MACCS as a System

Because of the MAGTF’s structure and our training, Marines enjoy decentralized control of both ground and air forces and greater flexibility and efficiency on the battlefield. Our philosophy is unique, and the end results are targets serviced, ground units supported, medical evacuations conducted, and bad guys killed. All of this is done with a synergy that is the envy of our sister Services and militaries around the world.

The Marine air command and control system (MACCS ) is a cohesive system made up of units from the Marine air control group. These units are involved in all six functions of Marine aviation but are most known for their work conducting the “control of aircraft and missiles.” The units that comprise the MACCS are large and, due to their unique function, do not normally provide aviation command and control (C2) within the continental United States except on very large exercises, such as the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course. Instead, the Federal Aviation Administration, military controllers at air stations, and military range control complexes normally provide the control and advisory services that pilots need when they operate within the United States.

Only when large-scale exercises are conducted, with vast airspace to control, can the entire MACCS be mobilized and simulate their critical wartime skills en masse. As a result, most Marine planners have seldom seen the whole MACCS in action and therefore don’t understand what the MACCS brings to the MAGTF. An equivalent would be sending out only half a squadron of aircraft. Planes would fly, but the real punch and the true capability of the platforms would be missing. To work as it should the MACCS is best employed with all of its components, as shown in Figure 1 (See below).

Marine liaison officers and contingency planners often find themselves in an environment where they are pressed to compromise the Marine Corps’ need for airspace, and to back away from the Marine Corps’ needs for decentralizing control functions down to the lowest level. As part of any planning, Marines are asked to pare down the deployment footprint to the fewest possible bodies to get the job done. However, critical pieces of the C2 system, which most planners have not seen and therefore don’t understand, always seem to end up on the “not needed” list.

Seamless Joint Integration

The MAGTF will execute its mission as ordered by the joint forces commander (JFC). The MACCS works with the MAGTF to integrate the MAGTF commander’s plan with the rest of the joint force and in accordance with the JFC’s guidance. The MACCS will coordinate and control aviation operations through the theater air-ground system (TAGS) that is established by the joint force air component commander (JFACC). TAGS is the joint aviation C2 system, and the MACCS is the MAGTF’s integrator into that system.

The MACCS, as a member of the TAGS, will coordinate directly with the JFACC through its liaisons at the coalition/joint air operations center and through the participating aviation C2 agencies. Wing-level integration occurs at the tactical air command center (TACC), which conducts future operational planning, performs airspace management functions, and serves as the senior aviation C2 agency on the battlefield. C2 agency-level command, control, and coordination occurs continuously as each MACCS agency (TACC, tactical aviation operations center (TAOC), direct air support center (DASC), air traffic control (ATC)) deals directly with its joint counterpart and integrates Marine air operations into the joint battle. Joint aircraft operate within this system using the procedures as outlined in the airspace control plan, area air defense plan, and the airspace control and air tasking orders.

Seamless integration exists only when all of the MACCS agencies are on the battlefield and expertly coordinating with their sister Service counterparts. This allows for specialists in each area of aviation C2 to apply their specific skills (and specialized joint aviation C2 equipment) to provide for efficient management of the air battle. It also allows for Marine aviation C2 experts to interpret, integrate, and coordinate the MAGTF battle plan into the joint battle. Joint partners may not always understand Marine combat assets and our employment methods, or have complete knowledge of the MAGTF commander’s battle plan. The MACCS provides the air/ground interface for Marine aviation within the single battle concept and coordinates the MAGTF scheme of maneuver with joint aviation.

The joint battle requires the entire MACCS in order to perform this level of integration. As with most teams, the removal of any member is detrimental to the functioning of the team. Under the best of circumstances, the MACCS performs these functions flawlessly, seamlessly, and without a lot of fanfare. However, under the wrong circumstances, lack of a single MACCS agency can compromise the mission or risk the lives of both aircrew and ground forces.
    It is very important to note that the U.S. Air Force does not fight like the Marine Corps and does not adhere to the Marine doctrine of centralized command and decentralized control. The Air Force adheres to centralized command and airspace control (per Joint Publication 3–52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone) but conducts decentralized “execution.”

The difference in doctrine and theory is immense. The Air Force will hold much of the decisionmaking and authorization of combat operations and airspace control very tightly, very high up the chain of command. As the battle changes, permission to change airflow with it must be requested and granted in order to execute missions. As the need to change airspace occurs, the centralized processes of the Air Force injects delay and inefficiency into the battle. Recent MACCS deployments are object lessons in doing it right, and doing it wrong.

Doing It Right

When C2 is working well, it affords the MAGTF commander the most lethal and responsive form of fire support available on the battlefield. Supplies and troops are moved rapidly by assault support, and targets are identified through deft reconnaissance. Armed reconnaissance missions mean that enemy targets are destroyed well before friendly ground forces come in contact with them. Safety of flight is enhanced, and the aviator has a helpful and watchful eye to assist when needed, and direct when required, but ultimately works collectively to accomplish the mission and satisfy the MAGTF commander’s intent.

