‘Yankee’ and ‘Zulu’

Quietly and smoothly the H–1 upgrades program has gained significant, positive momentum within the last 18 months. The UH–1Y achieved initial operational capability (IOC) on 8 August 2008, obtained a full rate production (FRP) decision on 17 September 2008, returned from a successful deployment with the 13th MEU on 31 July 2009, and deployed again in full squadron strength to Afghanistan in October 2009. The AH–1Z achieved all of the outlined “exit criteria” established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition Technologies and Logistics, and began its final operational evaluation (OpEval) in March and IOC in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 (FY11). All of these achievements warrant another look at the program, its progress, and its path toward the future.

Commonality

The benefits of having 84 percent commonality of major components between H–1 upgrades aircraft would seem obvious. However, because the UH–1Y and AH–1Z (referred to by the Marines as the “Yankee” and “Zulu,” respectively) aircraft have largely been scheduled to field sequentially rather than simultaneously, these aircraft are operationally maintained and employed within the same Marine light attack helicopter (HMLA) squadrons, each of which are assigned 18 AH–1s and 9 UH–1s. Marines have already demonstrated the benefits of H–1 upgrades commonality within the test and training squadrons, with HMLAT–303 removing a tail boom from an AH–1Z (which was being used to verify maintenance publications) and reinstalling it on a UH–1Y that was needed in support of the training schedule. With such a high degree of commonality there is a sizable reduction in both the ground support equipment footprint and the number of disparate spare parts required in the supply system. Numerous efficiencies appear in logistical supportability, especially considering that HMLAs are structured to deploy as detachments and constantly do so in support of MEUs and during distributed operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

UH–1Y Venom

The original H–1 upgrades plan was to procure the AH–1Z and UH–1Y at the same 2:1 ratio as they are assigned within the Operating Forces. The UH–1N’s participation in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), however, forced a shift in that strategy, as those conflicts highlighted the diminishing capabilities and safety margin offered by the 34-year-old Huey. In fact, if the UH–1N were loaded with the same payload and fuel that the UH–1Y can support at 129 nautical miles combat radius (with 10 minutes in the objective area, a 5-minute midmission hover out of ground effect, and a 20-minute fuel reserve), the UH–1N would not even be able to take off, let alone provide any mission support. With such low power available to the older UH–1N’s pilots and aircrew, their ability to provide offensive air and utility support to the ground combat element (GCE) is even more degraded at higher altitudes and at locations with unimproved landing surfaces, preventing crews from being able to fly out of “brownout” or other degraded visual environment conditions. The resultant procurement strategy, named “Yankee Forward,” takes every opportunity to accelerate replacement of the UH–1N and ensures that all pilots, aircrew, and maintenance Marines transition in concert with the new fielding effort.

With the vast increases in mission capabilities offered by the UH–1Y (see Figure 1), crews are no longer faced with having to compromise a particular aspect of payload, fuel, or ordnance to execute an assigned mission. Instead, the UH–1Y is now able to support the entire spectrum of utility helicopter missions, and its T700–401C engines give it the power to perform these missions under high, hot, and heavy conditions. UH–1Y pilots who recently deployed with the 13th MEU insisted that the aircraft had more weight-carrying capability at higher altitudes than did the Marine Corps’ legacy medium-lift workhorse, the CH–46E.

The summer 2009 deployment of the UH–1Y with the 13th MEU was a resounding success. With a small detachment of three aircraft operating with a still maturing supply system, the aircraft were able to achieve a mission capable rating of 78 percent and never dropped a “frag” throughout the deployment. Instead of being tasked with supporting OIF or OEF, the MEU was assigned to conduct antipiracy operations off the coast of Somali with Combined Task Force 151. With a section of aircraft constantly on alert status, the UH–1Y often flew in mixed sections with the AH–1W, was directly involved in the capture of seven pirates, and played a key role in the high-profile rescue of Capt Richard Phillips of the Maersk Alabama. The UH–1Y’s increased power and decreased vibrations made it the platform of choice for snipers conducting antipiracy operations.

Though only 22 of the 123 UH–1Ys have fielded thus far, efforts to enhance its capabilities are already underway. The nine UH–1Ys that will be deploying in support of OEF this fall have been outfitted with the new Brite Star Block II Electro Optical/Infrared Sensor (forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system), Northrop Grumman’s Gen II+ Mission Computer, Thales’ Optimized TopOwl Helmet Mounted Sight and Display, and a new aircraft software load. Six of the nine aircraft have been fitted for satellite communications capability, which is especially useful in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The Brite Star Block II sensor houses an advanced third-generation FLIR, integrated infrared pointer, color charged couple device television (CCDTV) camera, and a sensor “fusion” mode, which combines FLIR and CCDTV into one image. Brite Star Block II sensors on UH–1N aircraft were “forward fitted” to the UH–1Y as the legacy Huey began sundown in January.

Additionally, the deploying squadron has been outfitted with three command and control kits. These kits will enable ground commanders, forward air controllers, and air officers the ability to connect their organic AN/PRC–117 radios and remotely operated video enhanced/videoscout receivers directly into externally mounted antennas, thereby increasing their communications ranges and enabling them to send and receive full motion video so that situational awareness can be maintained during airborne operations.

