The EFV Is Dead

After years of delays, billions of dollars spent, and countless opportunity costs wasted, the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) is finally dead. So now what? The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, stated that the Marine Corps will continue to march forward pursuing an amphibious vehicle because, “Our Nation’s amphibious capability remains the Corps’ priority.” The Marine Corps needs the right vehicle for future amphibious missions, not simply a vehicle to replace the EFV. The Marine Corps should do two things before attempting to fill the void left by the EFV. First, it should analyze the potential future amphibious operations it will conduct across the full spectrum of warfare and validate the need for an amphibious vehicle. Future threats and future missions need to drive requirements and procurement. Second, the Marine Corps needs to determine how much it can afford to spend on a new amphibious vehicle. The Department of Defense (DoD) will attempt to trim $400 billion over the next 12 years, so the Marine Corps will have to bear its share of the Nation’s fiscal burden. Only after taking these first two steps can the Marine Corps make educated decisions about the desired performance specifics of the vehicle. The Marine Corps can no longer afford superfluous capabilities on the next amphibious vehicle, and tradeoffs will be necessary to make the vehicle affordable.

Additionally, the Marine Corps will need the support of the other Services to conduct an amphibious assault as part of the joint forcible entry mission. It needs the Army, Navy, and Air Force to continuously assess their roles in joint forcible entry operations to ensure that their training and procurement programs are optimized for the future as well. Amphibious assault, as part of joint forcible entry, is the most difficult operation Marines can conduct. For amphibious assault to be a viable capability for the Marine Corps, it will take a lot of assistance from its fellow Services. The survivability of Marines moving ashore will be largely derived from the synergy achieved by joint capabilities, as opposed to specific capabilities on an amphibious vehicle.

Need for an Amphibious Vehicle

Future threats and future missions need to drive requirements and procurement, not the simple math of replacing one vehicle with another. Before starting the acquisition process for the new amphibious vehicle, the Marine Corps should examine the future missions it will face and validate the continuing need for surface ship-to-shore capability in a hostile environment. On the surface, the answer to this question may appear to be clear. Several missions conducted by the 15th MEU in 2010 clearly demonstrate that the world is unpredictable, and Marines will need to respond to crises. That MEU simultaneously conducted air support in Afghanistan, humanitarian support in Pakistan, and retook the MV Magellan Star from pirates, killing nine of them in the process. Following closely behind the 15th MEU, the 26th MEU was on station in the Mediterranean Sea in March and responded in support of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya. This unit conducted NATO airstrikes and rescued a downed Air Force pilot ashore in Libya. But the successful performance of these MEUs has not necessarily validated the need for an amphibious vehicle.

The Under Secretary of the Navy, Robert O. Work, and the Special Assistant to the Director of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal, Frank G. Hoffman, make a strong argument supporting amphibious capabilities in their 2010 Proceedings article, “Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century.” These two retired Marines strongly argue that future amphibious capabilities will be needed, and their article is required reading for any serious student of future Marine Corps roles and missions. The article opens by stating, “As adversaries and weapons grow more advanced, amphibious doctrine must evolve, and the Navy-Marine Corps team must keep the blade sharpened for sea-to-shore capabilities. They further develop the rationale for multidimensional power, which includes amphibious operations.

Gen Amos stated on the day he was appointed Commandant, “Our nation still needs a force that is most ready when the nation is least ready and, ladies and gentlemen, that will be my focus as commandant for the next four years.” That means the Marine Corps needs to be prepared for missions that cover the full range of military operations. Marines need to be ready for both simple missions in permissive environments and more difficult missions in the face of a determined enemy. Marines need to be able to project power from the sea when there are no viable alternatives. Our Nation’s combatant commanders need a capability that provides freedom of action when foreign nations are reluctant to let American forces conduct military operations from their land or airspace. In the recent past, combatant commanders have been utilizing amphibious capabilities at an increasing rate. Since 2007, the requests for a MEU and its associated amphibious ready group shipping have increased 86 percent, while the need for single amphibious ships has grown by 53 percent.

