By Maj W. Hays Parks - Originally Published August 1976
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any other governmental agency.
More than eight years have passed since the tragic and aberrant events which occurred on 16 March 1968 in the village of My Lai, Republic of Vietnam. More than five years have passed since 1st Lt William L. Galley, Jr., United States Army, was sentenced by general court-martial to life imprisonment for his role in that incident. The outrage of the American public to the former was exceeded only by their indignation with the latter. That reaction-expressed in part by 15,000 letters to the President of the United States in the two months following Calley's conviction, almost all of which were critical of that conviction-resulted in unprecedented Presidential intervention in normal review procedures and in Galley's ultimately serving less than three months "house arrest" for every murder of which he was convicted.
Critical reaction to the conviction of Lt Calley proceeded along several avenues to reach that position. Some evoked the adage of Gen Sherman that "War is hell," a carte blanche approach to violence in combat. Others adopted a precedential approach, maintaining they had known of, witnessed, or participated in acts of a similar nature in "their" war. Others maintained a "turn about's fair play" attitude, submitting that inasmuch as the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese had been guilty of misconduct throughout the war, the actions at My Lai were merely retributive justice visited upon a village sympathetic to their cause. In writing of another case, author Jack Shepherd prefaced his narrative with yet another approach, quoting remarks by the brother of the principal accused:
Our country has taught my brother that he must take life in order to preserve it. This has been constantly pounded into his thinking. Our country has formed him into a machine, to fight, to suffer, to kill, without question. Will our country now punish him because this machine did not stop when we thought it should?
While many shared this automatous approach, others pursued a "just war" argument which held that the killing of a few Communists-regardless of age, sex, or combatant status-saved us the task of having to do it later. Another group, revitalizing old misperceptions of the post-World War II Yamashita case, utilized a strict liability argument in suggesting that if former President Lyndon B. Johnson, Gen William C. Westmoreland, and members of President Johnson's former Cabinet were held to the same standards they believe existed in the trial of Japanese Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita, "(T)here would be a strong possibility they would come to the same end as he did" (Convicted of permitting the wholesale commission of war crimes by members of his command, Gen Yamashita was hanged on 23 February 1946). Still others, believe the entire Vietnam War illegal, could not see the justification for prosecuting Lt Calley when the guilt was the collective guilt of the people of the United States.
The Army, chagrined by its negligent handling of the My Lai incident, was equally perplexed by public outrage over the trial of the My Lai accused. The situation was the not entirely uncommon one in which the perpetrator of a heinous offense is martyred in his prosecution, while his accusers take on the image of persecutors rather than prosecutors. As an indication of this phenomenon, entire draft boards resigned in protest of Calley's trial and conviction, the Veterans of Foreign Wars sold "Free Galley" bumper stickers to defray his legal fees, and radio stations throughout the nation broadcast the martyrizing but fictional lyrics of The Battle Hymn of Lieutenant Calley (the reader is left to speculate on the nature of public reaction had Lt Calley not been prosecuted or convicted, or had he been awarded a medal for his actions).
The My Lai incident is not representative of the conduct of the American military man during the conflict in Vietnam, but is representative (except in magnitude) of the type of isolated incident which occurred in Vietnam and its predecessor conflicts. The low number of Japanese taken prisoner of war during the island-hopping campaign of World War II, for example, resulted not only because of the tenacity of the Japanese defenders but because of the mistrust instilled in the Marines after the loss of LtCol Frank B. Goettge and his surrender patrol as the result of Japanese perfidy on Guadalcanal on 12-13 August 1942. As Isely and Crowl report in The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War,
This episode . . . followed by devious trickery, such as playing it dead before tossing a grenade, made it difficult to indoctrinate Marines on Guadalcanal and later with the necessity of taking prisoners of war. . . .
Similarly, Frank and Shaw concluded in the official History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (Volume V) that ". . . repercussions stemming from the knowledge of [the Goettge incident] continued as long as the Pacific War lasted." In an entirely different combat environment, fighting a different if perhaps equally tenacious foe, the U.S. Army in Europe during the period from June 1944 to the conclusion of hostilities in May 1945 court-martialed and executed ninety-five American soldiers for acts of misconduct against noncombatant civilians or prisoners of war.
