JUNE 2009

Writing Award Winners

MAJGEN ROY S. GEIGER AWARD

FRANCIS FOX PARRY COMBAT INNOVATION AWARD

Our Last Manned Striker Aircraft?

The Marine Corps is being left behind

The Marine Corps is in the process of purchasing its latest strike aircraft, the short takeoff/vertical landing F-35B. If recent history is any indication, the F-35 will be in service until at least 2050, and probably far beyond that. The F-35B is a technological wonder that promises superior combat performance and weapons delivery capability. Like all combat aircraft of the past 100 years, it will be piloted by a highly skilled, well-trained aviator who has endured and survived a process of selection and elimination that is unparalleled. Whenever we send one of these aircraft into combat, we are putting at risk a pilot and aircraft that are dear to our national treasury and our national conscience.

The citizens and political leaders of our Nation have become increasingly averse to combat casualties as our military has outstripped the conventional and technological capabilities of every other force in the world. We have become so good at what we do that the expectation is that we can go to war, defeat our enemy in a matter of days or weeks, and do so with minimal loss of life-on both sides. Additionally, the cost of procuring manned aircraft and training the pilots to fly them has increased exponentially over the past 25 years, so much so, in fact, that every new aircraft for which we determine a requirement is eventually reduced in numbers-required numbers-because we cannot afford to buy them. Every time we lose an aircraft and/or its crew, there is high drama generated by the media, and another statistic is added to the body count so carefully tallied by individuals and organizations with their own specific agendas.

Concurrently, we have reached a point that we no longer need risk the lives of fighter/attack pilots and crews in combat. The advances that have been achieved in unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and command and control (C^sup 2^) systems integration has brought us to the point that it is unnecessary to launch manned strike aircraft into harm's way. This new breed of strike fighter is the unmanned combat aerial vehicle or UCAV.

In his September 2007 Marine Corps Gazette article, "Digital Close Air Support," Maj Chad Sund provides an excellent synopsis of how close air support (CAS) can, and should, be conducted. The only element missing from his introductory vignette is the UCAV. In an accompanying article, "Technology Kills the Multicrew Concept," Capt Kevin A. Campbell provides a scenario of increasing complexity and stress to demonstrate the utility of multicrewed aircraft. Yet the compounding tasks he describes become moot when addressed by a pilot sitting at a console, unconcerned with his immediate well-being because there is no danger of running into the ground, having a midair collision, or being shot down by enemy air defenses. Thus, an integral part of the solution to future CAS points directly to the utility of UCAVs.

Background

The earliest recorded wartime use of UASs occurred on 22 August 1849, when Austria attacked the city of Venice with unmanned balloons loaded with explosives. Although a balloon doesn't generally meet today's definition of a UAS, the concept was compelling enough that once winged aircraft were invented, the effort to fly them unmanned for military purposes was not far behind.1 In 1916 Lawrence Sperry filed a patent for an aerial torpedo for the Navy. On 6 March 1918, the first known flight of a guided missile took place. The aerial torpedo climbed automatically from its launch and made a smooth, stable flight until the distance control automatically ended the test at a preset range of 1,000 yards. Further tests did not go as well. In the meantime the Army was working on its own aerial torpedo. The resulting weapon actually looked like a torpedo, fitted with dihedral biplane wings. The first tests began in September 1918, with the first full-scale flight on 2 October, when it was given the name "Bug." The test, however, was unsuccessful.2

The first recorded use of uninhabited aircraft as instruments of destruction was the German V1 missile and V2 rocket used against London in World War II, and the Allies experimenting with aircraft packed with high explosives and crudely controlled toward their targets by radio.3

In the 1970s the Air Force experimented with armed UASs to perform the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission. The project, designated HAVE LEMON, employed BGM-34A Ryan Firebees equipped with a weapons pylon under each wing, a forward-looking television (TV) camera, and a data link mounted in a pod on top of the vertical stabilizer. They were used beginning in late 1971 to perform strikes on simulated air defense sites with Maverick missiles and the GBU-8/B HOBOS (Glide Bomb Unit 8, Homing Bomb System) TV-guided glide bomb. Results were good enough to permit follow-on development of the BGM-34B, featuring an extended nose for an infrared or low-light-level TV imaging system and a laser target designator for targeting and control of laser guided bombs. Tests performed in 1973 and 1974 were successful and led to the BGM-34C, which could be used for reconnaissance or strike missions by swapping nose modules and other elements. The concept proved to be ahead of its time and HAVE LEMON faded away. The test squadron was disbanded in 1979, and its roughly 60 UASs were put into storage.

