By Ernest P Bond Jr
'I never knew an appeal made to them for honor, courage, or loyalty that they did not more than realize my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should come to England they will be found the Country's Sheet Anchor.'
-Lord St. Vincent
Of the Royal Marines, 1802
In August 1996 there was a reunion of The Chosin Few in Portland, OR. At the opening ceremonies there was a group of Brits in double-breasted blazers with Corps Crests; gray flannels; spit-shined, black leather shoes; green berets; and large medals. When they were introduced, they marched in to the accompaniments of the Royal Marine Band playing their regimental march, "A Life on the Ocean Wave."
They were survivors of 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines. Although most of them were in their 70s, the arm swing and drill was flawless. They marched like they were 20 again. The years seemed to be peeled away. They had come across from the United Kingdom at great personal expense to be with their brothers of the 1st Marine Division-Chosin Reservoir, 1950.
For most it is a brotherhood of friendship, respect and, yes, love between these Marines of both countries who often fly back and forth to attend social and personal affairs. They are indeed a "Band of Brothers." Those of us in the old 1st Marine Division have a respect and admiration for these Royal Marines, a superbly disciplined force of fighting men exchanging their blue tunics for a flak jacket with the easy rhythm of their marching step.
They are a self-regenerating elite, a jealous tribal entity, a military aspic of attitudes and manners left behind by the current world. They are highly professional. The young recruit is "kicked to excellence," as one officer expressed it, not literally these days but through long and arduous training. Emphasis on "troop and stomp" (once a Marine forte), they will tell you it "produces pride and teamwork." "Bad drill means bad discipline" that equates to a poor combat record.
At Chosin, with 50 percent casualties from a unit strength of 250, they shaved every day in combat, looked after weapons and gear even when wounded, and refused helmets in combat. They are, after all, the, original "Green Berets."
Starting in 1939 when Churchill formed the Commandos, of which there are several in the Royal Marines, their discipline and turnout were always a good example to us Americans, who in combat seem to forget. They were military in the finest sense of the word. In the late 1940s their recruit training was 12 months long. Now it is 30 weeks and a 30-mile hike before they leave the depot. As a former drill instructor-twice at Parris Island-I would call their training as similar to the old 1950s/early 1960s "high stress." Their graduates are not big on civilian clothes. Their officers look like officers-gloves, swagger canes, or sticks are still carried.
In short they taught us much about courage, honor, obedience, "spit and polish," camaraderie, and singing on the march or whenever they can find a "wet."
From one Chosin Few brother to another:
And thinking where most men's glory begins and ends,
I say my glory was: I had such friends.1
And now begins their journey to the Chosin.
41 Commando at Chosin2 by Donald B. Williams
How much might be done with a hundred thousand soldiers such as these.3
After the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that U.N. members provide assistance to the ROK [Republic of Korea], the United Kingdom was the first nation to join the United States in support of that resolution. Inasmuch as the United Kingdom has always worked side by side with the United States, their intervention into the Korean conflict was no different. In this situation, the North Korean forces consisted of seven divisions and five brigades, with an air force of 100-150 Soviet-made planes. The ROK forces numbered only five divisions with no air force or armor. There was no question on the part of the United Kingdom Defense Committee that immediate action in this instance was necessary. When General MacArthur took command of the U.N. forces on July 8, 1950, the stage was set for a full commitment on the part of the United States and U.N. member nations to resolve this bitter conflict once and for all.
Next to the United States, the British Commonwealth provided the majority of warships to serve under the operational control of the commander, U.S. Naval Forces Far East. In fact, the first on the scene to assist in providing land, sea and air forces to the ROK was a British Royal Navy contingent consisting of a light fleet carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyer and frigate escort ships. Two Royal Australian Navy destroyers also participated in this initial task force.
On August 29, 1950, the first of the land forces from Great Britain were transported to Pusan. They were the British 27th Brigade, which consisted of the First Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment and the First Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment. The Cromwell and Centurion tanks of the King's Royal Irish Hussars followed. On October 14, 1950, the 29th British Brigade arrived, consisting of 3 infantry Battalions-the Fifth Northumberland Fusiliers, the First Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment and a battalion of the Royal Ulster Rifles-plus the gunners of the 45th Royal Artillery.
