Challenges Imperiling Our Marksmanship Standards

“The deadliest weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle.”
—GEN John “Black Jack” Pershing, USA

“Every Marine is, first and foremost, a rifleman. All other conditions are secondary.”
—Gen Alfred M. Gray

“Our Corps, our culture has as its very basis, marksmanship skills—the ability to perform with a rifle. If you can’t shoot, you are not going to become a Marine.”
—Gen James T. Conway

The past several years of war have had a transformative effect on the Marine Corps as we develop new concepts and systems in collaboration with other Services to better integrate our warfighting capabilities. The result has been to substantially improve our interoperability, but this has come at some cost. It seems that with each passing year there are fewer and fewer things one can point to and say “only in the Marine Corps.” There is an apparent homogeneity that grows beyond mere concepts and systems; it pervades even our behaviors and standards. This effect becomes a problem only if you place significant importance in your sense of identity with your Service. I do.

I recently attempted to take full measure of what distinguishes the Marine Corps from the other Services. Of course, most everything that first comes to mind is purely subjective. I tried again to identify which of our measurable capabilities are truly unique, while remaining completely objective and basing my findings only on incontrovertible facts. I came up with a list of three things. First, we organize into task forces that are capable of providing all functions of aviation in support of their ground elements. Second, our operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver concepts drive our procurement and employment of over-the-horizon platforms necessary to complete the “mobility triad” (LCAC plus assault amphibious vehicles/expeditionary fighting vehicles plus CH–46/MV–22). Third, the best marksmen in the world are United States Marines.
       
The quotes above do as much to define who Marines are as anything else within our ethos, and Marines measure up. Surprisingly there are Marines willing to challenge this notion, and their first target of dispute is our Corps’ mantra of “every Marine a rifleman,” because they question both the efficacy of our training programs and the utility in training noninfantry Marines in infantry skills. Our “culture” is under attack. Critics of our marksmanship program have an agenda that involves the systematic dismantling of much of what has given the Marine Corps its preeminence. In addressing these challenges, it’s necessary to first define what “every Marine a rifleman” actually means. All Marines, regardless of occupational field, must be trained to standards that will allow them to perform in combat. All Marines must be able to fight. Specifically, all Marines must be able to perform the Marine Corps common skills, most importantly, “Perform the fundamentals of marksmanship with a service rifle/carbine (See Table 1).”1 In the following paragraphs I will explain the strengths of our marksmanship program, illuminate what the advocates for change have undertaken, and present solutions.

FRM

If our fundamental rifle marksmanship (FRM) course (see Table 1) was such that a perfect score of 250 was common, the standard would be of little value. Similarly, a minimum passing score of 190 on our course is a standard above that which any other Service can claim. In order to prove the efficacy of our marksmanship training methods, it’s necessary to compare performance against standards. While the variables between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps rifle qualification courses make a side-by-side comparison challenging, we can assess the relative difficulty between the two standards. The data in Figure 1 compares the U.S. Army rifle qualification standard against the performance of the last five recruit training companies that fired Table 1 aboard Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island (MCRD PI), and includes the scores from the 10.26 percent who initially failed to qualify. The U.S. Army rifle qualification course of fire requires 23 hits (out of 40) to qualify.2 In this study, the average number of hits per Marine recruit, for the first 40 rounds, was 26.68, albeit on much smaller targets and at greater distances.

The Department of Defense recently conducted a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) to establish the combat effectiveness requirements for rifle marksmanship. The standards for target engagement were defined in terms of “probability of incapacitation given a shot,” “range,” and “time.”3 Given that the specified target surface areas on the Marine Corps course are considerably smaller, hits recorded by Marine recruits should represent incapacitating hits. For the task “Engage Threat Personnel With Small Arms Fire, From 201 to 500m [Meters],” the requirement established was greater than or equal to 50 percent probability of incapacitation per shot. Marine recruits achieved 62.86 percent incapacitating hits from 200 to 500 yards, all unsupported and with iron sights. The CBA further determined that “[U.S. Army soldiers] lack the ability to achieve desired accuracy and incapacitating effects against personnel targets at ranges from 0 to 500m.” Based on postcombat surveys, 10 percent of the cumulative distribution of personnel targets engaged across all types of terrain are at ranges of 400m or greater. In Afghanistan there have been units that have completed very kinetic deployments whose direct fire engagements were all at distances of 500m or greater. The Marine Corps is the only Service that conducts marksmanship training beyond 300m for all personnel.

