Observations During Operation DESERT STORM

by BGen Paul K Van Riper - published June 1991

The Persian Gulf deployment was the best real-world test of Marine Corps force structure, training, and doctrine. Now is the time to apply the lessons learned from this valuable experience.

The observations contained in this article were drawn from my experiences in Southwest Asia (SWA) during Operation DESERT STORM. For most of this period (early January to early March 1991), I was able to travel throughout the area and to see all elements of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and much of the Central Command (CentCom) headquarters in operation.

This unique opportunity provided me a comprehensive view of the various organizations and insights that I believe can be of value to all those with a professional interest in how a Marine airground task force (MAGTF) is employed in an expeditionary environment.

Overall, my impressions of our units in action during DESERT STORM were extremely favorable. Morale was high, Marines at all levels were focused on the mission, and in general the Corps' way of doing business proved to be sound. Most important, Marines fought hard and fought well. They were expertly led.

As with any endeavor of this magnitude, however, there are things we need to reexamine in the months ahead to ensure the Corps is prepared for the future. This article is an attempt to outline what I consider to be the most important issues needing such reexamination.

Organization and Employment of the MEF
Until Operation DESERT STORM it was an open question for many Marines as to whether a MEF-and by implication, a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)-command element was a coordinating or warfighting headquarters. In the past some MEF and MEB commanders maintained that they provided general guidance to subordinate elements, resolved disputes, and allocated resources, but did not "fight" their MAGTFs.

Others voiced the opposite view, that is, that they commanded subordinate elements in a manner similar to any military organization, though often the details on how they accomplished this were sketchy, particularly in a MAGTF with only one ground combat element.

The distinction and the dialog surrounding this "fighting" versus "coordinating" argument are not new, as a review of the history of the development of the MAGTF reveals. For example, a Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) letter in 1954 established that air-ground task forces would have:

a separate commander with a separate task force headquarters [possessing] sufficient technical command and control capabilities [to exercise] broad operational and planning [functions].

A CMC letter two years later seemingly reversed this when it conferred command authority, after planning was complete, upon the element (air or ground) having primary interest in the operation. Other examples of attempts to resolve the issue can be found throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

During DESERT STORM I MEF was a warfighting headquarters in the sense of an army corps, that is, the commanding general fought his two divisions. It was more than a corps headquarters, however, in that he also directed how the air wing was to be fought. Simultaneously, he had responsibilities not directly related to warfighting because of his role as a component commander.

Those who served with or observed I MEF during DESERT STORM clearly recognized that a "coordinating" command element could not have successfully employed Marine forces. Of necessity, these forces had to be fought by a commander whose intent was clear and who was involved in the development of courses of action, the execution of schemes of maneuver and supporting fires, and the provision of combat service support.

The time has come to put this issue to rest and to get on with the important business of making MEF and MEB command elements the best warfighting headquarters possible. The following paragraphs illustrate why this needs to be done and offer suggestions on how to go about doing it.

Efforts of I MEF to organize and operate as a warfighting headquarters were in large measure ad hoc for three reasons. First, the Marine Corps lacks published MAGTF doctrine; in fact, we do not have a single manual on MAGTF operations. Also, few "how to" documents, such as standing operating procedures (SOPs), have been developed.

Thus, there was considerable improvisation as well as trial and error by members of the I MEF staff as they tried to come to grips with command and slaff action, as well as command and control at the corps/ component level. Second, the organizational structure of the MEF is not designed for wartime operations, especially sustained operations ashore.

Early in the deployment it was "go on, stay on" for many key staff officers. In December and January, personnel augmentation eased this situation somewhat Third, command post (CP) equipment is inadequate or simply does not exist. As an example, maintenance tents and commercial containers provided the bulk of shelters for the MEF CP. Additional communications equipment had to be borrowed from a number of sources to meet the demands of a warfighting headquarters.

The solution to the lack of doctrine is obvious-we need to develop it as soon as possible. Then the Corps must publish:

1. A "capstone" manual that describes the fundamental operational concepts for employing MAGTFs. This document should be written in the same style as FMFM 1.
2. A series of supporting manuals that explains in greater detail operational concepts for employment of the MAGTF-for example, operational responsibilities of staff sections, command and control, and planning.
3. A series of MAGTF SOPs that spell out the procedures for various functional areas, such as intelligence, fire support coordination, and command post operations.

To properly structure the MEF for 24-hour field operations, we must develop tables of organization (T/Os) based on wartime needs, even if all billets cannot be stafied in peacetime. Then, at least, the real requirements will be known and functions and tasks can be identified. It might be possible to "battle roster" personnel from posts and stations to fill identified MEF billets during contingency or wartime operations.

