An Opinion on Distributed Operations

by Demetrius F Maxey - published April 2005

Recently, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) examined how forward deployed forces could be improved to fulfill:

. . . the critical capability gaps of the combatant commanders, particularly gaps in timely, actionable intelligence and the ability to apply tailored combat power immediately, including special operations.1

What emerged from this examination was the conclusion that "[d]istributed operations [DO] will provide a set of new capabilities . . ."2 to the forward deployed Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander. As our Corps goes forward with this experiment, there are several fundamental improvements in training, personnel staffing, and resource allocation that must occur to set a strong foundation upon which to build a DO-capable force.

Current DO Mission Profiles
DO is described as "an additional capability that is applicable across the full range of military applications . . ."3 and advertised to provide the joint task force commander with improved abilities. For the past decade, each Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) has deployed with the battlespace awareness and shaping capabilities and table of equipment (T/E) called for in the DO concept. Each force and battalion reconnaissance platoon attached to the MEU has the ability to employ independently, communicate with high-frequency or tactical satellite radios, gather realtime actionable intelligence, conduct precision terminal guidance operations, and exploit time-sensitive targeting opportunities through offensive battlespace shaping operations. These capabilities are greatly enhanced when combined with human exploitation teams, operational detachment alphas, and other governmental agencies. Today, as you read this, force and battalion reconnaissance units in Afghanistan and Iraq are successfully conducting DO mission profiles daily.

An example of a maritime DO concept mission profile would be a vehicle-mounted platoon inserting 200 nautical miles off the coast of Liberia to link up with Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) infantry battalions, representing a multinational effort to conduct United Nations-sanctioned peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. This mission profile is consistent with the tenets of DO. It presents multiple fronts to the warring factions, it is unquestionably complex, it attacks the factions on multiple dimensions, it allows the MAGTF commander to keep continuous pressure throughout the war zone, and tactical decisionmaking is decentralized.

In August 2003, 26th MEU (Special Operations Capable) (SOC) conducted this mission profile. As part of Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF) Liberia, 6th Platoon, 2d Force Reconnaissance Company went ashore with the mission to conduct specialized reconnaissance, coordinate the efforts of ECOWAS battalions, control precision fires, provide situational awareness to the MEU and CJTF commanders, and conduct direct action as required. The platoon executed this mission by placing four six-man, vehicle-mounted teams with each of the ECOWAS battalions. They were equipped with the same T/E that is proposed in the DO concept.

But beyond equipment, they possessed the critical ingredient to conducting DO-type profiles-judgment. A seasoned captain who had operational experience in an infantry battalion and significant training as a force reconnaissance officer led the platoon. His judgment was the driving force that not only effectively directed the actions of his teams, but also maintained the situational awareness of the MEU and CJTF Liberia commanders. Two staff sergeants and a gunnery sergeant who averaged 12 to 16 years of operational experience led the teams. They exhibited the kind of professional, mature judgment that instilled confidence in the MEU commander while ensuring that this "asymmetrical" operation successfully executed the National Command Authority's intent of facilitating the ECOWAS efforts to stabilize Liberia without committing large numbers of U.S. ground forces.

The Rifle Platoon as the Base Unit
The premise that the "basic building block of distributed operations is the rifle squad . . ."4 must be revisited. The rifle platoon is the best suited base unit for DO. Judgment is the key to any leader successfully conducting independent operations. One of the greatest challenges to the DO concept is that sergeant squad leaders are the exception, not the rule. By the time a motivated, competent, experienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) makes sergeant in the grunts, it's time for him to rotate to a B-billet. Our NCOs are doing an incredible job of leading our infantry units. Our Corps' NCOs possess a tenacity, discipline, and ability to kill our Nation's enemies that has been unmatched in the history of modern warfare. But the DO concept proposes to extend our most junior leaders away from platoon leadership and thrust them out into the battlespace to operate independently. This can only be done with training improvements that (1) develop independent decisionmaking; (2) ensure technical competence with weapons and equipment; (3) provide tactical competence and reinforcement of proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and (4) foster maturation from first-term Marines to career infantrymen.

Any future warfighting concept undertaken by our Corps, DO or otherwise, must factor in the inherent ebb and flow of personnel in the Operating Forces due to our Corps' manpower formula. The infamous transient, training, patients, and prisoners, or T2P2, costs the Operating Forces about 20 percent of personnel across the board, equating to the average loss of two Marines per rifle squad. Consideration must be given to applying a portion of our congressionally approved end strength increases to lessen the impact of the T2P2 manpower formula on the Operating Forces.

Today's Marine infantry platoon commander is well-educated, grounded in sound infantry tactics, and a very capable leader. His platoon sergeant is the seasoned, mature professional who focuses the energy of the lieutenant. This leadership combination, with additional training, is currently capable of conducting the type of operations envisioned in the DO concept with the professional judgment required of independent operations.

