Command Religious Program
by LT Michael E. Foskett, USN
An important asset for overcoming a critical vulnerability in counterinsurgency operations.
“When religious and spiritual values are challenged during the chaos of combat, Service members may lose sight of the inner resources that sustain them. Service members can then become targets of fear, despair, hopelessness, and eventually, combat stress casualties. They are also at risk for committing misconduct stress behaviors. Chaplains are a source of direction and stability to Service members experiencing these dilemmas and seeking to refocus their personal beliefs and spiritual values.”(Emphasis added.)—Marine Corps Reference Publication 6–11, Combat Stress
The insurgency that the Navy-Marine Team faces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is a blend of the old and the new. Unchanged is the insurgents’ extreme interpretation of Islam that commands them to kill the “crusaders”—man, woman, or child—at any location, by any means necessary. This strategy has been in play for many years, with greater and greater success. What is new is their ability to manipulate the global media in hopes of winning a strategic victory that they could never win tactically. They have learned (the hard way) that to engage Marines at the tactical level leads to certain defeat. What they have resorted to is twofold. First, inflict a steady stream of casualties that is reported by the media. Second, “bait” Marines and sailors thru ethically asymmetric warfare to operate outside of their rules of engagement (ROE), capture it on film, and expose these acts through the media as an example of common war “atrocities” rather than isolated (and unauthorized) acts. Their hope is that a steady stream of casualties, coupled with media coverage of frequent American war atrocities, will negatively affect the center of gravity—the will of the American people to support security and stability operations in Iraq.
I would like to focus on the latter of the insurgent’s twofold strategy and argue that when this baiting of Marines and sailors is successful it highlights a critical vulnerability—the Marine’s and sailor’s moral and psychological fortitude to maintain ROE against a determined enemy in an ethically asymmetric environment. This critical vulnerability in a counterinsurgency (CoIn) environment tends to erode. Strong moral leadership, coupled with a command-supported command religious program (CRP) can effectively mitigate this critical vulnerability. Therefore, while the CRP should not become the main effort of the unit, it should be recognized as a complementing component to strategic mission accomplishment.
Actual CoIn events in OIF II demonstrate this critical vulnerability; e.g, the common experience of a Marine convoy being hit by an improvised explosive device (IED). When friendly casualties occur, Marines instinctively respond by attempting to close with and destroy the enemy. It was common for this author to hear Marines describe the rage that welled up inside them as they learned that one of their brothers had been wounded or killed. This rage was fueled by cultural distance1 and lex talionis—the natural human tendency to respond to an offender in the same manner that one was injured. Yet many times there was no outlet for this rage because the enemy could not be found due to remote detonation of the IED. There usually were, however, other Iraqis in the area who may or may not have had anything to do with the IED. It is only by strong moral and psychological fortitude that these Marines and sailors maintained their ROE and did not vent their rage into the local population. Had they failed to maintain their moral and psychological fortitude—in this case, had they killed noncombatants—it would have most likely had negative strategic ramifications, especially if captured by the media. The mistreatment of Abu Ghraib prisoners by soldiers of the 800th Military Police Brigade shows the negative impact at the strategic level when this critical vulnerability fails. The subsequent investigation clearly revealed that a large part of the problem was failure of strong moral leadership at many levels.2 But an ineffective chaplain (and an ineffective CRP) also contributed significantly to this failure by not inspiring moral ideals throughout the brigade.3 The cumulative impact of a few soldiers operating outside of their ROE resulted in a major public outcry in both Arab nations and America.
The natural tendency for this critical vulnerability is to degrade over time due to the nature of CoIn operations. In OIF I living conditions were difficult, but the difficulties and losses in battle were compensated by victory in battle and the gratefulness of the many freed Iraqis. For most involved in OIF II the physical living conditions of a firm base provided a standard of living far better than that experienced by participants in OIF I. Yet Marines and sailors in OIF II bear a psychological and moral load unique to CoIn operations. Marines and sailors of OIF II must frequently deal with the frustration of being unable to close with and destroy the enemy due to insurgents’ standoff tactics and their ability to hide among the local population. The frustration over American casualties is not usually offset by victory in battle, since victory in CoIn operations does not show itself in the taking of a city or the surrender of troops but in much more subtle ways—people choosing to solve problems politically rather than violently, the lessening of indirect attacks on military installations, local markets filled with people even after dark, the city police and Iraqi Security Forces becoming more competent, etc. Many of the Iraqis have grown indifferent to the American military presence. This indifference is construed by many Marines and sailors to mean that they are not wanted and their sacrifices are not appreciated. Thus the cumulative effect of lack of obvious victories, an Iraqi population that is mostly indifferent, an intense operational tempo, and mounting casualties creates an environment ripe for erosion of this critical vulnerability within the individual Marine and sailor.4
In order to mitigate the erosion of this critical vulnerability, commanders should actively engage in a full-spectrum approach that impacts the Marine’s and sailor’s mind, body, and spirit. Strong moral leadership at all levels is essential, but for many this leadership is not enough. Spiritual maintenance to mitigate this critical vulnerability is also needed. An effective CRP can help mitigate this critical vulnerability by complementing strong moral leadership in multiple ways.
