Marine Advisors
Can the Marine Corps better prepare them
by Capt Brian G. Cillessen
The insurgents held the high ground on three sides, pinning the unit and preventing withdrawal. The platoon sergeant realized it was time to fight and lead his men. He ran through a hailstorm of incoming enemy rocket propelled grenades and machinegun fire and boldly directed Mac’s machinegun. The enemy’s fire intensified, so he guided the grenadier and systematically helped destroy the remaining enemy positions. His actions bolstered the confidence of the unit, but he was struck down. He saved the lives of over 40 soldiers, the actions of a hero. Yet he was not awarded for gallantry or recorded in the annals of history. He was only remembered and revered by his Marine advisors, SSgt Cooper and SSgt McMillan, as the bravest man they ever knew. As an Afghani soldier, Abdullah displayed leadership qualities equal to that of history’s finest warriors.1
Since 11 September 2001, the Marine Corps’ commitment to fighting terrorism has extended beyond conventional warfare. In the spring of 2002, Marines deployed as advisors to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The Marines brought relief to U.S. special forces who were converting Northern Alliance militia forces to regular army units as part of the foreign internal defense (FID) effort2 through which the United States sought to establish a stable Afghani Government. In the summer of 2004 the advisory mission expanded beyond Afghanistan to Iraq to train and advise Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Marine Corps’ advisory role has increased along with the importance of the advisory mission. The mission is an economy of force—a small advisory force with modest resources that makes a tremendous impact. Yet, the Marine Corps has not maximized the potential of the advisory teams because they have not established a comprehensive training curriculum that screens and educates the Marine advisors. The Marine Corps must identify the associated mission essential tasks (METs) and appropriately screen Marines for required skill sets before assignment in order to establish a comprehensive training curriculum.
Background
The advisory mission for the Marine Corps is not new but rather an
old mission revisited. In 1919 in Haiti, LtGen Lewis B. “Chesty”
Puller’s first combat experience was as a Marine noncommissioned
officer (NCO) assigned to the Gendarmerie (Haitian constabulary) force
as a Gendarmerie lieutenant. He was charged with leading and developing
the constabulary force in order to protect U.S. interests by conducting
counterinsurgency operations. Later, as commander for the Guardia
in Nicaragua from 1928 to 1930, Puller earned a reputation as a small
unit tactician.3 In 1954 LtCol Victor
J. Croizat became the first Marine advisor to Vietnam, and in 1955
he was the senior U.S. advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).4
During the 1972 Easter offensive, Col John W. Ripley, a Co-Van5
advisor to the 3d Battalion, VNMC, distinguished himself and his Vietnamese
comrades by preventing the North Vietnamese Army from executing a
brutal and unimpeded attack at the bridge of Dong Ha.6
In fact, over the past decade the Marine Corps has continually deployed
Marines to South America and Western Europe to advise and train foreign
militaries.
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| An Iraqi soldier briefs a Marine advisor on their upcoming patrol route in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. (Photo by Sgt Ryan S. Scranton.) |
The establishment of legitimate foreign military forces is imperative when trying to promote stable foreign governments. Military advisors in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have been vital to U.S. national security and to the eventual transition from U.S. to Afghani and Iraqi forces. Since May 2002 the Marine Corps has provided approximately 9 Marine detachments (MarDets) consisting of 14- to 17-man advisor teams to train and operate with the ANA. Several teams consisting of 8 to 10 Marines each have also been assigned to advise ISF.7 These figures do not include the dozens of Marine advisors assigned to border training teams and the Iraqi National Police or who were temporarily assigned at the tactical level.
