Arab Media and the Battle for Ideas
The bad or the ugly
by Capt Peter J. Munson
A senior officer recently granted an interview to an international Arabic language news channel. After a lengthy interview conducted through a translator, the officer grew increasingly irritated with the needling questions and insinuations of the interviewer. He decided to end the interview before things really got out of control. He finished his answer to a particularly inflammatory question and then said with visible irritation, “I’m very sorry, but we’ll have to end our discussion now,” as he stood and pulled the live microphone from his uniform and left the room with the cameras rolling. What part of the interview do you think was broadcast? Do you think that his terse yet polite closing remarks were translated? Would the officer have acted the same way with an obnoxious American reporter in front of network cameras?
Several men in Syria watched the interview with disdain. As a younger member of the family started shouting insults at the television (TV), an older man counseled patience. “Let’s see what this American has to say.” The men listened to the officer’s justification of military actions and his denials of any undue force or civilian losses, but after years of living under oppressive regimes, they expected only lies from leaders. They instead looked for the body language behind these statements. Culturally, they were inclined to look beyond the face value of words to divine a person’s true intentions. When they saw the American’s anger, some may have interpreted righteous indignation, but the hotheaded youth jumped to his feet. “You see, he cannot defend himself. The impetuous Americans once again cannot defend their actions so they storm out in anger.”
Later that night, the man spoke with a religious leader in the Sunni Salafi mosque he attended near his home. The young man brought up the topic of the interview he saw earlier that day and his disgust with the “arrogant American” he saw. Sensing an opportunity, the imam brought him to a back room and sat him at a computer to browse a web site filled with pictures and details of alleged American atrocities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. The imam had been watching the young man for some time and slowly drawing him into the web of extremist violence. He felt the opportunity had come to send his prey to the next level. “You can do something about this. You can meet the call of Allah. This will never stop until righteous servants of Allah like you perform the duty of jihad. Our path is blocked without the sacrifice of shaheed, holy martyrs.” He pointed to a TV across the room. It was tuned to the al-Zawra satellite channel and was running continuous loops of Iraqi insurgent attacks against American troops.
Several months later the young man found himself chained to the steering wheel of a car loaded with explosives. Screaming “Allahu Akbar” (God is greatest) over and over again in terror, he slammed the vehicle into a U.S. military convoy. Three Marines were killed in the blast. The bomber’s handler hid nearby filming the attack. Later that evening a terrorist financier was using the video, downloaded from an insurgent web site, to entice donations from wealthy extremists in another Arab country.
While the events in this story are fictionally combined, they each have a factual basis. The bottom line is that we are engaged in a global struggle, and the enemy is often successful at manipulating the information battlefield to his advantage. Officers must come to a better understanding of the various Arab media outlets and their inherent biases. Viewing the professional foreign media outlets as battlefields rather than adversaries is the first step in reclaiming the initiative in the battle of ideas and reducing our vulnerability to enemy information operations. It is better that we give battle on bad terrain, rather than cede the battlefield to the ugly.
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| The Arabic media is a part of the information battlefield in the battle of ideas. (Photo by LCpl Timothy T. Parish.) |
Several large international satellite channels dominate the Arab broadcast news media. The most prominent of these channels is the infamous al-Jazeera. While al-Jazeera and, to a lesser extent, the other news channels are demonized as mouthpieces of extremism, a closer look at the regional media situation points to the possibility that these channels are actually the most balanced outlets available in the region. They may be much better than the quickly proliferating party- and sectarian-affiliated channels and web sites. Furthermore, the media market that has been opened by the proliferation of satellite dishes and Internet connections may be the best means for moderating the Arab media and demanding greater accountability on the part of Arab governments.
The major Arab news channels are very similar in format to what we are used to in the West. Channels like al-Jazeera (broadcast from Doha, Qatar) and al-Arabiya (broadcast from Dubai, United Arab Emirates) run 24-hour news coverage, interspersed with debate, call-in shows, and polished documentaries. These channels are ready to break to live coverage at a moment’s notice, a critical factor in keeping the attention of their target audience. Arabs are generally much more attuned to the news than the average American because they live in a much more volatile climate. Instant news coverage warns them of the ill winds that may soon be blowing their way. Resultantly, early coalition efforts in Iraq to run a domestic TV channel failed due to the station’s inability to compete with the allure of the other regional products and, specifically, their instant news coverage that the Iraqi channel simply could not provide.1
These major Arab channels are not particularly extremist in their own news coverage, but in their commentary and debate segments they do provide a venue for some highly vitriolic characters. Additionally, they are much more willing to broadcast scenes of violence and bloodshed than any channels in the West, but this owes as much to differing cultural norms as it does to any political program. Furthermore, the different camps hold a different view of reality. For example, even Americans hold differing opinions on the biases of FOX News and Cable News Network (CNN). From a Western perspective, Arab channels appear highly biased, yet from an Arab point of view the networks are relatively balanced. The simple fact that they provide an alternative to state-run media is a major factor in their allure.
