Fighting The Long War

In January the Commandant signed a document titled, Send in the Marines: A Marine Corps Operations Concept To Meet an Uncertain Security Environment. The booklet lays out an operational concept to deal with the uncertain future security environment. The concept builds on combat lessons learned, recognizes the need for cultural learning, and introduces the Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF).

The purpose of this article is to introduce you to Send in the Marinesand to allay some concerns associated with the concept. I highly encourage every Marine to read Send in the Marines, which is available on the web at http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/pl/plnref.asp.

Development of the concept began with a look toward the future while building on 232 years of Marine Corps experience. Not surprisingly, the Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate: 2005–2015 lists the following drivers of instability:

• Terrorism/irregular warfare.
• Ideological/religious extremism.
• Poorly governed/ungoverned spaces.
• Globalization.
• Economics/poverty/health crisis.
• Natural resource competition (water, energy, etc.).
• Science and technology competition/advancements.
• Changing demographics (“youth bulge,” aging populations, etc.).
• Environmental factors (climate change, natural disasters, etc.).
• Crime.

It is clear that violent transnational extremism will continue to be a significant destabilizing factor in many parts of the world. As such, there are two distinct options open to the United States. On one hand, the United States can wait for a crisis to develop and react with a coalition of the willing. On the other hand, the United States can work with foreign militaries, security forces, and governments in order to foster security cooperation and provide partner nation security organizations with the required tools to deal with problems in their own countries and regions.

Recognizing that it is better to prevent wars than fight them, our Nation’s leaders have decided to proactively meet these challenges through efforts aimed at building partner-nation capacity. As such, the Marine Corps must adapt to meet the challenge of being a multicapable force, capable of operating at the lower end of the operational spectrum while retaining the agility to rapidly shift across the full range of military operations and be successful at the high end.

Think of this as a twofisted fighter. The lead hand works at the low end with a series of jabs to keep the enemy off balance, keeping him from attacking. But when the need arises to deliver the full force of the Marine Corps (fighter/attack aircraft, tanks, artillery), the fighter delivers a rear hand strike.

Fortunately, the Marine Corps has a rich history from which to draw. The Marine Corps has operated at the high end in World War I, World War II, Korea, Operation DESERT STORM, and the opening phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Prior to and in between these high-end conflicts, the Marine Corps has been highly successful in fighting counterinsurgencies in Nicaragua and the Philippines, as well as building security force capacity in the Haitian gendarmerie. Additionally, the Corps has operated at both ends of the spectrum in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Based on estimates of the future threat, Marine Corps operations in the 21st century will likely focus on neutralizing asymmetric threats. As such, security cooperation and security assis- tance will constitute the Marine Corps’ efforts to build and augment partner nation security capacity. As learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, active and engaged presence is necessary to build partner capacity. As the United States works to prevent war, the Marine Corps will play a vital role by providing a persistent forward presence tailored to the needs of the regional combatant commanders (CoComs).

Marines will engage with foreign militaries, security organizations, and foreign governments, not as opponents, but as partners. The Marine Corps will enable CoComs to engage in the unstable regions of the globe in order to increase the security capacity of our partner nations and strengthen their legitimate governments’ efforts to create secure and stable regional conditions. Doing so will enable the CoComs to influence conditions as part of an overarching national campaign to reduce the impact of the drivers (listed earlier) on our national interests.

To accomplish these objectives the Marine Corps is developing the concept of the SC MAGTF. As currently envisioned, the SC MAGTF will be built around an infantry battalion. (See Figure 1.)

The SC MAGTF will be tasked with building partner-nation security capacity and supporting partner-nation security efforts in a specific regional area. SC MAGTFs will deploy to three regions—Africa, Southwest Asia, and South America. Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac) will continue to conduct civil-military operations and security cooperation activities with the forces assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.

In order to prepare for deployment to these regions, the units that are sourced to comprise the SC MAGTF will adopt a specific regional orientation. The regional orientation is similar to historic Marine Corps practice. During the Nation’s last period of steady state opera- tions (pre-Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM), east coast units focused on South America and the Mediterranean while west coast units focused on the Middle and Far East. Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is in the process of determining what specialized manpower and training will be required.

