JULY 2009

Professionalizing the Marine NCO Corps

They deserve consideration as professionals

by Earl J. Catagnus, Jr.

>Mr. Catagnus is a former infantry Marine staff NCO who served during the November 2004 battle for Fallujah. He is now pursuing a Ph.D. in military history at Temple University, Philadelphia, PA.

The late political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, created a conceptual framework for defining a “military professional.” He suggests that a military professional has three consistent characteristics—expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. For someone to be considered a military professional, these characteristics must not only be displayed by each individual, but they must also be institutionalized within the military organization. For Huntington, expertise is demonstrated through experience, education, and training. Professionals have a responsibility to the society that they serve and must operate within its written and unwritten laws. The synthesis of expertise and responsibility allows for the formation of a collective where military professionals self-identify as separate from comparable civilian occupations.1

Huntington argues that only the officer corps displays these three characteristics. The enlisted ranks are “tradesmen” applying “technical skills” to the battlefield and are not professionals. He opines:

The ranks which exist in the enlisted corps do not constitute a professional hierarchy...movement up and down them is much more fluid than in the officer corps....The education and training necessary for officership are normally incompatible with prolonged service as an enlisted man.2

His views of the enlisted ranks were formed in the 1950s when the American military was largely a conscript force. Since most draftees served 2 years, the training and education of enlisted troops were basic at most and hardly intellectual. In the early 1950s the U.S. Army attempted to modernize its noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps with several programs that emphasized both service and a liberal education.3 This, however, did not change the standard practice of individual unit commanders promoting and demoting NCOs based solely on their estimate of the NCOs’ performance. Published in 1957, The Soldier and the State accurately describes the American military’s enlisted ranks of that era. In contrast to NCOs, officers in the 1950s volunteered for service, went through general liberal arts university programs, and attended different Service and branch schools to gain expertise.4

According to Huntington, officers are “managers of violence,” and military professionals are restricted to combat arms military occupational specialties. Noncombat occupational specialists, such as doctors, lawyers, and logisticians, are not considered military professionals. He suggests they are “not capable of the management of violence, just as none of the specialists aiding the medical profession is capable of the diagnosis and treatment of illness.” For instance, a logistician’s primary duty does not include finding more effective methods to fight an infantry platoon but does determine the most efficient means for supplying that platoon. This does not mean the logistician is not professional. Nor does it suggest that a logistician faced with a combat situation would crumble under fire. It does mean, however, that the logistician’s specialty is not the management of violence; therefore, the logistician is not a military professional. Similarly, enlisted artillerymen, assault amphibious vehicle crewmen, and combat engineers are more “technicians.” They support the infantry and usually are placed under the direction of the supported infantry commander whether he is an officer or staff NCO. Collectively, they do not fall into Huntington’s categorization of a military professional.5

Huntington’s seminal book was written when the draft was still in place, the Cold War was in its most heated phase, and the images of massed armies clashing in epic battles were seared into the memory of all Americans. Both the military and the enemies of the United States have drastically changed since Huntington’s writing. Why is Huntington’s book still influential when discussing the idea of professional military forces? The reason is that his conceptual framework is still valid. Huntington’s three characteristics of military professionalism are still used as the metric to gauge whether a military force is professional. In the U.S. military, the group of military professionals has grown beyond Huntington’s limited claim that officers are its exclusive constituents. There is no doubt that 21st century NCOs, specifically U.S. Marine Corps infantry NCOs, fit Huntington’s criteria.

Marine infantry NCOs demonstrate expertise as indicated by their level of experience, training, and education. Most Marine infantry NCOs have completed at least one, most likely two, combat tours to either Iraq or Afghanistan. They experienced combat in urban, suburban, desert, and mountainous terrains. They participated in the full spectrum of 21st century warfare by conducting combat, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian operations. The current redeployment of Marines from Al Anbar, Iraq to Afghanistan is introducing a new cohort of Marines to a wholly different fighting environment, thus furthering their level of experience. The training of infantry NCOs has improved exponentially since the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. The revamped Squad Leaders Course, Exercise MOJAVE VIPER, close combat marksmanship courses, increased realistic training programs, and modernized professional military education (PME) courses all have produced an infantry NCO prepared for the 21st century “three block war.”