But it will be difficult for the Marine Corps to continue providing this type of support without an amphibious vehicle. In his statement addressing the termination of the EFV, Gen Amos stated that a modern amphibious tracked vehicle is:

. . . the key to allowing ship-to-shore operations in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments; assuring access where infrastructure is destroyed or nonexistent; and creating joint access in defended areas.

Even missions on the lower end of the conflict spectrum will require an amphibious vehicle to complement aluminum assault support aircraft and lightly defended Navy surface craft. Amphibious vehicles provide options. For example, during Operation UNITED SHIELD, conducted in Somalia in February and March 1995, the 13th MEU only used surface craft to land and withdraw. The threat to helicopters was deemed too great since two Black Hawks had been shot down over Mogadishu less than 18 months before. Additionally, the MEU was engaged throughout the withdrawal by small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades. Assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) provided protection for the last Marines off of the beach—protection they would not have had in an unarmored helicopter or MV–22 Osprey. If the Marine Corps doesn’t procure a vehicle to support future amphibious operations, then it is certain to be unprepared when the Nation needs it to act in this capacity.

Affordability: The New Performance Parameter

Now that the Federal budget is under fire, the Marine Corps will be required to eliminate excessive costs and live within its means. The Marine Corps has always prided itself on being the best value in the DoD and the post-EFV decisions it makes will provide an opportunity to reinforce that belief. The EFV decision made by then-Secretary Robert M. Gates has freed the Marine Corps from the burden of continuing on with the most expensive acquisition program it had ever undertaken. In January, he stated that:
The EFV, originally conceived during the Reagan Administration, has already consumed more than $3 billion to develop and will cost another $12 billion to build—all for a fleet with the capacity to put 4,000 troops ashore. If fully executed, the EFV—which costs far more to operate and maintain than its predecessor—would essentially swallow the entire Marine vehicle budget and most of its total procurement budget for the foreseeable future.

This decision has freed up billions of dollars for the Marine Corps to potentially utilize for other battlefield requirements and to begin the process of acquiring the right amphibious vehicle.

Navy Under Secretary Work provided details to Congress on how the Marine Corps plans to redistribute $2.6 billion of the EFV funds in the budget toward a new amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) and other requirements. The ACV program will receive $500 million in support of a new amphibious vehicle. Additionally, the Marine personnel carrier (MPC) will receive $400 million, $1 billion will go toward AAV upgrades while the ACV is being developed, approximately $500 million will be used for general procurement needs, and $200 million will be applied to the HMMWV program. These plans would provide a modest down payment for development of an amphibious vehicle for the Marine Corps, but more importantly, they reduce risk that was applied to many other programs to pay for the bloated EFV program. Although the ACV will assume some of this battlefield risk, it is still within the Marine Corps’ ability to field a formidable amphibious vehicle that costs less than the EFV would have. It may not have all of the bells and whistles that were planned with the EFV, but it will provide the required survivability for Marines going ashore.

Cost will definitely be a capability driver during the fielding process of a new amphibious vehicle. Over the past few decades, the Marine Corps may have been guilty of falling in love with new technology regardless of cost. The EFV, MV–22 Osprey, and F–35B Joint Strike Fighter short takeoff and vertical landing variant have been extremely expensive programs when compared to the Marine Corps’ rather modest portfolio of equipment in the past. It’s not that the Corps didn’t need this equipment to replace its aged inventory; it just seems that it allowed itself to become mesmerized by the next generation of technology without a serious and meaningful consideration of the potential drain on fiscal resources over the long run. Today’s fiscal constraints are very real and will be a part of the programming and budgeting process for decades to come as America struggles to address its mounting national debt.

