Coalition Joint Task Force 635
by LTC Christopher A. Field, Australian Army
The regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands, Camp Ramsi, Honiara,
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 22 December 2004–25 January 2005.
“May this memorial endure the ravages of time until the wind, rain and
tropical storms wear away its face, but never its memories.”
—Guadalcanal American Memorial,
Honiara, Solomon Islands
In the early hours of 22 December 2004, an Australian Federal Police Protective Services officer was murdered by sniper fire in Honiara, Guadalcanal while conducting a vehicle patrol with the Australian-led regional assistance mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Company A (Co A), 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, Ready Company Group (1 RAR RCG) was alerted that same day, and 100 men, vehicles, and equipment arrived by 3 Royal Australian Air Force C–130 aircraft in the Solomon Islands within 18 hours of the Australian Government’s decision to support RAMSI through the reinforcement of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) Operation ANODE.1
The Co A, 1 RAR RCG rapid deployment on Operation ANODE demonstrated the inherent utility and flexibility of light infantry by rapidly deploying forces into an unfamiliar and complex environment, assuming command of a 5-nation coalition joint task force (CJTF), working in support of an 11-nation participating police force (PPF),2 and quickly demonstrating Australian Government resolve to support the continued success of RAMSI.
This article aims to provide a brief background about RAMSI and Operation ANODE, broadly discuss capabilities of the Ready Battalion Group (RBG)/RCG, and describe operations conducted by the 1 RAR RCG between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 while deployed to the Solomon Islands.
RAMSI Background
The Solomon Islands were granted independence from Britain in 1978 and remained largely peaceful until significant ethnic-based violence erupted in late 1998. In 2000 Australia and New Zealand assisted a cease-fire that led to the signing of the Townsville Peace Accords in October 2000 and the deployment of an unarmed international peace monitoring team until June 2002. In 2003 the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) were unable to contain rising lawlessness, and in July 2003 the Solomon Islands Prime Minister requested assistance from the Australian Prime Minister and a “strengthened assistance” mission was planned.
On 24 July 2003, CJTF–635 was established in the Solomon Islands. CJTF–635 was established as part of the ADF Operation ANODE and was Australia’s commitment to the regional strengthened assistance mission, Operation HELPEM FREN. The overall force of civilians, police, and military was named the RAMSI. This structuring represented a new and unique model of regional intervention using the full complement of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military assets in a coordinated “whole of government” approach. The RAMSI aim was to prevent the Solomon Islands from descending into a “failed state” without appearing neocolonialist.3
At the height of RAMSI there were almost 1,800 joint and coalition military from five nations—Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Tonga—in support of over 200 participating police. Significantly, although the military was the largest contingent, it was the supporting agency to the 11-nation PPF.
By December 2004 Operation ANODE had been reduced in size, and CJTF–635 consisted of the CJTF headquarters and a platoon of infantry from New Zealand. The mission of the CJTF remained to support the 11-nation PPF.
Capabilities of the RBG and the RCG
The RBG comprises soldiers from all but two of the corps in the Australian Army and is responsible for providing two capabilities for the ADF.4 First, the RBG, at a permanently short notice to move, conducts infantry battalion group land operations in order to defeat the enemy in close combat through maintaining high-level proficiencies in complex terrain operations,5 peacemaking, peacekeeping, and evacuation operations. Second, the RBG provides a subelement of combat power, in the form of the RCG, at a notice to move that is significantly less than the RBG, again to conduct infantry company group/combat team land operations in order to defeat the enemy in close combat. The key elements of the RBG/RCG—command and control (C2), combat maneuver, combat service support, and offensive fire support (see Figure 1)—are task organized according to missions assigned.
Figure 1. The key elements of the RBG/RCG.
In December 2004 the 1 RAR Battalion Group was providing the ADF’s RBG capability, and Co A, 1 RAR Group was providing the core of the RCG. For Co A, 1 RAR RCG to deploy to the Solomon Islands within 18 hours of the Australian Government’s decision to support RAMSI, significant training was required during 2004. This training included 1 RAR’s assumption of RBG status in April 2004; RBG callout and assessment, Exercise EVEREADY BLUE, August 2004; 3d Brigade amphibious and airborne Exercise SWIFT EAGLE, September 2004; and the Co A, RCG callout and embarking on HMAS Kanimbla (L 51) in early December 2004. Co A, RCG continued to train during the Christmas 2004 3d Brigade reduced tempo period, enabling rapid recall and readiness currency, especially with regard to shooting skills.