The 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines was formed at Bickleigh Devon in August 1950 and placed under the command of Lt.Col. Douglas Drysdale. The unit was composed of approximately 200 members made up of volunteers from the UK, ship personnel from the Pacific Fleet, and a group from the Troopship Devonshire sailing toward Singapore. Its role was to initiate seaborne landings on the North Korean coastline targeting the railway supply routes running southward from Siberia.
Arrangements were made for the group in the UK to fly to Japan by civilian aircraft. One Inward Telegram from the British Embassy in Rangoon to the UK Representative in Karachi, Pakistan, marked SECRET IMMEDIATE, read as follows:
Three BOAC Charter aircraft carrying Royal Naval personnel will pass through Karachi at approximately 0001 hours on September 4, September 5, and September 6. Grateful if you would arrange for following message to be delivered in writing to Senior Officer of each party. BEGINS.
From Naval Attache Rangoon. It is most important from security aspect that you and your party should do all you can not to attract attention in Rangoon. You will be staying overnight at principal hotel and will have to be careful to avoid giving the impression of a large British service party. Please explain this to your party en route. ENDS.
From the United Kingdom to Japan, such a journey takes only a few hours by air today but at that time it took 5 or 6 days. Since the plane stopped at, or flew over, countries that were not supporting the U.N. action, the passengers were required to dress in civilian clothes. This meant that some of the men had to be issued a suit, shirt and tie in order to comply with this unanticipated dress code. The men from Troopshire Devonshire were also flown by air from Singapore to Japan. In their case, they underwent an uncomfortable 4-day journey aboard cargo-carrying Dakotas of the Royal New Zealand Air Force. One good thing about their tedious trip was an overnight stay at Clark Airfield in the Philippines. There they met their American allies for the first time and shared T-Bone steaks, rum and cokes, coffee, and the Silver Wing Club.
When the various groups arrived in Japan, they assembled in Camp McGill, a U.S. Army base near Yokosuka, where they underwent a period of very intensive orientation and training sessions on the use of U.S. explosives, weapons, equipment and reconnaissance operations. Every opened box or packet revealed something new to be quickly mastered. They also had to learn and understand a strange language spoken by their hostsnot the Japanese-the Americans. In addition, the Commando had to develop raiding techniques using 10-men rubber boats. This entailed long hours day and night paddling around Tokyo Bay, but soon the boats were moving across the water at fair speeds, even when loaded with equipment.
Meanwhile, Lt.Col. Drysdale was heavily involved in the operational planning. In order to have the necessary powers to carry out his extensive responsibilities, the Commando was commissioned as a ship of the Royal Navy `HMS 41 Commando' serving under the Naval Discipline Act. This Act allowed for harsher punishment for wrongdoers, but more importantly, it gave the Commanding Officer much greater authority when dealing with higher commands.
The word "Independent" in the title "41 Independent Commando" means that the Commanding Officer had sole responsibility for the Commando on all matters operational and logistical, without the support of British Headquarters. On personnel matters, Lt.Col. Drysdale dealt directly with the Royal Marines Office in London, which was no easy task in 1950. With the slow means of communication, even a telephone call could take hours, and sometimes days, to make connections.
With the war already in progress and U.S. ground troops committed to combat, various groups of 41 Independent Commando were dispatched on operations as soon as they became operational. One group, under the command of Lt. E.G.D. Pounds, comprised mainly of fleet volunteers, was given only a few hours of preparation time before they were dispatched via HMS WHITESAND BAY to the west coast of Korea to carry out a diversionary raid as part of a U.S. Army Raiding Battalion. This group subsequently joined the First Marine Division for the Inchon landings and continued on as far as Kimpo Airfield. When they rejoined the Commando, 41 Independent Commando was organized into two groups and ready for action. Their mission was to land on the east coast of Korea and blow the railroad line that hauled supplies down the coast from Russia to the North Korean army.
The first group, commanded by Lt.Col. Drysdale, boarded the U.S. submarine PERCH, which had been converted to carry the troops by removing the torpedo tubes. Also, a cylindrical hangar was built on the upper deck to house a small power craft or "skimmer," which could tow the rubber boats that would carry them to shore. The unusual sight of this huge projection on the afterdeck became the laughing stock of the Navy fleet, and soon the PERCH was commonly referred to in jest as "The Pregnant Perch." There were many theories as to how this strange sea vessel was branded with that particular label, all of which were unprintable at the time.
