Justifying Amphibious Capability

This article was written after reading Col John A. Keenan’s lead editorial in the July 2009 Marine Corps Gazette that focused on the lessening importance of amphibious capability in the minds of some of our civilian leadership.

The article discusses in sequence:

• The validity and cost-effectiveness of amphibious assault capability.
• Possible underlying causes for questioning its continued (cost-effective) value.
• An approach to address a perceived failure in modular cost-effective design.

The Move Not Played

The concept of “the move not played” is a staple of chess strategy. By maintaining multiple threats on the board, you force your opponent to consider each of them in allocating his resources. Once you commit to a specific course of action (or more accurately, once the opponent realizes that you have committed to a specific course of action), you have actually made your opponent’s job, if not easier, at least more clearly defined. This commitment of resources to the one selected course of action actually removes the other threatened options from the board. At that point you must implement the chosen threat with enough immediacy and violence to overcome the opponent’s reaction and defense, which had been forced to consider too many options to focus on any one.

I believe that this strategy is a major key to the value of amphibious assault. Forcing an opponent to consider just the possibility of a violent assault, and defending it appropriately, is possibly of as much value as the assault itself. Operation DESERT STORM certainly proved that this stratagem is still a valid option. Clearly the Marine Corps’ ability to generate such a widespread threat to an opponent is a key to our unique value to the Nation and is a great asset to our military planning, since it is such a huge dilemma to our potential foes. Equally clear, our system development requirements should be and are focused on delaying the ability of our opponent to recognize and react to our commitment of resources as long as possible.

The Real Issue?

It occurs to me that the criticism of amphibious capabilities is based, at least in part, not so much on the functionality itself but on the costs associated with maintaining it. As all military programs compete for increasingly scarce resources, our leadership rightly considers the cost of a capability (i.e., the opportunity cost) as a negative aspect (a divisor) of its value. While I am clearly a proponent of amphibious capability, as its cost increases—forcing other capabilities to be marginalized to provide the resources—I would be forced to reconsider my support. At one extreme, if our amphibious capability required immense resources to maintain, then any reasonable planner would have to look to alternatives. Only fanatics hold to a course regardless of any negative aspects. Professionals, especially budget managers, consider return on investment to be a key aspect of any decision. If you agree so far, then one key to continued emphasis on amphibious assault capability is to keep the dedicated costs as low as possible.

The Marine Corps has traditionally marketed itself as the best bargain of the Services. Right or wrong, that attitude is certainly brought into question by our stated need for two very expensive technologies:

•     High speed mated to vertical insertion (MV–22).
•     High speed mated to amphibious assault (expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV)).

Both of these capabilities clearly support the move not played strategy by hiding the commitment of resources for the longest possible time, exposing them only well into the assault. As such, both are clearly keys to Marine operations. But functionally, I see a dramatic difference between these two needs and our current plans for solutions.

The MV–22 generates synergy by marrying two capabilities (high speed and vertical lift) whose merger into a single resource enhances the functionality. It also is a generic capability increase that has many possible applications, and so the costs can be spread over these many capabilities. One sees all of the Services looking to take advantage of this new capability to improve existing functions, and this allows us to leverage the investment and reduce the dedicated cost.

While the EFV also marries two capabilities (high water speed and combat vehicle capabilities), the difference is that in this case, the marriage seems to cause more cost and compromised functionality than synergy. Both the waterborne and combat vehicle capabilities are lessened by the needs of the other. The capabilities can only be even partially made up by very costly ad hoc solutions. I am not questioning the need for fast assault or capable combat vehicle technology, only the need to combine them in a single asset. Here, there is no synergy, only compromise. Even if successful, the resulting expensive asset has only one purpose, and so the costs cannot be leveraged. While the technology of the EFV is amazing and the problem-solving talents of the development team are clear, the high costs reduce the return on investment and force our leadership to rethink whether the capability can be afforded, at the (opportunity) cost of other equally vital programs.

The Power Sweep

If I may throw in a sports analogy, I prefer to view the Marine Corps’ amphibious (and overall) capabilities as a parallel to the Green Bay Packers of the 1960s under Vince Lombardi. Their key play was the “power sweep.” It was said that everyone in the stadium including the hot dog vendors knew it was coming, but it succeeded simply because it was executed so well. When the Packers lined up, they did not have more players, or a new high-tech expensive football, or better pads; they simply used the same standard resources more efficiently than the opposition, through planning, training, and dedication. Does that not sound more like our Marine Corps than saying we can only win by expending vast amounts of our scarce budget on highly specialized tools?

