General David H. Petraeus' Remarks On Afghanistan - February 08, 2009
45th Munich Security Conference: "The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan"
Well, good morning to you all. And thanks to Chairman Ischinger and
his team. It's an honor to be with you - and it's great to be on the stage
with my new diplomatic partner, AMB Richard Holbrook. You know, it's every
Commander's dream to have an ambassadorial wingman who is described by
journalists with nicknames like "The Bulldozer." PAUSE. In all
seriousness, I want to publicly salute this gifted, selfless diplomat for
taking on his new position, an appointment that conveys how significant the
focus in the United States is on Afghanistan and Pakistan and on the South
and Central Asia region more broadly.
This morning's topic is Afghanistan, which Secretary of Defense Gates
recently described to the US Congress as posing "our greatest military
challenge right now." As he noted, our fundamental objective in Afghanistan
is to ensure that transnational terrorists are not able to reestablish the
sanctuaries they enjoyed prior to 9/11. It was to eliminate such
sanctuaries that we took action in Afghanistan in 2001. And preventing
their reestablishment remains an imperative today - noting, to be sure, that
achievement of that objective inevitably requires accomplishment of other
interrelated tasks as well. And, [as has been explained,] President Obama
has directed a strategy review that will sharpen the clarity of those tasks.
Afghanistan has been a very tough endeavor. Certainly, there have
been important achievements there over the past seven years - agreement on a
constitution, elections, and establishment of a government; increased access
to education, health care, media, and telecommunications; construction of a
significant number of infrastructure projects; development of the Afghan
National Army; and others.
But in recent years the resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda has led to an
increase in violence, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the
country. Numerous other challenges have emerged as well, among them:
difficulties in the development of governmental institutions that achieve
legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people; corruption; expansion - until
last year - of poppy production and the illegal narcotics industry; and
difficulties in the establishment of the Afghan police.
In fact, there has been nothing easy about Afghanistan. And, as Senator
Lieberman observed in a recent speech to the Brookings Institution,
"Reversing Afghanistan's slide into insecurity will not come quickly,
easily, or cheaply." Similarly, Secretary Gates told Congress, "This will
undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight." I agree. In fact, I think it
is important to be clear eyed about the challenges that lie ahead, while
also remembering the importance of our objectives in Afghanistan and the
importance of the opportunity that exists if we all intensify our efforts
and work together to achieve those objectives.
Many observers have noted that there are no purely military
solutions in Afghanistan. That is correct. Nonetheless, military action,
while not sufficient by itself, is absolutely necessary, for security
provides the essential foundation for the achievement of progress in all the
other so-called lines of operation - recognizing, of course, that progress
in other areas made possible by security improvements typically contributes
to further progress in the security arena - creating an upward spiral in
which improvements in one area reinforce progress in another.
Arresting and then reversing the downward spiral in security in Afghanistan
thus will require not just additional military forces, but also more
civilian contributions, greater unity of effort between civilian and
military elements and with our Afghan partners, and a comprehensive
approach, as well as sustained commitment and a strategy that addresses the
situations in neighboring countries.
This morning, I'd like to describe in very general terms the resource
requirements that are under discussion in Washington and various other
national capitals. Then I'll describe briefly a few of the ideas that
helped us in Iraq and that, properly adapted for Afghanistan, can help guide
GEN McKiernan and ISAF.
THE NEED FOR MORE FORCES, ENABLERS, AND TRAINERS
In recent months, our President and many others have highlighted the
need for additional forces in Afghanistan to reverse the downward spiral in
security, help Afghan forces provide security for the elections on August
20th, and enable progress in the tasks essential to achievement of our
objectives. Indeed, as has been announced in recent months, more US forces
are entering operations in as part of ISAF in Afghanistan now, more have
been ordered to deploy, and the deployment of others is under consideration.
Beyond that, the number of Afghan soldiers to be trained and equipped has
been increased, and many of the other troop contributing nations will deploy
additional forces, as well, with a number of commitments under discussion.
And I would be remiss if I did not ask individual countries to examine what
forces and other contributions they can provide as ISAF intensifies its
efforts in preparation for the elections in August.