A concurrent effort must be made to compare functions with and among subordinate headquarters in order that these units can be properly structured and staffed. There must be a logic to the functions performed by each headquarters and their structures must reflect this. A study of the various T/Os will quickly point out the inconsistencies in structures.

An example, perhaps mundane, but nevertheless real: (1) the adjutant for the MEF is a major who heads a branch in the G-1 division; (2) the adjutant for the division is a lieutenant colonel who heads a separate section; (3) the adjutant for the wing is a major who heads a division in the chief of staff department; and (4) the adjutant for the force service support group (FSSG) is a captain who heads a unit in the G-1 section. The strengths of these organizations are, respectively, 15, 29, 11, and 5 Marines.

We must make a concerted and coordinated effort to secure the equipment a MAGTF requires to operate in an expeditionary environment. A MEF must have easily erectable and transportable shelters for use in a variety of climates.

Also needed are lightweight collapsible radio benches, map boards, tables, lighting harnesses, and equipment modules. Automated systems to provide a near real-time picture of the air and ground situation are long overdue. (Recent efforts of the Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) to incrementally test and field new equipment through a Field Development System as part of the Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) is a sign we may soon see progress in this area.) A thorough review of communications requirements in joint operations should be a high priority in order to ensure our MEFs and MEBs can talk with higher and adjacent organizations.

Compounding these problems is the issue of the MEF's role as a component headquarters. In a large operation, such as DESERT STORM, the requirements imposed simply by being a component of a unified command can quickly overwhelm our present MEF staff. Some augmentation must be available to the MEF commander or a separate component headquarters should be created.

To help solve this problem I MEF established MarCent (Rear), an organization located in Riyadh to which more than 100 Marines were eventually detailed. Their billet assignments ranged from liaison officers in CentCom's Joint Operations Center to crew positions in the U.S. Air Force's Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft.

We need to define what role the MEF command element is to play in our Fleet Marine Force (FMF) structure. The first step is to clarify what are component functions and what are warfigliting functions. Followon questions are:

• Will the MEF perform both?

• If so, how will it be organized and staffed?

• If not, what agency will be assigned the component functions?

• How will such an agency be organized and staffed?

• What will be the relationship between the MEF and the component agency?

The Warfighting Center at Quantico, in conjunction with FMF Atlantic (FMFLant) and FMF Pacific (FMFPac), has undertaken a study to determine which headquarters should perform "type," "component," and "warfighting" functions. A clear understanding and delineation of these various functions would certainly help future MEF-level operations.

Composite MAGTFs
How MAGTFs are to merge into larger MAGTFs has remained an unresolved issue for many years, particularly the "MEB plus MEB into a MEF" case. Attempts by Headquarters Marine Corps in 1984-1985 to resolve this issue through proposals put forth by the Advance Amphibious Study Group (AASG) were unsuccessful.

The most definitive field examination of the merits of various schemes to form a composite MEF was carried out by I MEF under the direction of then-MajGen Ernest C. Cheatham, Jr., in early 1985. The results pointed out clearly the advantage of using conventional headquarters, that is, the MEF (nucleus) command element and division, wing, and FSSG headquarters vice surrogate headquarters as proposed by the AASG.

An evaluation of this I MEF test was forwarded to the old Doctrine Center but was never acted upon. Thus, the failure of the Marine Corps to publish doctrinal guidance on how to form a composite MAGTF led again to ad hoc solutions as Marine forces arrived in SWA in the early stages of DESERT SHIELD. The negative effects of this were felt for many months.

There should be no question as to the primacy of the MEF. Yet there will be until actions are taken to accomplish the following:

• Develop detailed procedures that allow a MEB command element to merge with a MEF (nucleus) command element to form a MEF command element. These procedures must ensure all billets and items of equipment are accounted for and properly allocated in the MEF T/O and table of equipment (T/E).

• Ensure contingency plans allow for the early deployment of the MEF (nucleus) command element and conventional division, wing, and FSSG headquarters elements and portions of their subordinate headquarters (for example, the artillery regimental headquarters) when MEBs are to form a composite MEF.

• Reaffirm that under normal circumstances a smaller MAGTF does not operate under a larger MAGTF; the smaller merges into the larger. In other words, MEBs do not operate as a separate entity under MEFs. The exception would be when there is sufficient geographical separation to permit independent operations.

In short, MEBs should be viewed as a "slice" of a MEF, not permanent organizations that join temporarily to form the MEF, or worse yet, stand-alone organizations that operate under the MEF. Looked at in another way, MEBs should routinely be considered as MEF (Forward).