The responsibility of Marine NCOs has increased rapidly in recent years. The nature of the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan forces officers to trust their enlisted subordinates with the execution of missions that impact national-level strategy and policy. This is a profound development predicted by Gen Charles C. Krulak in 1999 when he wrote about the emergence of the “strategic corporal.”6 The tasks currently given to Marine infantry NCOs were traditionally carried out by officers. With these tasks comes the inherent responsibility for their completion. Before Iraq and Afghan-

istan, infantry NCOs were not entrusted with the responsibility of managing violence on the scale now thought commonplace. In “Distributed Operations: Is the Marine Corps Ready?” then-Maj Michael D. Grice argues for NCOs to be “empowered to make the decisions necessary to leverage the strengths of the MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] over the enemy.”7 Grice suggests there is a need for more responsibility to be placed upon small unit leaders and that this is the future trend in Marine Corps battle leadership. No other Service relies more upon its NCO corps. For infantry NCOs, the responsibility requirement for Huntington’s professionals is fulfilled.
Marine NCOs continually maintain a sense of corporateness, or collective identity, unknown to most branches of the Armed Forces. It is well known throughout the Marine Corps that NCOs are its backbone. Marine NCOs are the only NCOs authorized to carry a sword—a tradition that signifies their segregation from both officers and enlisted non-NCOs. There is a spiritual transition in a Marine’s career when the blood stripes are “pinned on.” Upon promotion, a lance corporal enters into a select group filled with its own tradition and folklore. This imagined collective identity clearly signifies that corporateness is present among Marine NCOs.

There are, however, two areas where Marine NCOs do not match the criteria set forth by Huntington. The first is the length of service. Huntington argues that a military professional can only be considered a professional if he stays in for an entire career. Most Marine NCOs do not remain in the Marine Corps beyond their first enlistment. But those who make the Marine Corps a career would be considered, according to Huntington, military professionals. The second cri-
terion where Marine infantry NCOs are lacking is education. Huntington argues that a liberal education (a liberal arts college degree) is an essential element in being labeled a military professional. The vast majority of Marine infantry NCOs do not have college degrees. A liberal education broadens the mind and allows for the military professional to adapt quickly to situations needing a depth and breadth of knowledge in math, science, history, and the human condition.8

Public education has changed significantly since the 1950s when Huntington wrote The Soldier and the State. The introduction of standards-based education and research-based educational innovations exponentially increased the amount of material taught to students.9 It is not uncommon for a student upon graduation from high school to have taken college-level courses in math, science, and history. Although this may be true of some, it is unlikely that the majority or even a significant portion of NCOs took these classes. Marine NCOs, however, are exposed to a large amount of knowledge that was only taught in college during the 1950s. Therefore, on a rudimentary level, NCOs are recipients of a liberal education as envisioned by Huntington.

In addition to having a liberal education, Huntington suggests that military professionals must use that education to advance their profession. Military professionals engage in doctrinal development; create and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures; and collect and disseminate lessons learned during operations and training.10 NCOs, for the most part, have taken a leading role in the latter two functions. As evidence, one only has to glance through the back issues of the Marine Corps Gazette. Combat hardened NCOs are writing about their experiences in an attempt to improve the infantry.

NCOs have not participated in the former function—doctrinal development. The decentralized battlefield requires squad leaders and fire team leaders to make strategic-level decisions and execute those decisions beyond any officer’s observation. Officers, therefore, do not know exactly what is happening at the squad and fire team levels. They may infer or hypothesize to conceptualize this experience, but except in special circumstances, officers do not participate in this lower level action. The disconnect between officers and NCOs is imposed by the reality of the situation and not by any flaw in military hierarchy or organizational charts. NCOs must be active participants in doctrine formation in order for doctrine to remain pragmatic and effective. Currently, junior officers and NCOs are solicited to contribute but not be an integral part of doctrine development. One reason for this is that most NCOs are not familiar with Marine Corps doctrine.

Only a handful of squad leaders and fire team leaders have heard of Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1), Warfighting, and MCDP 1–3, Tactics. Even worse is that most platoon sergeants and platoon commanders only have limited experiences with the two and have not made a detailed study of either. The current Marine Corps PME system is deficient in dealing with their teaching. Marine Corps Institute courses do not promote the indepth and critical thinking necessary for their breakdown and understanding. How can NCOs participate in doctrine development if they do not know it exists? The answer is they cannot.11

It is crucial for NCOs to read these publications, understand them, and internalize their guidance. For example, during the November 2004 battle of Fallujah, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines fought an asymmetrical enemy that used a variety of tactics and techniques. These tactics and techniques were not fully anticipated prior to the assault on the city. This situation forced individual Marines, fire team leaders, and squad leaders to be creative, to improvise, and to adapt to an ever-changing tactical environment. They accomplished the mission and learned through trial and error important principles and concepts that forever guided their tactical decisions.12 Most of these general principles and concepts were already in place as Marine Corps doctrine and could have been found in MCDP 1 and MCDP 1–3. The NCOs, however, did not know they existed and were unable to benefit from the knowledge contained in these publications.

There is a simple solution that could rectify this deficiency in Marine Corps training and education. A 3-day “Professional Warfighters Course” could be run at the battalion level that would both familiarize junior officers and NCOs with current doctrine and increase their fighting efficiency. The course should include all platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and fire team leaders. There is a critical need for junior leaders to connect intellectually prior to entering a combat zone. In the Forward to the 1997 edition of MCDP 1, Gen Krulak commanded every Marine “enlisted and commissioned—to read this book, understand it, and act upon it.”13 The inherent complexity of the counterinsurgency battles in Iraq and Afghanistan requires all ranks to be able to “think” as well as shoot, move, and communicate. The decentralized nature of future warfare only compounds this need.

