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Green, Amber, Red: Lessons Unlearned At A Great Price

Photo by LCpl Mark W. Stroud
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Well trained, he should not be disarmed on a forward operating base.

The time has come for us to assume an arming posture that puts us in a better position to defend ourselves against the enemy. I was serving as the Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment (MarDet) USS Saratoga (CV 60) in the summer of 1983. The Saratoga’s homeport was Mayport, FL, and we were preparing for a 6-month Mediterranean deployment. Earlier in the year, the Marine Corps issued an ALMAR message requiring all commanders to report accidental discharges (the unintentional firing of a weapon) within hours to Headquarters Marine Corps. I was a young captain, and I recall thinking that this was the wrong message to send to the Operating Forces. I believed and expressed my opinion via the chain of command that leadership should emphasize weapons handling and focused training rather than the stick-in-your-eye approach that I thought the ALMAR was pursuing. My concern was the timid or career-minded commander who would simply remove most of the risk by taking a less than adequate approach to arming his Marines.

Back in 1983 all aircraft carriers deployed with a large complement of sensitive weapons, the kind that required additional security. The MarDet, consisting of 70 enlisted Marines, was responsible for the security of these weapons. As we prepared for deployment and the onload of the special weapons, I wanted our Marines to be properly trained and mentally prepared to perform their duties. I strongly believed in an aggressive arming stance, so I requested permission from our Skipper, CAPT J.K. Ready (later VADM Ready), to have all Marines train with loaded weapons. With my executive officer, first sergeant, detachment gunnery sergeant, and sergeants of the guard, we established a strict two-man rule, established loading and unloading procedures, trained each Marine, and fully armed them from that time forward.

On 21 October 1983, I departed Mayport with my family and headed home to Locust Fork, AL, for the weekend. I had orders to a 1-week counterterrorism course at Fort McClellan, AL, that started on Monday, 24 October. On Sunday morning we were getting ready for church when the news of the Marine barracks suicide bombing in Beirut was reported. The equivalent of 12,000 pounds of explosives ripped through the barracks killing 241 American servicemen—220 Marines, 18 Navy personnel, and 3 Army soldiers—in the deadliest single-day death toll for the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima during World War II. A hijacked truck loaded with the explosives crashed through a barrier fence, passed between two sentry posts, and drove through a gate into the lobby of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines headquarters building. The Marine sentries at the gate were operating under rules of engagement that made it very difficult to respond quickly to the truck. Sentries were ordered to keep their weapons at condition four (no magazine inserted and no rounds in the chamber). By the time the two Marines were able to engage, the truck was already inside the building’s entryway.

I am currently serving as the Deputy, Assistant Commanding General, Afghan National Army Development. Our organization falls under the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan at Camp Eggers in Kabul. We provide advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Defense, which is walking distance from our compound and inside the Green Zone. With few exceptions, armed military and civilian personnel carry unloaded weapons on U.S., coalition, and Afghan sites throughout Afghanistan. Weapons carry status is green—unloaded, no magazine in the weapon; amber—magazine in the weapon but no round in the chamber; or red—magazine in the weapon, round in the chamber. We are required to carry green here at Camp Eggers. Our camp, like most others, is filled with local nationals performing a wide variety of jobs from food preparation to facilities maintenance to janitorial duties. We also have many Afghan Army, police, and civilian visitors on camp every day. I submit that the threat is all around us, so I question why are we are required to carry our weapons in green status.

I was a Federal law enforcement officer from 2003 to 2008, and I was required to qualify with my service weapon each quarter. The emphasis of law enforcement qualification was to get your weapon out fast and reduce the threat. My marksmanship instructor at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA, said that you would be surprised how inaccurate you become with adrenalin pumping through your body. He suggested that we all continually train and mentally prepare for the shooting incident. Most gunfights with criminals are over in seconds, so we have precious little time to fool around trying to get a magazine out of the pouch and into the weapon. The green on blue incidents (where Afghan military or police, or those masquerading as such, fire on coalition forces) we have are criminal and should not be viewed as typical military encounters. We need to think like law enforcement and properly prepare for these encounters or we will continue to lose valuable response time and lives.

I did not know LtCol Frank Bryant all that well. We were both Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) Hands, and we attended language training in Rosslyn, VA, prior to deployment to Afghanistan. He was learning Dari, and I was in the Pashto program, so our paths only crossed to and from class or on breaks. The Pentagon’s AfPak Hands program trains military and civilian personnel from all Services, mostly midcareer officers, to serve as a core cadre to build trust between the U.S. military and local populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Joining the program requires a 45-month commitment, including two deployments of 12 and 10 months respectively. Frank was one of nine Americans killed by a lone gunman, an Afghan Air Force pilot, on 27 April 2011 during a meeting in an operations room of the Afghan Air Corps at the Kabul International Airport. The people who did know him well spoke highly of his professionalism, expertise as an F–16 pilot, dedication to the mission in Afghanistan, and love for his wife and young son.

