perhaps by the end of the Cold War, cer-

>LtCol Farrar is an operational lawyer (judge advocate) for North American Aerospace Defense Command-U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, CO. He is also Deputy County Attorney, Richland County, SC.



Ships in the Nassau (LPH 4) Amphibious Ready Group conducting an underway replenishment operation. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky.)

tainly with the Iranian uprising in 1979 and the radical Islamist undercurrent years earlier, and seen through British urban ops against the Irish Republican Army, as well as the Marine Corps' early proficiency in military operations on urbanized terrain.

Military operations other than war's bright line between war and an omnibus category of those missions falling outside of war simply does not capture the scope of the U.S. military's role as an instrument of national power post-11 September 2001 (post-9/11). Joint doctrine changed because the threat environment changed. As Marines, it

is critical to understand why this transformation occurred, how it affects the characteristics of modern operational challenges, and what opportunities the resultant environment presents for crisis responders attuned to the change. The reasons are many.

Victory in the Cold War left the U.S. as the remaining superpower—dominant in conventional and unconventional weaponry, thus creating an imbalance in the heretofore easily understood mano-a-mano standoff with the Soviet Union, mercifully checked by state actors rational enough to appreciate mutually assured destruction.

Second, the world has undergone intense urbanization, seen clearly in the red state/blue state dichotomy in American politics (where blue states are essentially “blue cities”). While cities have figured in combat throughout history, today we have the “three-block” war vice the “three-acre” war. Linear fighting in large unimproved battlefields to settle conventional disputes has given way to chaotic warfare through awkward and constraining avenues of approach, populated with combatants indistinguishable from civilians caught in the crossfire of a struggle over vaporous interests.

Third, our adversaries’ strategic objectives are different. Conquest of territory has been supplanted by the desire to promote an ideology, to project influence without requiring occupation, to compete for natural resources, space, cyberspace, economic dominance, and the like. The objectives, like the tactics intended to achieve them, are often amorphous.

Fourth, many of today’s adversaries are nonstate actors. This entails not only reorienting the traditional conception of military operations, but is frustrating across all levels of war. Where is al-Qaeda’s headquarters building? Who are its billet holders? Why don’t they wear uniforms? How come they shoot at us from sites traditionally protected by the law of armed conflict?

Fifth, fog and friction not only pervade combat across the modern threat spectrum where “no plan survives contact with the enemy,” but also in the processes of identifying and planning for crises.² Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between “known knowns” and “unknown unknowns” is instructive in this regard.³ Prior to 9/11, how many in a position within the USG to do anything about it were spending their time conceiving of how U.S. commercial airliners could be used as weapons of mass destruction? Today, courses of action to mitigate that scenario may be outdated as old terrorist tactics are discarded like cheap cell phones in favor of new ones, limited only by the creative imagination of those willing to trade their lives for our centers of gravity.

Sixth, the rise of individualism and small unit ability to change the course



LCU 1655 pulling alongside the USS Nassau in 2010. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Jonathan Pankau.)

of history characterizes the modern battlefield. On 9/11, 19 young men in airplanes with basic training and minimal overhead costs altered the world’s political, psychological, and economic landscape for the indefinite future.

Seventh, improved technology, information operations, “smart” phones, YouTube, social media, and the instant notoriety that can be gained therefrom, along with unprecedented command and control, has compressed response times and can push orientation, observation, decision, and action loops to the cyclic rate.

Eighth, noncontiguous areas of operation can themselves make asymmetry the rule rather than the exception.

Finally, the “other than war” category is limited only by the parameters policymakers fashion for using the military in potentially nonmilitary capacities. If posse comitatus, a restriction on the direct participation of U.S. military personnel in domestic law enforcement contexts, were reinterpreted or repealed, we could conceivably see Department of Defense (DoD) personnel building roads and bridges in the continental United States during perfect weather conditions as the natural extension of current limited domestic assistance in disaster relief or other exigent circumstances.⁴

The ramifications of the uncertain security environment of 2015–24 are far-reaching. Chief among those ramifications is the need for uniformed personnel skilled across a spectrum of disciplines that coincides with ROMO. At the same time, society may unfortunately be raising young men and women whose knowledge base is limited by their ability to frame Google search requests. As we move to an “information” vice knowledge society, this challenge will become much greater. Information and knowledge are often distinct from one another, but both are subordinate to wisdom, which underpins much of what is embraced in operational art.

Implicit in modern terrorist tactics is the fact that nonstate actors cannot compete with the U.S. and its allies in a conventional conflict. This reality increases the demands on uniformed personnel beyond their ability to shoot, move, and communicate.

The current range of operations embraces most everything within the scope of the military instrument of national power, including major campaigns, homeland defense, civil support, strikes, raids, show of force, enforcement of sanctions, protection of shipping, freedom of navigation, peace operations, counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, noncombatant evacuation

operations, recovery operations, consequence management, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, arms control and disarmament, and routine recurring military activities. One would be hard pressed to exclude the Navy or Marine Corps from having a stake in any activity within the ROMO.

Critically, this range unfolds amid the United States' reorientation to the Pacific Rim as strategic objectives in the Middle East reach uncertain returns, and China, Russia, and North Korea loom as resource competitors and military aggressors of unknown commitment. The counterinsurgency operations Marine "strategic corporals" find themselves playing a pivotal role in may give way to more traditional amphibious operations along a spectrum that includes a joint approach to deliberative theater entry at one end, to rapid littoral maneuver at the other. The Navy and Marine Corps must maintain flexibility across this range during

a force reset stemming from changing missions, theaters, and national fatigue over two wars. The apparent foregone conclusion of draconian defense cuts to remedy fiscal dysfunction vis-à-vis other national priorities does not help matters.

The Navy-Marine Corps Team, recognizing this through the same vision that produced expeditionary warfare ahead of its time, must again lead the way as a 9-1-1 force-in-readiness, not simply within the war/other than war paradigm, but across all operational categories.

Navy-Marine Corps Capabilities in the Cooperative Strategy

No one parried away the existential threat to Marines better than LtGen Victor Krulak, who concluded in an earlier era that the Marine Corps exists because America wants a Marine Corps.⁵ In desperate financial times, most of the DoD continues to search

for relevancy, its unquestioned combat successes and promotion of freedom throughout the world notwithstanding. The concise *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* illustrates this point.⁶ Released in 2007, the Navy realized the mutual advantage of joining with the Marine Corps and the U.S. Coast Guard to set forth a naval strategy centered on 6 core capabilities—forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

Clearly, vestiges of the Cold War remain, even if refocused perhaps to include nations outside of the former Soviet Union. A submarine armed with Trident missiles, lying in international waters just a few miles off the coast of, say, China, remains formidable power projection. However, counterterrorism, irregular warfare, a close association with special operations forces, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance

Membership is MUCH More than Just Staying Connected with the Corps!

DON'T FORGET YOUR OTHER MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS:

- **MCA&F's Flagship Magazines**
– 1st RATE Professional Reading
Mission critical reading for Marines and Friends of the Corps
Leatherneck – Magazine of The Marines
Marine Corps Gazette – Professional Journal of U.S. Marines



- **Member Value Pricing**
Valuable discounts at *The MARINE Shop* at Quantico and Camp Lejeune and ONLINE at www.marineshop.net – The most prestigious uniform & accessory provider for Marines – And a lot more!



- **Exclusive Member Discounts**
Cost saving discounts from top-name computer, auto rental, credit card, financial services companies and more!



- **MCA&F Professional Events**
Member discounts on attendance at events with top leaders addressing Corps & National Security Issues

LEARN MORE:
www.mca-marines.org
866-622-1775



JOIN TODAY!



and disaster response predominate in today's environment. By recasting seapower among the core capabilities, the Navy-Marine Corps Team enhances its national strategic rationale through what Dean Rubel describes as "the protection of the existing global system of trade and security [providing] both the context for the new strategy and the intellectual glue that tied together all regions of the world."⁷

Inclusion of the Coast Guard presents a situation where literally all boats are lifted by the rising tide of the cooperative strategy. The Coast Guard's dual capabilities and legal status, underpinned by a separate title in the U.S. Code, allows the strategic partners to capitalize not only on the Coast Guard's expertise in whole of government solutions, but provides a military and an "acceptable" law enforcement presence owing to its blended military-civilian duties, a presence not detained by the posse comitatus problem that hampers its partners.^{8,9}

The Navy offers a mobile alternative in countries that would like to see America's large land presence reduced. The Navy needs to strike the appropriate balance and find the price point where budgetary constraints all of government are under meet with forward presence and combat credibility, and the number of ships needed to sustain that level. Including the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard in that endeavor makes sense for a Service seeking its share of dwindling funding amid expanding missions.

The hallmarks of expeditionary warfare (special operations, mine warfare, amphibious warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal); the Marine Corps' enduring roles in maritime supremacy; power projection and strategic sealift; and current platforms like the MV-22 Osprey, as well as desired platforms such as a new amphibious assault vehicle, will allow the Marine Corps to execute the core capabilities in the cooperative strategy as our operational focus for the next decade crystallizes.

Amphibious Warfare: A Shield and a Sword

We cannot ignore critics, naysayers,

and those with opposite viewpoints on the proper role of seapower in the cyber age and "fourth generation" of warfare (where the state loses its monopoly on war).¹⁰ A frequently used arrow in the quiver of naval Service detractors is that amphibious warfare is obsolete in modern operations. In this regard, context matters, and the Navy-Marine Corps Team would do well to get in front and stay ahead of this criticism.

To those for whom "words mean things," there was profound cognitive dissonance in the aftermath of 9/11 that the U.S. pursued a global war on "terror"—a *tactic* and not an enemy. "Global war on terror," it is argued, was a classic misnomer that many have pointed out would be akin to entering World War II after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor under the heading, "War against sneak attacks."

Concepts and proven proficiencies, like words, can define and limit those to whom they are ascribed. The Marine Corps, ironically by virtue of its mastery thereof, has been identified as the subject matter expert on amphibious warfare and, in particular, amphibious landings, thus the pronouncement by then-Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that "... the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years."¹¹

That iconic event, still the subject of major Hollywood films, then became the plumb line by which the Marine Corps as an abstract proposition has been measured ever since. As a concrete proposition, we must tactfully point out to those critics that noting the lack of an operational need to storm beachheads in the recent threat environment no more invalidates the Marine Corps than considering the Army to be obsolete because it can point to no recent campaign successes using horse cavalry. Times change, as does technology, and thus the threat environment. Amphibious proficiency is more than a historical calling card. It is a proven capability, the currency of which may spike at an inopportune time. Until that day, unmatched excellence in 6 cooperative maritime strategic capabilities across 19 express military operations confirms that America not only wants a Marine Corps—it needs one.

The Continuum of Operations: Mastery or Mystery?

The notional balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations is spread among six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.¹² Recognizing today's threat posture, the USG has by practical necessity reinforced jointness and interagency-centrism in a whole-of-government approach to securing its strategic goals through all instruments of national power.

Combatant commanders in the present environment have been likened to Roman proconsuls, warrior-statesmen expected to contribute to the resolution of all problems in their areas of responsibility. Through the blurring of missions and the blending of capabilities, DoD members could be called upon to participate in potentially strategic-consequential meetings with local tribal leaders, serving as de facto U.S. ambassadors, anthropologists, culturalists, compassionate caregivers, village planners, and participants in drafting foundational governing standards for the area of operations. Many of these skills are resident or predominant in the Reserves.

Within the continuum of operations, the U.S. has clung to its understandable preoccupation with the main combat phases. We have been less proficient in shaping, envisioning endstates, crafting termination criteria, and in mastering the phase 4 stabilization and phase 5 enabling of whatever civil authority is put in place following military success against the largest components of organized resistance.

One need only look at disruption in the postconflict activities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) to get an appreciation for the latter-phase challenges. Inadequate troop strength preconflict, during, and postconflict; disbanding the Iraqi army; and improvised explosive devices are among a host of late-phase obstacles we negotiated, arguably with marginal success at times.

More fundamental, what was the reasonable strategic calculation for successfully imposing a Western system on a region that for thousands of years has been unfamiliar with and perhaps

not amenable to the freedom we cannot conceive of living without? Momentum gained through phase 3 in OIF waned predictably, with peacekeeping expert Robert Perito observing that failing to prepare for postconflict “. . . loses you the first six months of the operation. The doctrine on peace operations is that the initial month or so is critical.”¹³

In short, we excel in the “mountaintop experience” and struggle in answering the “what now” question as the continuum unfolds. There exists a need for a Service, perhaps even a functional component command, dedicated to the most neglected phases of U.S. operations. Proficient initially, U.S. dominance frequently creates a new set of problems for governance, stability, and long-term functioning, and examples of successes such as civil operations and rural development support in Vietnam, Joint Interagency Task Force South, and Task Force Bowie are the exceptions. More lasting strategic benefits, such as establishing favorable regimes and countries that might have a hegemonic regional influence to create allies or neutrals vice hostiles, also may be enabled through a proper focus on stability.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–2, Campaigning provides:

Thorough campaign planning can reduce the chaos and confusion in abruptly ending combat operations. When we disengage . . . it is of paramount importance to provide for the security of our forces as well as non-combatants and enemy forces under our control. The violent emotions of war cannot be quelled instantly, and various friendly and enemy forces may attempt to continue hostile actions.¹⁴

America fails to properly plan for these vital stability and enabling operational challenges at its peril. This national critical vulnerability presents an opportunity for the naval Service to take the initiative in bridging the neglected continuum phases. The Marine Corps is especially well-suited to this task: agile enough to react, competent to adapt, balanced to sustain, resolved to prevail, credible to win the peace with the same proficiency it dominates combat phases in support of national strategic objec-



Elements of the 24th MEU are transported to shore from the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7). (Photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Amanda M. Williams.)

tives. This is the heart of postconflict engagement, and the U.S. has no better bid for operational success in crisis response than the Navy-Marine Corps Team in the uncertain threat environment of the foreseeable future.

