The EFV

In the wake of the 2007 Nunn-McCurdy certification, questions over reliability and contemporary operational viability of the expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV) continue to cloud progress made in the development of the system. Full funding and support for successful acquisition of the EFV is vital to the Marine Corps. The increased mobility, lethality, communications, and survivability over the current assault amphibious vehicle (AAV7A1 vehicle reliability, availability, maintainability/rebuild to standard (RAM/RS)) will provide the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) with a critical, viable capability across the range of military operations. Acquisition of the EFV directly supports unique core competencies and fulfills a critical aspect in the Nation’s conventional dominance. This article aims to identify progress made in the development of system reliability and highlight EFV capabilities in order to broaden the discussion on the acquisition of this critical system.

Maintaining Dominance

In his January 2009 Foreign Affairs article, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates identifies balance as the defining principle of the new National Defense Strategy. Not only will the institutionalization of counterinsurgency capabilities be key, but equally important is the sustainment of the United States’ existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces. Specifically:

The United States cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance’s persistence.?.?.?.

Other nations may be unwilling to challenge the United States.?.?.?. But they are developing the disruptive means to blunt the impact of U.S. power, narrow the United States’ military options, and deny the U.S. Military freedom of movement and action.1

The scalable MAGTF organization is tailormade for this requisite principle of balance. Given the right capabilities, the MAGTF possesses the inherent flexibility to enable and sustain freedom of movement and action in a wide range of military operations. In Vision and Strategy 2025, the Commandant of the Marine Corps affirms the following among our core competencies: forward naval engagement, joint forcible entry operations from the sea, and austere expeditionary operations in the urban littorals. The EFV—through its enhanced mobility, lethality, communications, and survivability (discussed in greater detail below)—is designed to directly support these core competencies. It will provide the MAGTF with enhanced general support lift across the range of military operations from a forward naval presence, during maneuver operations from the sea, and during sustained operations ashore. The enhanced capabilities enable the MAGTF to fulfill a critical aspect of the Nation’s conventional dominance through ensuring freedom of movement and action—one that needs to be revitalized and maintained.

System Reliability

A product of inadequate testing and redesign, the failure of the initial system development and demonstration phase (SDD) prototypes to demonstrate acceptable reliability during the 2006 operational assessment (OA) was a significant concern driving the 2007 certification and restructure of the program. The inadequacies in testing and design faulted were cited during congressional certification testimony as products of an accelerated program schedule coupled with underfunding of the program reported to have approached $400 million.2 (The subsequent restructure allowed a second SDD phase (SDD–2) to be conducted with an updated series of newly manufactured prototypes. The critical design review (CDR) capstoned in December 2008 in support of the SDD–2 prototypes projected the design reliability to be approximately 61 hours mean time between operational mission failure (MTBOMF), which exceeds the reliability threshold requirement of 43.5 hours established for the CDR during the restructure. While the 61-hour MTBOMF is a projection based on the CDR, aggressive developmental and operational testing will facilitate the demonstrated reliability of the design to progress toward the threshold requirement along an established growth curve.

The restructured growth curve has five established points in time (2009–13) where the program must validate reliability progression. By exceeding the threshold requirement with the CDR projection, the program successfully achieved the first point. The next point for the program has two requirements: demonstrating system reliability at or above 22 hours MTBOMF through rigorous testing of the new SDD–2 prototypes and a revalidation of the design reliability projection at or above the threshold requirement (43.5 hrs). Both of these must be achieved prior to the next scheduled OA in 2011.

Successful results of testing, redesign, and integration of new components and subsystems into the overall system design will continue the reliability progression through the established points and into the scheduled manufacture of the low-rate initial production vehicles in 2013 for the initial operational test and evaluation events scheduled for 2014. With reliability growth validated through all remaining points, the vehicles fielded to the Operating Forces in 2015 can be expected to demonstrate at or above the program’s reliability key performance parameter (KPP) requirement (43.5 hrs).

