Wake Island America’s First Victory

By Arthur R Poindexter - Originally Published December 1991

The defenders of Wake Island comprised a bastard-type unit, equipped with obsolete hand-me-down weapons of World War I vintage. Yet, it was this unlikely aggregation that achieved America's first victory of the Second World War, fighting off a Japanese amphibious task force charged with the mission of seizing the island base without delay. The task force was not only repulsed but sent limping back to its bases minus some of its ships and aircraft after suffering significant personnel casualties.

Although Wake's defenders were severely outnumbered and outgunned, and eventually suffered a bitter defeat, their achievement in fighting off the first assault against such odds constituted a small victory which became a triumph of war propaganda.

It was only three days after the calamity at Pearl Harbor, which marked the beginning of U.S. participation in World War II, that the American armed forces scored this victory. It was a minor victory, to be sure, but it occurred at a time when the American public was being deluged by an avalanche of news reports that were for the most part dismal, depressing and somewhat demoralizing.

At the time of the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had launched simultaneous assaults on the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong and the Malay Peninsula, threatening the British base at Singapore and the British fleet in the Indian Ocean. There was a mood of apprehensiveness. Some pessimists expressed fears that the Hawaiian Islands or even the American mainland would be attacked next.

The small American garrison on Guam had already been compelled to capitulate after being quickly overrun by overwhelming Japanese forces. Thus, it was that a small victory at a place called Wake Island, which was unknown to most of the American public, became a significant story if only as an item to bolster the morale of a shocked and bewildered nation.

News editors needed an upbeat story and the American people were hungry for something to cheer about. Amidst the gloom and uncertainty of those anxious first days of war came a report that a small garrison of Marines had repulsed a Japanese amphibious task force, sunk several of their ships and downed some of their aircraft. It became, for the moment, a focus of media attention. Wake became one of the "ramparts we watched" during those first anxious days. As the print and radio media began to grind out rhetoric comparing the events at Wake Island to Bunker Hill or the Alamo, editorial writers, columnists, cartoonists, artists, poets, and even lyricists made the story a subject for their creative talents. A western ballad singer came up with a lyric something like this:

Wake Island, Wake Island,
It’s not even marked on the map.
Our Corps raised her name
To honor and fame.
When we stopped the advance of the Japs.

Wake is actually a coral atoll formed by a submerged volcano with only its top above the surface of the ocean. The atoll consists of three slender islets (Peale, Wilkes and Wake proper) in the configuration of a wishbone, with a coral reef which arches across the open end to enclose a shallow lagoon. Although the circumference of the atoll is almost 12 miles, the total land surface is less than 24 square miles, which is less than New York's Central Park.

Situated in the mid-Pacific approximately 1,034 miles west of Midway Island and 2,004 miles west of Hawaii, it is roughly 600 miles closer to Tokyo than to Pearl Harbor.

Owing to its location, part of the Japanese grand strategy for conquest on the Pacific called for the immediate seizure of Wake as an essential link in their defensive perimeter. Only by holding Wake could the Japanese prevent the United States from launching air attacks on their bases on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands to the south.

Capture of Wake and Guam would also block the American supply line to the Philippines. In addition, its possession would provide a base for reconnaissance and a stepping-stone for the invasion of Midway.

Although such considerations must have been apparent to U.S. military planners, the construction work to develop Wake as an advanced naval base was not undertaken until January 1941, and it was not until August of that year that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific, was authorized to provide a military garrison for the island.

The troops assigned to proceed to Wake and provide a "limited defense" of the island were a detachment from the First Defense Battalion of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. The original detachment consisted of five officers and 173 men, but in November it was reinforced, bringing its strength to 15 officers and 378 men under the command of Major J. P. S. Devereux, USMC.

Armament consisted of six 5-inch naval guns manufactured for the broadside batteries of WW I naval vessels; three batteries of 3-inch antiaircraft guns (some without essential fire-control equipment); 18 M1918 .50-caliber antiaircraft guns on pedestal mounts; and 30 M1917 .30-caliber water-cooled machine guns for beach defense. Communications gear and individual weapons and equipment of the troops were also of WW I vintage.