Notes

1. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–07, Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War (JP 3–07)*, Washington, DC, 16 June 1995; Joint Staff, *JP 3–0, Joint Operations*, Washington, DC, 11 August 2011; Ann E. Story and Aryea Gottlieb, “Beyond the Range of Military Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Washington, DC, autumn 1995.
2. Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, paraphrased in numerous sources, including Correlli Barnett’s *The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War*, Signet, New York, 1963.
3. Department of Defense, news briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen Richard B. Myers, Washington, DC, 12 February 2002.
4. U.S. Government, *Posse Comitatus Act*, Washington, DC.
5. Coram, Robert, *Brute: The Life of Victor Kruhlak, U.S. Marine*, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 2010.
6. Headquarters Marine Corps, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, Washington, DC, October 2007.

7. Moore, Charles C., III, “Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” *Parameters*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, summer 2011, quoting Professor Robert Rubel, Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College.

8. Title 14, U.S. Code.

9. Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, *Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian*, Washington, DC, 2009.

10. Lind, William S., COLs Keith Nightengale and Joseph W. Sutton, USA; and LtCol Gary I. Wilson, and Capt John F. Schmitt, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989.

11. Quote attributed to James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, 23 February 1945.

12. *JP 3–0*.

13. Robert Perito, United States Institute for Peace, quoted on p. 535 in Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor’s *Cobra II* Pantheon Books, New York, 2006.

14. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–2, Campaigning*, Washington, DC, August 1997.



The Marine Expeditionary Unit

A unique capability to bridge special and conventional operations in the fight for global stabilization

by Maj David Handy

As the United States progresses into the first decade following the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the Marine Corps must remain capable on two broad fronts: the ability to conduct large-scale conventional combat operations, and the ability to bridge the operational void between special and conventional unit employment. Conventional combat operations are essentially “what we do,” which, from a Marine perspective, involves things such as power projection from the sea, ship-to-objective maneuver, maneuver warfare, and combined arms warfare. Coordinating effects with special operations forces (SOF), however, requires some rethinking and redirection of existing deployment platforms to meet the challenge of conducting the full spectrum of MAGTF operations that are globally capable and serve a geographic combatant commander’s requirements, from theater security cooperation to forcible entry. These requirements also include building partner capability, improving security, and calming areas of instability by escalating force indirectly, directly, or through combat operations. The MEU program remains uniquely capable of delivering this capability to commanders. To achieve this end, however, the Marine Corps must expand the MEU’s capabilities outlook beyond the currently accepted mission sets; operational commanders must employ the MEUs routinely to demonstrate their full capability; and the current paradigm of the MEU as the theater reserve must be broken, allowing the full spectrum of its special capabilities to be employed by

>Maj Handy is an infantry and intelligence officer. He has deployed to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East, and supported both conventional and special operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He is currently assigned to Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Pacific. This article was his entry for the LtCol Earl “Pete” Ellis Essay Contest.



An expeditionary strike group assembled—24th MEU Marines and sailors of the two Jima ARG. (Photo by GySgt Chad R. Kiehl.)

functional commanders—namely the commanders of the respective theater special operations commands.

Fighting on two major fronts during the Global War on Terror has tired our Nation’s resolve and drained assets to the limits of effectiveness with campaigns that required long-duration occupation for stabilization and rebuilding purposes. While this does not mean that the United States will avoid future involvement in a large-scale war,

the duration of conflict over the next decade will likely be limited to support for a partner nation-state, such as the United States’ response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Campaigns such as this are at times necessary, and have a definable endstate (that is, to reestablish a functional existing sovereign government without a long-term nation-building requirement). Hence, the Marine Corps, as fundamentally a warfighting organization, must always

remain ready and capable of this type of warfare. What has emerged, however, is the recognition of a completely different spectrum of mission requirements to address a more dynamic and immediate threat in the next phase of the campaign against terror groups, criminal organizations, and rouge states.

A look at globalization theory breaks the world into a functional “core” of countries with stable governments and increasing qualities of life that operate within the limits of rule sets. Alongside the core is a disconnected, nonintegrating “gap” of countries that have limited or no functional governments, are replete with internal conflict, and are generally cut off from the rest of the world.¹ These countries do not operate by established rule sets, limiting the ability of diplomatic or other intermediaries to interject with political solutions, and therefore may require military intervention. In the battle for world stabilization, these countries are of considerable interest. As globalization expands, the endstate is to shrink the gap by building governments that will integrate into the larger core and, as a result, play by a more predictable set of rules, thus becoming more globally incorporated and more willing to solve problems politically rather than other means. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been exactly this: an effort to bring previously isolated nations into the world community and force them to operate by more predictable rule sets with the internal strength to sustain their own systems over time, hence shrinking the gap by two more states. Gap-shrinking does not necessarily have to equate to combat operations, but rather to a spectrum of indirect and direct actions that set the conditions to avoid full-scale conflict while achieving theater goals. The backbone of these operations is foreign internal defense (FID), a SOF core competency. Albeit not a SOF unit, the MEU is distinctly manned and equipped to complement and extend SOF efforts in FID, expanding the Marine Corps’ ability to support global stability and the goals of shrinking the gap.²

Consider the following vignette: A Marine special operations team


(MSOT) deploys to western Africa to conduct a FID mission. The team’s task is to conduct training with the host-nation’s national-level security forces to improve their ability to identify criminal or terrorist groups within their country, collect and package intelligence, plan operations, conduct limited-scale raids to interrupt networks, and build local-level security capacity to deny freedom of movement within that country to future nefarious operators. While conducting this mission, a spike in government-controlled food prices causes mass protests and riots within the urban areas of the country. Leadership within an antigovernment movement is clandestinely funded and supplied by a neighboring state that advocates removal of the national leadership either by nonviolent or forceful means. The porous borders, lack of rule sets, and absence of a coalition, union, or other global tie to an organization of countries make this a common example of a gap nation’s susceptibility to such aggression and instability. The breakdown of local security elevates the risk to the MSOT above an acceptable operating level to continue its mission without additional support.

Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, commits his MEU to the effort, and during the 3 days required to position the MEU, Special Operations Command Africa immediately deploys additional SOF teams via special insertion platforms to reinforce the immediate needs of the MSOT. The MEU positions offshore, offering the capability to perform the following applicable missions per *Marine Corps Order 3120.9C*: stability operations, humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, aviation operations, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, and, should the contingency require a larger force, airfield or port seizure operations.³ But the MEU brings additional capabilities that are arguably just as important to this scenario as the specified capabilities. The MEU offers a seabased command and control platform with strategic communications capability, reducing political sensitivities when host-nations limit the number of foreign forces authorized on the ground.

The MEU offers the smallest MAGTF that is all-source intelligence capable. Most notably, the MEU offers limited capabilities in information operations, psychological operations, security force assistance, and civil affairs, all of which are SOF core activities, and makes the MEU an ideal conventional asset to work in conjunction with SOF efforts currently underway.⁴ Introducing the MEU’s capabilities, both in its stated mission sets as well as its SOF-enabling functions, to the operational commander facilitates a more favorable relative value of force capabilities should the commander attempt to stabilize and control the situation and allow internal capability building to continue while host-nation security and leadership are reestablished, vice the alternative to withdraw forces altogether and evacuate the Embassy.

The MEU’s floating headquarters, with its specified task to conduct joint and combined operations, and capable of conducting several key SOF-enabling functions, can land the battalion landing team (BLT) to control key nodes such as a port facility, government buildings, and food distribution centers, while establishing security within an assigned area of responsibility. Once violence is quelled, the Marines can work to reestablish the local population’s faith and confidence in the existing government through humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, infrastructure repair, and restoration of services. These efforts are all performed in a security force assistance manner in concert with local security forces, are coordinated and deconflicted with host-nation leadership goals and priorities via the MEU’s forward coordination element and the American Embassy, and are accomplished while facilitating SOF efforts to reestablish a national-level security structure that is capable of managing this and future crises unassisted.

From here, this operation can follow one of two paths. First, as this mutually supporting force developing host-nation capability at all levels to reestablish internal security succeeds, the MEU can withdraw, leaving an improved local security apparatus capable of maintaining the stabilized environment. SOF



Mission requirements will change because of more dynamic threats. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Daniel J. Walls.)

can continue longer-duration FID and engagement efforts, progressing further toward the strategic objectives to narrow the gap within that region. The second potential outcome is that cross-border influences and support continue to gain in size and aggression, and a single reinforced battalion of Marines is not adequate in number to maintain a secure, stable environment. In this case, the MEU uniquely provides an on-site capability to transition from special to conventional efforts. The BLT has established the initial footprint, is capable of seizing control of an airport or other point of debarkation (if they do not already control it), and facilitates the introduction of a larger conventional unit, such as an air contingency force from Camp Lejeune or Fort Bragg, to continue the mission to stabilize the area.

To maximize this marriage of capabilities and further establish the conditions for success in this type of scenario, the current mindset of how to employ a MEU must change. Today's status quo has relegated the MEU program to a theater reserve asset that a commander uses to perform theater security cooperation tasks. Theater security cooperation is a low risk to the theater reserve mission because units can generally terminate the event early, if required,

and backload for employment elsewhere vice a mission that may or may not require extended commitments from which the forces can't easily recover. The attitude that has unfortunately formed around the MEU program is that every effort should be made to utilize other assets within the theater so that the reserve remains intact for an additional unforeseen event, which is a tremendous underutilization of extensive resources. Regular employment of the MEUs in low-level, short-duration FID missions will supplement Special Operations Command's (SOCOM's) efforts throughout gap nations, support the building of foreign nation security capacity and capability beyond what current missions are achieving, and establish the habitual working relationships and mindsets that will result in successful joint conventional and special unit contingency response, like the previously described scenario.

The Marine Corps can develop and offer this capability through a shift in training and by advocating for more appropriate employment and nonstandard command relationships during contingencies. Specifically, MEUs, while deployed, remain under the operational command of the theater's numbered fleet commander within that combatant command. To fully realize the capabil-

ity described in this article, the combatant commander must transfer the operational command of the MEU from the fleet commander to the respective theater special operations command's commander for employment during applicable crisis response. Operating as a subordinate element to a joint special operations task force, the MEU, with all of its SOF enabling, security cooperation, and warfighting capabilities, will then gain unprecedented access to missions that will enhance the overall stabilization and gap-shrinking effort globally.

The backbone to support BLT FID training exists in both standards and facilities. The most recent version of *Navy and Marine Corps Publication 3500.44A, The Infantry Training and Readiness Manual*, includes the 1000-level task for infantry officers and infantry unit leaders to "conduct key-leader engagement."⁵ The application of this task is further defined in the collective platoon standard to "train foreign forces."⁶ Finally, the following collective tasks outline the application of the individual standard at the company level:⁷

- Support the establishment of civil control.
- Support restoration of essential services.
- Support local governance.
- Support economic development.
- Restore civil security.
- Train and mentor foreign personnel.

These are FID tasks that, if trained to, support extending the BLT's employment well past typical theater security cooperation events generally limited to subject matter expert exchange and bilateral training. In fact, these collective standards facilitate tasking platoons and companies to support FID missions aimed to "protect the population and deny freedom of movement to the insurgents, . . . restore . . . [and] expand local capacity and promote a stable secure environment, . . . contain or quell the situation in accordance with commander's intent, . . . [and] enhance effectiveness of foreign security forces in conducting operations," the standards to which a unit is required to perform the aforementioned tasks.⁸ Injecting

BLT FID capabilities into this article's scenario highlights the economy of force the MEU achieves as opposed to any other conventional asset if employed as a mutually supporting capability with SOF. The primary difference is that instead of elements of the MEU deploying into the operational area with the mission and mindset of accomplishing security tasks themselves in order to achieve the desired stable endstate and redeploying, they now deploy to partner with an existing force or to begin selecting and training a force to partner with so that the host-nation can develop a capability to maintain its own stable environment. The goal endstate is to develop host-nation security forces' capability to eventually reassume control of the security posture. The MEU accomplishes this through a parallel effort to quell violence, reducing security threats to a more manageable level while simultaneously increasing internal host-nation security force capability in

concert with SOF efforts, leaving a local capacity in place to maintain stability unassisted. With training standards that support FID already written, the bigger question becomes how to train a BLT in FID without extending the already robust MEU predeployment training plan.

As previously noted, the Marine Corps will need to address two fundamental capabilities in the coming decade. First, the Marine Corps must reset its capability to conduct amphibious assaulted, forced entry, conventional war. Second, the Marine Corps must take a more active role in efforts to shrink the gap by improving the MEU engagement capability so it can enhance and facilitate SOCOM missions. With the improvements made to the MAGTF Training Center at Twentynine Palms, it is equipped to support these requirements by offering a tailored combined-arms exercise (CAX) to battalions that addresses their assigned deployment


mission. Prior to 2001, nearly every infantry battalion participated in a CAX as part of their predeployment training, whether deploying with a MEU or with the unit deployment program to Okinawa, Japan, with the one exception being 3d Marine Regiment. Units deploying in support of the recently reestablished unit deployment program should focus on preparing for the conventional warfighting tasks previously outlined and complete a more traditional pre-Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER (EMV) CAX aimed at sharpening the battalion's ability to operate as a maneuver element within the conventional warfare-focused MAGTF. Those battalions tasked to form BLTs would execute the more modern-day CAX or EMV.

If charged with bridging special and conventional operations, a BLT's spectrum of operations must include FID-type engagement up to the combat actions required to facilitate intro-

Professional Development — It Makes a Great Gift!