In addition to the focused effort on system reliability growth, developmental and operational testing over the last 2 years has also addressed other concerns as the system design continues to mature. Integration of testing, redesign, and new components has successfully addressed a water directional stability issue highlighted during the 2006 OA. Operational testing has also provided valuable information to discredit concerns over egress times and potential physiological effects of extended waterborne movement on embarked personnel. The results of these test events are documented and available in operational test reports from the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA).

Operational Viability

Two valid operational concerns with the EFV have emerged in reports from the Congressional Research Service3 and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.5 These concerns were repeated in a late February edition of the Marine Corps Times. First, the reports highlight the challenges to amphibious forces due to the proliferation of antiship threats; second, the reports question the applicability of the EFV across the spectrum of conflict—specifically due to the perceived vulnerability of the vehicle (in comparison to other combat vehicles) to the modern improvised explosive device (IED) threat. Specific analysis of the need to keep amphibious forces over the horizon to protect from the contemporary antiship threat is a broad topic in and of itself that deserves due Naval Services attention in the areas of amphibious force protection and operational area shaping but is beyond the intent and scope of this article. However, discussion of the increased capability of the EFV over the current AAV7A1 RAM/RS in mobility, lethality, communications, and survivability is important to highlight. These increased capabilities are at the heart of what will revitalize the ability of the MAGTF to conduct maneuver during not only forcible entry operations (FEO) and ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) from over the horizon, but also during follow-on operations (shore-to-shore maneuver, maritime interdiction, riverine) in the littoral environment and sustained operations ashore across the range of military operations against complex and varied security challenges.

Mobility. In his Foreign Affairs article, Secretary Gates put potential contemporary adversaries in perspective:

When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the ‘high end’ from the ‘low end,’ the conventional from the irregular, armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK–47s on the other. In reality, as the political scientist Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.6

In concert with this perspective of simultaneous hybrid and complex forms of warfare, the current Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (August 2008) from the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration promulgates the necessary balanced approach to ground mobility through development of a vehicle set better postured to support a range of operations from conventional to irregular. The EFV is a critical part of this mobility strategy.

•Mobility: STOM. In contrast to other ship-to-shore connectors, the EFV provides the one-of-a-kind advantage of a high-speed, self-deploying, tracked amphibious combat vehicle—the only option that enables FEO/STOM to occur from over the horizon in a mid- to high-threat environment without a tactical pause to unload and organize separate landing serials into employable units at an established craft landing zone (CLZ) and in adverse weather, surf, or beach conditions. Either individually or in a combination of two or more, these considerations elevate the operational risk assumed through the use of any other ship-to-shore connector alternatives to land the assault waves. Given a low-threat environment, the inherent constraints of CLZ operations required for other ship-to-shore connectors include more stringent requirements for littoral penetration site selection, the relative pause in tactical momentum, and the additional consideration of fixed site security at the CLZ as even a low-threat adversary could potentially concentrate lethal assets at that critical time and place. The importance of momentum and buildup of combat power ashore also cannot be overlooked. A 2008 combat and tactical vehicle assessment conducted by Program Assessment and Evaluation for the Deputy Commandant, Programs and Resources, found that in a generic battalion surface assault scenario from over-the-horizon, the associated timeline for the buildup of combat power ashore was near double or worse for all nonself-deploying alternatives (those requiring a separate ship-to-shore connector) to the self-deploying, high-speed capability the EFV provides. This reinforces past assertions of this consideration by the cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) and analysis of alternatives (AoA) conducted in support of the EFV program. Lost momentum through the measured reduction in buildup of combat power is due to existing amphibious force constraints including the limits of amphibious shipping, number of ship-to-shore connectors available and their associated load limits, well deck restrictions and cycle times, and an increased number of waves required to lift the vehicles to the CLZ(s). In contrast, the EFV is designed to transport the surface assault echelon of the landing force in a single lift from over the horizon ship-to-objective without a tactical pause to unload and organize at the beach. The self-deploying EFV design has been progressively validated over all other past and current alternatives through COEA7 and formal AoA.8 The EFV remains the best system to meet the operational requirements of FEO/STOM.

