Guantanamo Bay

The seizure of Guantanamo Bay by U.S. Marines played a more significant role in the Spanish American War than most historians have noted.

The capture of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the U.S. Marines during the Spanish American War may have had greater impact on the direction of the war, and possibly even on its outcome and the subsequent development of world history, than has been recognized in most historical assessments. It is my contention that the U.S. Army was in trouble in Cuba and that they could have been defeated, at least at Santiago, had additional Spanish troops from Guantanamo City entered the battle. The fact that these enemy forces did not join the fighting around Santiago was due in large measure to the U.S. Marines having captured Guantanamo Bay.

When the war erupted in April 1898, America's strategy was to blockade the south coast of Cuba in order to intercept Adm Pasqual Cervera's fleet, which was headed for Cuba with supplies. The elusive admiral managed, however, to steam through the Caribbean undetected, but his deficient coal supply and the knowledge that his American pursuers had a fix on his general location, convinced him to put in at Santiago de Cuba instead of proceeding to Havana. There Cervera knew he would find coal and a road and telegraph link to the Cuban capital.

Cervera managed to slip undetected into Santiago on 19 May 1898. Within 48 hours, Adm William T. Sampson, the commander of the North Atlantic fleet, sent orders to Commo [Commodore] Winfield Scott Schley of the Flying Squadron to proceed from his location off Cienfuegos to Santiago in order to confirm reports that the Spanish fleet was there. Two events involving Schley over the next week subsequently contributed to the Navy Department deciding to establish a naval base at Guantanamo--an excellent natural harbor about 40 miles east of Santiago. First, Schley had terrible problems trying to coal his vessels from colliers in swollen waters as he proceeded to Santiago. Secondly, while off Santiago on 26 May, he confirmed that Cervera was there. Once hearing this, Sampson, at the direction of Navy Secretary John Long, wired back to Schley, "Send a ship to examine Guantanamo with view to occupying it as a base . . . ." The commodore, however, remained in his position off Santiago. There is no evidence to suggest that Schley disapproved of Guantanamo as a coaling station. Instead, he most likely determined that he could not spare any of his vessels in case Cervera tried to escape from Santiago.

With Cervera in the harbor and with the knowledge that Spanish forces controlled the area around Santiago, Navy Secretary Long addressed a note to War Secretary Russell Alger inquiring about what plans the Army had to land forces around that port. On 31 May, Long sent a dispatch to Sampson, notifying him that the Army was about to embark 25,000 men to Cuba and requesting recommendations of sites suitable for landing the troops near Santiago. In the same message, Secretary Long asked, "Will not Guantanamo, Cuba, be the best site for landing the cavalry?"

Gen William Shafter, who had been placed in charge of the Army expeditionary force on 29 April, thought the Army should land at Daiquiri or Sibony which are nearer Santiago. He also felt that by landing closer to these towns he could reach El Caney and intercept any Spanish reinforcements from Guantanamo City. As one of Shafter's men later wrote:

It seemed most probable that the Spanish would begin a general concentration of their forces toward Santiago the moment that this city was to be General Shafter's objective. This being true, it is plain that General Shafter's Army, operating in front of Santiago from Sibony as a base, would be in a most favorable position to prevent the junction of the Spanish Army at Guantanamo with that of Santiago.

While Spanish forces existed in large numbers at other locations around Santiago, the 6,000 Spanish troops under Gen Felix Pareja at Guantanamo City, 15 miles north of Guantanamo Bay, were nearer than any other body of enemy forces and thus they most concerned the Army.