The UH–1Y’s participation in OEF was a driving factor in the decision to accelerate integration of the advanced precision kill weapons system (APKWS) onto the aircraft. APKWS pairs a 2.75-inch rocket with a semiactive laser seeker to provide a precision guidance capability to a weapon previously restricted to area targets. Though the AH–1W has been designated as the “threshold” aircraft for IOC of the APKWS, efforts to test APKWS on the UH–1Y will occur in parallel such that both will be capable of firing the laser guided rocket early in FY11.

AH–1Z Viper

An additional benefit to the Yankee Forward strategy was that the acceleration of UH–1Y procurement provided additional time to work on the complex integration efforts required of the AH–1Z. The constrained schedule leading up to the AH–1Z’s second OpEval prevented the ability to conduct a deliberate test-fly-fix cycle dedicated to fixing system anomalies. Under Col Harry “H-Man” Hewson’s direction, PMA–276 (Marine Corps Light Attack Helicopter Program Office) created a fully encompassing, phased approach—dubbed “Zulu Path Forward”—to ensure that all aspects of AH–1Z anomaly testing were accomplished. The plan also included both the flexibility and white space required to avoid the schedule constraints encountered during previous test periods. With full buy-in from both the test community and industry, Zulu Path Forward’s holistic, systems-engineering approach began to yield unprecedented progress almost immediately.

The biggest challenges facing the AH–1Z related to its target sight system (TSS). Since the targeting sensor is the heart and soul of any attack helicopter, ensuring the proper operation of the TSS was the major priority for test. Though TSS has extremely high detection/recognition/identification ranges and is likely the best sensor on the battlefield, if it couldn’t be integrated into the AH–1Z’s architecture so that aircrews could accurately direct all of the AH–1Z’s weapons, the capabilities that separate the TSS from other sensors just wouldn’t matter.

The issues have been resolved. Lockheed Martin worked hand in hand with PMA–276 and the test community to ensure that software loads, both within the TSS itself and in the aircraft’s operational flight program (OFP), contained requisite fixes to problems with the system. The latest aircraft series OFP, Software Configuration Set 5.0, eliminated reticle jump during target tracking and engagement. Integrated testing of the TSS during the risk reduction phase was so successful that the head of the integrated test review called it a “best practice” and deemed TSS as low risk going forward to OpEval. Lockheed Martin delivered the first production TSS 2 months ahead of schedule and is delivering each subsequent unit approximately 1 month early.

Early fielding and distribution has been beneficial not only for AH–1Z testing and training in preparation for OpEval, but also for the Marine Corps KC–130J community. TSSs were lent to help develop the KC–130J “Harvest Hawk” initiative, a sensor and weapons kit that will provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in addition to the KC–130’s primary aerial refueling role.

Fifty-eight of the 226 AH–1Z’s procurement objective will be “Zulu build new” (ZBN) aircraft, while the other 168 aircraft will be “remanufactured” AH–1Ws from the existing fleet. Original plans called for a total of 100 UH–1Ys and 180 AH–1Zs, which would have fully outfitted all of the 8 HMLA squadrons and the training squadron and test squadrons, and would have provided requisite “pipe” and backup aircraft. Those numbers, however, changed when plans were unveiled to increase the Marine Corps’ end strength to 202,000. Three new active duty HMLA squadrons were added, and one Reserve squadron was removed from service to ensure that the Marine Corps’ attack and utility components maintained pace with changes in the larger GCE.

After initially attempting to remanufacture UH–1Ns into UH–1Ys, the Marine Corps realized that the age and condition of legacy Hueys necessitated that all UH–1Ys be build new configuration. The 18-year-old AH–1W, however, can still be used as the base upon which the AH–1Z is produced. Since there aren’t enough AH–1Ws available for remanufacture into 226 AH–1Zs, the 58 ZBN aircraft will make up the difference.

The Corps’ growth to 202,000 and the remanufacturing of AH–1Ws pose special challenges to the HMLA community. Though the remanufacturing process saves the Marine Corps money by reusing many components from the AH–1Ws (which are rebuilt to zero time standard), there will be an approximately 2-year time elapse between the time an AH–1W is removed from the flight line for induction into “reman” until an AH–1Z is delivered back to the Operating Forces. During that interim, HMLA squadrons are forced to operate with a shortfall of attack helicopter assets. The shortfall is further exacerbated by the addition of the three active duty squadrons previously mentioned, as those squadrons will be outfitted with personnel at a rate well ahead of initial AH–1Z deliveries. Squadrons that would normally be assigned 18 AH–1s will be forced to operate with an average of 12 aircraft between FY13 and FY17. Once the AH–1Z has achieved an FRP decision, the Marine Corps will look closely at increasing ZBNs above the current plan of 58 to help mitigate the expected shortfall.

The Future for H–1 Upgrades

Another great benefit to the commonality between the UH–1Y and AH–1Z is the efficiencies gained by upgrading the aircraft with new capabilities. The large differences between the AH–1W and UH–1N required completely separate engineering and test efforts to develop and incorporate enhancements for each aircraft. Now, with such similar aircraft architecture, initiatives to add capabilities on H–1 upgrades aircraft occur simultaneously. Every major upgrade “roadmapped” into the future will be incorporated into both airframes, including a digital terrain elevation data level II digital map system, variable message format digital aided close air support capability, blue force situational awareness, the ability to send and receive full motion video to other aircraft and ground units, and integration of a laser spot tracker on each of the aircraft sensors. These aircraft are employed together in combat and should therefore share the same technologies and information to better support their common mission sets as well complement each aircraft’s unique capabilities.