Fourth-Generation Warfare and Network-Centric Warfare
by Capt Richard J. McLoughlin
A formula for success in 21st century conflict.
“Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of the enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy—measured in decades rather than months or years.”—Col Thomas X. Hammes,
The Sling and the Stone
“NCW [network-centric warfare] is about human and organizational behavior. NCW is based on adopting a new way of thinking—network-centric thinking—and applying it to military operations. NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated from the effective linking or networking of the warfighting enterprise. It is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness that can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent. NCW supports speed of command—the conversion of superior information position to action. NCW is transparent to mission, force size, and geography. Furthermore, NCW has the potential to contribute to the coalescence of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. In brief, NCW is not narrowly about technology, but broadly about an emerging military response to the information age.”
—David Alberts, John Garstka, and Fredrick Stein,
Network Centric Warfare
The natural and common proclivity of people to rally themselves around theories and ideas to the exclusion of competing schools oftentimes has very dangerous consequences. This is particularly true when it comes to theories of war vying for acceptance in an era where the present and future are subject to sudden, violent, and abrupt changes. Since the nature, scope, and methods of contemporary, as well as potential, enemies can never be forecast with absolute certainty, it would be suicidal to embrace any single theory that fails to address the full range of possible adversaries and their capabilities. However, if instead of abject dismissal, competing schools of thought sought to incorporate and acknowledge the useful elements of their rivals, the end result could yield a far more powerful conclusion with greater application and broader acceptance.
With the aforementioned thought in mind, today there rages a serious and contentious debate. The principal rivals fall into two camps—4GW theorists against those of the NCW school of thought. Granted there are other philosophies that are threaded within the two camps, but for the sake of clarity the crux of the debate falls into the revised shoot and maneuver proponents versus the 21st century technophiles. This is an unfortunate state of affairs for the two are not necessarily at odds but rather complementary and symbiotic.
The consequence of this problem is the production of fiefdoms that fail to identify and extrapolate each school’s merits while discarding their respective weaknesses. To be sure, both 4GW and NCW theories have positives and negatives. However, the point of this article is to examine the value of each in hopes that the debate will shift from the all or nothing approach to one of a more unified and functional concept that will meet all national security challenges.
The Value of 4GW
4GW began as a theoretical question posed in the 1989 article, entitled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” by William S. Lind; COL Keith Nightengale, USA; Capt John Schmitt; COL Joseph Sutton, USA; and LtCol Gary Wilson, USMCR (MCG, Oct89). In this article the authors asked the critically important question of how war evolved and, more importantly, how it would change in the subsequent years. While they did not offer a prognosis, they did bring forth the concept that the critical aspects of generational iterations were the result of either ideas and/or technology. This is a crucial acknowledgement for it touches on the only two areas that are fully capable of meeting the evolutionary demands of modern warfare. It is also somewhat innocuous for ideas are typically emboldened or dependent upon technology for credibility. As an example, the theory of blitzkrieg could only be fulfilled by the requisite technology. Without these supporting factors, blitzkrieg would have been nothing more than a novel idea. Although the original authors may argue that storm troopers were innovative tactically, let us not forget that changes in maneuver can be easily dispatched if they are not backed up by the capital of platform, hence the supremacy of technology through the procreation of ideas.
In the decades following, others jumped aboard and began to speculate even further. Books, articles, and Internet blogs followed in suit, along with working definitions and possible solutions. Col Thomas X. Hammes, the latest in a long line of 4GW theorists, further defined 4GW in his seminal work The Sling and the Stone (Zenith Press, 2004), expanding upon the previous authors to include not only a working definition but, more importantly, a framework for consideration and execution. If nothing else, there is value in this because the idea of how 4GW is put into practice was articulated in a way that gives it clarity of concept.
So what utility can be garnered from the aforementioned definitions of 4GW? The answer is scenario- and contingency-based planning. The understanding that can be drawn from 4GW conclusions will yield planners a far more realistic and indepth array of possibilities that may or may not present themselves in the years to come. 4GW includes strategic, operational, and tactical innovations that have yet to be employed or historically demonstrated. As a theory it compels planners and commanders to rethink the full threat environment, particularly the most likely scenarios that the United States will face for at least the next several years.
Because the 4GW theorists’ position is descriptive in nature and reactive by definition, it lends substantial utility to their argument. It addresses the current state of engagements and also better argues for how to address decentralized nonstate adversaries, such as terrorists and insurgents. As long as America and the free world are forced to engage Islamic radicals and other asymmetric threats, we will need to militarily react in order to mitigate these threats rather than shape them by using new technologies as the sole preemptive measure. This is not to suggest that technology cannot be augmented into the fight but rather that technology—as a means to address future threats—may not be the proper impetus in the current model of conflict. What matters here with respect to technology is its application and how it can be integrated into the current system as a means to provide immediate advantage. Thus, by definition, 4GW proponents attempt to see the world as it is currently framed, seeking to solve contemporary problems with what is readily available rather than what is possible.