Operations During 22 December 2004 to 25 January 2005
The mission of the 1 RAR RCG was to provide military security support to the PPF in order to reinforce the maintenance of law and order in the Solomon Islands. Operations by the 1 RAR RCG in the Solomon Islands between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 were based on three interrelated premises: (1) the existing Operation ANODE CJTF–635 was to be reinforced in order to strengthen the ADF’s support to RAMSI, (2) the security environment in the Solomon Islands was to be rapidly and professionally enhanced, and (3) the 1 RAR RCG deployment was to be effects-based, and measures were to be immediately developed in order to assess the impact that the deployment was having in the Solomon Islands.
Premise one: reinforcement of RAMSI. The three interrelated premises required two comprehensive actions by the 1 RAR RCG. First, the C2 of CJTF–635 needed to be firmly arranged to account for a triple increase of in-theater troop numbers. (See Figure 2.) Second, the 1 RAR RCG required the amendment of CJTF–635 procedures with regard to intelligence targeting and collection, methods of movement and maneuver throughout the Solomon Islands, logistics arrangements within the CJTF and between the CJTF and RAMSI, and significant enhancements to CJTF force protection.
Figure 2. C2 of CJTF–635 and the command relationship with RAMSI,6 December 2004–January 2005.
Prior to the arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, CJTF–635 had been commanded by an Australian Army major, who was the CJTF commander and Military Adviser to the Special Coordinator, RAMSI, Mr. James Bailey. Upon arrival in the Solomon Islands of the Commanding Officer (CO), 1 RAR, the Australian major assumed the sole role of military adviser to RAMSI, while CO, 1 RAR assumed command of CJTF–635.
CJTF–635 has, from the inception of RAMSI, developed a supporting/supported relationship with the PPF. In December 2004 the chief of the PPF was Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Sandi Peisley. Fortunately, during 2004 CJTF–635 had extensively rehearsed the operation of supporting/supported C2 relationships with the Royal Australian Navy’s Amphibious Task Group during numerous amphibious training exercises.7 In essence, supporting/supported C2 relationships require “special emphasis…to task grouping, economy, and coordination between parallel chains of command.”8 The 1 RAR RCG quickly understood the requirement to be the supporting element of RAMSI in order to ensure that the PPF produced the most credible effect in the Solomon Islands in the wake of the murder of an Australian police officer.
Premise two: rapid and professional enhancement of the security environment. With C2 measures in place, the 1 RAR RCG, combined with the New Zealand platoon from 2d Battalion, 1st Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, commenced increasing the tempo of patrolling in the Solomon Islands. This was a corporal’s operation, and the 12 section commanders, with their well-trained soldiers, displayed their calm professionalism and superb patrolling skills during the 34-day deployment.
It was the corporals from Australia and New Zealand who commanded all of the patrols in support of the RAMSI PPF. It was the corporals who performed more than 300 tasks in support of the PPF, including foot and mobile patrols, supporting special response and investigative operations, conducting provincial patrols, and providing a quick response to assist any high-value search operations. It was the corporals who allowed the CJTF to accurately target intelligence and collection assets. It was the corporals who used their warfighting patrolling skills in a peace supporting manner in order to dominate the battlespace so that criminal elements in the Solomon Islands either went to ground or were arrested. It was the corporals who made the logistics arrangements—which have always been complicated by the harsh terrain and climate of the Solomon Islands—work every day, with few complaints and zero failures. It was the corporals who continued to train their soldiers, especially in shooting skills, in order to maintain the operational edge for the 1 RAR RCG. It was the corporals who integrated new ADF technologies, such as the outstanding personal role radio, into a new, complex, and demanding operating environment. It was the corporals who ensured that previous failures in CJTF–635 force protection methods were not repeated. The corporals supported and shepherded their PPF charges in accordance with the police patrolling needs in an absolutely professional and faultless manner.