Navy Secretary Long was not pleased with Shafter's choice. Long felt that both spots recommended by the general had disadvantages due to their exposure to trade winds and high seas, to say nothing of their exposure to enemy fire from nearby hills. Obvious, too, Long was thinking of an invasion site that would facilitate both the Navy and Army. But Gen Shafter's reading of Lord [Edward] Vernon's account of the British attempt to capture Santiago via Guantanamo in 1741, convinced him of its impossibility. The British mistake was to establish a base 50 miles from their objective. Thus, the troops exhausted themselves in the march and in the construction of roads. The rotund Shatter, who feared exhaustion and disease anyway from the oppressive tropical summer in Cuba, believed that every minute less spent in the rain and heat was an advantage to the American forces. Furthermore, to have launched the campaign from Guantanamo would have meant Shafter's forces had to pass through the 12,000 Spanish troops between Guantanamo Bay and Santiago. As Herbert Sargent, an Army colonel who served in Cuba with Shafter observed, Shatter would have had to defeat Pareja at Guantanamo City on his way to Santiago or risk the Spanish attacking the American forces from the rear once the engagement at Santiago began. Of course, the Spanish could still attack from the rear if Shafter landed at his two choices near Santiago rather than Guantanamo, but the general was banking on the element of surprise. He knew that Pareja would immediately know about the American attack on Santiago had Shafter landed at Guantanamo Bay but might not learn of it until after the fact if he landed at Santiago—particularly if the Cuban insurgents could cut the telegraph lines and other Spanish communications between Santiago and Guantanamo City. As it turned out, by the time Shafter finally got his forces to Cuba three weeks later, all Pareja's communications with Spanish military headquarters had been severed, and the Spanish forces at Guantanamo City did not know of the American attack until after its initial success. Thus, the much criticized Shafter made the right decision in not selecting Guantanamo as his base for Army operations. From the Navy's standpoint, however, Guantanamo Bay was still the superior harbor for a naval base and coaling facility on the south side of Cuba--a circumstance that turned out to be very fortunate for Gen Shafter.

By early June, the Navy Department was convinced that it should proceed with the establishment of a naval base in Cuba. In addition to the confirmation of Cervera's fleet at Santiago and the coaling problems Schley had experienced off south Cuba, the Army's repeated delays in loading out from Tampa due to the erroneous reports of Spanish warships near Florida and to the inefficiency of the War Department, made Sampson realize that he might have to maintain the blockade for several more weeks. A repair and coaling facility clearly was needed. Furthermore, attempts to sink the collier Merrimac on 3 June at the mouth of Santiago's harbor to bottle up Cervera had failed, as had Sampson's attempts to knock out the battery at Morro Castle at the entrance of Santiago Harbor.

Consequently, on 6 June, Sampson ordered Capt Bowman McCalla to proceed to Guantanamo Bay and commence firing on an old Spanish guard house and telegraph station near the eastern entrance of the bay. McCalla subsequently asked that he be sent a contingent of Marines to assist in the capture of the bay, and the Marine force that had been waiting in readiness at Key West for several weeks soon embarked for Cuba.

On the afternoon of 10 June, nearly 600 Marines under Col Robert W. Huntington arrived at Guantanamo Bay. While a makeshift band played They'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight, 23 Leathernecks were overcome by the heat. A far more serious concern of theirs, however, was the knowledge that good Spanish troops sat just north of their position and might attack. For that reason, the colonel had requested that the Marblehead under Capt McCalla move nearer shore in order to fire her guns in the event of an attack. While he complied, McCalla doubted that the Spanish would attack in force, despite a formidable number of troops nearby, since the lack of roads into the area and the thick chaparral would make any type of major attack difficult. As it turned out, the naval officer was correct. Gen Pareja did not send his forces to attack the Marines, although Spanish snipers continued a steady barrage of fire throughout the day and night, causing havoc and sleeplessness among the American troops. One can only speculate on the psychological edge the enemy may have had over the Marines for the Yanks knew of the large Spanish force nearby and that U.S. Army reinforcements from the States had not yet left Tampa for Cuba. Moreover, they knew Adm Sampson needed all his bluejackets and Marines for the blockade of Santiago. But if some of the Marines felt isolated believing they had only the guns of the Marblehead to protect them, they were wrong. Hundreds of Cuban insurgents had been fighting the Spanish all around Guantanamo Bay for years.

