By Dick Camp - Originally published August 2000
The pre-dawn darkness was broken by the sharp flash and Grump of exploding mortar and artillery fire spewing metal in a lethal arc of death and destruction. The deadly orchestration was designed to soften up defenses for a massive attack, which began in the early morning hours of 25 June 1950 by seven infantry and an armored division of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA).
In a coast-to-coast coordinated attack they poured across the 38th parallel, brushing aside the ineffective resistance of the Republic of Korea (ROK) frontier force. Within three days the invaders seized Seoul, the capital; forced the government to flee; and turned its citizens into fugitives desperate to escape the fighting.
Frantic pleas to the United Nations brought about a resolution branding the North Koreans as aggressors and demanding their immediate cease fire and withdrawal. Two days later, after hearing nothing from the North Koreans, another resolution was passed, calling upon its members to provide economic and military assistance to embattled South Koreathe United Nations was in the fight.
Acting quickly, President Harry S. Truman ordered American naval, air and ground forces into action. The first units arrived from Japan ill-prepared and ill-equipped for combat. They were understrength, soft from occupation duty, short on equipment and heavy weapons, and were chewed up by the tougher, better trained and equipped NKPA. Outfought, they retreated in the face of the North Korean onslaught, trading space for time in an effort to regroup and establish a sustainable defensive perimeter. Even with the arrival of additional reinforcements, American forces were pushed further and further south, toward the seaport of Pusan.
General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, closely following events in Korea, pushed for the deployment of the Fleet Marine Force, but was stymied by the inaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Gen Cates could not even discuss the issue directly with them, as the Corps was not a regular member, only sitting in when invited. Exasperated, the Commandant prodded Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, into sending a "back door" message to Gen Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, asking if he wanted the use of a Marine brigade with supporting air.
Gen MacArthur, literally with his back to the wall in Korea, fired off a message to the JCS: "Request immediate assignment-Marine Regimental Combat Team and supporting Air Group for duty this command-MacArthur." In the meantime, Gen Cates sent the First Marine Division a "be prepared to deploy" warning order. He continued the pressure by showing up uninvited when the Joint Chiefs met to discuss and finally approve MacArthur's request.
In the absence of the division commander, the deployment message was sent to the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, who immediately ordered his Marines to begin war preparations. Shortly afterward, he received a phone call from the Assistant Commandant, Major General Oliver P. Smith, ordering BGen Craig to activate the First Provisional Marine Brigade and "have it ready to move out at the earliest possible date."
BGen Craig, an officer of high reputation, was noted for coolness under fire. An officer who fought with him on Guam related: "After I ran ashore, the bullets were raining in from several pillboxes, so I dived into the nearest foxhole. Who in hell was there but Eddie Craig. He was lying there with a field phone and a notebook, talking to a runner. He was so quiet and collected he could have been at a desk in the Pentagon. There's one thing about going to war with that man: There's no need to worry about who's running the show."
BGen Craig had his work cut out for him because the division was seriously undermanned as a result of cuts imposed upon the Corps after World War II by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson.
By stripping division and base units, the general was able to field one understrength infantry regiment, the 5th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray. "I had the choice of taking anybody I wanted," BGen Craig said. "Naturally, I took the best I could find."
A few miles up the road at Marine Corps Air Station, EI Toro, Calif., the First Marine Aircraft Wing was doing the same. BGen Thomas J. Cushman formed Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 33, consisting of four squadrons: Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF) 214, VMF-323, VMF(Night-fighter)-513 and VMO-6, an observation squadron, which included four H03S helicopters.
A naval aviator for more than 30 years, Cushman, like Craig, served in the "Banana Wars" and saw action as a wing commander during WW II. Designated as deputy brigade commander, BGen Cushman had a wealth of aviation experience, which complemented Craig's ground expertise. Together, they formed an extremely effective airground team.
Even with these efforts, there were serious shortages of personnel. The infantry battalions were short one company, and each company had only two platoons out of the three they rated. The artillery battalion had four 105 mm howitzers per battery rather than the normal six. To make up some of this shortfall, Marines from posts and stations all over the United States were ordered to Camp Pendleton, Calif.
Dozens of former recruiters and guard company troops poured into the base. Fortunately, most had previous experience in the Fleet Marine Force and needed only a short "snapping in" period to bring them up to speed, much of which was done on the transports at sea. Of the 6,534 men in the brigade, 90 percent of the officers and 65 percent of the staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) had been in combat, but only 10 percent of the junior enlisted men had.
The Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, Calif., was ordered to equip the brigade with rolling stock such as trucks, jeeps, trailers and amphibian vehicles. The center went into high gear, jamming the highways to the two bases. Much of the equipment had been mothballed at the end of WW II, and, according to Andrew Geer in The New Breed, "There were more veterans of Iwo [Jima] and Okinawa among the vehicles than there were among the men who would drive them."
Struggling to meet shipping deadlines, BGen Craig pushed his staff to complete the myriad details, working them around the clock. Remarkably, five days after activation, brigade units started moving to the docks at San Diego and sailed two days later for Japan, where they were expected to train and prepare for future amphibious operations.
Before departure, the general told his officers, "It has been necessary for troops now fighting in Korea to pull back at times, but I am stating now that no unit of this brigade... will ever receive an order to retreat from me. All I ask is that you fight as Marines have always fought."
The Commandant, on the docks to see them off, put it a little more succinctly: "You boys clean this up in a couple of months, or I'll be over to see you." With that, the division band struck up "The Marines' Hymn," lines were slipped and the 10 ships of Task Force 53.7 put out to sea.
Change of Orders
To gain planning time, Generals Craig and Cushman, along with key staff members, flew to Japan, stopping first in Hawaii to brief Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
BGen Craig outlined the fighting capabilities of the brigade, specifically emphasizing the need for additional infantry replacements to add the third rifle company and to replace casualties. LtGen Shepherd, an old friend, approved a monthly replacement draft of 800 men, which was to be a godsend in the weeks to come.
The commanders also discussed MacArthur's bold plan for an amphibious landing behind the NKPA lines using the entire 1stMarDiv. LtGen Shepherd had been instrumental not only in prompting MacArthur to request the division but also in writing the dispatch to the JCS.
The advance party reached Japan on the 19th and was immediately ushered into Gen MacArthur's office. He warmly greeted them, expressing pleasure at having Marines under his command again. BGen Craig remembered that MacArthur commented on the excellence of the 1stMarDiv and the Marine air which served under him in WW II. MacArthur went on to say that he had the greatest admiration for the Corps and would welcome its units any time. He outlined plans for holding the brigade in Japan until the remainder of the division arrived.
With the brigade's arrival just two weeks away, the advance party scouted various bases, attempting to find a location where the regiment and the air group could train together. On the 25th, BGen Craig departed for a visit to prospective camps. With his plane just 20 minutes out of Tokyo, he received an urgent message to return to headquarters, where he was briefed by BGen Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur's G-3.
Wright told Craig that the situation in Korea had dramatically worsened. The NKPA had broken through the U.S. and South Korean lines, forcing them to retreat toward the vital seaport of Pusan, the last foothold in Korea. Eight badly shot-up U.S. and ROK divisions dug in, forming a ragged, horseshoe-shaped defense line 90 miles long and 60 miles wide, for a last stand. Arrayed against them were 11 well-trained and well-armed NKPA divisions. If the allied force failed to hold, Pusan would fall and, with it all, of Korea.
The Pusan Perimeter was a perimeter in name only. Its American and South Korean defenders were stretched to the breaking point, unable to man the entire line. There were large gaps between units which were exploited by the NKPA to infiltrate small units into rear areas, sowing confusion and fear. Larger NKPA formations massed to attack, threatening a breakthrough, and there were precious few reserves to stop them.
The Marines represented a potent strike force which was desperately needed to help plug holes and shore up the perimeter. Gen MacArthur sent a priority message changing their orders and diverting the ships to Korea. The Marine brigade would fight in the Pusan Perimeter.
At sea, the convoy was having a tough time. First, the forward section of USS Fort Marion's (LSD-22) well deck accidentally flooded, submerging the embarked M26 tanks and ruining 300 rounds of scarce 90 mm ammunition. Fortunately, the tanks were repaired, but the ammunition had to be jettisoned.
Next, the troop transport USS Henrico (APA-45), carrying the regimental headquarters and the entire 1st Battalion Landing Team, developed a serious mechanical failure and was declared temporarily unseaworthy.
Ordered to the Oakland (Calif.) Naval Supply Depot for emergency repairs, Henrico finally limped under the Golden Gate Bridge after three attempts and rejoined the convoy just as it reached Korea.
With the brigade's arrival just days away, BGen Craig and the advance party flew to Korea and reported to LtGen Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army in Korea. Walker's Eighth Army was having a tough time of it.
The men were exhausted and demoralized; units were scattered and riddled with casualties; and panic was not too far below the surface-the NKPA seemed invincible.
The brigade's potent fighting force was desperately needed to stop the North Korean advance. Craig, realizing that his men would be immediately thrown into the fight, sent a message to the 5th Marines telling them to be combat loaded and prepared to move out as soon as the ships docked.
