by Peter F. Lydens
>Mr. Lydens, a former corporal and a member of the Marine Corps Reserve unit in Grand Rapids, MI, served on active duty with the Marine Corps from 5 August 1950 to 10 January 1952, including 1 year with the 1st Combat Service Group (Forward), Fleet Marine Force Pacific, attached to the 1st MarDiv in North and South Korea. After finishing his education at the University of Michigan with a bachelor’s degree in urban community and a master’s degree in public administration, he served as a city manager and senior-level local government management consultant. He presently lives in Mount Airy, NC, where he conducts pro bono consulting services for the City of Mount Airy and the Greater Mount Airy Chamber of Commerce.
Can it be so? While most Marines and many others are aware that by Federal statute, members of the United States Marine Band, “The President’s Own,” are exempt from recruit training, few Marines and even fewer others are aware that an estimated 8,500 Marines in the 20th century Marine Corps never went to boot camp. These were no-prior-servicemembers of the Marine Corps Reserve who were mobilized for active duty at the beginning of the Korean War in 1950. It is almost gospel that when two Marines—active, Reserve, or veteran—meet for the first time, the question of where they went to boot camp comes up in the first 5 minutes of conversation. When a Marine veteran states that he did not go to either the Parris Island or San Diego Recruit Depots, his fellow Marine gets a look of disbelief, especially when that fellow Marine determines that the Marine in question was neither an officer nor a member of the United States Marine Band.
Since the subject title is a little known anomaly in the history of the Marine Corps, it is time that an explanation is written for the purpose of clarifying the subject issue for all present, including Marine veterans, future United States Marines, and those, of whom there are many, persons who are devoted fans of the Marine Corps but have never served in the Corps.
Who Were They?
The Marines who never went to boot camp were the no-prior-service reservists with more than 1 but less than 2 years of satisfactory service in an organized Reserve unit who needed additional training. (See Mobilization Classification section below.) These personnel were assigned to:
• The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th Replacement Drafts for replacement and expansion purposes of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) (1st MarDiv
(Rein)) and attached units, and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW).
• The continental security forces to help restore the 50 percent reduction in those forces caused by the stripping of those forces of regulars to help fill out the 1st MarDiv(Rein) and attached units.
• The overseas security detachments to replace regulars on a man-to-man basis to make such regulars available for assignment to the 1st MarDiv
(Rein) and attached units.
• A number of other domestic and overseas positions of a high-priority nature in the eyes of Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in the early stage of the Korean War.
When GEN Douglas MacArthur requested first the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), and a short time later the 1st MarDiv(Rein), and attached units to bolster the not too successful showing of the United States Army and Republic of Korea forces battling the North Korean Peoples Army shortly after the beginning of the Korean War, which began on 25 June 1950, it was necessary to call to active duty every ground Marine Corps organized Reserve unit, as well as a substantial portion of the Reserve aviation units. The manpower from these units was badly needed to complete the manning of a wartime strength Marine division, along with a MAW, and attached forces. The regular Marine Corps establishment at the outbreak of the Korean War was woefully understrength due to an ultraconservative Secretary of Defense, a President who was not a fan of the Corps, and a Congress with higher spending priorities. Even stripping the 2d MarDiv of almost all of its Marines, and doing the same for the stations and other installations in the Marine Corps, there were not enough men to meet the requested manpower need without calling on the Marine Reserves.
The callup of the ground and air Reserve units, as discussed above, and most of the volunteer Marine Reserve personnel (those prior-service reservists not assigned to a specific organized Reserve unit) was necessary to fill out the division, the air wing, and attached organizations, as well as to establish a pool of personnel to replace expected casualties and to replace Marine Corps continental and overseas security personnel, as discussed above.
The Reserve units available in the summer of 1950 were made up of both World War II (WWII) veterans, primarily from the Marine Corps, and young men primarily in the 17- to 21-year-old age bracket with no prior service. Unlike the present-day Reserve Marine units, which require all enlisted personnel to have active duty experience including formal recruit training (boot camp), young men then were recruited for Reserve unit participation without any prior service or training in the Marine Corps. They were expected to learn to become Marines by attending weekly 2-hour drill sessions and 2-week summer training periods. Most post-WWII Reserve units were established in 1947 and 1948. The prior-service Marines in the Reserve units were expected to informally mentor the new young recruits as a supplement to the formal training program possible with limited time at weekly 2-hour drills and 2-week summer training periods. By doing so, the ethos of the Marine Corps was infused into the new Reserve unit recruits. Basic skill training relevant to the military occupational specialty (MOS) assigned to the young no-prior-service reservists was absorbed during the weekly drills and summer training periods.