It is, of course not just additional combat forces that are
required. ISAF also needs more so-called enablers to support the effort in
Afghanistan - more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms
and the connectivity to exploit the capabilities they bring; more military
police, engineers, and logistics elements; additional special operations
forces and civil affairs units; more lift and attack helicopters and fixed
wing aircraft; additional air medevac assets; increases in information
operations capabilities; and so on. Also required are more Embedded
Training Teams, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and Police
Mentoring Teams, all elements that are essential to building capable Afghan
National Security Forces. And I applaud the German Defense Minister's
announcement of additional police and army training teams this morning. As
with combat forces, some additional enabler elements are already flowing to
Afghanistan, commitments have been made to provide others, and others are
under discussion as well.
As Senator Lieberman highlighted in his Brookings speech, a surge in
civilian capacity is needed to match the increase in military forces in
order to field adequate numbers of provincial reconstruction teams and other
civilian elements - teams and personnel that are essential to help our
Afghan partners expand their capabilities in key governmental areas, to
support basic economic development, and to assist in the development of
various important aspects of the rule of law, including initiatives to
support the development of police and various judicial initiatives.
It is also essential, of course, that sufficient financial resources be
provided for the effort in Afghanistan. It is hugely important that nations
deliver on pledges of economic development assistance, that the Afghan
National Army and Law and Order Trust Funds be fully financed, that support
be maintained for the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and that resources
continue to be provided for the projects conducted by our military units and
PRTs at local levels. And, I applaud the German Defense Minister's
announcement of additional development aid this morning, too.
Of course, just more troops, civilians, dollars and Euros won't be
enough. As students of history, we're keenly aware that Afghanistan has,
over the years, been known as the graveyard of empires. It is, after all, a
country that has never taken kindly to outsiders bent on conquering it. We
cannot take that history lightly. And our awareness of it should caution us
to recognize that, while additional forces are essential, their
effectiveness will depend on how they are employed, as that, in turn, will
determine how they are seen by the Afghan population.
COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR AFGHANISTAN
What I'd like to discuss next, then, are some of the concepts that
our commanders have in mind as plans are refined to employ additional
forces. I base this on discussions with GEN McKiernan and others who have
served in Afghanistan, as well as on lessons learned in recent years. I do
so with awareness that a number of the elements on the ground are operating
along the lines of these ideas - and that their ability to do so will be
enhanced by the increased density on the ground of ISAF and Afghan forces as
additional elements deploy to the most challenging areas. Counterinsurgency
operations are, after all, troop intensive. Finally, I want to underscore
the fact that commanders on the ground will, as always, operationalize the
so-called big ideas in ways that are appropriate for their specific
situations on the ground. So here are some of those ideas:
First and foremost, our forces and those of our Afghan partners have
to strive to secure and serve the population. We have to recognize that the
Afghan people are the decisive "terrain." And together with our Afghan
partners, we have to work to provide the people security, to give them
respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate the provision of basic
services, the development of the Afghan Security Forces in the area, the
promotion of local economic development, and the establishment of governance
that includes links to the traditional leaders in society and is viewed as
legitimate in the eyes of the people.
Securing and serving the people requires that our forces be good neighbors.
While it may be less culturally acceptable to live among the people in
certain parts of Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, it is necessary to locate
Afghan and ISAF forces where they can establish a persistent security
presence. You can't commute to work in the conduct of counterinsurgency
operations. Positioning outposts and patrol bases, then, requires careful
thought, consultation with local leaders, and the establishment of good
local relationships to be effective.
Positioning near those we and our Afghan partners are helping to
secure also enables us to understand the neighborhood. A nuanced
appreciation of the local situation is essential. Leaders and troopers have
to understand the tribal structures, the power brokers, the good guys and
the bad guys, local cultures and history, and how systems are supposed to
work and do work. This requires listening and being respectful of local
elders and mullahs, and farmers and shopkeepers - and it also requires, of
course, many cups of tea.
It is also essential that we achieve unity of effort, that we coordinate and
synchronize the actions of all ISAF and Afghan forces -- and those of our
Pakistani partners across the border -- and that we do the same with the
actions of our embassy and international partners, our Afghan counterparts,
local governmental leaders, and international and non-governmental
organizations. Working to a common purpose is essential in the conduct of
counterinsurgency operations.
We also, in support of and in coordination with our Afghan partners,
need to help promote local reconciliation, although this has to be done very
carefully and in accordance with the principles established in the Afghan
Constitution. In concert with and in support of our Afghan partners, we
need to identify and separate the "irreconcilables" from the "reconcilables,
striving to create the conditions that can make the reconcilables part of
the solution, even as we kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.
