Courage on a Pacific Island

Reviewed by Rolfe L. Hillman III

>Mr. Hillman works for Tessada Inc. providing professional support to the U.S. Navy. He lived on Peleliu and can testify to the heat and hostile terrain of the invasion sites.

Col Camp’s book, Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15–21, 1944, is a detailed narration of the 1st Marine Regiment’s brutal assault on Peleliu Island. The author, a Marine Corps combat veteran and noted historian, utilized an extensive official and secondary works bibliography for his research. He supplemented the bibliography with interviews with Peleliu veterans by drawing on his personal and professional relationships. The book is well written editorially and an “easy” read. However, there aren’t any footnotes, and thus the book cannot be considered a scholarly work.

Marine Corps veterans and World War II historians will welcome this book’s narration of the 1st Marine Regiment/1st Marine Division’s heroic but very costly actions during the 15 September 1944 invasion of Peleliu Island, the Palaus. The author also utilized the Marine Corps’ extensive oral history collection to present a fast-moving, brutal, and personal account of the 1st Regiment’s actions. The regiment fought its way off the White Beach landing zones on the western side of Peleliu Island to the very rugged and heavily fortified Japanese positions dug into the limestone ridgelines of the Umurbrogol heights—Peleliu’s “spine” in the island’s middle.

The first half of the book provides an overview of the Japanese Army and Imperial Navy defenders in the Palaus; previous U.S. Marine Corps operations (Tarawa, Saipan, and Guam); the 1st Marine Division’s operations on Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Cape Gloucester; and the 1st Marine Division’s invasion preparation/training for the Peleliu invasion on Pavuvu Island. The objective of the invasion was to remove the Japanese threat on Peleliu to GEN Douglas MacArthur’s impending 20 October 1944 invasion of the Philippine Islands, which are 500 miles west of Peleliu.

The author agrees with historians’ conclusion that the Peleliu invasion was a costly, unnecessary operation because ADM William “Bull” Halsey’s Third Fleet fighters and bombers had destroyed all of the Japanese air and naval forces in and around Peleliu earlier in 1944. ADM Halsey recommended canceling the Peleliu invasion; however, Fleet ADM Chester Nimitz overruled the recommendation and ordered the invasion.

The second half of the book narrates the 1st Regiment’s day-by-day operations following its hotly contested landing on the White Beach landing zones. The book has a secondary goal of discussing the command and field leadership during the battle. The author provides short biographies of the Marine Corps’ III Amphibious Corps operational leadership, the division commanding general (MajGen Wil-

liam Rupertus); the division’s command staff, the 1st Regiment’s commanding officer, the legendary Col Lewis “Chesty” Puller; and the 1st Regiment’s battalion commanders. These biographies are crucial because there were difficult relationships between MajGen Rupertus and his officers.

The narration then exhaustively details the 6 days of bloody, costly action as the 1st Regiment fought to blast out the dug-in, veteran Japanese 14th Infantry Division defenders. The Japanese executed the new defensive doctrine of “defend in depth,” which began during the earlier operations on Guam and Saipan, Marianas Islands. The Japanese prepared numerous well-built and mutually supporting/interlocking bunkers, dugouts, spider holes, reverse slope artillery and mortar firing sites, and tank traps/trenches in the island’s hard coral and limestone caves. The Japanese quit wasting lives with heroic “banzai” charges into the teeth of American firepower. The Japanese defenders were well supplied with ammunition, food, and water; were highly motivated; and had competent leadership. The Japanese were also aided by the island’s vegetation, overgrowth that masked their positions from the American reconnaissance photos. The failure to spot the Japanese defensive positions led the U.S. Navy to order a short period of preinvasion naval bombardment and air support strikes against the positions. This was to prove a costly mistake for the Marines since many of the Japanese positions weren’t destroyed. Thus the hard lessons learned from the inadequate shore bombardment at Tarawa weren’t applied here. The Japanese defensive positions negated the American firepower superiority regardless of the duration of the shore bombardment and airstrikes.

The narration follows the 1st Regiment’s battalions and companies as they fought to seize the main objective of their landing zone/operational responsibility, “The Point,” while enduring accurate and very heavy mortar, artillery, machinegun, and sniper fire. The Marines also took casualties from the coral fragments blasted out by the shellfire. The Japanese’s infiltration tactics caused numerous Marine casualties. In addition, the Peleliu environ-

ment contributed to the Marines’ difficult situation: it was hot (105 degrees), dirty, smelly, and there was very little potable water.

One of this book’s strengths is that Col Camp is not only an excellent writer, but he also commanded troops. Thus he is able to narrate the regiment’s companies’/battalions’ operational situation and how they impacted their brother units. The narration also depicts the 5th and 7th Regiments’ operations to a lesser degree.

Col Camp describes how Col Puller had to contend with MajGen Rupertus’ intervention in directing operations, first offshore and then on Peleliu. As the 1st Regiment fought its way toward its objectives, it was taking extremely heavy casualties. Because of poor battlefield communications, Col Puller was not receiving accurate casualty information, which led him to order his commanders to carry out difficult operations with fewer and fewer men while being spurred on by MajGen Rupertus and his own leadership credo. Finally, on the 6th day, it became evident that the 1st Regiment was no longer able to function as an effective fighting force because of its losses that were over 50 percent. The regiment was pulled off the line and replaced by units of the U.S. Army’s 81st U.S. Infantry Division, which had successfully invaded the adjacent island of Anguar on 17 September. Higher Marine Corps leadership ordered the 1st Regiment’s relief despite fierce protests from MajGen Rupertus and LtCol Puller.

The book’s narration ends with the withdrawal of the 1st Regiment on 21 September. However, the fighting on Peleliu continued until November. This was ironic. MajGen Rupertus had claimed it would only take 3 days to successfully complete the operation.

In his summation the author emphasizes the 1st Regiment’s 1,749 casualties, which measured over a 50 percent loss of the organization. Col Camp provides his assessment of Col Puller’s leadership against these losses since this has been a controversial topic ever since.

In conclusion, the book is a fine narration of the 1st Regiment’s operations and should be acquired by 1st Marine Regiment interested parties, Marine Corps historians, and enthusiasts. Numerous photographs support the narration. However, the book has several weaknesses. There are few maps, they are small, and some are hard to read. The book does not discuss the 81st U.S. Infantry Division’s Anguar operation or how it came to fight alongside the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. It only briefly discusses why the 81st Division replaced the 1st Marine Regiment. Moreover, there is little coverage of the 1st Division’s 5th and 7th Regiments’ actions during the invasion. This is perhaps a harsh judgment since the author states that the purpose of the book was the 1st Regiment’s role not the entire operation. It is recommended for those with an interest in the 1st Marine Regiment.