Fielding the ACV

The Marine Corps must determine what kind of amphibious vehicle to procure by clearly stating the required capabilities based on future threats and missions. Given the fiscal constraints the DoD faces, the analysis of exactly what the Marine Corps needs is critical. The Marine Corps can no longer afford superfluous capabilities on the next amphibious vehicle. There is no money for extra cup holders or for leather seats. The Marine Corps has already begun to lay the groundwork for the acquisition process by publishing a request for information (RFI) so that industry can develop solutions for the ACV. The RFI provides the core characteristics for the ACV, but it also gives industry a fair amount of latitude since it does not require specific solutions, such as the ability to plane on water, or to have a V-shaped hull, or to have a certain thickness of armor. This is good because technology changes at a rapid pace, and solution sets change over time. Some smart people in industry may develop a revolutionary concept that nobody in the Marine Corps has even considered. During congressional testimony, LtGen George Flynn, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, commented that he does not have a specific design in mind because the Marine Corps is still learning about blast effects and how to counter them. This is a good indication that the Marine Corps is progressing with an open mind.

The real key will be to develop a solution that is affordable. Ashton Carter, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, has led the DoD’s effort to achieve better buying power. As part of then-Secretary Gates’ efficiency efforts, Secretary Carter has implemented a plan with the objective to “deliver the warfighting capability we need for the dollars we have.” Everything else in the plan flows from this objective—better buying power, affordability, improved productivity, leanness, etc. The DoD must be smarter in its procurement efforts. But this plan is not exclusive to the DoD. Secretary Carter points out that the DoD must partner with industry to become more efficient and incentivize companies to be more productive. The partnership with industry is critical to future acquisition improvements. Industry builds weapons, conducts research and development, and directly affects our Nation’s security.

Most efficiencies and savings will be achieved through tradeoffs, not program cancellations. One example lies in the tradeoffs made during production of the Navy’s next ballistic missile submarine. One specific modification reduced the number of launch tubes from 20 to 16. Combined with other changes, this reduced average procurement costs by 16 percent. The Navy originally estimated the cost of each submarine at $6 to $7 billion per boat, but has already reduced the cost down to $5.6 billion, and continues to look for changes that will further reduce the cost to $4.9 billion per copy. But the submarine will still have all of the necessary capabilities to complete its mission. Each ship will carry 16 ballistic missiles, and since each missile has 5 nuclear warheads, the submarine will have 80 nuclear warheads ready to fire. Even with the reduction from 20 to 16 launch tubes, the Navy will still have a capability that can completely change the course of war for our enemies. This is the model the Marine Corps needs to follow with the ACV program. It needs to identify the requisite capabilities for the ACV, and then identify acceptable tradeoffs in order to make the vehicle affordable.

Congress is the final ingredient needed to successfully acquire the ACV. Recently, the House failed to pass an amendment to the fiscal year 2011 Defense Appropriations Act that would:

. . . prohibit the use of funds in division A of H.R. 1 [House Resolution 1] to be used to research, develop, or test the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile program.

This is not the final word on the issue, but American taxpayers need Congress to support the DoD in its efforts to reduce defense spending. There are a number of historical examples when the interests of constituents have trumped the overall good of the Nation, resulting in the Congress allocating funds to the DoD for programs it didn’t want and it didn’t need. Yes, the termination of the EFV program will cost jobs for employees at General Dynamics and other subcontractors nationwide, but our Nation simply cannot afford overly expensive programs like the EFV in the future. With a clean slate from Congress, the Marine Corps can move past the troubled EFV program and partner with industry to meet its amphibious vehicle requirement.

Support From the Other Services

The Marine Corps will need the support of the other Services to conduct its amphibious assault mission as part of joint forcible entry. The ACV will need to be used at the high end of warfare in an amphibious assault role against a formidable foe, as well as in missions found in the middle and on the low end of the spectrum of warfare. It’s at the high end of warfare that the Services must really take a close look at joint capabilities. This examination will help frame the requirements for equipment; for example, the specific capabilities needed on the ACV.