The Navy recognized that UCAVs have a number of potential benefits compared to manned aircraft: they are cheaper with both lower purchase and operating costs, they are smaller and stealthier, they can perform high-G maneuvers impossible with piloted aircraft, and they eliminate the risk of aircrew being killed or captured. Since the Navy found itself increasingly committed to using expensive cruise missiles for punitive strikes and other limited military operations, UCAVs offered a cheaper alternative. One UCAV could carry a number of smart global positioning system (GPS)-guided munitions and hit multiple targets on a single sortie, then return home to be reused. Even with a high combat attrition rate, the cost would be less than that of a barrage of cruise missiles. The Navy did not commit to practical UCAV efforts until the summer of 2000 when they awarded contracts of $2 million for a 15-month concept exploration program. Design considerations included dealing with the corrosive saltwater environment, deck handling for launch and recovery, integration with C^sup 2^ systems, and operation in a carriers high electromagnetic interference environment. The Navy was also interested in using UCAVs for reconnaissance and penetrating protected airspace to identify targets for the attack waves.4

Where We Are

UASs, especially the Hellfire-armed Predator, were star performers in Afghanistan in 2001-02 and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both the Air Force and Navy had been developing plans for operational follow-ons to their demonstrator programs when pressure rose for them to merge their efforts, resulting in the short-lived joint unmanned combat air system (UCAS) program under Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency direction.

Currently the Services envision a stealthy machine with a pricetag of $10 to $20 million, which is actually modest for a sophisticated stealthy combat aircraft. It will feature stores pylons for external fuel tanks or additional munitions, midair refueling capability, and a narrow field-of-view synthetic aperture radar-moving target indicator (SAR-MTI) system for targeting and poststrike damage assessment.

The Air Force envisions this vehicle as an F-117 replacement to fly a pre-programmed route and drop guided weapons like joint direct attack munitions on predetermined GPS coordinates. There would be limited "man in die loop": the vehicle could be recalled but would otherwise operate autonomously, including differential GPS auto takeoff and landing. It would be a stealth aircraft and cost around $20 million. Performance attributes would include a 5,000-pound payload, 600 to 1,000 nautical mile radius, and flight at medium-high altitude. They would also like to use it as a jamming platform to penetrate enemy airspace and blind hostile radars. Over the long-term, the Air Force is interested in using a UCAV as a platform to carry directed-energy weapons, initially a high-power microwave to fry adversary electronic systems, followed by a high-power laser.

The Navy is interested in many of the features on the Air Force list but put reconnaissance and jamming at the top and strike at the bottom. A navalized UCAV would have a stronger airframe and landing gear for carrier takeofis and landings, an arresting hook, and avionics for automated carrier approach and landing, along with a "relative navigation system" to tell the UCAV its location relative to the carrier.

For over half a century, the Army and Air Force have abided by the 1948 "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" paper, referred to as the Key West Agreements, and revised under President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. The terms give the Air Force a monopoly on fixed-wing warplanes and allow the Army to operate small two-engine fixed-wing transports and helicopters. UASs were not covered, although they existed, but armed UASs were still a distant possibility. Recently the Air Force attempted to extend its fixed-wing monopoly to include executive agency of UASs. The Army does not agree (neither does the Marine Corps). The proposal was denied by the Defense Department in September 2007.