Command and Control
In 1988 CMC directed that a concept for MEF command and control, similar to that outlined in OH 6-1A. Ground Combat Element Command and Control, be developed. To date this has not been accomplished.

As a result, I MEF was forced to innovate in order to acquire facilities and equipment for its command posts, to organize its personnel, and to establish operating procedures. Though functional, the products did not provide for efficient staff action or command and control.

Because MEF command elements have seldom been required in exercises to function as a warfighting headquarters, simple SOPs for command post operations have not been developed. Nor is there an agreed-upon organization for the internal arrangement of the command post and its various centers/sections. We need to structure our MEF and MEB command posts in a standard way and human engineer them to operate as efficiently as possible.

The concepts and tenets contained in OH 6-1A should be reviewed with the goal of validating them. Then the command and control architecture of the entire MEF must be examined as an entity; parts cannot be considered in isolation, for they are all interdependent.

A revised document should then be published and used as the basis for development of a MEF-wide plan to update and integrate command and control for the MEF command element and the division, wing, and FSSG headquarters.

Intelligence
The weakest area I observed was tactical intelligence. Shortcomings existed at all levels, though the most significant were at the higher echelons. (See Gazette articles by Maj Craig S. Huddleston (Jan91) and Maj R. Scott Moore (Mar91) for additional discussions on difficulties with intelligence.) I had the sense many of the problems are endemic and stem from the way we select, train, and educate our intelligence personnel. Now is the time to reconsider whether we want to continue acquiring the majority of our intelligence officers through lateral moves.

In my opinion, we fail to establish an operational mindset in many of our intelligence officers. The majority appear to be focused inward on the "intelligence cycle." Many seem fascinated with systems and procedures rather than the product being (or more often not being) provided to the operators. A change in officer intelligence training would seem to be in order to correct this situation.

When it conies to analysis of information to produce usable intelligence, we are particularly weak. Knowledge of one of the best techniques to help with analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), is not wide-spread. Again, modification of our intelligence training must be considered.

Training and Education
Without doubt, the emphasis given to training the past few years is paying dividends. You could see it in the way Marines wore their equipment and handled their weapons, their attention to rear area security, and their response in tactical situations. We must keep the Marine Battle Skills Training program intact and strengthen it to the degree we can with additional training days.

Not surprisingly, the results of changes to professional military education are more difficult to assess. The tenets of FMFM 1 are just beginning to be understood. We have a long way to go to achieve operational competence throughout our officer corps.

Some of the deficiencies are in the understanding of concepts; more, however, are in the knowledge of procedures and the application of techniques. LtGen Walter E. Boomer's request was for more "craftsmen." I take this to mean officers who can plan an operation, set up and run a COC, FSCC, etc. Or in other words, staff officers who know how to function in the field and who can represent the Marine Corps at other headquarters.

The Amphibious Warfare School's (AWS) curriculum and the "Fighting the MEF" portion of Command and Staff College's (CSC) curriculum provide this ability to graduates. However, we just don't reach enough of our captains and majors. (Approximately 38 percent of captains attend AWS and 40 percent of majors attend CSC.) Of more concern is that educationally, our lieutenant colonels, colonels, and brigadier generals are generally left to fend for themselves. Too few can truly be called "MAGTF officers."

In the area of training and education we need to:

• Develop a program similar to the U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program to provide advanced operational training (with wargame support) to the command elements of MEFs and MEBs and the headquarters of their subordinate elements.

• Develop a course on MAGTF organization and employment for Marine officers assigned to Navy, joint, or combined staffs.

• Construct a functioning facility at Quantico that contains actual or surrogate communications and electronic equipment (radios, consoles, scopes, computers, etc.) for a MEF, division, regiment, wing, and FSSG command post. This would serve as a training facility for students and FMF staffs and as a concepts testing and evaluation facility for MCRDAC.

Targeting
Targeting is a discipline the Marine Corps has ignored for too long. As a result we paid a significant price during the early days of Operation DESERT STORM. Only the superb efforts of the deputy MEF commander, the MEF fire support coordinator, and others saved us at what was very nearly the last minute. The results have fortunately been well documented and efforts are underway at Quantico to develop solutions.

The Corps needs to recognize targeting as a discipline and respond accordingly. First, we need to develop doctrinal concepts and procedures based on I MEF's experience. Then we need to examine the U.S. Air Force's targeting courses and begin to send Marines to them if they meet our needs or establish our own course if they don't.