Those weapons were armament for an entire defense battalion with a strength of 980 officers and men, yet the detachment assigned to emplace and man these weapons had less than half that number. In addition to the critical shortage of personnel, the other glaring discrepancy was the lack of radar equipment for early detection of approaching aircraft.

On December 4, 1941, a skeleton squadron of fighter aircraft (VMF211) consisting of 10 officers and 49 men with 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighters under command of Maj Paul A. Putnam landed on Wake. There was also a small Army Air Corps communications detachment consisting of an officer and four men.

Additionally, there were small detachments of naval personnel, including Commander Winfield Scott Cunningham, USN, who had been assigned to assume command of the naval air station at such time as the station was ready to be commissioned. In the meantime, Cdr Cunningham was the senior officer present and nominally in command; however, the defense force, including the aviation element, functioned under the control of Maj Devereux.

Starting the day that the fighter squadron arrived, Maj Putnam had set dawn-to-dusk combat air patrols, consisting of four Wildcats flying at an altitude of 12,000 feet to conduct 360-degree surveillance of the ocean area surrounding Wake.

Hence, four Wildcats were airborne on the morning of December 8, 1941, at the time Maj Devereux received the report that Pearl Harbor was under attack. The major ordered the field music to sound "General Quarters" and all hands proceeded to their battle stations.

Shortly before noon, the garrison came under attack by 36 twin-engine medium bombers of the Japanese Navy's 24th Air Flotilla. The attackers came in at an altitude of only about 1,700 feet, concealed from the patrolling Wildcats by a low cloud cover. The lack of radar and the constant roar of pounding surf drowned out the sound of their engines. The bombers emerged from the cloud bank and were over the island, executing their bombing and strafing runs before the antiaircraft guns of the defenders could respond effectively.

Since Wake Island lies west of the international date line, December 7 at Pearl Harbor was December 8 at Wake.

The principal bombing and strafing targets were the Pan American Airways facilities and the airstrip which they plastered with closedpattern bombing while strafing the area viciously with 20-mm. machine guns. Seven of the eight planes on the ground were destroyed and the eighth was badly damaged.

Other damage was extensive and casualties were numerous. Several of the pilots, including Lieutenants George Graves, Frank Holden and Robert Conderman, were killed or mortally wounded while attempting to get their planes in order to take to the air. Casualties included at least 84 killed and many wounded, including Lt Henry "Spider" Webb, Captain Frank Tharin and Maj Putnam who remained ambulatory and carried on as squadron commander. So far as is known all the enemy planes returned to base, although some sustained damage from antiaircraft machine-gun fire.

In the grisly aftermath of the first strike by the enemy, tasks consisted of evacuating the wounded to aid stations, clearing away burning debris, repairing the surface of the runway and apron, constructing covered revetments to house the planes that were still operational or salvageable, and burying the dead.

On each day of the siege that followed there were more bombing raids, some involving even more enemy aircraft than were involved in that first devastating attack. Although the casualties inflicted and damage resulting from subsequent raids were severe, the enemy also sustained losses. After the first day, approaching bombers were intercepted by combat air patrols (of never more than four fighters) which attacked the flanks of the formation and each time downed one or more of the incoming bombers. The fighters would break off when the bombers were over the island and the AA batteries would begin registering an effective barrage.

Although flak was not heavy, the AA fire was accurately delivered and sent several bombers on a final descent into the sea or leaving the island as "smokers" that probably failed to return to their bases in the Marshalls. When bombers were beyond range of the AA guns, the pilots of VMF-211 harried the retreating bombers as they droned their way back to base at their 160-knot cruising speed and were able to down at least two more bombers from each day's raids. The morale of the defenders soared as they discovered that they were able to fight back effectively.

According to war diaries in the archives of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the first Wake Invasion Force sortied from its Ruotta anchorage at Kwajalein Island in the Marshalls on December 8, 1941, and arrived at a point south of Wake Island two days later.