Avoiding incidents of this nature can be likened to aviation safety. Just as the number of crashes is insignificant from a statistical standpoint to the number of sorties flown, the number of incidents of misconduct is small in comparison to the number of personnel who served-and served well-in the Republic of Vietnam. Like the aviation crash, coverage of the incident frequently is disproportionate, untold resources must be diverted to investigate and resolve the questions and issues it raises, and the commander is distracted from his primary mission of engaging the enemy. As with the aviation accident, the weak link often rests in human frailty. As with aviation safety, our goal is zero defects.
The nature of combat dictates a certain unfortunate inevitability of some acts of misconduct. Yet it is not in the nature of the U.S. fighting man to take on such an inhumane character, lowering his conduct in combat to the level of barbarity of some of his foes. It is a violation of international law-a part of the supreme law of our nation which each serviceman swears to uphold and defend at the time of entry into the military. It is contrary to the very concepts for which he is fighting. In the words of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for his being. When he violates this sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire cult, but threatens the very fabric of international society.
Additionally, in detracting from the overall superior performance and conduct of our forces in the field, incidents of misconduct-whether falsely alleged or regrettably true-have significant impact on public opinion, both internationally and domestically, and on the American citizen's support for the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine sent to fight the war. The incident at My Lai, for example, provided the Vietnam Veterans Against the War with a vehicle for holding their Winter Soldier Investigation at Detroit from 31 January to 2 February 1971. Although subsequent investigations revealed their allegations of widespread "war crimes" by U.S. forces in Vietnam to be without foundation, the fraud was capable of perpetration because of the occurrence of My Lai and lesser incidents. The appearance of evil, even if subsequently disproved, accomplished the intended result of discrediting the war effort of the United States in Vietnam. Similarly, the aberrant events of My Lai continue to vastly overshadow both the tactical successes and humanitarian programs of U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam.
It is the nature of the military that we examine our previous shortcomings in combat to avoid repetition of past mistakes. The problem extant most directly involves members of the Army and Marines, for they have the greatest face-to-face confrontation with enemy forces and civilians on the battlefield. Additionally, certain triggering factors generally are found only in the area of ground operations. The accompanying chart, however, indicates that the problem is one of concern for all services. Certainly, all of the offenses were not the result of combat or the combat environment. Incidents between United States military personnel and civilians occur both domestically and in peacetime deployment oversea. All reflect adversely upon the military. All are deplored by the military. It is the incident in combat-frequently given the misnomer " war crime, " a term which remains undefined in international law-with which we are concerned.
On the reporting of the first incident involving a Marine in late 1966 the Marine Corps announced a position similar to that of the other services which it maintained throughout its involvement in the conflict in Vietnam: While viewing misconduct against noncombatants as the unfortunate by-product of any war, the Marine Corps would not tolerate such misconduct. In each instance reported prompt and appropriate action was taken by all levels of command to correct the matter. At the same time, the Marine Corps sought to insure that all parties to any incident were given a full and fair hearing to further insure that justice was done. What was sought was rectification rather than magnification and disproportionate sensationalism. Yet prosecutorial functions, while serving as a deterrent, are also an admission that problems may exist elsewhere in the operational structure of the service, unit, or command involved. Consequently our thinking must not be only retrospective and prospective but introspective as well if we are to attain the previously ascribed-to goal of "zero defects."
There can be no excuse for the type of offense committed by First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., at My Lai on the 18th of March, 1968; but there are reasons. Examination of the majority of cases from the Vietnam conflict reveals a number of common factors. No single factor is, by itself, the cause of an incident. Collectively, the factors discussed are interdependent and somewhat related. Each influenced the action in a particular case in a particular way. Each factor, while not present in every case, is present in a sufficient number of cases to merit discussion and consideration in striving for its avoidance and minimization of incidents in future conflicts. Some are subject to immediate, positive corrective action. Some, such as manpower ceilings or the quality of manpower provided or denied the armed forces, relate to the nature of our Constitutional system of government whereby wars often are directed by the vagarious thinking of politicians while only incidentally being fought by the military. Where these factors are present and beyond the control of the commander he must recognize their effect on other factors as well as the increased potential for an incident to occur with the addition of each factor.
