The Reserve Unit Antiterrorism Officer

Originally published in the January 2003 Marine Corps Gazette

The bombings of our embassies in East Africa show how networks of terrorists have formed a nexus of support for attacks thousands of miles away.’

—Michael Sheehan
U.S. Ambassador, Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Intelligence ‘Undersight’?

“Federal prosecutors in Charlotte, North Carolina alleged on Wednesday that a Hezbollah guerrilla group cell provided material support and resources, including cash and equipment, to the Islamic militant group overseas. An indictment issued by a federal grand jury charged four people with conspiring to provide the Lebanon-based group with cash, night vision equipment, global positioning devices, mine detection equipment, cellular phones and blasting equipment. . . .”

—ABC News

My experience with antiterrorism (AT) and other security functions covers about 22 years. I started my career at Marine Barracks Guam as an armed guard. I have spent time in the infantry and more time in reconnaissance. Years later I did a tour at Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (Pacific) and taught at Fort Bragg, NC. One could say I’ve been on both sides of the fence either guarding or collecting information for a direct action mission. Now I am at a fixed site in an urban environment serving in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Two things I have become aware of over the years are: (1) you cannot defend a fixed position properly if you don’t patrol the hinterland, and (2) when you are in the defense you are under surveillance! Either way, someone is collecting valuable, exploitable intelligence information that our Marines may not be able to counter.

Recently we have been engaged in some very thought-provoking discussion about military operations on urbanized terrain. How will we approach an urban battlespace and ultimately win there conventionally? What or where is the enemy’s center of gravity in this condition? On the flip side, put yourself in the defenders’ boots—in a peacetime environment or in our current national situation. Strategically, we have placed Reserve military units in cities throughout the United States. Operationally, they provide full-time support to the active duty force. Tactically, these units, by location, are sitting ducks. The inspector-instructor (I&I) staffs are inundated with support requests and burial details. They can’t do everything including provide themselves proper security. Tactically, a strong response to an attack threat rarely gets widest dissemination to the unit as a whole. Only key individuals on the staff know about a real or perceived criminal/terrorist threat. Someone has to do something!

Most units, Active and Reserve, have someone designated in writing as the security officer or “intelligence representative.” The duties are ancillary and usually only hit checklist items deemed necessary by the commanding officer for some immediate requirement. This is unfortunate because there is a much broader program that must be initiated, developed, and managed. This is very necessary in combat service support and wing units because they will be the bulk of troops in the “rear area.” Furthermore, those reserve units stationed in or near urban centers should approach their site’s positioning as if in the tactical rear area. The person for that job is the Reserve unit AT officer (ATO).

AT Program Development: Instilling the Mindset
The Marine Corps does well with its approach to force protection and, specifically, AT on the active duty side of the house. With the Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) program oriented the way it is, Marines assigned to duty here will be very aware of world events and area of responsibility specific threats. On the Reserve side, though, we are facing something quite different.

Every Marine is initially introduced to AT through battle skills training (BST). They move along in their careers and are required to do Marine Corps Institute Course 0210 (MCI 0210), Terrorism Awareness for Marines, after they have completed their military occupational specialty (MOS) requirements. Other than that, it’s an annual training requirement on the checklist of things to do. This should not be so in the “asymmetric warfare” era we are supposedly in. AT training is the very tool we need to instill the modern warrior ethic. Those of us who are reaching retirement know very well the former Soviet threat and how we used to train for security duties; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare; deadly force/rules of engagement; Combined Arms Exercises; etc. to meet and defeat that particular threat. Then we had an enemy to identify with. Now we have shadows. In this vein, we cannot expect Marines to focus outward as in maneuver warfare when they are not confident enough to be proactive or respond positively to their instincts.

AT training provides us the means to educate and train personnel for tactical military duty. The Department of Defense (DoD) has very clear standards in DoD Directive 2000.16, Combating Terrorism Program Standards, and is referenced in Marine Corps Order 3302.1C (MCO 3302.1C), Marine Corps AT/FP [Force Protection] Program. We have particular tasks, conditions, and standards to meet for other survival oriented skill areas such as combat water survival, marksmanship, and physical fitness that are really pieces of the pie. AT training is a holistic program that enables Marines of all skill levels to come together as a team and focus its confidence outward, toward a real or perceived threat. The Marine Corps individual training standards for AT program management are contained in MCO 1510.114, AT/FP Program Management.

If a Reserve unit drilling at its home training center (HTC) has only 25 percent of a four-drill weekend devoted to BST, that time has to be intense and seriously focused. Not only that, but the training cadre must be expert in providing instruction and training. The unit must realize it must have a layered training plan that makes sense to all hands. (See Table 1.)

Table 1. BST training plan example.