In fact, programs already exist in this area and careful application of them
will be essential in the effort to fracture and break off elements of the
insurgency in order to get various groups to put down their weapons and
support the legitimate constitution of Afghanistan.
Having said that, we must pursue the enemy relentlessly and
tenaciously. True irreconcilables, again, must be killed, captured, or
driven out of the area. And we cannot shrink from that any more than we can
shrink from being willing to support Afghan reconciliation with those
elements that show a willingness to reject the insurgents and help Afghan
and ISAF forces.
To ensure that the gains achieved endure, ISAF and Afghan forces
have to hold areas that have been cleared. Once we fight to clear and
secure an area, we must ensure that it is retained. The people - and local
security forces - need to know that we will not abandon them. Additionally,
we should look for ways to give local citizens a stake in the success of the
local security effort and in the success of the new Afghanistan more broadly
as well. To this end, a reformed, capable Afghan National Police force -
with the necessary support from the international community and the alliance
- is imperative to ensuring the ability to protect the population. And the
new Afghan Population Protection Program announced by MOI Atmar holds
considerable promise and deserves our support as well.
On a related note, to help increase the legitimacy of the Afghan
government, we need to help our Afghan partners give the people a reason to
support the government and their local authorities. This includes helping
enable Afghan solutions to Afghan problems. And on a related note, given
the importance of Afghan solutions and governance being viewed as legitimate
by the people and in view of allegations of corruption, such efforts likely
should feature support for what might be called an "Afghan accountability
offensive" as well. That will be an important effort.
In all that we do as we perform various missions, we need to live our
values. While our forces should not hesitate to engage and destroy an
enemy, our troopers must also stay true to the values we hold dear. This
is, after all, an important element that distinguishes us from the enemy,
and it manifests itself in many ways, including making determined efforts to
reduce to the absolute minimum civilian casualties - an effort furthered
significantly by the tactical direction and partnering initiatives developed
by GEN McKiernan with our Afghan counterparts.
We also must strive to be first with the truth. We need to beat the
insurgents and extremists to the headlines and to pre-empt rumors. We can
do that by getting accurate information to the chain of command, to our
Afghan partners, and to the press as soon as is possible. Integrity is
critical to this fight. Thus, when situations are bad, we should freely
acknowledge that fact and avoid temptations to spin. Rather, we should
describe the setbacks and failures we suffer and then state what we've
learned from them and how we'll adjust to reduce the chances of similar
events in the future.
Finally, we always must strive to learn and adapt. The situation in
Afghanistan has changed significantly in the past several years and it
continues to evolve. This makes it incumbent on us to assess the situation
continually and to adjust our plans, operations, and tactics as required.
We should share good ideas and best practices, but we also should never
forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and
that what works in one area may not work in another.
IT WILL GET HARDER BEFORE IT GETS EASIER
In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the key points I've sought to
make. We have a hugely important interest in ensuring that Afghanistan
does not once again become a sanctuary for trans-national terrorists.
Achieving that core objective, in turn, requires the accomplishment of
several other significant tasks. Although there have been impressive
achievements in Afghanistan since 2001, the security situation has
deteriorated markedly in certain areas in the past two years. Reversing
that trend is necessary to improve security for the population, to permit
the conduct of free and fair elections in August, and to enable progress in
other important areas. Achieving security improvements will require more
ISAF and Afghan security forces of all types - combat, combat support,
logistics, trainers and advisors, special operations, and so on. Some
additional forces are already deploying, further increases have been ordered
or pledged, and more are under discussion. To be effective, the additional
military forces will need to be employed in accordance with
counterinsurgency concepts applied by leaders who have a nuanced
understanding of their areas of operation. And to complement and capitalize
on the increased military resources, more civilian assets, adequate
financial resources, close civil-military cooperation, and a comprehensive
approach that encompasses regional states will be necessary. None of this
will be easy. Indeed, as Vice President Biden observed recently,
Afghanistan likely will get harder before it gets easier. And sustained
progress will require sustained commitment. But, again, our objectives are
of enormous importance, a significant opportunity is at hand, and we all
need to summon the will and the resources necessary to make the most of it.
Thank you very much.