The second group, commanded by Maj Dennis Aldridge, the Unit Second in Command, embarked on two Assault Personnel Destroyers, USS BASS and WANTUCK. This group was accompanied by a member of the British Parliament and a journalist, Tom Driberg, who described 41 Independent Commando in the December, 1950 issue of Globe & Laurel as follows:
The lads grew remarkably quickly into the mood and outlook that seem to be characteristic of this special kind of outfit. One might define it as a nonchalant self-sufficiency, a debonair assurance that is never arrogant-a selfmocking toughness. The common idea of Commando "toughness" is wrong. They are not musclebound supermen. Many of them are quite slight and trimphysically compact, mentally alert. Their training fits them perfectly for such jobs as they had to do, two nights running, on the journey I took with them-landing, silently and invisibly on a hostile shore; disposing-still silently and invisibly-of anyone who may be guarding it; doing a definite limited job, such as blowing up a tunnel or a bridge, and getting off the shore again, if possible still unseen and unheard.
From the three ships, night raids were carried out in the ChongjinSingjin area of North Korea. A number of railway tunnels were damaged and a bridge was destroyed, plus mines were laid on the lines before they returned to the ships a few miles off shore. Tom Driberg described the scene in the Globe & Laurel as follows:
There was no moon, but the sea looked luminously grey in the starlight . . . Halfway to the shore, the P-boat (landing craft) stops and stands by. Because of the noise of its engine, it cannot go any nearer. The towrope is slipped. The Marines put down their weapons and take the paddles; the water laps gently in phosphorescent rings; the silence really is now almost complete as we slide towards a dark range of hills that looks steeper and more menacingly inscrutable each moment. A tiny red light winks at us from the beach-it is an OK signal from an officer who has swum on ahead.
The Marines split up into various parties. A "powder train" carried explosives to a railway tunnel. Demolition experts laid the charges and set the fuses. Others guarded the beach and the boats and checked the buildings around the railway. Mr. Driberg further described the scene in the Globe & Laurel:
After that we "got the hell out of it" as the Yanks say. It was a terrific moment for all the chaps-many of whom had never been in anything like it, the real thing, before when, halfway back to the ship, we suddenly saw the sky torn by a vivid orange flash, and heard the tremendous roar as the tunnel went up in the air and knew that our mission had been successful.
Unfortunately, two members of the Commando were killed during the raids-one just barely 18 years of age from Apsley, Nottingham. The other was from Plymouth, Devon who had served with distinction in World War II. Both were buried at sea and for many the solemn ceremony was compounded by the fact that it was the first time they heard Taps being played. As the ships arrived at Yokosuka and the Commando disembarked, the headline in the Star and Stripes proclaimed that the United Nations had given authority to cross the 38th Parallel. The Commando could not help but question at that point who had given them permission to cross.
As the U.N. forces advanced along both coasts, targets for small raids became scarce. Consequently, Lt.Col. Drysdale received orders to report for duty with the First Marine Division. In mid-November, the Commando were shipped via sea transport to the port of Hungnam in North Korea to serve as an additional reconnaissance unit. Their mission was to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank ranging as far as 23 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit and the Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out the Communist troops beyond the reach of routine infantry patrols.
41 Independent Commando, a small complement of about 200plus, were based a few miles inland at Hamhung where they remained for several days for fresh supplies, equipment and cold weather clothing. Like many others, 41 Independent Commando joined in the "I'll be home for Christmas" euphoria, and waited. They were ready to go, but vehicles to transport them to Koto-ri evidently were not ready. When days passed and still the vehicles did not appear, it became necessary for the Divisional Service Units to provide the transportation.
The situation was getting more critical by the day. The Communist Chinese forces were furiously pressing their attack at Hagaru-ri and Yudamni. There was only one Marine infantry battalion at Hagaru-ri and it was becoming increasingly more difficult to hold. Reinforcements were an absolute necessity. When 41 Independent Commando finally arrived at Koto-ri, they were greeted with the news that the road to the north was blocked.