In the example shown in Table 1 we are, in most cases, training to time not necessarily to standard. This obviously goes against the grain of training concepts. Yet, through reinforcement training and development of “read ahead” materials issued with a drill notice, mailed, or e-mailed, unit personnel can be made aware of expected standards, impending training, briefings, and education opportunities associated with BST/AT information. Unit staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) will administer/monitor the morning training events. Later that day they will participate in a SNCO “hot washup” to gauge the quality of their instruction. The unit ATO will then provide the commanding officer with a progress report and other recommendations. On a quarterly basis a small-scale unit exercise should take place during BST time. The small-scale activity should be a dress rehearsal for the DoD mandated annual unit exercise that evaluates the staff’s ability to plan and execute its HTC’s site plans based on its vulnerability assessment, identified mission essential vulnerability areas (MEVAs), (see Table 2) and selected DoD threat conditions (see Table 3). It also demonstrates the unit’s ability to organize for the various duties and missions it may perform in a “rear area security” environment and to proficiently detect, deter, or defend against an escalating terrorist threat. Skill areas to be exercised and evaluated might be:

• Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (to include coordination/cooperation with local authorities).

• Security force operation (identification checks, vehicle bomb searches, telephonic threats, etc.).

• NBC individual protective measures.

• Tactical convoys.

• Patrols.

• Area damage control.

• Medical triage.

• Small unit leadership.

MEVA	Method of Attack	Likelihood of Attack	Method of Mitigation	Measures* Alpha-Delta
Entire facility and occupants	Large vehicular improvised explosive device	Negligible	Deny access of large cargo carrying vehicles into main parking area
Selected occupants	Capture/Kill designated high-risk personnel	Negligible	All hands perform surveillance detection/reporting. Teach offensive driving/vehicle dynamics and hostage survival techniques to high-risk personnel/support personnel
Attack/Disrupt critical infrastructure	Utilities, local area network/ wide area network Internet systems attack and/or direct action against mainframe	Low	Conduct orientation/training/monitoring in accordance with DoD C.A–130, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OpNavInst) 5510.1H, Information and Personnel Securty Program Regulation Manual
Marine Corps armory	Dynamic/Explosive breaching	Low	OpNavInst 5530.13A, Physical Security and Loss Prevention; MCO 5500.13A, Physical Security; MCO 5510.15A, Security of USMC Installations
Marine Corps tactical vehicles/equipment	Sabotage	Negligible	OpNavInst 5530.14B, Physical Security and Loss Prevention; MCO5500.13A, MCO5510.15A

Table 2. Example MEVA matrix.

Condition	Description	Measures*
Normal	Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.
Alpha	Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and installations, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.	1–10
Bravo	Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists.	11–29
Charlie	Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and installations is imminent.	30–39
Delta	Applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, Threat Condition Delta is declared as a localized warning.	40–50

Table 3. Threat conditions overview.

*Note: The Measures column can be expanded by at least three more columns and would include applicable threat condition measures contained in DoD 2000.12H, Appendix 4, 2002 (draft)..

Training the Unit ATO According to paragraph 3h of the purpose statement of MCO 3302.1C:

The goal of the Marine Corps AT/FP Program is to do all that is possible to protect Marines, civilian employees and family members. To this end, commanders must focus on those areas that can best be influenced: such as training and education, proper operational planning and the provision of the necessary resources to provide the best possible level of protection.

Therefore, the goal of the program is to emplace a reliable individual who will administer this program in its entirety not bits and pieces or attempt to react when the commander says jump. This program must be woven into the very fabric of common Marine Corps training. To validate this more from “the welfare of the troops” perspective and in the words of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel: “The best form of welfare for the troops is first class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties.”

The Marine that is selected to fill the billet of ATO has his work cut out for him. There is no “cut and paste” solution. This Marine will have to be thoroughly indoctrinated into this program. The basics of the program can be learned in the initial phases of his career, but there is an incredible amount of detailed information that will take time to learn. Most programs in the DoD force-feed this information at an incredible rate. The AT Instructor Qualification Course (AIQC) at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center School, Fort Bragg is 10 days of academic intensity. If the student is not intellectually prepared for this immersion, they will most likely return to base “unqualified.” On the other hand, a potential instructor can attend the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course (INTAC) and really learn how a first-class AT course should be administered. AIQC provides an opportunity for very deep learning of a concentrated subject area, and successful completion is a very gratifying experience.

INTAC will provide every bit of information MCI 0210 provides along with practical application exercises/examples in detecting improvised explosive devices and surveillance, survival shooting, offensive driving skills, and hostage survival. This course is 1-week long and highly recommended before any attempt is made at AIQC. Furthermore, if the selected candidate has very little instructor platform time, the U.S. Army Special Forces/U.S. Marine instructors at Fort Bragg are outstanding examples of subject matter experts and should be observed diligently.

Because some of the subject matter taught by a potential ATO is “code of conduct” related, survival, evasion, resistance to interrogation, and escape school is recommended as well. The level B course would suffice as an experience not to be forgotten and lend credence to a code written in blood, sweat, and tears. For those Marines assigned to high-risk billets, the level C course will attune them much more dramatically. Guidance for code of conduct training is contained in DoD Directive 1300.7, Peacetime Guidance for the Code of Conduct and MCO 3460.1A, Training and Education Measure to Support the Code of Conduct.

