The Restructuring of the MLG

As the analysis of the Commandant’s force structure review results began in March 2011, the planners who developed the “organized as we fight” Marine logistics group (MLG) knew they had a steep burden to overcome. Reconciling a poised-to-deploy MLG in support of a crisis response MAGTF while adequately maintaining the high level of logistics support provided by our functionally aligned supply, maintenance, and engineer support battalions (ESBs) is a tall order to fill. The restructured MLG will separate much of the structure within those battalions to invest in a force generation capacity that acknowledges our known foundational commitments and builds a core capability in support of the crisis response “middleweight fighter.”
   
To understand the reasoning behind the restructured MLG one shouldn’t look any further than the Commandant’s “Roles of the Marine Corps” statement published within his planning guidance at his assumption of command. Although his Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) was guided by a slew of references, including Navy and Marine Corps operating concepts, guest speakers, and future strategy and vision documents, Gen James F. Amos’ vision of a Marine Corps “forward-deployed and forward-engaged” that will “respond to today’s crisis with today’s force . . . TODAY” and maintain an innate ability to “operate throughout the spectrum of threats” acted as the sounding board against which the restructured MLG would be measured. As one of the most significant initiatives the FSRG would recommend establishing the Marine Corps as a middleweight fighter, restructuring the MLG was not intuitive when the FSRG charter was drafted; however, by its conclusion it would become one of the centerpieces to defining its success.
   
Dedicated to its “first to fight” philosophy, the Marine Corps rapidly influences an area of operations with a credible and sustainable force that gains time for our national leaders to leverage the entirety of the national security apparatus. Linked to our naval character, that philosophy will manifest itself in the establishment of several MEB command elements (CEs). Forward engaged to immediately respond to a pending crisis or pierside to strengthen our amphibious roots, the MEB CEs will be supported by a logistics combat element (LCE) ready to deploy in support of the amphibious or maritime prepositioning force (MPF) crisis response MAGTF.
   
The Commandant, through his FSRG, placed a demanding requirement on the MLG. The intuitive need to organize as we fight is not easily realized. However, several months of deliberation led FSRG planners to conclude that today’s MLG, employed as a highly task-organized force, is not optimized to support the Commandant’s middleweight fighter vision. Rather, the MLG would be required to commit known structure to known force generation requirements. In steady state foundational activities that commitment is realized in permanently structured MEU combat logistics battalions (CLBs). At just under 300 Marines and sailors, each MEU will have a dedicated logistics element at its disposal. As a crisis response force, the middleweight MEB will drive the MLG to invest in its direct support relationship with the Marine division. At an end strength of just under 600, each infantry regiment will be directly supported by a CLB structured for the demands of the distributed battlespace. In general support to the MAGTF, our large supply and maintenance battalions will be shaped to create agile, multifunctional, and poised-to-deploy MEB-level general support CLBs. Recognizing the enabling capacity the Navy brings to the MAGTF, medical and dental battalions will be structured as independent commands under the MLG headquarters. And finally, remaining an independent command, the ESB will divest structure to conduct expeditionary engineering in general support to the MEU and direct support to the Marine division. Focused on the major theater operation and task-organized for lesser intensity conflict, the MLG’s current organizational construct is replaced by one that organizes for crisis response while maintaining the ability to engage through the range of military operations (ROMO) by aggregating and disaggregating of the force. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. 1st MLG model for the FSRG MLG. The restructured MLG invests in its direct support relationship with the Marine division, establishes permanent MEU CLBs, and restructures its supply and maintenance battalions into ready-to-deploy general support CLBs.
   
Although moving away from highly task-organized employment, the restructured MLG does not disregard task-organization based on sound mission analysis. Rather, it recognizes the requirement for a core structure, with core mission essential tasks that build relationships between commanders and staffs and maintains adequate structure to meet its demands in direct support of the Marine division and general support to the MAGTF. Engaging across the ROMO will require direct and general support CLBs to disaggregate at times into smaller elements supporting battalion- or company-sized MAGTFs or aggregate together providing the unity of effort required for larger scale logistics operations. Structurally, the FSRG aimed at the middleweight; however, the MLG will remain heavily influenced by mission requirements and sound logistics planning.
   
The tables of organization and equipment that provide the substance to the post-Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) MLG are highly influenced by the lessons learned from a decade of expeditionary operations and the anticipatory demands that may be leveraged against an LCE supporting the austere and distributed MAGTF. This is not an OEF LCE. Instead, it recognizes the combat enablers developed over years of conflict and shapes those enablers to meet our future demands. Investments in transportation, distribution, general engineering, and logistics command and control were paid for with reductions to logistics services, supply, and others that in most cases are mitigated with an operational Marine Reserve force organized as an integral component to any MAGTF force generation plan. Capturing the extent of the MLG restructuring by merely referring to an organization chart would be a disservice to the effort. The organized as we fight MLG resulted from a comprehensive review of its structure, down to the individual lance corporal and equipment item. Over 600 changes were recommended from the initial staffing to the Operating Forces and occupational field advocates. Investments in intelligence, command and control, and the administrative capacity of the forward deployed regimental and battalion headquarters are among the most significant and substantive improvements made through the Operating Forces analysis.
 
One of the more challenging aspects of the restructured MLG is the mirroring of the force. To better manage the force and accurately program for future requirements, the Total Force Structure Division (TFSD), within Combat Development and Integration (CD&I) Division, promotes mirroring of like units with like missions. The most notable mirroring initiative recently affecting the logistics community occurred within the Marine wing support squadrons, migrating from unique fixed-wing and rotary-wing units to common, interoperable organizations. Through mirroring, approved structural revisions to one CLB will be applied to all, forcing the logistics community to leverage its advocacy process and the Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics (DC I&L) annual logistics board in addressing its future capabilities. With the obvious benefits that mirroring provides to the management and programming of the force, there are just as obvious weaknesses that will challenge the MLGs as the FSRG is implemented.
    
The shortcomings of mirroring should be intuitive to the Operating Forces. A balanced and mirrored LCE supporting an imbalanced force in garrison has significant implications to the level and quality of logistics support to its customers within the MEF. The usual example logisticians have at the ready is the imbalance of light armored reconnaissance battalions between the east and west coast MEFs. In developing the mirrored force, the FSRG planners recognized that the organized as we fight MLG will contrast with the efficiencies of the functionally aligned structure and current force laydown. For every question the FSRG answers regarding the generation of the force, another is asked regarding its concept of operations while in garrison. It’s an imperfect structure that will require continual shaping as concepts of support materialize, concepts of operations develop, and emerging technologies mature. The known and unknown implications of mirroring will be one of the first issues the MLGs will most likely address through their occupational field advocates. It should come as no surprise that the Commandant’s vision would have direct structural implications on the MLG. Subsequently it should come as no surprise to the planners who continue to define the middleweight force that the MLGs, led by the DC I&L advocacy process, will continue to refine the force.
   
The restructured MLG is one of the most significant efforts to emerge from the FSRG. The extent of shaping the tables of organization and equipment into a new force, the investment in the MEU as the foundation of the forward deployed amphibious MAGTF, the realignment of structure to reinforce the direct support relationship with the Marine division, and the departure from the functional supply and maintenance battalions in favor of ready-to-deploy MEB general support CLBs is significant. There’s much work to be done, but the restructured MLG is a critical component to realizing the Commandant’s middleweight fighter vision.