The Marine Corps Needs the HET
Buy the right major end item now
by Capt Jonathan T. Baker
What motor transport assets does the Marine Corps have to move a tank or 25-ton crane? The simple answer is—none. Imagine the effect of that deficiency on someone stuck in Iraq with an inoperable tank that needs to be evacuated to Kuwait or on someone waiting for 3 days at a forward operating base in Al Kut for a 25-ton crane to road march 300 miles slowly to offload ISO (International Organization of Standardization) containers. The Marine Corps encounters these and similar problems routinely but lacks the ability to move vital equipment. Yet the M1070 heavy equipment transporter, also known as the HET, is the only asset capable of moving a tank or 25-ton crane. Moreover, the U.S. Army is the sole owner and operator of this Oshkosh product, and U.S. Code, Title 10 identifies the U.S. Army as being responsible for intratheater bulk transportation. With a high operational tempo and vast amount of equipment in wartime operations, the Marine Corps is left waiting in line for assets to complete its mission or contracting for host-nation support to bridge the gap. The Marine Corps is developing a new heavy truck asset, the logistics vehicle system replacement (LVSR), to fill some of these gaps, but it may not provide enough transportation capability for some units. Acquiring Marine Corps-owned HETs would provide the Marine Corps an organic capability to complete its mission, make it less reliant on the Army and host-nation support, and eliminate transportation shortfalls left by the LVSR.
The Need for an Organic Long-Reach/Bulk-Lift Capability
The Marine Corps’ current organic transportation capability lacks reach and bulk-lift capability. The M88 vehicle tracked recovery retriever can move a disabled M1A1 tank but is designed to move the tank short distances and removes the possibility of tank unit self-recovery because of the limited number of M88 assets available. This is an example of the long-reach problem faced by Marine units. Further, the 25-ton crane, used to offload containers and equipment, can drive on or off road, but it too is designed to drive a short distance and cannot be transported by any organic Marine transportation assets. This is an example of the lack of bulk-lift capability resident in the Marine Corps. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I) was rife with examples of Marines lacking food, water, fuel, and vehicle recovery because the Marine Corps lacked this capability. These deficiencies happened due to poor asset visibility and because the speed and distance of ground combat forces were too fast and far for logistical units to communicate and keep pace with them. The real problem for Marine logisticians has always been how to move a class of supply and put it in the Marines’ “hands” in an uncertain and ever-changing environment.
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| Only the Army has the HET. (Photo by Oshkosh Truck Corporation.) |
Marine logisticians realize the problem and hope to modernize unit capabilities, but “modernization” poses some challenges. One step the Marine Corps has taken toward modernization is creating the Marine Logistics Group (MLG), specifically the new combat logistics regiment (forward), which is designed to support a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). This regiment, however, is only capable of moving approximately 68,000 gallons of bulk fuel with currently owned assets. The sustained fuel use for the logistics combat element and ground combat element (GCE) of a MEB can swell to three times that much in 1 day.1
The solution seems obvious. The Marine Corps should buy the HET. The Marine Corps, however, will not purchase the HET because it does not fit on amphibious shipping. In order to maximize space and weight restrictions synonymous with amphibious shipping, the Marine Corps seeks to limit procurement of heavy assets. The Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is an example of this “light force” concept. Unfortunately, MEU-centric thinking leaves gaps in capabilities when the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) fights as it has in Iraq. In the race to Baghdad, the now debunked force service support group was confronted with many struggles because of the extended lines of communication and the speed of the GCE. While the HET cannot fit on Navy amphibious shipping, it doesn’t have to; it has to fit on a maritime prepositioning ship or on a commercial ship. Specific Marine units need HET augmentation and a task-organized Marine air-ground task force can bring the HET to help. Tank battalions, engineer support battalions (ESBs), the MLG, and the Marine wing support group are prime candidates for an organic HET. The Marine Corps does not need a grand fleet of HETs; it needs to replace LVS assets in units in which the LVS lacks the bulk carrying capacity to complete a unit’s mission.
Dependence on Army and Host-Nation Support
Since the Marine Corps still has a lift shortfall, the next option is getting help from the Army or from host-nation support. While the Army has gone from an “Army of One” to an “Army Strong,” it did not move to an “Army Big.” The Army’s strategic move to become lighter and more expeditionary takes an already scarce amount of resources and reduces it even further. The Army considers OIF a benchmark of success because of its inland petroleum distribution system that set up fuel farms as it moved toward Baghdad; however, the Army’s logistics personnel were identified as “miracle workers” because of the long distances their transportation assets moved to set up this system.2 The Army had to use its robust transportation assets in a leapfrog method. If the Army’s logistics personnel were miracle workers moving Army equipment, little “magic fairy dust” was left for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps used the same leapfrog technique with a good measure of success but failed to meet the mark in water and rations distribution because it does not have the same bulk-lift capability as the Army. The Marine Corps addresses organic and Army support shortfalls through the use of host-nation support that has proven sometimes unreliable. For example, during OIF:
A $12.6 million contract was written to lease more than 300 Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian flat-bed, low-bed, fuel, water and heavy-lift tow trucks (also known as Haji trucks) for six months.3
According to a Marine Corps combat assessment team after-action report:
By the time the Transportation Support Group received its first 90 trucks in Camp Coyote, FORTY of them were already in a ‘hard down’ status. . . . The maximum speed of the Haji (Host Nation) trucks was 35–40 mph [miles per hour], unable to keep up with the rest of a convoy. After the $12.6 million, six-month lease expired, the Marine Corps returned these sub-standard trucks to the foreign countries and was left with nothing. $12.6 million, and nothing to show for it!4
At a cost of $429,915 for both power unit and trailer, and with a weight limit of 72 tons, the HET could provide the reach and lift of any sized Marine unit with bulk fuel, water, or rations and move it to a forward combat service support area. The wasted $12.6 million could have bought 29 HETs. Then-BGen Michael R. Lehnert, then-Commanding General, 2d Force Service Support Group, and then-Col John E. Wissler, then-Commanding Officer, 2d Transportation Support Battalion, identified this problem when they wrote:
If the Marine Corps is going to continue to fight inland, we need to organize for the fight....line-haul capability...is vital to maintaining line-haul distances in the ranges employed during OIF. We cannot institutionally rely on host-nation assets to meet our warfighting requirements, if for no other reason than they will not always be available.5
Finally, the fact that military equipment is degraded by combat operations leaves the Marine Corps with even fewer options should another conflict arise outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, where forward operating bases are well established. As equipment is used more aggressively and more frequently, the Marine Corps’ greatest heavy transportation asset, the LVS, is taking a beating. The LVS cannot recover downgraded assets, such as tanks (72 tons), LVS variants with mobile loads (50,550 pounds), assault amphibious vehicles (68,000 pounds), and light armored vehicles (up to 28,000 pounds). The Marine Corps must employ its current inventory of degraded assets, borrow the Army’s HET, or hinge its hopes on the LVSR.