Miscellaneous
The U.S. Army trained and equipped superb liaison teams in the United States during the early phases of DESERT SHIELD. Personnel assigned to these teams came from various posts and stations throughout the Army. These teams were then sent to SWA and assigned full time to higher and adjacent units. Their value and professionalism were obvious. We would do well to consider creating similar teams that could be deployed in future contingencies. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) at Quantico offers several advantages as a site for such teams, to include knowledgeable personnel and a direct link to the FMF.

Marine Corps Reserve units performed in a highly creditable manner from all reports. I did hear concern expressed, though, about the skill and proficiency of some battalion staffs. The most frequent comment was that companies, after a little time to "warm up," were on a par with their Active counterparts, whereas battalion staffs seemed several steps behind. Landing Force Training Command Atlantic (LFTCLant) developed a two-week Reserve training course for battalion staffs that was to be implemented this spring. This may solve the problem, but we should review the issue closely to see if more corrective actions are needed.

"Friendly fire," as in all wars, had tragic results. This is a problem insufficiently studied in the past. The time has come to devote a significant effort to ensure we reduce incidents in future conflicts. A start might be a MCCDC-sponsored conference bringing together our best scientific minds with our operators to lay out a course of action. (The U.S. Army established a Center for Identification Technology at Fort Meade, MD, in February 1991 to begin work on this problem.)

On a similar note, hand grenades and dud ordnance caused unacceptable casualties. The Training and Education Center at Quantico is currently reviewing our training programs, particularly at the recruit depots and the schools of infantry, to see if we can instill the necessary awareness of how to safely handle or avoid these problems.

The creation of a general support command and direct support command from two FSSGs revolutionized the way combat service support was provided throughout I MEF. Though not without rough spots, the system worked, allowing for some significant accomplishments, not the least of which was supplying two divisions over a line of communication that eventually stretched 250 miles. As this change is studied, it will have obvious impact on doctrine and training.

With the passing of the RF-4B photo reconnaissance plane, the Marine Corps lost a capability it found it needed desperately during operations in SWA-tactical reconnaissance. Despite promises of suitable or better imagery from national systems, these systems did not deliver. The facts are:

• Electro-optical, synthetic-aperture radar and other so-called advanced systems cannot deliver imagery with the resolution of photographic film. In many cases only film can provide the quality needed by commanders.

• If we don't own the system, we will stand in line to get our fair share of the product.

We need to support early acquisition of photo pods for the F/A-18 and/or AV-8B. The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance (ATARS) is not the answer.

Units in I MEF developed and demonstrated a first-class capability to clear minefields and breach obstacles. The knowledge and skill gained needs to be retained. Some thoughts on how we might do this:

• Hold a conference on this subject with the goal of capturing details from the participants for incorporation into doctrinal publications.

• Develop a training film subsequent to the conference.

• Enhance the clearing and breaching range at Twentynine Palms for use by units in their work-up training before each Combined Arms Exercise.

Conclusion
Most of our modern high-technology systems worked well in DESERT STORM. Prominent in media reports were the successes of precision-guided munitions and night vision equipment. Other less publicized systems were also of great importance to I MEF. At the forefront were those devices that assisted Marines in navigating across and fixing locations in the often trackless desert terrain.

The Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS) proved to be invaluable. In the case of PLRS, initial attempts to display a "picture" of unit locations on the new "green machine" (AN/UYK-83) computer in combat operations centers showed great promise. A PLRS picture and an air picture provided by the Data Link Set-personal computer could potentially provide the MEF commander a real-time view of the friendly side of the battlefield. We need to emphasize the use of PLRS and GPS in future training exercises.

A standout was the Joint Surveillance Targeting and Attack Radar System (JSTARS). An Air Force-developed system designed to locate moving targets over a broad area, JSTARS is scheduled to be fielded in 1997. However, two aircraft equipped with early developmental models of JSTARS were deployed to SWA shortly before the ground war commenced.

Their performance exceeded the expectations of most key staff personnel and commanders. They enabled the MEF to monitor the movement of Iraqi vehicles throughout much of Kuwait and use this information to attack targets and develop intelligence. We need to support continued development of JSTARS and incorporate its employment into our doctrine.

In the closing hours of DESERT STORM Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA in his now famous, briefing described the performance of I MEF Marines in glowing terms, remarking that theirs was a classic operation of textbook quality that would be studied for many years. This will certainly be the case. However, Marines must be the first to study their own performance in a detailed and critical manner, for there are lessons to be learned.

Efforts fay MCCDC's Battle Assessment Liaison Team, which is now analyzing information gathered in SWA, have us on the right track. We must continue, for the ability and capability of a MEF or MEB to successfully prosecute the next campaign in large measure depends on the results of studies we undertake today.