•Mobility: ashore. Designed to match the land mobility of the M1 tank, once ashore the EFV falls in line with an acknowledged mobility tradeoff between tracked and wheeled vehicles. Tracked vehicles by and large provide increased tactical mobility over wheeled vehicles. Wheeled vehicles provide benefit to operational mobility over extended distances and on improved-surface roads but inherently have difficulty meeting the same power and terrain agility requirements (vertical obstacle height, trench crossing, slope negotiation, and stability) as tracked vehicles. Emerging technological improvements, such as active suspension systems, can improve a wheeled vehicle’s cross-country ability but generally only to more closely mirror the ability of an average tracked vehicle. As an example, the mission profile of the Stryker outlines 70 percent on-road, 30 percent cross-country employment. This type of mission profile, exacerbated by the additional weight of survivability upgrades, can be a limiting factor in the ability to tactically maneuver wheeled vehicles through a wide variety of terrain, especially in an environment devoid of numerous improved-surface roads. Recent allied experience from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in southern Afghanistan supports the benefit of tracked armor. Canadian forces provide that:

...recent experience in combat has provided irrefutable evidence that all elements of the combined arms team remain fundamental to the delivery of decisive combat power in the contemporary operating environment.10

Marine after-action reports have also supported this assertion, as stated by the battalion commander, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines:

We left our tanks and AAV in CONUS [continental United States] and did not deploy them to Afghanistan. At the time this decision was made we were not sure [in] what area of operation we would be conducting operations. We should have brought this capability to Afghanistan for the same reason it was assigned in the task organization. We could employ mechanized vehicles throughout southern Afghanistan, often in places that wheeled vehicles could not go. The M1A1 and the AAV provide significant and robust communications capability and firepower that would have been employed in the operation. British mechanized vehicles were employed in the area of operations. They were very effective because of their ability to maneuver through the desert sand dune areas without getting stuck. The BLT’s [battalion landing team’s] HMMWVs and LAV [light armored vehicle] encountered significant no-go terrain in the areas that British mechanized vehicles maneuvered.9
The EFV provides the requisite mobility ashore to support general support lift requirements where wheeled vehicles cannot always go, in a wide variety of environments.

Lethality. A dramatic improvement over the current AAV7A1 RAM/RS, the weapons station of the EFV personnel variant provides conventional lethality to address modern, traditional battlefield threats including light to medium vehicles, personnel formations, and fortifications with the existing variety of 30mm service ammunition alternatives (including antiarmor sabot, high-explosive, and multipurpose ammunition). The ongoing development of programmable air burst munitions will increase the target set for EFV and reduce required ammunition to defeat individual targets. The design and integration of supporting systems within this weapons station make it equally valuable in an irregular warfare setting. The two-man turret incorporates a silent watch system and accompanying optics suite that provide laser rangefinding and forward looking infrared components for increased day and night target acquisition and surveillance capability. These attributes, coupled with the vehicle’s navigational position systems, also provide the crew the additional ability to “hand off” accurate target identification and location data to other fire support/weapons systems for engagement. The size of the vehicle and the accompanying 30mm weapons system offers a significant overt deterrence value at vehicle checkpoints and other security positions, and given demonstration of a credible hostile act or hostile intent, the fully stabilized full-solution fire control system offers a scalable (coaxial 7.62mm machinegun and 30mm caliber main gun) precision weapons system to address a variety of threats accurately out to 2,000 meters during day, night, or in adverse weather.

Communications. This is an additional area where the EFV provides a robust benefit over existing comparable personnel carriers in support of conventional or irregular operations. The program’s mission essential function of “communicate” drives an information exchange requirement KPP that translates into each EFV personnel variant providing amplified external very high-frequency, ultrahigh- frequency (UHF), satellite communications, and data communications. The suite also provides global positioning system and inertial navigation systems, as well as the applications of the command and control personal computer accessed through both the vehicle and troop commander’s display and networked through the UHF data circuit (enhanced position location and reporting system). Additional data ports are available for carry aboard devices from the embarked unit. The silent watch system allows the communications suite to be powered up without operating the main engine of the vehicle. The open system architecture design of the communications suite enables the integration and migration to anticipated future upgrades.