Number of Subject Marines
As to the number of personnel who became the Marines who never went to boot camp, according to HQMC and specifically the Historical Branch, G–3 (Operations) Division, 28,693 enlisted personnel assigned to ground and air units of the organized Marine Reserve reported in at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune upon mobilization. An estimated 30 percent of those were no-prior-service personnel classified as not ready for combat (additional training needed). This would translate to an estimated 8,608 personnel in the subject category. Subtract those relevant personnel who failed the physical exam in the in-processing procedure or for some other reason would be discharged for the good of the Service and 8,500 would be a sound net estimate. The number might have been greater except for two factors. The first was that the prevalent organized Reserve enlistment period was for 2 years, though 3- and 4-year enlistment periods were also available. This meant that many organized Reserve personnel who had enlisted in the first 6 months of 1948, who did not reenlist, were discharged during the first 6 months of 1950. The second was that, though not normally publicized, it was possible for a reservist to request an early discharge from the organized Reserve, and some reservists took advantage of that option, which was not revoked until 20 July 1950, over 3 weeks after North Korea had invaded South Korea and 1 day after formal intent to mobilize the Reserve units was sent out. Fortunately, comparatively few enlisted Marine reservists took advantage of the delay in freezing discharges on their own request after the Korean War started.
One decision by the Congress made it possible for the Marine Reserve “short timers,” those who had less than 1 year to go on their enlistments, to serve during the Korean War. On 27 July 1950, 1-year extensions to all Marine Reserve enlistments that were to expire prior to 9 July 1951 were authorized by the Congress and implemented by the President.
Mobilization Classification
Classification officers accomplished mobilization classification at the time of in-processing at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. The classifications follow:
• Combat ready. All prior-service personnel, plus no-prior-service personnel with 2 years Reserve membership with at least 1 summer training period and attendance at a minimum of 72 two-hour weekly drill sessions or 2 summer training periods and attendance at a minimum of 36 two-hour weekly drill sessions.
• Noncombat ready (additional training needed). Over 1 year’s service in the organized Reserve, but less than 2 years, and satisfactory weekly 2-hour drill attendance.
• Noncombat ready (recruit training needed). Less than 1-year service in the organized Reserve and/or poor attendance at the 2-hour weekly drill sessions.
A problem that made the application of the above criteria somewhat skewed toward noncombat ready (additional training needed) status was caused by the combat ready requirement of a minimum of 2 years service in the organized Reserve for no-prior-service personnel. Many of the organized Reserve units had not been established for 2 years at the time of mobilization. So even if a no-prior-service Marine reservist enlisted on the first day of operation of such Reserve units and had two summer training periods and the required minimum number of weekly drills, he would be placed into the noncombat ready (additional training needed) category.
Another problem was lost or misplaced personnel records or incomplete personnel records that made it difficult for the classification officers to assure that reservists were placed in the most advantageous category for the good of the Marine Corps and themselves. In this situation, the classification officers had to objectively solicit the missing information orally from the reservist, no easy feat when a young gung ho reservist was eager to be classified as combat ready, though he really wasn’t, thereby jeopardizing not only his future but that of the other members of his future organizational unit and the unit’s mission.
Part of the procedure of the interview by a classification officer for the personnel assigned to the top two of the three categories at Camp Pendleton allowed for resolution of the above problems to some extent. The interviewing classification officer, after quickly reviewing the personnel file available or accumulating missing information if the personnel file was missing or incomplete, made an objective classification decision but then asked the reservist if he believed he had been properly classified. For these reservists, this was not a proforma question. Each man in the ready for combat category was informed that no prejudicial interpretation would be taken toward any Marine who believed he needed additional training before being assigned to a replacement draft or other unit. Those assigned to the additional training needed subcategory of the not ready for combat classification were allowed to attempt to convince the interviewing classification officer that they were combat ready, but no pressure was brought upon the personnel in that subcategory to do so. Anecdotal evidence of this procedure reflects that most Marines used sound judgment during this procedure, though it would appear that a small number of no-prior-service Marine reservists overestimated the value of meeting for 2 hours per week and attending a 2-week summer training period, and some of the early arriving no-prior-service Marine reservists even ended up being assigned to the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) and the Pre-1st Replacement Draft. The interviewing classification officer also had the authority to change the MOS of the Marine reservists being interviewed depending on the immediate needs of the Marine Corps, supported by data in the reservists’ personnel files. In many cases the present needs of the Corps trumped the MOS that reservists had held in their Reserve units prior to mobilization. Such action, as relevant, impacted the classification decision.
This classification interview process was not foolproof. But for the very great majority of those receiving the interviews at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune, it worked out well for both the reservists and the Marine Corps.
Replacement Drafts
Starting at the beginning of August with a Pre-1st Replacement Draft, periodic numbered replacement drafts were scheduled to bring the 1st MarDiv(Rein) with attached units and the 1st MAW up to full strength and maintain them at a wartime level. Those replacement drafts that involved the Marines who never went to boot camp are discussed below. While it is conceivable that a few of the subject Marines, those in the very earliest Reserve units arriving at Camp Pendleton after mobilization, somehow became members of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) and Pre-1st Replacement Draft, it is highly unlikely that the number was significant.