METs for Advisors
Few of the Marine advisors deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq recognized
the complexities of their mission. As a rule, a team of advisors has
to be proficient in planning, coordinating, and executing training
and combat operations. However, for the MarDets, the METs spanned
the spectrum of conflict. The Marine advisors in Afghanistan conducted
security patrols, border control points, raids, ambushes, cordons
and searches, and medical and civil action programs alongside the
ANA. For the ISF, Marines fought side by side with Iraqis in places
like Fallujah, Ramadi, and Baghdad. Today, Marine advisors accompany
their counterparts on all but the most basic missions, depending on
the level of experience of the host-nation (HN) forces. As Iraqi advisors
in Fallajuh, Marine Capts Brian Mulvihill and Michael Del Palazzo
had to be competent in the fundamentals of the offense, which included
establishing a support by fire, submitting a fire support plan, and
coordinating or communicating with adjacent coalition units.8
Consequently, Marines (individually and collectively) must be proficient in basic and advanced infantry skills like first aid (combat lifesaver), patrolling, cordon and search, convoy, radio communications (including satellite), crew-served weapons employment, threat (foreign) weapons operation and employment, offensive/defensive operations, orders preparation, and command operation center functions. Marines must be able to teach and instruct individual and collective training standards, as required of staff NCOs (SNCOs) and company grade officers. However, proficiency in a specific skill set does not necessarily equate to proficiency as an advisor; a modern-day Marine advisor must be able to teach and advise a fledgling HN force. In addition, METs should include tactics, techniques, and procedures for advising a foreign military as well as cultural preparation, including a basic understanding of the region-specific language.
The Right Marine for the Job
Commands must screen all Marines being considered for assignment to
an advisory team based on skills and personality traits. The Special
Forces Advisor Reference Book provides a list of requisite skills
that includes professional competency, interpersonal skills, instruction,
observation, and leadership.9
Professional competency. An advisor needs to have a strong background in infantry skills and confidence in infantry tactics, techniques, and procedures. An advisor may have less combat experience than his HN counterpart or may need to advise a soldier who is senior to him by several pay grades. In the ANA, for instance, the senior battalions have seasoned veterans who were either mujahideen10 fighters during the Soviet invasion or were trained as part of the Communist forces. For example, Capt Jalalladin, an ANA company commander, had experienced many battles as a young mujahideen fighter against the Soviet Union when they invaded his country. Later he fought as a militia commander for the Northern Alliance as part of the U.S. invasion in 2001.11 Regardless of Afghani soldiers’ combat experience, they are part of an unsophisticated military force that requires technical and tactical guidance in order to operate as a professional unit. However, each HN situation presents its own unique set of technical challenges. OEF and OIF advisors needed expertise in the employment and operation of both U.S.-style and Soviet-style foreign weapons, communications, operational planning, training management, and leadership. The abundance of expertise was exemplified in Vietnam; Marines often had to prove themselves in combat before being widely accepted as Co-Vans. By displaying professional competence, Marine advisors earned the trust and confidence of the HN unit, which ultimately translated to confidence in the unit’s soldiers to conduct increasingly complicated missions.
Interpersonal skills. An advisor is an unofficial diplomat (at the tactical level), and it is essential that he relate to the HN soldiers professionally, personally, and culturally. Because U.S. Marines represent a warrior ethos that is widely known and accepted, HN soldiers are eager to foster professional relationships with the Marine advisors. Moreover, HN soldiers in Afghanistan were motivated to meet professional standards because they did not want to disappoint their advisors. The Afghani soldiers worked very hard, even if their performance did not always equate to U.S. military standards.
Indeed, building intercultural understanding is a critical byproduct. Due to the social and cultural divisions between Americans and foreign soldiers, it is vital to bridge cultural gaps. The Marine advisors should always treat the soldiers with respect and dignity, even during the most challenging or trying moments; respect and dignity do not preclude the need for firmness or discipline. Exercising patience and maintaining composure are essential. The HN soldiers may have a different work ethic, and they often fall short of Marine standards because of cultural differences not abilities. If an advisor loses his temper or composure, a bad situation will get worse. In order to breach the cultural divide, Capt Patrick Faye, an ANA advisor in 2004, related that he “drank thousands of gallons of tea and ate entirely too much goat” in the process of establishing rapport with the Afghani soldiers. Faye further stated, “There were many times when I would be checking [sic] the lines and the soldiers would want to sit and have tea. Even if I didn’t understand a word they were speaking, I always obliged.”12 He continually checked the soldiers and watched out for their welfare. His concern for “his men” did not go unnoticed, and the mutual respect between him and his soldiers proved to be an asset when dealing with the civilian population as well. The Marine advisor supported the ANA commander on most missions and often found himself in the middle of shura (informal)13 or jirga (formal)14 meetings with village elders or local government officials. The mutual support of the advisor and his ANA counterpart provided confidence for the local population and added to the legitimacy of the HN military.