The advocates for change wish to replace our FRM course with an automated hit-or-miss course like those used by the U.S. Army. The key justifications offered for this proposal deal with relevancy and money. Some would have us accept that we should tailor our fundamental marksmanship training to meet contemporary combat environments and emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). And, assuredly, these ranges could be built with the money we would save by not having to pay Marines to pull manual target carriages.4

While the performance requirements of a Marine in a short-range urban fight (for example) may not be well replicated during an FRM course, neither can they be positively addressed by altering the FRM course of fire. Our fundamental rifle course of fire was never intended to replicate combat conditions, nor should it. The course is designed to isolate the fundamentals—to train and sustain a foundation of skills upon which all other marksmanship training is built. While there is absolutely a requirement for advanced levels of marksmanship training, this training must remain separate and subsequent to our FRM. Some of what might work well in the streets of Iraq would likely not be as useful when reacting to a long-range direct fire ambush in eastern Afghanistan. We must not allow our marksmanship program to be tailored to any specific combat environment; we must not allow emerging TTP to alter our FRM. Furthermore, the salary we pay our (primarily first-term) Marines to pull target carriages is money well spent. While in the pits, Marines maintain their focus on the training at hand, and they develop a keen ability to determine the direction and proximity of high-powered projectiles passing overhead—an important skill they would otherwise not have an opportunity to train to until they experience combat.

SMEs

Within the last few years, two of our four marksmanship MOSs have been eliminated. In 2007 the Marine Corps closed the Small Arms Weapons Instructor School (SAWIS). Small arms weapons instructors were the preeminent small arms trainers for the Marine Corps. Senior sergeants and SNCOs from all fields could advance from previous experiences as marksmanship coaches or primary marksmanship instructors and attend this arduous school to learn how to plan, implement, and supervise all small arms training in support of their units’ mission requirements. Small arms weapons instructors possessed the practical leadership and technical skills required to develop and execute detailed and comprehensive small arms training plans. SAWIS was created in 1988 in conjunction with its British Royal Marine counterpart—the platoon weapons instructors. In fact, SAWIS was the reason the U.S. Marine Corps and Royal Marines initiated a weapons instructor exchange program that we maintain to this day, only now our British platoon weapons instructors work exclusively at the Sniper School in Quantico. There were 714 billets coded specifically for Marines with the additional MOS of small arms weapons instructor, and many more Marines with this qualification had long served in this capacity for the many disparate commands throughout the Marine Corps. When this specialty was discarded, there was nothing created to replace it.

In 2009 the Marine Corps eliminated the range officer MOS. For decades range officers had been the stewards of our marksmanship program—the intrinsic marksmanship subject matter experts (SMEs). Infantry weapons officers are now responsible for our marksmanship program. Some of the former range officers were allowed to convert into the infantry weapons officer field; some moved into other MOSs or retired; none remain in their former billets. The feeder population for our marksmanship SMEs is now only 3 percent of its former size. There are presently 23,762 Marines on active duty who would have met the rank and time in service eligibility requirements for selection as range officers;5 there are only 793 Marines who are eligible for selection as infantry weapons officers.6 Instead of casting our net across all occupational fields to find the Marines who have the most extensive backgrounds in marksmanship training programs and small arms competition, we now pull all of our marksmanship SMEs from an exclusive segment of one field, and we do not require them to have any experience in basic marksmanship instruction. I do not present these facts to denigrate our infantry weapons officers. Infantry weapons officers are tremendous experts within their field, and I’m certain that they will be able to adjust to their new responsibilities. My point is that they have not yet done so. Training infantry Marines in the employment of organic weapons is completely different than conducting entry-level marksmanship training. Their baseline has changed, and there will be a period of transition.

