Crossing The Meuse

By Col Rolfe L. Hillman, U.S. Army (Ret.) - Originally Published November 1988

On the night of November 10th heroic deeds were done by heroic men. In the face of heavy artillery and withering machinegun fire, the 2d Engineers threw two foot bridges across the Meuse, and the first and second battalions of the 5th Marines crossed resolutely and unflinchingly to the east bank and carried out their mission.

In the last battle of the war, as in all others in which this division has participated, it enforced its will on the enemy.

MajGen John A. Lejeune
Commanding General
2d Division, AEF

"Men, I am going across that river, and I expect you to go with me."

Just that. No screaming, cursing, threats, or dramatic exhortations. A simple statement of fact. Capt Charley Dunbeck, commanding the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, made the statement on the last night of World War I, knowing full well that, from the heights on the far bank of the Meuse River, Germans in a last-ditch defense were churning the entire crossing area and river banks with artillery and machinegun fire. Amid widespread reports that an Armistice cease-fire could come at any hour-or might already have happened, Capt Dunbeck crossed the Meuse, and his men followed. The Armistice was formally signed shortly after 0500 the next day, and by the time of the cease-fire at 1100 elements of the battalion were over a mile northeast of the river crossing.

The Marine Brigade
In World War I, the 4th Marine Brigade, formed from the 5th and 6th Regiments, joined the Army's 3d Brigade (9th and 23d Infantry) as the principal elements of the Army's 2d "Indianhead" Division. The reason for that unprecedented inter-Service formation was that the Marines got authority early in the war to form and send a brigade to join Army combat elements in France. (They never obtained the goal of fielding a separate Marine division.) In its early action, the Marine brigade was commanded by an Army brigadier general; for the final three months of the war, the Army division was commanded by the Marine's MajGen John A. Lejeune.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive
Gen John J. Pershing's First Army had a lot to prove when it was formed on 10 August. Pershing, for over a year, had stood obsessively opposed to "amalgamation" of American troops piecemeal into the tired ranks of the British and French. Although Americans had fought under French and British command in the critical action of May through July, Pershing had successfully insisted on entering a first major action with American divisions under American command. As it developed, that first major action began 12 September 1918, with the relatively easy task of straightening the St. Mihiel salient south of Verdun. Next came the coordinated Allied offensive beginning 26 September that was tactically, logistically, and as a casualty producer a far grimmer business. The American divisions were largely new to combat and First Army's initial advance was disappointing; by 12 October Britain's Lloyd George considered Pershing's effort "quite ineffective"; France's Clemenceau thought Pershing was not making the progress he should and that the American effort was chaotic. These aspersions without a doubt put Pershing in a mood, as some would say today, to kick ass and take names. He sent a handful of senior generals packing, removed himself from the details of direct command by forming the second Army and turning over command of the First Army, and, in general, made it clear that he wanted and would get an army of fighters who would produce results, "regardless of cost." For the phase beginning 1 November-it turned out to be the final phase-Pershing carefully planned a main attack for the center axis to be carried out by V Corps (see Map 1) commanded by the experienced and tough-as-nails MajGen Charles P. Summerall. V Corps was formed by the 2d Division-by then considered "veteran"-and the 89th Division, an outfit that fought at St. Mihiel. Summerall's corps performed to Pershing's great satisfaction. By the end of the first day, the 2d Division had gone five miles and the 89th almost as far. For the first time in the whole campaign the enemy's lines were completely breached.

Thursday, 7 November
By 7 November, V Corps was facing the great obstacle of the Meuse River southeast from Sedan; its east banks dominated by depleted but tenacious German troops. The 2d Division was ordered to hold the line at the Meuse from Mouzon south to Letanne, both inclusive, while the 89th was to join in the south to Letanne, exclusive. Reconnaissance for finding suitable crossing sites was begun. On the night of 7 November, a German peace delegation crossed the lines to meet with Marshal Foch at Compiegne.

Friday, 8 November
The German delegation received a set of stern terms; a deadline of 72 hours to respond, and a flat-out condition that there would be no ceasefire until the final capitulation was signed. In the 2d Division, while various units made probes and piecemeal crossing attempts, the division staff, responding to successive Corps directives, set out its plan for an attack that was originally scheduled for the night of 9-10 November:

• To the north at Mouzon, the main attack would be made by the 6th Marines, reinforced by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.
• In the division's southern area, near Letanne, there would be a secondary effort, a "connecting detachment," also described as a "combat liaison group," to clear the area between the point of the Mouzon attack and the 89th Division crossings at Inor and Pouilly. This detachment comprised the 5th Marines, minus its 3d Battalion, and the 2d Battalion, 356th Infantry, 89th Division. With all permanent bridges in the area having been taken out by the retreating Germans, two footbridges were to be placed in the Mouzon area, two in the Letanne area, and both forces were to "push rapidly forward and seize the heights in their front."