The Secretary of the Navy recently presented a modification in tactics that demonstrates the need for a joint effort. Secretary Ray Mabus stated that the Navy and Marine Corps had reduced their requirement for ship-to-shore movement from 25 nautical miles to 12 to 16 nautical miles. This change is a result of improved defensive capabilities in Navy systems that will allow ships to move closer to foreign shores.Because of antiaccess/area denial technologies and improved fleet defensive capabilities, future amphibious assaults will look nothing like Tarawa or Iwo Jima. They will be characterized by technologically advanced weaponry—both offensive and defensive. Rather than being a battle of attrition, future amphibious assaults will be marked by accurate strike and precise defense. In this construct, the ACVs will not necessarily be the defining pieces of equipment in an amphibious assault as were landing craft in World War II. ACVs will likely be more like pawns on a chess board protected by more superior pieces that other Services will provide. This is not to say that ACVs are expendable, because nothing could be further from the truth. The safety of Marines is paramount. However, ACVs will largely rely on more capable American offensive and defensive weaponry, not necessarily expensive armament, propulsion, weaponry, and systems on the vehicles themselves. The ACV will provide a means to project power ashore where and when the combatant commander determines, but it will not do so alone. It will only be one piece of the larger forcible entry puzzle, and as such, it will not need all of the expensive capabilities that were envisioned on the EFV. The ACV’s survivability while moving ashore will be largely derived from the synergy achieved by all four Services’ offensive and defensive efforts working collectively in a forcible entry operation.

The Navy and Air Force have been developing the AirSea Battle Concept to better integrate air and sea capabilities in order to counter competitors. AirSea Battle Concept fundamentals include omnipresent unmanned systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; full development of unmanned underwater vehicles and systems; persistent refueling capacity; continuous evaluation of mission modules for the littoral combat ship, such as the mine countermeasures module; increased submerged precision strike; increased electronic warfare; and coordination to address cyber and command and control issues. These capabilities will be essential for controlling the commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace. But the Marine Corps needs AirSea Battle Concept planners to also support boots on the ground—largely Marines and soldiers. Even more specifically, the Marine Corps needs the Navy and Air Force to develop plans that support moving ground forces from ships and friendly bases onto the enemy’s turf. Littoral combat ships; Joint Strike Fighters; minesweepers; remotely piloted armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; and the mobile landing platform are a number of programs that the Marine Corps will need the Navy and the Air Force to integrate within amphibious assault doctrine. They will be critical for establishing conditions for a successful amphibious operation.

Amphibious assault is only one element of joint forcible entry operations. Other elements include the Army’s airborne assault and air assault capabilities. The Marine Corps recognizes that soldiers will also be crucial for successful forcible entry operations. So the Marine Corps needs the Army to continue its efforts to train for these types of missions. For example, the Army and Air Force conduct six joint forcible entry exercises (JFExs) each year. This preparation will be essential to establishing tactics, techniques, procedures, and relationships that will enable Army soldiers to conduct complementary operations while Marines cross the beach. But the DoD can do more in preparing for future warfare. An additional step that must be taken is to conduct a JFEx that involves all four Services. For example, the BOLD ALLIGATOR exercises focus on major amphibious operations of the future, which would provide an ideal opportunity to develop integrated planning and execution of forcible entry operations with the Army and Air Force. A future exercise could contain scenarios for an amphibious landing, airborne assault, air assault, and possibly bridging operations that are often critical once forces are ashore. The Navy and Air Force would have an opportunity to employ air-sea battle tactics that would include close air support. The Army and Marine Corps could exercise ground combat capabilities together. The possibilities for integration of the joint force would be significant. An exercise of this nature would be a significant undertaking, but if the four Services train together and play their respective parts in supporting a synergistic effort aimed at forcing their way onto foreign soil, U.S. forces will be hard to beat in the future.

Now What?