Task Force Drysdale was quickly organized to clear the road between Koto-ri and to reinforce Hagaru-ri. It was comprised of about 900 men and was made up of 41 Commando; George Company [G/3/1 USMC], under the command of Carl Sitter; and Baker Company [B/1/31st INF USA], under the command of Charles L. Peckham, which was en route to join Task Force MacLean east of the Chosin Reservoir. Lt.Col. Drysdale said, "Lads, it will not be a walk in the sun-Semper Fi."
On November 29, on a cold, snowy morning, with the temperature hovering near zero, the Task Force set off from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri on one of the most astonishing rescue operations in military history. Since close air support was delayed because of poor visibility, it was not until 9:00 AM before they could get underway. The plan was that 41 Commando would take the first hill to the east of the road; George Company would take the second hill; and Baker Company would remain on the road to parallel the progress of the two units as they secured the high ground. It was not long before they came to realize that there were huge numbers of Communist troops ahead, attacking in all different directions and destroying everything-and everyone-in their path. The master plan of the enemy had been put into place-to annihilate the First Marine Division. In the words of General Sung Shin-lin, ". . . Kill these Marines as you would snakes in your homes."
The day before, three Communist Chinese divisions hit the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni. Other elements struck Fox Company holding Toktong Pass. The main supply route was cut in several places. At Hagaru-ri the Marines and soldiers were completely surrounded and there was no place to turn.
The Task Force made up a convoy about 2 miles long and included 100 vehicles and 12 tanks. They leapfrogged their way north with little opposition until suddenly the Communist Chinese opened fire from the right front. Fighting back from exposed positions along the road, they soon came to realize that the enemy was in far greater numbers than they had anticipated. There were Chinese in front of them and in back of them as they pushed on slowly around roadblocks and other obstacles. Halfway to Hagaruri, they reached Hell Fire Valley, a long alpine valley in the middle of a mountainous range with a frozen creek winding through. They were being bombarded everywhere. Three hours passed and they had advanced only two miles. Four hours passed, and still no progress. In desperation, Col. Drysdale called for reinforcements. Early that afternoon, eight tanks arrived.
It was obvious that the hill-by-hill attack was not working. Consequently, it was decided that they should depend on the tanks and close air support to keep the flanks clear while the Task Force pushed through on trucks as rapidly as possible. The column moved out again and was hit immediately by enemy fire. The tanks halted. Casualties were being taken.
Meanwhile, George Company assumed the lead in the column. The tanks pushed on up the road using a by-pass around a destroyed bridge. The column continued northward-first George Company, then 41 Commando, then Baker Company, and finally the transport vehicles. Heavy mortar fire continued, and once again the column had to stop. Casualties continued to mount, and Lt.Col. Drysdale himself was wounded in the fray. Radio communications were knocked out, and it was now starting to get dark.
During daylight hours, American Corsair fighters mercilessly attacked the Chinese. When darkness descended, they were forced to return to their carriers leaving the convoy completely on their own.
Amid a continuous stream of bullets, grenades, and a fire inferno, the column again formed to leapfrog their way through. With the tanks in the lead, George Company could see the lights at the Hagaru-ri airstrip where American engineers were working feverishly. They kept going somehow, even through an ambush that destroyed a number of ammunition trucks. One writer described the scene-". . . the whole area glowed and flamed in the melted snow as though under some astonishing midnight sun." After ten hours and an average of one mile an hour, they reached the Hagaru-ri perimeter where they dug in the frozen earth and continued to fight off the constant Chinese barrages.
41 Commando, the next in line to try to reach Hagaru-ri alive, took a blast when a mortar shell hit an ammunition truck at the end of the Commando column. The blast formed a road-block and 41 Commando was now cut off from Baker Company following behind. The Chinese went in for the kill. Despite severe casualties, the Royal Marines pushed their way through three more roadblocks. About 1:30 in the morning, they dragged themselves into Hagaru-ri. It was a bloody battle, but in the end, about 150 men, including Lt.Col. Drysdale, broke through to Hagaru-ri.