The force consisted of the following ships of the Fourth Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy:

(a) three cruisers, the Yubari (flagship of the commander of the Wake Invasion Force, Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka, IJN), the Tatsuta and the Tenyru (Cruiser Division 18);

(b) six destroyers, the Hayate, Oite, Matsuka, Yayoi, Kisaragi, and the Mochizuki (Destroyer Divisions 29 and 30);

(c) two assault transports, APD32 and APD-33 (converted destroyers for transporting assault elements of the Special Naval Landing Force sometimes unofficially referred to as "Imperial Marines");

(d) two transports, the Kongo Maru and Konryu Maru (former merchant ships used to transport additional troops and supplies).

Also supporting the operation were two or more fleet submarines assigned to conduct offshore surveillance for amphibious reconnaissance prior to the assault landing at Wake.

Soon after midnight on December 11, the amphibious task force entered an assembly area five or six miles south of Wake at about 0100 and began debarking the landing force in choppy seas. The assault transports carefully lowered large landing craft, each capable of carrying 80 armed men to the shore. However, when the maru-type transports attempted to lower the landing craft, the boats banged dangerously against the sides of the ship rendering the debarkation of the landing force nearly impossible and extremely hazardous. Some of the landing craft capsized and swamped. When this was reported to the task force commander at 0230, H-hour was postponed until after daylight.

While this was taking place, the defenders of Wake began to observe blinking lights offshore to the south. "General Quarters" was sounded and all hands stood to at battle stations (as per Alert Condition 1), but strict blackout was maintained.

Shortly before 0500, the invasion force began its final approach to the objective on a northwesterly course with Adm Kajioka's flagship, Yubari, at the head column followed by the other two cruisers, Tatsuta and Tenyru. The six destroyers followed in two columns. The two assault transports followed the column on the starboard side of the formation while the two Marus took up positions astern of the portside column.

In the early morning light, all ships of the invasion force were visible from the island as the formation changed course and opened fire at 0522 from a range of approximately 8,000 yards. Steaming parallel to the south shore of Wake, they began their naval gunfire preparation for the landing. Initially, Camp No. 1 seemed to be the primary target, although the bombardment caused little damage. Most shells passed over the low silhouette of the island and exploded in the lagoon.

The two gun crews of Lt C. A. "Barney" Barninger's Battery A on Peacock Point at the southeast tip of Wake proper, and the gun crews of Lt John A. McAlister's Battery L at Kuku Point on the southwestern tip of Wilkes Island had the lead ships of the passing columns in their scopes and were already tracking their targets. However, all the guns on the island remained silent because Maj Devereux had issued emphatic orders to hold their fire until he personally gave the order to open fire.

The major had calmly and quite shrewdly estimated the situation and concluded that his 6-inch coastal defense guns were no match for the heavier armament of the attacking ships, either from the standpoint of effective range or in weight of metal (caliber). His best tactic was to rely on the element of surprise and to allow the enemy to conclude that the coast defense guns had been put out of action by the air raids.

After completing their first firing run, the lead vessels closed the range to 6,000 yards and executed a 180-degree change of course and commenced another firing run from the opposite direction. Still there was no response from the shore batteries as the Japanese ships steamed parallel to the southern shoreline of Wake with all the guns belching fire. Naval shells passed overhead with a hollow hissing sound followed by explosions in the lagoon to the rear.

Tension continued to mount as the bombardment continued. Some oil tanks between Camp No. 1 and the channel were hit and set ablaze. Maj Devereux remained firm in his injunction. Battery commanders, as well as the gun crews, were becoming impatient and frustrated as they awaited the order. The situation had taken on shades of Bunker Hill and "don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." Adm Kajioka and his officers may have been quite puzzled by this lack of reaction by the defenders. Perhaps they expected to see the colors flying from the water tower in Camp No. 1 hauled down and replaced by a white flag. Nevertheless, the ships of the attack force continued the bombardment of the island.

After completing the second run, the lead ship reversed course again, closed the range to approximately 4,500 yards and began the third firing run. Maj Devereux had finally achieved his objective of luring the enemy ships within effective range of his coast defense guns. Now he could inflict substantial damage to the amphibious task force. Accordingly, at 0615 on December 11, 1941, the major quite calmly issued his order to open fire.