In 2003 the entire MACCS was employed, in doctrinally sound fashion, to cover the Marine area of operations (AO) in Iraq:

• The TACC, provided by Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 38 (the senior MACCS agency,) was deployed at Al Jaber, Kuwait, along with an ATC detachment from Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (MACS–1).
• MACS–1 also provided the TAOC at Camp Coyote and ATC detachments at Al Jaber and Ali Al Salem, along with Marine ATC mobile teams (MMTs) to control forward operating bases and forward arming and refueling points north into the war.
• An early warning and control detachment from MACS–2 was attached to MACS–1 and provided gap filling and range extension for the Marine Corps’ overall picture.
• Marine Air Support Squadron 3 provided the DASC that deployed doctrinally with the 1st MarDiv fire support coordination center and attached air support elements to support the maneuvering regimental combat teams and coalition ground forces.
• The airborne DASC flew out of Shiek Isa, Bahrain.
• A little-known element of the MACCS, but one which saved lives at war, was a team of liaison officers who flew aboard the Air Force airborne warning and control system and coordinated Marine operations, especially strike and armed reconnaissance missions in the deep battle areas away from friendly forces.
• The Marine wing communications squadron (MWCS) tied all of these nodes together.
  
In order to execute the ground scheme of maneuver, the MAGTF was given its own AO and had its own airspace. As a result, the MAGTF, through the TACC, developed its own airspace control plan and area air defense plan and coordinated these through the coalition forces air component commander for inclusion of the Marine plan into the overall coalition airspace and air control plan. As a result the MACCS was deployed doctrinally on the battlefield, with minimal restrictions upon how it conducted warfare.

The end result was closely integrated aviation fires, reconnaissance, and other operations into the Marine ground scheme of maneuver. Great efficiency and flexibility resulted in swift action from Marine aviation. Missions could be changed quickly to support a rapid change in battlefield events, with aircraft diverted to trouble spots as needed and within minutes. Further, groundbased fire support could be requested, have the air cleared, and missions fired in very rapid succession.

Doing It Wrong

Contrast the system from 2003 with the one deployed in 2004. Due to the changing environment in Iraq, the mission—and the mindset—became static. Within the Marine AO:

• The TACC operated out of Al Asad.
• The DASC operated from Fallujah.
• The ATC detachments controlled Al Asad, Al Taqaddum, and the forward operating bases at Al Qaim, Korean Village, Fallujah, and Ar Ramadi.
• Low-altitude air defense (LAAD) units conducted their secondary mission of base defense.
• The MWCS once again tied all of the nodes together.

However, the TAOC had been left at home, their mission given instead to the Air Force Control and Reporting Center (CRC).

The DASC controlled airspace up to 11,500 feet above ground level. ATC controlled their airspace as delineated in the air control plan and the Iraqi Aeronautical Information Publication. The CRC controlled the airspace above 11,500 feet.

Major issues and serious tensions developed under this system, including issues of:

• High-angle clearance of groundbased fire support.
• Coordination of aircraft above 11,500 feet.
• Flight following and flight safety for fixed-wing aircraft.
• Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) integration.
• Mission deconfliction between aircraft above 11,500 and the Marine operations being conducted below.
• Tanking operations between split altitude of 11,500.

All of these issues centered around using the Air Force CRC vice having a Marine TAOC. A critical part of the system was left stateside, and its absence was felt. In this case the Marine Corps had to rely upon a highly centralized agency to control Marine fixed-wing aviation. As a result a rift opened over this ceiling at 11,500 feet. To fire artillery through this threshold, the Marine Corps had to coordinate with the CRC.

Because the CRC controlled the entire Iraq AO with a single controller, there was little chance that assurances of clear air and permission to fire would come quickly. This is why the Army and Air Force often use permanent restricted operations zones to coordinate fires instead of deconflicting operations realtime as is the practice in the Marine Corps. The CRC was not read into the Marine battle plan, and their focus was not complete and seamless integration with the MAGTF.

The rift also impacted aircraft whose missions required them to fly above 11,500 feet. Marine F/A–18 aircraft routinely reported near midair collisions above Fallujah and Ramadi. The CRC chose not to divide the country into sectors and instead had only one controller monitoring the whole of Iraq. Marine fixed-wing aircraft could not—and did not—receive timely traffic calls (which is routine procedure within the MACCS) to alert them of other aircraft flying in the area.

Unfortunately, because the TAOC was not in country, there was no organic agency able to provide the level of itinerant control that the squadron was looking for. The situation was rectified later in 2007 when the TAOC redeployed to Iraq, but the Marine Corps had operated for several years without part of the system, and it is by luck and coincidence that funerals did not result. This has led to some bad habits being learned by both the MACCS and the aviators.

Marine C2 agencies train as a team, fight as a team, and are focused on a single mission. As with all support functions, when the MACCS is functioning correctly, no one seems to notice. When it is not correctly functioning or, worse, when elements are absent from the system, everyone notices, because the commander’s ability to apply combat air power to the battlefield is diminished, and safety of flight for our pilots is jeopardized.

“It’s not that the Marine Corps wants to go off and fight their own war . . . we are talking about the integrity of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Since World War II, there has been an institutional determination on the part of the Air Force to gain operational control of Marine air.
“The Air Force fundamentally believes that there should be centralized control of all aviation assets, and the Marines have always been sort of hanging by their fingernails to make sure they preserve authority over their organic air assets.”
—Gen Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps

“I would storm the gates of Hell if I had Third Marine Air Wing overhead.”

—MajGen James N. Mattis, Commanding General, 1st MarDiv, February 2003, Kuwait