Army officials have been working on the Hunter, a twin-tail UAS that can fly for up to 15 hours at heights of up to 20,000 feet. The first weapons-equipped Hunters with Viper Strike munitions were delivered for live fire testing in March 2003. Army (and Marine Corps) concerns about armed UASs are more complicated than those of the other Services because precision and accuracy must be more exact when releasing a munition in an area with troops and/or civilians. In early September 2007 an Army MQ-5A Hunter with a Viper Strike smart bomb was used for the first time to attack a ground target, killing two men setting up an improvised explosive device near Qayyarah, Iraq. CPT Raymond Fields, commander of the Unmanned Aerial Surveillance Company, said:

We will see more weaponized Army unmanned vehicles being used instead of manned platforms to save not only our aviator brethren but also our Army ground brethren from enemy contact.

As Capt Ryan Hough points out in his Marine Corps Aviation Assodation 2007 Journal article, "Redefining Close Air Support in Iraq," the nearly seamless integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and CAS has reached the point where it has become necessary to refine our CAS doctrine. In the article he states that Marine Corps tactical aviation is now tasked with the following CAS mission objective:

Air action that includes searching, finding, fixing, identifying, and engaging hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the ground scheme of maneuver.

This has all become possible due to advances in tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been developed since 2003. Thanks to the targeting pods that we have today and the ground stations that allow ground personnel, from forward air controllers to unit commanders, to visually find and monitor targets for positive identification and delivery clearance, the framework for employing UCAVs already exists.

C^sup 2^

The Marine Corps has been working on C^sup 2^ modernization since 1775 and will probably continue to do so until the Rapture. Nevertheless, we have made advances in connectivity, interoperability, and reliability that now allow us to utilize UCAVs across the spectrum of offensive air support, from deep air support missions and SEAD during shaping operations to preplanned and immediate CAS, whether in conventional combat operations or asymmetric irregular warfare.

The concept suffered from C^sup 2^ problems, such as the vulnerability of communications links to jamming and spoofing and the need to hit specific targets and not accidentally kill civilians or friendly troops. More reliable communications links have been developed, automated systems have come into much wider use, and the military has learned to be much more comfortable with such new technologies.

Regardless of the C^sup 2^ hardware and software utilized, one thing seems clear: there must be a human in the loop who is highly skilled and thoroughly indoctrinated in aviation operations but who remains a part of the ground combat element. This means that we will need aeronautically designated personnel assigned to infantry and other ground maneuver units acting as forward air controllers to conduct terminal control operations for CAS. Marine Corps doctrine has always espoused "silence is consent" for aviators to deliver ordnance in combat operations, although we have rarely operated under this concept. The use of UCAVs for CAS will reinvigorate this concept.

UCAV missions could be conducted by operators in ground vehicles, warships, or control aircraft using high-speed digital data link. The operator would not fly the UCAV directly, since it could be programmed to handle the details of flight operations, leaving the operator in a supervisory role. The UCAV could loiter literally for days, especially with in-flight refueling, and conduct preplanned strike missions autonomously if communications were cut.

The Marine Corps is currently fielding hand-held target location, designation, and handoff systems so artillery forward observers can "speak" with new Excalibur Unitary GPS precision guided munitions fielded with the M777A2 155mm howitzer. The system will enable forward observers to perform target acquisition, then hand targets off to fire support units using formatted messages transmitted through existing tactical data systems and planned communications equipment. Obviously, this capability is also easily transferable to UCAV communications systems.

The Way Ahead

The Navy recently awarded a $635 million contract to build a carrier-based UCAS demonstration (UCAS-D) vehicle. The Navy's UCAS-D is focusing on a strike fighter-sized platform that will demonstrate carrier flight operations. As a stealth aircraft, UCAS-D would complement the carrier-based F-35C. It is envisioned to be the carrier task forces "first day of the war" asset. As a refuelable unmanned platform it will provide a persistent capability to acquire targets at high precision, designate fixed or moving targets, strike them with precision guided weapons, and collect and disseminate poststrike information. Testing is scheduled to begin in late 2009 and culminate with carrier flight operations in 2013. This contract is for technology development and demonstration and will not be an operational system. Following the successful conclusion of these trials, a full-scale development program will be launched with a targeted service entry date in 2018. The UCAS-D will be equipped with various sensors including electro-optical infrared, SAR with ground MTI capability, and electronic support measures. Unmanned combat aircraft are expected to be used for intelligence, surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance missions; long-range precision strikes; SEAD; CAS; electronic attack; and information operations. Navy officials have said they need to keep an open mind:

Just because we've operated manned aircraft a certain way for many years, it doesn't mean we have to operate [UCAS] the same way. This is different; we don't just pull the pilot out and put a computer in.5

As UASs have become more important, the Air Force has reactivated the 432d Wing as the first MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper wing at Creech Air Force Base, near Las Vegas, NV. The Air Force plans on increasing the number of UASs, which also means an increase in personnel, such as pilots, sensor operators, and maintenance positions, to execute the missions.