Once a Marine has undergone at least INTAC and is at least a sergeant, he may attend Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Antiterrorism Officers Course. It was formerly taught as two distinctly separate courses, the Antiterrorism Training Officers Course and the Force Protection Officers Course. They were related, yet they trained an individual either to be an instructor (ATO) or a program manager (FP officer). They have since been integrated. Nonetheless, this program concentrates on DoD 2000.16 standards and DoD 2000.12H, DoD Combating Terrorism Program. The Marine will now get involved in security functions, intelligence, law enforcement coordination, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conduct an AT command post exercise (CPX) and orally brief his team’s activities during the CPX. Upon successful completion of the course graduates are issued program materials to administer the AT program to their units and monitor its progress.

There are plenty of other related courses such as Dynamics of International Terrorism taught at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL; the High-Risk Personnel Course at Quantico; and NBC and terrorism-related intelligence courses to further enhance the ATO. What the ATO learns is perishable; therefore, to maintain proficiency this individual must be allowed to be committed to these duties for a minimum of 2 years before turning over responsibility (with overlap with their relief) and returning to duty in their primary MOS.

Various civilian training groups might be considered as well. Many are consistently contracted for government assistance. Most of these organizations are staffed by retired or former DoD servicemembers. They provide an array of services and can fill the void when Navy Criminal Investigative Service or Criminal Investigation Division cannot provide immediate assistance for vulnerability assessments. They can provide aggressor support and exercise evaluators. On average, you are contracting specialists with “real-world” experiences that have provided services such as level one through three AT training, executive protection, and surveillance/countersurveillance for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theatre/joint task force commanders, and State Department personnel. Additionally, exposure to these training staffs will provide a Reserve unit excellent introduction to the world of unconventional threats and add value to a Reserve unit’s tactical capability.

Where’s the Rear When the Threat Is Asymmetric?
In administering the AT program I have had an opportunity like no other. For instance, my battalion is geographically spread across the continental United States at 12 sites. I have gained command acceptance and received excellent cooperation up and down the chain of command. Outside agencies have been forthcoming with support and information. Development has been good. And there’s still much to do. City engineering departments have been able to provide up-to-date imagery for planning contingencies. Interservice liaison and cross-training have occurred. County health departments and the Centers for Disease Control have kept us abreast of persistent diseases and biological threats. We have also made progress in obtaining training support from our local fire and police training academies. The I&I is relatively engaged in community projects, assuring cross-cultural stimulation.

A concerned ATO, especially for a Reserve unit, must have his finger on the pulse of the community in which he serves. Initially, there was a list of 120 cities that were potential targets for a terrorist WMD event. That number has since increased. I have done independent demographic, economic, and geopolitical studies of some of these potential targets. I have also informed my commanders of the variety of potential threats situated in proximity to our sites and in turn have recommended immediate use of random AT measures to ensure that if an HTC was under any type of observation, the unit would be perceived as a hard target and, if not, the unit was given the name and contact phone number of a Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent assigned to deal with that type of domestic threat. This has to be done because you never know where you are in the attackers surveillance cycle. You could be in the preincident phase, or you could be the contingency plan for a foiled attack on a primary target in the initiation phase. You just don’t know, and Marines have been used as symbolic targets in the past. Lest we forget Beirut!

By embracing this program, we as Marines further perpetuate our tradition of “every Marine a rifleman.” The AT program provides clear direction and purpose. It can be used effectively by individuals, teams, and units. If there is command acceptance and approval, a strong individual with a sense of purpose can thoroughly train and educate Marines to be aware and ready. To further push this program forward in Marine Forces Reserve, Marines with MOS 0369, preferably an active duty gunnery sergeant qualified for independent duty, should be assigned at the battalion level to provide technical assistance in not only AT matters but weapons and tactical rear area security matters as well. At the company and detachment level, an excellent Reserve MOS 5711 sergeant should be brought onboard for long-term active duty special work for professional military development and to further enable the AT program for his company or detachment.

Conclusion
We are at the dawn of a new century, and we’re investing in some very educated guesses at the Service level. One thing the Marine Corps has prided itself for is its ability to “listen” to the “bottom up” and its expectations of shared ideas and innovation. We know that these new systems cannot function properly unless the people—the human resources—are thoroughly prepared to meet these future challenges.

Because the Cold War has ended, we have found that the redundancy we once needed is no longer what the taxpayers want. This was evident in base closures and force downsizing after DESERT STORM when the Clinton administration had its way. But we kept our Reserve units right where they have always been—in the public eye and near places we nationally recognize and deem as sites of potential WMD events. We cannot afford to manage AT at a glance. It’s not paranoia. It’s preparation and rehearsal in doing our part for homeland security. Furthermore, Marine Reserves have quietly participated in counterdrug efforts. By refocusing what we have learned here, we can do many things to support the executive order for the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security. But, first, we must have professionally trained Marines who can mobilize and fall in confidently. Marine Corps Reserve units must be able to execute their missions successfully at home, abroad, and tactically. A thoroughly trained and dedicated Reserve unit ATO can be the right tool for the job.

“People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.”

—George Orwell