RCO

The rifle combat optic (RCO) fielding throughout the Marine Corps is almost complete. Rarely do Marines report for annual rifle training with an iron sight rifle. There have been two developments associated with this that have been the source of great consternation. First, knowledge of the sight (particularly for first-time RCO shooters) is poor overall. Second, most tests show that the average RCO score is higher than the average iron sight score by a statistically significant amount.7 While they may seem mutually contradictory, these two developments should not have come as a surprise to anyone. The advocates for change have seized on these developments as grounds to deliver their coup de grâce on our marksmanship program—eliminate iron sights at the entry level. There have been multiple studies commissioned to investigate the performance of the RCO and to evaluate our marksmanship training requirements. These studies have been hailed as proof-positive that iron sights must be eliminated at the entry-level sites. The data in these studies offer no such proof. In a 3-month survey of Camp Lejeune annual rifle training shooters preparing to fire Table 1a with the M16 and RCO, “iron sight confidence” had a greater correlation to rifle score than did “RCO knowledge” or “RCO confidence.” In fact, “previous qualification category” had the highest correlation.8 Marines who previously performed well with iron sights performed better with the RCO.
       
One study showed that 17 percent of RCO shooters do not receive RCO classes during preparatory training. Overall, preparatory training conducted by units is inconsistent; in some cases, it is not conducted at all.9 While there has been no increase in rifle range failures or combat ineffectiveness attributed to this condition, it is being exploited to further assert the need to remove iron sights from entry-level training for the purpose of “potentially reducing the learning curve for mastering the RCO.”10

This has been done before. In 1985 the British Royal Marines adopted the SA–80 service rifle mounted with the Sight Unit Small Arms Trilux (SUSAT) optic. When the SUSAT was introduced, iron sights were eliminated from their marksmanship training program. Within 1 year of teaching only the optic, the Royal Marines reverted back to conducting their initial marksmanship training with iron sights because of an observed degradation in their marksmanship skills. The SUSAT is introduced at a later point in their training cycle. The Royal Marines continue this practice today.
       
For the shooter, the greatest challenge of entry-level marksmanship is in realizing the correct relationship between the aiming eye, sights, and target and achieving that relationship consistently. The adjustable sighting system on our Service rifle allows the shooter to focus on a singular, correct sight picture. The ability to correctly apply a different aiming hold for the countless combinations of wind speed (and value) and range is a far more advanced skill than what should be taught to entry-level shooters.
       
There exists a misconception that the RCO alleviates our need to apply the fundamental of aiming, in the traditional sense (as with iron sights), and that we must “unteach” these skills in order to be effective with the RCO. If we unteach the importance of maintaining a consistent relationship between the aiming eye, sights, and target, if we unteach the importance of maintaining our focus on the aiming vertex (whether that be the front sight post or bullet-drop compensator (BDC)) and not the aim point, we will lose our ability to hit beyond 300 meters.
        
At maximum effective ranges a Marine will not hit his aim point if he is looking at it. He must keep his focus on the aiming vertex. When the human eye is focused on a point that is 600 meters away (even under four times magnification), it cannot appreciate the precise position of a separate object that is mere inches away. Conversely, when a Marine is focused on the BDC, he will know precisely where it is in relation to objects beyond. This discipline can only be properly trained initially with iron sights. A Marine who can apply the marksmanship fundamentals well with a Service rifle and iron sights will successfully apply the same principles with the RCO, M40 sniper rifle, M242 Bushmaster, etc.
       
What may be more compelling to some than the philosophical debate on how to apply the fundamental of aiming is the requirement for backup iron sights (BUIS). The maintenance history for the RCO shows that RCO failures in combat do occur. The combat maintenance rate for M4 RCOs alone ranges up to 14 percent per year (through 2009).11 This is not an acceptable level of risk. BUIS will continue to be a requirement for the Service rifle, both as a matter of Marine Corps Systems Command policy and as a matter of practicality. BUIS is a dual-aperture sighting system, just like the iron sights we were all trained on initially. Marines cannot be expected to effectively perform with a dual-aperture sighting system if they’ve never been trained on it. The entry-level training sites now maintain the last entirely iron sight marksmanship programs.

