FEBRUARY 2010:

Where Is Our Kilcullen?

Counterpoint

Agree/Disagree?

by LtCol Neil Schuehle

>LtCol Schuehle is currently a U.S. Special Operations Command liaison officer in Washington, DC. He was formerly the CMC Fellow at the Center for a New American Strategy.

We produce brilliant and capable Marines through our education programs. (Photo by LCpl Jeffrey A. Cosola.)

LtCol Michael D. Grice, in his recent Chase Prize Essay Contest submission, “Where Is Our Kilcullen?,” observes that the Marine Corps is truly limiting itself in the profession of arms if we “continue to ignore the impact that a doctoral-level education has in the officer corps.” Citing LTC David Kilcullen, Australian Army (Ret), as the “greatest single influence on our counterinsurgency doctrine,” LtCol Grice makes sweeping pronouncements regarding the Marine Corps, namely that we lack our own equivalent to Dr. Kilcullen and that having no institutional doctoral program is a deficiency that the Marine Corps must remedy. While I do agree that an emphasis on education cannot be overstated, though not at the expense of operational expertise, I see no evidence that the Marine Corps is suffering whatsoever for lacking a stable of officers with doctorate degrees. Further, I find the supposition that the Marine Corps will not be allowed a seat at the planning table for want of a “doctorate and the credibility that it provides” slightly farcical. Addressing his observations in turn, I offer the following.

The Marine Corps Lacks the Equivalent of Dr. Kilcullen

Such a statement overlooks numerous stellar examples of Marines whom I believe to easily be Dr. Kilcullen’s equal. Despite their lack of doctorates, two who come to mind are Under Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Robert O. Work (a retired Marine colonel) and LtCol Frank Hoffman, USMCR(Ret). Both have contributed immeasurably to their institution as well as to national security. Some of their critical thinking has profoundly shaped doctrine for many decades. I find them also to be a most relevant comparison to Dr. Kilcullen as, like him, both have done as much or more in their capacity as retired officers as when on active duty. LtCol Grice further opines that in failing to produce an officer who is the equivalent of Dr. Kilcullen, the Marine Corps “stands ready to be marginalized within the Department of Defense . . . .” In light of the Honorable Mr. Work’s capacity as Under Secretary of the Navy and Frank Hoffman’s contributions to Navy special projects, as well as other efforts headed by the Honorable Michele Fluornoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, it would be hard to imagine how marginalized the Marine Corps will be for want of a doctorate program.

LtCol Grice also points out that the ability to think brilliantly and unconventionally is a product of education, though he stops short of stating that such is the product of doctoral education. I would argue that education is but one of many possible sources of brilliance. I would counter that reflection, mentorship, hardship, crises, and pure natural talent have proven as fertile a breeding ground for brilliance and unconventionality as education. He further suggests that the Marine Corps suffers in direct comparison with the Army for lack of an institutional doctoral program, offering such notable examples as GEN David Petraeus, BG H.R. McMaster, COL Pete Mansoor, and Dave Kilcullen. While he acknowledges that LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC(Ret), Gen James N. Mattis, and others are examples of brilliance despite the absence of doctorates, I disagree with the contention that the Marine Corps “lacks a systemic way to develop and educate officers to a level consistent with our Army, Navy, Air Force, and coalition counterparts.” We do. It is called professional military education, and it includes attendance at all of the Services’ schools and colleges as well as national and joint venues. Though not perfect, it has produced a number of instrumental leaders at the four-star level and in a ratio disproportionate to the size of our Service and general officer population (Gens Charles Wilhelm, Anthony C. Zinni, James E. Cartwright, James L. Jones, Mattis, and Peter Pace). While Army Headquarters is more likely to dominate at the theater level for obvious reasons, there can be no doubt that the other Services have noted the frequent elevation of Marines into critical leadership billets despite our relative lack of doctoral degrees.

The Marine Corps Must Remedy Its Lack of a Doctoral Program

Before the Marine Corps embarks on an institutional doctorate program, a comparative assessment with programs in other countries, as well as with our sister Services, should be addressed. In Dr. Kilcullen’s case I believe that the requirements for his doctorate in politics (some say political anthropology) from the University of New South Wales were less than those for comparable programs in the United States or Great Britain, at least in terms of span of time necessary. Time commitments alone make such a program far more challenging for a Marine officer than others, where a 4- to 8-year program would equate to 20 to 40 percent of a 20-year career. Oddly enough, the Australian Army seldom sponsors officers to pursue advanced degrees. In fact, “officers without bachelor’s degrees remain unhindered in their career aspirations.”1

In determining the requirement for a doctoral program, I believe a comparison of our ratio of doctorates with that in other Services to be the wrong yardstick by which to measure. On one hand I would argue that we are comparing apples and oranges when LtCol Grice points out technical disciplines for degrees in the other Services for which we have no Service equivalents. On the other hand, I would argue that we do have technical equivalencies within the disciplines of intelligence, logistics, combat, and communications, only that we measure these by success on the battlefield through promotion and command and not by conference of academic advancement. Inasmuch as many of the doctorates obtained by the other Services are achieved through a return to the Service academies, I find it hard to accept the author’s blanket statement that their doctoral programs are “inarguably successful.” A cursory sampling of the academies might reveal a slightly different picture (not that there are any lingering challenges from many of the policies instituted by ADM Himan Rickover or anything!).

Conclusion

If, as LtCol Grice proclaims, the Marine Corps’ “collective intellectual relevance is in peril,” then I would offer that it is far more likely the result of years of institutional pressures, prejudices, dogma, and groupthink than any lack of doctoral pedigrees. Our Service challenges within the beltway can be categorized by vision, strategy, concepts, programs, and budgets that have nothing to do with the pursuit of advanced degrees. That we as a Service continue to produce both brilliant Marines and capable commanders at the highest levels illustrates that our existing methodology works demonstrably well. Though our existing educational construct should continue to be assessed for ways in which to improve, nothing in this article compels me to agree that the Marine Corps needs an institutional doctoral program, for professional relevance or any other reason. As one former Marine has pointed out to me, “Do you want a regimental combat team commander who has a Ph.D. in social studies or one with the equivalent educational achievement and competency in infantry?”

Note
1. Lind, MAJ William, monograph written for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 January 2008, p. 21. Remark is attributed to Maj Matthew Cuttell, Australian exchange student at SAMS.