Marines Lose the Battleships' Firepower

By William L. Stearman - Originally Published March 2006

Dr. Stearman is the Executive Director, U.S.
Naval Fire Support Association and a retired flag-rank U.S. Foreign
Service Officer.

Robert Novak, in his 5 December 2005 column, said, "U.S. Marines, while fighting valiantly in Iraq, are the on the verge of serious defeat on Capitol Hill." This defeat came on 19 December when Congress, complying with a Navy request, ordered our two reserve battleships USS Iowa (BB 61) and USS Wisconsin (BB 64) to be donated as museums in California and Norfolk, VA. This action was the result of a Navy campaign, using mostly wrong or misleading information, that turned members of Congress against the battleships. (This fact is well documented, and along with the full text of the Navy's antibattleship briefing, is available at .)

This Navy action came after the publication of the 19 November 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on naval surface fire support (NSFS)-from which emerged that the battleships were, in essence, the only source of effective NSFS in sight. (See p. 27 of the GAO report.) Most importantly, the report contained this statement, "[The] Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. . . ." This statement must have been cleared by the Commandant, Gen Michael W. Hagee. (In the first draft the Marine Corps took no "official position" on battleship reactivation.) Gen Hagee's predecessor, Gen James L. Jones, who once wrote to me that battleships could solve the NSFS problem and who made several probattleship statements as Commandant, never went so far as to publicly support actual reactivation, nor had any of his post-1992 (when all battleships had been retired) predecessors-even though, clearly, these ships were and remain the only NSFS solution in sight. (The Navy says that the annual cost of keeping each battleship in reserve has been only $250,000. (See 13 December 2005 GAO report, p. 17.)

The Navy has come up with a number of NSFS solutions; e.g., arsenal ship, DD 21, and extended (5-inch) range guided munitions (ERGM), none of which have panned out. In point of fact, to the Marine Corps' prolonged chagrin, the Navy has never given NSFS the priority it should have. Gen Hagee wrote to me on 23 May 2003, "I view with great concern the present inadequacy of the Navy to provide the required naval surface fire support for ship-to-objective maneuver." Nothing has changed since.

When, during 9 April 2002 congressional hearings, the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Vernon Clark, was reminded that there were no NSFS solutions in sight, he replied that Marines would be supported by "combat air when forcible entry was required." The 13 December 2005 GAO report on NSFS, reflecting Navy views, stated that the present ongoing NSFS gap was "an acceptable risk" because of the availability of airpower. Never mind that, in a 29 July 2005 interview, Gen Hagee cogently noted that, while aviation is great, it can be "weathered out."1

The Navy reacted to the bold and forthright Marine Corps probattleship GAO statement by successfully ensuring that the Marines would never have battleship fire support, thus permanently depriving our Marines and other ground forces of essential NSFS for the foreseeable future. Gen Hagee had testified that the continuing absence of NSFS placed his troops "at considerable risk." That is, risk of needlessly becoming casualties for want of NSFS in inevitable future conflicts in the littorals where most of the world's population lives. Unfortunately, Marine Corps leadership, no doubt concluding that it couldn't "fight city hall" on this issue, has given in to the Navy position on battleships. Our repeated appeals to the top at Headquarters Marine Corps to save the battleships-which remained entirely possible almost to the end-went unheeded. With no hint of Marine Corps support, the battleships were doomed.

NSFS is not the only battleship-related issue. Our ability to conduct forcible entry from the sea (FEFTS)a vitally important strategic capability that deters potential hostile elements and copes with them when deterrence fails-requires, for credibility, an effective NSFS that only battleships can provide. FEFTS is of considerable importance in our global war on terrorism as well as other conflicts.2

The Navy's action to get rid of the battleships is, I am convinced, almost entirely due to Navy fixation on the futuristic DD(X) destroyer. The Navy most probably feared that logic might eventually prevail and that the two battleships would be reactivated, thus diverting funds from the DD(X) program. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the cost of the first DD(X) could be as high as $4.7 billion, and its initial operational capability (IOC) is in 2015, if then. The Marine Corps has stated a requirement for 28 DD(X)s, whereas only 7 are now planned, and this is highly optimistic. Battleships offer a far quicker, a far more economical (in both dollars and manpower), and a far more effective NSFS solution.

Concerning the DD(X), the following is what we wrote to Gen Hagee on 23 September 2005:

You expressed concern about fire support and about filling the gap until you get artillery ashore (a concern also expressed by your predecessor Gen James L. Jones) and stated DD(X) would provide a 'no kidding' extended range 'ability to get fire support.' . . . In point of fact, neither the DD(X) nor any other system currently contemplated, can meet stated [Marine Corps] NSFS requirements. For example, the Navy railgun, IOC of 2020, is hardly realistic in light of the seemingly insoluble acute barrel wear problem; (moreover, its round would weigh only 33 pounds on impact.) The 'Affordable Weapon' also does not yet exist, may not be so 'affordable' and is, in any case, a 1,000 mile range strategic missile, not suited for tactical NSFS.

The DD(X) will have only two advanced gun system (AGS) 155mm "guns" (actually rocket launchers) that fire the long-range land attack projectile (LRLAP). This round has an impact weight of only 63 pounds, which greatly limits its effectiveness for NSFS. The LRLAP requires 10 minutes to reach its maximum 95-mile range. (By comparison, a tested and concept proven 16-inch 280mm guided sabot round would take only 3.2 minutes and would impact with a weight of 530 pounds.) Moreover, the LRLAP will cost at least $100,000 each. This means one AGS firing will blow away $1 million per minute. No doubt for this reason, on 18 April 2005, LtGen James N. Mattis and then-LtGen Robert Magnus (both Marines) testified that each ship will have only 70 LRLAPs. The rest of the ship's 900-round load out capacity will be devoted to the yet-to-be-developed conventional 155mm extended range rounds with a 24-nautical-mile (nm) range; however, the Navy's ship safety standoff distance is 25nm offshore. The AGS clearly cannot fulfill the current NSFS requirements established by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The Navy lists ERGM (fired from guided missile destroyers and cruisers), along with DD(X), as an eventual NSFS solution; however, the long-suffering 5-inch ERGM, which has already wasted over half a billion dollars with no IOC in sight, cannot meet Marine Corps lethality and volume of fire requirements.

One glimmer of hope for the Marines is that paragraph (d) of the fiscal year 2006 Defense Authorization Act's section 1014, which strikes the two battleships, states that, in a Presidentially declared national emergency, the Secretary of Defense can request that the battleships be returned to the United States. It is, therefore, greatly in the Marine Corps' interest that the Navy ensures that these ships remain preserved, ready for reactivation-and that their present support infrastructure remains intact.

Notes
1. Hagee, Gen Michael W., interview, 29 July 2005.
2. Hoffman, LtCol Frank G., USMCR(Ret), "Forcible Entry Is a Strategic Necessity," Proceedings, November 2004, p. 2.