Give a Gift Membership to
Someone Special TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org
866-622-1775



duction of a larger force. BLT-bound battalions should execute a shortened version of the combined arms training, but also have the opportunity to rotate rifle companies and platoons through an urban scenario-driven exercise that requires them to respond to a crisis through engagement and security actions, as currently occurs at EMV. To enhance EMV, however, this should include FID tasks by partnering with a host-nation security force and measurably increasing that force's capabilities while controlling and improving the security environment. The endstate is not only to exercise the skills associated in performing the previously referenced training standards, but, more importantly, to shape a unit's mindset. Every Marine must embrace and understand the importance of FID in developing host-nation capabilities as an investment in long-term stability. FID is tiring and frustrating, and its success can be extremely difficult to observe or measure. Unit mindset leads to individual buy-in that directly affects mission performance in this type of operating environment, and that is what must be achieved during this exercise. A review of the EMV training objectives and scenarios could facilitate this training utilizing existing infrastructure and develop a capability that will meet operational demand for the MEU-bound units.

So where does the Marine Corps go in the next decade? It's a two-pronged attack on the global operational requirements. First, return to not just amphibious roots, but maneuver warfare roots. The capability to project power from the sea into a conventional short-duration war to protect a coalition or partnered nation against an invading foe is a fundamental warfighting capability and is probably the Nation's greatest expectation of the Marine Corps. Units must be designated to prepare for this contingency and remaster the detailed tactics, techniques, procedures, and new technologies involved in defeating a foreign aggressive military. By contrast, the second prong should address the current ongoing operational environment. In a time of reduced personnel, budgets, and missions, only SOCOM is increasing in all. In fact, since 2001, SOCOM has



The Makin Island (LHD 8) ARG transiting the Indian Ocean. (Photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist John Lill.)

more than doubled in both personnel and budget. Roughly a 66,000 person organization, SOCOM enjoys a \$10.5 billion budget and continues to expand, while all other parts of the Department of Defense are required to reduce and cut. On any given day, over 12,000 SOCOM personnel are forward deployed in more than 70 countries globally, conducting primarily FID engagement missions. An alignment with SOCOM in a habitual working relationship that enhances and possibly expands SOCOM's global mission capabilities equates to a greater Marine Corps involvement in current operations and could result in a more favorable review of future Marine Corps budgets and resources. The Commandant of the Marine Corps highlighted in his planning guidance that the Marine Corps must not only embrace Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, but also:

... improve our ability to function as a lead element of a Joint Force, to execute distributed operations, to provide command and control, and to conduct persistent engagement missions throughout the world . . . while we strengthen the relationships between our operating forces and special operations forces.⁹

The MEU, infused with the training to conduct partnering and low-level FID, the mindset to work in conjunction with special operations forces to build host-nation capacity, and the command

relationship to gain access to the global engagement battlespace, is a contribution to the effort to shrink the gap and create global stability that the MEU is uniquely task organized and equipped to provide the Nation.

Notes

1. Barnett, Thomas P.M., "The Pentagon's New Map," *Esquire*, March 2003, accessed at www.esquire.com.
2. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations*, Washington, DC, 18 April 2011.
3. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3120.9C, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) MEU (SOC)*, Washington, DC, 4 August 2009.
4. *Joint Publication 3-05*.
5. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Navy and Marine Corps Publication 3500.44A, Infantry Training and Readiness Manual, Draft*, Washington, DC, 2012, p. 9-61.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 6-56.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 5-4.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-63 and 5-68.
9. Amos, Gen James F., *35th Commandant's Planning Guidance 2010*, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2010, pp. 12-13.



The Broken Process

The errors with the Marine Corps awards system

by 1stLt Gregory Moynihan

The Marine Corps' awards system is flawed. Although broken, it is salvageable. In his article, "Enabling Timely Combat Awards" (*MCG*, Feb12), Col Lee W. Freund, USMC(Ret), impeccably lists the collective mistakes made and steps needed to speed up the awards process. In addition to Col Freund's recommendations, it is imperative that the responsible and adequate originator prepare himself in the following manner: conducts a thorough review of the two awards manuals that govern awards in the Marine Corps, takes the time to submit a well-written and detailed award,

>1stLt Moynihan is an adjutant with 1st Marine Regiment. He deployed in 2009 and 2011 aboard the 31st MEU with 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.

and asks a peer to review the award prior to submitting it in the Improved Awards Processing System (known as "iAPS"). Regardless of whether the award is a Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal or a Meritorious Service Medal, it needs to be well written, have substantive quantitative data, and be fitting for

the highlighted action or actions of the Marine or sailor.

Not all culpability, however, can be placed on originators. The structure of the Marine Corps awards system fails Marines and sailors in the very process for which it exists in the first place. According to *Marine Corps Order 1650.19J* (*MCO 1650.19J*), "[a]warding authorities shall establish an awards board to review and make recommendations on all proposed awards."¹ These awards boards have a fundamental shortcoming: They take too long. Although operational tempo is not lost on any Marine in today's Corps, there is no defense for the common occurrence of awards being in an "inboard" status for over 5 working days. It is unacceptable for awards to lay stagnant for more than 30 days with no action. As the award sits, the gap between the recommended Marine's actions and the award presentation grows exponentially, without excusable justification.

Commonly, Marines pass judgment on an award submission based on rank. This directly contradicts the following:

. . . Proper justification based on accomplishments, achievements, level of responsibility and billet held, *regardless of rank* [author's emphasis], will ensure deserving Marines are properly recognized and will significantly enhance the chances of the recommended award being approved.²

It is not out of the ordinary to hear fellow Marines reflect on the reality that certain personal awards were not achieved until a particular rank was first met. These very Marines, now on awards boards themselves, continue the cycle on the other side of the fence by making submission recommendations according to rank. *MCO 1650.19J*'s stance on this practice is quite clear: If there is proper justification, the recommended award's



The awards system process fails Marines and sailors. (Photo by LCpl Melissa Eschenbrenner.)

likelihood of approval is significantly amplified. Marines bound to the order are consequently duty-bound to habitually revisit the manual and recognize the unacceptability of rank as a qualifier (or disqualifier) for certain awards.

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1650.1H states that the proper awarding authority can “. . . approve the award, approve a lower award, disapprove an award, or approve a higher award, if so empowered, or recommend a higher award to the appropriate awarding authority.”³ Only the awarding authority can carry out the aforementioned actions. Therefore, as the authority, this individual maintains the responsibility to read the award in question and make a formative decision. This accountability must be acknowledged regardless of the board’s recommendation or the endorsement provided by those closest to the awarding authority. This decision lies solely—and ultimately—with the awarding authority and is therefore not unlike those decisions that remain within the realm of the established authority on the battlefield.

The Marine Corps adheres to a standard that demands a swift and comprehensive improvement of the awards processing system. From the originator to the awarding authority and all those in between, as Marines, we must be committed to improving the timely processing of awards in order to return these honors to the Marines deserving their presentation. Training must be implemented and presented to new officers as they enter the Operating Forces. As it should, The Basic School focuses on fundamental training and introduces new Marine officers to the responsibilities of a rifle platoon commander. Thus, the onus of an improved awards processing system does not lie on The Basic School, but rather on company commanders and mentors. In addition to fitness reports and proficiency and conduct marks, new officers require the knowledge that the awards system is an additional and critical means of taking care of our Marines and sailors. New Marine officers will unavoidably be submitting awards during their first years in the Service, and proper training and guidance will help facilitate

the compliance of award submissions prepared by them.

New officers are not the only Marines requiring adequate and thorough training and refresher courses. All Marines must methodically review the awards manuals. This practice is necessary for all Marines regardless of their status as board members, awarding authorities, or originators. Referring to the manuals and acquiring the indisputable truth on awards will help ensure they are submitted correctly, that the submission is appropriate, and that the required elements are present in the submission.

General officer commands must conscientiously provide specific and exhaustive award guidance. As is frequently the case, in-process combat awards are returned for multiple and redundant reasons. These causes include, but are not limited to, the following: waiting dispersion patterns such as composition, disposition, and strength of the enemy; specific number of rounds from small arms fire; and number of rounds expended. Specific award guidance provided to subordinate commands will decrease the current high frequency in which awards are returned to units for correction. This, in turn, would mitigate the unnecessarily prolonged awards process. As a note of caution, it is additionally important to be aware that the publication of guidance from general officer commands has the potential to create a stringent awards processing atmosphere that is detrimental to the system in its own right. Such an atmosphere could hypothetically put pressure on the originator to gather massive amounts of information. This practice, as one of precision, takes time, especially in a combat zone. Thus, when published, guidance must be written to clarify the award procedures, but not make award submissions unnecessarily difficult.

Although the awards system is broken, it is not irreparable. Marines at all levels must take a vested interest in the process, and commanders need to emphasize the importance of the awards program. Education is the responsibility of the command and the individual. Professional military edu-

cation instructions and manuals need to be taught, read, and discussed at all levels. Through self-taught instruction and command-sponsored professional military education, the Marine Corps can eradicate the paradigm wherein awards are based on rank first, then accomplishments second.

The awards board process can be resolved. Either steps must be taken to disband the boards throughout the Marine Corps, or awarding authorities must ensure that the right members are placed on the boards in the first place. At the general officer level, members are typically selected within the staff. Rather than practicing random board member assignment, these members should be selected according to the accomplishments of their Marine Corps career and MOS. For example, postcommand officers possess a wide base of Marine Corps knowledge and experience to guide them toward recommending the appropriate awards to the awarding authority. Members within the specific MOS of the Marine potentially receiving award recognition should be included in this process. These MOS peers understand the requirements of the MOS and therefore can guide subordinate commands in their recommendation to the awarding authority.

All Marines must contribute to the awards system, but it will take the corrective action of Marines in positions of authority to truly initiate and attain the indispensable transformation of the awards process in order to properly recognize personnel in a timely manner and regardless of rank.

Notes

1. Headquarters Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 1650.19J, Administration and Issue Procedures for Decorations, Medals, and Awards*, Washington, DC, 5 February 2001.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Department of the Navy, *Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1650.1H, Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual*, Washington, DC, 22 August 2006.



Let Us Fight for You

The moral imperative of a masculine infantry

by 1stLts B.L. Brewster & R.K. Wallace

George Orwell wrote, “We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious is the first duty of intelligent men.” We do not pretend to be particularly smarter than our peers, albeit we are admittedly less tactful. Since the inception of the U.S. military, service in combat arms has been the rightful duty and sole responsibility of the men of our society, as well it should be. However, women are now also poised to satisfy this critical requirement.

Men and women are different. *This is an axiom of our existence as human beings on planet earth.* As men, we feel inept trying to articulate this truth because the tools to do so have been intellectually banned in our society, labeled as “chauvinism.” Even the ways in which the discussion is framed pits the legacy of many despicable social institutions—slavery, exclusive suffrage, segregation—against those advocating an all-male combat arms. The truth remains that warfare is the contest of two opposing wills, the *zweikampf* in which these wills employ their militaries as fists in an ultimate struggle in which human beings maim and brutally kill one another. Ladies, as infantry officers, we do not wish to limit or control women, but we do want to fight *for* you. We want to endure hardship and suffering. We want to be miserable and filthy. We want to offer our lives so that yours might be spared. We want to fight for you. To do less is masculine cowardice and abdicating our societal role, ordained or evolved.

No matter one’s worldview, the assertion that women belong in the infantry is illogical. From an evolutionary perspective, it means pitting a generally smaller/gentler/more compassionate demographic against a generally larger/stronger/more violent demographic in a “survival of the fittest” contest that

“... exposure to danger is not combat. Combat is a lot more than that, it’s a lot more than getting shot at or even getting killed by being shot at. Combat is finding and closing with and killing or capturing the enemy if you’re down in the ground combat scheme of things. It’s killing.”

***—Gen Robert H. Barrow,
27th Commandant of the Marine Corps,
Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee,
June 1991***

>1stLts Brewster and Wallace, both infantry officers, have completed several combat deployments and have personal experience serving with women integrated at the tactical level. Both are married and each has three young sons.

ultimately determines the fates of societies. Simplistic animal survival is the driving factor here. From a biblical perspective, God made the genders specifically and intentionally different for many purposes. Men are to shoulder the responsibility of fighting to preserve the life and dignity of women, as well as to protect the next generation. This willing sacrifice and service is *for* the sake of women, not to control or demean them. Throughout the history of the western world, this has been the basis for the sacred masculine charge of chivalry: to serve all and protect the weak from the strong. Phrased this way, our statements may be unsavory; but, ask yourself, are they true? One can only appreciate these realities in much the same way as a marriage, the love of one’s children, and dare we say, albeit not

from personal experience, childbirth. You must experience it to appreciate the nuance.

False Need/Crisis

After more than a decade of war, we now see another expansion of women’s roles in ground combat. This time it has been predicated in part by fixating on the notion that there are “too few” female general officers because the military selects a higher rate of combat arms officers to be generals.¹ Thus, the argument goes, women are being unfairly barred from advancement because they are not allowed in the ground combat arms. It is a complete fallacy to assert the notion of there being too few female generals, and an even greater illogical leap to say that the way to fix this problem is to alter the force structure for the



Equality is not the issue. (Photo by Sgt Christopher Zahn.)

entire Service in the hopes of generating a select few at the 30-year service mark. This exposes an underlying feminist agenda that does not purport any desire to create a more capable, lethal military.

Where is the critical need? Does our Corps need additional volunteers to fill our infantry battalions? Additionally, it is supremely insulting to assert that somehow military leaders have been missing the key solution to a more effective ground combat element for the last decade, let alone in the history of the world. If women in the ranks would have made the infantry more effective, certainly commanders would have made it happen. Remember: The Lioness Program and female engagement teams were created to fill a critical need identified by combatant commanders, not to justify a belief or create “equality.”