As we move into this new era of UASs and UCAVs, it becomes important that the Marine Corps shapes the environment. During the 26-27 April 2007 Conference on Armed UASs held in Las Vegas, the Air Force, Navy, and Army were all scheduled to discuss their emerging armed UAS needs and requirements. And while the Navy may represent the naval requirements, the Marine Corps was conspicuously absent from the agenda. At the January conference, titled "Unmanned Military Systems: Transforming Military Capabilities on Land, Sea, and Air with Autonomous Systems," held in Washington, DC, the Marine Corps again was conspicuously absent until shortly before the event. There were featured speakers, case studies, and briefings from the Army, Navy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, institutions of higher learning, and numerous others, but nothing from or about the Marine Corps. So far this has been more due to a lack of people with UAS subject matter expertise available to attend rather than a lack of interest in UCAS. The Marine Corps' other challenge has been having a platform to weaponize. Now that the Marine Corps is procuring the Shadow UAS, there are several science and technology efforts that we may be able to leverage.

At the September 2007 Marine Corps Executive Offsite, decisions were made that both Tier II and III UASs will reside under the Marine aircraft wing. (Tier II is currently under the division to support the regiment and below.) Doctrinal changes will need to be made to show a change in Type II platforms and utilization as we transition from Pioneer to Shadow. The current UAS concept of operations was approved in March 2007 and will need to be rewritten to reflect these changes.

Conclusion

It seems that the Marine Corps does not currently see UCAVs as a high-priority system for future combat and CAS. Given the limitations on aviation funding that currently exist and that will likely get worse, it makes sense that, given the myriad advantages of UCAVs compared to manned strike aircraft, the Marine Corps should make the development of UCAVs and UCAV squadrons one of its top warfighting priorities. The Air Force and the Army have already proven the utility of UCAVs in combat, both in major combat operations and in asymmetric irregular warfare. The Army will undoubtedly increase its emphasis on UCAV strike and CAS, not only as a logical extension of current combat capability but also as a formidable hedge against potential Air Force encroachment on Army control of UCAVs.

If the Marine Corps is to remain in control of its own destiny and maintain its aura of innovation in combat capabilities and doctrine, we must move to the forefront of UCAV development and employment. It makes sense both fiscally and operationally.

Notes

1. Wikipedia, "History of Unmanned Vehicles," available at wikipedia.org/wiki/umanned_aerial_vehicles.

2. Goebel, Greg, "The Aerial Torpedo," In The Public Domain, available at http://www.vectorsite.net/twcruz_1.html.

3. Reed, Arthur, Brassey's Unmanned Aircraft, Brassey's Publishers Limited, London, 1979, p. 14.

4. Wikipedia, "History of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles," available at wikipedia.org/wiki/ history_of_unmanned_combat_air_vehicles.

5. Heely, RADM Timothy, "USN, U.S. strike drives will demp feasibility of shipboard ops," C^sup 4^ ISR The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare, 5 October 2007, accessible at http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2951263.

Urban Combat Casualty Evacuation

Can we do more for our wounded Marines?

by SgtMaj William Skiles

"First Sergeant!" yelled one of my Marines. "We have wounded Marines! Two priority and one urgent!" I quickly yelled to HM3 Jason Duty, my company corpsman, and to my two security Marines. We immediately got our gear on, grabbed our weapons, and headed to the company command post for details. As we arrived, I was told that Echo Company had four wounded, and two were serious. That meant one thing-the casualty evacuation (CasEvac) team had to get to those wounded Marines as soon as possible I knew that time was blood, and the longer me time spent getting the Marines to the hospital, the less blood they would have to survive.