Premise three: the 1 RAR RCG deployment as an effects-based operation (EBO). EBOs9 for the 1 RAR RCG and CJTF–635 were supported by a daily joint targeting board (JTB) that was implemented by CO, 1 RAR upon arrival in the Solomon Islands. The daily JTB fused intelligence gained by the CJTF with PPF intelligence in order to target areas for CJTF/PPF patrolling. Upon arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, every CJTF patrol was in support of the PPF, and every CJTF patrol was against targets developed by the JTB. The CJTF’s 12 sections were not sufficient to allow wasted or misdirected patrol efforts.
The daily JTB allowed CJTF–635 to synchronise operations in support of the PPF. The PPF campaign plan, after the deployment of the RCG, was to quickly eliminate the need for additional military support to RAMSI, and return RAMSI to pre-22 December 2004 levels of force protection. In addition, the PPF had the longer term goal of turning police operations in the Solomon Islands over to the RSIP in order to ensure that law and order in the Solomon Islands was controlled by the Solomon Island people. The daily JTB allowed CJTF–635 to quickly tailor tactical operations to support PPF campaign goals. The daily JTB ensured excellent communications between the PPF tactical operators and the CJTF tactical operators, particularly the police and soldiers on patrol. Most importantly the daily JTB enabled the following tactics, techniques, and procedures to be developed between the PPF and CJTF–635: developing a joint patrol roster, pairing CJTF–635 section commanders with PPF shift supervisors, aligning the CJTF–635 patrol timings with PPF patrol shifts, supporting all RAMSI patrolling with intelligence assets, and aligning PPF/CJTF community relations tasks with the operational need.
Conclusion
Co A, 1 RAR RCG deployment in support of the RAMSI represented a significant achievement for the ADF. The RCG was directed to reinforce Australia’s and the Pacific region’s efforts in support of the Government of the Solomon Islands. This reinforcement occurred with speed and professional acumen, supported by an effects-based campaign plan. As this article is written, RAMSI is continuing as a most successful regional peacekeeping effort.
Notes
1. The primary operation name for the ADF contribution to RAMSI is Operation ANODE. For non-Australian elements the operation name is Operation HELPEM FREN. The New Zealand operation name is Operation RATA II.
2. Eleven-nation PPF: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
3. Background material on the Solomon Islands and RAMSI has been sourced from LTCOL J.J. Frewen, CO, 2 RAR, “Restoring Peace to the Solomon Islands,” Australian Infantry Magazine, October 2004, pp. 37–41.
4. The two corps not included in the RBG are the Australian Army Aviation Corps and the Royal Australian Army Education Corps. That said, the RCG maintains a habitual relationship with the Australian Army’s 5th Aviation Regiment also located in Townsville, Australia.
5. Complex terrain operations include the jungle, the littorals, open country, and the urban battlespace.
6. CJTF–635 headquarters staff coordinated the CJTF–635 combat functions of intelligence targeting and collection, methods of movement and maneuver throughout the Solomon Islands, logistics arrangements within the CJTF and between the CJTF and RAMSI, and enhancements to CJTF force protection.
7. Supported commander is defined as a commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. Supporting commander is defined as a commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or develops a supporting plan. Land Warfare Doctrine 3–3–7, The Employment of Infantry, 2005 (Draft), Glossary, p. xxvii.
8. ADF Doctrine Publication, Operations Series, Amphibious Operations, ADDP 3.2, February 2003, p. 3.5.
9. EBO is the application of military and other capabilities to realize specific, desired tactical, operational, and strategic outcomes in peace and war. In EBO, planning focuses on the effects that a force is trying to achieve. The ADF’s aspiration for EBO includes further integration/interaction with other national agencies, the development of an effects-based planning process, and the development of a more sophisticated understanding among a wider range of people of the structure and culture of other countries, Department of Defence, Force 2020, Office of Public Affairs and Corporate Communication, June 2002, p. 22.
>LTC Field is the CO, 1 RAR RBG in Townsville, Australia. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and School of Advanced Warfighting.