Tables of organization for units that source the SC MAGTF will likely be coded with billets that facilitate the assignment of foreign area officers, regional affairs officers, linguists, and other personnel with regional expertise. HQMC is also reviewing assignment policies to take advantage of the microregion studies program for officers and noncommissioned officers. Assignment policies would not result, however, in a second lieutenant assigned a microregion in The Basic School or a sergeant assigned a microregion in the Sergeant’s Course spending the rest of their careers in a specific regiment.

The typical life cycle of a unit assigned to a SC MAGTF would consist of traditional high-end combined arms training, security cooperation predeployment training, and deployment as a part of SC MAGTF. (See Figure 2.)

The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) are critical enablers for the SC MAGTF predeployment training. CAOCL ensures that Marines are equipped with operationally relevant regional, cultural, and language knowledge that allows them to operate successfully with foreign security forces.

SCETC will support the SC MAGTF and other deploying Marines with advisor training cells that offer tailored, scalable, and regionally specialized training packages to prepare units and teams for international security force assistance missions. Additionally, SCETC is developing a security cooperation planner’s course that will teach policy, procedure, and planning considerations for Marine Corps personnel with security cooperation assignments.

Another enabler for the SC MAGTF is the Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). The MCIOC is a combat support organization that will enable a MAGTF information operations capability through training and planning support to MAGTF commanders. The MCIOC brings a graduate-level understanding of the regional environment and how the local populace receives, processes, and acts upon information. With this knowledge the commander can prepare a receptive environment before his arrival, maximize his effects on the ground, and ensure his influence persists long after his departure.

Following its predeployment training, the SC MAGTF would deploy to a forward operating site (FOS) for follow-on operations in the littoral areas of its assigned region. Based on partner-nation requirements, the SC MAGTF would disaggregate by further deploying task-organized forces (company-, platoon-, and squad-sized) to locations throughout the region. Some of these forces would deploy directly to training sites. Others might deploy to Navy ships as part of global fleet stations (GFSs) while the remainder might deploy to cooperative security locations (CSLs)1 for follow-on deployment to their training sites.

Figure 3 depicts a notional SC MAGTF that could deploy to a FOS at Rota, Spain where the MAGTF command element, the aviation combat element (ACE), and part of the logistics combat element (LCE) would be based. From there, a company would embark on naval shipping as part of a GFS, another company would operate out of a CSL in Sao Tome to support training in Ghana and Nigeria, and platoons would operate in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Kenya.

The ACE would provide assault support throughout the region and close air support as required. Meanwhile, the LCE would logistically support operations using organic, host-nation, and seabased resources. Because the SC MAGTF is fully trained to operate at the high end of the spectrum, it would be able to reaggregate using intratheater lift assets, such as the high-speed vessel and organic aviation assets, to meet an emerging crisis.

It is important to keep in mind that the SC MAGTF is a future capability based on the Marine Corps’ time-tested MAGTF concept. The Marine Corps does not expect to be able to deploy the first reinforced battalion-sized SC MAGTF until the demand for Marine forces in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility decreases and the buildup to 202,000 Marines allows for a deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:2. The future force laydown will look something like that depicted in Figure 4.

In conclusion, the net effect of the implementation of this concept will be a Marine Corps that is better positioned to address the challenges of an uncertain security environment. For the individual Marine, this operating concept will present many challenges and opportunities. The demands inherent in engaging an irregular enemy will require Marines to be both agile and flexible in their mindset and prepared to adapt quickly based on changes in the environment.

This concept represents a continuation of the enduring legacy that has seen Marines most ready when the Nation is least ready. Forward deployed with our Navy partners in the unstable regions of the world, our Marines will bring the fight to the enemy through effective deterrence and decisive engagement, while empowering our friends with capabilities that support U.S. efforts to bring economic prosperity and freedom to regions of the world that yearn for these opportunities.

Note
1. A CSL is an austere facility that has little o no assigned U.S. personnel and is intended for contingency access, logistical support, and rotational use by Operating Forces, Send in the Marines, p. 38.