We were going into the heart of the fight, and we had seriously wounded Marines to evacuate. We ran dvough sniper fire to our awaiting armored "CH-53" HMMWV (air casevac was impossible), started her up, and headed dirough the streets ofFallujah. The trip we embarked on was into the fiercest Grefights our company had faced. The date was 26 April 2004, and we were a part of an operation called VIGILANT RESOLVE. I drove this HMMWV over rubble and small walls to get to my wounded Marines. Doc Duty was always my "A" driver and Cpls Walti and Gibbs always rode in the back to provide security for the wounded. We became a pretty good team. The trip only took about 5 minutes, but it seemed like an hour.

As our vehicle approached the house where the wounded were loca ted, the volume of fire being exchanged between the Marines and the insurgents was incredible. We pulled up, but I had to back the vehicle into a small courtyard to get closer to the wounded. Once we stopped, we all jumped out and ran into the house where the wounded were waiting There was so much tire that Doc Duty literally skated on 5.56mm brass from a Marine's squad automatic weapon and fell to the ground.

We coordinated with the platoon commander and assessed who was more severely wounded. Once we had that figured out, we made three trips to the HMMWV loading the wounded. Meanwhile, Marines all around us were firing at the cyclic ra te to protect our trips to the HMMWV and the wounded who were loaded up waiting to get help. The bad guyswereabout 10 yards away the whole time we were loading the wounded. Constant rocket propelled grenade fire tell on the outside walls of the house. To make matters worse, an insurgent in the minaret of a mosque was sniping at us from the northwest.

When the HMMWV was finally loaded up with five wounded Marines, another was hit. As we were pulling out to head for friendly lines, an enemy grenade hit the top of the vehides hood! It didn't explode. "Thank you, Lord!!" As we drove a way, Doc emptied his pistol toward the bad guys, the boys in back were putting down tire, and I Bred my Ml 6A4 wim one hand out my window.

I drove the vehide like I was Jeff Gordon on a road course. I drove through the alleys and over die same rubble as before We finally made it to a safe zone and stopped atdiebattalion. We stopped only to have the battalion surgeons take a look and offer any quick help. Then the battalion had two combined antiarmor team (CAAT) vehides escort us to the Camp Fallujah hospital, and the great folks of Bravo Surgical took charge.

The Casevac I just described may sound insane, but to get to this point, my crew and I became experts at casualty collection for the company. We knew what to do and how to plan for almost all contingencies. We became a team of men, much like a fire department, awaiting the call to "Go!" Standing operating procedures (SOP) were practiced, rehearsed, and understood fully prior to any engagement. We were highly effective. It wasn't always this way, however.

I was the kind of first sergeant who needed to be with the Marines on the streets, near the fight and assisting the commanding officer (CO). On 26 March 2004, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (2/1) went dismounted into the city of Fallujah and battled the insurgents street by street and block by block. At the time we controlled about one-third of the city. I was patrolling with Marines from the human intelligence exploitation team and a group of snipers toward my company commander's position. All was well. We were getting rid of the bad guys wholesale. The rush was awesome. I became a lance corporal again and loved it. It was precisely then, when I had a Marine shot in the hip by an RPK light machinegunner, that I realized I had screwed up on plans to evacuate these guys. We had discussed it but were too busy with the offensive. This type of information was always included with the five-paragraph order in a sentence something like, "If wounded, use self-aid, buddy aid, or use air casevac procedures through SOP." Luckily, three CAAT vehicles were right there to help, and the Marine was taken to the hospital. If the CAAT hadn't been there at that moment, that Marine would have lost a lot more blood and might have died.

After that battle, I sat down with Capt Douglas Zembiec, CO, Echo Company, and we decided that the company needed a more thorough plan for casevac. I started to put on paper my plans to support the CO s wishes. In this environment, I knew immediately that air casevac was a 100 percent no-go. I watched AH-1W Cobras and UH-1N Hueys almost get knocked out of the sky because of the volume of small arms fire from the close-in urban setting.