One way an effective CRP helps to mitigate this critical vulnerability is by urging the Marine/sailor to contemplate the higher meaning of what he does. For example, the Christian Scriptures teach that every act is an act of service to God, not just acts done in church (1 Corinthians 10:31). This theme—to do the right thing out of religious duty—is not just a Christian theme; it is a theme that runs through most major world religions. Thus when the Marine or sailor is tempted to grow complacent on patrol or to stray outside of his ROE, this temptation is checked by his deeply held religious convictions.
Another way effective CRP helps to mitigate this critical vulnerability is by upholding the principle of human dignity, whether friend or foe. A common and necessary technique used by Marines and sailors to overcome the natural reluctance of killing another human being is to dehumanize the enemy. Marine Corps training methods aid in this dehumanization process.5 But this dehumanizing process, if not countered by strong religious/moral values, can lead down the “slippery slope” to war atrocities. Most world religions can prevent this slippery slope by teaching that all men and women have inherent worth simply because they reflect the image of their Creator. For example, in the Jewish Scriptures, God tells Noah that whoever kills a human being will themselves be killed, because every human being is of immense value since they reflect the very image of God (Genesis 9:5–6).
The cathartic affect of confessing and expressing negative emotions generated by CoIn operations is another way that an effective CRP helps to mitigate this critical vulnerability. One of the key ingredients in preventing and undoing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is for the traumatized individual to be able to confess his negative emotions to God and to others.6 The National Center for PTSD states that “telling one’s story (the ‘trauma narrative’) and directly facing the grief, anxiety, and guilt related to trauma enables many survivors to cope with their symptoms, memories, and other aspects of their lives.”7 Yet most Marines and sailors are reluctant to open up to psychiatrists because they fear being labeled as weak or because of perceived negative repercussions on their careers.8 Most religious services have built-in means that encourage this expression in nonthreatening ways. For example, a typical Protestant service will have a time of corporate prayer where one is free to share prayer requests with the expectation that it is a safe place to share and that he will be prayed for. Many other Protestant services have written prayers of confession as part of their format. For Catholics it is customary to be given the chance before or after mass for individual confession with a priest. It is commonly understood that religious services are for those in spiritual need, and they are formatted to meet this need. Additionally, all Navy chaplains are trained to facilitate critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) that helps Marines/sailors process traumatic experiences. Moreover, chaplains provide confidential counseling. The net result of religious services, CISD, and personal counseling is a Marine/sailor that is recharged spiritually and emotionally to continue to maintain his ROE in an ethically asymmetric CoIn.
If a commander has accepted the premise of this article, what must be done by the commander? Before entering into theater, the commander must make the recruitment and development of lay leaders a priority, especially those of faith groups outside of the unit chaplain’s faith group. The chaplain should be given ample time and resources needed to train all lay leaders.9 Unfortunately, the time when this lay leader training is most profitable is usually when the unit is most busy (2 to 3 months prior to deployment). This timing will undoubtedly mean that lay leader training will be competing with many of the other requirements of getting the unit “out the door.” However, well-qualified and well-trained lay leaders are force multipliers within a unit since they can help mitigate this critical vulnerability when the chaplain is not available or the chaplain is of a different faith group. A lesson that I learned is that lay leaders should be selected on the basis that they have the maturity to handle the sacred function of lay leader and that they be stationed where they are needed or have the freedom to travel.