The Marine Corps does not yet have a blueprint for the ACV, but it definitely knows that the EFV was not the right answer for future amphibious operations. The EFV was too expensive, and its design was based on battlefield factors that have changed since the origins of the program. The improvements in Navy defensive systems, development of technology to protect against improvised explosive devices, history of EFV performance problems and program delays, and budgetary constraints have changed the acquisition equation for Marine Corps amphibious vehicles. The ACV needs to take these changes into account so that the Marine Corps fields the best vehicle for the money. Tradeoffs between speed, maneuverability, survivability, communications, weaponry, and cost can be made, while still providing a greatly improved amphibious capability upgrade from the current AAV. In a recent presentation, Gen Amos stated that the ACV will not be a Cadillac Escalade. It will be a Chevy—a good, solid, reliable vehicle. Although most Marines would rather assault in an Escalade, they would also agree that the Chevy will get them to the beach ready to fight, but at a much more sustainable cost. The Marine Corps needs to buy a Chevy.

Notes

1. Amos, Gen James F., “Statement by Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James Amos on Efficiencies,” DoD News Release, Washington, DC, 6 January 2011.

2. United States Marine Corps official website, http://marines.mil/ontherecord/Documents/100909-15MEUPirates.pdf.

3. Work, Robert O., and F.G. Hoffman, “Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century, Proceedings, Annapolis, MD, November 2010.

4. Cavallaro, Gina, “Amos takes command of the Corps,” Marine Corps Times, Springfield, VA, 22 October 2010.

5. LaGrone, Sam, “Shifting horizons: Marines refocus their future at sea,” Jane’s Navy International, Englewood, CO, 14 March 2011.

6. Amos, “Statement by Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James Amos on Efficiencies.”

7. Gates, Robert M., “Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies,” DoD Speech, Washington, DC, 6 January 2011.

8. Rutherford, Emelie, “Marine Corps Humvees, MPCs Would Benefit from EFV Cancellation,” Defense Daily, Washington, DC, 12 January 2011.

9. “Marine Corps Request for Information for Amphibious Combat Vehicle, Solicitation Number: M6785411I0213,” last modified 16 March 2011, accessed at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=c3e9e125991dd56a889b9d4d67df0cc0&tab=core&_cview=0.

10. “Rep. Todd Akin Holds a Hearing on Amphibious Operations,” last modified 17 March 2011, accessed at http://findarticles.com/p/news-articles/political-transcript-wire/mi_8167/is_20110317/rep-todd-akin-holds-hearing/ai_n57105907/pg_14/.

11. Carter, Ashton, “Memorandum for Acquisition Professionals, Subject: Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending,” Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Washington, DC, 28 June 2010.

12. O’Rourke, Ronald, “Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 10 March 2011.

13. Daniel, Lisa, “Carter Outlines Military Acquisition Improvements,” American Forces Press Service, DoD, Washington, DC, 14 April 2011.

14. “The Library of Congress Bill Summary and Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012) H.AMDT.109,” last modified 18 February 2011, accessed at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:hz109:.

15. Censer, Marjorie, “General Dynamics laying off one-third of Woodbridge workforce,” The Washington Post, Washington, DC, 4 May 2011.

16. Steele, Jeanette, “Q&A: Navy secretary gears for ‘Don’t ask’ repeal,” Sign on San Diego, San Diego, CA, 24 February 2011.

17. Carreno, Jose, Thomas Culora, CAPT George Galdorisi, USN(Ret), and Thomas Hone, “What’s New About the AirSea Battle Concept?” Proceedings, Annapolis, MD, August 2010.

18. Tomiyama, Capt David, USAF, “Pope JFEX gives 15th WG Airmen unique training opportunities,” last modified on 23 September 2010, accessed at http://www.15wing.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123223442.

19. Amos, Gen James F., Discussion at Marine Corps Commanders Course, Marine Corps Base Quantico, 7 February 2011.