The Myth of the Decade

In this vein, the favorite slogans of “no frontlines” and “women have been in combat alongside their male counterparts” are fodder for the first paragraphs of many pieces demanding the equal opportunity for young ladies to be miserable, filthy, and scared. *Proximity to danger does not equate to combat proficiency.* To strike an improvised explosive device, to be shot at, or to have indirect fire impact near one’s position requires only presence in the battlespace; it is

passive. These traumatic events are mere byproducts of existing in a hostile environment. True combat, the kind for which the infantry exists, actively “*seeks, closes with, and destroys the enemy through . . .*” well, you know the rest. The point is, the infantry slogs in the filth and mire of foreign lands, conducts grueling movements under heavy load, and must be able to win by cunning, endurance, and brute force—always.

Indulge us for a moment as you consider the contrast in combat experiences among these comparisons: a MEF headquarters and a platoon combat outpost; the role of a wing service support battalion and that of an infantry battalion; a mounted resupply convoy and a dismounted movement to contact; a local security patrol and a meeting engagement or night ambush. Furthermore, there is little comparison between Camp Bastion and Now Zad (2008) or Al Asad and Ramadi (2005–06). Thus, the argument of “no frontlines” holds little sway in the minds of those who have fought through “Pak Alley” or had to conduct every patrol to the “government building” at the double time. The last decade has produced countless instances of close combat for some, just as it has branded the image of the MRAP’s (mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle’s) invincibility and the supremacy of unmanned aircraft

systems in the public conscience. For a moment though, think beyond the outpost wars we have come to believe as our only future form of warfare.

An Emotional Issue

The issue of women in combat arms is a highly emotional one, and it should be, as with any moral quandary in life. The implied statement that accompanies this discussion is that somehow men have too much “emotional energy” to be able to frame this topic rationally. The hypocrisy of this argument hardly needs explanation. The inertia for this discussion is generated by those advocates with an emotional belief that men are maliciously discriminating against them by excluding them from the combat arms, and that true equality of the sexes means complete disregard for natural capabilities. Ought we seek the equality of paternity and maternity leave, fitness standards, or grooming and appearance regulations? This is intellectual nonsense and its practical application is utter foolishness. As easily as one would dismiss a husband’s claim to be able to experience the sorrow of a miscarriage in the same way as his wife, so too we assert that there is no true argument, only illogical postulations based on a highly emotional false belief that women *should* be able to be men.

Poor Arguments Abound

We acknowledge that poor arguments against women abound and serve as redoubts for insecure men. These are attempts to justify something they believe, but cannot or will not identify truthfully. We have all read those angry snippets to editors about “when women compete against men in the Olympics . . .” or “when prize fights are coed. . . .” We assert that the physical discussion is a shallow argument, although it is easily won by history, physiology, and the insecure men promoting them. To borrow the tired, though inexact, analogy, there are no women in the National Football League for a reason. The physical is important, but not everything. The true arguments are ones of morality, unit cohesion, sexual distraction, and a degraded perspective.

True Arguments

Morally wrong. “Women and children first” has been a tenet of all emergency rescue efforts for time immemorial, yet we are evidently now prepared to dismantle this fundamental principle of western society for the sake of equality. It is an abdication of natural masculine responsibility to forfeit our role—even in small part—as protectors and defenders. Should we expect our teenage daughter to go down with the ship so a man might live in the name of equality? No matter how much she begs for the “opportunity,” would you let her?

Sexual attraction. There is no tasteful way to address this topic. The natural attraction between college-aged people results in jackassery.² Ask any commander of a mixed-gender unit, or hearken back to your college days. The contradiction in terms is that mature men and women in the latter half of their careers expect young enlisted singles to conduct themselves with the maturity of 40-somethings in a sterile office environment. No matter how disciplined the man, sexual attraction—or at least distraction—is as involuntary as a woman’s natural response to a baby’s cry.

At this point the reader may be tempted to roll his eyes in exasperation as the thought “men are selfish pigs” darts through his head. Yet one would not be so critical if the human desire in question was food, water, warmth, or conversation. While the former three are actual requirements for human life, and sexual fulfillment is not, we leave you to consider the significance of the latter in the well-being of the individual as a sufficient parallel to convey the irrefutable significance of physical attraction in our lives. No matter how disciplined the men, sexual attraction will corrode the very fabric of a unit, destroying that precious esprit de corps that allows one group of men to triumph over another in a death struggle. When the possibility of sexual attraction is removed from group dynamics, so too is all pretense, thus allowing for true sacrificial relationships.

Weighed down. Personal anecdotes abound, but one need only observe any formation run or conditioning hike and

note the demographics of those who lag far behind the formation.³ Undoubtedly, a few ladies remain with the pack, outpacing many males even, but this is not the norm. The dangerous and unspoken dynamic at work in a unit’s psyche is that a man who falls back “just needs to be conditioned more,” whereas a woman is immediately the object of scorn because the unit knows that—in general—she isn’t capable of keeping up. This only serves as the impetus for counseling in units where physical training is simply about meeting height and weight requirements. In the infantry, however, repeated physical failure spawns contempt of the individual and undermines the common trust in the belief that every man can keep up on patrol, buddy rushing, or carrying a litter.

unnecessarily cumbersome equipment and its direct relationship to increased heat injuries, immobility, and unit ineffectiveness. As the last decade has provided ample vignettes of womanly courage, frontline service, and exposure to violence, there has been little desire to evaluate the actual effects on these women or the units in which they operated. From the male perspective, it is quite clear that any comments we might have as the duty experts on ground combat are unwanted and thought to be shamefully prejudicial.

The dignity of women. Consider that photos with captions highlighting women on patrol present a false understanding of the dynamic at work amongst that infantry squad. The reality confined within that frame is that she is not “on patrol,” she is “along for” the patrol.

Women inserted in small numbers in infantry units will not completely dismantle their effectiveness. It will, however, place an unnecessary doubt in the unit’s collective confidence.

This issue is not just about the physical viability of the unit; it is about their mental fortitude too. Women inserted in small numbers in infantry units will not completely dismantle their effectiveness. It will, however, place an unnecessary doubt in the unit’s collective confidence. Men who cannot perform in combat units are usually singled out, sent to the company office or armory, and otherwise marginalized. This would hardly do for political appearances if women in the infantry were similarly treated.

Degraded perspective. The unique advantage of the integration argument is that negative data against the argument can neither be truly presented nor will it be accepted. This is much like the body armor argument where data can always support the value of increasingly heavy vests and plates in terms of rounds stopped and lives saved. Yet, for those outside the infantry, there is little interest in capturing the results of

The female engagement team is not an addition to the lethality of that squad; they are an escorted entity, much the same as reporters or visiting dignitaries. The dangerous dynamic at work is that this reoccurring imagery will slowly convince us, much like magazine covers and centerfolds, that these women represent reality. There is no airbrushing in combat.

Winning at war. The true tragedy of this initiative is that we will become a less effective ground combat force, riddled with a plague of time-consuming misconduct issues and lower expectations regarding proficiency and conduct. We will put men and women in a position to fail, discipline them when they do, and tell commanders the old adage, “this is a leadership issue.” There will be no regard for the fact that we will have created a reality based on a belief of how some wish things to be, rather than the reality of natural capabilities and design.

As a brief aside, those who have not served in the infantry or in close combat would not dream of telling us they understand our jobs or experiences with regard to tactics or combat stress, yet they feel complete authority to do so under the label of “women’s rights.” Who has conferred our individual human rights upon us? Our society, our government, the mythical “nature,” or someone greater? Who has preserved those rights? Has it been the demonstrator, the advocate, the legislator? These three categories are the wonderful luxuries of civilized society, but the accomplishments of the western world were made possible through shrewd diplomacy coupled with force, and a healthy understanding of truth. The ability for us to have this conversation is a result of the prosperity and complete security purchased for this Nation through the violence of men. The sterile planning environments and crisp political chambers are the rear area of any conflict, and exist only because filthy, sweaty, scared young men stand ready to kill or die. This is reality. Do you believe it?

A Man’s Place

The question looming, hidden and afraid in masculine hearts, as this discussion rages, is nearly impossible to ask: Where now does a man go to prove his manhood in society? This is dismissed in our postmodern culture, but in the history of the world, the individual man has always had opportunities to prove his strength, valor, and skill as part of a grand adventure or the challenge of apprenticeship. If you do not accept the need for men to know intrinsically that they have proven themselves as men (protectors, providers, leaders) in a way only they can, consider the devastation of a woman unable to conceive.

Not Equality

Our culture is seeking a false equality. The presence of women in the military does not justify their inclusion into all areas of the Service, especially the infantry. As an organization, the Service is aptly defined because it is not an institution meant to serve the individuals who comprise it; the mission of fighting



Being a grunt is physically challenging and demanding. It’s not an equal opportunity MOS.
(Photo by LCpl Austin Long.)

and winning is its sole purpose, and all involved are in the “service” of that end. Our enemies do not recognize gender rights, and it has only been our realistic understanding of the nature of war that has preserved our society’s ability to create the opportunities currently enjoyed by women.

Conclusion

We are the men who want to fight for you. The enemy we have fought will not discuss, cite studies, or entertain debate. He will just rape or kill you.

As junior officers, our perspective is limited, but its relevance is confirmed by our recent experiences in close combat and the long legacy of warriors preceding us. Our responsibility remains to influence and lead at the tactical level, but our hope is that our unabashed assertions will be acknowledged as attempts to state truth in the timeless reality of the struggle of opposing wills. LtGen Victor “Brute” Krulak’s wise understanding that our Corps is not *needed*, but *wanted* by the American people cannot hobble us with an insecurity that prevents us from being something a portion of our society may dislike. The truth remains that we have no obligation to be what society wants us to be, only to fight and win to preserve that society—and truth.

Notes

1. Burrelli, David F., “Women in Combat: Is-

ues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 13 December 2012, cites recommendations 9, 18, and 20 of “From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership and the 21st-Century Military” by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 13 December 2012, pp. 127, 129, and 130.

2. Marine Corps term for immaturity and rowdiness resulting in misconduct; similar to “tomfoolery.”

3. Results of the 2012 Ground Combat Physical Performance Standards test show less than 10 percent of females outperformed the male average in 5 physical categories. Most telling are the average times for the 25-meter casualty drag where female officers doubled, and enlisted women tripled the average male time. As presented at Marine Corps Combat Development Command’s Officer Professional Military Education Brief, Quantico, 12 October 2012. See also “Female Physiology & Performance, Injuries at Entry Level Training,” USMC Women in the Service Report, Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service Brief, 22 September 2011. Stephanie Gutmann’s *The Kinder, Gentler Military* (Encounter Book, San Francisco, 2001) is a decade-old treasure trove of data and anecdotes on this topic.



Join the debate.
Go to www.mca-marines.org/forum.
Don’t forget our blog at mcgazette.blogspot.com.

Battlefield Surveillance Company

Seeing the big picture today and tomorrow

by LtCol Michael J. Lindemann, Jr.

Today, Marine Corps units deployed today to Afghanistan are employing an unprecedented array of battlefield sensors to gain a degree of battlespace awareness (BA) that would have been largely inconceivable 15 years earlier. Over the previous decade, the Department of Defense (DoD) has rapidly developed and deployed a wide range of sensor capabilities in a variety of platforms and made them broadly available to warfighters at multiple echelons. In response to continued demands for greater BA, the Marine Corps is exploiting this success to develop and implement a new capability called persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (persistent ISR). Looking to the future, the enhanced BA offered by an advanced persistent ISR capability will be critical to the Marine Corps' success in any conflict we envision.

Annex B of the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan presents the plan to realign structure to create a battlefield surveillance company (BSC) at each of the three intelligence battalions.¹ The BSC will constitute a core organizational, functional and technological framework for persistent ISR supporting MAGTF BA requirements. Timely implementation of the BSC is necessary in order

“Evolving Marine Corps Operating Concepts increasingly depend on precision. Battlefield sensor technologies developed over the last 10 years during OEF/OIF have brought an unprecedented array of capability to inform MAGTF Commander decisionmaking. These intelligence sensors must be synchronized and capable of tipping/cuing additional organic and non-organic collection assets to ensure precise operational recommendations. The BSC optimizes these ISR resources across the Service and ensures that the appropriate situational awareness is available to deliver knowledge at the point of execution. The BSC will synchronize ground-based sensors and is a critical component in the persistent ISR strategy, necessary to support the Service Campaign Plan and provide the MAGTF commander with a holistic surveillance picture.”

*—BGen Vincent R. Stewart,
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters Marine Corps*

to retain existing BA capabilities, develop and sustain relevant expertise, and support further development of Marine Corps requirements and strategy for persistent ISR.

The Marine Corps ISR Enterprise and Persistent ISR

As part of a larger effort to establish and develop the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISRE), the

Marine Corps is developing an initial capabilities document (ICD) to establish foundational requirements that address the complex BA needs of the MAGTF commander.² This ICD and its associated functional concept are called “persistent ISR.” The purpose of persistent ISR is to enable faster, better decisionmaking across the MAGTF via an integrated BA capability.

Although a common buzzword within the DoD over the past several years, persistent ISR has not yet been formally defined in the joint lexicon.³ Consequently, there are multiple disparate visions of what persistent ISR should be and how it can be best achieved. The MCISRE ICD defined persistent ISR as:

>LtCol Lindemann is an intelligence officer and student at the Naval War College. He was Commanding Officer, 3d Intelligence Battalion, and has previously deployed to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM with Task Force 58 (November 2001–February 2002), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with I MEF (November 2002–July 2003) and the 11th MEU (July 2004–February 2005).

