Chokepoint

“Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.”
—John F. Kennedy

“The force that holds the sea lines of communication controls the seas and the force that controls the seas will control the outcome of the war.”
—Maj Forrest R. Lindsey, 1988

“The global oil market is very vulnerable to potential supply disruptions, given that reserves are heavily concentrated among a handful of major producers and consuming centers are often far from producing basins.”
—Lehman Brothers Report, 18 January 2008

The employment of naval forces to protect vital sea lanes and keep open key chokepoints is a principal tenet of sea control and seapower. In this context, a chokepoint represents a narrow passage or other point of congestion through which vital commerce must pass; the closure of this point could prove devastating to the world’s economy. The intent of this article is to explore the utility of using specialized amphibious forces along these sea lanes to combat the diverse threats to our Nation’s political, economic, and military interests, notably threats to freedom of navigation and world oil supply. I intend to demonstrate how specialized seabased amphibious forces following the precepts of operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) can retain, regain, or deny freedom of navigation along the sea lines of communications (SLOC) known as the global oil chokepoints.1 This article explores the defense of the Malacca Straits, a likely amphibious force scenario, and examines potential adversaries through a focus on this critical zone. I argue that in order to guarantee freedom of navigation, it will be necessary for the United States to project our fleet and land forces to the Straits of Malacca, through the Indian Ocean, on through to the East and South China Seas and be ready to “conduct diverse operations from humanitarian to security cooperation to major combat operations” across these regions.2 This ability to project forces to the distant and often confined spaces of South Asia is an imperative of seapower and is vital to our national interests.

Theater of Operations

A SLOC represents the primary route between ports used for trade, logistics, and movement of naval forces.3 The goal of SLOC operations is to maintain, regain, or deny freedom of navigation along the SLOC. Freedom of navigation operations are conducted to demonstrate U.S. or international rights to navigate air or sea routes.4 Most of the threats to SLOC emanate from close proximity littorals; the Strait of Malacca for instance is at one point only 1.5 nautical miles wide.

The global oil chokepoints are a chain of 10 strategic centers that collectively process 64 percent of the world’s oil. Table 1 shows the top 10 global oil chokepoints. The disruption of flow from any of these systems could potentially interrupt or even eliminate a substantial volume of the worldwide supply of oil. All are located in littoral regions, and all are accessible from the sea. It is not possible to examine all 10 chokepoints in the scope of this short article. However, by focusing on the Straits of Malacca with its complex geopolitical situation, the utility of amphibious forces in any of their defense can be amply demonstrated.

Strait of Malacca

The strait is of critical importance to the United States, its allies, and its competitors in the region. The Department of Energy estimates that approximately 15 million barrels of oil transit the strait per day. It is also estimated that 30 percent of the world’s trade and 18 percent of its oil transit through the strait annually. Closure of this waterway would raise freight rates worldwide and cause severe shipping delays. . . . With roughly half the world’s fleet required to sail [farther].5

Recognizing the vulnerability to oil flow, in May 2006 the Department of State (DoS) established the Global Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Strategy and Task Force to increase the security of oil processing installations. The task force does well assisting local powers’ efforts to increase security through the development of treaties, security pacts, and landbased security sector reform. However, the DoS has little maritime capability and requires assistance to facilitate security operations along the SLOC and at chokepoints.

The Strait of Malacca is the number two chokepoint in the maritime oil transit chain. Map 1 shows the prominence of the strait in the oil transit route from the Middle East to Asia. The strait is a narrow body of water running between West Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, surrounded by a complicated mixture of jungle, mountain, and urban environments. It connects the Pacific Ocean to the east with the Indian Ocean to the west; thereby, the strait is the main shipping channel linking Asia and the Middle East. It is estimated that more than 50,000 ships traverse the strait annually, and the number grows each year. While about a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the strait, approximately 80 percent of the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC’s) oil transits through as well.6