The investigation is ongoing, but it appears that the gunman walked into the room and began firing, killing Frank and two others within seconds and six more in a short time frame. I know the Army colonel conducting this investigation; I am confident his work will be complete and thorough, but we already know a few facts. The arming requirement at this site was amber, so no one had a round in the chamber if they were following procedures. The arming status had been green 4 days prior to the incident. I know some officers who ignore the arming policy and carry red all the time because they would rather risk the consequences of discovery and be better prepared to survive.

It seems to me that we repeatedly fail to learn the lessons of the past. From the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut to the 16 green on blue incidents here in Afghanistan since March 2009 (36 NATO deaths, 25 of them were Americans), you would think our view would change. I fail to understand why our force protection policies take the view that it is safer to walk around in a combat zone with an unloaded weapon than it is to be red all the time. Law enforcement officers around the world have a round in the chamber all the time because they know that seconds count. Law enforcement encounters normally take place at 7 meters or less and are over in less than 5 seconds. It is fast, it is violent, and you do not have time to think. You train to react to the threat and you keep shooting until the threat is removed.

I am not suggesting that some of those nine Americans would be alive today if they had been in red status, but I am saying we would all be in a better position to counter the threat if we were red all the time. When you do this, it changes your perspective; you know that your weapon is loaded and what will happen if you pull the trigger. It is also a deterrent to the bad guy. He is looking for a weakness he can use to his advantage. An unarmed servicemember is a perfect target.

It is not only civilian police who carry red. The U.S. Air Force does not have a reputation as the most aggressive “snake eaters” in the U.S military, but they certainly have it right when it comes to arming their security forces. LtCol Steve Heffington has been an Air Force security forces officer for the past 18 years and has commanded three security forces squadrons. He briefed me on Air Force security forces arming procedures. Steve is a fellow AfPak Hand, and he was a close personal friend of Frank Bryant; he escorted Frank’s body home from Afghanistan. Worldwide when on duty, except on joint posts with differing guidance, Air Force security forces’ M9s are always red and hot; in other words, there is a round in the chamber, and the weapon is off safe.

Part of the Air Force’s argument for carrying red and hot at all times is that Department of Justice studies have proven that an adversary armed with only a knife can advance and defeat an individual armed with a handgun from distances up to 20 feet. By the time the armed individual recognizes the threat, determines that lethal force is justified, and withdraws the handgun from the holster, the adversary can overtake and incapacitate him. Adding additional steps to employing the handgun (chambering a round or sweeping the safety), significantly delays the shooter’s ability to respond and place rounds on target. Additionally, during life threatening encounters, one proven physiological effect is that individuals lose fine finger movement, and other motor skills are significantly impacted. This inhibits the individual’s ability to operate small controls on the weapon, such as the safety lever, and can even create problems with his ability to perform such tasks as pulling the slide to the rear to chamber a round. All of these factors reduce the shooter’s capabilities to respond to the threat with rapid and accurate firepower and places him at a major disadvantage, especially against an adversary armed with a firearm. To ensure that airmen have the greatest tactical advantage, they are trained to withdraw the pistol from the holster, place the sights on target, and press the trigger. A properly trained individual can accomplish this easily in under 4 seconds. Air Force security forces have very few negligent discharges, so the concern that an armed servicemember is unsafe is not supported by the weapons safety record enjoyed by the Air Force.

If I were put in charge of force protection in Afghanistan, I would immediately institute robust weapons handling and employment procedures that mirror law enforcement and the U.S. Air Force security forces. After certification, armed personnel would carry red at all times. We would only pull a trigger at the range or when we engage a threat. Make no mistake, those who would do us harm would also know and think twice before they attempt an attack.

During my 12-plus months in Afghanistan, I have seen too many risk averse officers. They do not realize that this view is as bad as the officer who does not take proper precautions to protect his troops. No one wants to lose a member of his command, but some risks are worth taking. I strongly believe that our arming stance is a worthwhile risk. Mishaps will occur because we are human, and we make mistakes, but our servicemen and women will become proficient with the proper training. More importantly, they will be better able to defend themselves.

To those officers who widely complain about our posture and lack of aggressiveness, in arming, force protection, movement, and general engagements with the Afghans, I suggest that you remember your frustration when you become the commander. Do not worry about your career; take appropriate risks and think like a warrior rather than a shrinking violet. The future is yours, and you can change this mentality. To the current commanders, I sometimes wonder if you have forgotten what got you the stars you are wearing. I cannot believe it was a course that always took the risk-free path.

I believe it is time for a fundamental change in the way we view force protection. It seems we have learned nothing since the Marine barracks bombing so many years ago in Beirut. I am convinced that a more aggressive posture will prevent future losses by improving reaction time and acting as a deterrent to those who would take advantage of our unarmed troops.

>Author’s Note: This article is dedicated to the memory of LtCol Frank D. Bryant, Jr., USAF; Majs Philip D. Ambard, USAF; Jeffrey O. Ausborn, USAF; David L. Brodeur, USAF; Reymond Estelle, USAF; and Charles A. Ransom, USAF; Capt Nathan J. Nylander, USAF; MSgt Tara R. Brown, USAF; and LTC James McLaughlin, USA(Ret).

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