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| An advisor inspects a weapon owned by an Iraqi citizen. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.) |
Instruction. “Every [noncommissioned officer], staff NCO and [commissioned] officer knows that to lead [he] must be able to instruct. . . ,”15 said Maj Andrew Millburn, a coordinator for the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC)16 in Quantico. However, an advisor must be armed with multiple methods of instruction and should have a wealth of instructional experience in his field.
The Socratic method of instruction17 is preferred if the situation allows enough time to develop the advisee. An advisor remains in the shadows and provides limited guidance to the HN commander in order to drive him to make the proper decision. This method serves the purpose of promoting the HN commander’s confidence without detracting from his leadership and command presence.
Instruction goes well beyond tactical and technical skills. As an advisor, it is imperative to develop the leadership skills of the HN forces as well. Marines must continue this practice in their advisory role albeit with sensitivity to cultural differences about leadership. Because of their lack of experience, the Afghans or Iraqis may require specific directions and guidance. For example, SSgt Tim Cooper, an ANA advisor from 2004 to 2005 stated:
If you asked them (ANA) what they want to do, you would never get the answer you were looking for, but if you told them what had to be done and asked how they would like to accomplish the instruction, you would get far better results.18
Leadership. The Marine advisor should be more
than a liaison between coalition units; he should be an example of
solid leadership throughout his assignment. The advisor is in the
spotlight much like an officer or SNCO; the HN soldiers will respond
more to what the advisor does than to what he says. However, in most
situations, leadership is often very subtle. The Marine advisor must
possess a moral compass for both the small Marine team he is operating
with and for his HN counterpart. Due to the language barriers, leadership
for the advisor is often less verbal and more visual, so setting the
example and maintaining integrity is imperative. For instance, making
the extra effort to check the lines in the middle of the night provides
a powerful leadership example for the HN leaders and soldiers alike.
The role of the leader is relative to interpersonal relationships
and culture.
In addition, true leader-advisors are prepared to make tactical decisions
on a regular basis because they may be the only link between other
coalition forces and their HN units. Moreover, they often have a better
understanding of the tactical scenario. Therefore, they are forced
to task HN commanders one moment, then change hats and advise them
how to accomplish the task the next. For example, during Operation
PHANTOM FURY in Fallujah,
Capt Brian Mulvihill was the senior advisor for an Iraqi battalion
conducting combat operations in the city. During the operation his
battalion was tasked to clear a mosque that was occupied by insurgent
fighters. The Iraqis did not have the confidence to clear the mosque
and were unwilling to continue the fight due to the sights and sounds
of the battlefield. Mulvihill was forced to lead from the front and
take command of the unit as a leader should. His unit ultimately accomplished
the mission, and his actions bolstered the confidence of the Iraqi
troops he was advising and leading. It is equally important that the
advisor understands the capabilities and limitations of his force
relative to the mission, ensures that his forces are not being employed
inappropriately, and provides sound tactical leadership advice.
Observation. Marine advisors conducting combat missions must be able to maintain situational awareness as it relates to the HN soldiers, the mission, and the joint and combined tactical operation. HN soldiers, speaking in their own language, understand the nuances of the culture and often produce more significant intelligence/information than the U.S. forces. However, advisors must be prepared to vet and disseminate collected information by asking the proper questions and by conducting thorough debriefs with their counterparts. This may require the advisor to monitor an information/network tracking system or significant events log. For instance, during a raid in the winter of 2004, the ANA soldiers had difficulty recovering antiaircraft missiles. Marine advisors had to interject or the mission was going to fail. Marines consolidated all pertinent information from each subordinate ANA soldier and were able to facilitate the mission success. Tactical information generally has immediate consequences, so Marine advisors must have the wherewithal to capitalize on the situation. The link for determining what information is relevant to the overall tactical picture is often the Marine advisor.