Discussion of the individual causative factors which follow may or may not suggest a solution to the problem. It should be noted that while references to the My Lai incident are prevalent, they are illustrative rather than exclusive. Each factor occurred with sufficient repetition to warrant its inclusion in the discussion that follows.
Lack of Training. General Douglas MacArthur, in his 1933 Annual Report of the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated:
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.
The training of men for combat is twofold: individual and unit. The military takes pride in the individual training its officers and men receive while recognizing that the well-trained, disciplined unit comes not only through individual training but from a unit's training as a team. A combat unit is like a machine. It runs best when carefully assembled with precision fitted parts that have been tested individually and as a unit. All services recognize the value of unit training by requiring that each unit satisfactorily complete carefully articulated minimum training requirements prior to deployment into combat. The desire is to take the parts and mold and polish them into an effective whole in order to provide the unit with optimum chance of success in the accomplishment of its mission with a minimum of casualties. It also gives to the unit a degree of cohesivesness and internal discipline not found in a less-trained unit, and it is this degree of discipline which is essential to the prevention of misconduct in combat. The principle is well-established. Yet during the Vietnam War, in their exuberance to exude confidence to their superiors, both military and civilian, the services rushed individuals and units through curtailed training cycles to "ready" them for combat. Such a "can do" attitude is not only dishonest but counterproductive in the long run. It is somewhat of a paradox that in peacetime Marine recruits spend twelve weeks in the all-important process of becoming a Marine, while in wartime they spend eight. Army recruits suffer similar training reductions. Arguably some time is saved by cutting "nice to know" subjects and extending the training day. Perhaps what is lost is not peacetime trivia but four additional weeks of acquiring the necessary self-discipline to adhere to the equally necessary restrictions of the Law of War.
The same is true of unit training. Prior to their deployment to the Republic of Vietnam in December, 1967, the eventual My Lai units had their eight-week training cycle cut to four weeks. Two weeks prior to deployment, the unit exchanged its M14 rifles for the M16, which required a week's orientation and range time. Other predeployment activitiesphysicals, administrative matters, shots, preventive maintenance, inspections, and packing-limited attendance of this essential, mandatory training to "non-essential" personnel not required elsewhere. In every case of misconduct investigated, lack of training, whether unit, individual, enlisted, noncommissioned officer, or officer-was considered to have been a key factor in the incident which was under investigation. Units which entered the war trained generally suffered no incidents. Disciplinary problems occurred in untrained, piecemeal units, or with new personnel who arrived and were sent into combat without adequate in-country training and orientation.
Training serves other purposes. It allows time for the promulgation and implementation of and unit familiarization with necessary and required directives and procedures regarding operational activities. United States forces in Vietnam promulgated a most extensive system of directives regarding the conduct of combat operations, rules of engagement, and the handling of noncombatants. Yet despite directives stressing individual responsibility and awareness at the lowest levels, dissemination of these directives was concluded by several investigatory bodies to have been poor. The post-My Lai investigation, for example, found there to have been a great deal of confusion in the principal My Lai unit, C/1/20, as to the purpose and limitations of the search and destroy mission, even though the purpose of such an operation was spelled out clearly by MACV, USARV, and III MAF directives in effect at the time of the My Lai incident.
The question to be asked in retrospect as well as prospectively begs recognition: Where a conflict does not imperil our national survival, where a man or unit is not needed to fill the breach and stave off immediate defeat, can we afford to ignore the minimum training times, schedules, and objectives imposed by cooler heads during peacetime? Military and civilian leaders must resolve whether the battle being waged justifies the deployment of partiallytrained individuals and units, realizing that the positive results may be of limited duration while the negative-increased friendly casualties and undesirable incidents-in the long run far outweigh the positive.