Survivability. As a result of the evolving irregular threat, primarily encountered in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and OEF, combat vehicle programs have sought to provide more protection of crews and embarked troops in two primary areas—horizontal and vertical surface protection to counter increased ballistic, explosively formed projectile (EFP), and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) threats and underbelly protection to counter increased mine and IED threats. During the last 5 years every major combat and tactical vehicle that has seen service in OIF or OEF (including AAV7A1 RAM/RS, HMMWV, medium tactical vehicle replacement, M1A1/2, M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, Stryker, and LAV) has identified a requirement for or undergone survivability upgrades in these two areas.

•Survivability: ballistic protection. From inception, the base armor design of the EFV has advanced survivability markedly above that of the current AAV7A1 RAM/RS. The baseline horizontal and vertical surface protection of the EFV matches or exceeds that of comparable combat vehicles (M2/M3 baseline, Stryker with ballistic upgrade, LAV–25.) (See Figure 1.) That baseline surface protection includes integrated spall protection that significantly reduces the spall angle resulting from more capable threats (RPG, EFP). The vehicle additionally integrates systematic signature management attributes and a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear collective protection system that enables the crew and embarked troops to remain at a lower mission oriented protective posture while maneuvering through contaminated environments. Additionally, like the communications suite, the horizontal and vertical armor system of the EFV has been designed with open system architecture, anticipating for integration of armor upgrades as material development produces lighter and more capable armor solutions.

•Survivability: underbelly protection. The protection offered by combat vehicles against increased under-

belly threats has been a consistent area of concern and a significant driver in the production of contemporary survivability upgrades. Following the introduction of the mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) series of vehicles, the EFV program (like many other ground vehicle programs) has come under scrutiny over underbelly protection concerns. The MRAP has highlighted the raw benefits of vehicle weight (mass) and a V-shaped hull in terms of underbelly protection. However, these two factors are not a complete picture as to what drives increased underbelly survivability. A holistic look at the entire vehicle design is required, focusing not on just one or two attributes but also on the integration of multiple attributes across the design. Attributes that contribute to underbelly survivability are not just limited to vehicle weight and hull shape but also include hull bottom and troop compartment standoff distances from ground level, hull design (multiple hulls), hull material hardness, crew and embarked troop seating, fire suppression, and spall protection. While restricted to a flat-bottomed hull by the design requirements of a high-speed tracked amphibian, the underbelly survivability design of the EFV has taken this critical approach to integrate proven survivability attributes that provide a combined benefit—given the vehicle’s capability requirements—to the crew and embarked troops. The attributes within the baseline design that most contribute toward underbelly survivability include: •Increased standoff distance and multiple floor/hull design between the troop compartment and the ground (AAV: 18 inches, EFV: 34 inches).

•Optimally suited aluminum utilized in hull construction.

•Blast attenuating seats for the crew and embarked troops.

•Integrated spall liner.

•Automatic fire extinguishing and suppression system.

The baseline design of the EFV provides underbelly protection that matches or exceeds that of comparable combat vehicles (M2/M3 baseline, Stryker baseline, LAV–25). As noted above, these comparable combat vehicles have all pursued survivability upgrades in response to the current mine and IED threat experienced in OEF and OIF. This additional survivability consideration has not been lost on the EFV program.

