Observations from the combat service support element of the 24th MEU.

The threat in the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (24th MEU’s) North Babil area of operations (AO) was a conglomeration of various factions representing Sunni and Shia, former regime elements, homegrown and foreign Wahabbist/Salafist extremists, criminal thugs, dirt poor farmers scratching out an existence, and hardcore foreign fighters. As such, there was no “silver bullet,” clear-cut single menace within the AO. Rather, there were numerous threats whose specific goals often overlapped. However, the one consistent characteristic these disparate groups shared was their desire to see coalition forces (CF) fail in their mission to bring stability to this highly volatile region of Iraq.

These factions do not discriminate as to which U.S. forces they want to kill in their desire to defeat us. They do seek to attack us at our weakest points. This is where the old adage that every Marine is a rifleman comes into play. Insurgents recognize that for our U.S. Army counterparts, combat service support (CSS) units are not trained to the same level as combat arms soldiers. For CSS Marines, infantry tactics are also not the main focus of training, but due to our Marine Corps warfighting philosophy, we are prepared to fight when given the opportunity.

The CSS role traditionally has been a rear area mission dismissed by combat arms as a noncombat arms administrative mission. As Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) transitioned from a fluid, traditional maneuver war, the role of CSS changed. Convoy missions have become some of the most dangerous operations carried out in Iraq.

In OIF I insurgents learned the hard way that to tangle with U.S. forces head-on was a quick way to die. CF are no longer fighting a national army; they are fighting an insurgency operation. The goal of the insurgents is not to defeat CF forces in direct engagements. Their goal is to inflict enough casualties to break the will of U.S. and multinational forces. They do not have to win; they just have to live to fight another day.

The North Babil AO
In the North Babil AO there are few highway options for convoys to use in order to complete their tasks of CSS. The two main arteries that link North Babil to Baghdad and Fallujah are Highways 1 and 8 (known as Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa and Alternate Supply Route (ASR) Jackson, respectively). Both highways are two lanes in each direction, all-weather improved roads. ASR Jackson is open to civilian traffic, but due to its high rate of insurgent activity, CF does not use it for CSS purposes. Paradoxically, MSR Tampa was closed to civilian traffic due to the numerous destroyed bridges and in order for CF to better secure it for military use. Beyond those two lines of communications the only other options available are the numerous canal roads that crisscross the farmlands that define that region of Iraq. However, due to the fact that they are narrow dirt roads not wide enough to accommodate anything larger than a HMWVV, and subject to flooding in the aftermath of rainstorms, they are not an option for anything other than mounted patrolling. In fact, the numerous canal roads, also known as dirty roads by the local population, are more of a hindrance to U.S. forces because they provide ingress and egress routes for insurgents.

In order to protect oneself and become a “hard target,” it is advisable to avoid any type of pattern. Times and routes should obviously be altered on a regular basis. As MSR Tampa is the only viable convoy route in North Babil, the only technique available to CF is to change times of departure and arrival of convoys. Even this step is not that effective as insurgents are able to conduct surveillance of camps very easily since many smaller roads surround the camps. Additionally, U.S. camps hire numerous foreign nationals from the local area. And while they are screened and vetted, their loyalties are questionable. Even if they have no anti-U.S. agenda, they are subject to greed or intimidation by insurgents. Insurgents also employ many techniques to alert their colleagues of approaching convoys. Anti-CF use cell phones, or Thuraya phones, to relay location and direction of convoys to their colleagues poised to attack. Using an even lower technological approach, insurgents have signal plans using flares, parachutes, or even the flashing of household lights to alert others of CF convoys.

With CSS routes practically written in stone, the only option available to minimize the establishment of patterns is to alter times of day that convoys conduct movements. In most areas throughout the theater, it is common practice for convoys to travel at night. The conventional wisdom is that U.S. forces have a technological advantage through their night vision capabilities; we “own the night.” Although this practice may work in other parts of Iraq, in North Babil, nighttime convoying is more dangerous. So altering times of convoy movements was not limited to day versus night. Rather, we avoided setting patterns by departing at different times in the morning and returning at different times at night. Due to the increased threat of attack at night, if there was a conflict of whether to alter the specific time of departure or arrival or to travel at night, we always favored daylight travel.

As soon as 24th MEU entered the AO it quickly found that if a convoy was to be targeted by insurgents it would by during nighttime. Although improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are used during the daytime in this AO, they are generally used along smaller routes that are being patrolled by HWMMVs. Along MSR Tampa it was very rare for IEDs to be struck during the daytime. This was likely due to the large amount of daytime vehicular traffic, the constant patrolling, and the greater visibility daylight provides CF personnel. However, due to the minimal traffic, observation was less likely to compromise insurgents setting up daytime IEDs along the secondary and canal roads.