The Professional Warfighters Course would provide a unique opportunity to build an intellectual connection with all leaders in an infantry platoon. PMEs and field training evolutions do not allow for this type of mental interaction. Generally, PMEs are structured to separate officers and NCOs and teach skills necessary for the accomplishment of their respective duties. Field training focuses on specific tactics, techniques, and procedures projected to defeat a conventional or nonconventional foe. The Professional Warfighters Course, however, would place all ranks together in an educational environment designed to stimulate critical thinking and problem-solving skills. This would allow platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders, and fire team leaders to understand how each individual thinks. By connecting mentally with one another, the platoon’s leaders would learn to trust each other’s decisions. On the battlefield, trusting one’s subordinates and superiors translates into reduced reaction time.14

Instructors for the course should be drawn directly from the battalion to decrease the need for external support. Company commanders and officers who attended the resident Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) are outstanding choices for instructors. Graduation from the resident EWS demonstrates an individual’s understanding of Marine Corps doctrine as well as personal cognitive ability. Using company commanders as instructors has the added benefit of demonstrating their expertise to all of the battalion’s leaders. This promotes an atmosphere of trust between superiors and subordinates that will decrease the amount of friction in combat.

For the first 2 days of the course, instructors would teach the major principles contained in MCDP 1 and MCDP 1–3. One day should be dedicated to each manual, and every chapter should be taught and discussed in an open forum. The third and final day would attempt to connect the previous 2 days of doctrine to the modern battlefield. Critical thinking and creativity on the battlefield, initiative in combat, and leadership classes would be taught in the morning. The culmination of the course would be a training evolution without troops conducted in the afternoon on the final day. To provide incentive for participation in the course, all attendees should be awarded a completion certificate. This is similar to the completion certificate awarded to graduates of battalion run NCO leadership courses, such as Corporal’s Course. Table 1 is an example of a tentative course schedule.

After the successful integration of infantry NCOs in doctrinal development, most, if not all, of the requirements for professionalization will have been met. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations articulates a clear definition of military professionals. They are managers of violence who demonstrate expertise, responsibility, and a corporate identity. Huntington denied the enlisted corps this designation in 1957 because they did not meet the criteria. Current Marine infantry NCOs, however, are on the brink of warranting this distinction. Marine general officers recognize the need for enlisted Marines and NCOs to read, internalize, and apply the principles eschewed by MCDP 1 and MCDP 1–3. Unfortunately, at the grassroots “boots on the ground” level, that need is still largely ignored. Commanders must take corrective action to remedy this shortfall. A possible solution is the Professional Warfighters Course. Executed within the infantry battalion and utilizing organic resources, the course would be an easy addition to a predeployment workup. Engaging infantry small unit leaders in intellectually stimulating activities will increase battlefield effectiveness, decrease decision and reaction time, and increase unit cohesion. Marine infantry NCOs stand on the cusp of attaining this unique title—military professional. The Marine Corps should take the necessary steps to propel them forward into this exclusive club.

Notes

1. Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1957, pp. 1–18.

2. Ibid.

3. Arms, L.R., “A Short History of the Army NCO,” NCO Museum Staff, available at www.ArmyStudyGuide.com, November 1989.

4. Huntington, p. 18.

5. Ibid., p.12. For a complete discussion of the definition of a military professional, see Huntington, pp. 12–14.

6. Krulak, Gen Charles C., “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999.

7. Grice, Maj Michael D., “Distributed Operations: Is the Marine Corps Ready?” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2008, p. 21.

8. Huntington, pp. 11–12.

9. Bransford, John D., Ann L. Brown, and Rodney R. Cocking, ed., How People Learn: Brain, Mind, and Experience, School Expanded Edition, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 233–247.

10. Huntington, p. 8.

11. In 2005 the author made attempts to rectify this shortfall in his infantry battalion (3d Battalion, 5th Marines) by proposing the implementation of a Professional Warfighters Course. There was initial approval from the senior leadership, but the conduct of the course was never executed.

12. Catagnus, Earl L., Jr., et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 2005, pp. 80–89.

13. MCDP 1, Warfighting , Headquarters Marine Corps, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1997, Forward by Gen Krulak.

14. Holmes, Richard, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle, Free Press, New York, 1989, pp. 332–333.

Additional Resources

"The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War" by Gen Charles C. Krulak; Marines Magazine, January 1999

"Distributed Operations: Is the Marine Corps Ready?" by Maj Michael D. Grice; Marine Corps Gazette, March 2008, Pg. 21

"Infantry Squad Tactics" by Earl L. Catagnus, et al.; Marine Corps Gazette, September 2005, pp. 80-89