There was mass confusion for Baker Company when the ammunition truck exploded in the rear of the 41 Independent Commando. The explosion forced Baker Company and the long train of vehicles to come to a halt. There was a mad scramble as the troops took up defensive positions. Some officers and NCOs, unable to take control, acted independently and hurriedly set up defensive lines. All in all, it was a terrible ordeal which continued throughout most of the night. Of the three companies, Baker Company was the hardest hit. In the end, one officer and 69 men found their way back to Koto-ri and 140 were missing in action.
General MacArthur, now facing a totally different situation, radioed Washington:
All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. . . . We face an entirely new war ... Our present strength of force is not sufficient to meet this undeclared war by the Chinese.... This command had done everything humanly possible within its capabilities but now is faced with conditions beyond its control and its strength.
General MacArthur was going over to the defensive, and Washington had no choice but to concur.
General O.P. Smith was left with only one option and that was to fight his way out. When he made his famous "Retreat, Hell" decision at Hagaru-ri, 41 Independent Commando was very much a strong presence despite having lost 50 percent of their original number.
The breakout southward from Hagaru-ri began early on the morning of December 6. The 7th Marines was ordered to take the lead, followed by the 5th Marines, with 41 Commando and the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines attached. It was cold and the wind was vicious. The road was jammed with trucks, jeeps and tanks. Destroyed vehicles and trash were everywhere, and there seemed to be nothing but death all around them. It took 38 hours to travel 11 miles. Despite the cold, despite their painful, aching, tired bodies, all they could do was keep walking.
The 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was the first to arrive at Koto-ri. The Chinese were still attacking the main column from both flanks and they were pouring in everything they had. The Marines retaliated in kind.
The last elements of the First Marine Division arrived in Koto-ri around midnight on December 7-8 and they all had had it. More than 14,000 men were crammed into this small village. Tired, dirty, hungry and cold, all they wanted to do was collapse. But before they knew it, they were receiving orders to resume the attack the next morning through the Funchilin Pass to Chinhung-ni. One Royal Marine said, "Cheer up, lads, we'll get out of this mess." His tone of voice inspired renewed courage and confidence to go on.
The long column continued in a seemingly endless procession only to encounter still another roadblock-a huge chasm where a bridge was supposed to be. The column could climb down one side and up the other side to get to the road ahead, but there was no way they could get their equipment through, plus their dead and wounded. There was nothing to do but rebuild the bridge! It was nothing short of a miracle when the flood of people, vehicles and equipment stretching back to Koto-ri resumed their crossing throughout the night. It was now just a matter of putting one frozen foot ahead of another.
All of the fight was out of the Chinese and the troops were encountering less and less resistance. By 9:00 PM December 11, all units arrived in Hungnam. The armored tanks rolled in at midnight. Hot food, water, showers, warm stoves, and R&R were waiting for them. As soon as the necessary preparations were made, they were moved to the safety of waiting ships. The disastrous Chosin Reservoir campaign was over.
General O.P. Smith sent the following message to Lt.Col. Drysdale:
As Commanding General of the First Marine Division, I desire to take this opportunity to acknowledge the high qualities of leadership, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed by officers and men of the 41 Independent Commando of the Royal Marines while serving with this division in North Korea.
I am familiar with the long and glorious history of the Royal Marines. This history records many outstanding feats of heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice by units and individuals alike. The performance of the 41 Commandos during the drive from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri, during the defense of Hagaru-ri, and during the advance from Hagaru-ri to the south will, in the perspective of history, take equal rank with the past exploits of the Royal Marines.
I can give you no higher compliment than to state that your conduct and that of your officers and men under your command was worthy of the highest traditions of Marines.
41 Commando spent Christmas with the First Marine Division at Masan. They had suffered 50 percent casualties, killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Their ranks were badly depleted, particularly in specialists and NCOs, and it was eventually decided that they should withdraw to Japan to await reinforcements. It was with mixed feelings that the Commando left their USMC comrades. In his report, Lt.Col. Drysdale stated:
This is the first time that Marines of the two nations had fought side by side since the defense of the Peking Legation in 1900. Let it be said that the admiration of all ranks of 41 Commando for their Brothers in Arms was and is unbounded. They fought like tigers and their morale and esprit de corps is second to none.