On 12 June, some 60 of the Cuban freedom fighters under a Col Laborde paid a visit to Huntington's camp. The Cubans related that the Spanish had some 400 troops stationed at Cuzco Well, a point about 4 miles southeast of the Marines. The Spanish had maintained a regular station there because of the fresh water, and now troops from Fisherman's Point at the mouth of Guantanamo Bay, who had fled Yankee guns a few days earlier, had joined them. The two leaders discussed strategy, with the Cuban recommending an attack on the well. Huntington was reluctant at first because of the lack of possible reinforcements and the knowledge that the Spanish troops under Pareja at Guantanamo City had railroad access to Caimanera should they want to try and reach Cuzco Well quickly. Both McCalla and the Marine leader agreed, however, that if the fresh water supply at the well was shut off, the Spanish would have to abandon lower Guantanamo Bay. They also knew that no railroad existed on the east side of the bay for the movement of Spanish troops and they concurred that the U.S. Navy could block any Spanish assault on the Marines from the bay itself. These considerations, and the almost constant lack of sleep from sniper fire, convinced Huntington to try and capture the well.

Again, the details of the attack-in which Sgt John H. Quick and Pvt John Fitzgerald won Medals of Honor—are not as significant as its outcome, which was a resounding victory for the Americans. The battle not only removed the last of the Spanish troops which threatened the Americans entering the bay, but it most importantly helped keep the Spanish force at Guantanamo City due to the exaggerated stories given Gen Pareja from those forces that had escaped. They reported being attacked by 10,000 American troops. This was credible to the Spanish commander since he had long expected an American assault on Guantanamo. In fact, nearly two months earlier, the Governor General of Cuba, Ramon Blanco, had ordered Gen Arsenio Lineres to fortify Santiago and Guantanamo because of fears that America would seek a naval base on the south side of Cuba to help intercept Cervera or as a base for an attack on Santiago as Adm Vernon had attempted. It is also probable that Blanco was trying to protect the Spanish telegraph cables that ran from Guantanamo to Haiti, Puerto Rico, and on to Madrid. Moreover, his last orders were to remain at his location in order to guard the road between Guantanamo Bay and Santiago. Given this and his belief that the Marines actually numbered 20 times more than they did, it is not surprising that the Spanish commander decided to remain at his position rather than attack the Marines. Similarly, Huntington, knowing that the Spanish force at Guantanamo City out-numbered him six to one, made the decision to remain where he was, guarding the entrance to Guantanamo Bay. In so doing, he felt he could best protect America's new coaling and repair facility in Cuba, which soon began dispersing ammunition, medical stores, clothing, quinine, and food to the Americans maintaining the blockade and to the Cuban insurgents operating in the area. Additionally, the United States had reconnected the cable from Guantanamo Bay to Mole St. Nicolas, Haiti. This made Guantanamo the center for important telegraph messages between the Navy and War Departments and American forces on land and sea.

Meanwhile, on 22 June, the Army was finally landing some 17,000 troops from Tampa at Daiquiri and Sibony east of Santiago. From the first, the Army was in danger of defeat. According to one officer with Shafter:

If the hills and ridges above Daiquiri and Sibony had been fortified even with hastily constructed field-works, and held with ten or twelve hundred soldiers with a few field guns, a disembarkation at these places would have been very difficult if not altogether impossible.

Another student of this period has observed that Shafter:

. . . planned to march his forces through roadless swamps and jungles to Santiago, and lay siege to that well-defended and nearly impregnable military citadel. Every movement was advertised to the waiting enemy.

Yet despite anticipating that the Americans would arrive in June and the fact that over two months had elapsed since Governor General Blanco gave the first warning that the Americans would likely land near Santiago, only 850 men had been ordered by Gen Lineres from Guantanamo City to Santiago, leaving nearly 6,000 men some 40 miles distant. The failure to secure additional troops and to take the offensive against Shafter likely cost Spain a victory at Santiago, for the U.S. Army not only faced difficulties in landing, but nearly every aspect of its march inland involved potential defeat. At Las Guasimas, for example, the Spanish controlled a ridge 250 feet high which gave a view of the entire terrain, yet their failure to fortify it with additional troops led directly to their defeat at that location. Similarly, when Shafter attacked El Caney, on the road between Santiago and Guantanamo City, the Spanish forces at Guantanamo should have been ready to attack his flank while other Spanish forces took the offensive against American units attacking San Juan Hill. In these battles of 1 July, Shafter had made the tactical error of dividing his forces, yet the Spanish again missed a golden opportunity to rout him. Instead of bringing in additional forces from Santiago and Guantanamo City, Lineres let Gen Joaquin Vara del Rey at El Caney fight the 5,000 men under Gen [Henry Ware] Lawton with less than 500 troops. Even though the Spanish fought gallantly and inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans, the battle was lost because Lineres deployed less than 10 percent of his available troops to fight at El Caney and San Juan. In fact, less than one percent of the total Spanish force in Cuba fought in these decisive battles.

