Letters
The VA Disability System
I read the article, “Filing a VA Disability Claim” by Raymond F. Gustavson, Jr. (MCG, Apr07), with interest. As one with significant exposure to the benefits process, as well as a subject of the Veterans Administration (VA) medical system for many years, I have extensive experience with both the VA health administration system and the VA benefits administration system and can state with confidence that everything that the author stated in his article is factual, and that’s unfortunate.
The VA medical system is universally recognized as being among the best in the world, particularly in its ability to accommodate the massive number of cases it is required to manage. The medical treatment is exceptional. However, the disability benefits system is cumbersome, sluggish, and marginally functional. On average it takes 177 days from initial request for benefits to receive a rating. Mr. Gustavson’s detailed and accurate rendition of the process to file a claim is reflective of my statement. The VA disability benefits system is constructed for the VA, not for the military it serves. The process is in dire need of being revised, streamlined, modernized, and structured for the user rather than the VA.
While I strongly encourage every military individual exiting the Service within the next year to pay strict attention to Mr. Gustavson’s sage advice and guidance, I am hopeful that sometime in the future, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs will be directed to revise, upgrade, and simplify the existing benefits system. The warriors of today are the veterans of tomorrow, and they deserve to be treated as professionally and sensitively in timely determination of their VA benefits as they are in the application of medical care.
Col Ken Jordan, USMC(Ret)
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The DASC and Apaches
I would like to provide some clarification and recommendations in response to the article, “AH–64 Apache Attack Helicopters” by Maj Michael D. Grice (MCG, Mar07). In the article it is stated that a problem with the AH–64 “A” model is that only its high-frequency (HF) and very high-frequency (VHF) SINCGARS radios are capable of secure communications. It is also stated that this caused a problem when the aircraft checked in with the direct air support center (DASC) because the DASC used secure ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) nets for aircraft. While that statement is true, the DASC also has the instant capability to switch between secure and nonsecure mode. Nothing more is required than the control officer hitting a switch on the panel before him/her. This capability allows all aircraft that are currently on the net to increase their situational awareness by listening to the unsecured call from the AH–64s. The AH–64s in turn get a quicker brief and routing. Secondly, the DASC has VHF capability that the AH–64s could check in on. Another alternative is HF. The DASC is HF capable both secure and unsecure. While not the most friendly net to use, this option was used with great success during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM I and II. Lastly, in Figure 1 in the article, the DASC is represented by a picture of a tactical air operations center Marine and equipment. As stated in the article, the DASC does not have radar and uses procedural control. To recap, the DASC is HF/VHF/UHF and satellite communications capable both secure and unsecure and does not possess radar.
Capt Mark D. Blydenburgh
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Embedded Reporters
I would like to comment on Maj Stephen H. Kester Sr.’s letter, “Another View of Public Affairs” (MCG, May07), and public affairs responsibilities under combat conditions. Maj Kester is completely wrong in his comment about there being no need for embedded press during combat operations. The need is simple. Since World War I the press has been given such access to troops because the purpose of their being there is to keep the public informed about what is occurring, good or bad! Without public support, war efforts are quickly eroded. We have an old saying in the Corps that goes like this, “The press covers the war, and our combat correspondents cover the Marines fighting the war.”
Taking into consideration the radical technological advances in electronic equipment, including satellite transmissions and the new camera cell phones, the military has had a difficult time staying even with the current media. However new technology should not be a reason to hinder public coverage of our Marines when we send them in harm’s way.
Maj Norm Hatch, USMCR(Ret)
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Our Naval Character
The May editorial, “Losing Our Naval Character,” is spot on its subject. The causes, concerns, and corrections proposed are done with a very slow blink toward history’s lessons. While I agree that the Marine Corps’ naval character is far less nautical today, I would also postulate that the Navy itself suffers from a loss of naval character.
This Nation and its Marine Corps share virtual inceptions, and from the beginning, Marine Corps operations have basically been small unit activities that originated from either a Navy warship or specially designated auxiliary vessel. Recall that 1stLt Presley Neville O’Bannon had but 7 Marines under his command on 27 April 1805 as a part of U.S. Army GEN William Eaton’s 500 Christian-Islamic force that defeated Barbary pirates at the Battle of Derna.
Excluding World War I (WWI), nearly all Marine activity for 165 years was built around company- to battalion-sized operations from a half dozen or less ships. In WWI the Marines were but another segment of the trench bound masses, far removed from “amphibious” activity and using ships just to cross the Atlantic, after which they plodded as all other Army elements.
No one will question the emergence of amphibious warfare that the Marines honed during WWII. Huge flotillas with scores of ships and hundreds of boats snap readily to mind when one recalls the war in the Pacific. But was this really “large” unit activity? I would suggest that as each transport put its battalion into landing craft it was in effect doing what the Marines had been doing since day one—offloading a contingent of ground fighters to transit from ship to shore to engage an enemy.
The last large Marine Corps amphibious operation was the landing at Inchon during the Korean War, after which the Marines operated as an independent ground force controlled by an Army theater commander. While wading ashore off Da Nang, Vietnam was a ship-to-shore evolution, it was not an amphibious assault. From the earliest days in Vietnam to its end in 1975, large-scale amphibious operations were not on the Marine Corps’ menu. In Vietnam, in-country and homeward rotation was performed generally by Air Force transport planes or contracted commercial air. Even when the Navy had 500 ships the Fleet Marine Force was small unit at best.
In actuality, from WWII on the Marines have been used as another combined arms ground command, and this seems to bring some happiness to Marine Corps senior officers. These large unit ground operations mean a requirement exists for stars on a parity with the other forces involved in conflict—Army, Navy, Air Force.
So what is contemporary naval character? In fact it is not based on large-scale amphibious operations. Marines, like special operations, are most effective with quick, hard hits of specific points and rapid recovery. An “army of occupation” of infrastructure development should be left to the Army military police or corps of engineers.
Today’s Navy has 275 combat vessels and 299 admirals or about-to-be admirals. These numbers could mean that each ship could have its own admiral with some to oversee the “ghost Navy” a-rusting on the James and Alabama Rivers or the NuNavy ghost ships that will not be built due to cost overruns. The Naval Academy boards over 4,200 midshipmen, most of whom will not get a summer cruise aboard a naval combatant as there are not enough ships to go around.
In short, the Marines must, and should, continue to practice small unit maritime, ground, air, and special operations. They should take their character from history. At a time when the Navy appears grounded in the silt of many mismanaged and misguided programs, it may well be best that the Marines look toward their battle standards and continue to hone the warrior standards so needed by the Nation they serve.
LCDR John R. Haddick, USNR(Ret)