The strait is 500 miles long, up to 83 feet deep, and at its narrowest is only 1.5 nautical miles wide. Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia share joint administration of the strait. The Indian-controlled Nicobar and Andaman Islands dominate the Indian Ocean entrance to the strait in the Bay of Bengal. Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand also influence the strait’s western side. Across the eastern entrance lay the disputed Spratly, Paracel, and Pratas Islands. These islands dominate the main route to the PRC, the Republic of China (ROC), Korea, and Japan—some of the largest oil consumers in this hemisphere. The high volume of traffic, the narrow confines of the strait, and the complicated political geography make for a dangerous combination at all times, creating a heightened security concern.

Potential Threats to the Strait of Malacca

Oil and territorial disputes. Tension over mineral rights, specifically seabased oil, exists throughout the region. Disputes between Malaysia, Indonesia, ROC, the Philippines, PRC, Vietnam, and others over oil and gas deposits in the areas surrounding the Straits of Malacca, in particular within the South China Sea, have created instability and threaten the region.7 They have also led to regional military buildups and arms race issues. At the heart of the disputes are the Spratly Islands claimed in whole or in part by the PRC, the ROC, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The Paracel Islands are claimed by the PRC, ROC, and Vietnam. In addition, the Pratas Islands are claimed by the PRC and ROC. Several small islands off of Borneo are disputed between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Criminal activity. Regional criminal activity, including illegal narcotics trade, creates instability and can funnel large sums of money to potential insurgent organizations.8 Similar and related to the illegal narcotics trade, the high volume of merchant traffic, the narrow confines of the straits, and the rugged terrain make piracy viable for criminals and insurgencies to illicitly create cash flow. This money can be used to procure the latest weapons systems and high-end communications equipment. According to James Kraska of the Naval War College, piracy is on the rise:

Piracy endangers the sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability. Piracy is also corrosive to political and social development. . . .

In the first 9 months of 2008 there were 103 incidents of piracy resulting in boarding and hijacking and 47 attempts along the Straits of Madagascar, through the Indian Ocean, on through to the East and South China Seas.9 There were 50 incidents and 7 attempts in the Straits of Malacca and nearby South China Sea.

“Hybrid threat.” At any time, the combination of large quantities of modern arms, money, and illegal activities could be combined by extremist factions to disrupt the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Malacca. This hybrid threat represents irregular forces that:

. . . fight using a mix of conventional and asymmetric means . . . that mimic what we typically associate with state armies.10

An insurgent group could establish itself in the urban areas along the littorals fully embedded with the population, while at the same time it could utilize the rugged coastline, islands, jungle, and mountain terrain to hide weapons and establish insurgent cells. If an insurgent group were to take control of a section of the strait, it would be able to extort large sums of money from the international shipping corporations and otherwise threaten freedom of navigation. For example, a small group could, if armed in a similar fashion to Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel, severely inhibit merchant traffic in the strait.

The potential weapons for the hybrid threat to utilize to seize control of the straits are all readily available in the region. The weapons range from the simple to the most advanced. Small, fast attack boats; mines; rockets; antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), both sea and land launched; antitank missiles and guns; heavy machineguns; rocket propelled grenades; and an array of portable antiaircraft weapons are all in the inventories of regional states.11 These conventional weapons can be augmented with improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers and could have devastating effects in the tight confines of the strait. Once established and embedded within the population, an insurgent force would need only to defend itself.12 Since the defensive area is rugged, populous, and relatively confined, the insurgents would need only a small force to effect and maintain the SLOC closure. A Hezbollah-like force operating from the thick jungles supported by the population would be very difficult to defeat.

Spread of Chinese Influence

The increased competition over resources, growing economies, and the emergence of large, modern weapons stockpiles are linked together. Asian militaries are growing in the numbers of modern air superiority fighters and precision guided munitions (notably cruise missiles).13 The proliferation of weapons is fundamentally changing the strategic balance all along the Indian Ocean-South China Sea SLOC. This growth, tied to the aforementioned vulnerabilities, may have a destabilizing effect on the region.