. . . [t]he strategy that synchronizes organic MAGTF ISR collection assets, with support from joint resources and combat support agencies as necessary, to provide the supported commander with relevant and continuous battlespace awareness over specified named areas of interest for required periods of time.⁴

How is this definition of a future Marine Corps persistent ISR capability different from current Marine Corps ISR requirements and capabilities? Prior to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), wouldn't a G/S-2 (intelligence) have sought to employ available resources in a similar manner to achieve a similar outcome? The simple answer, of course, is "yes," but today the scope of expectations and capabilities are exponentially greater than what was conceivable even as recently as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I. Two subtle but key differences in the persistent ISR definition are the changing expectations associated with what constitutes *relevant* BA and the new expectation that it will be *continuous*. There is also a common expectation that BA must be broadly shared to the greatest extent possible: up, down, and laterally, and in near real-time.

In Afghanistan today, Marines perform a combination of support and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism actions. MAGTF battlespace includes population centers and surrounding areas, key lines of communications linking them, and potentially more rural areas serving as havens for insurgents or narcotics production. A critical aspect of relevant BA entails detecting, identifying, and tracking hostile individuals and small groups among a population of several thousand people. Inherent in this requirement is the need to discern within the countless normal, innocuous interactions of populated areas, threat actions such as intelligence gathering, command and control, logistics, and preparations to attack our forces with weapons ranging from improvised explosive devices to guided rockets, missiles, and mortars. These MAGTF intelligence requirements have generated aggregate demand for persistent ISR spanning a



Surveillance cameras are concealed during an operational check. (Photo by Sgt Amber Blanchard.)

few hundred square kilometers, within a considerably larger overall area of responsibility. In many ways, the requirements of modern support and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism have led to dramatic increases in the size, scope, level of detail, and timeliness we associate with relevant BA.

The strategic imperative to enhance BA through persistent ISR is clearly articulated in the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group's study recently approved by the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council (MROC).⁵ This study, *Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century: Strategic Opportunity and a Vision for Change*, is both instructive in anticipating the nature of future operations, and directive in force development. The report clearly articulates a vision of future conflict based on the hybrid war concept.⁶ In looking beyond OEF-Afghanistan, the Amphibious Capabilities Working Group's report notes that:

“. . . irregular warfare is here to stay, even if not practiced in sustained counterinsurgencies ashore. . . . Hybrid forces may be able to avoid many of the lethal effects of joint shaping by blending in with civilian populations, especially in urban environments. . . .”

In multiple instances, the report makes the case for “detailed and relevant situ-

ational awareness” providing insights such as “enemy disposition, noncombatant activities, and potential threat actions.” The MROC-approved planning and implementation guidance resulting from this report specifically directs the Director of Intelligence to advance MCISRE capabilities for persistent surveillance. Persistent ISR is not a requirement that ends with the OEF-Afghanistan drawdown, but rather is an integral element of future Marine Corps operations.

Capabilities of Marine Corps Persistent ISR

Although preparation of the ICD for persistent ISR is underway, there is not yet an official Marine Corps approach to delivering this capability. Should the MROC approve this ICD, developing and implementing the Marine Corps approach to persistent ISR will require an iterative process shaped by emerging technologies, the experiences of MAGTF exercises and deployments, and new ideas. I believe that persistent ISR for the MAGTF will require a sensor network that can be described by the following five core capabilities:⁷

- *Sensing.* Entails a mix of organic ISR sensors while also integrating relevant data from other MAGTF sensors, as well as joint and national intelligence sensors.

- *Sense-making.* Performs automated processing, integration, and correlation of sensor data, including the ability to semiautonomously recognize unique signatures and discern patterns of interest.
- *Visualization.* Supports the common operating picture and user-defined visualization of relevant battlespace derived from the integrated sensor network and other available databases.
- *Delivery and storage.* Performs both user-defined data push and enterprise-wide access to stored sensor data. Enterprise-wide access includes use by any element within the MAGTF, the larger MCISRE, and, when appropriate, the broader joint forces and intelligence community.
- *Operations planning and management.* Performs semiautonomous, collaborative sensor operations and provides an integrated view of sensor network coverage and gaps for effective collections planning and operations management.

The Marine Corps and other Services have already employed rudimentary examples of these capabilities in combat, while even more impressive prototype systems are in advanced stages of development. Probably the most important enabling characteristic is the common, interoperable, open-system architecture that allows disparate sensors and data to be readily incorporated into the net-



Surveillance equipment will survey areas of interest for the MEU. (Photo by Sgt Amber Blanchard.)

sistent ISR strategy. However, it will provide unique functions supporting each of the five core capabilities listed above, and will be central to the successful delivery of persistent ISR to the MAGTF commander. Like the overall persistent ISR strategy, implementation of the BSC will follow an iterative process that refines execution of its concept of operations (ConOps).

As we develop the BSC ConOps, the overarching goal is to plan and implement a synchronized, integrated

BA capabilities, one informed observer claims that today, U.S. intelligence analysts spend roughly 80 percent of their time gathering intelligence, but only 20 percent analyzing it.⁸ Employing the BSC to integrate a broad range of advanced sensors into a collaborative, semiautonomous network will free analysts (and the combat operations center) from the “mall cop” approach of manually monitoring multiple video feeds. The BSC will instead enable greater emphasis on analytic processes to discern conditions that merit more focused attention, and ultimately support superior decisionmaking across the MAGTF.

While small unit leaders in the BSC focus on proper employment of table-of-equipment resources, intermediate and senior company leaders will also apply their broader expertise in employing non-table-of-equipment sensor capabilities. These leaders will be responsible for construction of the associated sensor network architecture delivering each of its five core capabilities. This broader role for BSC leadership and systems is integral to realizing the true opportunity for MAGTF persistent ISR. While it is certainly possible to increase MAGTF ISR capabilities simply by creating a company to employ an advanced sensor suite, that alone would not satisfy

The BSC constitutes but one element of the Marine Corps' overall future persistent ISR strategy.

work, and processed by software applications. This open architecture must also accommodate the range of national and joint ISR sensor capabilities. Of note, many of the capabilities described here are analogous to ubiquitous civilian products and services made possible by standardization of data formats and communications tools.

The Role of the BSC

The BSC constitutes but one element of the Marine Corps' overall future per-

MAGTF sensor plan that enables unity of effort across all MAGTF and supporting joint ISR capabilities, including both aircraft and ground platforms. The BSC will employ its own organic groundbased sensors and incorporate data from other available sensors and systems in order to provide a coherent sensor network responsive to MAGTF needs.

Reflecting on the immense volume of individual reports, data, and video feeds associated with current separate



The Marine Corps will establish foundational requirements that address battlespace awareness. (Photo provided by HQMC Intelligence Department.)

the larger objectives of persistent ISR. Each of the five core capabilities is dependent on integrating the operations and relevant data from a wide range of sensors into a single network. This entails a deliberate effort by Marines trained and equipped for this challenging mission.

The BSC will support the MAGTF as an important element of the surveillance and reconnaissance center, assisting the G/S-2 and G/S-3 (operations) staffs in planning and executing sensor operations to address intelligence and BA priorities. BSC detachments may also be designated to perform similar functions within major subordinate elements (MSEs) or commands. Through its intended role and planned ConOps, the BSC is aligned with several principles of MAGTF employment and force planning. The BSC responsibilities for sensor employment and data delivery further contribute to MAGTF interoperability with joint forces. Similarly, the BSC role in supporting common BA across the MAGTF directly supports the single battle concept.⁹ Finally, the institutionalized practice of deploying task-organized BSC detachments with customized sensor capabilities supports adaptive force planning.

Naturally, there are questions regarding the relationship of the BSC to existing

units and capabilities. BSC capabilities for planning sensor operations will enhance current MAGTF and MSE G/S-2 processes for collection requirements management (CRM)—the function of prioritizing ISR requirements and determining how to apply limited resources to meet the requirements. The BSC will also greatly improve the MAGTF's and MSE's ability to execute collections operations management (COM). Today, this is predominantly a manual process commonly performed by an ad hoc team. Emerging capabilities for semiautonomous, collaborative sensor operations will significantly increase the effectiveness, accuracy, and speed of COM. Simply having a unit in the MAGTF command element with the experienced cadre for planning and managing integrated sensor operations constitutes a material improvement to CRM and COM capabilities.

Boundaries of the BSC ConOps

It is useful to identify several points beyond the scope of the BSC ConOps. The BSC will not gain tasking authority over other units or sensors that fall within the purview of existing G/S-2 and G/S-3 staff responsibilities, nor will it preclude other intelligence units from directly incorporating relevant data from diverse sensors into their own BA and analysis efforts. Establishing

the BSC will not change the role of Radio Battalion or its operations control and analysis center; the BSC will complement the unique authorities and expertise of these units. However, the BSC will require access to general service signals intelligence and electronic support databases in order to realize the full potential of its sensor network. Signals intelligence and electronic support data complements the other types of sensor data available to the BSC, and is particularly useful in supporting semiautonomous sensor cueing, as well as initial identification, characterization, and evaluation of visual contacts.

This capability for semiautonomous analysis and correlation of sensor data does not supplant the key responsibilities of existing intelligence analysis capabilities. The sense-making capabilities of the BSC network will complement and support the role of analysts who remain necessary to determine patterns and individuals of interest, provide context, and determine value. The automated capabilities of a semiautonomous, collaborative sensor network will accelerate and enhance human activities—not replace them.

Finally, while the BSC will ensure proper employment and operation of the sensor network and will be the steward of sensor data, it is not intended to be the data consumer. Like any unit, the BSC will properly maintain and employ its assigned equipment. Unlike most Marine Corps units, the BSC will frequently train personnel from supported units to serve as sensor operators and monitor sensor feeds based on their own unit mission requirements. This arrangement will be appropriate due to the very low ratio of BSC personnel to sensors, the number of units employing the sensor network, and the extensive specialized tasks that can only be performed by BSC personnel.

We Need BSC Now

It should be apparent that none of the infrastructure necessary to fulfill the mission previously described can be built overnight or on the fly. Future operations will most likely be “short warning, ‘come as you are’ challenges.”¹⁰ Accordingly, the Marine Corps requires

"Our vision calls for an integrated network of airborne and terrestrial advanced sensing capabilities that can be tailored to the unique needs of a deployed MAGTF Commander, and can deliver near-real-time data to support his decisionmaking needs . . . from situational awareness to targeting. The BSC will move our vision forward by enabling us to manage, deploy, operate, recover, and maintain key technology on behalf of the MAGTF Commander within a single organization. The concept is long overdue."

*—SES Phillip Chudoba,
Assistant Director of Intelligence*

standing units with the requisite systems and expertise to provide advanced BA capabilities. Once established, these units must be fully integrated into MAGTF exercises, and their capabilities institutionalized within broader operating concepts.

The Marine Corps must act now to train, man, and equip the BSC. As

we conclude sustained combat operations in Afghanistan and contend with declining budgets, we risk atrophy or loss of important BA capabilities unless we craft a coherent plan to adapt and sustain them for future contingencies. MAGTF expertise in a variety of sensor operations will wither as ad hoc capabilities, units, and staff positions

created to employ sensors unique to OEF-Afghanistan are reabsorbed into garrison structure. If not incorporated into and sustained by MAGTF units, the unique equipment developed to fulfill OEF-Afghanistan requirements will also be lost.

In the effort to address urgent requirements for forces in combat, the DoD and Services deployed many of these capabilities as immediate but temporary solutions. Several of the new BA systems and technologies employed today in Afghanistan were developed outside the normal requirements process and are without long-term program funding. One remarkable example already in use is the Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS). In addition to representing our most adept groundbased capability for monitoring ground activity from long ranges, this system already operates as an integrated network, with G-BOSS incorporating data from the Tactical

Troop Information and Professional Development Programs are Easier with **UNIT SUBSCRIPTIONS!**

**Professional Reading Every
Marine Unit Should Have Readily Available:**

Unit Commanders

Did You Know that Subscriptions to *Leatherneck* and *Marine Corps Gazette* are APPROVED for Purchase with Your Unit's Appropriated Funds?

Order your Unit Subscriptions **TODAY**

Visit our website and click on the *Join/Renew* option on the tool bar at the top to get started:

www.mca-marines.org



**HELP YOUR PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
SUPPORT MARINES – JOIN TODAY!**

www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775

Remote Sensor System and Scan Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System into a common user interface. While not the final objective system, it represents a particularly useful capability to retain until the Marine Corps fields an improved system.

Besides the immediate loss of several current MAGTF capabilities for persistent ISR, any atrophy in our sensing capability or expertise will also undermine the quality of further input to the formal requirements development process. With the loss of units possessing the mandate and skills to perform this mission, so goes the quality of advocacy for this capability—until the next crisis. Continued employment in exercises and emerging operations, with the BSC in place, will lead to further innovation that enhances the ongoing multiyear formal requirements process.

There are several concerns that need to be addressed in conjunction with establishing the BSC at each intelligence battalion. Some key considerations include selecting the correct mix of non-program-of-record sensors and processor capabilities to retain, developing coordinated BSC ConOps, developing training and maintenance plans for non-program-of-record equipment, and establishing stable programmed funding for these systems. Additionally, III MEF and 3d Intelligence Battalion currently lack the structure to create a BSC on the same scale as 1st and 2d Intelligence Battalion. The 3d Intelligence Battalion BSC should be allocated the necessary personnel structure. A less-satisfactory solution for III MEF would be a standing (and regularly exercised) support relationship with a BSC from one of the other intelligence battalions. Separately, there is a parallel need to improve CRM capabilities at each echelon which could be incorporated into the BSC mission or aligned elsewhere within each intelligence battalion.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy emphasizes the central role of timely, effective decisionmaking in combat, explicitly embracing the Boyd Cycle (or OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop) as a conceptual model for generat-

ing decisive tempo in order to prevail. In this context, all efforts to gain and maintain BA become supremely important not only to the commander, but also to combat leaders at every echelon. Indeed, all Marines want to be aware of every relevant aspect of the battlespace in order to maximize their mission effectiveness as an individual and unit.