Current MCCDC courses of action propose either (1) each infantry battalion has one DO platoon per rifle company, or (2) each infantry battalion has one DO company with three DO platoons. The squad-based DO concept employs 4 sets of DO equipment per platoon, 12 in each company. A platoon-based DO concept would expand the battalion's capabilities to allow all nine rifle platoons in the battalion to be "DO capable." While removing the inevitable "elitism" stigma of the DO company, the battalion would be uniformly equipped and trained to conduct DO mission profiles.

Additionally, a platoon-based DO concept produces savings in equipment and training costs that can be used to flush out the existing T/Es of the reconnaissance units. Currently, some of their equipment must be drawn from Marine Forces Reserve to meet existing operational requirements. Additionally, a platoon-based DO force will reduce the proposed overall equipment and training costs compared to a squad-based DO force. A portion of this reduction in costs can be applied to purchase much needed training ammunition for the Operating Forces.

Current Marine Corps Formal Training
Today's Marine Corps training system is not currently able to produce squad leaders who are capable of executing the DO concept. The Squad Leader's Course does a fantastic job of reinforcing the basics of leadership, operations orders, land navigation, and patrolling. With training, it is realistic to expect our squad leaders to execute urban patrols on the streets of Ramadi within a few kilometers of friendly lines. However, it is unrealistic given our current infantry training system to expect our squad leaders to "penetrate complex urban environments . . ."5 as an independent force as advocated by some DO proponents. Current operations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the overriding need for our rifle squads to have significant firepower and reinforcements within relatively close proximity to them. The ground truth is that squads conduct patrols within the coverage of the battalion's 81mm mortars and with a quick reaction force on standby to reinforce when needed.

We should have great confidence in our squad leaders while they are operating in the close proximity of the platoon's leadership. But we cannot confuse that confidence with an infantiy squad leader's capability to operate 10 miles from his platoon leadership as suggested by proponents of DO. TTP for DO squads to successfully operate independently and survive will require very detailed standing operating procedures (SOPs) and the mastery of every infantiy skill set. Our Corps' reconnaissance community has a wealth of knowledge and proven combat SOPs to draw from that encompass many of the DO concepts of employment.

To accomplish all that DO employment will demand, the fundamental training of infantrymen must change. Training and Education Command (TECom) will need to include DO equipment training in the formal schools pipeline. As an example, it currently takes 2 weeks to train reconnaissance Marines to learn the basics of the secondary imagery dissemination system, and another 3 months of practical application for them to truly be functional with the equipment.

Each member of the DO unit must go to Survival, Evasion, Resistance to Interrogation, and Escape (SERE) Level C training. Operating widely dispersed beyond friendly lines has inherent risks. One of the major risks that must be mitigated is that of a Marine who is separated from his unit. The 3-week SERE Level C training is essential to ensuring that these DO squads are prepared for this requirement to operate widely dispersed. It is also currently a combatant commander mandated requirement that any personnel operating in a high-risk mission profile, such as DO, must receive formal SERE Level C training. The creation of a Marine Corps SERE school and a training pipeline that can train every DO infantryman must be given serious consideration by TECom.

Enhanced shooting skills must also be developed to increase the likelihood that these DO squads will win every firefight. This will require more ammunition for training to fully master pertinent individual and collective training standards (ITS/CTS). Simply put, ammunition allows for adequate training and building of self-confidence in the individual Marine and the unit as a whole. This self-confidence is central to successfully training DO-capable units.

Conclusion
As MCCDC seeks to elevate the capabilities of our infantry battalions through the DO concept, it must realize that DO is not a revolutionary change in our Corps' operational employment. Rather, it is the evolutionary adaptation of our infantry TTP to the threat profiles presented by our Nation's enemies and global terrorism. If our Corps is to successfully field DO-capable infantry squads, some fundamental changes must first occur. In the spirit of LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr.'s call for a "spirited debate," I extend these recommendations to MCCDC:

• Invite those officers and Marines from the Operating Forces with relevant DO experience to be centrally involved in the concept development.

• Fully field the T/E of existing reconnaissance units that are critically deficient in the very same equipment that is integral to the DO concept.

• Provide adequate ammunition to properly train infantry units per ITS/CTS standards.

• Establish the rifle platoon as the basic building block of the DO concept.

Our Corps has a long tradition of innovative thinking and pioneering new warfighting concepts. As this experiment goes forward, there will be opportunities to draw from our Corps' recent combat successes. But whatever the outcome, current T/E, training, personnel, and ammunition shortfalls within the Operating Forces must be shored up to facilitate the successful implementation of the DO concept.