Osprey Program Will Need Joint Public Affairs Office
by Maj Stewart T. Upton
Media reports on the program numbers are inconsistent, sources varied.
The revolutionary Osprey tiltrotor aircraft—that can take off and land like a helicopter but fly like an airplane—has a negative perception by the American public mostly because there exists no single fact checking organization responsible to monitor and respond to the media’s reporting on the Osprey. The Department of Defense (DoD) should direct and coordinate one single organization involved with the Osprey’s development to handle the oversight and release of information to the media. A single public relations cell is needed to coordinate a consistent release of information and to explain or research the information that is inconsistent. Inconsistent information happens because all of the answers are not solidified in the Marine Corps but with the Osprey’s many stakeholders, such as the aircraft’s makers, Textron Bell Helicopter and Boeing Company; their subsidiaries; congressional oversight committees; the Secretary of Defense and the Navy; U.S. Navy Testing and Evaluation—with congressional, DoD, and U.S. Navy budgeting (to name a few).
The hardest information to track in regard to trying to report on the Osprey involves finding accurate information on per aircraft or overall program costs, production numbers, scheduled deployment to the fleet, and congressional funding. Some media reporting examples illustrate the lack of consistency by various news organizations and their information sources:
- How much has been spent on the program so far?
- “During more than two decades and an investment of almost $20 billion by the government, the Osprey was heralded as a revolutionary aircraft.”1
- “Congress has yet to approve the 50.5 billion dollar program…”2
- “During more than two decades and an investment of almost $20 billion by the government, the Osprey was heralded as a revolutionary aircraft.”1
- How much will each aircraft cost?
- “V–22s, which cost $71 million apiece, have two wingtip rotors that swivel. The rotors are pointed upward to fly like a helicopter and forward to fly like an airplane.”3
- “The Pentagon this week gave Boeing Co. and Textron Inc.’s Bell Helicopter division the green light to start building 400 of the $100 million aircraft, 360 of which are slated for Marine units.”4
- “V–22s, which cost $71 million apiece, have two wingtip rotors that swivel. The rotors are pointed upward to fly like a helicopter and forward to fly like an airplane.”3
- How many Osprey aircraft will be produced per year?
- “The program wants to increase production from the current rate of 11 Ospreys a year to 16 aircraft in fiscal [year] [FY] 2007, 24 in FY ‘08 and ultimately a high of about 43 a year.”5
- “Production at Textron’s Bell Helicopter unit in Texas and Boeing’s Philadelphia plant would ramp up to 22 aircraft by 2009 and 48 by 2012, up from 16 this year.”6
- “The program wants to increase production from the current rate of 11 Ospreys a year to 16 aircraft in fiscal [year] [FY] 2007, 24 in FY ‘08 and ultimately a high of about 43 a year.”5
One consistent message that has not changed in the media’s reporting on the Osprey is that news organizations frequently use the word “troubled” when making reference to the V–22 Osprey aircraft or program in their reporting. More than 200 different organizations, issues, and people have been reported on involving the Osprey. With every new problem, issue, or change in top defense department leadership, the list continues to grow. With such a broad array of subjects—that mostly receive critical media reports in regard to the Osprey program—the average American only perceives a troubled aircraft and program. Confusion occurs when a person attempts to comprehend the program through the media’s reporting because their focus continues to change from one complicated or highly technological issue to another. With an unclear message, information, and a negative public perception, the Osprey program needs to provide communication that is clear at the very least. By doing so a breakdown of the complicated issues can take place and a positive perception may follow.
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| An MV–22 picking up an M198 howitzer during operation- al testing. (File photo.) |
Since the aircraft will be fielded by basically every Military Service, a joint public affairs office (JPAO) could be set up by the DoD. This cell would have not only the ability and power to require its authority for any and all release of information in regard to the program but to immediately notice and react to false or incorrect information being reported in the news. Subject matter JPAOs have been established by the military for wars or major operations. Their success is observed in their ability to be recognized by the media as the primary identifiable information source and the first or last place they call to ensure comment for their news reporting.
Ideally, the DoD could direct and coordinate one single Service or organization involved with the Osprey’s development to handle the oversight and release of information to the media. This point of contact could be either the U.S. Marine Corps as the Military Service or Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, where the aircraft’s first home is located (and other Military Services are beginning to establish their involvement in the Osprey program). A good example of this kind of arrangement is the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP) based out of Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico. The program and personnel are joint but designated to be led by the Marine Corps for the DoD. Information provided in response to news reporters’ queries and press releases in regard to the JNLWP comes from the PAO at MCB Quantico or from PAO, Headquarters Marine Corps. The similarities between this program and the Osprey include heavy congressional involvement, budgeting, and Service secretaries, as well as numerous contractors and subcontractors. The difference is the media coverage.
At the 2005 Paris Air Show, staffers for Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. and the Boeing Company were characterized by The Dallas Morning News as chastising reporters for bringing up the aircraft’s rocky past.7 The prominent media coverage of the Osprey is more than likely due to the many news values it possesses. Some of the Osprey’s news values are its oddity of being a hybrid aircraft, the conflict found on its many issues pertaining to the functionality of the new technologies in combat, investigations into the falsification of maintenance records, the cost, and the crashes. With 24-hour cable news networks and an array of tailored media outlets having an interest in covering the Osprey (such as software designers, engineers, aviation enthusiasts, military organizations and associations, for example) media coverage of the Osprey is expected to not only continue but to increase. It would behoove investors and supporters of the Osprey aircraft program to consolidate PA assets now when the opportunity presents itself and the program warrants it.
Notes
1. Pasztor, Andy and J. Lynn Lunsford, “Pentagon Clears Full Production for Osprey Aircraft,” Wall Street Journal, 29 September 2005.
2. Thompson, Estes, “Marine General Wants Osprey by 2007,” Associated Press, 13 July 2005.
3. Whittle, Richard, “One Giant Step for Tilt-Rotors,” The Dallas Morning News, 20 September 2005.
4. Mortenson, Darrin, “Troubled Osprey Could Fly Missions for Marines by ‘07,” North County (CA) Times, 1 October 2005.
5. Selinger, Marc, “V–22 Osprey Almost Done With Operational Evaluation,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 14 June 2005.
6. Capaccio, Tony, Textron-Boeing V–22 Is Effective, U.S. Tester Says, <http://www.Bloomberg.com>, 27 September 2005.
7. Fairbank, Katie, “V–22 Osprey Looks Like a Done Deal,” The Dallas Morning News, 19 June 2005.
>Maj Upton served as Director, PAO, MCAS New River from 1998–99 when the first Osprey training squadron was stood up. He has also served as the media officer for HMX–1 Testing and Evaluation from 1999–2001 and media officer at PAO HQMC from 2001–03. He is currently serving as the Director, PAO for MCAS Iwakuni.