On the evening of 2 Aug., USS George Clymer (APA-27), nicknamed Greasy George, edged into the pier, met by an impatient commander who looked in vain for signs that his men were ready for combat. Hundreds of troops lined the rails "rubbernecking," as if they didn't have a care in the world. On the dock, a South Korean band serenaded them with a tinny and slightly off-key rendition of "The Marines' Hymn."
Spotting his Chief of Staff, Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, BGen Craig shouted out, "What battalion is the advance guard?" Registering the look of surprise on the colonel's face, he shouted again, "Did you get my orders?" They had not; something had gone amiss.
Reacting calmly, the general ordered a conference for that evening to bring his key officers up to speed on the tactical situation while the ships unloaded. The intelligence officer (G-2), LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman, led off the briefing with a grim narrative of the situation, followed by LtCol Joseph L. Stewart, the operations officer, who sketched in the operations plan.
Finally, Craig summed up the meeting: "The situation is serious. We're going into battle against a vicious, well-trained enemy. The Pusan Perimeter is like a weakened dike, and we will be used to plug holes in it as they open. We're a brigade, a fire brigade!"
The Fire Brigade
At 2300 that evening, BGen Craig received orders from Eighth Army to move to Changwon to back up its 25th Division on the southwestern side of the perimeter. General unloading had begun, and the Pusan docks were a bedlam of noise and organized confusion, as the supplies and equipment for thousands of men were taken from the holds of ships and organized into supply points and vehicle parks.
Working parties struggled to unload pallets and break open crates for the long lines of Marines forming to draw ammunition, hand grenades, C-rations and medical supplies. The men worked through the night, and by 0630 the first elements were on the move.
As the troops clambered aboard the trucks, rumors were rife. Lieutenant Robert D. Bohn recalled: "The thing I remember most about arriving in Korea is being briefed by some Army people who, in retrospect, had obviously never been out of Pusan. These fat lieutenants told us all those honor stories. Although they didn't know what the hell they were talking about, they were very successful in scaring us. We all began to think the North Koreans were about ten feet tall."
The brigade arrived in Changwon late in the afternoon and immediately started digging in on the high ground along the road, preparing for its first night in combat. With the gathering darkness, a phantom army invaded the brigade perimeter and was taken under fire by the inexperienced troops.
A single rifle shot was followed by a deadly barrage of automatic-weapons fire, as apprehensive Marines blasted bushes and shrubs that, in their minds, had mysteriously turned into North Korean infiltrators. Sometime before dawn, order was restored by veteran NCOs. BGen Craig reinforced the message, making it known, in no uncertain terms, that he would not tolerate a repeat performance.
Later in the day, he and LtCol Stewart met with LtGen Walker, who briefed them on Eighth Army's plans for the first American counterattack of the war. The attacking force, designated Task Force Kean, after MajGen William B. Kean, CG of the 25th Division, was to execute a three-pronged attack to destroy North Korea's crack 6th Infantry Division, 7,500 battle-hardened veterans, supported by tanks and artillery.
The scheme of maneuver called for the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) to pass through the 27th Infantry and clear the Tosan road junction west of Chindong-ni. The Marine brigade would then jump off from the junction and attack along the road to Sachon, while 5th RCT continued to advance along the northern fork to Chinju.
The attack was scheduled to commence on 7 Aug. LtGen Walker wrapped up the briefing by stating, "No one is to fall back again to the rear. We are going to stop the enemy where he is and, if necessary, we would fight to the death." It was a rather prophetic send-off for commanders who were about to launch the first ground offensive of the war. BGen Craig noted, rather tongue in cheek, "General Walker made these points rather strongly."
Hurrying from the conference, the two Marine officers climbed aboard a VMO-6 helicopter for a quick flight to brief LtCol Murray on the operation. The pilot, Lt Gustafve F. "Gus" Lueddeke, radioed 5th Marines that Warrior Six-Craig's radio call sign-was inbound. This simple flight represented a tactical innovation-a revolution in the manner in which commanders controlled widely dispersed units-foreshadowing the development of heliborne tactics in the 1960s.
Crisis at the Crossroads
At first light on the 7th, after a short air-artillery preparation, the 5th RCT jumped off in the attack only to be stopped dead in its tracks by heavy NKPA automatic-weapons and mortar fire from Hill 342, overlooking the road junction. With casualties mounting and the attack stalled, MajGen Kean ordered Craig to assume command of all Army as well as Marine units in the Chindong-ni area.
