The Age Of Air Power

When Martin van Creveld speaks, people listen. His thoughtful works on military theory and history continually seek to challenge conventional wisdom. His insights and arguments are profound and substantial enough that even if one does not agree, they cannot be dismissed; they must be countered.

Van Creveld’s latest book, The Age of Airpower, is another such work. Arguably the most indepth treatment of the subject available, Van Creveld not only addresses airpower in terms of both land- and seabased aviation, but also includes the space domain with its proliferation of ballistic missiles and satellites. Is so doing, he covers the role of airpower in conflicts from pre-World War I to Afghanistan.

Van Creveld seeks to demonstrate that airpower reached its high point in World War II and, relative to the promises of its proponents, is in a period of decline and increasing ineffectiveness. He argues that due to nuclear deterrence, conventional warfare amongst superpower competitors is extremely unlikely. But he points out that it is the anticipation of this type of conflict that drives airpower strategy and procurement in developed nations, resulting in dwindling airpower assets that are too expensive to maintain, that are too expensive to risk or lose in combat, and that are wholly ineffective against the types of actual conflicts encountered by today’s militaries.

Van Creveld is very effective in building a foundation for his central argument. It is hard not to sympathize with his questioning the utility of trying to locate handfuls of insurgents with a few hundred dollars of explosives using manned aircraft costing hundreds of millions of dollars in price, personnel, maintenance, and facilities. He points out that World War II fighter-bombers and dive-bombers were functionally as effective in destroying tanks, locomotives, and bridges as their modern counterparts, and at a fraction of the cost.

Despite a solid foundation, Van Creveld’s overarching argument re‑garding the overall decline of airpower is not convincing. Conventional deter‑rence, not just nuclear deterrence, is also important in giving peer states pause before launching proxy wars or limited operations. It is a critical component in reassuring allies and in dissuading hostile actions by nonnuclear states. While drones, satellites, and missiles have certainly altered the landscape and calculus of some types of manned flight, their presence and capabilities indicate that the role of airpower itself remains crucial. While the ability of precision munitions to be effective is beholden to properly finding and identifying the threat, the employment of tactical air at the small unit level remains a significant force multiplier regardless of the operational environment. Even Van Creveld admits that it would be foolish for a commander to undertake any operation of meaningful size without at least local command of the air.

The Age of Airpower does not necessarily convince one that the days of airpower are vanishing, but it expertly and effectively continues Van Creveld’s work of championing transformation, challenging militaries to think about what they are designed to do vice what they are actually doing—the threats they prepare for versus the threats they are actually facing and/or are likely to face. Certainly in this age of shrinking defense dollars, the role of airpower should be analyzed to ensure that it is providing the most efficiency in the most cost-effective manner. In this context, The Age of Airpower constitutes a must-read.

THE AGE OF AIRPOWER

By Martin van Creveld.
Public Affairs, New York, 2011

ISBN 158648981X, 512 pp.

$35.00 (Member $31.50)