The New LVSR
The much-anticipated LVSR will enhance the Marine Corps’ lift capability, but it will still leave gaps in lift. The Marine Corps plans to purchase 1,581 LVSR variants through fiscal year 2012 (FY12) to replace the aged LVS fleet.6 The LVSR should provide maximum lift of 22.5 tons of payload (up to 50 tons) using a fifth wheel and trailer.7 At first glance this would seem like an exceptional increase since the current LVS payload maximum is about 25 tons, but a closer look reveals that the lift shortfall gap is still a risky jump. At best, the LVSR can still only transport one D–7 bulldozer at a time; unfortunately D–7s are usually employed in pairs, so you still have the same problem as with the old MK48/16/870 LVS variant. (It takes two trucks.) The LVSR can carry the flat rack refueling system (2,500 fuel container), but the Army’s M978 heavy expanded mobility tactical truck has the same capability, and it could be purchased without excessive research and development funds.8 Similarly, the M1A1 Abrams tank weighs 72 tons, so the LVSR can’t help the tank battalion. Moreover, the battalion will still lose its M88 recovery vehicle if a tank has maintenance problems because it has to evacuate it for maintenance. The D–9 bulldozer weighs 63 tons, so the LVSR can’t take it to protect Marines fighting in an urban environment because it exceeds the LVSR 50-ton weight limit.
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| The planned buy of the LVS will not close the lift gap that can only be filled by the HET. (Photo by Oshkosh Truck Corporation.) |
Also, the Marine Corps’ plan to field 1,578 LVSRs through FY12 provides fewer than the current number of LVSs in the Marine Corps.9 An ESB currently can only lift 23 percent of its equipment in one lift with its current LVS assets.10 The new LVSR fielding plan will reduce the number of LVS assets, sometimes even cutting the number in half.11 In contrast, purchasing eight HETs in exchange for current LVS assets would double the ESB’s lift capacity.12
Counterarguments
Opponents, however, say the HETs are slow off road. With a full payload, HETs may have to reduce their speed to 15 mph on an unimproved surface. Since the LVSR still has to make two trips to carry an equivalent load, depending on the distance, the HET may still win the race. Others argue that the HETs cost more than the LVSR per unit. This is true. A HET costs $429,915, while an LVSR cost around $330,000. However, by purchasing HETs, the Marine Corps does not have to invest $14.579 million in research and development or additional life cycle costs of $3.5 billion in operator and maintainer manpower (for the LVS).13 The HET does not fit on amphibious ships; however, neither does a MEF, and that is what the HET would support.
Conclusion
The Marine Corps’ current lift shortfalls, inability to rely on Army and host-nation support, and LVSR limits can only be fixed by the HET. The HET is not a panacea for Marine Corps transportation, but it is the bridge between current, future, and supplemental transportation for the Marine Corps. At the end of the day, shortfalls will always occur, but that does not excuse the Marine Corps from excluding a proven and required asset from supporting its Marines. Our former Commandant, Gen Alfred M. Gray, said, “Commanders must base all their concepts of operations on what they know they can do logistically.”
Notes
1. MLG recommended table of organization and equipment, August 2006, Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS).
2. Thurmond, Suzi, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician, July/August 2004, Vol. 36, Issue 4, p. 3.
3. I MEF Contracting Section After-Action Report, Quantico, 2003, p. 4.
4. Lieske, Bryan D., “Combat Service Support or Combat Host Nation Support? Are We Moving in the Right Direction?” EWS, 2005.
5. Lehnert, BGen Michael R., and Col John E. Wissler, “MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 2003, p. 30.
6. Deluca, Kevin, “Capability Production Document for the Logistics Vehicle Replacement Version 1.3,” from a Program Manager, Motor Transport Office, Headquarters Marine Corps, April 2006.
7. Platt, LtCol L.A., USMC(Ret), “USMC LVSR,” information paper, Quantico, 17 August 2005.
8. Deluca.
9. Ibid.
10. Darnell, Chad, “ESB Heavy Lift Requirements,” EWS 2006.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Deluca.
>Capt Baker is an 0402 logistics officer. He served as the Marine Wing Support Squadron Motor Transportation Company Commander during OIF I. He wrote this article when he was a student at EWS, 2006–07. He is currently assigned as the Logistics Officer, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, Camp Lejeune.