Persistent ISR is often understood in simplistic terms of employing large numbers of diverse, advanced sensor capabilities to enhance BA. While this is partially correct, the Marine Corps does not seek to saturate a battlespace with countless sensors. Headquarters Marine Corps Intelligence Department leaders frequently say, “It’s not about darkening the sky with UAVs,” when seeking to distinguish the Marine Corps approach from other conceptualizations of persistent ISR. The real promise of persistent ISR is to provide not only more data, but to use the data smarter to accelerate the *observe* and *orient* steps, improving the quality and effectiveness of decisions throughout the MAGTF. The Marines of the BSC will provide the core expertise to develop and implement a sensor network customized to the mission and operational requirements of the MAGTF and its subordinate elements. Persistent ISR and the BSC reflect the intersection of vast new demands for BA with the emergence of advanced technologies that, when employed properly, can substantially improve the tempo, lethality, and unity of effort in MAGTF operations at every echelon.

Notes

1. Intelligence Department, appendix 1 to annex B of the *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan, Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise Roadmap 2010–2015*, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 28 April 2010.

2. The MCISRE is:

“... the synergistic integration of all Service ISR elements into a single capability or system that is networked across all echelons and functional areas including the operating forces, supporting establishment, systems and personnel in order to achieve superior decision making and enhance lethality.”

Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise Roadmap, Intelligence Department, Headquarters Marine Corps, 2010, p. 4.

3. Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC, 2010.

4. Intelligence Department, *Initial Capabilities Document for the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise, Version 2.0*, Washington, DC, 2010, p. F–3.

5. Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council Decision Memorandum 32–2012, *Amphibious Capability Working Group Final Report*, Washington, DC, 27 April 2012.

6. Hoffman, Frank, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Public Policy, December 2007, available at www.potomac institute.org. See also by the same author, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2009, available at www.armedforcesjournal.com.

7. Derived from MAJ David Pendall, USA, “Persistent Surveillance and Its Implication for the Common Operating Picture,” *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November–December 2005, citing MG John F. Kimmons, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command presentation at the Global Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Conference, sponsored by United States Strategic Command, Denver, CO, 29 September 2004.

8. Noonan, LTG Robert, USA(Ret), “Fixing the ‘I’ in ISR,” *Federal Times*, 1 October 2012, p. 21, available at www.federaltimes.com.

9. “Single battle concept” is defined by *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1–0, Marine Corps Operations* (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 27 September 2001), as one of the 3 MAGTF planning tenets derived from the Marine Corps maneuver warfighting philosophy: “Single-battle is a unifying perspective of operations which holds that actions anywhere in the operational environment can effect actions elsewhere.”

10. *Amphibious Capability Working Group Final Report*.

>Author’s Note: The author would like to thank Mr. Phillip Chudoba, Mr. Edward Warford, and Mr. Anthony Smith of the Intelligence Department, HQMC, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.



The Physical World and Its Military Challenges

reviewed by LtCol Morgan Mann

A political geographer would claim that physical geography, more than political systems and religious or ethnic identities, determines the fates of nations and prophesizes the likelihood of future conflict. Robert Kaplan's *The Revenge of Geography* offers a balanced and fresh perspective on the ancient topic of geography and how the physical world around us impacts the geopolitical challenges facing the Marine Corps today.

Kaplan introduces the reader to the major thinkers of political geography over the past 200 years. Of particular significance are Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman. These two men wrote in the first half of the 20th century and described the world in the broad contexts of its physical make up. Mackinder focused on the central Asian "heartland," the region from the Russian steppe eastward to Kazakhstan and Mongolia. This expansive landscape is the funnel from which conquering Mongols, Huns, and Turkic armies invaded the west. If a single nation controlled the interior lines of the heartland, it could conquer the remainder of Asia and Europe. With the vast majority of the planet's landmass occupied, world domination would result. Spykman, on the other hand, focuses on the world's littorals. He describes the "Rimland," which included China, the Indian subcontinent, North Africa, and the


>LtCol Mann is the Executive Officer of 25th Marines and a member of the Gazette editorial panel.

Middle East. In Spykman's world, the Rimland is key terrain wherein landlocked nations seek access to sea lanes, trade, and escape from the harsh environment of the central Asian steppe.

From the historical geopolitical perspectives of Mackinder and Spykman, Kaplan takes the reader to the modern era and overlays the complexities of globalization, urbanization, and the information revolution. He effectively takes a broad survey of the world's flashpoints

Kaplan interconnects the domains of maritime power and land power, pointing out the critical role the world's littorals play in geopolitics.

and ties them to modern-day issues, then attempts to answer the question of why the geography of a particular region matters. In addition, Kaplan introduces the reader to the naval theories of Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett. Kaplan interconnects the



THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate. By Robert Kaplan. Random House, New York, 2012. ISBN 1400069831, 432 pp. \$28.00 (Member \$25.20)

domains of maritime power and land power, pointing out the critical role the world's littorals play in geopolitics. Throughout, the theoretical discussion of the idea of "pivots" is regularly addressed. The word "pivot" is not used as it is in today's political discussions regarding a "pivot to Asia." This suggests an actor, the United States in this case, making a conscious turn in policy. Rather, geopolitics uses "pivot"

Kaplan effectively illuminates the importance of geography to both the strategist and those who practice the operational arts. At a strategic level, the physical world is the constant with which a strategist must work. Yet, time and again, strategists take for granted or underestimate the constraints that mountains, oceans, and deserts place on achieving strategic ends. At the operational level, we are forced to view geography in three dimensions. As has been proven many times over, air power alone does not achieve decisive results; one must act on the ground, and pay tribute to the passes, vales, rifts, and peaks. No longer does a cruise missile suffice in accomplishing ones' military aims. Herein the reader gains an appreciation for the challenges of the physical world.

Kaplan's work, and that of the works he cites, is very relevant to the Marine Corps today. The book challenges the reader to look beyond

ethnic and religious tensions when evaluating areas of potential future conflict. The physical makeup of a region or geographic combatant command can portend future instability regardless of social fault

Kaplan effectively illuminates the importance of geography to both the strategist and those who practice the operational arts.

lines. Kaplan does an excellent job drawing out the critical nature of the world's littorals and the challenges that urbanization and demographics will place on the most instable regions of the world. I recommend anyone

interested in geopolitics read Kaplan's source material, and also to read some of the foreign policy realists, such as John Mearsheimer, who effectively overlay balance-of-power realism with the physical world, as it is not how we want it to be.

The Revenge of Geography is a very readable and enjoyable book. It asks big questions that are relevant to the Marine Corps as we face a volatile, uncertain, and complex world. Incorporating the thoughts of the great geopolitical thinkers with the social, political, ethnic, religious, and technological dynamics of today can create an effective starting point for framing the operational and strategic problems of the day.



What are Professional Marines Reading?

All In-Print Titles on the Commandant's Professional Reading List — On Hand and Available for Expedient Shipment to Marines World-Wide!

Visit our Website to View the Complete CMC and the First Lady of the Marine Corps Reading Lists



Explore our Extensive Selection About Marines, the Art of War and More:

www.marineshop.net • 888-237-7683

The MARINE Shop: 300 Potomac Ave., Quantico • 703-640-7195

The MARINE Shop at Camp Lejeune: Bldg. 84, Exchange Annex, Hadnot Point • 910-451-7500



Your purchases at The MARINE Shop help fund MCA&F Programs that support Marines! Learn more at www.mcafdn.org.



GET MEMBER VALUE PRICING! JOIN TODAY!

www.mca-marines.org • 1-866-622-1775

'Takes pleasure in awarding the...'



Note: The award records in the Marine Corps' award processing system and improved awards processing system were used to populate this list, which reflects personal combat awards from the start of the global war on terrorism presented to Marines and sailors serving with Marine Corps forces only. This list may not reflect certain personal combat awards processed outside of either system and/or approved by another branch of Service. Any questions on the content of the list should be submitted in writing to the Personal Awards Section (MMMA-2) at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Manpower Management Division, MMMA-2, 3280 Russell Road, Quantico, VA 22134.

Silver Star

Ridgeway, Daniel W. Sgt 7th ESB, 1st MLG

Bronze Star with Combat "V"

Barfield, Jason N. LCpl 3/7, 1st MarDiv
Brooks, Jr., Michael A. LtCol (MSOR) MarFORSOC

Bronze Star

Abramaitys, Jeffrey J. LtCol I MHG (Fwd)
Arrieta, Rodolfo SgtMaj 3d MAW (Fwd)
Barge, Jr., Hezekiah LtCol I MEF (Fwd)
Beheresht, Cyrus D. Col I MEF (Fwd)
Benavides, Ricardo Maj 1st MarDiv (Fwd)
Fauls, Matthew S. MSgt CLR 15, 1st MLG
Fuller, Keith M. LtCol I MEF (Fwd)
Galang, Lanae M. CPO I MEF (Fwd)
Gillard, Eric M. LtCol 3d MAW (Fwd)
Herzberg, Paul M. Maj 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv
Hess, Drew R. Maj 3d MAW (Fwd)
Hopkins, Max H. Maj I MHG (Fwd)
Lucas, Wilfredo L. LT 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv
Perry, Jason S. LtCol 6th Mar Regt, 2d MarDiv
Rocquemore, Jr., Kenneth SgtMaj I MHG (Fwd)
Santmyer, William A. Maj I MHG (Fwd)
Varnadore, Brenda L. MSgt I MEF (Fwd)
Weathers, Brent A. LtCol I MEF (Fwd)

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation With Combat "V"

Bowers, Jason P. Capt I MHG (Fwd)
Brochetti, Adam J. Capt 2d Recon Bn, 2d MarDiv
Meza, Jr., Octavio Sgt 1/7, 1st MarDiv
Polidora, Christopher F. Capt I MHG (Fwd)
Sims, Michael J. Sgt 2d ANGLICO MHG, II MEF
Stroud, Jr., Richard T. Sgt 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv
Yeary, Andrew J. 1stLt 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv

Navy and Marine Corps Achievement With Combat "V"

Amayaramos, Anthony F. Sgt CLR 15, 1st MLG
Barcelona, Nicholas S. Sgt Marine Cryptologic Support Bn

Cooper, Sammy J. Sgt 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv
Fite, Justin C. SSgt 1/7, 1st MarDiv
Keller, Jarrod J. Cpl I MHG (Fwd)
Mull, Kenneth R. Cpl 1/8, 2d MarDiv
Satham, Steven P. Sgt 7th Mar Regt, 1st MarDiv
Shoemaker, Christopher L. Sgt CLB 2, CLR 2, 2d MLG



To see previous personal awards from 11 September 2001 to the present, go to www.mca-marines.org/gazette/archives.

FREE BOOKS

Enter our weekly Book Drawing.

A new book is posted every Friday.

www.mca-marines.org/gazette/bookdrawing

Index to Advertisers

C ² TECOE.....	25
College of Distance Education.....	16, 44
Ellis Contest.....	2
John Deere.....	CIV
MCA&F.....	7, 9, 17, 35, 39, 43,
	52, 54, 57, 63, 75, CII
MCAF.....	28
Military Historical Tours.....	39
The <i>Marine</i> Shop.....	80
USAA.....	5, CIII



Editorial Policy and Writers' Guidelines

Our basic policy is to fulfill the stated purpose of the Marine Corps Gazette by providing a forum for open discussion and a free exchange of ideas relating to the U.S. Marine Corps and military capabilities.

The Board of Governors of the Marine Corps Association has given authority to approve manuscripts for publication to the editorial board and editor. Editorial board members are listed on the Gazette's masthead in each issue. The board, which normally meets once a month, represents a cross section of Marines by professional interest, experience, age, rank, and gender. The board reads and votes on each manuscript submitted as a feature article. A simple majority rules in its decisions. Other material submitted for publication is accepted or rejected based on the assessment of the editor. The Gazette welcomes material in the following categories:

- **Commentary on Published Material:** Submit promptly. Comments normally appear as letters (see below) 3 months after published material. BE BRIEF.
- **Feature Articles:** Normally 2,000 to 3,000 words, dealing with topics of major significance. Manuscripts should be DOUBLE SPACED. Ideas must be backed up by hard facts. Evidence must be presented to support logical conclusions. In the case of articles that criticize, constructive suggestions are sought. Footnotes are not necessary, but a list of any source materials used is helpful.
- **Ideas and Issues:** Short articles, normally 750 to 1,500 words. This section can include the full gamut of professional topics so long as treatment of the subject is brief and concise. Again, please DOUBLE SPACE all manuscripts.
- **Letters:** Limit to 200 words or less and DOUBLE SPACE. As in most magazines, letters to the editor are an important clue as to how well or poorly ideas are being received. Letters are an excellent way to correct factual mistakes, reinforce ideas, outline opposing points of view, identify problems, and suggest factors or important considerations that have been overlooked in previous Gazette articles. The best letters are sharply focused on one or two specific points.
- **Book Reviews:** Prefer 300 to 750 words. Please DOUBLE SPACE. It is a good idea to check with the editor in advance to determine if a review is desired. Please be sure to include the book's author, publisher (including city), year of publication, number of pages, and cost of the book.

The best advice is to write the way you talk. Organize your thoughts. Cut out excess words. Short is better than long. Submissions may be sent via regular mail and should include one hard copy of the manuscript and a disk with the manuscript in Microsoft Word format. Photographs and illustrations must be in **TIFF, JPG, or EPS** format (**300dpi, 5x7 inches**, color preferred) and **must not be embedded in the article**. **Please attach photos and illustrations separately.** (You may indicate in the text of the article where the photos are to be placed.) Include the author's full name, mailing address, telephone number, and e-mail address. Mail to: Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134. Articles may also be submitted via e-mail to gazette@mca-marines.org. Please follow the same instructions for format, photographs, and contact information when submitting by e-mail. Any queries may be directed to the editorial staff by calling 800-336-0291, ext. 144.