In theater the commander must realize that religious expression for most of his Marines and sailors needs a corporate forum. It is common knowledge that free exercise of religious expression is a constitutional right. Yet, what is not understood by many commanders is that for most religious communities this constitutional right can only find adequate expression in a group setting that is led by a chaplain or a lay leader. In fact, the chaplain corps continues to exist as a government-funded entity (in spite of constitutional challenges) for this very reason—to provide the free exercise of religion to servicemembers when they are deployed “to areas of the world where religions of their own denomination [are] not available to them.”10 Implicit in this court ruling (Katcoff v. Marsh) is that servicemembers be afforded the regular opportunity by their commands to voluntarily attend worship services. For example, a Catholic cannot participate in Holy Communion (a key component in Catholic religious expression) unless there is a Catholic priest or a Eucharistic lay leader leading the mass/lay leader service. It is not enough for a commander to allow his Marine/sailor to study his sacred Scriptures and pray on his free time. The commander should make it clear to his subordinates that adequate religious expression by his troops is a priority. Marines and sailors should be given regular opportunities to attend religious services and not face recrimination of any kind—spoken or unspoken. It is then the chaplain’s responsibility to work with the operations section to schedule services at times suitable to the mission—multiple services, if need be. After all, as it is said in the chaplain corps, “every day is Sunday.”
In no way am I suggesting that the CRP become the main effort of the unit. Commanders cannot allow religious practice and expression to supercede tactical and strategic end states. The chaplain should understand and achieve the commander’s intent not vice versa. Yet as our Nation applies the full spectrum of its assets against defeating terrorism, commanders should likewise take a full-spectrum approach to mitigate against this critical vulnerability, since its failure—especially if it is captured by the media—will result in a negative impact at the strategic level. Mitigation requires strong moral leadership at all levels. But for many—especially the millennial generation whose spirituality is strong—strong leadership is not enough.11 An effective, command-supported CRP complements strong moral leadership to mitigate against the erosion of a Marine’s or sailor’s moral and psychological fortitude to maintain his ROE against a determined enemy in an ethically asymmetric environment.
Notes
1. The cultural differences between Middle Eastern culture and American culture are significant, and for most Marines and sailors, there is little opportunity to narrow these differences through cross-cultural experiences simply due to force protection issues. These differences, coupled with the nature of the guerrilla conflict (the difficulty of telling friend from foe), leads to many Marines and sailors distancing themselves emotionally and psychologically from most Iraqis. Most are viewed with suspicion. For more research done on emotional distance, see LtCol Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Little, Brown, and Co., New York, 1995, pp. 160–164.
2. Schlesinger, James R., et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations, Arlington, VA: 200, p. 75.
3. Mansfield, Stephen, The Faith of the American Soldier, The Penguin Group, New York, 2005, pp.154–155.
4. Grossman, pp. 83–85. I believe LtCol Grossman is correct when he surmises that the well of fortitude can be depleted. Marines and sailors involved in CoIn operations usually do not taste the victories on the battlefield that would replenish them, only the losses.
5. Allow me to clarify what I mean by a “necessary” dehumanization process. It is the training needed to overcome the reluctance to kill another human being in combat if called upon to do so, and no more. For example, firing at human silhouettes vice “bull’s eye” targets at the rifle range trains the Marine to instinctively engage a human silhouette in combat. This dehumanization does not mean that the shooter experiences no remorse for the killing of another; it simply means that he is able to perform his duty when called upon by his leaders to do so. For more a detailed discussion on the dehumanization process, see Grossman.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the therapeutic value of confession and emotional outpouring with individuals suffering from PTSD, see Dr. Jonathon Shay’s Odysseus in America, Scribner, New York, 2002, pp. 164–179.
7. “Treatment of PTSD: A National Center for PTSD Facts Sheet,” available at http://www.ncptsd.va.gov/facts/treatment/fs_treatment.html.
8. Zucchino, David, “Marine to Marine,” Los Angeles Times, 31 July 2005.
9. While the time requirement for training lay leaders varies from chaplain to chaplain, it is not excessive (4 to 8 hours). The training that is key for Catholic lay leaders is to learn how to properly lead a Catholic lay leader service and handle the Eucharist (Catholic communion). The costs for lay leader training are also acceptable; few resources are needed.
10. See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1985).
11. This essentially is the premise of Stephen Mansfield’s The Faith of the American Soldier and has certainly been my experience as a chaplain during OIF II. Although the millennial generation tends to be more eclectic in their approach to religion than that of previous generations, they are still very spiritually attentive and desire a corporate forum for spiritual expression.
>LT Foskett served as an enlisted Marine—light armored vehicle crewman—in the Marine Corps Reserve from 1988 to 1996 and was activated for Operation DESERT STORM. As a chaplain he served with 2d Bn, 7th Mar for 3 years, deploying to Okinawa for 10 months and to OIF II for 7 months. He is currently assigned as the Chaplain, Marine Barracks, 8th and I.