The 1st Replacement Draft, which left San Diego on 1 October and arrived in Wonsan, North Korea, on 6 November, was made up of prior-service Reserve personnel not arriving in time for assignment to the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) or the Pre-1st Replacement Draft, with a small number of no-prior-service reservists who arrived at Camp Pendleton early enough to receive 4 weeks of advanced infantry training prior to assignment to the 1st Replacement Draft.
The 2d Replacement Draft, which left San Diego on 15 October, consisted mostly of no-prior-service Marine reservists who had just completed, like their counterparts in the 1st Replacement Draft, a focused 4 weeks of advanced infantry training. Thus, this unit was the first to contain a large number of the Marines who never went to boot camp. After having spent several days at Camp Otsu, Japan, for further processing and prior to reembarking for North Korea, almost all of them ended up arriving in the harbor of Wonsan, North Korea, on 10 November 1950, the 175th Birthday of the Marine Corps, and after an administrative landing the next day, were disbursed to the various units of the 1st MarDiv(Rein) and related units that they had been assigned to. The close arrival dates at Wonsan Harbor of the 1st and 2d Replacement Drafts (only 4 days) can be explained by the fact that the 1st Replacement Draft vessels could not enter the harbor until the multitude of mines installed by North Korea could be safely removed or detonated.
The 3d Replacement Draft left San Diego in mid-November, the bulk of which arrived in Hungnam, North Korea, in mid-December, in time for some of them to take part in the Chosin-Hungnam-Wonsan campaign, while others were ordered to reembark aboard ship to be taken to Pusan, South Korea, for further assignment with the 1st MarDiv(Rein)) and attached units in the Masan, South Korea, area. This draft contained a high percentage of the remainder of the no-prior-service Marine reservists who needed additional training, who were unavailable for the 2d Replacement Draft because of various temporary duty assignments. These personnel went through somewhat longer advanced infantry training than the personnel assigned to the 1st and 2d Replacement Drafts (anecdotal evidence reflects at least 8 weeks).
The 4th Replacement Draft, which was scheduled to leave San Diego on 30 November, contained a significant number of the no-prior-service Marine reservists who had been given specialized training at wire (telephone) and radio schools or otherwise had been assigned to longer temporary assignments that did not allow them to sail with the 2d or 3d Replacement Drafts and thereby were also among the Marines who never went to boot camp. But now the most recently recruited Marine reservists prior to mobilization, those whose initial duty assignment was recruit training at the San Diego or Parris Island Marine Recruit Depots, were available and began filling up the replacement drafts, beginning with the 4th Replacement Draft, after also going through advanced infantry training of a length similar to that of the 3d Replacement Draft. Due to Chinese Communist Forces entering the Korean War, the embarkation date for the 4th Replacement Draft was cancelled, and it was combined with the 5th Replacement Draft, which embarked from San Diego on 25 January 1951 and arrived in Pohang, South Korea, on 16 February 1951. Those no-prior-service Marine reservists were the last of the Marines who never went to boot camp.
Scuttlebutt About Makeup Boot Camp
While I found no evidence of a formal adopted policy for makeup recruit training for the Marines who never went to boot camp, there was much scuttlebutt about the subject. Among the various scuttlebutt were the following ideas:
• Set up a modified boot camp in Japan and rotate the subject Marines stationed in Korea and Japan to it after a specific number of months of overseas duty.
• The same idea only to Marine Recruit Depot San Diego upon rotation back to the United States for all overseas assigned personnel.
• Set up a modified boot camp in the Pusan-Masan, South Korea, area for the subject Marines in Korea, rotating them in and out as logical.
• Assign the subject Marines to the San Diego Marine Recruit Depot between their return from overseas and prior to release from active duty or discharge.
Anecdotal evidence reported one attempt on having an abbreviated boot camp for the subject Marines aboard a replacement draft troop transport, but bad weather caused this to be terminated after 2 days. It appears that boot camp was informally initiated. Fortunately, wiser heads at HQMC believed that none of those alternatives (and others that I never heard about) made enough sense to dedicate always limited fiscal, manpower, and operational resources to, especially since the bulk of the subject Marines would be spending or had spent a year or more in overseas service. And one can only imagine the reaction of a subject Marine who had served in Korea being given recruit training upon returning to the United States by a fellow Marine who had not yet served in Korea. Since the subject category applied to only a limited number of Marines during a limited number of months, and the Marine Corps wished to return the reservists to civilian status as soon as organizational and operational circumstances allowed, more than likely it was concluded by HQMC that the “on the job” experience compensated for the lack of the traditional and formal recruit training so dear to the hearts of Marines past and present.
Conclusion
I have never heard of a subject category Marine who regretted not having the opportunity of going through boot camp training at Parris Island or San Diego. I, like the others in the subject category, am rather proud of my unique status and the fact that the Marine Corps had faith in the Marines who never went to boot camp to serve honorably, loyally, and effectively as United States Marines. |