These satellite channels, along with the Internet, have broken Arab regimes’ monopoly on the press and have greatly weakened their control on the information flowing to their citizens. Al-Jazeera has played a prominent role in pushing the limits of freedom of the press across the Middle East. Due to their probing reporting on governmental and human rights issues, al-Jazeera representatives have been expelled from several Arab countries. Most recently, a reporter working on a human rights documentary in Egypt was arrested and her tapes confiscated. In another development in Egypt, a video of police brutality was posted to an Egyptian web log, bringing attention to the ongoing problems there.2 Satellite channels and Internet sites will have an increasingly prominent role in uncovering corruption, brutality, and incompetence in regional governments, forcing greater accountability for their actions. Regional news outlets are still growing into this role.
Al-Jazeera’s attempts to sell sensational news have backfired to some extent. Many moderate viewers in the region, sick of constant scenes of calamity and endless tirades of guest speakers, have tuned to alternative channels. Unfortunately, for those inclined to a more extreme point of view, there are much more immoderate sources available. Technology has enabled many groups to create video-filled web sites and even satellite TV channels. The al-Manar channel is the mouthpiece of the Lebanese Shi’a Hezbollah (Party of God) and played a prominent and frustrating role in the brief war with Israel in summer 2006, encouraging resistance and denouncing Israeli attacks and alleged atrocities while flaunting Israel’s inability to shut down their operations. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a powerful party in the Shi’a-dominated ruling coalition, also has its own network, al-Forat (Euphrates), that broadcasts sectarian-themed programming. A more virulent Iraqi channel is al-Zawra, which has become the voice of many insurgent groups, reportedly financed by a former Sunni member of the Iraqi National Assembly who stands accused of embezzling millions of dollars in U.S. funds meant for a security project. The station has some news-type broadcasts where announcers condemn the coalition and the Iraqi Government, but it more frequently runs graphic video loops of insurgent attacks on U.S. forces.3
The proliferation of local, sectarian, and party-affiliated channels has provided a venue for extremist propaganda and inflammatory programming. Channels like al-Jazeera seem tame by comparison. The mainstream Arab media has major advantages over the local programming in that it appeals to a wider audience, has much larger operating budgets, and carries much more legitimacy as a credible news source. Despite the apparent bias to Western eyes, we must recognize that the mainstream Arabic channels are much more balanced than the many alternatives found on the satellites and over the Internet. Viewer fatigue with al-Jazeera’s negative broadcasting, and an attempt to improve its reputation in the West in order to burnish the image of its newly launched English language channel, may serve to moderate the network’s message, making it a stronger voice for balanced reform and stability in the region. Additionally, the existence of several credible competitors for the Arab viewers will force programming directors to create a product that is attractive to the widest audience possible. This will drive programming toward what is agreeable for the median viewer, moderating some of the rhetoric found on the airwaves today.
Arabic Media Web Sites Several Arabic news outlets offer English language pages. A look at Arabic pages can give officers a feel for the layout and content of other news sources through the pictures alone. Al-Arabiya Satellite TV Network, Arabic Service Al-Jazeera Satellite TV Network, Arabic and English Service Al-Forat Satellite TV Network, Arabic Service Al-Manar Satellite TV Network, Arabic Service |
Military leaders contemplating the battle of ideas in the Middle East should look at mainstream Arab media outlets not as adversaries but as battlefields. Just as the physical terrain of a battlefield can favor one force over another, foreign media rarely favor American forces operating in controversial missions abroad. Yet, just as we are often forced to find a way to succeed on less than favorable terrain, we must recognize the obstacles and biases in the foreign media and tailor our fight to them rather than considering the media a hostile force or a thing to be avoided altogether. It is better for an American point of view to be covered with editorial bias than for an enemy spokesman to speak without rebuttal because we refused to show up on the battlefield. Furthermore, the battle for hearts and minds in the Middle East will not be affected by CNN and FOX News, but the regional battle for financial, material, and personnel support will be heavily affected by regional coverage.
Military officials preparing for an interview with a foreign media outlet should consider the interview as an opportunity to provide an American counterpoint to enemy disinformation available elsewhere, rather than a distasteful encounter with an enemy correspondent. At the same time, officials should not expect kindness in the editing of their remarks, so it is critical that they avoid displaying undue emotions or cutting short an interview in frustration. Officers with a sound understanding of the target audience’s culture and point of view will likely provide the best commentary to counter enemy information operations and avoid inadvertently inflaming passions. Finally, an officer must realize that his comments will be translated, so speaking clearly and without heavy use of idioms will result in the most faithful translation of both words and the underlying meanings.
At the bottom line, Americans often have a hard time understanding why their generally good intentions are treated so roughly around the world. The truth is that not everyone sees the world through the same glasses as we do, and often we disregard divergent viewpoints as unimportant or unduly biased. In the current struggle it is imperative that we improve our attempts to express our good intentions to the citizens of Iraq and the Middle East and to understand how our words and actions are viewed.
Notes
1. Chandrasekaran, Rajiv, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2006, pp. 130–131.
2. Staff writer, “Egypt: Not Too Happy,” Economist, 20 January 2007, p. 57.
3. Santora, Marc and Damien Cave, “Banned Station Beams Voice of Iraqi Insurgency,” New York Times, 21 January 2007, Section 1, p. 8.
>Capt Munson is a Middle East/North Africa foreign area officer and a KC–130 aircraft commander with operational experience in the Middle East. He graduated from the Defense Language Institute’s Arabic Language Course in April.