Both batteries at the southern extremities of the atoll roared into action. Owing to the destruction of the rangefinders of both batteries as the result of bombing, range had to be estimated without reliable data. The first salvo fired by Lt Barninger's Battery A directed at the flagship Yiibari splashed into the ocean beyond the target, sending water high into the air. However, the deflection was perfect. "Barney" ordered the gun captains to reduce elevation and resume firing.

The result was that rounds of the second salvo struck the cruiser amidship ship close by the waterline. Smoke spewed from a hole in her side, as Yubari turned away from the island on a zigzag course. One of the converted destroyers maneuvered into a position between the cruiser and the shore battery and attempted to lay a smoke screen to conceal the withdrawal of Adm Kajioka's stricken flagship. This vessel was hit, seemed to change into a ball of fire and sank in a matter of seconds, apparently with no survivors. The converted destroyer (APD-32), which had a crew of 168 officers and men, was being utilized as an assault transport and also had on board approximately 225 troops of the Special Naval Landing Force.

While Battery A was engaged in its gunnery duel with Yubari and her escort, Battery L at the western tip of Wilkes Island engaged the other two cruisers, which had shifted their fires to the coastal batteries. John McAlister's crews quickly scored hits on both Tenyru and Tatsuta. Even the transport Kongo Maru, which remained a comfortable 9,000 yards from the island, suffered some hits.

At this point, the three ships of Destroyer Division 29 began steaming in column directly toward the Battery L position. Hayate was in the lead, closely followed by Oite and Matsuka. Hayate became the priority target and was hit squarely by three salvos. There was a monstrous explosion amidships and the bow and stern of the vessel seemed to separate as it disappeared below the surface, leaving a spot of foam where a ship had been just seconds before. There were apparently no survivors from its crew of 248 officers and men. Hayate became the first Japanese surface vessel to be sunk by United States forces during the war, having sunk shortly before the converted destroyer. Oite then came under fire and was also hit. However, she managed to change course and lay smoke to cover her withdrawal along with Matsuka.

While this was taking place, the ships of Destroyer Division 30, Yayoi, Kisaragi, and Mochizuki, had ranged to the west of Wilkes where the two guns of Lt Woodrow Kessler's Battery B on Peale Island could be brought to bear. Battery B quickly scored hits on the Yayoi and the Kisaragi. Both ships, however, continued to return the fire of the batteries on Wilkes and Peale Islands. Then, they, too, were soon obliged to reverse course and lay smoke to cover their retreat to the southwest.

Prior to 0700, Adm Kajioka, whose flagship Yubari had broken away from the pounding by Battery A, decided that his plan of operation for invading Wake Island had been thwarted, not only by unfavorable weather, but also by the stout and accurate firing by the shore batteries. He ordered a general withdrawal of his task force toward Kwajalein and by 0720 all of the enemy vessels had retreated beyond the effective range of Wake's shore batteries. However, the ordeal of the battered and defeated Japanese task force was not at an end.

The four F-4F Wildcats that were still in operation after the destruction wrought by enemy air raids were ready to scramble prior to dawn, but had been ordered to remain on the ground until after the coast defense batteries had answered the enemy fires. As soon as this had occurred, Maj Putnam took to the air, along with his three most experienced pilots, Capts Henry T. Elrod, Frank C. Tharin, and Herbert C. Freuler.

The first mission was to seek out and engage any enemy aircraft supporting the invasion force. But since the enemy's original plan called for a ship-to-shore movement during hours of darkness, there were no carrier aircraft on station at the time. When this had been verified by a 360-degree sweep of the area at an altitude of 12,000 feet, the pilots of VMF-211 were ready to pounce on the ships of the attack force as soon as the gunnery battle was concluded.

When the ships of the would-be invasion force had retreated beyond the range of the coastal batteries, Maj Putnam and his pilots zoomed down upon the enemy cruisers, executing "smoke stack" bombing and strafing attacks. Both ships of Cruiser Division 18 sustained damage. The torpedo battery of Tenyrii was put out of action, and part of the superstructure of Tatsuta was destroyed.