Rifle Scores Tied to Promotion/Performance Evaluation

Is the rifle range “unfair”? One study has declared that the variances one may encounter while on the rifle range make it so.12 Not everyone gets to fire a rifle; some have carbines. Sometimes Marines still qualify with iron sights, while others fire with the RCO. Perhaps there were Marines on a firing detail the previous week who had more pleasant weather. Some Marines may fire with their M203 attached. Some Marines have smaller bone structure and think they might shoot better with a collapsible stock. Should rifle qualification scores be removed from composite score computations for the sake of fairness? Should the performance evaluation system no longer include qualification scores either? If performance on the rifle range were removed from consideration for promotions, weaker shooters would become more competitive for promotions. This is not consistent with our ethos and does not serve to advance our collective focus on marksmanship.

Solutions

RCOs in entry-level training. The recruit depots can implement RCO training upon conclusion of Table 2 firing. Due to recent curriculum realignment, MCRD PI could implement an RCO training package with minimal adjustments to the recruit training schedule. This training could include classes, zeroing, known-distance live fire confirmation, and unknown-distance live fire. The recruits could keep the RCOs on their weapons for their last 3 weeks of training, culminating with a squad live fire attack during the Crucible. This would give the Schools of Infantry a head start, allowing them to advance the RCO training they administer. Additionally, this would require far fewer units to be maintained at the recruit depots (60 percent fewer RCOs than what would be required to issue out for the full cycle of training). The Basic Officer Course already implements RCO training upon conclusion of Table 2 (no change required). Tables 1 and 2 must remain strictly iron sight programs at the entry level.
       
Marksmanship proponent. The Commanding Officer, Weapons Training Battalion, Quantico, should remain the marksmanship coordinator for the Marine Corps, and the Marksmanship Programs Management Section should be fully staffed and remain collocated with the Precision Weapons Section, the Marine Corps Shooting Team, and the Academics Management Section for Lead Schools.
       
SAWIS. Every battalion, group, and squadron should have at least one small arms weapons instructor. If we were still producing these trainers we likely would not be deliberating over why much of the Operating Forces are doing a poor job of training their Marines on the RCO. This school must be reinstated.

Conclusion

Infantry weapons officers have now just begun to assume positions previously held by range officers. So while our infantry weapons officers are still developing the requisite expertise to manage our Corps’ most precious of standards, our focus must remain on preserving that standard rather than fundamentally altering it on the cusp of this very critical transition. The advocates for change to our marksmanship program should focus their experimentation on Table 2 (Basic Combat Rifle Marksmanship), Table 3 (Intermediate Combat Rifle Marksmanship), and Table 4 (Advanced Combat Rifle Marksmanship) and leave Table 1 intact.

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Notes:
1. Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, NAVMC 3500.18A, Marine Corps Common Skills (Vol 1) Training and Readiness Manual (Short Title: MCCS (Vol 1) T&R Manual), Washington, DC, 16 December 2009.

2. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3–22.9, Rifle Marksmanship, Washington, DC, April 2003, p. 6–11.

3. Operations Analysis Division (OAD), Battlefield Standards for Marksmanship and Training Implications Study, Quantico, 10 November 2009, p. 5.

4. OAD, Rifle Combat Optic (RCO) Training Study, Final Report, Quantico, 25 February 2010, Appendix H.

5. The Operational Data Store Enterprise (ODSE) is an Oracle database that represents the current snapshot of all of the data in the Marine Corps total force system. It is updated on a cyclic basis and provides the user, through the Cognos Impromptu Application, access to easily retrievable data for analysis and reporting. See also Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1412.9B, (SecNavInst 1412.9B), Marine Corps Limited Duty Officer and Warrant Officer Programs, Promotions, and Continuation Procedures, 7 February 2006, paragraph 4.

6. ODSE, SecNavInst 1412.9B, and Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Bulletin 1040, Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) Enlisted to Warrant Officer (WO) Gunner Selection Board, with Change 1, 4 June 2010, MarAdmin 317/10, paragraph 1.

7. OAD, Rifle Combat Optic (RCO), pp. 16–17.

8. Ibid., Table 5–4.

9. Ibid., p. 46.

10. Ibid., p. 47.

11. Ibid., Figure D–3.

12. OAD, Battlefield Standards, p. 20.