In a subsequent revision of the plan, it was specified that the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines would be in a support position, disposed to follow either the 6th Marines' attack in the north or the south axis of the task force at Letanne. Given the primitive state of command communications and the impromptu nature of recent tactical planning, this scheme must be seen as complex and an invitation to disappointments.

For the remainder of 8 November, elements of the 9th and 23d Infantry made efforts at bridge repair, and after dark two companies of the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry attempted to cross a partly demolished bridge. Men of the advance party fell through traps into the water; others worked their way forward to a gap too wide to cross, and the attempt was canceled.

Saturday, 9 November
A plan to move a battalion of the 23d across to attack Mouzon from the rear was canceled when it was learned that yet another bridge had been destroyed. Division engineers continued preparation of bridge sections from salvaged lumber. Division orders were issued to launch the Marine brigade's attack to begin at 1800 but were later postponed due to a lack of prepared bridging. Throughout the night of 9 November, the frontlines were held by the 9th Infantry.

Late on 9 November, Marshal Foch sent a message to all commanders in chief implying that he was uncertain of the outcome of negotiations, and that he wanted the Germans to know that there could be no further delay. The message received by Pershing included the sentences:

It is important to coordinate and expedite our movements. I appeal to the energy and initiative of the Coramanders-in-Chief and their armies to make decisive the results obtained.

In his memoirs, Pershing wrote:

Orders in response to this appeal were immediately issued and their execution by the First Army was underway on November 10th and 11th. Yet here again no urging was necessary. Our troops were determined not to give the enemy any respite. Already the crossing of the Meuse had been planned for the whole army. . . .

Sunday, 10 November
Preparations for crossing the Meuse continued, and at 1400 a confirming order was issued for the crossing to begin at 2130. This was now reckoned to be the earliest hour at which the bridges and troops could be in position. Battalions began their move to attack positions shortly after 1730.

On this same afternoon MajGen Summerall addressed V Corps' field grade officers assembled at 2d Division headquarters. On the theme that "the lateness of the season demands heroic action," he said that only by increasing the pressure could the Germans be made to come to terms.

We will not pause. The immediate problem is to effect a bridgehead on the east bank of the Meuse. You will take that crossing. Get into action and get across. I don't expect to see any of you again. But that doesn't matter. You have the honor of a definite success-give yourselves to that. Report to your commands.

A company commander in the division's machinegun battalion supporting the crossing wrote 11 years later that the cold anger generated by the talk drove the officers through that night, and that, in retrospect, he judged that was exactly what Summerall wanted to produce-determination born of anger. Who is to say?

The Main Attack At Mouzon
Maj George K. Shuler, the senior battalion commander (3d Battalion, 6th Marines), was in command of this crossing. None of the four assigned battalions were in place at the attack hour. When Maj Shuler arrived at 2230 after being delayed by artillery fire, he was met by an officer of the 2d Engineers who told him only one of the two bridges had been completed, and that the Germans had obviously discovered the planned use of the site and were covering it with vigorous artillery and machinegun fire. Forty soldiers were assigned to help the engineers' effort, and the engineer officer was told to report back when both bridges had been completed. By mid-night, Maj Clyde Metcalfs 2d Battalion, 6th Marines had arrived in the assembly area. The other two battalions had not.

The Crossing Near Letanne
We now come to the chronological and geographical point where strategic urgency, tactical planning, operations orders-supported by command directives and exhortations from Foch, Pershing, Summerall, and the other intermediates-arrive at the battalion and company level, and on down to platoon leaders and noncommissioned officers and riflemen. This is the point where it is determined which side will close with and destroy the enemy. Under the circumstances in the assembly area of the Bois de l' Hospice, the definition by Gen William Tecumseh Sherman is most appropriate: "I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of the measure of danger, and a mental willingness to endure it."

At this southern site, the revised plan called for the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 356th Infantry of the neighboring 89th Division to attack from positions in Bois de l' Hospice using two footbridges to take the high ground of the Bois d'Alma Gisor and Bois de Flaviers (see Map 2). By 2000, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines under Maj George W. Hamilton (designated to be in reserve and prepared to be diverted to the north) and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines under Capt Dunbeck had arrived, ready for the attack.