First aid classes and combat aids are great for teaching Marines how to quickly take care of one another if wounded. However, Marines need to be able to keep on fighting and let the corpsmen tend to the wounded. So, in a tight urban battle like Fallujah, the corpsmen have an even greater task in keeping these wounded Marines alive alone until a casevac can get them out.

The bottom line is this. I have been through 23 years of resident and nonresident professional military education (PME), various schools from scout/ sniper to drill instructor, and even served with the Royal Marines for a couple years, but I have never been educated on what I faced in those battles-individual and mass casualties, with enemy forces lurking close by. I had never practiced or been taught in any PME school about what I learned there-first aid, casevac, and accountability for both the wounded Marine and his gear. I think we need to look at this type of education at senior warfighting schools for both officers and staff noncommissioned officers.

The intent of this article is to inform leaders of Marines what to think about when it comes to casualties and possible techniques to plan for them. I will say that I'm no expert, but in 7 months I evacuated over 70 Marines from the battlefield; 5 died and over 20 were evacuated out of Iraq because of their wounds. I guess that would at least make me a subject matter expert.

Casevac preparation is made up of three phases-a planning phase, a reaction phase, and an accountability phase. For the planning phase I will use the acronym that we all use to estimate a situation, METT-TSL (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and fire support available-time available, space, logistics). Along with the mission statement, it gives me all the basics I need to start planning the who, what, where, when, and why. I also take this information and start my own map study. I'm looking for accessibility to company locations, staging areas for vehicles that provide response times of 5 minutes or less, and possible routes from the battlefield to the hospital. The enemy situation lets me know how many of them to expect, their strongholds, and their geometry of fires. With this information, I can plan how to get in closer to the wounded if needed. With troops and fire support available, I review the choice of who to use for vehicle security, our routes to and from the surgical teams, and any other assets out there that can assist if needed. Terrain and weather are a big deal due to rubble and obstacles. If it's been raining, or hasn't rained since the beginning of time (especially in Iraq!), driving conditions in both day and night (with night vision goggles) are affected.

Ever try to drive at night with night vision, behind another vehicle, at a rapid rate of speed, when the dust is too thick to describe? Oh, and you have four seriously wounded Marines in the back needing desperate help. I don't wish this on anyone. The third "T" is time. As stated earlier, time is very critical, and you must plan to get the wounded to treatment as soon as possible. Time means response time from the call for casevac to picking up the wounded, getting out of there safely, and dropping off the wounded at the hospital. The "SL," space and logistics, apply to the wounded in the vehicles. Space is needed to get in the tight roads in these cities and maneuver without getting lost or stuck. Space must be planned for all of the wounded Marines' gear and weapons in the vehicles as well. Logistics is based on the vehicles and the equipment needed during the actual casevac.

I learned that the basic military ambulance is worthless in urban Iraq with casualties. It has limited armor, the back can only fit two wounded in like sardines, and there is no room for anyone else to help them while en route to the hospital. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation, administering intravenous (IV) lines, or putting your entire body weight on a guy's artery to stop the bleeding cannot be done in these vehicles. We just used good old hardened high backs for the evacuations. They provide armor, room for the corpsmen to move around, and the ability to stack more than two guys at a time. Better still, you can use two security guys to fire at the enemy from the back if necessary. I wish they could develop a high back with built-in stretchers, folding poles for IVs, and compartments for gear and medical supplies-and make it really armored.

The casualty vehicle must be protected at all costs. If the vehicle gets hit, there are suddenly more wounded, less ability to react, and only a small chance anyone will survive. The vehicle must be staged out of harm's way until needed, and once called, a smart and decisive driver must decide how far to go in to get the wounded. For me, the condition of the wounded was the primary factor. Routine injuries, or the "walking wounded," could travel back to me. If the wounded were in an urgent or priority category, I would always go farthest into the battle but try to keep the vehicle safe. Remember, time is blood.

Plan for the worst and the "what ifs." Communications planning has to be talked about as well. Most communications between units will be close in this environment. The problem is being in buildings. Practice all types of communications in various types of structures using the radios available to your unit. Know their limitations and ranges before you actually have to use them. You must have day and night no-communications plans as well. Use infrared or pyrotechnics to let someone know of wounded if your communications break down. Also, know all adjacent units. They can assist you if you can't get through to your own casevac vehicle.