Capt Freuler attacked the transport Kongo Maru. One of his 100-pound bombs struck her stern, igniting gasoline fires that ravaged top-side equipment of the ship. After the pilots had expended all of their .50-caliber ammo and the two 100-pound bombs released from improvised racks on the belly of their planes, they would return to the island to refuel, rearm and return to the fray.

The most spectacular achievement of the air operations was the dive-bombing attack by Capt "Hammering Hank" Elrod, which dealt the fatal blow to the already damaged Kisaragi, which sank 30 miles southwest of Wake at 0731. Originally it was reported that a light cruiser had been sunk, but it was later determined that Kisaragi had been incorrectly identified.

All together, VMF-211 pilots flew a total of 10 sorties, dropped 20 100-pound bombs and fired 20,000 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. Although all of the pilots had managed to return alive, their success had not been without cost. All of the planes had sustained damage from AA fire by the ships they had attacked. Capt Elrod's plane was so badly damaged that he was obliged to make a crash landing. He was hauled out of an airplane that was damaged beyond repair. There were then only two F-4Fs still operational to oppose attacking enemy bombers.

Just before noon on December 11, Lts John F. Kinney and Carl R. Davidson were at the controls of the two Wildcat fighters that were still serviceable. They were conducting a combat air patrol when they sighted a formation of 30 shore-based bombers approaching from the northeast at 18,000 feet. They intercepted the attacking bombers and unhesitatingly tore into the formation with their machine guns spewing out a hail of .50-caliber projectiles. Davidson knocked two of the bombers out of the sky while Kinney sent another limping back to base, emitting a trail of black smoke.

The antiaircraft batteries on the atoll reacted swiftly and delivered accurate barrage fires that caused one of the bombers to plummet into the water just off Wilkes Island. In addition, they accounted for three more "smokers." Batteries D and E fired a combined total of 225 rounds which was a remarkable feat considering that each of the batteries had only three guns that were operational.

That afternoon, Lt Kinney was able to report to Maj Putnam that he and his engineering crew (consisting mainly of Technical Sergeant William J. Hamilton and Aviation Machinist Mate James F. Hesson) had three of the Wildcats patched up well enough to fly combat air patrols. This was a noteworthy accomplishment which had been achieved by salvaging and interchanging parts of wrecked F-4Fs, as well as a considerable amount of ingenuity.

Difficulty in starting the engine of the plane to be piloted by Lt David D. Kliever caused some delay before he lifted off the runway to join the other two pilots of the combat air patrol. As he was gaining altitude, he spotted a completely surfaced submarine approximately 25 miles offshore on a bearing of 225 degrees from Wake. After ascertaining that it was an enemy sub, he pushed over and dove from an altitude of 10,000 feet with his machine guns blazing. Just before pulling out of his steep dive he released both of the 100-pound bombs. When he pulled out of his dive he was so close to the surface that fragments of the exploding bomb ripped holes in the wing and tail surfaces of the Wildcat.

Although Kliever could not be sure that either of the bombs had been a direct hit, he was quite sure that both bombs had landed within a very few feet of the pressure hull. He circled to the right and watched the submarine sink below the surface. Later he and the other pilots circled overhead and observed a large oil slick.

The destruction of the enemy submarine was later, more or less, verified by the questions put to American pilots by Japanese interrogators who indicated a concern for a submarine that had been missing in the vicinity of Wake Island. However, according to some Japanese sources, the submarine with a crew of 70 officers and men was lost at sea in the vicinity of Wake Island as the result of a "collision with another Japanese vessel."

Just after dawn on the morning of December 12, two four-engine patrol bombers strafed and bombed Wake and Peale Islands without causing significant damage. Capt Tharin, who was already in the air at the time, managed to intercept and shoot down one of the huge flying boats. This definite kill occurred just after 0500 or approximately 24 hours after the invasion force had opened fire on the defenders.

