The Wrong War

“We have fought the wrong war with the wrong strategy. Our troops are not a Peace Corps; they are fighters. Let them fight, and let the Taliban fear.”
—Bing West

Corruption. Entitlement. Ambiguity. These are only a few of the obstacles the U.S. military faces in the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Through his experience patrolling alongside soldiers and Marines, Marine combat veteran and war correspondent Bing West highlights the pitfalls and dangers posed by the current strategy in Afghanistan through combat stories and case studies in “The Wrong War.”

West’s numerous tours as a correspondent in the Middle East during the last 10 years have led him to the conclusion that the U.S. military has misused American forces and adopted an insufficient strategy in Afghanistan. What West sees in American soldiers and Marines are enthusiastic volunteers, some new to combat, others hardened from previous tours, all eager to get into the fight. Yet, transitions between political administrations and contradictory statements from military and civilian leaders have rendered these warriors powerless to take their fight to the enemy.

Instead, West argues that the risk-averse strategy of nation-building and modern counterinsurgency places these highly skilled fighters in vulnerable positions with nearly impossible rules of engagement. Within the U.S. military’s higher ranks, West finds that detached leaders continually fail to effectively analyze and understand the vast amount of intelligence gathered on the battlefield of the digital age, often leading to misconceptions about the reality of the war from the grunt’s perspective.

The author provides detailed accounts of missions in different regions of Af­ghanistan in order to display the extent to which the current Afghan strategy fails to achieve the high standards that define an American victory. In the eastern province of Konar (Kunar) on the border with Pakistan, West adeptly compares the plight of soldiers and Marines with that of King Sisyphus and his eternal task of pushing a boulder to the top of a mountain, only for it to roll back down.

West focuses on the Korengal and Waigal valleys, where soldiers and Marines operated in isolated outposts, surrounded by volatile villages with conflicting languages, loyalties and expectations. In these valleys, the United States suffered some of her highest single-day casualties.

The plan for these outposts, which was to disrupt the Taliban’s movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, ultimately failed and turned into a nightmare for American units operating with minimal popular sup­port from the villages and with too few soldiers and Marines.

Corruption within the Afghan government has further impeded progress. West recounts tales of U.S. forces who carried out their missions precisely, leading to the capture of important Taliban leaders and bomb-makers, only for those men to be released within weeks or even days due to mishandling and corruption within the Afghan justice system. The author also argues that in many villages, the cash handouts for reconstruction have created a culture of entitlement.

In the infamous Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, West details the actions of British and American forces fighting together, as well as those of Task Force Commando, a specialized unit com­bining U.S. Special Forces advisors and soldiers of the Afghan army. Through an examination of Task Force Commando’s battle for the hostile town of Marjah, West finds that this type of unit was quite successful and required fewer American troops, making it easier and cheaper to maintain. Through this example, the author provides evidence indicating how the United States could eliminate the Taliban as well as lower the cost of the war in both American lives and money.

West’s conclusion regarding the need for units similar to Task Force Comman­do as a method of improving the strategy, however, comes with a historical warning. While the training of an effective Afghan army is imperative, the United States must focus on training that army to remain effective even without the help of American firepower. U.S. advisors in Vietnam helped to create a South Vietnamese army in America’s own image, and despite its effectiveness with American support, the South Vietnamese faltered without the help of American air support and firepower after the U.S. left Vietnam.

Ultimately, Bing West’s “The Wrong War” provides tales of both bravery and tragedy while simultaneously offering convincing evidence of the multitude of problems plaguing U.S. forces in Af­ghani­stan. This book presents valuable lessons for those interested in the war in Afghani­stan as well as for those interested in the infantryman’s perspective of counterinsurgency on the ground.

THE WRONG WAR: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan.

By Bing West.

Published by Random House. 336 pages.

Stock #1400068738.

$25.20
MCA Members. $28 Regular Price.