Discussion Guide for MCDP 1 Warfighting

[Sean Griffin]

If you are interested in discussing MCDP 1 Warfighting - on the required reading list for Privates, Privates First Class, Lance Corporals,Officer Candidates and Midshipmen, here's a baker's dozen discussion topics sent to the Professional Reading Program by an infantry Marine.
1. What is the nature of war? What does this really mean to the rifleman, squad leader, or platoon commander?
2. Define the levels of war. MCDP-1 shows two Venn diagrams depicting the relationship between the levels of war. What is different about these diagrams and to which types of war does each apply?
3. Define attrition warfare and maneuver warfare. Which style has the United States typically pursued?
4. What are some common misperceptions regarding maneuver warfare?
5. Is maneuver warfare applicable at the squad and platoon level? If so, how?
6. Does technology impact the way we fight?
7. What is combat power?
8. Of offense and defense, which is the stronger form of combat?
9. What is a mission type order?
10. Describe base unit tactics? Why do we use them?
11. Why do we designate a main effort?
12. What is commander’s intent and why is it important?
13. Why is judgment critical to maneuver warfare?
I'll post the answers this Marine provided later.
Semper Fi - Director Marine Corps Professional Reading Program

[Sean Griffin]

The first question from my previous post (MCDP 1 discussion topics provided by an infantry Marine) came with the following suggested response:

1. What is the nature of war? What does this really mean to the rifleman, squad leader, or platoon commander?

War is described as fluid, chaotic, violent. Words like friction and fog also characterize war. These terms, however, are just words on the page unless one thinks about what it really means for the individual soldier or Marine. Numerous written accounts, as well as our own individual experiences on the battlefield, add depth. War means fighting, and fighting means death or injury, fatigue, confusion, frustration. War means seeing your friends killed or maimed. War means pushing through fear to accomplish the mission at hand.

This has significant implications for us off of the battlefield as well. We endeavor to make our training as realistic as possible so that we may be prepared for the chaos and friction of war. With significant effort, we could remove the chaos from training. We could ensure that vehicles show up on time, that communications work well, that each Marine is well-rested and fed, that plans are well-made and understood by all, and that sufficient supervision is applied to ensure mission accomplishment at all levels. We have the assets to accomplish this but we do not and we must not. We train with friction because no amount of effort will remove that factor from the battlefield. We must learn to embrace friction, to learn to expect it and to deal with it on the individual and unit levels. The implication is that we will operate in that environment better than our opponent can. If this turns out not to be true, then we will fail in battle. (MCDP 1 pages 1-20)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

11. Why do we designate a main effort?

The main effort is commonly referred to as the leader’s “bid for success.” We designate a main effort in order to help subordinates focus on their portion of the mission. For example, a platoon commander designates one squad as the main effort and the others as supporting efforts. The tasking statement for the main effort will look a lot like the mission statement for the platoon. The tasking statements for the supporting efforts will focus on allowing the main effort to accomplish its mission.
Typically the main effort is “weighted” in some way. This means that additional assets not organic to that unit will be assigned to it. This could be something tangible (fire support asset, assault team, etc) or intangible (priority in the prep for combat cycle, leadership in the form of the platoon commander himself).

(MCDP 1 pages 91-92)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the process of posing and answering MCDP 1 Discussion Topics started today.

2. Define the levels of war. MCDP-1 (pages 29 and 31) shows two Venn diagrams depicting the relationship between the levels of war. What is different about these diagrams and to which types of war does each apply?

The tactical level of war is defined as the art and science of winning battles and individual engagements.
The operational level of war is the art and science of winning campaigns.
The strategic level of war is the pursuit of policy objectives through the use of military force.
In the first Venn diagram (page 29) the tactical level and the strategic levels overlap with the operational level but not with each other. The implication is that actions at the tactical level do not directly influence the strategic level. This model is typically applied to conventional warfare.
In the second diagram (page 31), the circles are compressed and the tactical level does overlap the strategic level. MCDP-1 gives two examples of when this might apply—nuclear war and Irregular Warfare (IW). In both of these cases decisions made at the tactical level would directly influence policy objectives.
This is easy to see in the case of nuclear war. A nuclear weapon employed in a particular battle would most likely affect the course of the whole war, as the only case of nuclear employment in history has demonstrated.
This is also true for IW (aka counterinsurgency). Because the indigenous population is both the battlefield and the objective of IW, actions at the tactical level, which is where the only real contact with the population is happening, necessarily affect policy goals.
The temptation is to think that is because of the media. However, the media is only a catalyst. The widespread and near-instantaneous dissemination of information through various media outlets today only hastens the reaction that would happen anyway. Numerous so-called small wars in our nations history prove this. For example, despite the lack of telephones, satellite television, and the internet, as well as vigorous censorship on the part of military and civilian authorities, harsh US methods versus Filipino guerrillas and the Philippine population following the US war with Spain (1898) severely affected American sentiment. Reports of this, in turn, severely affected military morale in the Philippines and also nearly led to the election of the Democrat William Jennings Bryan, who ran on an anti-imperialist platform. (MCDP 1 pages 28-32)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