A critique of the action at Wake Island on December 11-12, 1941, obviously draws attention to the Japanese losses of four warships sunk and at least six others that were damaged; four aircraft downed with three or more "possibles;" and personnel casualties estimated to be at least 850 (mostly killed or missing) and perhaps many more. (This figure does not take into account the crew of the submarine believed to have been destroyed, crews of downed aircraft or troops lost in attempting to debark and retrieve the landing force.)

These losses for the two days are compared to American casualties of only four Marines wounded in action. There was, however, considerable damage to gun positions and fuel storage tanks on the island as the result of the naval gunfire bombardment; and all of the four remaining fighter planes sustained damage from the AA fire by the ships. As a result, one plane was irreparably damaged.

Nevertheless, the lopsided box score compels even Japanese historians to acknowledge that the battle at Wake was a definite American victory. Moreover, Cdr Masatake Okumiya later wrote, "Considering the power accumulated for the invasion of Wake Island and the meager forces of the defenders, it was the most humiliating defeat the Japanese Navy had ever suffered."

The report by RAdm Marushigi Kinomori, who saw both of the cruisers under his command damaged during the action, attributes "the failure of the Wake Island invasion force" to: 1) the accuracy of Wake's coastal artillery; 2) the aggressive, courageous and skillful American fighter pilots; 3) bad weather (which caused difficulty in boating the landing force and attempting to retrieve them later) and 4) the insufficient strength of the invasion force. (Whereas the task force assigned the mission of seizing Wake in the first attempt consisted of 13 surface ships supported by submarines, the task force for the second and successful attempt on December 23 consisted of more than twice that number of surface vessels supported by submarines and carrier aircraft.)

Another naval historian noted that the action at Wake Island proved anew the truth of an old naval dictum: "Fixed ground defense guns can usually out-shoot attacking ships."

Although the battle at Wake Island was minor in scale compared to operations in the Pacific which followed, it did have a significant impact on the war in two respects. First, the defeat of an enemy task force which had been assigned a priority mission was a setback which upset the timetable for the Japanese campaign of conquest in the Pacific. It created a delay that bought time for the U.S. armed forces to prepare for the assault on Midway and thereby achieve a major American victory. Second, by providing even a small victory during a time of gloom and uncertainty, the episode served to bolster the morale of the nation and galvanize the resolve of the American people to strive for and "to achieve the inevitable triumph. . . ."

In the context of military history, the action at Wake Island on December 10-11, 1941, was not only the first American victory of World War II, but it has been accorded a number of other "firsts." It was the first time in the Second World War that: 1) an enemy surface ship was sunk by American forces; 2) an enemy vessel was sunk by American aircraft; 3) a Japanese fleet submarine was destroyed by American forces; 4) an amphibious operation was aborted (It was the only abortive amphibious operation of the war in the Pacific.); 5) a Medal of Honor was awarded to a Marine aviator (The Medal of Honor was awarded post-humously to Capt Elrod, who was cited for his gallant conduct not only as a fighter pilot, but in the ground combat in which he was mortally wounded on December 23, 1941.); and 6) a Presidential Unit Citation was awarded by personal direction of the President and the only one signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

And finally, "the Saga of Wake Island," as it has been called, provided an abundant harvest for the grist of the propaganda mill. Along with the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor," "Remember Wake Island" became one of the often repeated phrases of the war. Not only distinguished military historians such as Samuel Eliot Morison and John Toland, but numerous writers of WW II nostalgic literature have retold the Wake Island story many times, comparing it to Bunker Hill, Belleau Wood or the Alamo, and referring to the episode in such extravagant terms as "an epic of courage and heroism" or "another illustrious chapter in the proud record of the Marine Corps."

Editor’s note: LtCol Arthur A. Poindexter, the author, was a second lieutenant on Wake Island and served as commander of Maj Devereux’s mobile reserve. He has confused his article to the lesser-known first attempt by the Japanese to seize Wake. They were soundly defeated but would return in far greater numbers and on December 23, 1941, landed successfully. Wake was surrendered to the overwhelming Japanese force to prevent unnecessary bloodshed, particularly because of the large number of civilian workers on the islands.