Leveraging recent vehicle survivability upgrade programs like the U.S. Army’s tank urban survival kit (TUSK) and Bradley urban survival kit (BUSK), a 2007 Marine Corps study was conducted on improving the underbelly protection of the EFV. The study enabled completion and approval of Level A and Level B appliqué belly armor kit designs for the EFV, similar to those underbelly kits produced and fielded for the TUSK and BUSK programs. The kits are designed to be mounted on existing hardware points during sustained operations ashore to counter increased underbelly threats in a conventional or irregular setting. Like other survivability upgrades, the kits add weight (Level B estimated to add 3,640 pounds, ~4 percent addition to gross vehicle weight), and for the EFV will require a tradeoff in water capability, currently under examination by the program office as the appliqué designs are further developed according to the prescribed requirements. However, the improvement in underbelly protection is significant. The Level A kit is expected to match or exceed the upgraded underbelly protection offered to the LAV–25/LAV III and Stryker by their survivability kits, and the Level B kit is expected to match or exceed the upgraded protection offered M2/M3 by the BUSK upgrade kit. (See Figure 2.)
These contemporary threats; the evolution of enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized to employ them; and the spiraling survivability upgrades are indicative of an “action/reaction” cycle in a relatively static irregular warfare context. Within this context, the characteristics of fixed coalition positions, established and routine lines of communications, and extended time for adversaries to observe and adapt have enabled threats to develop and modify themselves—constantly adapting to remain effective. In the case of the contemporary underbelly threat of IEDs, this action/reaction cycle pushes more survivable vehicles to the battlefield followed by parallel threat development until an overmatch is achieved. The consistent development of overmatching threats is enabled by the given characteristics of this irregular warfare context. A different context, where maneuver is the dominant characteristic, significantly disrupts the ability of overmatch threat development in the action/reaction cycle, especially the ability to accurately position overmatching underbelly threats. Toward the end of his article, Secretary Gates offers the following:

But no one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain.?.?.?. As General William Tecumseh Sherman said, ‘Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.’12

For the Marine Corps, our core competencies require at some point that a balance be struck with combat vehicles. Survivability must be considered with maneuver and cannot be elevated to such a level that strategic, operational, and tactical mobility is sacrificed. The Marine Corps Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy aims to achieve this balance.

Conclusion

Provided full funding and support to accomplish the required testing and continued development, the EFV program will continue on this restructured path to successfully field the system. The program will continue to advance the design along the established reliability growth curve and deliver a vehicle at initial operational capability that will provide the enhanced general support lift capability to the MAGTF, ensuring freedom of movement and action across the range of military operations and enabling the core competencies that make our Service unique. From a forward naval presence, during maneuver operations from the sea, and during sustained operations ashore in the world’s littoral regions, the EFV will fulfill a critical capability in keeping the Marine Corps the Nation’s “force in readiness.”

Notes

1. Gates, Robert M., “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs web site, available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy, January 2009, p. 3.

2. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, “Hearing on the Expeditionary Fighting Vechicle Program, 26 June 2007,” Political/Congressional Transcript Wire, 28 June 2007, p. 13.

3. United States Marine Corps, MCOTEA, Infantry Degradation Final Report dated March 2007 and the Water Directional Stability 1 Developmental Test/Operational Test Event Report dated November 2008, Quantico, 2007–08.

4. Feickert, Andrew, “The Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Re-
search Service Report RS22947, September, December 2008, pp. 5–6.

5. Wood, Dakota L., “Strategy for the Long Haul: The U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment Report 2008, pp. 58–65.

6. Gates, p. 4.

7. Akst, George and David Brenner, Advanced Amphibious Assault Program COEA, Center for Naval Analyses, 1990, updated 1993, 1994.

8. United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Studies and Analysis Division, AoA, Advanced Amphibious Assault Program, Quantico, 2000, updated during 2006–07 Nunn-McCurdy Congressional Certification.

9. Cadieu, Maj Trevor, CD, “Canadian Armour in Afghanistan,” Canadian Army Journal, Volume 10.4, Winter 2008, p. 5.

10. Henderson, LtCol A.M., After-Action Report and Lessons Learned From OEF Phase III, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned website, available at www.mccll.usmc.mil, 25 September 2008, pp. 24–25.
11. Survivability figures represent a general comparison of known standard armor protection levels for occupants of logistics and armored vehicles (Standardization Agreement (NATO) 4569). The specific armor protection level associated with a given vehicle or upgrade is often classified. In order to keep this figure unclassified but still offer the value of a general comparison, specific armor protection levels are omitted, not defined, and not associated with any vehicle in the figure. Data utilized in the comparison was obtained from the National Ground Intelligence Center.

12. Ibid.

13. Gates, p. 7.