Lack of Training in the Law of War. Training in the Law of War in the past has been given lip service by the armed forces. This has occurred due to a lack of understanding of the subject and a failure to relate it to other military subjects. In 1968, in responding to a letter from then-Army Chief of Staff Gen Harold K. Johnson concerning reports of mistreatment of prisoners of war by United States forces, LtGen Bruce Palmer, deputy commander of United States forces in Vietnam, opined that such lapses in U.S. forces conduct occurred inasmuch as "instruction in the Geneva Conventions has tended to be abstract and academic, rather than concrete and practical."
Training in the Law of War presents many anomalies. It is required by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which as treaties are part of the supreme law of our nation. Despite its authoritative basis it is one of the most ignored subjects. In the crush of the peacetime training cycle it is set aside for more essential peacetime subjects. When war commences, there is little time for it as training cycles become compressed. When taught, it is given cursory treatment, either through the showing of an out-of-date training film or by an untrained instructor reading an equally out-ofdate lesson plan. In a recent survey one instructor stated that he always scheduled his Law of War classes for 1115 so that his soldier audience, anxious to beat the line at the mess hall, would not ask any questions on conclusion of the thirty-minute film he showed. Such training, in the words of Gen Palmer, becomes abstract and academic rather than concrete and practical. Training which cannot be related to impending combat is quickly discarded. A lack of knowledge and understanding of the Law of War may give flexibility to an absolute legal concept. Worse, the training may be ignored completely. The annual Inspector General inspection of the American Division on 31 July 1968 noted a deficiency within the Division in Geneva Conventions training during the preceding year-a year which included predeployment training, an incountry indoctrination and training program and the incident at My Lai. Lt Galley's company arrived at Duc Pho in early December 1967, where it attended the 11th Brigade's incountry indoctrination and training program. Contrary to MACV and USARV directives, instruction in the handling of noncombatants was not received during this period.
If the tragedy which occurred at My Lai can be said to have had any positive effects, one would be an increase in training in the Law of War. For example, the Army has produced six excellent training films concerning the Law of War. Army and Marine officer schools at all levels now include blocks of instruction in the Law of War. A new directive, Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 of 5 November 1974, delineates for the first time the responsibilities of each service for dissemination and implementation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. It also assigns specific lines of responsibility for establishing procedures for the reporting, investigation, and prosecution of acts of misconduct by United States military personnel, the reporting of acts of misconduct by enemy forces, the reporting of acts of misconduct by or against allies of the United States, and for the promulgation and implementation of rules of engagement.
These steps, while positive in nature, do not entirely rectify the problems of the past. The principal problem lies with instruction, and that problem is four-fold: the subject, the instructor, the areas of instruction, and the methods of instruction.
The first part of the problem relates to Gen Palmer's comment: the Law of War is often viewed as an isolated subject contrary to the conduct of warfare, an unnecessary, unrealistic restraining device inhibiting the combat commander in the accomplishment of his mission. Politically-imposed restrictions in the rules of engagement are erroneously blamed on the Law of War. Because of these misperceptions, the Law of War has fallen into disrespect on occasion-and disrespect may encourage disregard for the law.
To be sure, the Law of War is not without its shortcomings. Like tactics, when codified it has been written to fight the war just concluded. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, were designed for the most part for interstate confrontations between uniformed armies. Little consideration was given the problem of the guerrilla or of intrastate warfare. These matters have been under consideration since 1971 in annual meetings of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts at Geneva, Switzerland. Yet the incidents which have occurred indicate that the shortcomings are not with the law but with the individual's knowledge of the law. Under no circumstances is it proper to murder a noncombatant. This is the misconduct under consideration rather than the myriad grey areas susceptible to question or misinterpretation.