By 2 July, the allied troops had pulled within a mile of Santiago, but Shafter had lost hundreds of men. Thus he made an appeal to Adm Sampson to "make effort immediately to force entrance (of Santiago) to avoid further losses among men, which are already very heavy." His closing statement, "You can now operate with less loss of life than I can," was in reference to an earlier request for naval assistance which Sampson had rejected because of his estimate of unacceptable losses of both men and ships. The admiral, however, was still not sure he could move his ships near the harbor entrance until Shafter had taken out the coastal batteries. Even then he was not convinced that he could maneuver past the sunken Merrimac in the harbor’s entrance or the Spanish mines in the channel.

Shafter was incensed by this news and wrote Sampson:

It is not reasonable for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those we have been pitted against, it will be some time and a great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the Navy cannot work under destructive fire as well as the Army. . . .

He then asked Sampson to continue firing on shore, although he wondered if some of the big Navy shells falling around the Army units were meant for him.

Sampson, still skeptical of a successful attack on the entrance to Santiago harbor, seriously considered sending the Marines from Guantanamo to assault Morro Castle under the cover of Navy guns. Sampson subsequently wrote to Shafter late on the morning of 2 July:

If it is your desire that we should force an entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

This comment was in reference to the fact that the Marines at Guantanamo Bay had remained there in part to prevent the Spanish force at Guantanamo City from attacking the Army at Santiago and from retaking the bay which had become a necessity for maintaining the blockade. Had Gen Pareja received word that the Marines had abandoned their position, and especially if the Marines were defeated at Morro Castle, the Spanish troops at Guantanamo City would have proceeded to Santiago to help in the struggle there, as well as likely taking over Guantanamo Bay.

On 3 July, Shafter was in a quagmire over how to proceed. On that day he wrote the War Department that upon approaching Santiago:

We find it of such a character and the defense so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between Santiago River and Sibony . . . Our losses to date will aggregate 1,000 . . . sickness . . . exhaustion from intense heal and the exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday, and the almost constant fire which is kept upon the trenches . . . General Wheeler is seriously ill and will probably have to go to the rear today. General Young also very ill, confined to bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot . . . I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance to the harbor . . . I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days . . . .

Fortunately for Shafter, the Spanish fleet tried to escape Santiago harbor that same day and was destroyed by the U.S. Navy. The irrefutable conclusion, however, is that the primary reason for Shafter's victory was the failure of the Spanish generals to deploy more forces effectively against the U.S. Army. Certainly Gen Shafter recognized the potential disaster awaiting him had Pareja moved his troops from Guantanamo City and entered the conflict directly. Shafter's reason for rejecting an earlier suggestion to establish an Army base camp at Guantanamo Bay, you will recall, was based largely on his fear of encountering the Spanish force from Guantanamo City, as was his decision to attack El Caney on the road between Santiago and Guantanamo. As it was he remained in constant fear that Pareja would attack his flank since those were the closest and most numerous Spanish forces to his position. Shafter also knew that many of his men suffered from yellow fever and other ailments, which weakened them and contributed to the heavy loss of life the U.S. Army was experiencing on the battlefield. Already the Army had lost over 10 percent of its men in the battles for El Caney and San Juan alone. Shafter recognized the further vulnerability of his men should the Spanish force around Santiago get reinforcements. He told a meeting of his top generals at El Poso on 1 July that some 7,000 troops were at their "rear at Guantanamo. If they come down . . . we shall have to get back. . . . If these forces take us in the flank, which would not be very difficult in our present exposed position, I will be held responsible."