To the PRC in particular, these threats represent a clear danger. According to Christopher Pehrson of the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, “China’s greatest strength and its greatest vulnerability is the economy, and therefore it is the centerpiece of Chinese policy and strategy.” As so much of the PRC’s growth is tied to the commerce of the Indian Ocean-South China Sea SLOC, they must seek means to protect it. The Chinese have been gradually increasing their influence along the oil chokepoint route. The centers of PRC influence along this route are Hainan Island, the Spratlys, and Paracel Islands; Sitwa, Burma; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan. This chain of influence is often referred to as the Chinese “String of Pearls.” The String of Pearls describes:

. . . the manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the Arabian Gulf.14

However, just as the vulnerability of the SLOC is a catalyst for the PRC to pursue increased spending on expeditionary forces, it is also a catalyst for the other nations too.

India

Any moves by China to strengthen its position in the Indian Ocean will inevitably interact with India. The fact that the Indian island chains of Andaman and Nicobar sit at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca confers “a measure of influence over vital sea communications” to this nation.15 Indian maritime doctrine clearly states an understanding of the value of chokepoints:

. . . by virtue of our geography, we are . . . in a position to greatly influence the movement/security of shipping along the SLOCs in the [Indian Ocean Region] provided we have the maritime power to do so. Control of the choke points could be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.16

The concept that the Indians could block the strait could prompt the Chinese to deploy ballistic submarines to the region thus initiating a regional naval arms race.17 For now, however, the Indians are in a strong position to balance Chinese and U.S. naval power as they can view both as potential competitors or partners.

Countering the Threats, Seizing Opportunity

Because of the complicated political geography and the proliferation of antiaccess weapons, the United States must maintain presence in and around SLOCs to maintain freedom of the seas. However, there is no guarantee that U.S. forces will have safe staging areas to utilize as bases in close proximity to a SLOC. To exercise sea control and maintain freedom of navigation, the United States and its allies must have a force-in-readiness that can operate from the sea or other austere location to retain, regain, or deny access to the SLOC. A landing force capable of locating and closing with threats to the SLOC from a mobile seabase provides the National Command Authority with a far more flexible and scalable option. Therefore, specialized amphibious forces, namely the U.S. Marine Corps operating from U.S. Navy amphibious shipping, must stand ready to conduct all actions necessary to safeguard freedom of navigation and gain sea control.

Retain. Operations to retain U.S. and allied access to the strait include theater security cooperation, freedom of navigation operations, and counterpiracy operations, to name a few. Through military-to-military exchanges, exercises, port visits, and combined counterpiracy patrols, the Navy and Marine Corps maintain a constant presence in the region. MEU presence and participation in regional exercises like COBRA GOLD in Thailand serve well to remind adversaries of U.S. capability. The near constant presence of U.S. naval forces ensures that our freedom of navigation is retained. However, presence alone will not be enough. Naval forces will need robust capabilities to conduct visit, board, search, and seizure operations; raids; and other operations designed to deny potential threats the ability to form and operate in and around critical infrastructure sites and chokepoints. The Marine Corps is perfectly placed to provide these tailored and scalable responses.

Regain. The United States will be compelled to act swiftly in the event a regional power conflict, terrorist action, or other warlike act occurs that denies freedom of navigation through the strait. Offensive naval and ground operations to reopen the SLOC may be required. In this eventuality, specially designed amphibious forces provide the most flexible response. Amphibious forces operating from a seabase can quickly close on the strait to isolate and neutralize the threat. In this environment, our forces would need the flexibility to respond to peer conventional as well as hybrid and irregular threats. Naval forces in this environment would likely remain at a distance from the confines of the strait to gain maximum standoff protection from landbased weapons. As such, Marine landing forces would need to be structured to provide long-range, over-the-horizon capabilities for force closure, fire support, and sustainment.