While the brigade staff set up a command post, Craig went forward on a personal reconnaissance of the road junction. He found it jammed with vehicles and equipment, creating an irresistible target for the NKPA gunners.
LtCol Harold S. Roise's 2d Bn, 5th Marines was ordered forward to seize Hill 342 and relieve an Army battalion and a Marine platoon that was desperately clinging to the crest, under heavy pressure. The battalion ran into the same stubborn resistance that stopped the initial advance and was forced to dig in for the night.
Co D, commanded by Captain John Finn Jr., had a particularly tough time, losing eight killed and 28 wounded including the company commander and three lieutenants. Master Sergeant Harold Reeves, the company gunnery sergeant, was awarded the Silver Star for taking command of the leaderless men and holding the position until relieved the next day.
The unexpectedly heavy enemy resistance forced BGen Craig to concentrate his forces against the crossroads, employing the brigade and elements of the 5th RCT and the 27th Infantry. After 54 hours of intense infantry action, including hand-to-hand combat, the enemy started withdrawing southwest toward Kosong, after losing an estimated 600 casualties.
Captured documents revealed that U.S. forces had been opposed by elements of the 13th and 15th regiments of the NKPA's 6th Division.
Two days later, 11 Aug., Marine artillery, 1/11, flushed a North Korean motorized regiment out of cover, sending it on a frantic dash for safety. As the surviving vehicles fled out of range, carrier-based VMF-323 F4U Corsairs bombed and strafed the remnants. The "Kosong turkey shoot," as it was known, left more than 100 destroyed or abandoned jeeps, motorcycles and trucks of the NKPA 83rd Motorcycle Regiment, virtually eliminating it as an effective fighting force.
At the height of the action, MSgt Herbert Valentine, flying an OY observation plane, spotted a speeding NKPA jeep with what appeared to be a high-ranking officer in the rear seat. With the Corsairs busy shooting up the convoy, he and his observer, Lt Patrick Sivert, decided to "strafe" the jeep with their side arms, .38-caliber pistols.
After making several passes without hitting anything-and being shot at by the occupants-they made a last run. The driver took one look too many, missed a turn and drove off a cliff with the officer still sitting rigidly in the seat. There was a hot debate within the aircrews on whether to paint this "victory" on the nose of the aircraft.
The following day, as LtCol George R. Newton's 1/5 advanced toward the final objective, its lead element, 15 men of the brigade reconnaissance company, forced the NKPA to prematurely trigger an ambush. In a classic combined-arms/ infantry assault, 1/5 broke through the ambush, inflicting heavy enemy casualties. The climax of the attack occurred when Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski and a squad of infantrymen sprang their own ambush, killing an entire enemy platoon of 39 men without a single Marine casualty.
As 1/5 fought through the ambush, BGen Craig received orders to send a battalion back toward Chindong-ni where a reinforced NKPA regiment had infiltrated the perimeter, overrunning two Army artillery battalions and cutting the main road. LtCol Robert D. Taplett's 3/5 loaded aboard trucks and rushed 25 miles east to where, after a 15-minute artillery prep, Capt Joseph C. Fegan's Co H jumped off in the attack, a little more than three hours after entrucking. By the next morning, 3/5 had rectified the situation and forced the enemy to withdraw, but not before the Army artillery had to be destroyed with airstrikes.
In a week of hard fighting, the brigade had stopped the NKPA 6th Division cold, just 35 miles from Pusan-the high tide of the North Korean advance. The Marine air-ground counterattack inflicted more than 1,900 North Korean casualties, destroyed a motorized regiment's vehicles and eliminated a major threat to the perimeter.
However, the action had not been without cost, as 66 Marines were killed in action, 240 wounded and nine missing in action. Rifle companies were so depleted by casualties that a call went out for volunteers, which was answered by men from the brigade and regimental staffs, cooks, bakers and bandsmen-lending credence to the Corps' doctrine that every Marine is a rifleman.
This remarkable performance by Warrior Six and the fire brigade stabilized the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, gave the defenders a much-needed morale boost and gained time for MacArthur to plan and execute a "master stroke," the Inchon landing.
For outstanding performance, the 1 st Provisional Marine Brigade was awarded both the U.S. and Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation. Individual Marines were awarded four Navy Crosses, 12 Army Distinguished Service Crosses, 54 Silver Stars and more than 900 Purple Hearts.
Editor's note: "U.5. Marine Operations in Korea: 1950-1953, Volume 1" is an excellent source for more detailed descriptions and is available from the MCA Bookservice.
Retired Col Dick Camp is the author of "Lima-6," a story of a Marine company commander in Vietnam, and he is a frequent contributor to Leatherneck.
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