Nighttime was a whole other situation. Although units patrol along MSR Tampa at night, the darkness and the canals that crisscross the area provide excellent cover and concealment for IED emplacers. Seeking to exploit our weaknesses, insurgents waited until patrols passed and emplaced their IEDs. Often patrols were able to spot the IEDs, and during 24th MEU’s tenure in the AO, the instances of IEDs being found surpassed the number of devices actuated.

Threats in the AO
The insurgents that U.S. forces find themselves fighting are looking to inflict the most damage possible with the best chances of survivability. And along those lines, the best way for insurgents to attack U.S. personnel is by creating the most damage with the least cost. The most effective means of conducting such missions is through the use of IEDs.

IEDs are therefore the biggest threats to convoys. IEDs are the preferred method of attack by insurgents for several reasons. First and foremost, they provide insurgents a large bang for the buck at a small cost. Two types of IEDs that convoys are most likely to encounter are victim activated and remote detonated. Both types of IEDs provide a good degree of standoff. Victim activated devices are emplaced by insurgents and rigged to go off as a result of a convoy tripping the wire or other triggering mechanism. In these types of devices, the insurgent exposes himself to potential observation and danger while implanting the device. However, once the device is set up, he can get out of the area quickly and avoid U.S. forces in the aftermath of the blast. So long as a convoy does not come along while he is placing the device, and if he is proficient at his trade, he has little to fear. Additionally, the IED man is most often not alone. He usually works with a partner or a team who provides early warning of any threats.

Remote control activated IEDs also leave a degree of standoff. They do require the triggerman to stay in the vicinity of the device in order to detonate it. The IED man can be several hundred meters from the actual ambush site. In the aftermath of the event he has to avoid detection as he egresses the area. Observation may come in the form of air support called in as a result of the event, or the deployment of troops who survive the blast as they sweep the area and cordon it off for an explosive ordnance disposal postblast investigation. Once again, although the triggerman still must avoid detection, this attack method is not nearly as dangerous and likely more effective than confronting a heavily armed convoy with a direct fire weapon.

IEDs do not only come in the form of roadside bombs, however. Vehicleborne IEDs (VBIEDs) are also a serious threat. VBIEDs can come in the form of a broken down vehicle on the side of the road that blows up as a convoy passes by, or the VBIED may be a moving vehicle with a suicide driver who drives into a convoy. (In this case the VBIED is called a suicide VBIED or SVBIED.) VBIEDs can often be more dangerous because they can carry large quantities of ordnance. Additionally, those with a suicide driver can allow insurgents to troll for targets of opportunity and more accurately target specific vehicles. They also provide an excellent psychological advantage, coupled with the fact that they often cause more casualties. During 24th MEU’s time in theater, the number of VBIEDs increased exponentially. Fortunately, as the number of incidents increased, their effectiveness against CF dropped dramatically from the summer to the fall of 2004. The drop in success was likely due to better situational awareness on the part of convoy personnel and their efforts to ensure adequate standoff of vehicles coming near them.

Although not as effective as IEDs, indirect fire (IDF) was another attack method used against convoys. IDF was not always used as a lone attack method; it was usually used in conjunction with enemy direct fire weapons, such as small arms and machinegun fire, as well as with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Although the combined arms approach to attacking convoys had the potential to be devastating, MEU Service Support Group 24 (MSSG–24) convoys suffered no killed in action and very few wounded in action to these types of complex attacks.

Most attacks on convoys that were not solely IED attacks usually commenced with some sort of explosion, either IED or mortar. Then they were usually followed by small arms and sometimes RPGs. Fortunately, the firepower available to the convoys was sufficient to lay down heavy fire and suppress the enemy with them having little effectiveness with their fires.

Once again, as survivability more than effectiveness was their emphasis when combating CF, insurgents often placed some sort of natural barrier or obstacle between themselves and the CF. Usually they were on the other side of a canal allowing them quick egress once they were overpowered with firepower. The canals often impeded HWMMVs and dismounted Marines from giving chase to kill the insurgents.

The North Babil Province of Iraq proved to be one of the AO’s most tenuous. Insurgents preferred to target what they considered to be less hard targets, such as convoys and CSS operations, rather than tangle with infantry forces face to face. The 24th MEU’s innate ability to integrate the elements of the Marine air-ground task force proved vital to their success in Iraq.

>Capt Meglathery served as the MSSG–24 intelligence officer based out of Camp Kalsu, Iraq. He is currently the intelligence officer for II MEF G–7 (Exercise and Training), Camp Lejeune.