Close examination of the Law of War shows it to be consistent with the Principles of War, tactical concepts, and basic leadership principles. This has not occurred by coincidence, for the Law of War has been developed by military leaders with extensive combat experience. This interrelationship needs to be exploited to facilitate greater understanding and respect for the Law of War. The Marine Corps Development and Education Center has produced a self-instructional text utilizing an interdisciplinary approach to the Law of War for its officer courses. Students are asked to analyze tactical situations from all standpoints. In one scenario a unit is assigned the mission of seizing, occupying, and defending a village. Upon taking the objective several men begin looting homes, others commit sex offenses, while others execute several prisoners of war taken in the attack. Obviously the offenses violate the Law of War. They also violate tactical considerations. From a tactical standpoint, the unit has neither secured nor consolidated its position and is susceptible to sustaining heavy casualties should the enemy subject the position to artillery attack. The acts of misconduct jeopardize the unit and its position in the event of counterattack. Neither is the commander in a position to continue the attack if so directed. In considering the Principles of War. the commander has accomplished his immediate mission through utilization of the principles of Mass and Economy of Force. He forfeits both because of the illegal acts of his subordinates and violates another: the principle of Security. From a leadership standpoint, he has lost control of his men.
There are other tactical considerations of a long-term nature. If prisoners of war are routinely executed, there will be no prisoners of war in the future, for the enemy will choose to fight to the death rather than surrender to face an inevitable death. If civilians and their property are abused, they will aid the enemy in his cause while resisting ours. In both cases we have lost the intelligence value of each class of people. We will pay for those losses through more casualties of our own. As Sir Philip Sidney declared in 1580, "Cruelty in war buyest conquest at the dearest price."
The interrelationship between the Law of War. the Principles of War, tactical considerations, and principles of leadership accounts for the complexity of the subject. As with tactical questions or leadership questions, answers do not come easily. The subject does not lend itself to cursory preparation or presentation by unskilled or inexperienced personnel. It deals with a complex area of the law. Yet it requires leadership and tactical training and experience to avoid presentation in a legal vacuum. The recent accession of outstanding former small unit leaders to the ranks of judge advocates through the Excess Leave and Fully Funded Law programs offers one solution. The Army has hit upon another: team teaching. Its regulation regarding Law of War training requires that all instruction be given by a judge advocate with a combat arms officer with leadership experience, preferable in combat.
Most instruction in the Law of War in the past has been general rather than specific, with little attention paid to audience analysis. As with any subject, there are many areas of information which may be essential to one unit while irrelevant to another. For example, infantry units are concerned with the handling of prisoners of war during the initial capture phase. Military police units are interested in prisoner of war collection and detention. Disbursing units will need to know prisoner of war rates of pay. When training time is of the essence, the audience should be provided with that information which most directly relates to the accomplishment of its mission.
The two preceding points suggest that Law of War training cannot be left to casual assignment. Instruction should be provided by a permanently-assigned judge advocate-combat arms officer team from the division staff, trained in the Law of War, who tailor each presentation to the unit receiving it.
Finally, consideration must be given to the vehicle of instruction. Educators are in general agreement that the worst mode of instruction is the lecture. The military in large measure has dispensed with the lecture method and replaced it to the greatest extent possible with the practical exercise. Initial instruction by necessity may come by lecture. Follow-on instruction and perfection of a skill is best accomplished by doing it.
Training in the Law of War is no exception. Returning to the training of an infantry unit, for example, the areas of primary concern are those of the handling and treatment of prisoners of war and civilian noncombatants. Military field manuals prescribe specific procedures for each. These procedures have been reviewed to insure their consistency with the Law of War. Initial instruction should be by lecture and demonstration, followed by practical application at every possible opportunity. For the last three years the Marine Corps and certain Army units have utilized military personnel, both male and female, as civilian personnel and prisoners of war on tactical exercises. In Operation SOLID SHIELD '74, for example, participating units found the tactical area of operations liberally "salted" with noncombatants. The "war" was not fought in a vacuum and noncombatant procedures were put to practice. More realistically, Marines guarding a pontoon bridge across the intercoastal waterway were forced to detain several yachts that entered the exercise area contrary to Coast Guard warnings. Confronting personnel with these situations in peacetime diminishes the likelihood of noncombatant abuse in combat.
In the concluding portion of his article next month, Maj Parks continues his analysis of the cause of misconduct by combatants in the war zone. His discussion considers personnel turbulence, personnel shortages, personnel quality, leadership and other factors.
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