The ONLY Way Known To Man, to Surpass the Staunch, Martial Style that Comes with Strutting in Marine Evening Dress...

Add a Boat Cloak!

Order Yours Today and Get Ready for the Ball Early!

Featuring:

- Highest Quality Marine Uniforms
- Expert Tailoring & Precision Medal Mounting
- Marine Sword Repair Services
- Professional Reading, Specialty Gifts and Apparel for Marines
- Marine Corps Birthday Ball Party Supplies

And More...

**The MARINE Shop • 300 Potomac Ave.
Quantico, VA 22134 • 888-237-7683
www.marineshop.net**

Your purchases at The MARINE Shop help fund MCA&F Programs that support Marines!



GET MEMBER VALUE PRICING AS AN MCA&F MEMBER!

www.mca-marines.org • 866-622-1775

China's New Regime

The potential for East Asian conflict

by 1stLt Daniel P. Grant

Last November's cessation of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress ushered in a new generation of Chinese leadership. This once-in-a-decade change in the East Asian political landscape caps a tumultuous year of regional conflict and has untold implications for U.S. foreign policy and military engagement. It falls on Marine Corps leaders to analyze the geopolitics of the region as they navigate the uncertain waters of the White House's "pivot to the Pacific," something most officers have experienced difficulty in doing as they abandon 10 years of a U.S. Central Command-centric mindset. Many Marine Corps units have disappointingly embraced pre-11 September 2001 scenarios to provide "realism" in their training. Many of these scenarios include a North Korean invasion of South Korea, or an imaginary "Soviet-style" enemy that embraces Cold War-era technology and doctrine. Surprisingly, scenarios involving enemies with capabilities comparable to the Chinese military are few in number, with many officers deriding them as unrealistic. A war involving China is unfathomable to most people, with the majority of naysayers citing the superiority of the U.S. military. This type of self-gratifying thinking is dangerous, as it blindly ignores the current political climate in East Asia with regard to the recent Chinese elections. The purpose of this article is to create understanding and discourse on the current state of East Asian geopolitics and explain how the recent change in Chinese leadership creates a real potential for military conflict within the region.

On 15 November 2012, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping was elevated to the powerful post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, succeeding Hu Jintao. Also elected were roughly


>1stLt Grant is an intelligence officer assigned to 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, currently deployed to Okinawa, Japan.

two dozen members of the party's politburo and the remaining six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party's ruling body. The newly elected leaders face the daunting task of reforming China's beleaguered economic system while advancing an increasingly assertive foreign policy. Under the rule of Hu Jintao, China's gross domestic product averaged more than 10 percent growth per year, vaulting past the likes of Germany and Japan to become the world's second-largest economy. Chinese exports likewise grew by 30 percent annually and now account for over 10 percent of the global marketplace, according to recent figures from the World Trade Organization.

However, growth is slowing as the current market for exports offers little room for expansion. The appreciation of the yuan against the slumping euro also damages the competitiveness of Chinese products and saps the profit margins of small firms. Despite these issues, the Chinese economy grew at a rate of nearly 8 percent in 2012, an enviable rate for any developing nation. Chinese citizens are more affluent than ever, and an estimated 500 million people have been lifted out of poverty within the last decade. The rise in affluence has not come without a price, however; China's income disparity is among the largest in the world. The gap between urban and rural household incomes has jumped 68 percent since 1985, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Critics of China's economic structure also point to state-owned enterprises,

which command a substantial portion of the economy and account for nearly 70 percent of domestic bank lending. The entrenchment of state-owned enterprises has created large barriers to entry for small businesses, a key component of economic growth and domestic consumption.

Corruption is also rampant throughout the Chinese bureaucracy; China ranks 75th on Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index," scoring an abysmal 3.6 out of 10. A complex government procurement process and a lack of substantive anticorruption legislation create ideal conditions for bribery, embezzlement, and patronage. Official numbers are difficult to produce, but Minxin Pei, director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment, places the total value of corruption at as much as \$86 billion each year. The problem seems to permeate from the highest levels of government. A 25 October 2012 article in *The New York Times* revealed that family members of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had amassed personal wealth of over \$2.7 billion dollars. The Communist Party responded in kind by blocking access to the English-language and Chinese-language versions of the *Times*' website. Despite the government's blatant protectionist censorship, the Chinese populace is starting to take notice of the inherent culture of fraud. Sina Weibo, China's version of the social media site Twitter, has become a popular forum for the discussion of political corruption. In some cases, the conversation has become so volatile that it has led to the investigation of certain officials. In late September 2012, the head of the Shaanxi Bureau of Work Safety, Yang Dacai, was removed from his position for alleged "discipline problems" after a coordinated "netizen" campaign



A decade of growth. (Figure from The Wall Street Journal, "Charting China's Economy: 10 Years Under Hu, 10 November 2012.)

uncovered incongruities in his personal wealth. Beijing will continue to keep a wary eye on public discourse this year.

The path forward for Xi Jinping's administration will be extremely difficult. Economic reforms aimed at creating social equality and restructuring the state sector will be met with heavy opposition from vested interest groups and extortionate party members. Mr. Xi will need to quickly shore up support from willing participants and press forward with reform in order to appease an increasingly critical general public. I would argue that the Chinese government could accomplish this by exploiting an existing territorial dispute through military force. Territorial disputes in East Asia have been commonplace over the last year as China continues to push its sovereign claims further east. Each of the disputes resulted in massive public outcry and demonstrations by the Chinese populace against rival nations. Beijing has proven in the past that it is not opposed to leveraging or even stoking nationalistic fervor when it is politically opportune. Earlier last year, the state-run Xinhua News Agency ruthlessly promoted the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute between the Japanese and Chinese governments in part to take the focus off of the Bo Xilai scandal, in which a prominent

politician was implicated in the cover-up of a high-profile murder.

Military action in support of sovereign claims would be wildly popular with the Chinese public. A survey conducted by the Chinese newspaper *Global Times* during the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute found a staggering 90 percent of respondents advocating further action against the Japanese Government. Politically, the conflict would provide the new regime under Xi Jinping both time and leverage for economic reform by taking the national spotlight off of political machinations. The regime would also benefit through increased support from the largely inexperienced People's Liberation Army (PLA), which would jump at the opportunity to finally flex its muscles. It is important to note that this scenario presents a no-win situation for the U.S. Government. By intervening militarily, Washington would justify Chinese accusations that the Pacific pivot has been nothing more than pretense to interfere in sovereign affairs. U.S. political influence abroad would wane as gridlock within the United Nations Security Council sets in. An isolationist stance, however, would be equally disastrous for U.S. relations. Strategic partnerships within the region, most notably with Japan and the Philippines, would

dissolve, and an emboldened Chinese regime would look toward the control of additional territory.

The military operation itself could take any number of forms. A contingent of amphibious forces could theoretically land unopposed on any number of islets within the Paracel or Spratly island chains and establish a military outpost under the administrative control of the Sansha military garrison. Competing claimants would be forced to either acknowledge Chinese sovereignty of the territory or take military action against it. Logistical support to the outposts would be easily solved using Chinese maritime surveillance ships, which routinely patrol the South China Sea. Amphibious operations are certainly within the capabilities of the PLA. The Nanjing Military Command Area, one of 7 military command regions, took part in a massive amphibious exercise as recently as August 2012. The exercise successfully incorporated mechanized landing forces, artillery, close air support, and commando units from the Jinan Military Command Area, as reported by *China Daily*. The level of coordination involved in the exercise implies that the PLA is working to improve coordination between its army and naval forces and across its military command areas.

Political forces have done little to stem the potential for conflict. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to produce a code of conduct with regard to disputes arising in the South China Sea. Such an agreement would provide guidelines for the resolution of disputes over maritime rights or territorial claims among ASEAN's 10 member-states. China has consistently expressed a wish not to "internationalize" such disputes—a clear commentary against U.S. involvement in conflict resolution—instead advocating a bilateral approach between competing claimants. Member-states such as the Philippines and Vietnam oppose this approach, as they lack the political, military, or even economic resources to negotiate on level footing with Beijing. The inherent disagreement has left ASEAN politically fractious and impotent with regard to regional mediation.

The Obama Administration's pivot to the Pacific has exacerbated the potential for conflict by producing a consolidation of military power within the region. A veritable arms race continues unabated, buoyed primarily by increases in military appropriations by Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Last year (2012) marked the first time in history that defense spending in Asia surpassed that of Europe, and it shows no signs of slowing down. In 2011, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation with Vietnam, and expressed interest in pursuing a similar relationship with Cambodia and formerly despotic Myanmar. Japan has responded similarly by signing strategic partnerships with both Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing now finds itself surrounded on all sides by an increasingly hostile policy of containment and points its finger clearly at Washington as the source of the problem. The pivot has produced increasing nationalistic rhetoric within China, and fuels the popular misconception that the United States is actively seeking to prevent the country's rise to prominence. Under these pretenses, Chinese leadership can justify military action as a necessity to ensure national interests and future security.

The Marine Corps stands uniquely poised to influence the future of the Pacific as the Nation's amphibious force-in-readiness. In the event of armed conflict with China, the Corps' unique warfighting capabilities would be perfectly matched for the littoral geography of the region. From a technological standpoint, Chinese anti-access/area denial systems would place increased emphasis on the over-the-horizon capabilities of the MAGTF. Chinese antiship cruise missiles and sophisticated air defense systems would dramatically reduce the maneuverability of the U.S. Navy and Air Force and increase the distance necessary for the projection of power. Additionally, the use of precision weaponry by the PLA would require amphibious forces to deploy as small, independently operating units to facilitate movement inland. The resulting fight would favor the Marine Corps' doctrinal tenants of

maneuver warfare and decentralized command.

Kinetic operations aside, the Pacific pivot and the return of the Unit Deployment Program provide the Marine Corps with new opportunities for military engagement. Several countries have already recognized the potential for increased cooperation and have sought out additional training opportunities. The U.S.-Philippine Exercise BALIKATAN was attended last year by the Australian, Japanese, and South Korean militaries for the first time in the event's history. In apparent recognition of Chinese aggressiveness, several militaries have also moved to increase their amphibious capability with support from the United States. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces recently released plans to purchase 4 AAV-7 amphibious platforms from the Marine Corps, and have studied the feasibility of stationing RQ-4 Global Hawk assets in the lower Ryuku Islands. These capabilities will become critical to the stability of the region should the U.S. Government choose to take

Sources

Barabozza, David, "Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader," *The New York Times*, 25 October 2012.

Pei, Minxin, *Carnegie Endowment policy brief, No. 55, New York, October 2007.*

Social Sciences Academic Press, "Annual Report on Urban Development of China," No. 5, Beijing, August 2012.

Tiantian, Bai, poll: "Take more action on Diaoyu spat," *Global Times, Beijing*, 17 September 2012.

Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2012," accessed at cpi.transparency.org.

World Trade Organization, "Trade Profiles—China," Washington, DC, April 2012, accessed at stat.wto.org.

Staff writer, "PLA units hone their battle skills," *China Daily, Beijing*, 18 September 2012.

an isolationist stance toward potential conflict.

Marine Corps leaders will take a large role in influencing the future regional stability of East Asia. As a result, we have an obligation to understand the political context of the region we operate in. Failure to do so will make us unwitting pawns in a global relationship that will dominate the political realm of the 21st century. *MarAdmin 619/12, Implementation of the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program* (Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 24 October 2012) is a step in the right direction, but the framework needs to be disseminated at the small unit level. Unit leaders should attempt to provide basic regional familiarization within training exercises and tailor the scenario toward a conflict within the East Asian realm of possibility. This type of preparation will improve our ability to fight tomorrow's conflict and maintain our relevance in the near future.



Tips for Program Managers

Avoiding potentially painful learning experiences

by Maj R.G. DuVall, USMC(Ret)

I have accumulated some experiences as a program manager during my Marine Corps career and my second career with several major defense contractors and thought I should pass them on to the present generation of program managers. I will try to break them down into categories that may seem logical to the reader.

Writing Specifications

I would advise that one should be cautious of field input. I say this in full knowledge that once upon a time *I* was giving input from the field. The drawback of field input is that the source generally has little or no engineering or research and development (R&D) experience, and the input may lead to expensive and lengthy development of something that has some user support and questionable utility. Canvas all of the Operating Forces' affected users to see if the input has a use and the support of a majority.

Beware of subsystem salesmen. I have experienced people coming to my desk and making the most outrageous claims for their product. As the Marine Corps Liaison Officer, Army Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force (AFVTF), I was responsible for all light systems due to my light armored vehicle (LAV) background. Among these systems was the light FACS (Future Armored Combat System), an armored gun system (AGS) replacement. I received a call from Fort Knox stating they were changing the requirements for the system to read the same protection level and armament as the present M1A1 Abrams battle tank and a weight of 20 tons. They had a visit from a group that had developed



The decision made was to have 7 road wheels on the Abrams M1 A1 tank. (Photo by Cpl Sarah Dietz.)

>Maj DuVall retired after 22 years in the Marine Corps.

a new armor that was better than the classified M1A1 heavy armor that was only 2 inches thick and weighed ¹/₂₀ of the current armor. I asked if they had been shown any test data or used test samples, and was told, "no." I told Fort Knox that we would stay with the present requirements. If General Dynamics could lower the weight of the M1A1 from 70 tons to 20 tons, they would have jumped on that opportunity.