Plan each individual's responsibilities during a casevac and know each other's jobs. Plan for your vehicle to go down, and have a bump plan with another vehicle staged and ready to go. Plan to collect all gear at the hospital and have each Marine carry an equipment description list (EDL) card listing all of his serialized gear in the butt stock of his rifle. For Marines carrying pistols, put the EDL cards in the spare magazine pouches on their holsters. Plan to work with the hospital staff on the status of injuries and locations of the wounded. One rule I follow is this-you can never plan enough.

I call the next phase the reaction phase because that's what you will always have to do-react. Each time I got the call for casevac, I had to react to the situation, and each situation was different. On 12 April we had to react to over 12 wounded Marines at the same time, while the enemy was engaging our positions pretty heavily. On 21 April we had to react to a single Marine who was shot through the throat and barely alive. On casevac duty you can never control enemy fire and who might get hurt, so you are always going to be in reaction mode.

The reaction phase begins with your unit's casevac SOP. Some use code words, matrices, or checklists. We were more direct. Our call sign was "Warhammer," and I was "Warhammer 8." That to me was still too confusing. I kept it as simple as it could get. "First Sergeant!" meant it was time to roll. I would always ask for the number of wounded, their classifications, and their adjusted locations. Then it was my decision on how and where to go into the battle. I drove my vehicle, and I wouldn't have it any other way. Leaders must drive in this environment and operational theater. The main focus of effort for your "reaction" to killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action is twofold.

Number one What is the nature of the wounded from severe to slight? If you have Marines in an urgent or priority status, you have to go! Remember, time is blood. Routine or walking wounded do not need the casevac team to swing into high gear. Their wounds can wait until the battle stops or slows. There is no reason in the world to bring those precious casevac vehicles into harm's way if not needed. Again, all Marines need to understand the nature of wounds and reporting classifications in order to quickly relay this essential information in a few seconds instead of letting precious moments go by while Marines either lose blood or while the casevac team takes unnecessary risks.

Number two. How many are wounded, killed, etc.? This information will send different numbers of casevac vehicles. In other words, if there are four wounded, two urgent and two routine, you can use one HMMWV. With eight wounded, you will need two HMMWVs. This requires additional SOP training, etc. Always plan for massive casualties. You can always react smaller.

The next phase is the accountability phase. You have brought the wounded Marines or KIAs to the hospital. Now what? Where is the KIAs gear, weapon, night vision goggles, global positioning system, etc.? What do you do with his dog tags, identification card, wallet, and other personal stuff on his body and gear? This Marine also has personal gear back at the base. You might have 10 wounded Marines at once, gear all over the place, flak jackets in the vehicles, helmets back with the unit, weapons only who knows where, and all of this happens at night-in the pitch black-chaos maybe? The need to get these Marines to medical treatment is the priority, but someone must have a cool, calm head to think past the blood and chaos. While the professional medical teams are attending to the Marines' needs, they don't need other Marines losing control, aimlessly walking around the hospital hallways causing distractions.

So, focus on each wounded or dead Marine's things, focus on his location, and assist with administrative-type information for the doctors. Blood type comes to mind. I had many Marines with missing dog tags. You have to have blood type information available at all times. I would not recommend writing important information like blood type on a Marine's utilities. The utilities are going to be cut off of him with serious injuries anyway. So be prepared administratively to assist with the wounded, KIA identification, and with the EDL cards in place. Have other Marines who assisted in the casevac organize all of the gear for each and every Marine. I used to make piles of gear for each Marine and have a guard on these piles until all was accounted for and we moved out.

Again, this article is designed to inform and, hopefully, educate and warn of the hazards to your Marines who fall in harm's way and the leader's responsibility to them. I think every day of the seriously wounded and dead Marines whom I had to evacuate and wonder if I could have done something more to accomplish this grave task. Could I have driven more quickly? Could I have reacted more quickly to the calls for casevac? I hope this article gives you the strength to arm yourselves to answer these questions before the time comes.