The close tolerance in planning invited the unexpected, and it came. The battalion of the 89th Division, having received its marching orders late, arrived late. Maj Hamilton, by virtue of his seniority, was in overall command of the river crossing operation. He made a quick decision that his battalion be substituted for the crossing. Although the engineers had by greatest valor completed the two planned bridges, one of them was twice broken; Hamilton's next decision was that 1st Battalion, 5th Marines would lead the way across the remaining bridge.

The Lineup at Letanne
1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Maj George W. Hamilton, battalion commander).
Just over 5 months earlier on the morning of 6 June, when Maj Julius S. Turrill's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines advanced to be mowed down in the wheatflelds before Hill 142 at Belleau Wood, Hamilton had led Company B. Battle accounts describe him as "being everywhere" to get his men moving forward, actually overrunning his objective, then pulling troops together in protected positions. Later, on 20 September, when Turrill was wounded, Hamilton assumed command of the battalion and commanded it through Blanc Mont. Lejeune called him daring and brilliant.

Hamilton's men began crossing at 2130. The historians of the 2d Division recorded:

The other [bridge, southern of the two] held, and despite the machinegun fire which swept it, the 1st Battalion worked its way across, from 9:30 to 10:30 P.M. . . .the battalion [was scattered] badly, and a strong machine gun nest encountered as it started forward completed the work. Only about a hundred men could be assembled before daylight, and these were assembled into a single company.

The machinegun nest mentioned in this passage was described in a more detailed account as a complex of three tiers of German machineguns rising, one above the other, on the high ground across the river. Of the Marine machinegun companies planned to support the crossings, only one gun of the 23d Company got across to protect the bridge laying, while its remaining four guns were knocked out of effective use on the west bank. (The 8th Machinegun Company crossed in the later consolidation phase.)

Marine Corps historian/artist John W. Thomason, Jr. acquired his firsthand knowledge of men in combat as an officer in Company B of this battalion. Ten years later, he remembered-and he thought others might not-"the line of dead engineers on the path between the heights of the Meuse . . . and the place where the bridge was, that last night of the war."

2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Capt Charley Dunbeck, battalion commander).
In the rapid troop expansion following the U.S. war declaration 1stSgt Dunbeck had skipped up to a captain's commission within the space of two weeks. He had commanded 43d Company (Company F) of Maj Frederic M. Wise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines when it plunged into the battle for Belleau Wood on 6 June 1918. In hand-to-hand combat, he was boyo-netted in the groin and later shot in both legs, earning a Silver Star Medal in lieu of a recommended Medal of Honor. When doctors threatened amputation, he left the hospital and smuggled himself back to his unit. When the 2d Division moved against the fortifications of Blanc Mont Ridge on 3 October, he was again commanding Company F. On the second day, he was shot in the head and left ear and saved by an NCO who pulled him into defilade. His awards were a Dis-tinguished Service Cross and a Navy Cross. On 26 October, being the senior surviving officer, he had taken command of the battalion.

With the 1st Battalion having crossed on the southern footbridge to make a hold on the east bank, 2d Battalion delayed briefly while broken sections of the northern bridge were repaired, then moved through the dark and fog under the continuing fire. The footing was precarious on the footway supported by floating logs "like a railroad track turned upside down." Participants wrote their memories of the rain of shrapnel, hospital corpsmen moving among the wounded scattered along the banks, and the dead floating on the icy current. An artillery round dumped the command group into the cold water; an officer cried, "Save me, Captain, I can't swim." Dunbeck collared the flounderer and told him to wade since the water was then only waist deep. Dunbeck's men were across by 2330. At midnight, the river flats were cleared, and patrols were being dispatched.

2d Battalion, 356th Infantry, 89th Division (Maj Mark Hanna, battalion commander).
As early as 5 November, the 89th Division was making efforts to cross the Meuse at its mithichanneled location at Poully. Before daylight on Wednesday, 6 November, Maj Hanna, nephew and namesake of a noted Ohio politician, made a solo crossing of a damaged bridge and reconnoitered German positions and activities for two hours. He came back in broad daylight, escaping pursuing fire. The division historian wrote, "The very audacity of this exploit seemed to have rendered him immune."

The 2d of the 356th, having gotten a late start, had taken a battering from German artillery on its approach march. Arriving at the river area after 1/5 had been substituted to make the first crossing, Hanna, sometime about midnight, twice led successive groups of his men over the river; on the third passage he was killed. Company G, which was designated an assault company, was reduced to 19 men and 2 noncommissioned officers; all officers were killed or wounded. That remnant attached itself to Company F. By 0600, 300 men of the battalion were consolidated and began to move on the east bank.