The Commando rested at Ebisu Camp located in the suburbs of Tokyo and enjoyed the delights of that beautiful city. When the Military Police did not try to understand their merriment, they hurriedly moved on to the Australian Naval Base at Kure. As new replacements arrived, they were trained to use U.S. weapons and equipment and to take their place within the Commando. Soon the Unit was up to its maximum strength of 300.
Meanwhile, plans were being made for the next task which was to mount a Commando raid to cut the East Coast railway which was again being used to move supplies from Manchuria to Hungnam. This was to be a daylight demonstration in force with considerable support. 41 Independent Commando, with small elements of the Navy and Marines, went ashore to complete the task. Over eight hours later, the railway embankment was blown three times and produced a crater 100 feet wide and 16 feet deep.
Following the success of the raid, the Commando established a Forward Operations Base on the islands within Wonsan Harbor, some 60 miles behind the North Korean lines. The purpose was to carry out harassing raids on the northeast coastal defenses with the aim of drawing enemy troops away from those opposing the U.N.
In October, 1951, the command of 41 Independent Commando passed from Lt.Col. Drysdale to Lt.Col. F.N. Grant. Shortly thereafter, when both sides were engaged in protracted peace talks, the Commando was withdrawn from Korea. There being no requirement for an amphibious raiding force, the Commando returned to the United Kingdom and on February 22, 1952, 41 Independent Commando was officially disbanded at the Royal Marines Barracks in Plymouth.
41 Independent Commando gained a wealth of experience during its short history considering the small size of the Unit. As the members joined other Units, their expertise was well distributed throughout the Royal Marines. A high percentage of officers went on to achieve their own commands, four of them reaching General Officer ranks. From the enlisted ranks, some received commissions while many went on to be highly respected NCOs. Five of them reached the highest non-commissioned rank of Regimental Sergeant Major.
Final Note
Since 1664 this beautifully disciplined force has fought around the world, bringing honor and valor to its colors and country.
They believe in severe discipline, pride in ceremonials (which among all ranks is an art form), physical training, and the commando run. They believe in "manly" music. Their Corps of Drums is probably the best in any military in the world. Theirs is a magnificent example of the terms professional and military. They will never go the gentler path. It would weaken their fabric.
So, from your American brothers, here's a tribute from your country's poet laureate:
To take your chance in the thick
of a rush, with firing all about,
Is nothing so bad when you've cover
to `and, an' leave an' likin' to shout;
But to stand an' be still to the
Birken ead dri114 is a damn' tough bul
let to chew,
An' they done it, in the Dollies-'Er
Majesty's Dollies-soldier and sailor
too!
Their work was done when it
`and't begun; they was younger nor
me an' you'
Their choice it was plain between
drownin' in `eaps an' bein' mopped
by the screw.
So they stood an' was still to the
Biirken 'ead drill, soldier and sailor too!
We're most of us liars, we're `arf
of us thieves, an' the rest are as rank
as can be,
But once in a while we can finish
in style (which I `ope won't `appen to
me).
But it makes you think better o'
you an' your friend, an' the work yo
may `ave to do,
When you think o' the sinkin'
Victorier's Jollies-soldiers and sailor too!
Now there ins't no room for to
say ye don't know-they `ave proved
it plain and true
That, whether it's Widow, or
whether it's ship, Victorier's work is
to do,
An' they done it, the Jollies-'Er
Majesty's Dollies-soldiers and
sailors too!5
Per Mare Per Terrain-Semper Fidelis.
Quote To Ponder
Patience Required
"Fatigue the opponent, if possible, with few forces and conserve a decisive mass for the critical moment."
Carl von Clausewitz
On War (1832)
Notes
1. Williams Butler Yeats.
2. This article originally appeared in "The Chosin Few" Sixth International Reunion booklet, August 1996. The author is Mr. Donald B. Williams, formerly of Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Mr. Williams wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance and research efforts of Mr. Fred Hayhurst, formerly of 41 Independent Commando, during the development of this article.
3. Napoleon I while inspecting the Marine Guard, HMS Belkrophon after surrendering, 15 July 1815.
4. In 1852 the Birkenhead transport was sunk off Simon's Bay. The Marines aboard her went down as drawn up on her deck.
5. Rudyard Kipling.
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