The Amphibious Dilemma

by F G Hoffman - published February 1993

The series of historical analyses written by Maj Jon T. Huffman over the last several editions, as well as Col Gordon D. Batcheller's superb Schulze Memorial Essay piece (MCG, Nov92), raise serious questions about the status of amphibious operations. It is not an understatement to assert that the future well being of the Corps lies in addressing the challenges described by these authors.

In the August 1992 Gazette, Maj Hoffman provided an overview of Operation WATCHTOWER and contrasted the relatively easy landing on the main island of Guadalcanal with the costly supporting assaults on Gavutu and Tanambogo. He finds distinct similarities between the current state of amphibious assault capabilities today and those existing in 1941. In 1941, thanks to the collective genius of a few intellectuals at Quantico and in the fleet, we had the doctrine, but little of the hardware and firepower necessary to execute full-scale assaults against serious opposition. Maj Hoffman finds the same situation today, given the large number of nations with advanced weaponry that could thwart an assault. I agree with this historical analogy.

In light of the sharp decline in defense spending, Maj Hoffman properly questions the Marine Corps' ability to continue seeking technological and modernization solutions to preserve a forcible-entry capability and anticipates the "early budgetary death" of the advanced amphibious assault vehicle program. He believes the "only reasonable approach lies in doctrine and tactics"-a view that can be read as an endorsement for maneuver warfare.

In a subsequent effort, covering the Army's Operation TORCH and the seizure of North Africa (MCG, Dec92), he contrasted the Army's night landing and employment of surprise with the Marine Corps' reliance on firepower to overwhelm enemy defenses. Adding fuel to the debate, he stated that "secure in the knowledge that they were right, Marines have never looked back." In concluding, Maj Hoffman suggests we look at technology differently:

Instead of using it as a bigger stick to beat the enemy harder in the same old way, it could be a lever that catapults us to a new level of doctrine.

I partly agree with Maj Hoffman that there is a "gap between old weapons and ideas that no longer work and new ideas that are still beyond practical implementation." However, I see the glass half full-or as Col Batcheller phrased it, the quiver half fulland based on the new direction taken by our senior leadership, " . . . From the Sea" (MCG, Nov92), believe that we are on the way to filling that quiver.

Col Batcheller paints a pessimistic picture about where we stand. He deals harshly with the Navy for having lost the strategic forcible-entry look it once possessed. He disparages both maneuver warfare and any excessive reliance on technology as a "high-risk, high-tech" panacea without place in the harsh reality of combat operations. The one common point he shares with Maj Hoffman is that he believes there is no reason to expect that resources will be made available to remedy our deficiencies.

My position falls somewhere between these two gentlemen. Eliminating the gap between current capability and operational imperatives will require both the bold application of maneuver warfare that Maj Hoffman advocates and the hardware acquisitions that both authors believe to be beyond our reach.

The resource picture may look bleak, but that does not excuse current Marines from fighting for what the Nation requires. The biggest dilemma facing our Corps is convincing our superiors in the Pentagon and our elected leadership in Congress that the Marine Corps' roles and capabilities are not built on sand, the sands of the bloody beaches of World War II. Many of our critics confuse our enthusiasm for the V-22 Osprey and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle with a fixed mindset about replaying those costly campaigns.

Contrary to Maj Hoffman's comments about "the old way," modern day Marines are not myopically stuck on the assault concepts of the Pacific. The body of literature in professional journals like the Gazette over the past decade has focused on new ideas, such as the over-the-horizon concept, to ensure that assault operations are conducted to avoid enemy strongpoints and to achieve decisive operational objectives appropriate to the given situation. The new phrase "Operational Maneuver From the Sea" (regrettably "OMFTS" does not sing) captures this intent better than simply amphibious assault.

In this vein, I have found great value in Maj Hoffman's historically based assessments. There is a legitimate role for a robust assault capability in the Marine Corps, but we must remind ourselves that the assault is not an end in itself. Clausewitz reminds us that "it is a crude error to equate attack with the idea of assault alone." Like airborne assault, amphibious assault is only a delivery means, and we should not confuse the ship-to-shore movement or crossing the beach itself with the ultimate end-the accomplishment of an assigned campaign objective.

Maj Hoffman's erudite reviews of Operations WATCHTOWER and TORCH reinforce this broader point and highlight the diverse ways in which strategic and operational factors influence the application of amphibious operations. Speed, surprise, and bold exploitation can destroy enemy forces and secure amphibious task force objectives just as decisively as the bloodiest frontal assaults. We have always, in my mind, had the mental and doctrinal flexibility to search for and apply innovation when the situation warrants it

However, a "full quiver" of arrows also mandates the ability to secure objectives when the situation is not optimal and when some opposition can be expected. The supporting operations during WATCHTOWER support the view that sometimes the overall situation does not allow a leisurely buildup of combat power ashore without opposition. Our objective in the next decade should be to ensure that Marines have the means to conduct these operations when and where necessary. We should not have to rely on chance, favorable terrain, or the enemy's inattention.

This assumes that the hardware is available. We need to ensure that, as Col Batcheller so aptly put it, reality keeps pace with rhetoric and that the direction verbalized in " . . . From the Sea" is translated into force structure, modernization, and budget changes in both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

The debate should not be polarized into one of "old school" and "new school" or attrition versus maneuver warfare. Modern-day proponents of forcible entry are not "attritionists" bound to the frontal assaults of World War II. Nor is maneuver doctrine inappropriate for the Marine Corps' primary role. However, as Col Batcheller points out, many new ideas remain unproven and are not necessarily consistent with the reality of our profession. Those envisioning successful operations without need for firepower, technological advantage, or risk against an opponent have few historical antecedents to draw on. We shouldn't delude ourselves. Col Batcheller put it best; deception of the enemy is great, "but to deceive oneself is to court disaster."

We need to do what is required to successfully project power from the sea and then win on the battlefield. That requires both the audacity and cunning of maneuver warfare, and the application of technology and raw combat power that remain as valid requirements for warfare in the 21st century. As the Nation's rapid response force, it is necessary that we have the capability, as the Commandant has put it, to "knock down the door" on occasion.

The crucial component of the new operational concept for naval operations, Operational Maneuver From the Sea, is the continuous and seamless transition of combat power from the sea, through the ship-to-shore phase, and into the rapid prosecution of the expeditionary campaign. It is this capability and this goal that should hold our attention and guide our efforts.

The September editorial in the Gazette underscored the need for Marines to remain focused on their fundamental contribution to national security. The key role that the Nation requires of her Corps of Marines is forcible entry, "the projection of power from the sea into hostile areas against active resistance." This need not necessarily engender visions of bloated bodies afloat in the surf of Tarawa, nor should it be construed as mindless advocacy for a modern-day Antietam.

In the roles and missions debate that is sure to engulf the new Administration, Marines should remain focused singularly on their association with the Navy and its unique contributions to the Nation. Trying to sell ourselves off as "cheap" in terms of resource requirements may result in finding ourselves technologically and operationally irrelevant.