At this point I expect that I might have made friends with those espousing continuing our forcible entry capability but enemies of EFV proponents. I would ask the latter to keep all of the goals of the EFV, but consider losing the requirement that it be a single complex asset. My military experience is over 20 years old and out of date, but as a software designer I know that the best way to solve a complex problem is often to break it into manageable (and modular) components and solve each directly and efficiently, then link the solutions together as needed.

So my charge would be to apply the EFV team’s proven problem-solving ability to these distinct issues:

•     Build or buy the ideal Marine combat vehicle.
•     Figure out how to get it to shore from over the horizon at high speed.
•     Do each in such a way that they can be merged when so needed and used independently when so needed.
•     We need to separate the delivery process (ship to shore) from the delivery package (the thing I have once I get to the shore). My logic is that in the “workflow” of an amphibious assault, the delivery occurs at the onset, and the continued capability is of little value (unlike the MV–22). Clearly a Marine combat assault vehicle must be intrinsically amphibious (river crossings, administrative moves, etc.), but the value of high-speed, long-distance ocean access ends at the surf line. (I had noted in a prior letter to the Gazette that building the high-speed water capability into the fighting vehicle is like asking a paratrooper to carry his parachute around after landing.) If  we look at other successful systems, military and otherwise, we see that modularity—the separation of distinct functions—is a major value point. It allows both updates of individual functions without impacting the other functions, as well as enabling new combinations to address new challenges. So let us determine an optimal fighting vehicle—freed of the compromises needed to make it a fast boat—then separately determine how best to get it to the starting line.

The assault vehicle should be the best combination of capabilities from the beach on. While it need not provide high-speed, over-the-horizon capability, it must be acceptable to the assets that do provide this function. Weight-per-occupant and footprint-per-occupant ratios should match or beat the assault amphibious vehicle and EFV. (By the way, even the M113A3 Bradley does both, in addition to being a less valuable target with fewer “eggs in one basket.”) LCAC and helicopter deliverability might be tremendous complementary options in many cases.

Well, now that we have it, how do we get it to the beach? The expense and compromises of turning it into a fast boat for a once-per-operation transit are unacceptable. Even if we solved it, we have built a costly technology that has minimal shared value for other Marine operations or for our Navy and Army teammates. Instead, we should examine the “boat” aspects separately.

A simple Google search for terms like “fast barge” shows commercial equipment-carrying craft capable of very high speeds with combat vehicle-like loads. Speeds consistent with and exceeding the EFV are achieved with a fraction of the horsepower, because the compromises have been removed. It’s just easier to move a boat in the water than a tank. Here’s my proposed plan of action.

We will contract for a military version of a fast barge-like craft that can hold one or more of our new vehicles. The craft will be capable of EFV speed or better, likely in worse conditions than the EFV. (Such craft exist now, generally with engines much smaller than a single EFV engine). The combat vehicles might be embarked directly into the barges to save space. They will arrive at the beach with full complements of fuel and engines that have not been running for hours. The vehicles could disembark near shore for the final sprint (protecting the craft and freeing it earlier), or perhaps ride right to the beach. The craft is then free to return to the ship for subsequent waves and/or supplies, or whatever is needed. While I expect few existing craft have been designed for unloading their cargo at sea, I expect the talents of the EFV development team are more than up to that customization task.

The biggest gain in my mind is that the craft itself (I’ll start calling it a landing craft now) could be used for other missions, with or without the combat vehicles embarked. This lets us leverage the investment with our naval teammate and lessen the direct cost by leveraging the assets for other missions. With all of the Navy attention to littoral issues, this Navy-Marine teamwork might provide unique additional capabilities. A fast landing craft with the added firepower of one or two Marine combat vehicles (with or without the squads of Marines) that could land one or both vehicles or keep them embarked for firepower provides a lot of options to a littoral-oriented naval commander. Just as Marines have pioneered and excelled at the task organization of our combat units, trust that we can task organize our amphibious resources, providing the optimum flexibility and efficiency for whatever mission is presented to us, rather than requiring expensive, single purpose, compromise-stricken assets. I have to think that parallel development and procurement of these two modular amphibious needs will be far more cost-effective and useful than the current EFV model. Boats married to tanks—makes for an ugly kid!