An Open Letter to All Marines: A Response to LtGen Robert B. Neller

READ LTCOL ROBERT B. NELLER'S LATEST ARTICLE (November 2011)

At the battle of Jutland in 1916, the British Grand Fleet had a marvelous opportunity to destroy its nemesis, the Imperial German High Seas Fleet. The British Royal Navy, however, snatched tactical defeat from the jaws of victory. Watching the destruction wrought on the British ships by their German opponents, ADM Sir David Beatty exclaimed, “There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.”1 It was neither the ships that were to blame for British failure at Jutland nor the men who manned them.

The fault lay with the system that Royal Navy leaders had created in the generations before Jutland. The men who led the Grand Fleet at Jutland had spent their formative years immersed in a culture that was rigidly centralized and demanded absolute obedience to orders. The Royal Navy had instituted and relied upon communications systems that allowed commanders to exert control over the most trivial details during battles at sea. Jutland revealed the shortcomings of this system. The cost was failure in battle, and the blood of good British sailors poured into the North Sea to no good purpose. In a letter to Beatty shortly after Jutland, VADM Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, who had been present at Jutland, wrote, “Our system of peace training has not been ideally suited to the requirements of modern war . . . . It is almost inevitable now that we must reap what we have sown . . . .”₂

What significance can the battle of Jutland have for modern-day Marines? After all, the events just described occurred in Europe nearly a century ago. It is tempting to believe that Jutland is just ancient history and irrelevant today. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is a lesson here if we would heed it.

In his letter in the June 2011 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, LtGen Robert B. Neller wrote to voice his displeasure with “The Attritionist Letters.” “The Attritionist Letters” seem to claim that the Marine Corps suffers from overcentralization and that Marine leaders are becoming risk averse. I cannot, and will not, debate LtGen Neller’s perceptions regarding other general officers. I take him at his word; I firmly believe in the quality of our leadership.

I also cannot debate LtGen Neller’s perceptions during his 35 years of experience in the Marine Corps. Perceptions are unique to each individual. In the 23 years with which I have been associated with the Marine Corps, however, I have perceived an alarming trend toward ever greater centralization, occurring in virtually every conceivable field. I also believe that anyone who has eyes can see it. I doubt that LtGen Neller would deny this. Where LtGen Neller and I almost certainly disagree is in regard to whether or not this trend toward centralization is beneficial. I believe that too much centralization is potentially disastrous, while he likely sees it as a sign of progress. It is certain that many decisions to centralize training, administration, supply, etc., have been made with the best of intentions and for good reasons (to ameliorate the impacts of faster promotions and make use of improved communications, shorter training times, diminished resources, etc.). My concern is that, when taken as a whole, these developments constitute a long-term threat to the health and effectiveness of our Corps. I can only respond to LtGen Neller that, similar to the British at Jutland, there seems to be “something wrong with our bloody” system. It is more than the predeployment training plan.3 There are a number of other examples one could cite that illustrate the danger that is slowly sapping the vitality of our Corps.

For instance, tasks have migrated up the chain of command. Tasks once assigned to field grade officers are now conducted by their superiors. The tasks once conducted by SNCOs are now conducted by lieutenants. The SNCOs, left with less responsibility, usurp the authority once held by sergeants. In large part, this trend results from the desire not to allow subordinates to make mistakes. This same desire to prevent subordinates from making mistakes has led to the reputed “death of the operational art.” There is currently a debate in many professional journals claiming that the operational art has been diminished or rendered irrelevant; modern communications have rendered it pointless.4 Modern communications systems are, after all, only tools; it is people who must wield those tools. If the operational art is dead or has diminished in importance, then Marine leaders are complicit in its demise. As leaders, we either commit the sin of over interference with our subordinates and misusing technology, or we do not voice our objections when our seniors several levels higher attempt to control tactical events through an unmanned aircraft system.

The issue of centralization is essentially one of philosophy. Some may believe that “big brother” can help them achieve more than they could otherwise and that this is more important than the potentially negative side effects that come with this assistance. I believe that too much interference, even that which is conducted with the best of intentions, breeds a culture where the abdication of responsibility and dependence upon direction from seniors is rife. Such a culture is both pernicious and extremely difficult to break. Truly changing culture is, without a doubt, the most difficult of all tasks facing military leaders.

This is a debate in which all Marine leaders have a vital stake and in which all should take part. I agree wholeheartedly with LtGen Neller that membership in our professional organization is essential. Just as critical is a free and open exchange of views regarding the issues of the day. I urge every Marine to weigh in on this topic and make their opinions known.

The Royal Navy changed its culture slowly over time. In the time of Nelson, a ship’s captain was told that he could not go far wrong if he brought his ship close to the enemy’s ship to do battle. This was not a prescription for action under all circumstances but an exhortation to act aggressively and not to wait for orders. In the century following, this culture was destroyed until, by the time of Jutland, a ship’s captain was expected to wait supinely to be told precisely what to do by his superiors. These changes came from a desire to improve the Royal Navy, to make it function more efficiently, to systematize and standardize the fleet, to minimize risks, and to prevent mishaps. Many of the Royal Navy’s leaders did not understand or consider the long-term, cumulative impact of the decisions they were taking or the unintended consequences that they would have. This is the true meaning of the battle of Jutland for Marines. The road to hell is, after all, paved with good intentions. 

The trend toward creating more centralization in the Marine Corps in the name of efficiency, risk management, or whatever, must be halted. It is not too late to reverse this tide, but my personal belief is that time is getting short. If we do not protect what is best in our culture and exorcise the demons that plague us soon, we will find ourselves in the position of the British after Jutland, coping with defeat and trying desperately to determine where things went wrong.

Notes
1. Gordon, Andrew, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, John Murray Ltd, London, 1996, reprint Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, p. 120. Gordon has written the definitive book on the battle of Jutland and the manner in which the culture of the British Royal Navy contributed to the outcome of the battle.

2. Ibid., p. 526.

3. I am on record as an opponent of the predeployment training plan.

4. I, for one, believe that the operational art is still as relevant as ever.