Monday, 11 November
Back at Mouzon, Maj Shuler, whether or not he was aware of the furor to the south, telephoned 6th Marines' headquarters at 0300 that if the engineers had not completed the second bridge by 0400 he would withdraw the force to the Bois du Fond de Limon, since there was not suitable daylight cover for the four battalions in the forward area. Two accounts state that this decision was made "by mutual agreement of the battalion commanders." At Compiegne, the Germans had agreed to terms around 2200 Sunday, and the delegates worked the remainder of the night to finalize the version signed at about 0510. At 0600, radio operators of the 2d Division brought Gen Lejeune a monitored message from Field Marshal Foch advising major commands of the end of hostilities at 1100. Lejeune was told by V Corps to ignore this as a possible German hoax.

After what he called "the most trying night I ever experienced," Lejeune finally got official, through-channels notification. He was particularly concerned that this word get to Hamilton and Dunbeck, whose battalions were known to be moving on toward east bank objectives. The four battalions intended for the Mouzon crossing had closed into Bois de Fond de Limon by daylight, and there they received the cease-fire. There had been no "main attack." Considering the conditions under which the Marines at Letanne had managed to carry out their assault crossing, the Mouzon cancellation appears, from this distance in time, as a curious and unsettling episode. Further questions are raised by the afteraction report of Col Mitchell, 2d Engineers, which has the passage:

Two other footbridges were assembled at the river bank north of Mouzon and the Infantry notified that they were ready, but they notified the 2d Engineers that the plan to cross there had been abandoned.

It is no less than anticlimactic to record that when elements of the three Letanne assault battalions reformed and moved out in the early morning hours of 11 November, they met only scattered, though desperate, opposition. Now joined by an assortment of detachments that had crossed the Meuse River unopposed, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, by 1100, had gained the ridge at Senegal Farm, about a mile in from the crossing site, and Dunbeck's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines had patrols in Moulins, about twice that distance from the river. The battalion of the 356th Infantry moved south and made contact with 89th Division elements, who had crossed by rafts, unopposed, near Poiully. Word of the cease-fire had to be sent forward by runner; Maj Hamilton, at a subsequent debriefing, told Lejeune that it had been fully noon before some of his men had been informed, although no casualties had taken place after 1100. The crossing operation had cost the 5th Marines 31 killed and 148 wounded, and the 2d Battalion of the 356th Infantry counted 256 losses. Thus the price of that small portion of the east bank of the Meuse River had been 435 men. A Marine historian who had been a participant recorded:

[The] conclusion was received with considerable skepticism as being too good to be true. Most of the men were so exhausted from recent experiences . . . that they were incapable of response. The realization that the war was over slowly permeated their benumbed minds.

Afternoon of 11 November
On the afternoon of the Armistice, Lejeune visited the wounded in division field hospitals, among them a sergeant whose leg, mangled by artillery just after he had crossed the bridge, had been amputated. Gen Lejeune recorded the conversation in his Reminiscences:

I then said, "What induced you to cross the bridge in the face of terrible machine gun and artillery fire when you expected that the war would end in a few hours?" In answer, he said, "Just before we began to cross the bridge our Battalion Commander, Captain Dunbeck, assembled the companies around him in the ravine where we were waiting orders, and told us, "Men, I am going across that river, and 3 expect you to go with me." The wounded man then remarked, "What could we do but go across, too? Surely we couldn't let him go by himself . . . ."

I have always felt that the incident I have just narrated gives one a belter understanding of the practice of leadership than do all the books that have been written, and all the speeches that have been made on the subject.

Epilogue
MajGen John A. Lejeune went on to serve another eight years as the 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps beginning in June 1920.

Maj George Hamilton was one of those rare cases where a combat leader at company and battalion level came through every major action unscathed. In July 1922, while participating in maneuvers on the Gettysburg battlefield, he was killed in an airplane crash.

Col Charley Dunbeck, after having received four wounds and being medically retired in 1921 for heart trouble induced by his having been gassed, died in 1978 at age 93. In 1939 he had asked for and received reassignment to active duty, and by the end of World War II, he was a colonel in charge of the physical security of all Navy installations in Washington. He retired a second time in April 1946. One of his proudest moments came when he acted as a pallbearer for Gen Lejeune in 1942, this being at the specific request of Gen Lejeune in his will.

"Men, I am going across that river, and I expect you to go with me."