Don't write specifications telling industry how to do the job. Tell industry what you want in performance and let them come up with solutions. When Quantico did the LAV assault gun (LAV-AG) specifications, they went so far as to specify the eye relief on the gunner's sight. Industry is full of

engineers who are very innovative. Let them do their job and don't put them in a box. So many people use the phrase, "We've always done it that way." Don't accept that. Challenge it every time you hear it.

Plan for growth. There isn't a system in military use that hasn't grown during its period of service. The Stryker fleet started out at 18 tons and is now running at 30 tons. The LAV fleet has grown in a similar manner. I had the pleasure of working with Dr. Phillip Lett, the Chrysler Defense Lead for the M1 program. He asked if I knew why the M1 had 7 road wheels. He told me that he insisted on the extra road wheel because he knew the Army would someday take the vehicle to 70 tons.

COTS versus GOTS. Using civilian off-the-shelf (COTS) items can be a useful way to lower cost in development, production, and logistics. This is a two-edged sword, however, as most COTS items were not designed for military use. A system I managed had

a requirement to use a COTS engine. We selected one from a very limited number of options. The engine weight and power factors were very good and the price suited the project well. The Government then stated that the engine must meet all the standard Government requirements. These included the side and longitudinal slope requirements. I believe these are good requirements and necessary on a ground system, but civilian engine manufacturers don't build engines for 60 percent slope operation. The manufacturer told us he would have to open a special line for our engine in production and the price and logistic cost savings were lost. It may have been better to have specified a government off-the-shelf (GOTS) engine to start with. Another GOTS advantage is that the Government has established contracts covering many high-use items. On the same system, the Government program manager stated that the contractor would provide all the on-vehicle equipment, the weapons, and the communications equipment. During a discussion, I pointed out that the Government has established contracts for these items. We would have to establish contracts, which would mean disruption or delay on already-running contracts, and the addition of our cost factors onto the price of the items under discussion. This is part of the way you get a \$500 hammer. The program manager decided to supply those items from government stock.

Limit the number of standard clauses. Remember the problems of "we've always done it that way" when you look at standard clauses. Some are there just to keep people's "rice bowls" full and provide work you don't really need done. Make people tell you what they are going to do for your money and how the system will be better or meet its requirements with their input.

Stick to the requirements and don't allow changes in midstream. More programs have foundered on requirements changes than any other reason. Requirements changes often entail partial or complete redesign of the system and a restart on the R&D with all the cost increases and schedule delays.



A contractor avowed he could lower the weight with the pernil protection. (Photo by Cpl Sarah Dietz.)

Be careful what you ask for. Some requirements may sound simple or very important at the time, or a real time or money saver during the lifetime of the program. Forcing weight/space restrictions on a system for transportability purposes may sound good, but realistically examine how often that capability may be used before paying the penalty that it will impose. The LAV helicopter lift is one example of this.

Remember that each requirement, however trivial, is a test point. Systems like the Crusader Advanced Field Artillery System had the contractors breaking down the requirement to the lowest level of subsystem, each requiring testing.

Testing

Always remember that testing is expensive. As previously discussed, each requirement becomes a test point. Be sure you want to pay for it before you specify it.

Testing requires a great deal of preparation and coordination. Going to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds Test Center will require your constant attention, as it is always overcommitted and understaffed. Test schedules become disjointed because the test area you need must be available, so each day your system will go to the area that is available that day. It may not fit your

schedule, but it is the only way it can work—you must stay flexible. Testing is supposed to uncover problems and often does. You must plan for downtime for the contractors to analyze and fix the problem. Tight schedules cause more problems than they solve.

Don't stack up a large number of untested, brand new technologies on one platform. The main battle tank is a good example of a large number of untested technologies on one platform. The tank had the driver in the turret within a contrarotating station, a 152mm gun/missile launcher, caseless ammunition, a new fire control system with laser rangefinder, an autoloader, height-adjustable hydropneumatic suspension, advanced armor, an engine with pistons with adjustable heads, and turbochargers with adjustable vanes. All of these were brand new at that time. When testing began, the problem was that, on any given day, several of these systems were down, and testing could not be conducted, therefore every system was not getting the development time it needed. If faced with this type of situation, plan to use a number of old chassis to act as surrogates to test just one of the new technologies such as a suspension test bed, an engine test bed, an autoloader test rig, and so on. The extra cost will be more than compensated by staying on schedule

and seeing that each subsystem receives proper development.

Never ad lib test events—stay with your schedule. My team always had a rule that we would never attempt a particular performance test/demonstration in front of our customer until we had accomplished it during our testing with consistency. Screwing up a test in public is the fastest way to becoming unfunded and cancelled, and will ensure your program to get a bad reputation and bad press. The old adage that “you only have one chance to make a good first impression” applies for every public test/demonstration.

Incorporate contractor testing into your overall test plan to capture early results and corrective actions conducted by the contractor. Remember that both of you want the program to be a success. MajGen Ray M. Franklin, Commanding General, Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command, for whom I worked, had a sign in his office that said, “Bad news is not like wine. It does not get better with age.” I adopted that philosophy when I became a program manager, and it served me well for over 20 years. Do the same with your contractor counterpart and work with that person to maintain an open, honest relationship. To have the bad-news policy I described means you must never “kill the messenger,” because there will always be bad news in the R&D world.

Don't schedule user evaluations until your system has demonstrated sufficient maturity (reliability). Users are generally not patient with system failures and recurrent flaws; they don't understand the R&D world and lack the patience to put up with the test-fix-test cycle that goes with that stage of development. If the system is not sufficiently mature, you will get a bad review, which can spread through the Operating Forces community and leave you without user support.

One other preparation for user evaluations should be the complete familiarization of all the participating users with the requirements and missions that your system was designed for. This can avoid users expecting something very different from what they



The LAV passed user evaluations and has been a mainstay of Marine Corps combat vehicles.
(Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2d Class Nardelito Gervacio.)

evaluate. Most user evaluations contain useful input about the performance parameters of the system as compared to the briefed requirements/missions; however, you will always receive a stack of comments about how the seat could be 2 inches to the left and the steering wheel closer or farther from the operator, and so on. Again, size constraints due to transportability requirements should be stressed if they exist, because users *always* want more space and are *never* happy with interior size.

Administration

Keep the program aimed at the objective: stay focused. Fight additions, add-ons, and changes, which can be very expensive, screw up your schedule, and cost you the program in the end.

Be aware of how seniors and other areas of the R&D community view your program. On one program I led, another section of Marine Corps Systems Command made it very clear to me that they were furious that Marine Corps Systems Command had worked with another outside agency to sponsor the program (and provide additional funding), and every time they saw me they told me that they couldn't wait to get the vehicles under them so they could cut them up and be done with the pro-

gram. As unprofessional as it was, it is not uncommon for certain groups to defend their turf, to covet other programs' assets (money), and to work to undermine these efforts and redirect the funds to their projects.

Cultivate outside-the-box thinking by all participants in your program. If an idea improves the product, saves funds, improves the schedule, or makes the system look better to the user or deciding authority, than it is good no matter where it came from.

Careful planning and avoiding the pitfalls discussed above can help you avoid problems that put your program under negative scrutiny by seniors, press, and the public. Communication among all participants in the program is vitally important and is a part of the bad-news policy previously discussed. On one of my programs, our system was specifically designed to fit inside a helicopter also under development. A member of that helicopter's program manager shop attended every major program meeting we had. After a number of years and an expenditure of \$40 million, our system was invited to the Patuxent River Test Center to demonstrate embarking on a helicopter. After the demonstration, I was informed we did not meet the

floor-loading requirement. We broke out the helicopter requirement document and pointed out that our system met this requirement. We were then told by the helicopter program manager (he had been the air officer of an LAV battalion for which I was the executive officer many years earlier) that a previous program manager had allowed the helicopter contractor to remove every other fuselage stringer so they could make contract weight. This had not affected flight strength, but had reduced floor strength below the *required* level to the point that our vehicle could not be loaded and flown internally. Because the member of their program managers' office had kept this information to himself, the Marine Corps wasted \$40 million. Communication would have allowed us to make what were, in reality, easy modifications to meet the new floor loading. The chance was passed by and the assets and investment lost.

Be available. If your system appears at industry shows, you should be present and should coordinate what will be said about and shown to the show's attendees. You and your contractor counterpart are the programs greatest salesman; use real test data and test footage to sell your system not hyperbole. Control the sales pitch process and focus the pitch to create the correct impression. You must be prepared to have very high-ranking visitors, and your preparation will ensure the proper message is being conveyed. Remember what was said about never ad libbing a demonstration or performance test. The same applies to these high-visibility shows. I have watched senior members of major defense companies walk up and begin to spout nonsense about their system which had no basis in fact. Be prepared to control such events by meeting with everyone who will be on the floor, and knowing what will be said, who will handle technical questions, and who will handle programmatic questions (production, in-service dates, price ranges, etc.).

Program strategy. Production is always a tough question, and all must realize that higher quantities reduce unit cost. If you are allowed to consider other buyers,

The author assisted in the preparation of the following programs:

- ***The Marine Corps light tank/infantry support vehicle and LAV-AG concepts, tradeoff analysis, and acquisition strategies.***
- ***The U.S. Army AFVTF AGS concept, market surveys, analyses, program definition, and acquisition strategy.***
- ***The product improvement program for the Marine Corps LAV applique armor test, evaluation, and acquisition.***
- ***The organizational and how-to-fight documentation for the Marine Corps LAV battalions and the LAV gunnery package.***
- ***Analyses for the AFVTF light armor system's lethality and performance.***
- ***Analyses, evaluation, and trade-off considerations for the AFVTF kinetic energy missile and its host vehicle.***
- ***Formulated the test and evaluation master plan for the AFVTF.***
- ***Developed the AFVTF transportability study.***
- ***Represented the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command on the Department of Defense Competitive Strategies Acquisition Board.***

The author was the Program Manager for:

- ***The Teledyne LAV 105mm gun.***
- ***The Teledyne AGS, expeditionary tank, and low-profile turret for the Canadian Army Cougar Replacement Program, the design that led to the U.S. Army MGS (Stryker Mobile Gun System).***
- ***The automotive test rig for the U.S. Army Armored Systems Modernization program, the first vehicle to use advanced hybrid gas turbine/electric traction drive, drive-by-wire, 270-volt high-power management, fully digitized controls, and hydropneumatic suspension with active track tensioning.***
- ***The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/Office of Naval Research/General Dynamics Land Systems/Marine Corps RST-V Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting Vehicle) program. The RST-V was the first military wheeled vehicle designed to incorporate hybrid electric drive from the ground up. The RST-V is also designed for V-22 internal transport and to incorporate an integral classified survivability suite.***
- ***The advanced hybrid electric drive 8x8.***
- ***The advanced ground mobility vehicle, a hybrid electric drive replacement for the U.S. Special Operations Command ground mobility vehicle.***
- ***The hybrid electric drive for the U.S. Army Stryker vehicle.***

than that should be a major goal of program strategy. Two hundred units are expensive, almost hand-built systems, since it doesn't pay to buy fixtures and tooling. One thousand or more units bring big savings, and the build tempo can bring even more. The Japanese Self-Defense Force builds only one dozen vehicles a year and they are very expensive at that rate.

Conclusion

I hope that these tips will be helpful, as they were acquired over a long period of my life and involve some painful learning experiences. Our Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen deserve the best, and sometimes the best isn't necessarily the most complicated or the most expensive. War is the most stressful of all experiences, and technology in weapons systems should not increase that stress and frustration, rather, it should lower them and raise confidence in the user that he has command of his situation.



Our Marines deserve the best system equipment we can provide—not necessarily the most expensive. (Photo by SSgt Edward R. Guevara, Jr.)



Recently Moved or Promoted?

Then It's Time to Update Your Member Record

START HERE

Here are Some of Your Options After Member Portal Login:

Member Profile – Change member records on rank, mailing address and email address, etc.

Add a Magazine – Upgrade your subscription

Password Change – Revise your member password


Renew Now – Go Here to renew your membership

Gift Subscription – Use this option to give a gift subscription to a buddy **And MORE...**

EASY to do Anywhere You Have an Internet Connection

www.mca-marines.org





When it comes to financial obstacles, we're ready to help.

At USAA, we know military life is different. We've been there. So for current and former military service members and their families, we offer free financial advice geared specifically to the realities of your life. For help managing expenses, creating an investment strategy or planning for retirement, talk to a USAA investment advisor today. We make it easy to get started.

Contact us for your free financial assessment.

usaa.com/mca | 877-651-6272



Insurance Banking Investments Retirement Advice

We know what it means to serve.®

USAA means United Services Automobile Association and its insurance, banking, investment and other companies.

Investing in securities products involves risk, including possible loss of principal. Financial planning services and financial advice provided by USAA Financial Planning Services Insurance Agency, Inc. (known as USAA Financial Insurance Agency in California, License # 0E36312), a registered investment advisor and insurance agency and its wholly owned subsidiary, USAA Financial Advisors, Inc., a registered broker dealer. MCA&F receives financial support from USAA for this sponsorship. © 2013 USAA. 144200-0613




WE'RE JOHN DEERE, REPORTING FOR DUTY.

Whether you're requisitioning equipment for construction, material handling, reclamation, or conservation, we'd like to be your ally. Expect quality machines, responsive customer service, and 24/7/365 genuine John Deere parts availability through our FLASH™ ordering system. What's more, all our military construction models run on either diesel or JP8 jet fuel. A full line of attachments and custom armor solutions are also a phone call away.

Contact John Deere Direct Government Sales at 800.319.3757 today and put our duty-bound dozers, loaders, graders, and excavators to work in your theater of operation.



JOHN DEERE



To view our complete line of military equipment, scan this image on your mobile app.

www.JohnDeere.com