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| A Marine advisor and an Iraqi soldier prepare to conduct a home search in Saqlawiyah, Iraq. (Photo by Cpl Mike Escobar.) |
Overall. When Col J.W. Dorsey, head of the 55 American Marine advisors in Vietnam during the Easter offensive in 1972, was asked what skills make a good Marine advisor, he simply replied, “The same thing that makes a good Marine: willingness to serve, and if necessary, endure hardships.”19 However, the role of the current Marine advisor is more fluid. The majority of Marine advisors are providing guidance, leadership, and support for infantry type tactics, weapons employment, and civil and security operations. Conversely, some infantry-centric Marines have been challenged as advisors because they have been tasked to widen their scope of responsibility—to manage thousands of dollars of operating funds, to execute pay call for hundreds of soldiers, to work with local contractors for food and supplies, and to ensure facilities maintenance. Consequently, potential Marine advisors must be screened not only for professional competence, interpersonal aptitude, observation, and leadership, but also for maturity, common sense, and problem-solving skills.20
Advisor Training Program
Current training. Currently, SCETC hosts 1 month of training
(up from 2 weeks) prior to the advisors deploying. The current training
venue consists of individual skills for shooting, moving, and communicating
and incorporates first aid, force protection, antiterrorism measures,
convoy operations, language, and culture. On occasion, the class will
obtain a historical or operational perspective from a former advisor
or guest lecturer. However, little opportunity exists to benefit from
the firsthand experiences of former advisors because of the hasty
redeployment of the advisor teams back to their parent units. Also,
SCETC has no command authority over other supporting institutions
and cannot task instructors to volunteer in support of SCETC training,
thus creating other shortfalls in the curriculum.
The training package has not been formalized because of a lack of resident, assigned, or dedicated subject matter experts. In fact, training standards are inconsistent and consume the scarce predeployment time the MarDets have to prepare. Moreover, most of the instruction is at the introductory level with no time for sustainment or remediation. Quantico offers few available training ranges because of the competition from the resident schools on base. Couple this training resource with a lack of subject matter experts and a small SCETC staff and each advisory training evolution is a challenge. In true Marine fashion, however, SCETC and the advisor teams have done a tremendous job with few resources available.
Proposed training. The point, however, is that the training and preparation for a unique job like combat advising needs to be more comprehensive. Potential advisors need to complete a supervised and structured program that encompasses three levels of training in addition to supplemental formal schools. Core skills for the advisor should consist of Level I and Level II training; advanced advisory skills should consist of Level III and supplemental formal school training. Level I (core) should focus on enhancing and sustaining the technical skills required of Marine SNCOs and company grade officers. Level II (core advisory skills) should develop specific instructional, mentoring, tactical, and operational skills. Level III (advanced advisory skills) should concentrate on region-specific cultural and language skills as well as professional military education, leadership, logistics, and training management. Supplemental training should also include limited attendance at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg, NC, focusing primarily on FID.
Recommended supplemental training. The USAJFKSWCS implements training for FID and has produced publications, such as the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Special Forces Advisor’s Reference Book, and Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. All, or a portion, of the advisor MarDet should be required to attend formalized instruction (advisory mission) by U.S. special forces. The formal instruction may be accomplished by attending a portion of the school or by requesting a mobile training team. Formal instructions from subject matter experts will broaden the Marine advisor’s perspective and complement the advisor cadre for the near future. The training should also include role-playing, advisory panels, counterinsurgency operations, and instructional methodology. The value of a formal education cannot be understated as the Marine Corps embraces the advisory mission.