Deny. In the event of a peer or near-peer competitor conflict, closing, denying, or threatening denial of the use of the strait can be a great benefit. Targeting the SLOC can counterbalance other regional threats. The threat of this action acts as a deterrent. For instance, in a conflict between the two Chinas, the PRC would attempt to block U.S. access to Taiwan. The PRC would attempt to gain regional naval and air superiority and with air- and sea-launched ASCM, ballistic missiles, mines, and other standoff weapons that force the United States out of direct support range to the island.18 However, by recognizing the Malacca Strait as a PRC critical vulnerability, the United States could counterbalance the threat by cutting or threatening to cut the flow of oil through the strait. Naval forces would be instrumental in blocking merchant shipping from making its way to the PRC. It would require a major military escalation before the United States would sink shipping heading for China. However, redirecting ships to neutral ports for internment and seizing ships via boarding would be an appropriate and easy response. Unfortunately, to blockade the Chinese coast would be difficult in the extreme. But to block the chokepoints is a distinct possibility. The threat that this blockade could be emplaced acts as one more means of counterbalancing the threat to the ROC.

Conclusion

The vulnerability of the global oil chokepoints through the Indian Ocean and on to the South China Sea represents a critical vulnerability for the United States, its allies, and its competitors. The threats are diverse, ranging from criminality and piracy to terrorism and state-versus-state competition for resources. Because of the very real vulnerability to freedom of navigation along this route, the United States needs specialized amphibious forces capable of confronting the diverse threats by retaining, regaining, and/or denying the use of the SLOC through the use of seabased OMFTS capabilities. An examination of the Strait of Malacca clearly demonstrates the vulnerability and the need for naval forces to counter it. The complex political and physical geography of the strait makes it extremely unstable and vulnerable. The closure or threat of closure of this strait by the action of nonstate actors or through deliberate state action threatens nearly 20 percent of the world’s total oil flow. Naval expeditionary forces capable of striking both land and sea are absolutely vital to the defense of critical infrastructure trade routes like the Strait of Malacca. In order to maintain control of the seas, the U.S. Marines working in tandem with the Navy must continue theater security cooperation and other presence missions in South Asia. In addition, to safeguard our national interest we must continue to exercise and develop amphibious operations capabilities necessary to regain or deny access to the Strait of Malacca and other global oil chokepoints.

Notes:
1. Lehman Brothers Global Equity Research, Global Oil Choke Points, Energy and Power, 18 January 2008, accessed at http:www.lehman.com.

2. Headquarters Marine Corps, Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century, Washington, DC, 18 March 2009.

3. Klein, John J., “Maritime Strategy Should Heed US and UK Classics, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, pp. 67–69.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC, 1999.

5. Lehman Brothers.

6. Djalal, Hasjim, South China Sea Island Disputes, accessed at http://www.southchiasea.org/docs/Djalal.

7. Pehrson, Christopher J., String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral, July 2006.

8. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), CIA World Fact Book, accessed at http://www.cia.org.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pf.html.

9. Kraska, James, “Fighting Piracy,” Armed Forces Journal, Washington, DC, February 2009, pp. 10–17, 37.

10. Oliver, Erwin, “Getting it right: What the 34-day war has to teach the U.S. Army,” Small Wars Journal, accessed at http://www.smallwarsjournal.com.

11. Kopp, Carlo, “Precision Guided Munitions in the Region,” Technical Report APA–TR–2007–0109, revised August 2009, Air Power Australia, accessed at http://www.ausairpower.netAPA-Regional-PGM.html.

12. Oliver.

13. Kopp.

14. Pehrson.

15. Holmes, James R., and Toshi Yoshihara, “China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle?,” Naval War College Review, Naval War College, Newport, RI, Summer 2008, pp. 41–60.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Mahnken, Thomas G., The Cruise Missile Challenge, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2005, accessed at http://www.csbaonline.org.