12. What is commander’s intent and why is it important?

Commander’s intent is the leader’s vision of what the situation will look like at the completion of the mission. This can be expressed in one of several formats. A common way to express intent is through endstate. The leader describes what a snapshot of the battlefield should look like upon completion of the mission with regard to friendly locations and capabilities, enemy locations and capabilities, and/or the terrain.
Commander’s intent is critical because it both allows and establishes the boundaries for subordinate initiative. Leaders should assume that “Plan A” will not work for some reason, and that subordinates will need to find another way. The commander’s intent ensures that actions taken by subordinates in the absence of specific orders will still contribute to mission success.

(MCDP 1 pages 89-91)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:
3. Define attrition warfare and maneuver warfare. Which style has the United States typically pursued?

Attrition warfare seeks the incremental destruction of the enemy. It is characterized by a focus on numbers of troops, trucks, tanks, planes, etc available to each side.

Maneuver warfare seeks to cause the systemic failure of the enemy. Rather than focusing on numbers, the goal is to identify a critical component of the enemy system and destroy it, which in turn causes the enemy to collapse. Leaders are trained to look at what makes the enemy strong (center of gravity), what makes him weak (critical vulnerability), and develop a plan to exploit the weakness without becoming exposed to the strength. Other words commonly associated with maneuver warfare are “surfaces” and “gaps.”

The United States has typically pursued a strategy of attrition. Despite our doctrine, some believe that this continues to be true to this day. Consider the preoccupation with body counts and numbers of weapons captured versus the true metrics of success in irregular warfare (governance, economic factors, rule of law). (MCDP 1 pages 36-39)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

13. Why is judgment critical to maneuver warfare?

The goal of maneuver warfare is to decentralize decision-making to the lowest level. As discussed above, leaders focus on telling subordinates what to do but not how. Although the leader will plan a scheme of maneuver which reflects how he or she plans to accomplish the mission, it is understood that “no plan survives first contact” and that subordinates will need to take initiative and act without specific orders within the boundaries of commander’s intent. There will almost never be time for a Marine to notice a gap, report it, wait for orders, and then execute. By then, the enemy has most likely acted first and the opportunity has passed.
Marines at all levels must possess both the courage and willingness to make decisions with limited information, and the good judgment to ensure that those decisions are sound. This is why, in addition to proficiency, individual character is so critical to success in battle.

(MCDP 1 pages 85-87)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

4. What are some common misperceptions regarding maneuver warfare?

The most common misconception is that maneuver warfare equals a bloodless victory, or one that comes with a minimum of fighting. While it is true that we seek to throw our strength against an enemy weakness (gap), there will still be some fighting. War is not a game of chess.

Another misconception equates maneuver with movement. Maneuver warfare may or may not mean more movement than a war of attrition, but maneuver and movement are independent of each other. (MCDP 1 pages 72-76)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

5. Is maneuver warfare applicable at the squad and platoon level? If so, how?

Although the adage “Every attack turns into a frontal assault for the squad” has some basis in fact, the concept of maneuver warfare absolutely applies at the squad and platoon level. Examples:
The fireteam, our smallest fighting unit, retains the ability to employ combined arms with the assets organic to it.
While a squad or platoon may be conducting a frontal assault on a given position, this is in concert with adjacent units in a supporting role (SBF, for example).

In addition to space, units maneuver through time. Immediate action drills and Standing Operating Procedures enable us to act more quickly than the enemy in a given situation, exploiting (we hope) his inability to act in an environment characterized by chaos and friction.
(MCDP 1 pages 94-95)

[Sean Griffin]

Continuing the distribution of the MCDP 1 Discussion topics introduced today:

6. Does technology impact the way we fight?

Technology will impact techniques, but should not affect the principles that guide the way in which we fight. For example, night vision equipment and other night gear only facilitate the way in which we achieve direction, surprise, and control (“the trinity of the night”). (MCDP 1 pages 65-67)