Conclusion
Marine advisors will continue to make a substantial contribution to
the development of the Afghani and Iraqi militaries, which will further
contribute to enhancing the stability of the Afghanistan and Iraq
Governments. At a recent conference,21
Co-Van advisors readily admitted that the Marine Corps advisory mission
in Vietnam took several years to develop. When LtCol Croizat became
the first Marine advisor to the VNMC, the units were in their infancy,22
much like the ANA and ISF are today. The Marines spent 13 years developing
their advisory tactics, techniques, and procedures. Therefore, expectations
for a comprehensive training program as outlined in this article are
not likely to occur immediately. However, the advisory mission is
essential to current operations and will eventually bolster the future
transition from U.S.-led military operations to the respective HN
forces.
Though Marines have had exceptional results as advisors for the ANA and ISF, the Marine Corps needs to recognize the complexities of the mission. To mitigate the lack of time and resources to train an advisor core, only the most qualified Marines should be assigned to the mission. The advisory mission will soon become the main effort of U.S. operations in both theaters. Marines will continue to be subject to a plethora of unconventional tasks in an environment in which they are expected to display leadership, initiative, and expertise. Marine advisors will undeniably continue to adapt to the fluid nature of their mission. However, in the short term the Marine Corps should allocate more time and resources to teach advanced advisory skills to Marines who are better suited for the advisory role. Then, as the advisor core develops, more sufficient time and resources need to be employed to promote a comprehensive training program for all prospective Marines. Screening and training of Marine advisors will enhance immediate results and increase the success of the ANA and ISF.
Notes
1. This vignette is a personal experience of the author who was an embedded trainer and advisor for the ANA from 1 September 2004 to 7 March 2005.
2. FID is defined in Field Manual 20–3, Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces, as “participation by civilian or military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free their society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.”
3. Hoffman, LtCol Jon T., USMCR(Ret), Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC, Random House, New York, 2001, Chapters 1–3.
4. Miller, John Grider, The Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000.
5. Co-Van is Vietnamese meaning trusted friend. The Marines who advised the VNMC earned their respect. “‘They were,’ noted Vietnamese Marine Commandant, LtGen Le Nguyen Khang, ‘our friends . . . the U.S. Marines do not make any distinction between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Vietnamese Marines,’” Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969, Chapter 18, “The Advisory Effort and Other Activities,” History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1988.
6. Miller, John Grider, The Bridge at Dong Ha, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989.
7. Co-Van reunion, LtGen Jan Huly, unclassifed brief, November 2005. Nearly 500 Marines have advised or trained since the onset of OEF and OIF.
8. Mulvihill, Capt Brian and Capt Michael Del Palazzo, personal interview, 9 November 2005.
9. Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Special Forces Advisor Reference Book, Research Planning Inc., October 2001.
10. Mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 1980s were referred to as “freedom fighters” and often referenced favorably as defending the principles of independence and freedom. The Arabic word, which may also be transliterated as mujahidin, mujahedeen, mujahedin, mujahidin, mujaheddin, etc., is a plural form of mujahid, which literally means “struggler,” someone who engages in jihad, or “struggle” but is often translated as “holy warrior.” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen#Afghan_Mujahideen.
11. Jallaladin, Capt, ANA, interviews with author, September 2004 to March 2005.
12. Faye, Capt Patrick, interview with author, 15 October 2005.
13. Shura is an informal meeting between parties to discuss current, past, or future issues.
14. Jirga is a more formal mechanism for resolution and decisionmaking in terms of policy.
15. Chenelly, Joseph R, “Marine Foreign Advisors,” Leatherneck, August 2004, p. 43.
16. SCETC is an organization at Marine Corps Base Quantico that is primarily responsible for the training and coordination of Marine advisors deploying overseas.
17. Simply put, Socratic instruction entails directed questioning and limited lecturing without declaring the answer or solution outright.
18. Cooper, SSgt Tim, personal interview, 27 February 2005.
19. Davidson, James A., “The Advisors,”
Leatherneck, March 1973, p. 18.
20. Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, Special Forces
Advisor Reference Book.
21. Co-Van luncheon, November 2005.
22. Miller, The Co-Vans: U.S. Marine Advisors in Vietnam.
>Capt Cillessen wrote this article as part of the Contemporary Issues Program at Expeditionary Warfare School in 2006.