Shafter decided to wait 24 hours before making any decision. Then on 3 July as we have seen, he wrote the War Department that he was thinking of withdrawing five miles because of his tenuous situation. As Capt John Biglow, USA, recalled:

The enemy's position was about as nearly ideal as a real position can be . . . at San Juan there was hardly any preparation for artillery, and the infantry and the dismounted cavalry, who made the attack, were exposed to the enemy's fire for about an hour immediately preceding their advance, most of them not being able to fire back.

And Col Herbert H. Sargent, USA, whose work on the Santiago campaign is the most authoritative and analytical piece available, concluded:

Inasmuch as the (Spanish) troops actually there, even though poorly handled, made the accomplishment of Shafter's task extremely difficult, it does not seem possible that the Americans could have been successful had Lineres received the reinforcements . . . had the greater part of the garrison at Guantanamo been concentrated at Santiago and properly supplied with provisions, the chances of success would have been overwhelmingly in favor of the Spaniards.

Two questions remain. Why did Lineres fail to concentrate his forces? He had ample time between the landing of Shafter in Cuba and the attack on El Caney and San Juan Hill to have shifted forces from Guantanamo Bay to near Santiago. The answer is that he tried to contact Pareja, but the thousands of Cuban insurgents roaming the area between Santiago and Guantanamo intercepted and executed many messengers. Furthermore, Lineres still expected a major U.S. offensive at Guantanamo so he left Pareja there in order not to lose that city and because he erroneously thought that he could hold off the Army at his location since his troop strength was about equal to that of Shafter's. In addition, Lineres believed that he lacked the supplies to support additional troops at Santiago. But his failure to deploy his troops properly cost the Spanish dearly at Las Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan.

Why did Pareja not send his force to Santiago, or at least a scouting party, since he knew the telegraph and cable lines had been severed and the Americans were ready to attack? For one thing, like Lineres, he sent out scouts who were intercepted by the Cubans. Secondly, his last order from Lineres was to stay put. Pareja doubtless decided this was good advice since he shared his commander's belief that the Americans would still try an invasion of Cuba through Guantanamo. This seemed even more plausible to Pareja after he learned that the Marines had routed his men at Cuzco Well, and he was led to believe that their force was much greater than his own. This last point in fact might have kept Pareja at Guantanamo City even had he learned that Lineres was in trouble. That is, had Pareja received word to send reinforcements to Santiago, he might still have determined his force was best deployed where it was with such a large force of Marines at Guantanamo Bay and with his knowledge that thousands of other Spanish forces were available to Lineres around Santiago. Indeed, had Pareja not believed the Marine force was larger than it was and likely to attack his position, he might have spent more time trying to communicate with Lineres. As it turned out, his decision to remain at Guantanamo City, and conversely the presence of the Marines at Guantanamo Bay, may have cost Spain a victory and an opportunity to prolong the war.

The seizure of Guantanamo Bay by Marine forces, therefore, played a more significant role in the Spanish American War than most historians have noted. In fact, in most survey history texts dealing with the period and even in some books on the war itself, Marines at Guantanamo are mentioned only in passing if at all. Perhaps this is a result of the Army emerging victorious in the seemingly more important battle of Santiago, or perhaps it comes from the popularizing of the Army's exploits by men like Theodore Roosevelt. Without any question, however, the Marines contributed significantly to the course of the war and to the course of history. As one observer of the period put it, the securing of the first foothold on the Cuban coast at Guantanamo Bay acted:

. . . as a station for coaling, cable communications, and refilling (proving) to be of the greatest value to Sampson's ships. The admiral might indeed have found it difficult, or even impossible, to maintain an effective blockade of Santiago had Key West, nearly 1,000 miles away, remained his only available base.

Additionally, the Marines who seized Guantanamo put into action the concept of an expeditionary force capturing an advanced position and establishing an advanced facility for the fleet. The experience led to the Marines experimenting with similar beach operations a few years later and led ultimately to the Corps assuming responsibility for seizing advanced bases and developing the entire concept of amphibious advanced base warfare. The securing of Guantanamo also led the United States to negotiate for the lease of the bay as a major naval station for the purpose of supplying American ships and guarding the vital Windward Passage. And finally, of course, the presence of the Marines at Guantanamo divided Spanish forces and enabled the Army to avoid a potential military disaster at Santiago. Guantanamo Bay is a neglected chapter in our history.