While 4GW proponents began with the right questions, and even suggested the proper starting point of technology from which to find viable solutions, these considerations are disproportionate when addressing potential conflicts with China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran. It is here that their theory begins to lose some of its luster, for 4GW is ill equipped to sufficiently address either a stronger force or a more technologically advanced opponent. This isn’t to suggest that conventional opponents will not incorporate 4GW strategies. They will, however, avoid 4GW as the primary model upon which their operations are conducted. To be sure, guerrilla and asymmetric strategies have a place within conventional engagements, but they will never be the prime focus, and it is here that NCW must take the lead in regard to future plans and force disposition.
The Value of NCW
Before one can effectively argue for or against NCW, it is necessary to ask the question as to whether or not technology, and specifically information technology, can be considered a revolution in military affairs (RMA). First, what is meant by RMA? Quite simply, and at its most basic level, RMA is the introduction of some entity that forever alters the conduct and disposition of war. This entity may be a platform, doctrine, system, or simply an idea. But if we consider for a moment why war is such a costly endeavor against the backdrop of RMA, then we can see that technology has the potential to be revolutionary.
The reason war is such a burden to humanity results from three key elements. The first being the moral question in terms of human cost through lives lost and those affected. The second element is the financial and resource intensity of waging war. War is a costly enterprise. And finally, the issue of time always surfaces as a significant factor. War, after all, is time-intensive. However, if any one of these elements can be mitigated, let alone all three, then whatever that mitigated factor is can be defined as revolutionary. There can be no doubt that technology has the potential to reduce the amount of casualties using precision munitions, not to mention reducing war’s cost by streamlining processes and expediting conflict resolution. This is where technology has the potential to be classified as a true RMA, and it is with this concept in mind that NCW should be analyzed.
NCW promises faster cycle times in all areas of the fight, from planning through execution. It also promises a scope and depth heretofore unseen through knowledge extrapolation and conflict coverage. Finally, it fosters a seamless interaction of warfighting components permitting them to be augmented as necessary. But like any concept, the assumed advantage must first be validated and refined in an honest environment that demands full exposure.
Arguably the best justification for NCW implementation rests upon the current agendas and conventional capabilities of potential adversaries. It is no mystery that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are all moving swiftly to modernize, advance, and supplement their forces by harnessing the awesome technological promise that exists today. Additionally, they are likely taking our very own capabilities, along with their own experimental technologies, and progressing down the evolutionary path. This progression is clearly manifest in the information warfare battalions already in existence in many of these countries, but also compounded by the open source, multinational corporate environment. It is here that 4GW fails and NCW succeeds, because it would be strategic suicide to address only asymmetric threats and actions without also looking beyond the horizon to likely encounters in the years to come. One need look no further than the transition from the small wars that dominated the 1920s and 1930s segueing into the ultimate worldwide fight of World War II for proof that what is contemporarily applicable is quickly rendered obsolete. Furthermore, it is blatantly apparent that information technology is being adopted by all—regardless of warfighting philosophy.
Similar to the overnight transformation of 19th century naval forces from wooden based to steel based—rendering many of the great navies obsolete—so too does the potential of information technology weigh upon conventional forces. The gargantuan growth, commercial availability, and universal adoption of technology throughout the world has today become a reality available to all those willing to invest the capital and time, regardless of agendas. A daily review of The Wall Street Journal or any other leading business periodical will confirm the assertion that innovations are no longer the strict purview of the U.S. military-industrial complex but have instead become the sole dominion of private industry, often with little or no national allegiance. While this is good for the world’s economy, it also places American military forces in a highly vulnerable position. Therefore, NCW must be considered as the logical response since it alone seeks out viable solutions from which to address technological challenges all too likely to surface in the years to come.
With regard to the current array of asymmetric threats, NCW also has something to contribute. Since these forces clearly employ both modern and antiquated technology in order to exploit the weaknesses in our current platform, perhaps NCW can bring fresh thinking that will yield faster results. The increasing occurrence of nonstate military threats using commercial off-the-shelf technology as a central part of their platform demands new technological solutions. This will neutralize those threats in arenas and venues not available politically and/or physically to conventional forces. It must be accepted that technology is necessary if conventional forces are to effectively swarm and eliminate a nondescript and fluid threat, such as those seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Granted, this would be in conjunction with the standard array of tools, such as human intelligence, but technology is one of the bigger force multipliers available. Again, this is predicated on a promise from tomorrow but certainly warrants consideration today. When coupled with 4GW concepts, the two schools of thought may prove to exhaust all possible avenues available to the enemy.
There is no question that information technology, as has been demonstrated in the last several decades, enhances our ability to effectively wage war. The ability to communicate, target, supply, transport, shift, mass effects, precisely engage, navigate, manage, and conduct operations through to conclusion has been without historical equal. Yet, the force structure has barely even begun to tap into the vast promise of technology. This is unfortunate, and although certainly a function of cost, it is also very much a function of culture. Yet, we would be wise to remember that there is also a huge distance delineating the vision of technology and its application. It is here that NCW needs to be reigned in until fail-safe measures can be introduced that allow for contingencies in the event of failure. Therefore, when the lofty, albeit laudable, goals of NCW fail to meet the demands placed upon it, then 4GW concepts can act in support until the requisite solutions are fielded.
Disposition and Solution
As an organization we must face the fundamental truth that the prosecution of war requires many different capabilities. The nature of war as conducted on land is often a far different venture than that which is prosecuted at sea, or for that matter in the air, in space, or economically. Therefore, it is incumbent upon planners to fully assess all potential venues and adversaries. The requirements for sustaining naval and air superiority are more in line with the NCW school of thought than they are with 4GW, if for no other reason than the technological dependency required to operate at sea and in the air. Land forces, on the other hand, require both NCW and 4GW if they are to meet the full spectrum of challenges that face the Nation. It is absolutely critical to success that insurgents, as well as traditional conventional forces enhanced with technology, be considered and addressed with the appropriate platforms. America must be prepared to engage a violent and dispersed asymmetric foe while at the same time being prepared to meet a fully functional combined arms opponent. If this goal is to be achieved then we must jettison the fiefdom thinking that permeates all echelons and be far more pragmatic in our philosophy and planning.
4GW correctly approaches the situation in the analytical sense of identifying how the current enemy approaches war, while NCW focuses on setting trends by seeking ways to harness technology as an agent for uncontestable change. If both concepts are coalesced, then there can be no question as to the power of the final product—a product that is prepared for both today and tomorrow, and one that is worthy of the challenge.
If we are to continue to have martial success then we must come to terms with the development of a common philosophy. This philosophy should be objective in nature, realistic, and tempered by historical, quantifiable, and verifiable models. The key here is to reconcile the present with the future. Both 4GW and NCW have something to contribute and should be synthesized, thus parlaying the strengths of each into a stronger, more unified model. Suffice it to say that at very least we need to acknowledge the following:
- Technology is a tool and at best only a partial solution but potentially strong enough to offset traditional advantage.
- “Commander’s intent” must never be replaced, and it is imperative that decisionmakers at all levels be identified, respected, and incorporated into the NCW platform. This is crucial when considering NCW for it holds the potential to have all levels of war centrally managed. Operational and tactical situations should never be managed from the White House or Pentagon, only aided by them.
- The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is by definition asymmetric and requires a counterguerrilla strategy that NCW currently fails to sufficiently address.
- Technology will be used by the insurgents and terrorists wherever it proves itself effective.
- Technology with military application is becoming increasingly available to the average consumer around the world, including terrorists, insurgents, and states with the desire and capital.
- Technological and tactical solutions must be sought to neutralize the insurgent threat.
- There still exists the very real possibility that conventional war may break out with a larger and more capable country. This war will be prosecuted very differently than the GWOT scenarios and requires a sophisticated organization that 4GW fails to satisfy. It can be argued, however, that 4GW may also be employed concurrently with conventional operations.
- NCW is possible but requires a phased approach with a healthy respect for its weaknesses.
- The NCW platform must be installed parallel to the current system with fail-safe contingencies always on the ready.
- All theories must be opened to criticism and unbiased verification and subject to periodic and independent scrutiny.
- Technological development is no longer driven and dominated by the military-industrial complex but, instead, is now driven by the private sector. As a result, technology is essentially open for purchase and understanding to most interested parties.
- Preservation of the “chain of command” is vital, regardless of whether that is in a horizontal (4GW) or vertical engagement (NCW).
4GW may have a better handle on where the best short-term investments should be made, but these investments should also be hedged by the long-term solutions proposed by NCW. As a result, technology and its application must be viewed from two separate but equally important trains of thought. First, we must approach technology from the vantage point of response in so far as we employ it to solve the current problems. Subsequent to that, we must also approach technology from the position that it can forever alter how war is fought in a disruptive sense. In other words, how can technology shape the battlefield so that future engagements are compelled to move in the direction that we define? If technology can increase speed, scope, and depth to such an extent that all conventional forces are ill equipped to defend against it, and at the same time also neutralize insurgent methods, then the promise will have been fulfilled. It is with this idea in mind that the debate should begin.
>Capt McLoughlin is the Officer in Charge, Navy Marine Corps Intranet Training Detachment, San Diego/Marine Corps Network Operations and Security Command Operations Liaison Officer.
